New Series, Volume V
Editorial Board
Prof. dr. H.A.G. Braakhuis (Catholic University, Nijmegen) Prof. dr. K.-W. Merks (Tilburg Faculty of Theology) Prof. dr. H.W.M. Rikhof (Catholic Theological University at Utrecht) Dr. R.A. te Velde (Tilburg Faculty of Theology)
Managing Editor
Previously published in this Series:
Vol. I
Vol. II
Vol. ill
Vol. IV
Henk J.M. Schoot, Christ the 'Name' of God: Thomas Aquinas on Naming Christ, 1993 Jan G-J. van den Eijnden ofm, Poverty on the Way to God: Thomas Aquinas on Evangelical Poverty, 1994 Henk J.M. Schoot (ed.), Tibi soli peccavi: Thomas Aquinas on Guilt and Forgiveness, 1996 Harm J.M.J. Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God's Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will, 1996
© Stichting Thornasfonds - Nijrnegen ISBN 90-6831-966-3
D.1997/0602n5
AND 'LIFE' AFTER DEATH
1997
To Mieke, .- nihil enim est ita proprium amicitiae quam convivere amico (SIb TI-TI 25.3.co)
This publication is published with the financial support of (a.o.) the Stichting Thomasfonds, the Radboudstichting, the J.E. Jurriaanse Stichting and the Catholic Theological University at Utrecht.
1""uNiV£rAim . "1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
AQun-jAS ON GOD AND LIFE 8
1. S~int Thomas Aquinas ............................. " 8 1.1 The incomprehensible God as the core of theology ....... 9 1.2 God's revelation as the source of theology. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13 1.3 The unity of theological science •..........•.......•. 17
2. God, life and death ..........•...................... 20 2.1 The meaning and use of the words 'life' and 'death' ......• 20 2.2 'Life' as a name for God's essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25
2.2.1 Summa Theologiae I 18.1-3 .................... 25 2.2.1.1 God's essence: the metaphysical order ..•.. 30 2.2.1.2 God's essence: the logical order .......... 35
2.2.2 Summa Theologiae I 18.3-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• 41 2.2.3 The life of God and the life of man . . . . . . . . . . . . •. 46
2.3 Divine life and the divine Persons . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . •. 48 2.3.1 Distinguishing the divine Persons ....• ,......... 49 2.3.2 The divine Persons and life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 54
3. The relation between life on earth and 'life' after death ....... 61 3.1 Rephrasing the question .............. . . . . . . . . . . .. 62 3.2 The framework of this study ....................•.. 63
CHAPTER II FOUNDATIONS OF LIFE WITH GOD 67
1. The human condition and the tradition of living with God. . . •. 68 1.1 Creation and the place of man ...................... 68 1.2 Death as evil: the separation of body and soul . . . . . . . . . .• 77 1.3 Death as punishment: Original Sin and its effects . . . . . . . .. 82
1.3.1 The harmony in the state of integrity .•.......... 83 1.3.2 Original Sin and the meaning of death .. • . • . . . . . .. 88 1.3.3 The human condition, evil and punishment ......... 91
2. Christ, revelation of God and source of grace .............. 95 2.1 Life, death and the (first) coming of Christ ..........•.. 96 2.2 Christ as veiled revelation of God .................... 104 2.3 The suffering and dying of Christ: revelation and grace .... 109
2.3.1 The passion and death of Christ as restoration of a rela- tionship ................................ 110
2.3.2 The passion and death of Christ as example ........ 119 2.4 The resurrection of Christ and the perspective of life .. ; • . . 121
3. The participation in the work of Christ through the sacraments . 125 3.1 The partial sharing in the fruits of Christ'S passion .•..... 126 3.2 The effectuating .and disclosing power of the sacraments . . . . 130 3.3 The sacraments as foundation and framework of life with God132
CHAPTERll DYNAMISM OF LIFE WITH GOD 141
1. Living with God and acting as a human being .............. 141 1.1 The moral order and practical science ................. 142 1.2 God, happiness and the ultimate end of human life ....... 145 1.3 The virtues and life with God ........•............. 150
2. The augmentation of grace and the attitude towards one's own death ....•.•.................................... 155 2.1 Theological virtUes and their augmentation ............. 156 2.2 De ordine caritatis: charity and the hierarchy of objects .... 167 2.3 The Evangelical Counsels ..................•....... 171 2.4 Manyrdom ........•.......•............. ; . . . . . 176
3. Living with God and dealing with life and death ............ 180 3.1 The social order and killing people ......•............ 181
3.1.1 Killing guilty people ....•.................... 183 3.1.2 Killing heretics •..•..•...................... 188 3.1.3 Killing innocent people .........•............. 192 3.1.4 Killing and Christian perfection ................. 194 3.1.5 Killing oneself ...•......................... 198
3.2 God and homicide ............•.....•.•.....•.... 202
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER IV PERFECTION OF LIFE WIlli GOD 207
1. The nature of the reflection on the consummated life with God . 207 1.1 Eternal life •...............•.........•.......... 208 1.2 Ultimate end ................................... 209
1.2.1 The order of execution .........•......•••.... 210 1.2.2 The order of intention ...................•... 212
1.3 God's glorifying work: the tract of ~schatology .......... 213 2. Living with God in the mode of perfection .••......••..... 217
2.1 Eternal life .........................•.......... 217 2.1.1 The glorified ,soul ........................... 217 2.1.2 The glorified body ........................•. 225
2 1 3 The glorified creation .............••......... 230 . . 232
2.2 Eternal death ......•...................•....... 2.2.1 The 'logic' of hell ..... : ..............•...... 233 2.2.2 The limits of reflection .....................•. 238
3. The impact of eternal life on ~arthly l.ife .•................ 244 3 1 Eternal life as consummation of life of grace ............ 244 3:2 The communication between the living and the dead ...•.. 247
CHAPTER v CONCLUDING OUR STUDY:
LIVING WIlli GOD AS MEANING OF LIFE 254
1. The meaning oflife ............ , .......•......•..... 255 1.1 Life and ends ..............•......•.......•.... 257 1.2 Life and signification ........................•.... 259 1.3 Living with God as meaning of life ................... ;~;
2. The' meaning' of death .•.....•...................•..
A d · . I .....••. 269 ppen IX •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Appendix II ........................................ 272 Bibliography ....•.......................•........... 275 Indices .•..•..•...........•.•....................•. 290
INTRODUCTION
From its very beginning human life, in its inexhaustible beauty and riches, is accompanied by the dreadful perspective of death. We know that one day all of us will die; we know that one day we will be separated from our beloved ones - insofar as this is not already the case; we know that we cannot pass on life to our children without, at one and the same time, condemning them to the same fate. This inescapable cruelty makes us players in a tragedy from the moment we are born.
In the Christian traqition the evil of death is interpreted from the perspective of the 'Good News'. In Holy Scripture we are told about the Living God, who is a God of Life, wanting us to live and be happy. We are told about God The Father, Son and Holy Spirit, working in history and revealing Himself in order to communicate life, Eternal Life. We are told about the Son Incarnate, Jesus Christ, who lived among us and gave His life for the sake of our well-being. We are told that Christ resurrected from the dead in order to enjoy a blessed life eternally and that we may hope to share this Eternal Life.
Nevertheless, the perspective of death remains a daily reality. The many ways in which Death shows its horrible face display a cruelty one never becomes inured to; a cruelty which raises serious questions for the believer who searches for the understanding of his or her faith. One of the most widespread of these is the question as to how God's goodness is compatible with all the suffering in the world - since the 17th century known as the problem of theodicee. Closely related to this, though deliberately put in different terms, is the question which is central to this study. Given the suffering entailed in human life on earth; given the promise of Eternal Life; and given the insights that both are related to God, the question is: what is this all good for? If we are created for happiness in Eternal Life, what is the sense of this earthly mixture of happiness and misery? Why the cruelty and the pain? Why earthly life anyway? In other words: what is the meaning of human life and how does it relate to the promise of another 'life' after death?
In order to deal with this last question, the work of one of the great Teachers of the Church: Saint Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274) has been studied. Special attention is paid to the way he approaches the matter at hand; the perspective he adopts when dealing with life and death in relation to the incomprehensible triune God. To a large extent this specific interest is due to the context within which this study was written: the research group 'Thomas Aquinas' of the Catholic
INTRODUCTION
Theological University at Utrecht. By this group special consideration is given to the profound theological character of the work of the Angelic Doctor and his attention for the use of language, in particular in divinis.' In the first chapter both the appropriateness of the theological perspective and what I wish to accentuate will be indicated.
Considering the secondary literature on Aquinas' view on life and death, this study makes a contribution as regards both its central question and the broadness by which the matter is approached. Until our day the only monograph on life in Aquinas' theology dates from more than seventy years ago'; there is no book exclusively dedicated to Aquinas' view on death. As far as the various articles are concerned which have been written on Aquinas' account of life and death: they all approach the subject from limited viewpoints and are restricted to certain aspects.' In the study at hand the attempt is made to integrate the'various viewpoints and bring the different aspects with regard to Aquinas' view on life and death into relation with one another. This task could only be set to right from a particular (theological) perspective and within certain limits.
The limits of this study are due to the fact that 'life' is a key-word in Aquinas' theology. For this reason it was clear from the outset, that selections had to be made, lest this study would end in recovering and rephrasing Aquinas' entire theology from the perspective of the concept 'life'. At the same time, however, it was also clear from the very fact that 'life' is a key-word that the whole of Aquinas' theology had to be taken into account so that none of its overtones would be missed. It was apparent that this is of special importance because of the variety of not­ integrated perspectives of study mentioned before and the fact that an
This group includes the following authors quoted in this study: J. van den Eijnden, H. Goris, F. de Grijs, H. Rikhof, H. Schoot, W. Valkenberg, F. Vosman and J. Wissink. For a short characterisation and determination of the position of this approach in the 'landscape' of research on Aquinas, cf. H. Rikhof, 1995[a].
, M. Grabmann, 1922. , On death, cf. A- lippi, 1965 and 1966; A- Pegis, 1974; T. Janez Barrio, 1978; M.
Rousseau, 1978 and 1979; B. de Margerie, 1983; L. Dewan, 1988j A. Zimmermann, 1992; The most comprehensive are the studies of L.F. Mateo-Seeo, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1982[a] and [b], who, however, is never quoted (whieh is probably due to the fact that he writes in Spanish). On Aquinas and life, the only articles I found are those of G. Kreiing, 1928 and I. Yarza, 1987. Apan from these StUdies, which explicitly deal with life and death, a lot of material can be found in Studies on Aquinas' anthropology, esehatology, Christology and other tracts and themes.
INTRODUCTION 3
answer to the central question cannot be found in one of the tracts of Thomas' theology when considered separately. Thus the choice was made to concentrate on the systematic coherence of Aquinas' account of life and death from an explicitly theological perspective. As a conse­ quence certain limits and characteristic features were entailed: * Since not every reader will be at home in Aquinas' entire systematic
theology, each chapter opens with an introduction into the specific field at issue, written from the perspective of t\le key-word 'life'.
* In order to safeguard systematic coherence and clarity, the various discussions on details in tracts of Aquinas' theology are not exhaustively listed add scrutinized. They are treated only insofar as they directly concern our central theme.
* For the same reason this study is less explicitly focused on historical and doctrinal discussions in which Aquinas was involved, or developments in his thinking. As point of departure the Summa· 1beologiae is taken, accompanied by other works from the last years of Aquinas' life.
Having presented the limits and characteristic features of this study, I cannot but express the hope that the book may be helpful as a guide to
the texts of Aquinas himself and - via these texts - to Holy Scripture and to the One who was the centre of his life.
This study was completed on March 7, 1997.
CONVENTIONS
Works of Thomas Aquinas
The classification and enumeration is based on the brief catalogue of authentic works of J. Weisheipl, 1974, p. 355-405. In brackets the suppo­ sed year(s) of writing are indicated, following Weisheipl. After the year of writing, the edition used is mentioned. If available, the edition of the Commissio Leonina, S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici Opera Omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XlII P.M edita, Romae 1882-, is used. If not, the text is adopted from R. Busa, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia ut sunt in Indice Thomistico, (Indicis Thomistici Supplementum), Stuttgart/ Bad Cannstatt 1980, apart from Aquinas' commentary on the Sentences (see below). Leonina is the standard edition and still incomplete. Busa has the advantage of being a complete edition, to be consulted in print or on CD-Rom. For the sake of clarity the spelling of all editions is made uniform, following Busa.
Theological syntheses In Sent Scriptum super libras Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombar­
di (1252-1256), ed. P. Mandonnet (vol. 1 - 2, Paris 1929) and M.F. Moos (vol. 3 - 4.22, Paris 1933, 1947); the rest of vol. 4 according to Busa.
ScG Summa contra gentiles (1259-1264), Leonina. The second Arabic number (in Latin quotes sometimes in between brackets) refers to the paragraph as indicated in Busa.
STh Summa Theologiae (1266-1273), Leonina.
Academic disputations De ver Quaestiones disputatae De veritate (1256-1259), Leonina. De pot Quaestiones disputatae De potentia (1265-1266), Busa. De malo Quaestiones disputatae De malo (1266-1267), Leonina. QD De anima Quaestio disputata De anima (1269), Busa. De virt Quaestio disputata De virtutibus in communi (1269-1272),
De car De corr
Busa [18.1]. Quaestio disputata De caritate (1269-1272), Busa [18.2]. Quaestio disputata De correctione fraterna (1269-1272), Busa [18.3] Quaestio disputata De spe (1269-1272), Busa [18.4].
CONVENTIONS 5
De virt card Quaestio disputata De virtutibus cardinalibus (1269-1272), Busa [18.5].
Quodl Quaestiones quodlibetales (7 to 11: 1256-1259, the rest: 1269-1272), Busa.
Expositions of Holy Scripture In Job bcpositio in Job ad litteram (1261-1264), Leonina. In Psalm Postilla super Psalmos (1272-1273), Busa. Catena Glossa continua super Evangelia {Catena Aurea} (1262-
In Mat In Joan In Rom In I Cor
In II Cor
1267), Busa. Lectura 'super Matthaeum. Reportatio (1256-1259), Busa. Lectura super Johannem. Reportatio (1269-1272), Busa. Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos (1270-1272?), Busa. Lectura super Epistolam I ad Corinthios (1259-1265?), Busa. Leetura super Epistolam II ad Corinthios. Reportatio (1259- 1265?), Busa. Leetura super Epistolam ad Hebraeos. Reportatio (1259- 1265?), Busa.
Expositions on Aristotle In De anima Sententia super De anima (1269-1270), Leonina. In Eth Sententia libri Ethieorum (1271), Leonina. In Met Sententia super Metaphysicam (1269-1272), Busa.
Other expositions In De Trin Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate (1258-1259),
Leonina. In Div Nom Expositio super Dionysium De divinis nominibus (1265-
1267), Busa. In De causis Expositio super librum De causis (1271-1272), Busa.
Other writings De per! De perfectione spiritualis vitae (1269-1270), Leonina. CImp Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionum (1256),
CompTh De sub
Leonina. Compendium Theologiae (1269-1273), Leonina. De substantiis separatis (1271-1273), Leonina.
De reg princ De regno (or De regimine principum) ad regem Cypri (1265-1267), Leonina,
6
Deform
In Symb
De fonna absolutionis sacramentalis ad generalem magis­ trum Ordinis (1269), Leonina_ De articulis fidei et Ecclesiae sacramentis (1261-1265), Busa_ Collationes super Pater Noster (1273), BU,sa. Collationes de Decem Praeceptis (or De duobus praeceptis caritatis et decem legis praeceptis) (1273), Busa. Collationes super Credo in Deum (1273), Busa.
Abbreviations of Biblical books
All abbreviations, even those in the Latin texts quoted, are following the ,j New Jerusalem Bible:!
Co Corinthians Lk Luke Col Colossians Lv Leviticus Dt Deuteronomy Ml Malachi Ep Ephesians Mt Matthew Ex Exodus P Peter Ezk Ezekiel Ph Philippians Ga Galatians Ps Psalms Gn Genesis Rm Romans Hab Habakkuk Rv Revelation to John Heb Hebrews Sg Song of Songs Is Isaiah Si Ben SiralEcclesiasticus Jb Job Th Thessalonians Jm James Tt Titus Jn John (lJn= 1" letter) Ws Wisdom K Kings
Other conventions
[ 1 [Busa: 1
Patrologia cursus completus, series latina, J.-P. Migne (ed), Paris 1844-1890. Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et marum, H. Denzinger/P. Hiinermann, Freiburg i. Br'!Basei/RomalWien 1991". Word(s) or numbers added by me for the sake of clarity. Number of a line according to the Busa edition.
~ ij , li
~ il >J
CONVENTIONS
Number of a line according to the Leonina edition. Article Objection Counter-argument Response Answer to an objection Prologue Quaestio
7
CHAPTER I
IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRlA TE PERSPECTIVE: . AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
In this chapter we will establish the foundations on which the rest of this book is based. Firstly, our interpretation of Thomas Aquinas is sketched (1). This may be helpful in locating our approach from within the variety of interpretations the work of Aquinas has witnessed since th~ thirteenth century. Having done this, a first investigation in the field thiS stU?y covers ~ollows (2). Our aim is to find an appropriate perspective from which the theological question of the relation between life .on earth and 'life' ~er de.ath can be dealt with. Once this perspecti­ ve IS settled, our question wdl be rephrased in terms of the concepts that are relevant for Aquinas and a framework is proposed within which the various aspects of the question can be examined (3).
1. Saint Thomas Aquinas
The .impact o~ Tho~as Aquinas on the tradition of Western theology and phllo~ophy IS coOS/derable. The Saint (since 1323), Teacher· of the Church (since 15~7) and Patron of all Roman Catholic schools (since 18~0) has been Interpreted, followed and criticized by all kinds of thinkers over the past 700 years. During the first centuries after his death his wor~s were used as manuals for students of theology, from the 19th century till only a few decades ago his teaching was the inspiration for the N eo-Thomist!c manuals and moreover, he still challenges the t~oughts of many, ~ IS shown by the hundreds of papers and studies on him tha; are pu~l~shed every year'. The doctor communis is 'public p;operty and writing about hiS theology one will almost inevitably dlscov~r oneself to be one in a long line of interpreters. This study is no exceptIOn.
The interpretation of Aquinas presented here IS a theological one.
Cf. the Bulletin Thomi". (1940-1965), continued in lWsegna di letteralura Tomistica (1966- ).
CHAPTER! 9
The portrait which inspired our investigation is not that of the thinker who wrote the definitive "tourist guide to the highways and byways of divinity".' It is the portrait of a Dominican Mendicant Friar whose theological activities should be seen within the framework of his life dedicated to God.' The relationship with the triune God was the centre of Aquinas' life of prayer and study and this is reflected in his theology. How this influences the perspective from which the questions concerning God, life and death are asked, will become clear as we proceed by sketching the features of Aquinas' theology.'
1.1 The incomprehensihle God as the core of theology
Theology for Aquinas is what the word already says: God-talk, sermo de Deo.' More precisely: theology is about God and everything else insofar as it is related to God.' The same ardour we perceive in Aquinas' tracing every possible question in theology back to its relation with God, can, however, be observed in his allegiance to a second principle: the fundamental impossibility of knowing, in this mortal life, what God is. This sounds strange for a theologian who is famous for his penetrating philosophical reflections and systematic rigour. To what degree is Aquinas clinging to this principle? How can he proceed as a theologian on this basis? What kind of incomprehensibility is at stake here?'
2 B. Davies, 1992, p. 193. , Friar Thomas d'Aquino J. Weisheipl significantly entitled his biographical staitdard
work. The works of Thomas Aquinas cover a period of two decades of writing (1252·1274). This study does not concentrate on doctrmal developments in his teaching, although imponant shifts will be reponed when relevant. Point of depanure is the Summa Theologiae, taken as his most original, mature and extended systematical work.
S STh I 1.7.sc: Olud est subiectum scientiae. de quo est sermo in scientia. Sed in hac scientia fit sermo de Dea; dicitur enim theologia, quasi sermo de Deo. Ergo Deus est subiectum huius scientiae.
6 STh I 1.7.co: Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra'doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt . ipse Deus,' vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad primipium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus 'Om sit subiectum huius scientiae. Quod etiam manifestum sit ex principiis huius scientiae, quae sunt articuli,fidei, quae est de Deo. Cf. also STh I 1.3.ral: sacra doctrina non determinat de Deo et de creaturis ex aequo, sed de Deo principaliter, et de creatu:ris secundum quod referuntur ad Deum, ut ad principium vel finem.
7 Cf. 1. Oeing-Hanhoff, 1974; W. Hoye, 1988, with suggestions for more literature on the subject.
10 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
In the first place, it is imponant to see that the incomprehensibility of God. refers to knowledge of God which creatures have. It is not a property of God as such, but a feature which should be considered within the relation of God and creature. God quoad se is supremely knowable, incomprehensibility is at stake only quoad nos.'
In the second place, one should notice that the awareness of this incomprehensibility is considered as the highest and most perfect knowledge of God a creature can obtain.' Thus a number of possible misinterpretations are ruled out. Aquinas' sayings are not the dramatic result of a failed effort; they are not an obligatory pious remark before the real reflections start; they should not be interpreted within the context of a measure of secularisation in which God has 'evaporated' after an ongoing process of criticism of and distrust in the possibility of human reason", neither is it the result of a fundamental option for agnosticism.
In the third place, it should be kept in mind that God's incompre­ hensibility is not nullified by grace: revelation intensifies rather than softens the incomprehensibility." The supreme knowledge of God's nature attainable in this life has the character of a learned ignorance (docta ignorantia): the more perfect we know God in this life, the more we understand how He surpasses all that can be comprehended by the created intellect. This 'ignorance' remains, no matter how much we are joined with Him by grace (quasi ignoto coniungamur). And still we can learn to know Him more fully as we learn to appreciate more how everything is connected with God and how things can be attributed to
• Aquinas compares the rdation betWeen the human mind and God with a bat blinded by the light of the sun: S7b I.12.1.co: dieendum quod, cum un~ue sit cognoscibi/e secundum 'ql«Xi est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixlione potentiae, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile in se, aiieui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intel/igibilis supra intellectum, skut soi, qui est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione propter excessum luminis. Cf. also S7b I 2.1.
, This statement is made by Aquinas throughout his works: Cf. S7b II-II 87 .CO: elSi non videamm de Deo quid est, videmus tamen quid non est, et tanto in hac vita Deum perfoctius cognoscimus quanta magis intelligimus eum excedere quidquid intellectu com· prehenditur; De pot 7.S.rat4: iIlud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod seiat se Deum nescire, in quantum cognoscit, iI/ud quod Deus est, omne ipsum quod de eo intelligimus, excedere; Cf. also In De Trin 1.2.ra1; seC I 30.5; ScG ill 49.8; In De causis 6; De 'VeT 2.1.ra9.
" J. WLSSink, 1992, p. 46-48 and 1994, p. 32-33. " W. Hoye, 1988, p. 121-122.
I
CHAPTER I 11
Him which can only be known by divine revelation." The reason for underscoring the incomprehensibility of God follows
from Aquinas' account of God as a free Creator. This account is based on the revelation of Scripture where God has made Himself known as the One who is the first cause and the final end of creation. As such God cannot be a part of creation. This means that He cannot be adequately thought of in terms of distinctions that can be made within the created world. Thus the distinction between Creator and creatures becomes more fundamental and of a different nature than all other possible distinctions betwee? creatures: "God differs. differently"." .
Since the incomprehensIble God IS no deus OtlOSUS, but the trlUne God who ultimately founds, sustains and perfects the dynamism of .all creation up to the achievements of human reason, one of the major tasks of theology is to respect God's otherness during the process of clarifying God's concern with the world. Aquinas found a way of respecting God's incomprehensibility by placing major attention on the deficiency of our language in representing what God is. Even the most sophisticated philosophical distinctions, in his view, s?f~er f:om a mode of signifying which is apt for creatures only. The dIstInctIOn between God and creature can be expre seer at best by showing how and why our language fails to represe God." Aquinas' God-talk has a .radical negative strain: it is deep marked by a respect for God's Incom­ prehensibility ."
12 5Th I 12.13.ral: licet p reve1ationem gratiae in hac vita non cogtWscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei quaSi igoo coniungamur; tamen plenius ipsum cognoscinuls, inquantum plures et excellentiores ectus eius nobis demonstrantur; et inquantum ei aliqua attribui· mus ex revelatione div' dt/ quae ratio naturalis non pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum.
13 H. Schoot, 1993, p. 2 2. The distinction between God and creation as a fundamental insight determiniug uinas' procedure has been stressed by J. Pieper, 1953. Recendy it has been Iy expouuded by R. Sokolowski, 1982, whose book has been a great inspiratio for this study. Cf. also 2.2.1.1 in this chapter, p. 30ff.
,. In this respect I am uch debted to the interpretation of Aquinas proposed by D. Burrell, 1979 and 198 . What Burrell works out with regard to God's essence is adopted and applied the manner in which God actS by K. Tanner, 1988 and M. Dodds, 1993. The sam is worked out with regard to Aquinas' Christology by H. Schoot, 1993. .
" Cf. F. de Grijs, 1988, . 35: "The incomprehensibility of the living God should, therefore, not be underst od as one of God's many attributes or propenies. Rather when speaking of God's comprehensibility one gives a characteristic feature of all attributes and thus of all od-talk." [translation c.!..] Cf. also K. Rahner, 1974, p.
AQUlNAS ON GOD AND LIFE
thus, with regard to our knowledge of God two aspects are to be ',"owledged simultaneously. On the one hand God is sought in and
aC"'·. b . d (b be10nd creatIon, He can e recogruze ut not comprehended) by the pings He effects", He can be the object of one's devotion and - as in ~quinas' case - the centre of one's life. Being capax Deiv, man is desig-
d to know and love God as we will see in the next chapter. On the peper hand, the triune God remains the incomprehensible God the ~dden One: The. combin~ti?n of ~hese two aspects is characteristic of Ipe process I~ which m~ IS Increasl~gly united with the incomprehensi­ ble God. T~'s process IS so c~ntral In Aquinas' theology that he uses it
characterISe the mortal hfe of human beings. Our life with the ~o cOJIlprehensible God is a life on the way, in via, never reaching its
f'~ al destination as long as we live. The life in via is a restless life III 'h d ' ided by the perspectlve t at Go may be seen as He is, according to
fr;e promise of lJn 3,2: Videbimus eum sicuti est and leo 13,12: Videmus
----43 and 1975, p. 306·319. , STh I 12.12.00: Respondeo dicendum quod natura/is nostra cognitio a sensu principium
1 stpnit, unde tantum se nostra natura/is cognitio exiendere potest, inquantum manuduci pteSt per sensibilia: . Ex sensibil~bus a~tem non potest usque ad hoc intel/eetus noster ptingere, quod dZ'fJmam essentzam videat, qu~ .c:eaturae s~~ibiles sunt eJfoctus Dei (ljrmtem causa: non adaequantes. Und~ ex senstbiltum cogmtume non potest tota Dei llirtus cogoosct, et per consequens nee euts essentia videri. Sed quia sunt eius efJectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perdue; POssumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo an est, et ut cognoscamus de ipso ~ quae neeesse est ei eonvenire secundum quod est prima o~nium c~ excedem O~~ltt sua ~ausata. Unde cognoseimus de ipso habitudinem ipsius ad (ftdturd!' quod s~~et omntum est edUSt;· et differentiam creaturarum ab ipso. quod scilicet non est alzquid eorum quae ab eo causantur,' et quod haec non reJnOventur ab eo prop~er eOO defectum, sed qu~ superexeedit. .
17 j\.qutnaS adopts the ex?~on froa; Augustme's XIV De Trinitate 8 [pL 42,1044]; eo ip!O quod focta est ad ,:",:~",em Det, .'~pax est Dei per gratiam. Cf. 5Th I·II 113.10.co 3l1d S'lb m . 4.1:~: ~unilltud~ l11l4gmlS att~nditur in natura humana secundum quod est capax Det, scilKet IpSum attmgendo propna operatione eognitionis et amoris. Cf. also S'fh . ~ .23.1.00: Deus IlUtem est in/inita.e. bonitatis. ex qua contingit quod ad par&telpatronem bonoru:n su:u crea~as admutlt et praecipue rationales creaturas, quae, i"quantum ~u~t .ad ~gmem .Del jactae. sunt capaces beatitudinis divinae. Quae quit/em, COnslStlt In f:t!itrone. Det, p~ quam etiam ipse Deus beatus est et per seipsum Jives, mquant«m s'.ilKet selpSO Jruttur. On the history of the capacitas Dei in the theo10!lY of AugustIlle and Peter Lombard as well as the reception by Aquinas, d. F. de Gn~, 1967, p. 222·252 (the capacrty for God, grounded in the belief that man is created after God's image, is a key·word in this study on the image of God in In sent).
CHAPTER I 13
nunc in speculum et in aenigmate; tunc autem focie ad faciem.18 This vision of God is like a home-coming (in pat:ria): a beatific vision that fulfills all our desires. Nevertheless, even then God will not be known insofar as He is knowable. Even the visio beata does not entail that we will be able to 'comprehend' God, in the sense of grasping God's essence intellectually."
Getting to know the incomprehensible God takes a lifetime and concerns all the intellectual capacities we have, both volitional and cognitive. It transforms these capacities and changes our view on reality. It even changes our approach to reality and our appreciation of the different kinds of knowledge we can obtain. Theology is also a form of knowledge. Therefore, what impact the principle of God's incomprehen­ sibility has on Aquinas' account of theology, is the subject of the next paragraph.
1.2 God's revelation as the source of theology
The impact of God's incomprehensibility on Aquinas' account of theology becomes apparent as soon as we begin to examine the word he chooses for what we call theology. In the first question of the Summa Tbeologiae, Thomas asks "whether another doctrine is required apart from philosophical studies".'o The necessity for such a doctrine is evident, for man is directed at the incomprehensible God as his ultimate destination. This final end of man should be known by him so he can direct his intentions and actions towards this end.21 With the help of
18 Both verses play an imponant role in Aquinas' reflection on the perspective of life, and are often quoted in 5Th I 12. We will come back to this in chapter N, p. 217f!.
19 In 5Th I 12.7.ral Aquinas points out that the word comprehernio may be used in two ways: Uno modo. striete et proprie. secundum quod aliquid includitur in comprehenden­ Ie. Et sic nullo modo Deus comprehenditur, nee intellectu nee aliquo alia, quia, cum sit infinitus, nullo finito includi potest, ut aliquid /initum eum infinite capiat, skut ipse infinite est. Et sic de comprehensione nunc quaeritur. Alio modo comprehensio largius sumitur, secundum quod comprehensio insecutioni opponitur. Cf. also STh I·n 4.3.ral and 5cG m 55.
20 5Th I 1.1: Utrum sit necessarium praeter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haber;.
" 5Th I 1.1.co: Resporuleo dicendum quod necessarium foi' ad humanam salurem, esse doctrinam quandam secundum reveiatronem divinam, praeter philosophicas discipfinas. quae ratione humana investigantur. Primo quidem, quia homo ordinatur ad Deum skut ad quendam finem qui comprehensionem rationis excedit. secundum ii/tid Js 64,4: "Oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praepariasti diligentibus te." Finem autem
AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
natural reason, cultivated and brought to perfection in the philosophical disciplines, some truth about God may be found, but only by a few thinkers and after a long time, mixed with a multitude of errors. For the sake of the welfare of man, which is dependent on this knowledge of God, another kind of knowledge is needed, in which God Himself teaches the truth. So by divine revelation man is more appropriately and securely brought to his own destination."
This doctrine, based on divine revelation, is called a sacred doctrine. Aquinas discerns sacra doctrina from theologia. The latter can be the name of the philosophical procedure which is aimed at the knowledge of God insofar as this can be obtained by the light of natural reason. But it can also be the name of a part of the sacred doctrine." 1beologia in the second meaning can be compared with what we understand by theology nowadays. Because of its relation with sacra doctrina, it is, however, important to take a closer look at both concepts and the connection between them.24
Sacra doctrina is a body of knowledge which is founded in God's revelation, or, as Aquinas puts it, which proceeds from principles which are known by the light of a higher science, which is the science of God
oportet esse praecognieum hominibus, qui SUdS intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in jinem.
" S7b I I.l.co: Unde necessarium foil homini ad salutem, qund ei nota /ierint quaedam per revelationem divittatn, quae rationem humanam excedunt. Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratkme humana investigm possunt, necessarium foit hominem instrui revelatione divina quia veritds de Dea, per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum erro~ homini proveniret, a (uius tamen 'fJeritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo est.
" S7b I 1.!.ra2: Unde nihil prohibet de eitdem rebus, de quibus philosophicae disciplinae tradam secundum quod Junt cognoscibilia tumine natura/is ratum~ et aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine Jivinae revelationis. Unde theologia quae ad sacram doctrinam peninet, differt secundum genus ab ilIa theologia quae pars phi· losophia< ponitur.
Z4 M. C;:orbin, 1974, has ~ollowed the shifts in Aquinas' account of theology and its rdatlon to philosophy m four stages (In Sent, In De 7nn, ScG, S7b). The book has met some serious critique (lv.!. Jordan, 1981) but for the character of theology as intellectus fidei its analy';' remains valid; Cf. also T. Gilby, 1964, p. 58-66; J. Wa1grave, 1982/1976, p. 3·15; B. Davies, 1992, p. 10·14; M. Jordan, 1993, p. 232.251; J. Wissink, 1993, p. 15·36; H. Rikhof, 1995[b], p. 435-439.
CHAPTER I 15
and the beatified." By putting it this way, Thomas underlines that the divine subject of theology is also the source and the centre of theology.
In the first place this is shown by the relation bet:",ee? sacra doctri~ and sacra scriptura. The content of the sacred doc~rlOe IS what ~d. IS teaching us through Scripture. The sacred doctrIne IS first and pn.marlly handed down to us in Scripture, which makes this book normative for all that is part of or springs from the sacred doctrine. Th~ connection between the two is so close, that Thomas uses sacra doctrtna and sacra scriptura side by side, sometimes using the one when the reader would expect the other." .
In the Christian traClition, the sacred doctrine has been summarized in the Articles of Faith, since the knowledge of the content of Sc~ipture is too important to remain reserved for only those who have time to occupy themselves with the difficult study. of Script~re.~ But sa::ra doctrina is broader than Scripture and the ArtIcles of FaIth: It comprISes all manner of instructive communication from God to man, directly or indirectly." . ., .
1beologia, as a part of the sacra doctrina, IS the sClentI~c reflection. on the content of faith. Drawing an analogy between the SCIences, AqulOas considers the Articles of Faith as the principles of theology. Since these articles are nothing more than the summary of the content of ~cripture, the eminent position of Scripture in the process of theology IS beyond
25 5Th I 1.2.co: Et hoc modo sacra doetrina est screntia, quia proeedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est sCientia. Dei et beatorum. J. WlSSu:.k, 1994, p. 18, paraphrases sacra doctrina as "the doct:rmal content of Holy SCrJpture as taught by the Church and in university classes by magistri".
" Cf. J. Wissink, 1994, p. 17, footnote 4. 27 5Th IT-IT 1.9.ral: veritas fidei in sacra Scriptura di}fose continetur et variis modis. et in
quibusdam obscure,· ita quod ad eliciendum fidei veritatem ex ~a 5criptura. ~uir~tur longum studium et exercitium, ad quod non possunt pervenn-e omnes illt qutbus necessarium est cognoscere fidei writatetn, quorum plerique. aliis negotiis occupatio studio 'Vacare non possunt. Et ideo foit necessarium ut ex sententiis sacrae 5cripturae aliquid manifestum surnmarie co//igeretUT quod proponeretur omnibus ad credendum. Quod quidem non est additum sacrae Scripturae, sed podro ex sacra Scriptura assumptum.
28 Cf. T. Gilby, 1964, p. 63: nSacra doctrina, then, is expressive in all manner of w~ys, and should not be restricted to the rational exposition of a system of widely·rangmg yet consistent propositions, on which score alone the Summa has been sometimes admired, by those, however, who have not gone beyond its outward appearance."
16 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
any doubt." In Aquinas' days this was reflected in the official title of the professor of theology at the university: Magister in Sacra Pagina. The first task of the Magister was reading and explaining Holy Scripture, guided by the tradition centered around the Anicles of Faith and with the help of the finest tools natural reason (i.e. philosophy) can offer. The entire undenaking of theology is centered around the bener understanding of the revealed sacred doctrine. The' fact that the first principles of this doctrine are revealed, deeply influences its mode of procedure. The principles - the Anicles of Faith - can not be proved, since they are directly related to the incomprehensible God." They can only be approved of, defended and clarified in their interrelation, their unity and their connection with God."
This leads us to a second manner in which God is at the centre of theology. For Aquinas, theology is the understanding of faith (intellectus fidei) and God is also the source and core of faith." Faith is a gift from God, by which the intellect is illuminated by a light of a quality differing from the light of natural reason. Thus the mystery of God, once again, appears at the core of theology: this time not as the formal subject of theology, but as guiding and helping those whose faith searches for understanding.
2' All. elaborate study of the place and function of Scripture in the theology of Aquinas is: w. Valkenberg, 1990. In his concluding reflections Valkenberg states: "In its primary function, Scripture functions as the source aod framework of theology. As the Word of God, it is received and interpreted in theology; as presupposition of Christian theology it determines the theological horizon." (p. 300).
:JO On 'the clear-cut role of natural reason in theology, d. 5Th I 1.8.ra2: Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandum fidm; quia per hoc tollere_ meritum fide~ sed ad mani/estandum aliqua alia quae <raduntur in hac doctrina. Cum enim gratia non tolla: naturam, sed perficiat, aportet quod natura/is ratio subserviat fide~' SKut et natumlis inclinatio wluntatis obsequitur caritati; Cf. ]. Walgrave, 1982/1976: 11. Jordao, 1993.
" In the still valid words of Vancao ! (DH 3016): Ac ratio quidem, fide iIIus<rata, cum sedldo, pie et sobrie quaerit, aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentittm eamque fructuosissimdm assequitur tum ex eorum, quae natura/iter cognoscit, analogia, tum e mysteriorum ipsorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultima,· numquam tamen idonea redditur ad ea perspicienda instar veritatum, quae proprmm ipsiu,s obiectum ~onstituunt. Divina enim mysteria sua pte natura intelle~tum creatum sic excedunt, ut etiam revelatione tradita et [tde sus~epta ipsius tamen }idei velamine contecta et quadam quasi caligine obvoluta maneant, quamdiu in hac mortal; vita. ·peregrinamur.4 Domino: per fidem enim ambuiamus et non per speciem" (2Co 5,6). Cf. also J. Wissink, 1994, p. 24.
" Cf. J. Walgrave, 1982/1974[.]. We will come back to this in chapter m, 2.1, p. 156ff.
CHAPTER! 17
Completing the picture, it should be kept in mind that the. direct context of theology is the community of faithful who are searchmg for understanding of their faith. It is a context in which the 'object' whic~ is studied is already part of the investigator's life. The One sought, IS
the One addressed in daily prayer, met in the sacraments of the Church and, in the case of Aquinas, the One on whom life is orientated, even to be seen in determining his daily timetable.
For Aquinas, therefore, theology has its p.oint ?f ~eparture and destination in a lively relationship with God. It IS a sClentlfi.c endeavour in which God is sough~ with the double help of God. Studymg theol~gy has the character of a reaction, it is part' of an answer to a call which precedes and, ultimately, escapes the undenaking."
1.3 The unity of theological science
In the light of what has been said the third aspect of Aquinas' theolo­ gy which deserves our attention can: quit~ easilr, be ~resented. As Thomas explains, the unity of theological sCience IS 70nstltuted ~y t~e unity of its formal subject. In the sacred doctrme everythmg IS
considered under the formal consideration of being revealed by God." This formal consideration grants a unity which covers different philosophical disciplines. In philosophy a distinction is made between speculative and practical science. The?logy covers bot~ areas. It has a practical side which is concerned WIth human acts msofar as these prepare man for the perfect knowledge of God (eternal beatitude). Mainly, however, it is speculative and concerned with God."
" As 11. Corbin puts it (1980, p. 14): "En bref, Ie croyant n'~ ni a fonder ni a j~tifier un appel dont il n'est point Ie maltre et qu'il ne peut jamatS se, donn~ deter~e et revendique, dans toUS les domaines de sa vie, .par la Parole de I Autre, il ~olt s~~ ment permission et commendement de se Sltuer et rec:onnrut.re comme un temaln
parmi d'autres." . . . )4 5Th I Ij.co: Quia igitur sacra Scriptura consU/erat aliqua secundum quod sunt d~v~n~tus
Yevelata, secundum quod dictum est [STh I 1.2fi omnia quaecumque sunt dzvtnttus reveJabi/ia, communicant in una ratione formali obiecti hums scientiae. Et ideo compre­ henduntur sub sacra doctrina sieut sub scientia una.
35 5Th I 1.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod sacra doctrina, ut dictum est, una exist~, se extendit ad ea quae pertinent ad diversas scientias philo~0f"icas, f1!Opter ratt~~~ formalem qUtfnJ- in diversis attendit, scilie~t prout ~unt dwt~o lumlr:e cognosCtbilza. Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis ali4 Stt speculattva et al~ J7r.actzc~ sacra. &amen doctrina comprehendit sub se utTamque; sicut et neu: eaden: scu:nt~ s~ cogn?sctt, et ea quae facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam practtctt, quta pnnctpaltus aglt de rebus
18 AQUJNAS ON GOD AND LIFE
With regard to the hermeneutical distance which separates us from Aquinas, it may be appropriate to examine this idea of unity. In contrast to a lot of contemporary theology, the unity of theological science appears at three levels.
In the first place, there is, what I would like to call, a unity of tracts. Aquinas is famous for his rigour in making distinctions and with the expression 'unity of tracts' I do not mean that he mixes up the questions he deals with. The general structure of the Summa Tbe%giae, for instance, is very much refined and its lucidity and elegance has been compared to a Gothic cathedral." What I mean by the 'unity of tracts' is the extraordinary coherence of Aquinas' theology. 37 The greater one's acquaintance with Aquinas' theology, the more one discovers how, in the Summa, every article has the nature of a hologram in which the rest of the work is reflected. Studying moral theology, one cannot pass over the sacraments which are the context of Christian life. Studying the sacraments, one cannot omit paying attention to Christ who founds them. Studying Christ, one has to take a look at Thomas' God·talk and so on. In every key Aquinas strikes the resonance can be heard of the whole of his theology. Therefore one can hardly speak of his Christology, eschatology or moral theology: they are all different aspects of the one science of theology the centre of which is the incomprehen. sible God. For our study on Aquinas' account of the relation of life on earth and 'life' after death this entails that we cannot limit ourselves to a single tract of his theology.
A second form of unity is realized in the unity of theological sub· disciplines. In the past seven centuries the scientific landscape has undergone some profound changes and Christian theology has become a collection of specialized disciplines. Nowadays the book-shelf of the average Biblical scholar will hardly show any overlapping with that of the moral theologian specialized in medical ethics .. In the thirteenth
divinis quam de actibus humanis,· de quibus agit secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perflCt4ln Dei cognitionem, in qua aeterna beatitudo consistit.
" The discussion about the piau only confirms its brilliant architecrure. Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 4-5, with an overview of the relevant literature.
'7 With this observation I do not mean to state that Aquinas should have constructed a closed system of thinking in which everything. our Creator included, is controlled. Nor do I mean that he has made no developments in his thinking, even in the years he was working on the Summa Theologiae. I want to place emphasis on Aquiuas' central intuition of the incomprchensible God of love which pervades his entire theological work.
CHAPTER I 19
century the situation was different. Due to the relatively orlglflative phase of medieval theology, Aquinas could approach his subjects as a theological uomo universale. Philosophy, Biblical science, psychology, moral theology, dogmatics, ascetical and mystical theology: they all can be traced in the Summa and they all are pointed towards the central mystery of faith, at the service of which they were developed." Thus Aquinas' systematic rigour and formal approach should not be played off against his Biblical inspiration. In fact we should bear in mind that Aquinas, in his systematical works, tries to be as close to the Biblical inspiration as in his commentaries on Holy Scripture."
In the third place, as was already examined in the last paragraph, a unity can be perceived with regard to the life of the theologian and the way of proceeding in this science. Both are pervaded with God's activity and find their coherence in this divine activity. For Aquinas studying theology properly cannot be confined to intellectual virtues alone. As we have seen, theology is faith searching for understanding !fides quaerens intelleaum) and the theological virtues (faith,. hope and charity) are intrinsically connected with moral and intellectual virtues.'" Theology is performed at the service and within the context of the union of man with God. Moreover, an important aspect of theology is
38 This, as well as the 'unity of tracts', has a direct bearing on the limits of this study which covers, roughly the whole field of theology Aquinas knew: the secondary literature on the varied subjects, tracts and sub-disciplines has become highly specia· lized and comprehensive. In this respect we do not mean to be exhaustive.
" As L. Sentis (1992, p. 286) puts it, "Ie but de la theologie est de donuer accOs aux Ecritures Saintes, et non de proposer un ensemble doctrinal qui les remplace". The kind of misinterpretations Senrls warns us against is obvious in our days in which a widespread aversicn for and suspicicn of toralitarian systems of thinking can be observed. Aquiuas' theology is easily identified with such a s)"tem, and played off against a more Biblical narrative theology in which the sense of mystery is claimed to be safeguarded in a better manner. M. Corbin (1974) has urged, rightly, that most wanting in our days, is a speculative theology in which the various results of the different specialties are confronted with each other and brought into relation with one another.
" On the connection of the virtues cf. STh 1·11 65.1·5; In STh I 1.6.co and raJ Aquinas explains that judgement in matters of faith may be the result of either the wisdom (sapientia) which is a gift from the Holy. Spirit or the wisdom which is the result of studying the sacred doctrine. The former is higher, like the judgement, with regard to moral affairs, of the vinuous person is higher than that of the moral philosopher who knows everything about virtues but possesses none of them. Cf. J. Walgrave, 1982/1974(a1, p. 119; Cf. also 5Th 11·11 45.2.co.
20 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
its reflection on the dynamism of this union."
Summarizing these three features of Aquinas' theology, we can say that in this study Aquinas' theology is interpreted as based on the interpretation of Scripture, centered around the incomprehensible God and, in more than one respect, concerned with the unity of the theological discipline. The interpretation thus carried out, has the character of following Aquinas in his attempt to show the nexus mysteriorum with regard to God, life and death.
2. God, life and death
Having sketched our interpretation of Aquinas, we will proceed with a first orientation in the field this study covers. Our aim is to find an appropriate perspective from which the theological question of the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death can be dealt with. In order to find this perspective we will, first, take a look at Aquinas' use of the words 'life' and 'death' (2.1). We will discover a network of meanings and contexts in which 'life' and 'death' are used. This variety raises questions concerning the connection of the words and the realities th.ey . refer .to. In order to discover the way the network is organized, we wIll InvestIgate Aquinas' explanation of 'life' as a name of God's essence (2.2) and as a name which can be attributed to each of the divine Persons (2.3). This will give us insight into the connection of life and death with the incomprehensible God and provide us with a perspective from which the theological question can be rephrased.
2.1 The meaning and use of the words 'life' and 'death'
In various instances in his works Aquinas accounts for the different
" Which Aquinas practices in his account of the theological vinues and the gifts of the _ Holy Spirit. Cf. M. Corbin (1974, p. 901) who remarks as a conclusion of his reading of STh I·II 68.2: "ces trois modes mltapbysique, the%gique, mystique devien. ~t les troIS degres d'une echelle unique qui trouve son point culminant dans la VlSlon de Dieu face a face qui' rejouit- les bienheureux. La faute de l'interpretation couran~e est d'oublier ~u·une. distinction n'est point une separation figee mais une dyn~l9.ue, q~'une ~l&archre n'est point une repanition statique de diverses posslbilites maIS une ligne ascendante dialectique qui maintient a la fois la consistence de la niveau inferieur et sa tendence a se depasser pour s'egaIer au niveau superieur."
CHAPTER I 21
meanings the words 'life' and 'death' can have. Throughout his works Thomas consequently discerns three meanings of vita which can all be traced back to distinctions Aristotle makes."
In a first meaning of the word, vita refers to the existence of a being which possesses the ability to move itself in a certain manner. In this first meaning vita is a substantial predicate, referring to the being of the subject, as is reflected in Aristotle's definition vivere viventibus esse est.43
In a second- meaning, which is less familiar to us than the first and the third, vita refers to a specific act of a living substance which is characteristic for its mode of being. Thus the volitional and cognitive acts of human beings can be called their 'life': these acts are characteristic for the human mode of being regarded as self­ movement.44
In a third meaning, with the word vita the chief occupation or direction of man is signified. Thus one can lead a honorable life, a contemplative life, etc."
" Cf. R. Defecrari, 1948, p. 1170·1172. 4) n De anima 7 (415b13): vivere autem vivemibus est esse, causa autem et principium
horum anima (quoted in 5Th I 18.2.sc). In this study, focusing primarily on Aquinas' reception of Aristode, I will quote the latter in Latin. Aquinas did not know Greek and studied the works of Aristode in translations, mosdy provided by William of Moerbeke (d. J. Weisheipl, 1983', p. 374-381). The text of Aristode is adopted from the edition of Aquinas' commentary which was consulted.
« IX Eth 11 (1170a16): Yivere autem determinant anima/ibm-potentia sensus, hominibus autem sensus vel intel/eetus. Potentia autem. ad operationem reducitur; principaJe autem in operatione. Vuietur autem vivere esse principalieer sentire vel intelligere. Aquinas comments (In IX Eth 11 [Leon: 30D: in omnibus animdJibus communiter determinatur vivere secundum potentiam sensus, in hominibus autem determinatur secundum potentiam sensus, quantum ad itt quod habet commune cum aliis animalibus, vel secundum potentiam inte/lecms, quantum ad id quod est proprium sibL Omnis autem in potentia reducitur ad operationem skut ad propriam peifectionem: uOOe id quod est principale consistit in operatione et non in potentia nuda, actus enim est potior quam potentia, ut probatur in IX M£taphysicae. Et ex hoc patet quod principaliter Viflert anima/is vel hominis est sentire vel intellig~.
" I Eth 5 (1095bl4-19): Bonum enim et felicitatem non irrationabiJiter videntur ex his quae huius 'Vitae sunt "existimare. Multi quidem et gravissimi voluptatem. Ideo et vitam diJigunt voluptuosam. Tres enim sunt maxime excellentes. et quae nunc dicta est et quae civilis est et tertia quae contemplativa est. Aquinas comments (!n I Eth 5 [Leon: 62]: unusquisque id ad quod maxim< aflicitur reputat vitam suam, sicut phiJosophus phiJosophar~ "venator venari et sic de allis. Et quia homo maxime afficitur ad ultimum finen; necesse est quod vitae diversificentur secundum diversitatem ultimi finis.
22 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
These three meanings in which the word vita is used are closely connected by the notion of 'self-movement'. Since the human mode of being is an intelligent mode of being, one could even say that, in the case of human beings, these meanings of the word 'life' imply each other. The species homo is differentiated from the genus animal by the predicate rationale which refers to the intellectual operations; the nature of these operations determine the specific nature of human existence. In other words: the life (in the third meaning) we lead follows from our free deliberate choices flife' in the second meaning) which follow from our mode of being ('life' in the first meaning)."
Generally speaking, Aquinas considers mors as the opposite of vita. The logical definition of death is privatio vitae. Taken as a privation mors is called a malum and like any malum can only be known insofar as the bonum in which it inheres is known, mors can only be known insofar as vita is known. Therefore, in these paragraphs we will mainly concentrate on Aquinas' use of life.
The three meanings of vita just mentioned may serve as a first orientation in the matter. When we turn to Aquinas' actual use of the word, however, a somewhat more complicated picture takes shape. The word vita, taken in each of the meanings, functions in a variety of contexts, with a variety of applications."
With regard to vita in the first meaning, Aquinas speaks of vita animae or spiritualis on the one hand and vita corporis or corporalis on the other hand. He distinguishes vita temporalis from vita aeterna. Theologically he makes a distinction between vita naturae or naturalis, vita gratiae and vita gloriae or gloriosa. With regard to the human soul he discerns vita nutritiva, vita sensibilis and vita intellectiva or rationalis. He speaks of vita angeli and vita Dei, of vita praesens and vita !utura,
46 In In IX Eth 7 the connection of the different meanings can be detected [Leon: 74]: Esse autem nostrum consistit in quodam actu, esse enim nostrum est vivere et per consequens operari (non enim est vita absque vitae operatione quacwnque), unde unimi­ que est amabiJe operari opera vitae,' {adem autem in actu est quodam modo ipsum opus facientis. actus enim moventis et agentis est in moto et patiente; ideo itaque diJigunt opus mum et -artifices et poetae et bene/aclores, quia diligunt suum esse.
" For an introductory overview the lists of R. Deferrari, 1948, p. 117()'1172 (vita) and p. 703 (mays) are a useful guide. On these pages the references to the works of Aquinas can be found as well. For a full consideration of the matter one should also take intO account words like vivus, vi'lJijicare, mortalis (culpa morta/is, peccatum martdeO and monifer. Since aile these words are derived from the meanings of vita and t1WYS as they are introduced here, they will be discussed later in this study.
CHAPTER 1 23
vita corruptibilis or mortalis and vita incorrupu.bil~ or. immortalis . and many more kinds of life. An entire network of slg~ficatlOns comes I?to perspective and it becomes clear that the question of the relation between our life on earth and 'life' after dea~ in Aqu~nas' the~l0!l! cannot be dealt with unless the connection of different kInds of VIta IS taken into account and their order and hierarchy is revealed. . . .
Vita in the second meaning is less frequently used by AqUInas: m thIS meaning he only distinguishes vita secundum actum from vita secundum potentiam. . .
With regard to vita in the m~aning of the ch~ef. Occup~tlOn ~f man, however we can again ,find a Wide array of variations: VIta actt'Va and vita con;emplativa, vita practica and vita speculativa, vita bestialis and vita spiritualis, vita laboriosa, vita luxuriosa, VIta monasttca and many more.
As we have already noticed, mors as a privation shares the 'para· sytical' nature Aquinas attributes to ~l kinds of evil. T~e vari~ty ~f combinations is less elaborate than In the case of VIta (which IS theologically appropriate, of course), but some. i~teresting dis~inctions should be mentioned: mors carnalis or corporalts In contrast With mors spiritualis, mors temporalis as against mors aeterna and mors naturalis opposed to mors violenta. ...
From this first impression of the VarIOUS ways In which the words vita and mors occur in Aquinas' works, we can justly draw the conclusion that 'life' and 'death' are words which are found throughout the entire field of theological reflection: referring to the lowest vegetative creatures as well as to th~~ supreme ~r~ator. Moreover, b! the fact that vita is also one of the dIVIne names, It IS suggested that thiS 'omnipresent' aspect of the word in Aquinas' theology has a special theological importance. This suggestion is confirmed when we take a closer look at how Aquinas attributes 'life' to God: in his view vita is maxime proprie referring to God." This means that, looking at the signification of vita, God is the subject wh~ch most ap~r.o~ri~tely may be called 'living'. God is even more appropnately called IIvmg than are human beings. Looking for insight into what 'life' is, this would mean that we should take a look at God first, in order to determine what all the other kinds of life essentially are. In a way this is appropriate since
.. SIb 1 18.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod vita maxime proprie inDeo '7'. Cf. also ScG I 97.3: Sed Deus maxime non ab alio. sed a seipso operatur: cum SIt pnma causa agens. Maxime igitur ei compet;t vivere.
24 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
God is the formal subject of theology. But how does this relate to God's incomprehensibility which we noticed at the centre of Aquinas' theological reflection?
In order to proceed, we will have to take a closer look at the way in which Aquinas attributes 'life' to God, what this reveals regarding his perception of God's mode of being and what this entails for the human mode of being. Before we take a closer look, however, at the procedure Aquinas follows two observations are of importance.
In the first place we must bear in mind the context of Thomas' work: the exposition of Holy Scripture. The variety of meanings in which vita and mars occur in the writings of Aquinas are the result of his close reading of Scripture. At first sight this may seem strange, since we started our orientation on the use of the word 'life' with the observation that the distinctions Aquinas makes are all to be traced back to Aristotle. As we will see later in this study, however, Aristotle does nothing more than provide an instrument which helps Aquinas to make a meticulous analysis of what is told in Holy Scripture.
One of the main sources of Aquinas' theological reflections on life is the gospel of Saint John" in which the word 'life' is one of the key words. so In this gospel Christ Himself is called vita as well as panis vitae, knowing God is called vita aeterna, Christ is said to be giving aqua viva and the Father is said to have vita in semetipso. In the gospel of Saint John questions arise as to what exactly is meant by 'life' and how it is related to God: Father, Son and Spirit. Apart from the fourth Gospel the word vita as a divine name is found in various places in
., Apart from Scripture, Aquinas' attention for 'life' as a name of God, seems to be raised also by the fact that pseudo-Dionysius dedicates a chapter to vita in his famous De divinis nominibus; which was a highly esteemed work with authority close to Holy Scripture in Aquinas' days. Cf. G. Rocca, 1993, p. 642-649.
" The most important passages are in the words of the vulgata: (Tn 1,4) in Ipso "ita era., (Tn 1,4-5) et "ita erat lux Imminum; et lux in tenebris luret. .. ; (Tn 3,16) sic enin> duexit Deus mundum. .. ut omnis •... habeat vitam aeternaTnj an 3,36) qui credit in Pi/ium habet vitam aeternatnj (In 4,10) tu forsitan petisses ab Eo et dedisset tim aquam vi'lJd.mj an 5,21) sicut enim Pater suscitat mortuos et vivificat ... ; ern 5,26) sicut enim Pater habet "itam in semet Ipso; (Tn 6,35) Ego sum panis "itae ... ; (Tn 6,52) panis quem ego dabo earo mea est pro mundi vita; an 6.58) skUI mis;t Me vivens Pater et Ego vivo propter Patrem. .. ; (Tn 11,25) Ego sum resurrectio et "ita; (Tn 12,24) nisi granum frumenti eadens in terram mortuum fomt; an 14,6} Ego sum via et veritas et vita; an 17,3} haec est autem vita aeterna ut cognoscant Te solum verum Deum.
CHAPTER! 25
Holy Scripture.'1 In the second place, since we aim to give an interpretation of
Aquinas as a theologian and a thinker close to Scripture, our intention is to take into account, from the outset, that the God he speaks about is the triune God: Father, Son and Spirit. For the sake of clarity, however, Aquinas often treats first the one nature of the triune God and later the three Persons in the one God." We will do the same by focusing on 'life' as a name for the divine nature in the first place.
2.2 'Life' as a name for God's essence
In Summa 1beologide I 18 Aquinas devotes an entire quaestio to the inquiry as to whether God can be called 'living' or 'life'. We will present an analysis of this question" because it offers an excellent opportunity for picturing Thomas' approach with regard to 'life' as a name for both creatures and Creator.
2.2.1 Summa Theologiae I 18.1-3
The question of the life of God is treated within the context of the knowledge of God, since Aquinas considers knowing to be a kind of living. This knowledge of God is situated within the larger framework
" Cf. e.g. p, 35,10: apud Te fons 'Vitae, a verse which Aquinas often quotes as referring to Christ who is with the Father; and Ps 83,3: cor meum et earo mea exultavit in Deum vivum, quoted in 5Th I 18.3.sc.
52 According to K. Rahner, this distinction of two perspectives on the triune God is found for the first time in Aquinas' work. In the history of theology it was a major factor for the development of a division of the doctrine of God into twO treatises: de deo uno and de deo trino. This separate treatment, with negative side-effects, became common practise aher the Summa Theologiae had ousted Peter Lombard's IV Libri Sententiarnm (K. Rahner, 1967, p. 323-324). In contemporary theology the observati­ on and warning of Rahnec have been acknowledged and taken to heart. Cf. N. Lash, 1993.
53 Other places of interest are: SeC I 97-99, I~ XII Met 8, In Joan 14.2, In Div Nom 6. We have chosen for S'Ih I 18 because it is Aquinas' most mature work, here he treats the subject more extensively than in other places and he is not bound by any texts on which he has to comment. In Div Nom 6 would be a good alternative because of the unique condense enumeration of the various kinds of life which God bestows. The text of pseudo-Dionysius. however. forces Aquinas to place all emphasis on the causality and pre-existence of God's life: a position which Thomas corrects in his own systematic works.
26 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
of the consideration of God's operations: His knowledge (STh I 14-18), His will (STh I 19-24) and His power (STh I 25)."
In the first two articles of STh I 18, Aquinas' intention is to specify what we are talking about when we call a substance 'living'. In the first article (utrum omnium rerum naturalium sit vivere) it immediately becomes apparent that the one word 'life' is used to signify different substances in reality; plants and animals as well as a natural element like water. In order to distinguish between living and non-living things, Aquinas takes as point of departure a substance of which it is clear that it is living: an anima!." He observes that in our common use of language we begin to call an animal 'living' from the moment that it moves itself and we call it 'dead' from the moment this ability of self­ movement has disappeared. Thomas concludes that we call a substance 'living' in the proper meaning when it moves itself according to a certain sort of motion. Motion may be taken in the proper meaning as referring to the act of something existing in potentiality of existence (in this case 'life' regards the being of the substance) or it may be taken in the wider meaning as regarding the act (c.q. operation) of a substance which already possesses the first perfection of being. Thus vita in the proper meaning refers to the first perfection (esse) or second perfection (operatio) of a substance in which motion in the proper or wider
54 5Th I 14.prol: Quia vero inte/ligere quoddam vivere est, post comider4tionem divinae scientiae, considerandum erit de vita divina. Thomas reflects on the operations of God after he has taken God's substance into consideration (STh ! 2-13). In these first questions of the Summa Tbeologiae, after an inquiry about the nature of me sacred doctrine, Aqoinas asks whether God is (STh ! 2), how God is (or rather, how He is not, since we cannot know God's essence) (5Th I 3-11), how God is known to us (STh ! 12) and how God can be named by us (STh ! 13). In the questions regarding God's substance (STh ! 2-13), the mOst fundamental decisions about our knowing and speaking of God are made; decisions which heavily influence the rest of the Summa Theologiae. We will therefore return to these initial questions in our inter­ pretation of STh! 18 when necessary.
S5 5Th I 18.1.eo: Respondeo dicendum quod ex his quae manifoste vivum, accipere possumus quorum sit 'Oivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste anima/ibus convenit ... Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando ineipit ex se motum habere... Ex quo patet quod ilia proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent,' sive accipiatur motus proprie, situt matus dicitur actus imper­ fecti, idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout motus dicitur actus perfect~ prout intelligere et sentire dicitur nu)'Ver~ ut dicitur in III De anima 7 {431a6} ut sic viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel ,operationem aliquam ...
CHAPTER! 27
meaning can be detected. Not all natural things, however, exist in this way. Water, for instance, does not have the ability to move itself. It can be moved by something else, and thus be called 'living': not in the proper meaning but having a similitude with life. . . .
In this approach we see how one word, VLta, may be applied In lts proper meaning to different realities on the basis of a common ratio of self-movement." When the element of 'movement' in the ratio of vita is taken in a wider meaning (as in the case of the operatio) we still speak of 'life' in the proper meaning, but when the element of 'self is taken away, there can only be talk of 'life' by means of similitude.
One may observe tfrat Aquinas, in this article, moves between the logical and the (meta)physical order in his analysis of what life is. He gains insight by scrutinizing the implicit rules we adopt in our common sense language and by testing these rules with the help of metaphysical distinctions. The reason why Aquinas proceeds in this way is that in his view our naming of things is determined by our mode of knowing. Thomas explicitly brings this into discussion in the second article of the question (utrum vita sit quaedam operatio). In this article the question posed is whether life is an activity (secunda perfectio) or a mode of being (prima perfectio)- In his reply Aquinas states that our intellect is apt to know the essence of things, but that it can do so only after having received information from the senses." The information the senses provide is restricted to the external, accidental qualities of the object. We name things as we know them: with regard to life this becomes apparent by our use of the word 'life'. Sometimes the word refers to
S6 STh I 13.4.co: Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re significata per nomen. Cf. R. McInerny. 1961, p. 61·64 who underscores that the ratio or definition is produced by the intellect.
57 5Th I 18.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dietis patet, intel/ectus noster, qui proprie est cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiect~ accipit a sensu, cuius propria obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod ex his qU4e exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoseendam essentiam reL Sic ergo dicendum est et de vita. Nam 'vitae' nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est movere seipsum, non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc signifzcandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, 'vivere' nihil aliud est quod esse in tali natura. et 'vita' significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto; sicut hoc nomen 'CW'sus' significat ipsum CurTere in abstracto. Unde 'vivum' non est praedicazum accidentale, sed substantiale. Quandoque tamen 'vita' sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus nomen 'Vitae assumitur,' situt dicit Philosophus, in IX Ethicorum 9 [1170a18], quod vivere principaliter est sentire, vel inteJligere.
28 AQUlNAS ON GOD AND LIFE
activities such as willing and knowing (by which the essence of a living substance is made known) and sometimes to the essence of the substance itself. Both meanings of the word 'life' are proper, but the second is the more proper meaning, being the term of our knowledg~.
In the third article, Aquinas arrives at the central Issue of SIb I 18: whether life can be attributed to God (utrum Deo conveniat vita). He begins the article with three arguments that seem to contradict the view that life can be attributed to God. All the arguments are based on the seeming discord between the simplicity of God and .certain eleme.nts that are to be found in all living substances mentioned m the precedmg two articles (movement, a soul as principle of life and corp orality). As an argument in favour only Psalm 83,3 is quoted: Cor meum et cr:ro mea exultavit in Deum vivum.
Thomas begins his reply with the statement th~t 'life', in t~e most proper meaning, is in God. The explanation of this statement ~s based on an analysis of the shifts in signification that take place m both elements that form the ratio of 'life' ('self' and 'movement'), when the word is attributed to living substances at different ontological levels. At the lowest level of living substances we perceive self-movement (growth and decrease) which is restricted to carrying a movement into effect, the end and form of which are determined by nature: the life of plants. 58
At a second level of animated substances both the nature of motion as well as the degree of self-determination are modified. The degree ~f self-determination is higher, since those beings acquire the form of theIr self-movement for themselves through their senses. The more complete their senses are, the more elaborate their self-movement is. In the case of the oyster, equipped with the sense of touch only, the self-movement is restricted to dilation and contraction. In the case of animals endowed with more senses, the self-movement can be elaborated up to ~ocal movement. Thus an increase in self-determination is combined WIth a change in the nature of motion. The amount of self-determination in animals, however, is considerably restricted: the objective of their move-
51 5Th I 18.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod vita rnaxime proprie in Deo est. Ad tuius e'Uidentiam, considerandum est quodJ cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab diu mota,' quanta perfectius com petit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo in-venitur vita ... lnveniuntur igitur quaedam, quae movent seipsa, non habita respectu ad formam vel fin~ quae inest eis a natura, sed solum ad executionem motus, sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt, determinantur eis a natura. Et huiusmcdi sunt plantae ...
CHAPTER I 29
ment is implanted in them by nature. Their instinct moves them by means of the form conceived by the senses. 59
At a third level self-movement embodies the substance choosing the end of the movement as well. At this level human beings are situated, endowed with an intellect which is able to control the senses and
. produce external movement. Here not only self-determination is still greater, the nature of motion is changed as welL Movement in the wider meaning, as referring to intellectual and volitional activities, is the cause for greater self-determination.60
Aquinas leaves no doubt that, however free the self-movement of human beings might be; metaphysically man is bound by nature. The intellect can only be actuated according to the first principles and the will can only be moved by virtue of the ultimate end which it cannot refuse. Thus, he concludes, a substance whose nature is not determined by anything else, but whose nature is its very act of knowing, obtains self-movement in the highest possible degree. Such a being would have life in the highest degree. Since God is such a Being, He must possess life in the highest degree."
This final conclusion seems to contradict the negative start of SIb I 3.prol (quia de Deo non possumus scire quid sit). God's nature is identified as His very act of knowing and thus we seem to know what God's nature is: ipsum eius intelligere. Did Aquinas change his mind and does he admit that God's essence can be properly named by us with the help of the same words we use for the naming of created substances? Can knowledge of divine life be gained by simply investigating the subse-
s' STh I 18.3.co: Quaedam vera utterius movent seipsa. non solum hahito respectu ad executionem matus, sed etiam quantum ad fonnam quae est principium TTWtus, quam per se acquirunt. Et huOOmodi sunt animalia ...
60 STh I 18.3.00: Unde supra talia animalia sum ilia quae movent seipsa, etiam habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi praestituunt. Quod quidem non fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cuOO est cognoscere proportionem finis et eOO quod est ad finem, et unum ordinare in alterum.
'1 STh I 18.3.co: Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad a/iqua se agat, tamen aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura,. sicut sunt prima principia, circa quae non potest aliter se habere. et ultimus finis, quem non potest non velie. Unde. licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen oportet quod quantum ad a/iqua ab alia moveatur. Illud igitur cuius sua natura est ipsum intelligere. et cui id quod natura/iter habet non determinatur ab alia, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxinie est vita. Urule PhiloSfJphus. in XlI Metaphysicorum 11 [1072b27J, ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens. eoncludit quod habeat vitam peifeetissimam et sempiternam, quia intelleetus eius est perfectissimus. et semper in actu.
30 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
quent levels of created life? In order to appreciate more precisely what Aquinas says here, we
should interpret this article of STh I 18 in the light of what has been said before in the Summa Theologiae. Both orders, according to which Aquinas works in STh I 18, the metaphysical and the logical, are scruti· nized with regard to God in the first 13 questions of the Summa. In order to appreciate more precisely how to interpret quaestio 18, we will therefore take a look at both.
2.2.1.1 God's essence: the metaphysical order
Vivere viventibus esse est, Thomas learns from Aristotle and he says that 'life', in its proper meaning, refers to the act of being. Asking for the nature of God's life, therefore, is inevitably connected with the question of God's mode of being. Thinking in terms of being, in all the objects we come to know through our senses the 'being' is determined by the essence.62 The distinction between the esse of a substance and its essentia is, ontologically, the most fundamental distinction one can make. Therefore, asking for God Thomas begins to ask for the being or existence of God (STh I 2) followed by an investigation into His essence (STh I 3-11).
The triune God who revealed Himself through Holy Scripture, however, is not exactly an object which we come to know directly by our senses. Though Thomas builds up his argument according to the distinction between God's being and His essence, in q.3 he blurs that distinction by saying that in God, being and essence cannot be separated. How is this to be interpreted? Beginning with q.2, interpreting the five ways as proofs of God's existence and reading the following questions as providing information about the object, the existence of which has just been proved, Aquinas' claim about the iden· tification of being and essence in God could be interpreted as a confirmation of having the possibility to know God's essence.
At the very beginning of STh I 3, however, Aquinas explicitly states that we cannot know God's nature or essence and that we should rather
62 Here we touch upon a long discussion about the relation between esse and essence in Aquinas' thinking. For literature d. R. te Velde, 1995.
CHAPTER! 31
investigate how God is not." Taking this remark seriously, the identi­ fication of God's being with His essence takes the shape of a prohibition sign. Moreover, after this identification of being and essence, q.2 should be read again, in order to see what exactly Aquinas is up to here.
Thus, in order to gain insight into Thomas' view on God's life we will, firstly, ask what he intends with the identification of being and essence in God and, secondly, ask how this identification affects the reading of Aquinas' remarks on God's being.
It has been argued, and I hold this to be the most elucidating and theologically coherent i(lterpretation of Aquinas that, with the identifi­ cation of God's existence and His essence he articulates the most fundamental insight that determines his entire theological undertaking: the distinction between creatures and Creator." Thus, by blurring the most basic distinction in the ontological order Aquinas intends to make· a new distinction, one between God and creatures. What is at stake here for Thomas is the possibility for maintaining the Biblical idea that God is at one and the same time Creator of all creatures (which implies that He cannot be part of creation and has to be radically distinguished from it) as well as the One who is intimately linked with all creatures as their final goal (which implies that He is present in creation as its sustainer, redeemer and the One who perfects it). In fact it is the reflection on the triune God, Father, Son and Spirit, articulated by the Councils and recognized in Holy Scripture, that causes Aquinas to modify the use of Aristotle's philosophical instruments. How the life of God is articulated in the doctrine of the three Persons of God will be treated in the next paragraph. For the moment we are concerned with showing the
63 STb I 3.prol: Cognito de a1iquo an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo sit. ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed poems quomodo non sit. Primo ergo considerandum est quomodo non sit; secundo, quomodo a nobis cognoscatur [q.12],· tertia quomodo nominetur [q.13j..
.. 10 a compact and penetrating book D. Burrell (1986) shom the history of development of this distinction by thinkers of the three great monotheistic religions: "The candidate proposed Mthe distinction between essence and existence- finds its roots in Alfarabi, its firSt aniculation in IbnMSina, is approved by Maimonides, and brought to a refined status by Aquinas." (po 35) With this interpretation Burrell is in line with J. Pieper's observation of creation as the hidden key in Aquinas' philosophy (quoted by Burrell on p. 34, the note on p. 119 fails however). Pieper makes his observation in: J. Pieper, 1953, 1974 and 1978, among other places. Pieper's position is also adopted by O.H. Pesch (1988), and worked out by R. Sokolowski (1982) in what he C3lls 'the Christian distinction'.
32 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
rightfulness and meaning of the attribution of 'life' to God. Can we be more precise about what Thomas tries to establish? In
order to do so, as a first step, it may be helpful to take into account which positio