LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS AT THE SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL IN NIGERIA

THE ELEVENTH WORKSHOP OF  

PARLIAMENTARY SCHOLARS AND PARLIAMENTARIANS 

WROXTON COLLEGE, WROXTON, OXFORDSHIRE, UK, 26-27 JULY 2014  

EMMANUEL REMI AIYEDE, Ph.D.DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IBADAN NIGERIAeaiyede@yahoo.com

 & 

IBRAHEEM OLADIPO MUHEEBDEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IBADAN NIGERIAibraheem_muheeb@yahoo.com

INTRODUCTION: SUBNATIONAL LEGISLATURE IN NIGERIA

Functions and Importance

• Each state (subnational government) is a microcosm of the federal structure with separation of powers in terms of functions and personnel among the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.

• The executive’s assent is required for a bill to become law, and the Constitution empowers the Governor to veto an unpleasant legislation although the veto can be overridden by a two-thirds majority vote by the state’s house of assembly.

• Section 4(1) vested the legislative powers of the Nigerian Federation in the National Assembly comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives.

• Section 4(6) outlined the legislative powers of the States Houses of Assembly similar to those of the National Assembly.

INTRODUCTION 2

• Section 188 of the constitution particularly empowered the State Houses of Assembly to remove - as last resort - an erring Governor or Deputy Governor as the case may be, in line with these provisions.

 • While national legislature has gained prominence, discussion on

sub-national legislature and legislative practices are few and limited.  

• The reform initiatives geared towards entrenching transparency and accountability through national agencies and institutional frameworks like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), underscores this fact.

INTRODUCTION 3

This presentation• This presentation is an extract from the report of a study that examined the

performance of a subnational Legislature in Nigeria from 1999 to 2011, being the longest surviving period of any legislature in Nigeria.

Primary Focus • The study examined the Ogun State legislature, fourth (1999-2003); fifth (2003-

2007); and sixth (2007-2011) on law making, representation and oversight as a microcosm of the conflictual distributive and transactional politics in Nigeria.

Specific Objectives• Explored the historical evolution of the legislature; undertook an assessment of

the legislature in terms of effectiveness using Polsby’s three dimensions of institutionalisation, namely: autonomy; internal complexity; and universalism; Identified factors that accounted for the representative deficit of the state legislature in our unit of study.

GENERAL: DIRECTIONS OF RELATIONS

Performance: Positive Side• Against the background of its history, the legislature offered the desirable alternative to

authoritarian rule, prevented the absolute reign of dictatorship and justified representative government to some extent.

• In composition in geographical terms, each of the assemblies represented the people of the State.

 • The legislature screened the executive’s nominees for appointments and postings; received,

occasionally made selective adjustments and passed annual budgets, and supplementary appropriation bills; recorded considerable success in law making; and occasionally played prominent roles in shaping the business environment.

Performance: Negative Side• Credits to the State Assemblies were eroded by the several manifestations of weakness,

resulting in a number of national executive instruments-instigated summary impeachment of State Governors, express arraignments and prosecutions of some, indictments of many, and endless investigations of others.

• Cases cited here, illustrate instances of ‘external’ encroachment on spheres of the States, affirming State Assemblies’ weak disposition.

GENERAL: THE OVERSIGHT QUESTION

Case1: Abdication of Responsibilities• The British authorities through the London Metropolitan Police provided a comprehensive inventory of money

laundered by a former Governor from the North-Central Nigeria, in the United Kingdom (UK). He had transferred about 230million Nigerian Naira or ₤920,000 through different banks in Nigeria to his private bank accounts with Barclays Bank.

• A remarkable impeachment attempt on the Governor was initiated by Eight out of the Twenty-Four legislators of the State House of Assembly on charges of misconduct, misappropriation of funds and money laundering pending prompted by the EFCC.

• The State lawmakers were forced by the EFCC - deploying the state security apparatus - to sit without a quorum and its principal officers in clear breach of legislative procedures.

Case 2: Double Standard• Another state Governor from the Southwest Nigeria, elected on the platform of the ruling Peoples

Democratic Party (PDP) in 2003 was impeached on allegations of corruption, abuse of office and gross misconduct, he had presided over the administration of the State from May 2003 to October 2006.

• Other charges include: illegal operation of foreign accounts; illegal diversion of public funds; receipt of illegal gifts; and illegal transfer of the sum of $100,000 to the United States.

• The State lawmakers were forced by the EFCC - deploying the state security - to take legislative action.

GENERAL: THE OVERSIGHT QUESTION 2

Case 3: A Case of Complicity• Yet another State Governor from South-South Nigeria on the platform of the PDP, had

successfully presided over the affairs of his State for a four-year term of office (1999-2003). He was impeached in December 2005 over charges ranging from money laundering, misappropriation of public funds, to gross misconduct and abuse of office while on his second tenure.

• Going by EFCC’s record, financial exposure and material acquisition traced to the Governor include but not limited to; active domestic and foreign bank accounts, landed property and substantial holdings in several local and foreign business concerns.

• The build-up to his impeachment and subsequent prosecution were at the instance of the Presidency through the EFCC.

• The State’s legislators were intimidated, hoodwinked and coerced into taking legislative action, most sittings for which were conducted outside the House chamber and the State.

Essence• The conditions and circumstances that warranted their impeachment were not in

doubt though; but the procedures through which that end were realised raises questions on the status and substance of the state assembly.

UNDERSTANDING THE WHY: FROM SPECIFIC STANDPOINT

The Ogun State Legislature in Retrospect• Developments in Ogun State 1999-2011 offer useful insights into the circumstances of the states

legislatures’ weak disposition viewed against the background of the performances of the fourth (1999-2003), fifth (2003-2007), and sixth (2007-2011) assemblies.

• Ogun State has had six assemblies from inception (1976) to 2011.

• The first assembly in Ogun State was inaugurated on October 2, 1979 following the 1979 general election and the inauguration of post military civilian regime.

• The civilian-to-civilian transition of 1983 witnessed another election to usher in what was supposed to be the second Assembly for the 1983-87 legislative term to commenced on October 2, 1983 but was aborted by another military intervention, Buhari/Idiagbon coup of December, 31, 1983.

• Another experiment in legislative practices 1992-1993 was truncated with the November 17 1993 military coup led by Sani Abacha.

• The Alliance for Democracy (AD) - dominated 26-member 4th assembly inaugurated for the 1999-2003 legislative term of four years had comprised of new members.

• The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) – dominated 5th assembly of the Ogun State House of Assembly inaugurated for the 2003-2007 legislative term produced the first female Speaker in the political history of the State and in Nigeria at the time.

• The PDP 6th assembly inaugurated for the 2007-2011 legislative term composed twelve (12) former members of the fifth legislature (2003-2007) and fourteen (14) new lawmakers.

SPECIFIC: UNDERSTANDING THE WHY 2

Institutional Autonomy• Executive had the prerogative for the appointment and dismissal of Clerk of the assembly, which it

exercised on its terms. For finance, the assemblies were at the mercy of the executive through the state Commissioner of Finance, the Commissioner for Budget and the Accountant-General of the State.

• The executive did withheld funds, when it felt uncomfortable with developments that - in its estimation - appeared to challenge the operation of the executive. A member summed this up that:

• ‘…even if we had to go to Abuja, which cost about N100, 000 (₤320) we have to write a memo, put it in a file and go cap in hand to the executive for money.

• In the ensuing process, the legislature was unable to prevent legislators’ personal financial interests from unduly influencing their official action in relation to the executive.

• The assembly’s attempts to consolidate this initiative were resisted by the executive in connivance with a faction of the legislators.

• The perceived executive intransigence and high handedness culminated into prolonged face-off with the executive that practically brought meaningful legislature-executive relationship and indeed governance to a halt in the state for the better part of the sixth legislative term.

• The fallouts of Resolution ‘167’ barring the government from all financial transactions until the assembly directs otherwise.

• A determined executive could clandestinely debar the legislature from functioning properly without necessarily dissolving the Assembly through threats and intimidation with instruments of the state security.

SPECIFIC: UNDERSTANDING THE WHY 3

On internal complexity, • Each of the State Assemblies recorded high turnover of membership. All the legislators for the

1999-2003 assembly were new members ditto for the legislative term 2003-2007. The 2007-2011 assembly comprised of twelve former members of the fifth assembly (2003-2007), and fourteen new members.

• Members of the fourth assembly largely rode on the goodwill of pro-democracy organisations and individuals whose choice of candidates made the list of would-be legislators in the immediate post-military administration.

• Similarly, members of the 2003-2007 as well as the 2007-2011 assemblies were nominated or selected and their election bankrolled by ‘godfathers’, including traditional rulers, influential party and opinion leaders.

• This accounted for the attendant inexperience, indiscipline and disregard for the rules of legislature-executive engagement.

• The sixth assembly had to contend with leadership instability. 3 speakers in the sixth assembly, characterised by disregard for due process and party fractionalisation, conflicts over allegiance to the governor, involving accusations and counter accusations of cultic oath-taking.

SPECIFIC: UNDERSTANDING THE WHY 4

A House in Disarray• The sixth assembly was caught in the web of an intra-party

and intra-institutional crisis that hindered effective discharge of its duties barely two years into its four-year legislative tenure.

• The assembly was consequently polarised along the pro and anti executive groups.

• This internal crisis was to set the tone of discord between the legislature and the executive.

• The internal crisis denied the assembly of harmony and co-operation among members as well as jeopardised the stability of the assembly.

SPECIFIC: UNDERSTANDING THE WHY 5

The Majority Curse• The 4th and the 5th legislature enjoyed considerable party hegemony. Legislative

function was reduced to ‘quality control’ of executive action in the AD & PDP dominated assemblies.

• The legislature played less significant roles in legislation.

Formidable Opposition Gap• There was no record of any major challenge for the 1999-2003 AD dominated

fourth assembly by the major opposition parties, the APP and PDP at the time, ditto for subsequent assemblies.

• Crisis often ensued and became public knowledge when secret agreements between actors were considered breached and discountenanced

• The default interpretation of legislature-executive relationship was bolstered by the dearth of virile opposition that could have posed a formidable challenge to the ruling party.

DERIVABLE CHARACTERISATION

The Transitional Assembly• The AD- dominated 1999-2003 assembly was transitional, from military rule to civilian rule. It was technically

and institutionally deficient to function effectively, having been peopled by individuals who were inexperienced in legislative matters, with limited educational qualification, and limited exposure.

• Again, the State legislature, like any other, suffered prolonged setback unlike the executive arm of government.

• The Constitution was just being put to test through the various democratic institutions whose powers derived from it.

 The Rubber Stamp or Ratifier Assembly• The PDP dominated 2003-2007 legislature was a rubber- stamp legislature, subservient to, and largely

depended on the executive for its human and material resources.• Members owed their nomination and attendant success at the poll to godfathers as well as the defective

electoral system. Their respective electoral victories were bankrolled by the governorship aspirant and the eventual State governor.

• Members became willing accomplices and were ready to compromise, to the satisfaction of the executive. • It was peopled by inexperienced members with poor role perception and no clear-cut party ideology beyond

primitive accumulation through executive hand-outs.

The Fragmented Assembly• The PDP dominated 2007-2011 assembly was a fragmented legislature. It was chaotic and cultic. • The legislature’s operation was mired in intra-institutional violence and primitive disposition of legislative

responsibilities. Members worked at cross-purposes resulting in crisis of confidence among the legislators on the one hand and between the legislature and the executive on the other hand.

• The legislature suffered from the presidential burden of the outgoing President, Olusegun Obasanjo from the same party, PDP who was a major factor in the legislature-executive crisis that divided the assembly into two factions G11 and G15.

• The assembly was basically uncoordinated and ineffective.

CONCLUSION

• This paper argued that subnational legislatures were not autonomous from the executive during the first decade of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.

• The legislatures suffered from poor requisite capacity as well as the legitimacy deficit that ensued from the pre-election nomination and selection of assembly members’ across the states of the federation.

• The executives played prominent roles in producing and removing the principal officers of the assemblies; and they were willing tools in the hands of their respective state executive.

• Basic legislative rules were established during the various legislative terms but were observed in breach.

• Attempts by the national government through executive instruments to breath life into state assemblies’ internal rules and constitutional powers resulted in fractionalisation of not a few state assemblies and endless frictions with the executives.

• The turn over of leadership of the legislatures was not only rampant; the turn over of membership was quite high, starving many assemblies of the benefit of experience.

• Subnational legislatures were subservient in their dealings with the executive and generally weak in furthering their representative calling.

• The sub-national Legislature should be restructured and strengthened to enable it assert itself as well as overcome its own collective inadequacies.