LEGAL WRITING CASES

7/23/2019 LEGAL WRITING CASES

1/65

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 149375 November 26, 2002

MARVIN MERCADO,petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques and Enrile Bertumen, was chargedwith and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, for which he and his co-accused were sentenced to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four

(4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.1

The case before us concerns only the petition for review of accused Marvin Mercado where he assails his conviction, andarguing that the Court of Appeals having increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of seventeen(17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certified the case to this Court as the penalty of thirty (30)years was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124,2of the 2000 Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead with the Court of Appeals.

In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon bypetitioner, was applicable only when the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty,i.e., the penalty was at least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by the appellate court on the accused wasclearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538,3which is not considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule

124.4

The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied on People v. Omotoy5where the Regional Trial Court found theaccused guilty of arson and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as

minimum, to reclusion perpetua. The case reached this Court on automatic appeal. In Footnote 16 of the decision, it wasobserved -

The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the reason no doubt that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is involved,albeit joined toprision mayor in its maximum period in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually, theappeal should have gone to the Court of Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court entertains appeals in criminal cases onlywhere "the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher" (Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII, Constitution), i.e., the penaltyis at least reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse will be overlooked so as not to delay thedisposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been imposed on the accused,and causes no prejudice whatsoever to any party.

Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable

to the instant case considering that the penalty imposed was seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.

Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and one(1) day to forty (40) years. While the thirty (30)-year period falls within that range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless is a singleindivisible penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty (30)-year period for reclusion perpetua is only forpurposes of successive service of sentence under Art. 70 of The Revised Penal Code. 6

More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is one penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972which is a special law and not under The Revised Penal Code. Unless otherwise specified, if the special penal law imposessuch penalty, it is error to designate it with terms provided for in The Revised Penal Code since those terms apply only tothe penalties imposed by the Penal Code, and not to the penalty in special penal laws.7This is because generally, speciallaws provide their own specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties are not taken from nor refer to those

in The Revised Penal Code.8


2/65

The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months under RA 6538 is essentially within the range of the medium periodof reclusion temporal. However, such technical term under The Revised Penal Code is not similarly used or applied to thepenalty for carnapping. Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstance of violence against orintimidation of any person or force upon things, i.e., seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, does notcorrespond to that in The Revised Penal Code.9But it is different when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnappedvehicle is killed or raped in the course of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, since this is penalized with reclusion

perpetua to death.10

Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of "x x x imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)DAY as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as maximum." 11For thesereasons the use of the term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its decision is not proper. Besides, we see no basisfor the trial court to set the minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day since RA 6538 sets the minimum penalty

for carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

We see no error by the appellate court in relying on a Footnote in Omotoy12to affirm the conviction of the accused. Thesubstance of the Footnote may not be the ratio decidendi of the case, but it st ill constitutes an important part of the decis ionsince it enunciates a fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That this rule is stated in a Footnote to a

decision is of no consequence as it is merely a matter of style.

It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with the instant case since the former involves an appeal from the RegionalTrial Court to the Supreme Court while the case at bar is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Asenunciated in Omotoy, the Supreme Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty imposed is reclusionperpetua or higher. The basis for this doctrine is the Constitution itself which empowers this Court to review, revise, reverse,modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments of lower courts in all criminal cases

in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

13

Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a criminal case brought to it on appeal is at least reclusionperpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty, refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify thecase and elevate the entire records to this Court for review.14This will obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-wastingshuttling of criminal cases between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction overthe case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of

its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.15

On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may be

had only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 4516where only errors or questions of law may be raised.

Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue of whether there was indeed a violation of The Anti-Carnapping Act.

This issue is factual, as we shall find hereunder.

In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani parked the subject Isuzu Trooper in front of his house at No. 7015-BBiac-na-Bato St., Makati City, Metro Manila. The vehicle was owned by Augustus Zamora but was used by Bhagwani as aservice vehicle in their joint venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper was nowhere to be found prompting Bhagwani toreport its disappearance to the Makati Police Station and the Anti-Carnapping (ANCAR) Division which immediately issued

an Alarm Sheet.17

On 31 May 1996 Bhagwanis neighbor, fireman Avelino Alvarez, disclosed that he learned from his daughter, a common -lawwife of accused Michael Cummins, that the accused Rommel Flores, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and Michael Cummins

himself stole the Isuzu Trooper. Alvarezs daughter however refused to issue any statement regarding the incident. 18

In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 "Miling" Flores brought to his house Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, EnrileBertumen, Rommel Flores, and complaining witness Bhagwani. In that meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen and Floresadmitted that they took the vehicle and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and Baguio.19They claimed however that it waswith the knowledge and consent of Bhagwani. They alleged that on the night they took the vehicle, they invited Bhagwani to

join them in their outing to Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they asked him instead if they could borrow the IsuzuTrooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed and even turned over the keys to them.20

Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during that confrontasi in the house of SPO3 "Miling" Flores but his co-accused

narrated his participation in the crime.21

The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but increased the penalty imposed on the four (4) accused from a prison termof twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as

maximum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.22


3/65

Petitioner insists that the accused were more motivated by fun rather than theft in taking the Isuzu Trooper, and that theymerely took the vehicle for a joyride with no intention of stealing it. If they were really thieves, according to petitioner, they

would have sold the vehicle outright instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio.23

Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a petition for review on certiorari where only questions of law, and notquestions of fact, may be raised. The issue before us being factual, a reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may not beentertained in this appeal. Besides, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding uponthe Supreme Court.24This rule may be disregarded only when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to thefindings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported by the evidence on record. But there is no ground to applythis exception to the instant case. This Court will not assess all over again the evidence adduced by the parties particularly

where as in this case the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely coincide. 25

However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on its imposition of the penalty. Republic Act No. 6538 imposes the penaltyof imprisonment for seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the carnapping is committed bymeans of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things. The evidence in this case shows that theaccused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it, thus demonstrating that force was used upon thevehicle; nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit the imposition of the full penalty. With the application of TheIndeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed may be reduced to an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17)

years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the Motion and Manifestation of petitioner MarvinMercado dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to an

indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.


4/65


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner,vs.ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional TrialCourt, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents

MARTINEZ, J. :

Which should prevail between the ratio decidendiand thefalloof a decision is the primary issue in this petitionforcertiorariunder Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent Isabel's petition for appointment

as administratrix of her grandmother's estate by virtue of her right of representation.

The suit stemmed from the following:

On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married inthe Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, IsabelAguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel

Cojuangco-Suntay filed a criminal case 1against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, EmilioAguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) 2a complaint for legal separation against hiswife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children whowere living with their mother. 3The suit was docketed as civil case number Q-7180.

On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay

on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. It being admittedby the parties and shown by the record that the question of the case and custody of the three childrenhave been the subject of another case between the same parties in another branch of this Court in

Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case.

With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third party defendants arewilling to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is willing to accept the offer instead of heroriginal demand for P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded said sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim

and to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P5.000.00.

SO ORDERED. 4(Emphasis supplied).

As basis thereof, the CFI said:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital.Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the

hospital he continued to be under observation and treatment.

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified asschizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsenedwith time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; thateven if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right

and wrong.


5/65

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years afterplaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under

Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after (sic) existing at the time ofthe marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason,freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition ofplaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this verycomplaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really

lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic). 5(Emphasis supplied).

On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The

latter is respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will. 6

Five years later or on October 26, 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) 7a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of herlate grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay which case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No.117-M-95. In her petition, she alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of thedecedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of the estate. 8

On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the decedent, that he hasbeen managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect the integrityof the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor formore than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him. 9

On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the special proceedingcase alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Insupport thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by rightof representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabel's fatherpredeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by representation. Petitionercontends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents

is "null and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent. 10On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioner's Motion toDismiss. 11When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 9,1998, 12petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his motion to dismiss as well as his motion forreconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding for the settlement ofestate of a deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the decision declaringthe marriage of respondent Isabel's parents "null and void" must be upheld; and (d) said decision had long become final and

had, in fact, been executed.

On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioner's motion to dismiss was alte having been filed after theopposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and that petitioner in hisopposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent Isabel's allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo

Suntay, the decedent's son. She further contends that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the judgment in CivilCase No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its dispositiveportion because in an action for annulment of a marriage, the court either sustains the validity of the marriage or nullifies it. Itdoes not, after hearing declare a marriage "voidable" otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly, that the status of

marriages under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled is "voidable."

The petition must fail.

Certiorarias a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) thetribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of


6/65

discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequateremedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the

proceeding. 13There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper. 14

A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's

motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted thereunder, to wit:

The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the pertinent laws applied, theCourt finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate considering the peculiar nature of this

special proceeding as distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was notadversarial in nature and the petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause of action against aparticular defendant. Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in the maintenance of the proceedings,not only because of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs qualify, the State shall acquire the

estate by escheat.

xxx xxx xxx

The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to file and maintain thisspecial proceedings, that in the case bench, the body of the decision determines the nature of the action

which is for annulment, not declaration of nullity.

The oppositor's contention that thefallo of the questioned decision (Annex "A" Motion) prevails overthe body thereof is not without any qualification. It holds true only when the dispositive portion of a final

decision is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation orconstruction.

Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may be referred to forpurposes of construing the judgment (78 SCRA 541 citingMorelos v. Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of JuanPresto v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive portion must find support from the decision'sratio

decidendi.

Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as Annex "A" of oppositor'smotion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basisof Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Petitionerbeing conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered

legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.). 15

The trial court correctly ruled that "a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate." The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings. 16The Rules do not onlyapply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and othercases not therein provided for.

Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filedthereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed "within thetime for but before filing the answer to the complaint." Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before the filing of

petitioner's opposition 17which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.

Not only was petitioner's motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost two years after respondent Isabel was alreadythrough with the presentation of her witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented two witnesses. The filing of the

motion to dismiss is not only improper but also dilatory.

The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence on this matter, as petitionerasserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case. In fact, the alleged conflict between thebody of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFIof Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is clear under

paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family Code.

Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has categorically declared that themarriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void" and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the marriagefrom its inception is void and the children born out of said marriage are illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained.

Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 18of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. 19


7/65

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have takenplace at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status,

rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Art icle 89 20irrespective of whether or not the partiesto the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.

On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by finaljudgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the specialcontract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from

being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate ;and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged

natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. 21(Emphasis supplied).

Stated otherwise, the annulment of "the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formedby the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union produced during

its continuance." 22

Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal connotations and implications, Annul means to reduce to

nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with 23whereas null and voidis something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulledpresupposes that it

subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifyinga marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition which already exists from the very beginning.

There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that it is the dispositive portion of the decision which must control as towhether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents was void or voidable. Such argument springs from amiscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the

body of the decision and its dispositive portion.

Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in thedispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions

presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing, 24the sameis not without a qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a finaldecision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need ofinterpretation or construction-which usually is "the case where the order or decision in question is that of a

court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which thejudgment is based." 25

Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the decision, effort must bemade to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the court.

In Republic v. de los Angeles26the Court said:

Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or applicationof laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." This mandate of

law, obviously cannot be any less binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments .

. . .The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so as to bring all of itsparts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as to giveeffect to every word and part if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court,consistent with the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864) [Emphasis supplied].

Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows that the marriage is

voidable:

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified asschizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsenedwith time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; thateven if the subject has shown marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate understanding of right

and wrong.


8/65

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years afterplaintiff's mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under

Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of themarriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabitedwith the other as husband and wife;

xxx xxx xxx

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition ofplaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this veryhandling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of

schizophernia (sic). 27

Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent Isabel's parentsbased on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of the childrenare therefore governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would beanathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and

Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside theirmarriage on October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estateadministratrix, the legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right ofrepresentation the estate of their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio AguinaldoSuntay, had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a determination by the courts ofwhether the Letters of Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the

successional rights of the personalities involved over the decedent's estate.

It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro,emphasized to "all magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be exercised in theformulation of the dispositive portion of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decisionbecomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as thedirections and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be spelled

out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or interpretation. 28

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISIMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.


9/65


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4316 May 28, 1952

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HON. HIGINIO MACADAEG, HON. POTENCIANO PECSON, HON. RAMON SAN JOSE, as Chairman and Members,respectively; of the Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, and ANTONIO GUILLERMO, alias, SLIVER, as aninterested party,respondents.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for petitioner.Hon. Higinio B. Macadaeg, Hon. Potenciano Pecson and Hon. Ramon R. San Jose in their own behalf. Antonio V. Raquizaand Marcelino N. Sayo for respondent Antonio Guillermo.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an action of prohibition against the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission, composed of Honorables HiginioMacadaeg, Potenciano Pecson, and Ramon R. San Jose, Judges of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to restrain andprevent it from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition for amnesty filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias

Silver, who was convicted and sentenced by this Court on May 19, 1950, for murder in G.R. No. L-2188.*

The grounds uponwhich the petition are based are (1) that this Court has already expressly ruled in its judgment of conviction of said case thatsaid Antonio Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because the murders of which he was convicted werecommitted "not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two rival guerillaunits," and (2) that the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in theSupreme Court on October 2, 1946 (date of Administrative Order No. 1 of the President), at that time. The respondents filedanswers independently of each other, and with the exception of Judge Ramon R. San Jose, they oppose the petition,alleging (1) that the decision of this Court does not prevent the respondent Antonio Guillermo from invoking his right to theprovisions of the amnesty, because said right was not an issue at the trial on the case against him, and the pronouncementof this Court thereon is not final and conclusive and is merely an obiter dictum, and (2) that under a liberal interpretation ofthe administrative orders implementing the President's Amnesty Proclamation, the respondent Commission has jurisdiction

of said petition.

The record discloses that the original information against respondent Antonio Guillermo was filed in the Court of FirstInstance of Ilocos Norte on September 16, 1946, and as amended information, on July 15, 1947. The Court of First Instance

rendered judgment on March 29, 1948. Thereupon, Guillermo presented an appeal to this Court, and this Court rendered itsjudgement on May 19, 1950. On June 5, 1950, Guillermo's Counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, but this motion wasdenied on July 13, 1950. On June 20, 1950, even before his motion for reconsideration was acted upon, respondentGuillermo filed a motion with this Court for the suspension of the proceedings and the reference of the case to the SeventhGuerilla Amnesty Commission, but this motion was denied by this Court on July 13, 1950. Antonio Guillermo filed his petitionfor amnesty for respondent Commission on July 8, 1950. On August 2, 1950, the records of the case against Guillermo wereremanded to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the execution of the judgment, and on October 17,1950, the respondent Commission required the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte to forward the records ofthe case to it, and on November 9, 1950, it is set the case for hearing over the opposition of the Solicitor General. It was at

this stage that this action of prohibition was filed in this Court.

The first ground upon which the opposition to the petition is based, namely, that the holding of this Court that the respondentGuillermo is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, is merely an obiter dictum, is without any legalfoundation, and must be dismissed. An obiter dictumis an opinion "uttered by the way, not upon the point or questionpending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects" (Newmanvs.Kay, 49 S.E. 926, 931, 57 W.Va. 98, 68 L.R.A. 908, 4 Ann. Cas. 39 citing United States ex rel. Johnston vs.Clark County Court, 96 U.S. 211, 24 Ed. 628),or the opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is not required to decide (29 Words & Phrases 15), or anopinion of the court which does not embody its determination and is made without argument or full consideration of the point,and is not professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself (29 Words & Phrases 13.). A cursory reading of thedecision of this Court in G. R. No. L-2188 **against respondent Antonio Guillermo discloses that the ruling of the Court thatthe said respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty is not an obiter dictum, but is a ruling of the Court on anissue expressly raised by the party appellant on facts or evidence adduced in the course of the trial of his case. It is not anopinion uttered by the way; it is a direct ruling on an issue expressly raised by a party. It was not unnecessary to make thatruling; the ruling was absolutely essential to a determination of a question of fact and of law directly in issue. It was not madewithout argument or full consideration of the point; it was deliberately entered by the Court after arguments on both sides

had been heard. This Could not have avoided determining the issue without the peril of rendering an incomplete decision.


10/65

Hereinbelow we quote portions of the decision of this Court, from it which it can readily be seen that it had before it evidence

of the claim of amnesty expressly raised before the Court, and its ruling that appellant was not entitled thereto.

x x x x x x x x x

Apparently realizing the inconsistency and untenability of that position appellant also contends that granting for thesake of argument that the accused was the author of the crime, there is proof "that the ill-starred seven were

charged of (with) being spies for the Japanese.

The insincerity and weakness of this last-ditch plea is manifest. Appellant does not claim that he killed the sevenvictims because he had proof and believe that they were spies for the Japanese. He merely says that they were

charged (by Sagad) with being spies for the Japanese.

x x x x x x x x x

At any rate, the amnesty proclamation now invoked is not applicable. We are satisfied from the proofs that themassacre in question was committed not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of afracticidad strife between two rival guerrilla units. That was to hinder and not a further the resistance against theJapanese enemy. It was a shame: and it would be adding insult to injury to stigmatize the memory of theunfortunate victims of such lust for power of and supremacy as spies and traitors to their country, in the absence of

the competent proof as they really were. We spurn the baseless suggestion as rank injustice.

A more serious contention is, May not respondent Guillermo raise the issue before the corresponding guerrilla amnesty

commission in view of our ruling in the case of Viray vs. Crisologo, et al.***

G. R. No. L-2540, in which we held that the factthat the defendant has declined to take advantage of the amnesty proclamation at the beginning of his trial before a courtmartial does not preclude him from invoking it after he was found guilty and convicted. The express holding of this Court is

that case is as follows:

In our opinion the fact that respondent Crisologo had declined to take advantage of the amnesty proclamation atthe beginning of his trial before the court martial does not now preclude him from invoking it, specially after he wasfound guilty and convicted. Before his trial he may and he must have entertained the idea and the belief that thekilling was justified and was done in the performance of his duties as an official according to the criminal law, andthat consequently there was no need for amnesty. However, after the court martial had disagreed with him anddisabused him of his belief, he realized the necessity of invoking amnesty. There is nothing in the law that standsin his way toward seeking the benefits of a law which in his opinion covers and obliterates the act of which he had

been found criminally responsible.

We hold that the above cited is not applicable to the case at bar, for in that case the defendant did not invoke the benefits of

the amnesty at the time of the trial or on appeal, and only did so after he had been adjudge guilty and convicted, while in thecase at bar he did so. It is true that the appellant Guillermo did not expressly plead amnesty, but the facts andcircumstances surrounding the commission of the act charged against him as an offense were disclosed at the trial, fromwhich facts and circumstances he later predicated the issue, before this Court, that he was entitled to the benefits of theamnesty. It may be true that the appellant Guillermo did not expressly plead amnesty as a defense at the trial of his case.But the rules on the criminal procedure do not include to be expressly pleaded. (Section 1, Rule 113, Rule of Court.) Evenwithout an express plea of amnesty, a defendant may submit evidence that the commission of the act imputed to him fallswithin the provisions of the amnesty proclamation, without a previous formal announcement of such a defense before orduring the trial. And even without such express plea, if the court finds that the case falls under the provisions of the amnestyproclamation, it is the duty of the court to declare the fact, if the fact justify such a finding, and extend the benefits of the

amnesty to him.

. . .; and the accused, during such trial, may present evidence to prove that his case falls within the terms of thisamnesty. If the fact is legally proved, the trial judge shall so declare and this amnesty shall be immediatelyaffective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged. (Proclamation No. 8, September 7,

1946, 42 Off. Gaz., No. 9 p. 2073.)

That the respondent herein Guillermo did not submit evidence to that effect is inferred from the claim of his counsel in thecase against him that "there is proof that the ill starred seven were charged with being spies for the Japanese." Not onlythat, he expressly raised that issue in this Court on appeal. May he rise this issue again before the guerrilla amnestycommission, and thus have this administrative body reverse or change the finding of this Court?

Under the circumstances of the present case, we hold that he should no longer be permitted to do so in view of "the generalrule common to all civilized systems of jurisprudence that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by itsappointed organs, upon a disputed fact or state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the


11/65

question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed it has been well said that this more maxim is morethan a rule of law, more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is a fundamental concept in the

organization of every jural society." (Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil., 303, 310; section 44, Rule 39, Rules of Court).

It is also argued, in support of the claim that this Court had no jurisdiction to make the ruling that respondent Guillermo is notentitled to amnesty, that the guerrilla amnesty commissions are the first ones to pass upon petitions for amnesty, thatregular judicial tribunals can not rule upon such an issue (of amnesty) unless it has first been resolved by a commission, andthat these are not judicial tribunals but administrative bodies acting as arms of the executive in carrying out the purposes ofthe amnesty proclamation, which is merely a form of executive clemency. It is true that the grant of amnesty originates in anexclusive act. But the proclamation was issued under expressly authority in the Constitution [Article VII, section 10 (6)], wasexpressly sanctioned by the Congress (Resolution No. 13 dated September 18, 1946), and has the nature, force, effect, andoperation of a law. That the cognizance of applications for amnesty is vested in the guerrilla amnesty commissions are merescreening bodies is not denied, but there is nothing in the proclamation to support the contention that the authority todecide any claim for amnesty is to be exercised but said commissions alone, to the exclusion of the courts. Neither can it bedenied that any one charged before the courts may claim as a defense, waive the filing of an application therefor, andsubmit evidence thereof in the trial of his case. In this latter case it would be a cumbersome procedure, indeed, if saiddefense were first required to be submitted to commission for decision, latter to be reviewed by a court. The only sensibleinterpretation of the law is that while all applicationsshould be passed upon by commissions, an accused may, instead offiling an application, choose the alternative remedy of just raising the issue in a court of justice in the trial of his case. And ifthis second alternative is chosen, the applicant should be declared estopped from contesting the decision, as well as theauthority of the court that adversely passed upon his claim.

But there are further and other considerations, also weighty and important, that attend respondent Guillermo's petition foramnesty. He is not one filed during the pendency of this case in the Court of First Instance it is a petition filed after finaljudgment of conviction in this Supreme Court. It does not appear in the record that during the one and a half-year period

(September 16, 1946, to March 29, 1948) that this case was being coursed and tried in the Court of First Instance of IlocosNorte, that he ever filed an application for amnesty. Neither does it appear that the provincial fiscal has ever reportedGuillermo's case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission for Ilocos Norte, pursuant to the direct mandate of the amnestyproclamation. Nor did Guillermo ever claim amnesty as his defense at the time of the trial. May we not justly infer from thesepositive circumstances that, during all the time the case was pending and up to the filling of appellant's brief in the SupremeCourt, amnesty was never thought of as a defense, either by the accused himself or by the fiscal, or by the judge trying thecase? As a matter of fact, this Court found that the issue of amnesty raised in this Court of Appeal was a "last-ditch plea."Guillermo only thought of amnesty on June 20, 1950, after this Court had found him guilty, overruling his defense ofamnesty, and before his motion for reconsideration was denied. We are therefore, constrained to hold that his presentpetition is not entirely free from a reasonable suspicion as to its ends and purposes. It seems to us to be a last desperateattempt by technicality to avert or delay the execution of the judgment of conviction rendered against him. Of course, no

court of justice would countenance such ill-advised attempt.

The second ground upon which the petition for prohibition is based is that the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission has nojurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent Guillermo's application. We also find this contention to be correct.

Administrative Order No. 11, which creates the guerrilla amnesty commission, expressly assigns to the Seventh "cases fromthe different provinces and cities now pending appeal in the Supreme Court." (Emphasis ours.) Said administrative orderwas promulgated on October 2, 1946, on which date the criminal case against respondent Guillermo was still pending in theCourt of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. His case was a case in the province (Ilocos Norte) assigned to the Second GuerrillaAmnesty Commission. Respondents cite administrative Order No. 217 of the Department of Justice dated December 1,1948 to support their claim that the Seventh has jurisdiction of the application, because of that date Guillermo's case wasalready pending in the Supreme Court. This department order was issued, as it expressly states, "in view of theappointments of new Judges of First Instances," not for the purpose of setting forth cases cognizable by each of the differentcommissions, which the President had already done. Besides, it can not be interpreted to modify the President's

administrative order apportioning the cases among the amnesty commissions.

In resume of our conclusions, we state (1) that the finding of this Court that Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits ofamnesty, is not an obiter dictumbut a pronouncement on a material issue, and is final and conclusive against him and maynot, under the principle of res judicata, be again raised in issue by him in any tribunal, judicial or administrative; (2) thathaving voluntarily raised the issue in this Court during the consideration of his case, he is now estopped from contesting the

judgment, of the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse ruling; (3) that this petition is an ill -advised attempt ofdoubtful good faith, to arrest or delay the execution of a final judgement of conviction; and (4) that the respondent

Commission has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for amnesty.

Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is hereby granted, and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on November 24,

1950, made absolute, with costs against respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver.

Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.


12/65


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11986 July 31, 1958

BERNARDO MANALANG, ET AL.,petitioners-appellants,vs.ELVIRA TUASON DE RICKARDS, ET AL.,respondent-appellees.

Luis Manalang and Associates for appellants.

Jorge V. Jazmines for appellees.

FELIX, J. :

Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards is the owner of private subdivision located at Sampaloc, Manila, with an area of 44,561.80square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 40961 (Exhibit 13) in 1954, the lots therein were leased to varioustenants among whom were Bernardo Manalang, Vicente de Leon and Salvador de Leon occupying Lots Nos. 174-C, 160and 158, respectively. As the City of Manila allegedly increased the assessment of said land effective January 1, 1954, theadministrator thereof notified the tenants of the corresponding increase of the rentals of the lots therein, such that the rentalfor the lot occupied by Bernardo Manalang was raised from P36 to 80; the rental for Lot No. 160 was raised from P10 to

P43.12; and from P24 to P51.24 for Lot No. 158. The said tenants, however, insisted on paying the former rate, and as thelandowner refused to accept the same, the former consigned them in court.

On April 27, 1954, Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards, assisted by her husband, Jose A. Rickards, instituted with the MunicipalCourt of Manila Civil Case No. 31401 against Bernardo Manalang; Civil Case No. 31406 against Salvador de Leon; and CivilCase No. 31411 against Vicente de Leon, all for ejectment. Therein defendants filed separate motions to dismiss invokingthe provisions of Republic Act No. 1162, which was approved on June 18, 1954. The matter was duly heard and on July 14,1954, the Municipal Judge of Manila issued an order denying the motions to dismiss and suspending the proceedings for 2

years from the enactment of Republic Act No. 1162 or until further order from the Court.

On April 13, 1955, upon motion of the plaintiffs, the Municipal Judge issued an order setting the cases for hearing on themerits. Defendants tried to secure a reconsideration of the aforesaid order, but as their motion was denied, they filed apetition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 26135) against the spousesRickards and the Judges of the Municipal Court of Manila, alleging that the order of the same Court of July 14, 1954, alreadydisposed of the action and determined the rights of the parties. It was thus prayed that a writ enjoining the respondent

Judges from proceeding with the hearing the cases be issued; that said respondents be declared without jurisdiction to hearthe same; and that the orders of Municipal Judge Estrella Abad Santos setting the case for hearing on the merits and the

order of Acting Judge Sumilang Bernardo denying their motion for reconsideration be set aside and declared null and void.

To this petition, the respondent spouses filed their answer denying some of the averments of the same. And specialdefenses, it was contended that the order of July 14, 1954, did not settle the controversy it being merely an interlocutoryorder, and as such could not be reviewed by a petition for certiorari. It was, therefore, prayed that the petition be dismiss edand the Municipal Judges be ordered to hear the cases on the merits.

On February 6, 1956, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petition on the ground that the order of the inferiorcourt was merely interlocutory in nature, and that the statements contained in the body thereof were the basis of the court'sruling, as embodied in the dispositive part thereof denying the motion to dismiss and suspending the proceedings therein for2 years or until further order from the court. From this decision, defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the lattertribunal certified the case to Us on the ground that it involves only a question purely of law.

The main issue presented by the instant action is whether the order of the inferior court of July 14, 1954, is interlocutory ornot and consequently, whether the lower court erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed therein. The

aforementioned order of the Municipal Judge dated July 14, 1954, is hereunder copied in full:

ORDER

After a thorough consideration of the Motion to Dismiss and the opposition thereto, this Court is of the opinion andso holds that from the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 no ejectment proceedings should be instituted orprosecuted against any tenant or occupant and that the unpaid rentals of the tenants, if any they have, shall be


13/65

liquidated and shall be paid in 18, equal monthly installments from the date or time of liquidation and that thelandlord cannot charge more than the amount being charged or collected by them from their tenants as of

December 31, 1953.

It is undisputed fact that the premises occupied by the herein-defendants have been and are actually being leasedto tenants, for which reason it is governed by the provisions of the aforesaid Act. But inasmuch as these threecases of ejectment have been instituted before the approval of said Act, it is the considered opinion of this Courtthat its prosecution should be suspended. As to the motion to dismiss same is untenable and without merit, for ifthese cases of ejectment will be dismissed as claimed by the herein defendants, the liquidation of the unpaidrentals could not be carried out effectively as provided by said Act.

As to the unconstitutionality of section 5 of the Republic Act in question, the presumption is that same is valid andconstitutional until it is declared otherwise by the competent tribunal, for which reason we deem it our boundenduty to enforce the avowed policy of the Republic of the Philippines, as expressed in said Act (Pastor Mauricio et

al. vs. Hon. Felix Martinez et al., CA-G. R. 5114-R, promulgated January 31, 1952).

WHEREFORE, this Court orders the denial of the motion to dismiss, and the suspension of the proceedings in thethree above-entitled cases during the period of two years from the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 or until

further order of this Court.

We see no reason why the ruling of the lower Court should not be affirmed. The order of the Municipal Judge of July 14,1954, is clear enough to call for any construction or interpretation, for while it opens with the paragraph stating that it was theopinion of the court "and so holds that from the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 no ejectment proceedings should beinstituted", etc., the dispositive portion of the order decreed the denial of the motion to dismiss which was based on the

same Republic Act No. 1162. And this ruling is understandable. It appears that the actions for ejectment were filed beforethe enactment of Republic Act No. 1162 and conceivably under the general principle that laws can only be enforcedprospectively, the Municipal Judge for one reason or another saw it fit to suspend the proceedings for quite a long period,probably with the expectation that the question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1162 might be in the meantime

duly passed upon.

It can be seen from the foregoing that the issues presented in the ejectment proceedings were not settled thereby, forprecisely the motion to dismiss filed by defendants based on the provisions of Republic Act No. 1162 was denied. Certainly,said actions having been merely suspended, and the jurisdiction of the court over said proceedings not having beenassailed, the said court has the power to reopen the same for trial on the merits in order that the rights of the parties thereincould be finally determined. It is argued, however, by appellants that the body of the order recognized the prohibition laiddown by Republic Act No. 1162 against the institution of ejectment proceedings after the effectivity of said Act. It is anelementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of thedecision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questionspresented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declarations in the body of said order that may be

confusing. In the case at bar, considering that the dispositive part of the order merely suspended the proceedings withouttouching on the merits of the case or disposing of the issues involved therein, said order cannot be said to be final in

character but clearly an interlocutory one which in this case cannot be the subject of an action for certiorari.

Wherefore, and acting merely on the question of procedure submitted to Us by the instant appeal, We have to affirm, as Wedo hereby affirm, the order of the lower Court dismissing appellant's petition for certiorari and prohibition. Without

pronouncement as to costs. It is ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia,JJ.,concur.


14/65


Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40675 August 17, 1983

PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.HON. VICENTE ERICTA, Judge, Court, of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch XVIII; THE ACTING BRANCH CLERKOF COURT, Branch XVIII; REGISTER OF DEEDS- OF QUEZON CITY; and JAIME 0. RIVERA,respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner. Renato B. Herrera for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, Act ing C.J :

The Court dismisses for lack of legal basis and merit this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to set aside thequestioned orders of respondent judge granting execution of its final and executory decision and judg[nent orderingpetitioner corporation to execute the sale of the subject property in favor of private respondent and to annul thecorresponding transfer certificate of title issued by respondent register of deeds in favor of said respondent pursuant to the

deed of sale executed by respondent branch clerk of court on behalf of petitioner corporation as authorized by respondentjudge.

Private respondent Jaime O. Rivera had obtained as plaintiff the judgment of December 28, 1971 granting his 6tct ion forspecific performance and "ordering the defendant petitioner [PHHC] to execute a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff[respondent Rivera] of the entire property described in paragraph 2 of the complaint" and to pay P2,000.00 - attomey's feesand costs. The judgment was - entered pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3802 enacted by Congress on June 22,1963 providing for the sale at cost to registered tenants/lessees like respondent of the dwelling units occupied by them andfor the application in full in their favor of an the past rentals paid by them to the purchase price. Petitioner failed to appeal thesaid judgment which has long since become final and executory. In fact, in Resolution No. 17 of its board approved on July25, 1972, petitioner formally accepted respondent's proposal to waive the P2,000.00 - attorney's fees awarded in his favorby the judgment and approved the sale of the entire property (Lots 12-A to 12-H, Block 447, together with the rowhouses

thereon) with one unit for residential purposes and the others for a general and maternity clinic.

Nevertheless, petitioner failed to execute the corresponding deed of sale in favor of respondent despite two writs ofexecution issued by respondent judge at respondent's instance, with the claim not set forth in the aforesaid board resolutionthat respondent had not completed payment of the purchase price (at cost). Respondent consequently filed a motion for thelower court to appoint and authorize the clerk of court to execute the deed of sale on behalf of petitioner corporation in hisfavor, expressly asserting that "as duly proven during the trial of this case, [that] he has completed payment of the totalconsideration of the sale as he is covered by Republic Act No. 3802 which provided for the sale at cost [of the 'properties] to

registered tenants."1Overruling petitioner's opposition thereto, respondent judge issued the questionedOrder of March 14, 1975 granting the motion, as follows:

Acting on the plaintiff's motion dated March 3, 1975, and the defendant's opposition thereto dated March6, 1975, the Court hereby orders Atty. Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, Acting Branch Clerk of Court, to executea Deed of Sale of the property described in paragraph 2 of the complaint for the amount of P31,427.01which, as per decision of this Court dated December 28, 1971, had already been paid by the plaintiff to

the defendant People's Homesite and Housing Corporation.

xxx xxx xxx

The execution of this Deed of Sale shall be done at the cost of the defendant People's Homesite and Housing Corporation

and the Deed of Sale shall have the same effect as if it was executed by the defendant itsell " 2

Petitioner filed an extended motion for reconsideration and respondent judge, squarely meeting the issues raised, denied

the same in the questioned extended Order of April 21, 1975, as follows:

The motion for reconsideration is based on the allegation that the dispositive portion of the decision ofthis Court dated December 28, 1971 does not contain the purchase price of the property and, therefore,


15/65

its inclusion in the Order of the Court dated March 14, 1975 is allegedly contrary to Rule 39, Section 1 ofthe Rules of Court. The PHHC contends that only the dispositive portion of the decision constitutes the

real judgment which should be executed.

The dispositive portion which is being executed reads as follows among others:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment ordering the defendant to execute a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff of the

entire property described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;'

Precisely, the Order of the Court dated March 14, 1975 orders the execution of the aforecited dispositiveportion of the decision. This decision has become final and executory. The inclusion of the purchasepyice of P31,427 01 in the Deed of Sale to be executed by the Clerk of Court does not prejudice thePHHC nor does it alter the decisiom Although the purchase pyice does not appear in the dispositive part;

it can be found on page two of the decision itself

The Court does not wholly subscribe to the view that the judginent can be found only in the dispositiveportion of the decision.

It is true that the resolution of the court in a given issue, which determines and settlesthe rights of the parties, is ordinarily embodied in the last or dispositive portion of thedecision (Manalang vs. Rickards, G.R. No. L- 11986, promulgated July 31, 1958), yet,not infrequently such resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts thereolStyle in decisionmaking or preparation is personal to its writer. As long as the decisionsatisfied the requirement of the law (Art. VIII Sec. 12, Philippine Constitution; Rule 35,Sec. 1. Rules of Court), we find no compelling reason to adopt a definite and stringentrule underlining how and where the judgment would be framed. Indeed it is well saidthat to get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof shouldbe resorted to but same must be considered in its entirety (Escarella vs. Director ofLands, 83 Phil. 491; 46 Off. Gaz. No. 11, p. 5487; I Moran's Comments on the Rulesof Court, 1957 Ed. p. 478, Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans' Board and AssGciates

Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., No. L-12779, dated August 28, 1929, 106 Phil. 125). 3

Hence, the present action of petitioner contending that respondent judge's court "abused its discretion or acted without or inexcess of its jurisdiction" in issuing the aforesaid questioned Orders leading to the execution of the deed of sale by the clerkof court on behalf of petitioner corporation and the issuance of T.C.T. No. 206668 of Quezon City in respondent's favor "byadding therein matters which were not included in the dispositive portion of the decision dated December 28, 1971. " As

above stated, the Court has found the petition to be without legal basis and merit.

Respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion nor did he act "capriciously or whimsically" as to amount to lackof jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Orders. As correctly stated by respondent judge in denying reconsideration, his courtwas merely ordering the execution of the dispositive portion or judgment of the decision for 11 execution of a deed of sale infavor of the plaintiff [herein respondentj," no more, no less. Said judgment ordered the execution of such deed of saleunqualifiedly and unconditionally and has long become final and executory. The entire record shows that no claim is madeby petitioner that the amount of P31,427.01 paid by respondent by way of rentals for a period of ten years (1954 to 1964) (asexpressly found in the decision) does not cover the full cost to it of the property. The decision's clear implication is that theserentals did fully cover the cost to petitioner of the property and therefore constituted full,,payment of the purchase price as

fixed by

Republic Act No. 3802. Hence, the judgment ordering unqualifiedly the execution of the sale to respondent, subject to no

further payment of any amount.

If petitioner wanted to dispute such judgment, it should have appealed the same but it did not do so. Nevertheless, whenrespondent moved for authority for the branch clerk of court to execute the sale due to petitioner's failure to heed the writ s of

execution, pursuant to Rule 39, section 10 of the Rules of Court, 4petitioner was given full opportunity both in itsopposition and at the hearing of respondent's motion to show that such rentals paid by respondent did notcover the fun cost to petitioner of the property (as fixed by the cited covering Act) but it could not cite anydeficiency. It still had another opportunity when it filed its motion for reconsideration, but could not do so.Manifestly, respondent's rental payments fully covered the purchase price (at cost) of the property. Allpetitioner could do was raise a technical question that the trial court's final decision of December 28, 1971did not contain the purchase price of the property. This was utterly untenable since the judgmentunqualifiedly ordered the execution of the sale without any further payment and petitioner failed to showthat respondent's substantial rental payments over a ten-year period did not fully cover the cost of the


16/65

property. Finally, having submitted this issue for respondent judge's resolution, petitioner is now inestoppel from "speculating on the fortunes of litigation" and now challenging the adverse orders in thesecertiorari and prohibition proceedings.5

Two other submittals of petitioner are equally without merit. First, the fact that respondent branch clerk of court executed thedeed of sale before petitioner was furnished a copy of the execution order of March 14, 1975 (due to an oversight of the

mailing clerk) in no way constitutes a jurisdictional defect that affects the validity of the order. 6The order for execution ofthe deed of sale was a matter of right flowing from a final and executory judgment and could have beenissuedex parteunder Rule 39, section 1 of the Rules of Court. At any rate, petitioner had fuu opportunityto contest the order, through its motion for reconsideration which was denied in due course by respondent

judge per the reasoned Order of April 21, 1975. Second, contrary to petitioner's claim, no abuse ofdisicretion was committed when respondent judge issued the execution order notwithstanding thependency in the Court of Appeals at the time of CA-G.R. No. 51545-R entitled "Jaime O. Rivera,

petitioner-appellee vs. PHHC,respondent-appellant," which was an appeal by petitioner from the adversejudgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City permanently enjoining it from enforcing anejectment order agikinst respondent in view of petitioner's subsequent approval of the sale of the propertyto respondent pursuant to Republic Act No. 3802. Clearly, the pendency of such appeal had no bearingon the questioned execution orders at bar. At any rate, the ejectment order had manifestly become mootand academic as correctly held therein by the lower court. Finally the records of said case show that asper judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals on September 14, 1978, the judgment appealed from byherein petitioner PHHC was affirmed and final entry of judgment was therein made on October 13, 1978.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued is lifted effective

immediately. No costs.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Relova, J., took no part.


17/65


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE,petitioner,vs.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY,respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J. :

A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemedlegally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laidout in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of the bench

and the bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures and requirements.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision2and July 29,

2003 Order3of the Regional Tr ial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).4

The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief5filed before the RTC-Manila by hereinRespondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence,Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any ofherein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his

flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x."6

Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed aClarificatory Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a

separate Motion for Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:

"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a Constitutionalprovision and to declare whether acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive portionbecause a dispositive portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and thebenefit that the prevailing party wronged should get. The step that these movants have to take, is direct appealunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the SupremeCourt."7

The Antecedent Proceedings

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the RTC-Manila against Velarde andhis aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutionalprovisions,8specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the actsof religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for aspecified candidate.

The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:

"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss.Subsequently, Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While HisEminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, f iled an Answer within the extended periodand similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the commongrounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered tosubmit a pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions toDismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider the


18/65

denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano

complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. x x x.

"x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde,Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than thosealready considered in the motions to dismiss x x x."9

After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in praying for adetermination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental

Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law."10

It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in thePetitionthe separation of church and stateeven tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle.Through its discourse, the court a quoopined at some point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to

any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."11

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus,

Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

Hence, this Petition for Review.12

This Court, in a Resolution13dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submittheir respective comments. In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties -- impleaded as respondents in the

original case below --the opportunity to comment, if they so desired.

On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14

The Issues

In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution:

"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quowas proper and valid;

"2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondents Petit ion for declaratory relief;

"3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;

"4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial

determination;

"5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,

"6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent."15

During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified as follows:

"A. Procedural Issues

"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action? Did

respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?

"B. Substantive Issues

"1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and

the Rules of Court?

"2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsingcandidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said

candidates?"

The Courts Ruling


19/65

The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.

Procedural Issues:

Requis i tes of Pet i t ions f or Dec lara tory Rel ie f

Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for declaratory relief, provides in part:

"Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmentalregulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to

determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder."

Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contractor other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. Thepurpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration ofthe parties rights or duties thereunder.16The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciablecontroversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legalinterest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.17

Justiciable Controversy

Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much less establish before the trial court, that there

existed a justiciable controversy or an adverse legal interest between them; and that SJS had a legal right that was beingviolated or threatened to be violated by petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on merespeculations, contingent events, and hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened into an actual controversy. Thus, itsPetition for Declaratory Relief must fail.

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, notone that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.18The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failedto allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petitiondid not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and whatparticular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.

As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment,19what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS?He confesses that he does not know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC)"yields nothing in this respect." His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28,

2003, the election season had not even started yet; and that, in any event, he has not been actively involved in partisanpolitics.

An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain "a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate

facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim x x x." 20Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.

Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that suchactual or threatened endorsement "will enable [them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden totheir leaders, enabling them to control the government"[;]21and "pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious erosion of thepeoples faith in the electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of

elections,"22which would then be violative of the separation clause.

Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute ajusticiable controversy. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the

respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, aparticular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.

Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitableviolation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actualcontroversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable23cannot be exercised when there is no actual orthreatened violation of a legal right.

All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was "that the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof be resolved."24In otherwords, it merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective


20/65

candidates for political offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask fora declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights.

Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.25

Cause of Action

Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause of action need not be alleged orproven. Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, there need not be any violation of a right, breach of duty or actual wrongcommitted by one party against the other.

Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for declaratory relief should be a deed, a will, acontract (or other written instrument), a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. But the subject matter ofthe SJS Petition is "the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for electiveoffice or to urge or require the members of the flock to vote for a specified candidate." 26According to petitioner, this subjectmatter is "beyond the realm of an action for declaratory relief."27Petitioner avers that in the absence of a valid subject matter,

the Petition fails to state a cause of action and, hence, should have been dismissed outright by the court a quo.

A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to thelatter.28Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the nameddefendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right ofthe

plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.29

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal. 30However, in special civil actionsfor declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for thisexception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instrumentsinvolved or of rights arising thereunder.31Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least

threatened.

A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the former had any legal right in itsfavor that it sought to protect. We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it "hasthousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarificationof the constitutionality of the partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in the process to insure

adherence to the Constitution by everyone x x x."32

Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not only is the presumed interest notpersonal in character; it is likewise too vagu

LEGAL WRITING CASES

Documents

Transcript of LEGAL WRITING CASES