Legal Support to Operations - · PDF fileand personnel supporting Army operations. Legal...

FM 27-100

Legal Support toOperations

Approved byThe Judge Advocate General

Pursuant to Army Regulation 5-22

30 September 1999

Field Manual 27-100: Legal Support to Operations

i

PREFACE

Legal support to operations encompasses all legal services provided by JudgeAdvocate General’s Corps (JAGC) personnel in support of commanders, units, andsoldiers throughout an area of operation and across the spectrum of operations. Thissupport includes Operational Law and the six Core Legal Disciplines, which supportcommand and control, sustainment, and personnel service support. Legal support tooperations promotes the operational mission, provides quality legal services, andpreserves the legitimacy of operations.

Field Manual 27-100, Legal Support to Operations, is the Army’s capstone legaldoctrinal manual. It describes the missions and operations of JAGC organizations, units,and personnel supporting Army operations. Legal support to operations must bethoroughly integrated into all aspects of operations to ensure compliance with law andpolicy and to provide responsive, quality legal services. This manual does not providecomprehensive treatment of the Law of War or Geneva Conventions. For information onthese topics, refer to Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.

The purpose of this manual is to provide authoritative doctrine and guidance onall legal support to Army operations. It also provides the basis for legal training,organizational, and materiel development. It contains guidance for commanders, StaffJudge Advocates, staffs, and other JAGC personnel. It implements relevant Joint andArmy doctrine, incorporates lessons learned from recent operations, and conforms toArmy keystone doctrine.

The proponent of this publication is The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S.Army. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 to Commandant, TheJudge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, ATTN: JAGS-CDD, Charlottesville,Virginia 22903-1781.

Unless otherwise stated, specific gender pronouns include men and women.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 ROLE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE .....................................................................1-11.1 THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS MISSION..........................1-11.2 PERFORMING TRADITIONAL ROLES .........................................................1-1

1.2.1 Mission.........................................................................................................1-21.2.2 Service..........................................................................................................1-21.2.3 Legitimacy....................................................................................................1-21.2.4 The Military General Practitioner ................................................................1-31.2.5 The "Judge" Function...................................................................................1-41.2.6 The "Advocate" Function .............................................................................1-51.2.7 The "Ethical Adviser" Function ...................................................................1-51.2.8 The "Counselor" Function............................................................................1-5

1.3 IN A CHALLENGING NEW ENVIRONMENT...............................................1-61.3.1 More Missions..............................................................................................1-61.3.2 Command and Control Relationships ..........................................................1-71.3.3 International Operations ...............................................................................1-71.3.4 Fluid Operations...........................................................................................1-71.3.5 Technological Advancements ......................................................................1-8

1.4 CHALLENGES FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES IN THE 21ST CENTURY .......1-81.4.1 Mission.........................................................................................................1-81.4.2 Service..........................................................................................................1-91.4.3 Legitimacy..................................................................................................1-10

1.5 SUMMARY......................................................................................................1-102 ORGANIZATION TO SUPPORT ARMY OPERATIONS .....................................2-1

2.1 JUDGE ADVOCATE ORGANIZATIONS .......................................................2-12.1.1 Office of The Judge Advocate General ........................................................2-12.1.2 Field Operating Agencies .............................................................................2-32.1.3 The U.S. Army Legal Services Agency........................................................2-32.1.4 The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army.....................................2-52.1.5 Army National Guard Legal Organizations..................................................2-62.1.6 U.S. Army Reserve Legal Organizations .....................................................2-72.1.7 Staff Judge Advocate Offices.....................................................................2-102.1.8 Command Judge Advocates .......................................................................2-14

2.2 JOINT LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS ................................................................2-142.2.1 The Office of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ...2-142.2.2 Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Unified Command Staff JudgeAdvocates ................................................................................................................2-152.2.3 Joint Task Force Staff Judge Advocate......................................................2-15

2.3 MULTINATIONAL FORCE LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS ............................2-152.4 PROVIDING ARMY LEGAL SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS.....................2-15

2.4.1 Overview of Operational Law Support ......................................................2-162.4.2 Tailoring Operational Law Support ...........................................................2-19

2.5 SUMMARY......................................................................................................2-20

iv

3 OPLAW AND CORE LEGAL DISCIPLINES SUPPORTING ARMYOPERATIONS .................................................................................................................3-1

3.1 INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................3-13.2 OPLAW ..............................................................................................................3-23.3 MILITARY JUSTICE.........................................................................................3-33.4 INTERNATIONAL LAW ..................................................................................3-63.5 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.................................................................................3-73.6 CIVIL LAW ........................................................................................................3-93.7 CLAIMS............................................................................................................3-113.8 LEGAL ASSISTANCE ....................................................................................3-133.9 SUMMARY......................................................................................................3-15

4 LEGAL SUPPORT IN THEATER OPERATIONS..................................................4-14.1 THE THEATER..................................................................................................4-2

4.1.1 Key Terms and Distinctions .........................................................................4-24.1.2 Communications Zone and Combat Zone....................................................4-34.1.3 Strategy.........................................................................................................4-34.1.4 Structures of Command and Coordination...................................................4-44.1.5 Command, Control, and Support Relationships...........................................4-8

4.2 PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING........................................................4-104.2.1 Planning......................................................................................................4-104.2.2 Functions of Staffs .....................................................................................4-114.2.3 The Military Decision Making Process......................................................4-124.2.4 Decision Making in a Time-Constrained Environment. ............................4-184.2.5 SJA Planning, Decision-Making, and Orders. ...........................................4-20

4.3 LEGAL SUPPORT IN THEATER..................................................................4-204.3.1 Introduction. ...............................................................................................4-204.3.2 Overseas Presence and Force Projection....................................................4-214.3.3 Legal Support in Theater ............................................................................4-224.3.4 The United States as a Theater (Domestic Operations). ............................4-244.3.5 Technical Channels. ...................................................................................4-24

4.4 MATERIEL ......................................................................................................4-254.4.1 Legal Automation.......................................................................................4-254.4.2 Mobility......................................................................................................4-284.4.3 Communications ........................................................................................4-29

4.5 TRAINING .......................................................................................................4-294.5.1 Principles of Training.................................................................................4-294.5.2 Mission Essential Task Lists (METL)........................................................4-324.5.3 Planning for Training. ................................................................................4-34

4.6 LEGAL SUPPORT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS ......................................4-354.6.1 Legal Support and Special Operations ......................................................4-374.6.2 Legal Support and Civil Affairs .................................................................4-38

5 LEGAL SUPPORT IN WAR ....................................................................................5-15.1 THE LIMITS OF WAR ......................................................................................5-25.2 PHASED AND NESTED OPERATIONS .........................................................5-35.3 CONCEPT OF LEGAL SUPPORT IN WAR ....................................................5-4

v

5.3.1 Command & Control, Sustainment, Personnel Service Support..................5-45.3.2 Command and Control (C2).........................................................................5-45.3.3 Sustainment ..................................................................................................5-55.3.4 Personnel Service Support ...........................................................................5-6

5.4 THE CORE LEGAL DISCIPLINES IN WAR...................................................5-75.4.1 Administrative Law......................................................................................5-85.4.2 Claims ..........................................................................................................5-85.4.3 Civil Law......................................................................................................5-85.4.4 Military Justice.............................................................................................5-85.4.5 International Law..........................................................................................5-85.4.6 Legal Assistance...........................................................................................5-9

5.5 ORGANIZATION FOR WAR ...........................................................................5-95.5.1 Theater Legal Structure ................................................................................5-95.5.2 Army Service Component Command ..........................................................5-95.5.3 Command Posts..........................................................................................5-105.5.4 Judge Advocate Disposition.......................................................................5-115.5.5 Brigade Command and Control Facilities ..................................................5-22

5.6 MATERIEL IN WAR.......................................................................................5-245.7 TRAINING FOR WAR ....................................................................................5-25

6 LEGAL SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR ..........6-16.1 INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................6-26.2 STRATEGIC CONCEPT ...................................................................................6-36.3 THEATER CONCEPT .......................................................................................6-3

6.3.1 Political Objectives ......................................................................................6-46.3.2 Legal Complexity .........................................................................................6-46.3.3 Mission Complexity .....................................................................................6-46.3.4 Command and Control .................................................................................6-46.3.5 Interagency Coordination .............................................................................6-5

6.4 THE ARMY'S ROLE IN MOOTW....................................................................6-56.4.1 Arms Control................................................................................................6-66.4.2 Combating Terrorism ...................................................................................6-66.4.3 Counter-Drug Operations .............................................................................6-66.4.4 Enforcement of Sanctions and Exclusion Zones..........................................6-66.4.5 Humanitarian Assistance..............................................................................6-66.4.6 Nation Assistance.........................................................................................6-76.4.7 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.........................................................6-76.4.8 Peace Operations ..........................................................................................6-76.4.9 Recovery Operations ....................................................................................6-86.4.10 Show of Force Operations............................................................................6-86.4.11 Strikes and Raids..........................................................................................6-86.4.12 Support to Insurgencies ................................................................................6-96.4.13 Operations Under Armistice Conditions ......................................................6-9

6.5 ORGANIZATION OF LEGAL SUPPORT........................................................6-96.6 LEGAL ASPECTS OF C2, SUSTAINMENT, AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

6-9

vi

6.6.1 Legal Basis for the Operation.....................................................................6-106.6.2 Status of Forces ..........................................................................................6-106.6.3 International & Interagency Relationships .................................................6-116.6.4 Use of Force & Rules of Engagement (ROE) ............................................6-116.6.5 Treatment of Civilians................................................................................6-126.6.6 Fiscal Responsibility ..................................................................................6-136.6.7 Intelligence Oversight ................................................................................6-14

6.7 LEGAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS..........................................................6-146.8 LEGAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS......................................................6-156.9 SUMMARY......................................................................................................6-15

7 THE UNITED STATES AS A THEATER...............................................................7-17.1 INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................7-17.2 Organizing and Equipping Judge Advocates ......................................................7-27.3 Training Judge Advocates...................................................................................7-27.4 Military Support to Civil Authorities..................................................................7-3

7.4.1 General .........................................................................................................7-37.4.2 Authorization for Military Support ..............................................................7-37.4.3 Lead Agency Concept and Role of Military.................................................7-47.4.4 Rules for Use of Force.................................................................................7-5

7.5 Military Support to Law Enforcement ................................................................7-67.5.1 Civil Disturbance Operations .......................................................................7-67.5.2 Counter-Drug Operations .............................................................................7-9

7.6 Emerging Threats in the Continental United States (Terrorism) ......................7-128 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT....................................................................................8-1

8.1 INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................8-28.2 ROE DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS...................................................8-2

8.2.1 Commander's Responsibility........................................................................8-28.2.2 Purposes of ROE ..........................................................................................8-28.2.3 Drafting Considerations ...............................................................................8-38.2.4 Situation Considerations - METT-TC..........................................................8-48.2.5 Definitions and Key Concepts......................................................................8-58.2.6 Types of ROE...............................................................................................8-6

8.3 CJCS Standing ROE ...........................................................................................8-78.4 THE I-D-D-T METHODOLOGY ......................................................................8-9

8.4.1 Interpret ........................................................................................................8-98.4.2 Draft ...........................................................................................................8-108.4.3 Disseminate ................................................................................................8-138.4.4 Train ...........................................................................................................8-13

vii

INTRODUCTION

Mission of The Judge Advocate General’s Corps and Purpose of FM 27-100

The mission of judge advocates and supporting legal personnel is to provideprofessional legal services at all echelons of command throughout the range of militaryoperations.1 The purpose of Field Manual (FM) 27-100 is to describe how the JudgeAdvocate General’s Corps (JAGC) will provide legal support to operations and howcommanders should integrate legal support in operational planning and training.

Legal Support to Operations and Functional Areas

Legal support to operations encompasses all legal services provided by judgeadvocates and other legal personnel in support of units, commanders, and soldiersthroughout an area of operations and across the spectrum of operations. Legal support tooperations falls into three functional areas: command and control, sustainment, andpersonnel service support (or support for short). The following are illustrative examples ofthe types of legal support within these functional areas. Command and control functionsinclude advice to commanders, staffs, and soldiers on the legal aspects of commandauthority, command discipline, the application of force, and the Law of War (LOW). Someexamples of judge advocates’ command and control responsibilities are interpreting,drafting, and training commanders, staffs, and soldiers on rules of engagement;participating in targeting cells; participating in the military decision-making process;participating in information operations; applying the LOW; and advising commanders onpolicies prescribing soldier conduct and ensuring discipline (e.g., jurisdictionalalignment, convening authority structure, and authority to issue General Orders).Generally, issues directly affecting the commander’s operational decision-making processon the battlefield fall within command and control functions. Sustainment functionsinclude negotiation of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements and status of forcesagreements (SOFAs), combat contingency contracting, fiscal law, processing claimsarising in an operational environment, and environmental law. Personnel service supportfunctions include soldier discipline advocacy services (courts-martial, nonjudicialpunishment, and other routine matters in the administration of military justice), legalassistance services, and basic soldier-related claims issues.

Operational Law

Operational Law is that body of domestic, foreign, and international law that directlyaffects the conduct of operations. The practice of Operational Law consists of legalservices that directly affect the command and control and sustainment of an operation.Thus, Operational Law consists of the command and control and sustainment functions oflegal support to operations. Support functions are an integral part of legal support tooperations; however, they are treated separately from this discussion of Operational Law.

viii

Core Legal Disciplines

The six core legal disciplines are administrative law, civil law (including contract,fiscal, and environmental law), claims, international law, legal assistance, and militaryjustice. Functional areas of legal support to operations contain some core legaldisciplines in their entirety, and cut across others. For example, foreign claims are asustainment function, while personnel claims are a personnel service support function.Functional areas of legal support are intended to describe better what combat(operational) functions are supported by particular legal services. While some traditionaljudge advocate functions are associated with Combat Service Support (CSS), legalsupport to operations goes beyond traditional CSS functions, and often impactssubstantially on a commander’s command, control, and sustainment of an operation.Further, providing critical legal support requires the presence of judge advocates andother legal personnel far forward and in key operational headquarters, centers, and cells.

Doctrine to Train and Operate

The United States Army is doctrine-based, and FM 27-100 contains the doctrine forlegal support to operations. Doctrine within the military profession is the authoritativeguide to how forces fight wars and conduct operations.2 Doctrine builds on collectiveknowledge. It reflects wisdom that has been gained in past operations. It incorporatesinformed reasoning about how new technologies may best be used and new threats maybest be resisted.3 Doctrine, in this and other field manuals, records a shared and reasonedvision that can serve as the basis for planning operations, organizing and structuringforces, training soldiers and units, leading, developing tactics, and procuring weapons andequipment. The military professional who studies doctrine knows the principles thatofficially guide these essential functions of United States forces: doctrine, training,leadership, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS).

Effective doctrine is not dogma. It is not doctrinaire. It is not static. Effectivedoctrine is dynamic, adapting to changes on the battlefield and in the world. It is alsobalanced, reconciling the need for precision to achieve unity of effort with the need forflexibility to achieve decentralized application.4

FM 27-100 links JAGC roles and missions to current Army keystone doctrine,recorded in FM 100-5, Operations, and to developing doctrine. FM 100-5 anddeveloping doctrine, in turn, link the Army’s roles and missions to the National MilitaryStrategy and the National Security Strategy. Developing doctrine takes the forceprojection concept enunciated in the 1993 FM 100-5 to a new level with the concept ofstrategic preclusion—moving so fast (strategic maneuver), with such lethality (strategicfires), that enemies cannot set forces and operate at an advantage.5 This requires theability to project fighting forces into more than one theater and to sustain those forcesfrom support and staging bases that may or may not be in close proximity to thesupported forces.

ix

Changes in the strategic situation since the end of the Cold War, and the developmentof the Force XXI Army, require a new model of legal support to operations. Past doctrinemust change to meet the demands of the significant increase in the number and types ofArmy missions, joint and combined operations, fluid operations, complex command andcontrol relationships, and technological advancements. Thus, in addition toimplementing FM 100-5 and national strategic documents, this manual implements orconsiders applicable portions of several joint doctrinal manuals, as well as FM 100-6,Information Operations; FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations;FM 100-11, Force Integration; FM 100-15, Corps Operations; FM 100-16, ArmyOperational Support; FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment,Demobilization; FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations; FM 100-20, MilitaryOperations in Low Intensity Conflict; FM 100-23, Peace Operations; FM 100-25,Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces; and other current Army manuals.

Judge advocates must be trained and prepared to operate independently across thespectrum of core legal disciplines and the spectrum of conflict, standing by thecommander’s side. To succeed in today’s operational environment, judge advocates mustbe master general practitioners; effective in their roles as lawyer, ethical advisor, andcounselor; increasingly knowledgeable as soldiers and lawyers; constantly aware of theoperational situation; and proactively working to promote the mission, serve Armypersonnel and their families, and enhance the legitimacy of Army operations. Doctrinein this manual reflects that judge advocates are increasingly operating individually, or insmaller teams, in order to better support split-based operations and the specializedoperational cells and headquarters required to run mobile, tailored forces.

Supporting legal personnel (warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, andenlisted soldiers) must be proficient in battle-staff and legal tasks, and managing a legaloffice in the field. Legal specialists (enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers withmilitary occupational specialty 71D) must spot potential legal issues and raise them forresolution. Legal specialists must operate under JA supervision across the range of corelegal disciplines and the spectrum of conflict. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) mustalso perform traditional functions—training and taking care of troops. In addition tolegal, staff, and office skills, all JAGC personnel must train to proficiency in soldiercommon tasks.

Accordingly, commanders, with the Staff Judge Advocate, are responsible fortraining and supporting judge advocates and their subordinates to ensure robust legalsupport to operations. Training must be conducted according to the Army’s trainingprinciples, such as those found in FM 25-100, Training The Force, and FM 25-101,Battle Focused Training. Staff Judge Advocates must develop a training plan andMission Essential Task Lists (METL), to include establishing conditions and standards,training objectives, and selection of battle tasks. The training plan must include trainingthat integrates and trains JA personnel with the units they support in a variety ofenvironments, settings, and exercises. Without active training, judge advocate personnel

x

will not develop the soldier and lawyer skills needed to provide legal support tooperations.

Operational law training and practice in all components must reflect that militaryoperations are inevitably joint and increasingly combined. Army National Guard legalsupport is embedded in National Guard organizations, including the National GuardBureau, State Area Commands, and subordinate guard units. U.S. Army Reserve legalsupport is embedded in Reserve units, such as the U.S. Army Reserve Command, andcontained in Judge Advocate General Service Organizations (JAGSO). The recent adventof Active Component-Reserve Component (AC-RC) Divisions, with their teaming andtraining associations, dissolves some of these historical boundaries, meshing active andreserve component soldiers into a standing division headquarters with subordinateNational Guard enhanced brigades.

Finally, the modern training and practice of operational law must recognize thatdigital and information technologies have profoundly altered the pace of operations andthe manner in which judge advocates locate legal authority and introduce legalconsiderations into the conduct of military operations. The materiel required to providelegal support to operations derives from the three functional areas—command andcontrol, sustainment, and personnel service support. A judge advocate must be able toshoot, move, communicate, and research on the battlefield. Thus, judge advocates musthave vehicles, sophisticated automation equipment—to include the Rucksack DeployableLaw Office and Library (RDL), communications equipment, and access to keycommunications modes, nodes, and nets. Current operations are more legally intensethan ever before. They involve vast numbers of government, non-government, andprivate organizations. The judge advocate’s ability to reach back through technicalchannels for research and support is critical.

Legal Support to Operations

1-1

1 ROLE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE_____________________________________________________________________________

1.1 THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL’S CORPS MISSION

The mission of the Judge AdvocateGeneral's Corps (JAGC) is to provideprofessional legal support at all echelonsof command throughout the range ofmilitary operations. This supportincludes Operational Law and the sixCore Legal Disciplines, which supportcommand and control, sustainment, andpersonnel service support.

Throughout the history of the UnitedStates Army, the JAGC has performedthis mission by supporting the Armymission; providing quality legal servicesto commanders, staffs, personnel, andfamily members; and promoting thelegitimacy of the Army both inAmerican society and throughout theworld.

As the 21st Century dawns, theJAGC transitions along with the Army.The JAGC will capitalize on newinformation technologies, strengthen itstechnical support network, obtain newwarfighting capabilities, master the legalissues affecting operations, and developthe Soldier-Lawyer-Leaders who willperform the JAGC's traditional roles in achallenging, new environment.

1.2 PERFORMINGTRADITIONAL ROLES

Traditionally, judge advocates havemastered many fields of law, andperformed several legal roles (judge,advocate, and counselor), all in supportof three fundamental objectives:mission, service, and legitimacy.

CONTENTS PAGE

THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL’S CORPS’ MISSION..... 1-1

PERFORMING TRADITIONALROLES........................................... 1-1

Mission.................................... 1-2Service..................................... 1-2Legitimacy............................... 1-2The Military General

Practitioner......................... 1-3The “Judge” Function............ 1-4The “Advocate” Function....... 1-5The “Ethical Adviser” Function 1-5The “Counselor” Function..... 1-5

IN A CHALLENGING NEWENVIRONMENT............................. 1-6

More Missions......................... 1-6Complex Command & Control 1-7International Operations....... 1-7Fluid Operations..................... 1-7Technological Advancements 1-8

CHALLENGES FOR JUDGEADVOCATES IN THE 21stCENTURY……................................... 1-8

Mission.................................... 1-8Service..................................... 1-9Legitimacy............................... 1-10

SUMMARY...................................... 1-10

FM 27-100

1-2

1.2.1 Mission

“Mission” means protecting andpromoting command authority,preserving Army resources, and ensuringfair military systems, especially themilitary justice system. Judge advocatespromote command authority in severalways. They participate in the keymilitary decision-making processes,becoming involved early to identify andresolve legal issues before they becomecommand problems. They createefficiencies and improve uniteffectiveness by leveraging legalsolutions to accomplish Army missionsin lawful ways. They add value to theorganization as soldiers and individuals,applying their skills and energy to solvelegal and non-legal problems. Theyadminister the military justice system,which promotes the discipline thatmakes units effective. They provideadvice on other Army procedures thatpromote organizational discipline, suchas investigations, reports of survey,standards of conduct, and environmentalcompliance.

1.2.2 Service

“Service” means meeting the legalneeds of commanders, staffs, personnel,and family members. Judge advocatesprovide these clients legal advice basedupon a thorough understanding of thesituation, an analysis of lawful

alternatives, and their individualprofessional judgment. They enhanceC2, sustainment, and support operationsby providing operational law advice andlegal services in all core legal disciplines(military justice, international law,administrative law, civil law, claims, andlegal assistance) during peacetime, war,and operations other than war.

1.2.3 Legitimacy

“Legitimacy” means engenderingpublic respect and support, promotingjustice and ethical behavior. Judgeadvocates must be “competent,confident, caring, and courageous . . .grounded in values, and totallyintegrated into the Army.”6 Theyenhance the Army’s legitimacy byintegrating society’s values into Armyprograms, operations, and decision-making processes.

To promote legitimacy, judgeadvocates must be well-grounded inArmy and constitutional values.Frequently, there is tension between themilitary mission and civilian control thatthe judge advocate must resolve for thecommand. This tension existed inAmerica before the RevolutionaryWar…

Prior to his assumption of command of the ContinentalArmy, Washington had been deeply concerned with theadministration of military justice. As early as 1756, whenWashington was engaged in the French and Indian war, heprotested the enactment of the “act governing mutiny anddesertion” which required a commander to obtainpermission from the Governor of Virginia to hold a general


1-3

court-martial and to obtain a warrant from Williamsburg,the colonial capital, before execution of sentence. It washis opinion that if good discipline was to be maintained,justice had to be meted out expeditiously.7

…and continues to modern times.

The differences between the military and civiliancommunities result from the fact that it is the primarybusiness of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fightwars should the occasion arise . . . . [T]he militaryconstitutes a specialized community governed by a separatediscipline from that of the civilian, and . . . the rights ofmen in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned tomeet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty . . .

United States Supreme CourtParker v. Levy8

Judge advocates are able to reconcilethese tensions for the command becauseof their status and specialized training assoldiers and lawyers. They serve assoldiers in every operationalcontingency; therefore, they appreciateArmy values – Loyalty, Duty, Respect,Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, andPersonal Courage.9 They are members

of the legal profession; therefore, theyappreciate American constitutionalvalues, including civilian control.

Finally, to promote legitimacy, judgeadvocates must help the Army conductoperations in ways that will win publicsupport.

The responsibility for the conduct and use of military forcesis derived from the people and the government. The Armycommits forces only after appropriate direction from theNational Command Authorities (NCA). In the end, thepeople will pass judgment on the appropriateness of theconduct and use of military operations. Their values andexpectations must be met..

United States ArmyField Manual 100-5, Operations10

1.2.4 The Military GeneralPractitioner

Judge advocates must not onlydisplay professional values and well-

honed skills as a judge, advocate, andcounselor, but also have broad legalexpertise. During the Spanish-AmericanWar, then Lieutenant Colonel EnochCrowder served in the Philippines,

FM 27-100

1-4

where he worked on the arrangement forthe Spanish surrender, headed the Boardof Claims, served on the PhilippineSupreme Court, and drafted thePhilippine Criminal Code.11 During

World War II, then Colonel ThomasGreen assisted in drafting martial lawdocuments and served as the executiveto the Military Governor in Hawaii.

“In a deployment, they’ve got to be ready to shift into 4-5functional areas on any given day. They’ll touch crim. law,operational law, fiscal law, foreign claims, personnel law,ethics... all in one day.”

--LTC Michele M. Miller12

Today, deploying judge advocatesmust be capable of providingcomprehensive legal advice and servicesin all core legal disciplines (militaryjustice, international law, administrativelaw, civil law, claims, and legalassistance) and, in addition, have generalknowledge of legal sub-disciplines (e.g.,contract law, fiscal law, environmentallaw, or intelligence activities law).

When practicing these core legaldisciplines, a judge advocate must be aneffective lawyer, which includes theroles of “judge” and “advocate,” ethicaladvisor, and counselor. Recognizing theapplicable function is of the utmostimportance; the function must beappropriate to the task at hand.

1.2.5 The "Judge" Function

True to their title, judge advocatesperform the function of "judge." Theyare routinely called upon for opinions orrulings on whether a law is applicable, alegal obligation exists, or a legal rightmust be respected.

This function is not limited tomilitary judges and magistrates whoparticipate in courts-martial and other

proceedings under the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice. It applies also to judgeadvocates rendering legal opinions,serving as legal advisors on officialinvestigations, ruling on whether claimsare cognizable, and reviewing thelegality of procurement actions. As"judge," the judge advocate does notinterpret the law on the basis of personalviews or policy preferences, but ratheron the basis of a careful reading of theauthoritative rule and objectivereasoning.

The judge function demands distinctskills: legal research and interpretation,reconciliation of facially contradictoryprecedents, and extensive knowledge ofwhich legal authorities have precedence.It requires impartiality, diligence,independence, moral courage, andintimate knowledge of the facts. Itrequires prudence in refraining fromactivities that could cast doubt uponimpartiality. It requires wisdom, care,sound judgment, and a judicioustemperament.13


1-5

1.2.6 The "Advocate" Function

Also true to their title, judgeadvocates perform the function of"advocate." They are commonly reliedupon to make arguments about what alegal rule means or whether it applies, topresent evidence, or to persuade.

Judge advocates frequently performthis function within a structured,adversarial proceeding, in which theyprosecute or defend a particular client'sinterests. The client may be thecommand or an individual soldier.Advocacy skills may also be neededoutside the courtroom: in liaison withenvironmental compliance agencies,non-governmental organizations or ahost nation; or in formulating commandpolicy, as a full understanding oftenrequires the ability to see issues fromdifferent points of view.

Advocacy requires many importantskills. These include careful study ofsubstantive rules, applicable procedures,and decision-makers; conductinginvestigations; interviewing andexamining witnesses; formulatingtheories; and composing arguments.Sometimes advocates use theirpersuasive skills to seek changes in thelaw. Ethical performance of theadvocate function requires zealousness,but also candor and fairness.14

1.2.7 The "Ethical Adviser"Function

Judge advocates perform theadditional function of advisingcommanders whether their actions areethical. This includes appraisingconduct in light of laws and regulations

governing the conduct of governmentofficials, but also includes considerationof other ethical precepts, includingofficer ethics and Army values.

1.2.8 The "Counselor" Function

Judge advocates also perform a"counselor" function in which theyadvise commanders whether proposedactions, while legal and ethical, areprudent.

Judge advocates functioning ascounselors provide advice early in thedecision-making process to enable thecommand to accomplish missions. Theyseek to be proactive and to confrontproblems before the problems confrontthe command.

When a judge advocate acts in any ofthese functions, they identify issues;formulate courses of action and evaluatetheir strengths, weaknesses, and legalconsequences; anticipate potential legalattacks; consider ethical and prudentialconcerns; provide their personalrecommendations to decision-makers;and frequently execute commanddecisions.

A variety of skills are required toperform these functions. As a militarystaff officer, the judge advocate mustplan, train, and coordinate, all with anunderstanding of the Army, its history,and operational art. Judge advocatesmust work constantly and tirelessly toacquire an intuitive and reasoned graspof the command's interests andobjectives. As a lawyer, the judgeadvocate must research, analyze,

FM 27-100

1-6

negotiate, and mediate. By combininglegal and military knowledge and skills,the judge advocate enhances decision-making processes and contributes toeffective, ethical, and lawful missionaccomplishment.

1.3 IN A CHALLENGING NEWENVIRONMENT

Judge advocates must perform theirtraditional roles in a challenging, newenvironment, described by Joint Vision2010 in this way:

Accelerating rates of change will make the futureenvironment more unpredictable and less stable, presentingour Armed Forces with a wide range of plausible futures.Whatever direction global change ultimately takes, it willaffect how we think about and conduct joint andmultinational operations in the 21st century. How werespond to dynamic changes concerning potentialadversaries, technological advances and their implications,and the emerging importance for information superioritywill dramatically impact how well our Armed Forces canperform its duties in 2010.15

The new environment will consist ofmore missions, complex command andcontrol relationships, internationaloperations, fluid operations, andtechnological advancements.

1.3.1 More Missions

Missions are increasing in numberand type. “The US military will becalled upon to respond to crises acrossthe full range of military operations,from humanitarian assistance to fightingand winning major theater wars . . .”16

Between 1990 and 1996, the Army“deployed 25 times – an increase inmissions by a factor of 16.”17 During thesame period, the Army has becomesmaller. Between 1989 and 1999, theActive Army reduced from 781,000 to468,000, and the Total Army from1,960,000 to 1,068,000.18

Missions will increase not only innumber, but also in diversity. TheNational Security Strategy requiresmilitary forces “to effectively deteraggression, conduct a wide range ofpeacetime activities and smaller-scalecontingencies, and . . . win twooverlapping major theater wars.”19

Supporting national military objectivesinclude promoting peace and stability,and defeating adversaries.20 Toaccomplish these objectives, the Armyenvisions a full spectrum of missions,including defending or liberatingterritory, intrusions in support ofcounterdrug and counterterrorismoperations, peacemaking, peacekeeping,national and theater missile defense,multilateral military exercises, military-to-military exchanges, and humanitarianrelief.21


1-7

1.3.2 Command and ControlRelationships (Joint,Multinational, andInteragency)

Command and Control relationshipswill become increasingly complex.Operations will be joint andmultinational, requiring improvedinteroperability among the services andwith allied and coalition partners.22

Additionally, U.S. forces must “enhancetheir ability to operate in consonancewith other U.S. government agencies,and with Non-governmentalOrganizations (NGOs), InternationalOrganizations (IOs), and PrivateVoluntary Organizations (PVOs) in avariety of settings.”23 These relationshipswill require much of future leaders.

Our future leaders at all levels ofcommand must understand theinterrelationships among military power,diplomacy, and economic pressure, aswell as the role of various governmentagencies and non-governmental actors,in achieving our security objectives.They will require a sophisticatedunderstanding of historical context andcommunication skills to succeed in thefuture. The evolution of commandstructures, increased pace and scope ofoperations, and the continuingrefinement of force structure andorganizations will require leaders with aknowledge of the capabilities of all fourservices.24

1.3.3 International Operations

U.S. Armed Forces will continue tobe involved in international operationsfor several reasons. First, threats toUnited States security interests are

international; they include regionalconflict, proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, terrorism, ethnicdisputes, and international organizedcrime.25 Second, responding to thesethreats will require internationalcooperation. “We are continuing toadapt and strengthen our alliances andcoalitions to meet the challenges of anevolving security environment.”26 Thiswill require military forces to act incooperation with other nations’ forces.Third, responding to these threats willrequire the full spectrum of militaryoperations to shape the internationalenvironment, respond to internationalcrises, and to deter and resolveinternational conflicts.27

1.3.4 Fluid Operations

Military forces will be required to beflexible, versatile, and responsive inchanging missions and locations, and todo this as it restructures. “[O]ur militarymust also be able to transition to fightingmajor theater wars from a posture ofglobal engagement -- from substantiallevels of peacetime engagement overseasas well as multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingencies.”28 “Allorganizations must become moreresponsive to contingencies, with less‘startup’ time between deployment andemployment. Because we rely on thetotal force to provide the full range ofmilitary capabilities, we also requireresponsive reserve components that canrapidly integrate into jointorganizations.”29 The Army’s “ability toproject power is greater today than at anytime in our Nation’s history. . . . Today,we can deploy a heavy armored brigadein 96 hours. . . . our ability . . . will be

FM 27-100

1-8

further enhanced, thus making our forces even more versatile . . .”30

This era will be one of accelerating technological change.Critical advances will have enormous impact on allmilitary forces. Successful adaptation of new andimproved technologies may provide great increases inspecific capabilities. Conversely, failure to understand andadapt could lead today’s militaries into prematureobsolescence and greatly increase the risks that such forceswill be incapable of effective operations against forces withhigh technology.31

1.3.5 Technological Advancements

For judge advocates, the mostsignificant technological advancementwill occur in information systems. Thiswill change operations in three importantways; it will accelerate the tempo ofoperations, allow fusion of informationin distinct staffing cells, and empowerdecision-making at lower echelons thanin the past.32

1.4 CHALLENGES FOR JUDGEADVOCATES IN THE 21ST

CENTURY

While judge advocates will continueto perform their traditional roles, the newenvironment will greatly affect how theypursue their three fundamentalobjectives – mission, service, andlegitimacy.

1.4.1 Mission

Pursuing the mission in the 21stCentury will challenge judge advocatesin three distinct ways. First, judgeadvocates must become increasinglyrefined as soldiers and lawyers. Judgeadvocates must understand how the

Army will accomplish its variousmissions, and how to identify andresolve legal issues arising during thesemissions. They must understand thecommand and control relationshipsinvolved in each operation, and provideadvice concerning the authority andresponsibility of relevant agencies.They must be thoroughly grounded in allcore legal disciplines to be effective in afluid operational environment. Theymust be increasingly knowledgeable ininternational law as the Army cooperateswith other nations’ forces to secureUnited States interests world-wide.

Second, judge advocates mustbecome more involved in the militarydecision-making process in criticalplanning cells, and at lower levels ofcommand. As information technologyincreases the speed of decision-makingand allows fusion of information indistinct cells, it becomes critical forjudge advocates to be located where therelevant picture of the battlefield isreceived, evaluated, resolved, andaffected. Otherwise, legal advice willnot be timely or effective. To beproactive, the judge advocate must bepresent. As information technologyempowers decision-makers at lower


1-9

levels of command, judge advocatesmust be present there.

Third, judge advocates must becapable of expanding the level of legalsupport to meet the mission demands ofa force projection army. Projectioncreates surges in demand for legalservices: deploying forces require legalsupport; the power projection platformrequires temporarily increased legalsupport during mobilization, andaugmented legal support in the event ofdeployment of tenant units and theirorganic judge advocates; the homestation continues to require legalsupport. Judge advocates, in both theactive and reserve components, mustplan for the legal resources to meet thesedemands, and must be prepared toprovide services with the deploying unit,the power projection platform, or homestation.

1.4.2 Service

Providing effective service tocommanders, staffs, personnel, andfamily members in the new environmentwill challenge judge advocates in fourways. First, judge advocates mustmaintain connectivity with operationaland tactical networks and legalinformation sources in a fluid andtechnologically advanced environment.Of paramount importance will be theability of the Rucksack Deployable LawOffice and Library (RDL) to interfacewith Maneuver Control System –Phoenix (MCS-P), Global CombatSupport System – Army (GCSS-A),Combat Service Support Control System(CSSCS), and Legal Automated Army-Wide System (LAAWS). As future

systems develop, judge advocateconnectivity must continue.

Second, judge advocates mustprovide technical supervision(supervision of legal operations by aStaff Judge Advocate) and technicalsupport (direct legal expertise fromJAGC organizations) to deployed judgeadvocates in every contingency. Thevariety of legal issues arising fromdiverse missions is a tremendous legalchallenge to a deployed judge advocate.This can be especially challenging injoint and multinational operations. Injoint operations, service specificregulations and policies apply. Inmultinational operations, troopcontributing nations must still complywith their national laws. Legalsupervision and support must beeffective to ensure quality legal serviceto commanders and staffs. RDLconnectivity will be critical to providingthis support.

Third, judge advocates must bemobile. They must move, not only withthe supported unit, but alsoindependently to investigate claims andpotential war crimes, to be at thecommander’s side at key meetings, andto perform other legal missions. A judgeadvocate’s ability to collect evidencefirst-hand is frequently the referencepoint from which a claim is adjudicatedfairly, and the truth about a potential warcrime is learned. Responsive service ina fluid operational environment requiresdedication of transportation in support ofthe judge advocate.

Fourth, judge advocates mustprovide professional legal services topersonnel and families, most importantly

FM 27-100

1-10

during deployments and split-basedoperations. Expanding the level of legalsupport during demanding times will bethe most significant challenge. Alsoimportant, however, will be allocatingadequate legal resources: the trainedpersonnel and facilities required toprovide the professional atmosphereexpected by clients.33 This contributessubstantially to good quality of life,which in turn, retains quality people.

1.4.3 Legitimacy

The future environment willchallenge judge advocates in severalways. First, judge advocates must bewell-grounded in constitutional andinternational law and values. Theirunderstanding of, and ability toreconcile, those laws and values will beinstrumental in promoting effectivecoalitions and international publicrespect for U.S. Army operations.Second, as the U.S. seeks to promotedemocracy abroad,34 the internationalcommunity will expect U.S. Armyoperations to be consistent withdemocratic values. Therefore, the judgeadvocate’s traditional role of assistingcommanders to integrate democraticvalues into Army operations mustcontinue. Finally, as the U.S. military“serves as a role model for militaries inemerging democracies around theworld,”35 judge advocates mustpersonally serve as teachers, trainers, andmentors for their counterparts.

1.5 SUMMARY

The judge advocate in the 21st

Century must adapt the traditional role toa more demanding, complex, fluid,international, and technological

environment. The judge advocate mustcontinue to be a master of all core legaldisciplines, and must be effective in theroles of judge, advocate, ethical advisor,and counselor. The judge advocate willsucceed in the new environment bybecoming increasingly knowledgeable assoldiers and lawyers, maintainingconstant awareness of the operationalsituation and communication withtechnical supervision and support, andintegrating constitutional andinternational democratic values intomilitary operations.


2-1

2 ORGANIZATION TO SUPPORT ARMY OPERATIONS_____________________________________________________________________________

2.1 JUDGE ADVOCATEORGANIZATIONS

2.1.1 Office of The Judge AdvocateGeneral

The Office of the Judge AdvocateGeneral (OTJAG) is an element of theArmy Staff. The organization isdepicted in Figure 2-1. OTJAG provideslegal services to the Chief of Staff, U.S.Army, members of the Army Staff,agencies of the Army, and members ofthe Army generally. Two FieldOperating Agencies also support TheJudge Advocate General in providinglegal services to the Army: U.S. ArmyLegal Services Agency (USALSA),which includes the U.S. Army ClaimsService (USARCS), and The JudgeAdvocate General’s School, U.S. Army(TJAGSA).

The Judge Advocate General (TJAG)is responsible for all Army legalservices, heads the Judge AdvocateLegal Service, and performs, amongothers, the following legal functions:36

• Legal Advisor to the Chief of Staff,U.S. Army, and Military LegalAdvisor to the Secretary of the Armyin coordination with the GeneralCounsel.

• Authority for establishment of theArmy Trial Judiciary and U.S. ArmyCourt of Criminal Appeals, andperformance of judicialresponsibilities prescribed in theUniform Code of Military Justice.

• Principal legal advisor to theSecretary of the Army and Chief ofStaff, U.S. Army, concerningmilitary justice matters, andsupervisor of the administration ofmilitary justice in the Army.

• Principal legal advisor to the ArmyStaff concerning the organization,powers, duties, functions, andadministrative procedures of theArmy.

CONTENTS PAGE

JUDGE ADVOCATEORGANIZATIONS............................ 2-1

Office of The Judge AdvocateGeneral................................... 2-1

Field Operating Agencies......... 2-3The U.S. Army Legal Services

Agency................................... 2-3The Judge Advocate General’s

School.................................... 2-5Army National Guard Legal

Organizations....................... 2-6U.S. Army Reserve Legal

Organizations........................ 2-7Staff Judge Advocate Offices.. 2-10Command Judge Advocates.... 2-14

JOINT LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS... 2-14The Office of the Legal

Counsel to the Chairman,Joint Chiefs of Staff............. 2-15

Unified, Specified, and Subord.Unified Command SJAs....… 2-15

Joint Task Force SJA............... 2-15

MULTINATIONAL FORCE LEGALORGANIZATIONS............................ 2-15

PROVIDING ARMY LEGALSUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS..…... 2-15

Overview of Operational LawSupport.................................. 2-16

Tailoring Operational LawSupport.................................. 2-19

SUMMARY....................................... 2-20

FM 27-100

2-2

• Primary legal advisor to the ArmyStaff concerning operational matters,international law issues arising fromdeploying and stationing of U.S.forces overseas, and implementationof the DoD Law of War Program.

• Supervisor of the Army Claimsprogram, and Secretary of the Armydesignee for settling claims againstthe U.S. under various, specificclaims statutes.

• Supervisor of the Army LegalAssistance Program.

• Principal legal advisor to the ArmyStaff concerning acquisitions,

procurements, logistics, securityassistance, and fiscal law matters.

• Overseer of the Army Standards ofConduct Program.

• Technical supervisor for the JudgeAdvocate Legal Service; responsiblefor recruitment, career management,assignment, professionalresponsibility, and direction in theperformance of their duties of allmembers of the Judge AdvocateLegal Service.

Figure 2-1

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

AJAG/CLL AJAG/MLO

AJAG FOR OPNS(USAR IMA)

SPEC ASST (ARNG)

SOCO(TAJAG Supervises)

CONTRACT LAW(AJAG/MLO Supervises)

ADMIN LAW(AJAG/MLO Supervises)

CRIMINAL LAW(AJAG/MLO Supervises)

INT'L/OP LAW(AJAG/MLO Supervises)

LEGAL ASSISTANCE(AJAG/MLO Supervises)

LABOR & EMPLOYMENT(AJAG/MLO Supervises)

PPTO

SPECIAL ASSISTANTFOR

GUARD AND RESERVEAFFAIRS

TAJAG

TJAG

LEGAL ASSISTANCE(AJAG/MLO Supervises)


2-3

The Assistant Judge AdvocateGeneral (TAJAG) supervises theorganization, administration, andfunctioning of OTJAG; the FieldOperating Agencies of OTJAG; theprocurement and professional training ofmembers of the Judge Advocate LegalService; the proficiency of reservecomponent judge advocates; and theoperations of the judge advocate Guardand Reserve Affairs Department,Regulatory Law and Intellectual PropertyDivision, Legal Technology ResourcesOffice, and Standards of ConductOffice.37

The Assistant Judge AdvocateGeneral for Civil Law and Litigation(AJAG/CLL) supervises or overseesContract Law Division, LitigationDivision, Procurement Fraud Division,Contract Appeals Division,Environmental Law Division, DefenseAppellate Division, and Trial DefenseService.38

The Assistant Judge AdvocateGeneral for Military Law and Operations(AJAG/MLO) supervises or overseesCriminal Law Division, AdministrativeLaw Division, International andOperational Law Division and the Centerfor Law and Military Operations(CLAMO), Legal Assistance and PolicyDivision, Labor and Employment LawDivision, and Government AppellateDivision.39

The Army National Guard SpecialAssistant to TJAG is the principaladvisor to TJAG concerning all mattersaffecting judge advocates in the ArmyNational Guard.

The Assistant Judge AdvocateGeneral for Operations is an IndividualMobilization Augmentee, and theprincipal advisor to TJAG concerning allmatters affecting judge advocates in theU.S. Army Reserve.

2.1.2 Field Operating Agencies

Certain enduring and specializedlegal missions demand significantsynergy or independence from the SJAsections that support various echelons ofcommand. The Judge AdvocateGeneral's Field Operating Agencies(FOAs) are organizations designed tomeet this institutional need.

2.1.3 The U.S. Army Legal ServicesAgency

The primary mission of USALSA isto deliver legal services to theDepartment of the Army in coordinationwith OTJAG; support and deliver legalservices to field activities; andconsolidate delivery of legal services bymilitary judges and defense counsel toguarantee their independence. Theorganization is depicted in Figure 2-2.

FM 27-100

2-4

USALSA ORGANIZATION

Figure 2-2

The Commander, USALSA,commands the organization, and asChief, United States Army Judiciary,directly supervises the United StatesArmy Court of Criminal Appeals, theUnited States Army Trial Judiciary, theMilitary Magistrate Program, andExaminations and New Trials Branch.USALSA includes:

• The United States Army Court ofCriminal Appeals (ACCA). (TheCommander, USALSA serves as theACCA's Chief Judge. There is alsoan Individual MobilizationAugmentee Chief Judge.) TheACCA performs appellate review ofcourts-martial pursuant to Article 66,Uniform Code of Military Justice(UCMJ), when the approvedsentence includes death, a punitivedischarge, or confinement for oneyear or more, and considers certainpetitions for new trials pursuant toArticle 73, UCMJ.

• The United States Army TrialJudiciary, an element of the UnitedStates Army Judiciary, providing

full-time military trial judges topreside over general and specialcourts-martial. The Chief TrialJudge supervises Military Judges andprovides judicial support throughoutthe Army.

• The military magistrate program.

• Examinations and New TrialsBranch, which examines all generalcourts-martial not reviewed byACCA, processes petitions for newtrials and extraordinary relief, andexamines cases involving militarycommissions and courts of inquiry.

• The Litigating Divisions, whichprovide legal advice and litigationservices in contract law, procurementfraud, environmental law, regulatorylaw, intellectual property law,civilian and military personnel law,torts, and other areas of law.AJAG/CLL exercises operationalcontrol over the Litigating Divisions.

• The United States Army TrialDefense Service (TDS), whichprovides defense legal services for

USACCA ENT TRIAL JUDICIARY GAD(AJAG/MLOSupervises)

DAD(AJAG/CLLSupervises)

USATDS(AJAG/CLLSupervises)

(AJAG/CLLSupervises)

LITIGATION DIV(AJAG/CLLSupervises)

PROC FRAUD DIV(AJAG/CLLSupervises)

ENV LAW DIV(AJAG/CLLSupervises)

REG & IP LAW DIV(TAJAG

Supervises)

USALSA


2-5

Army personnel as authorized by lawand regulation.

• Defense Appellate Division (DAD),which provides defense legalservices to military accused beforethe ACCA, the United States Courtof Appeals for the Armed Forces(CAAF), and the United StatesSupreme Court.

• Government Appellate Division(GAD), which represents the UnitedStates before the ACCA, the CAAF,and, when requested by the UnitedStates Attorney General, the UnitedStates Supreme Court.

The United States Army ClaimsService (USARCS) administers theArmy's claims program, supervising theinvestigation, processing, and settlementof claims against and on behalf of theUnited States. It also establishes claimspolicy and supervises claims training.

To maintain the independence ofdefense legal services, The AJAG/CLLexercises technical supervision andoperational control over DAD and TDS.The AJAG/MLO exercises technicalsupervision and operational control overGAD.

2.1.4 The Judge Advocate General’sSchool, U.S. Army

TJAGSA offers resident andnonresident courses of study for theprofessional legal training of the Army.TJAGSA conducts and publishesresearch in all legal disciplines.TJAGSA conducts combat development,manages the Army Law Library Service(ALLS), and produces all instructionalmaterial to train and maintain the 71D

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)for both the active and reserve forces.

TJAGSA also provides technicalsupport for deployed judge advocates.Its academic departments—Administrative and Civil Law, LegalResearch and Communications, CriminalLaw, Contract and Fiscal Law, andInternational and Operational LawDepartments—have subject matterexperts in all the core legal disciplines.Deployed judge advocates reach back forlegal expertise from these experts.

The Center for Law and MilitaryOperations (CLAMO), a resourceorganization for operational lawyers, isalso located at TJAGSA. The mission ofCLAMO is to examine legal issues thatarise during all phases of militaryoperations and to devise training andresource strategies for addressing thoseissues. It seeks to fulfill this mission infive ways.

• First, it is the central repositorywithin The Judge Advocate General'sCorps for all-sourcedata/information, memoranda, after-action materials and lessons learnedpertaining to legal support tooperations, foreign and domestic.

• Second, it supports judge advocatesby analyzing all data andinformation, developing lessonslearned across all military legaldisciplines, and by disseminatingthese lessons learned and otheroperational information to the Army,Marine Corps, and Jointcommunities through publications,instruction, training, and databasesaccessible to operational forces,world-wide.

FM 27-100

2-6

• Third, it supports judge advocates inthe field by responding to requestsfor assistance, by engaging in acontinuous exchange of informationwith the Combat Training Centersand their judge advocate observer-controllers/trainers, and by creatingoperational law training guides.

• Fourth, it integrates lessons learnedfrom operations and the CombatTraining Centers into emergingdoctrine and into the curricula of allrelevant courses, workshops,orientations, and seminars conductedat TJAGSA.

• Fifth, in conjunction with TJAGSA,it sponsors conferences andsymposia on topics of interest tooperational lawyers.

2.1.5 Army National Guard LegalOrganizations

Legal support is embedded inNational Guard organizations, includingthe National Guard Bureau, State AreaCommands (STARC), and subordinateguard units. Normally, each statecommands and controls its ArmyNational Guard units. When these unitsare called into federal status and while inCONUS, FORSCOM subordinate unitswill normally command and controlthem; the FORSCOM and FORSCOMsubordinate command SJAs willnormally exercise technical supervisionof these federalized judge advocates.When Army National Guard units areassigned, attached, or OPCON to othercommands, the SJA of the gainingcommand will exercise technicalsupervision over all the assigned,attached, or OPCON judge advocates.

The National Guard Bureau, whilenot in the chain of command, formulatesand administers programs to ensure thedevelopment and maintenance of ArmyNational Guard units. Each state selects,appoints, and assigns its officers,noncommissioned officers, and enlistedpersonnel. Notwithstanding, TJAGauthorizes state appointments to theJAGC, and ensures that judge advocatesin the Army National Guard are subjectto the same training, educationalstandards, and supervision as othermembers of the JAGC.

Each of the fifty states and theDistrict of Columbia, Guam, PuertoRico, and the Virgin Islands appoints anAdjutant General as the senior militarycommander of its STARC, whichconsists of its Air and Army NationalGuard units. The State Judge Advocateis the senior judge advocate serving withthe state. Army National Guard units arestructured like Regular Army units. Themajor Army National Guard units aredivisions, brigades, and regiments. Themission of the office of the Staff JudgeAdvocate section in Army NationalGuard units is the same as that of an SJAsection in a similar size regular Armyunit. Army National Guard enhancedbrigades are the principal reservecomponent ground combat maneuverforces of the United States Army. TheSJA section of an enhanced brigade ismodeled on, and has the mission of, theSJA section of a separate brigade in theactive component.

Members of the JAGC in the ArmyNational Guard serve in a unique status.Each is a full member of the JAGC andalso a member of the particular stateguard unit. Army National Guard judge


2-7

advocates support their units’ federalmission to maintain properly trained andequipped units that are available forprompt mobilization, and state missionto provide trained and disciplined forcesfor domestic emergencies or asotherwise required by the state.

The Army National Guard judgeadvocate’s dual status can be useful. Forexample, an Army National Guard judgeadvocate in state status could bepermitted to provide assistance tocivilian authorities when a judgeadvocate in federal status might beprecluded from providing assistance dueto the restrictions of the Posse ComitatusAct.

Military judges in the Army NationalGuard are trained and certified by TJAGsimilarly to the military judges in theArmy and Army Reserve. While in statestatus, an Army National Guard militaryjudge may, when authorized byapplicable state law, preside over courts-martial convened under state law. Uponmobilization and federalization of anArmy National Guard military judge, theChief Trial Judge will review the ArmyNational Guard military judge's training,background, experience, and qualities(demonstrated mature judgment and highmoral character) to determine theofficer's suitability to serve as a memberof the Army Trial Judiciary. ArmyNational Guard officers who qualify forsuch service may be assigned, as needed,to the Army Trial Judiciary.

2.1.6 U.S. Army Reserve LegalOrganizations

Legal support in the U.S. ArmyReserve consists of support embedded inU.S. Army Reserve units, such as in the

judge advocate sections of GarrisonSupport Units (GSUs) designed toprovide legal services to powerprojection platforms, and in JudgeAdvocate General ServiceOrganizations (JAGSOs).

JAGSOs are legal units that providelegal services to troops not otherwiseprovided organic legal support.Additionally, JAGSOs provide CONUSsustaining base support for mobilization,mobilization sustainment, anddemobilization operations. JAGSOsconsist of judge advocates, warrantofficers, and enlisted legal personnel.

JAGSOs consist of modular teamsthat provide legal services in all corelegal disciplines. JAGSO teams are anintegral part of the Total Force and mustmaintain high standards of professionalproficiency and military readiness.TJAG is responsible for the technicalsupervision, training, and assignment ofJAGSO personnel. Trainingassociations between active componentand reserve component legal elementsensure quality training and seamlessintegration during mobilization.

Each type of JAGSO has specificcapabilities. The Legal SupportOrganization (LSO), which iscommanded by a judge advocate,provides operational control andtechnical supervision for as many as fourLegal Services Teams (LST). An LSOwill be assigned primary duties as adeploying or mobilization support unit.Those LSOs assigned mobilizationsupport duties are referred to asMobilization Support Organizations(MSO). MSOs retain a follow-on, post-mobilization, deployment mission. TheLSO is modularly organized, and may be

FM 27-100

2-8

split into teams or tailored to supportspecific mission requirements and split-based operations. The LSO consists of--

• Support Section A: One chief judgeadvocate (COL), one legal servicescoordinator (MAJ), one legaladministrator (CW4), and one legalspecialist (SPC).

• Support Section B: One senior judgeadvocate (LTC), one legal servicescoordinator (MAJ), one chief legalNCO (CLNCO) (MSG), and onelegal NCO (SGT).

The Legal Service Team is the basicJAGSO and is capable of legal supportto all operations. It can provide legalservices to a command and its soldierson the basis of one LST per 6,000soldiers. The LST is divided into threesections: Command Opinions section,Client Services section, and Litigationsection.

• The Command Opinions sectionconsists of the director, legal services(LTC), a senior legal opinions officer(MAJ), an administrative andcontract law officer (CPT), and asenior legal NCO (SFC). Thesection performs all administrativelaw functions and provides all legalreview and opinions required by lawor regulation regardingadministrative classifications,reductions, and eliminations. Itadvises the command regardingstatutory and regulatory complianceand acquisitions. It providesinternational and operational lawlegal services and investigates andreports on violations of the Law ofWar.

• The Client Services section consistsof a senior client services officer(MAJ), a legal assistance officer(CPT), a claims officer (CPT), andtwo legal NCOs (SSG/SGT). Thesection performs all legal assistanceand claims functions. It provideslegal assistance and advice tomembers of the command to assist inresolving personal civil lawproblems. It receives, investigates,and adjudicates claims against andby the United States.

• The Litigation Section consists oftwo Trial Counsel (CPT), a CourtReporter (SSG), and a LegalSpecialist (PFC) and advises thecommand regarding all militaryjustice matters, represents thegovernment in trials by court-martialand before administrative boards,and processes all pretrial andposttrial actions.

The Regional Trial Defense Team(RTDT) provides operational control,training, and technical supervision for asmany as four Trial Defense Teams. TheRTDT assigns cases, provides trainingand general supervision, and assists trialdefense counsel in counseling clients andpreparing actions for trial beforeadministrative boards or courts-martial.The RTDT consists of a regional defensecounsel (LTC), a senior defense counsel(MAJ), and a legal NCO (SSG). TheTrial Defense Team (TDT) performsduties as defense counsel in proceedingsbefore administrative boards, underArticle 15, UCMJ, and in courts-martial.It is capable of providing defenseservices on the basis of one team per12,000 soldiers. A TDT, whichcurrently exists separately from the


2-9

RTDT, consists of a senior defensecounsel (MAJ), three defense counsel(CPT), and one legal NCO (SSG). Tomaintain their independence, when notmobilized, regional and trial defenseteams assigned to defense legal supportorganizations operate under the technicalsupervision of the Chief, U.S. ArmyTrial Defense Service. Uponmobilization, defense teams organic toLSOs/MSOs will be under operationalcontrol of the U.S. Army Trial DefenseService.

The Senior Military Judge Teamperforms judicial duties and supervisesMilitary Judge Teams. Its memberspreside at general and special courts-martial, perform duties as militarymagistrates, and serve in various otherjudicial capacities. The team consists ofa senior military judge (COL) and a legalNCO (SSG), and is capable of providingjudicial services on the basis of one teamper 15,000 soldiers. The Military JudgeTeams, which currently exist separately,consist of a military judge (LTC) and alegal NCO (SGT). Upon mobilizationand IAW 10 U.S.C. 826(c), militaryjudge teams organic to LSOs/MSOs willbe reassigned to the U.S. Army TrialJudiciary, will come under thesupervision and control of the USALSA,and will be employed as directed by theChief Trial Judge and attached, asrequired.

The Army assigns JAGSO teams totheater armies, theater army areacommands, corps, corps supportcommands, and other organizations asrequired. To prepare and train foroperational missions, it is important foractive component SJAs to establish closerelationships with supporting JAGSOs.

The gaining organization SJA, therefore,is responsible for planning for theemployment of JAGSO team personnel.Except for regional and trial defenseteams and senior and military judgeteams, JAGSO teams fall under thetechnical supervision and administrativecontrol of the SJA of the organization towhich a JAGSO team is assigned. TheJAGSO teams may augment the SJAsection or may work as a remotedetachment. The active component SJAis responsible for tasking the JAGSO toperform operational missions.

Upon mobilization, JAGSO teamsdepend on the unit to which they areassigned for all logistical andadministrative support. Personnelservices, finance, communications,transportation, maintenance, automationequipment, and supply are all areas ofsupport needed by the JAGSOs to enablethem to deliver the operational lawservices for which they are designed.

While not on active duty, JAGSOteam duties depend on the units to whichthey are assigned (regional supportcommand or regional support group) forall support and administrative functions.Typical areas of heavy support includemaintenance, unit reportingrequirements, common soldier skilltraining, and transportation.

Each LSO and LST is designated toprovide legal services in support ofeither mobilization or other militaryoperations. When supportingmobilization, the LSO or LST provideslegal services to United States ArmyReserve, National Guard, federal, andstate agencies affiliated withmobilization. It assists ContinentalUnited States Army (CONUSA) SJAs in

FM 27-100

2-10

premobilization planning and incoordinating use of legal assets withinthe CONUSAs. It coordinates withregional support commands (RSC) orregional support groups (RSG) toprovide required legal services, such asSoldier Readiness Processing, toexpanded troop populations. Itcoordinates with RSC, RSG, STARCs,and installations to provide responsivelegal services to family members andother authorized personnel. It assists inthe re-acquisition of federal property forinstallation expansion, helps develop orrevise Department of Army civilianwork rules as required, and providesadvice and assistance on acquisitionmatters while monitoring streamlinedacquisition procedures for possible fraudor abuse.

Upon mobilization, one LSO and atleast one TDT will be assigned toFORSCOM subordinate commands(most likely the CONUSAs) in each ofthe ten standardized federal regions toperform mobilization support andCONUS sustainment base missions.Twenty LSTs will be assigned to thesemissions and will be assigned as neededunder the supervision of the tenmobilization support LSOs.

2.1.7 Staff Judge Advocate Offices

The Office of the Staff JudgeAdvocate (OSJA) is organic to unitscommanded by a general court-martialconvening authority. An organizationwith a General Officer in command mayalso be assigned an OSJA, even if thereis no general court-martial conveningauthority. OSJA provides all legalservices to the organization except those

which must be provided independently.The OSJA normally is composed of aStaff Judge Advocate (SJA), a DeputyStaff Judge Advocate (DSJA), DivisionChiefs, judge advocates, a LegalAdministrator, a Chief LegalNoncommissioned Officer (CLNCO),legal specialists, and federal civilianlegal support staff.

The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), thesenior judge advocate, is a member ofthe commander's personal staff40 and, assuch, communicates directly with thecommander to provide legal advice forall matters affecting morale, good order,and discipline of the command.Additionally, the SJA is a member of thecommander's special staff.41 As such, theSJA serves under the supervision of theChief of Staff, provides legal services tothe staff, and coordinates with other staffmembers to provide responsive legalservices throughout the organization.

The SJA, as a field representative ofTJAG, provides technical supervisionover all JAGC personnel and legalservices in the command, includingplanning and resourcing legal support,conducting and evaluating training, andassignment and professionaldevelopment of JAGC personnelassigned to the command. The SJA mayalso use the legal technical channel tocommunicate with TJAG and otherSupervisory Judge Advocates.42

The SJA is responsible for all legalservices required by the command inoperational law and the core legaldisciplines described in Chapter 3.Normally, the SJA’s duties include:43

• Providing military justice adviceand performing military justice


2-11

duties prescribed in the UniformCode of Military Justice.

• Resolving legal problemsregarding administrative boards,investigations, or other militarytribunals.

• Technical supervision andtraining of legal personnel in thecommand and its subordinateunits.

• Providing legal advice andassistance concerning contracts,health care, environmentalmatters, and compensationmatters.

• Providing legal counsel to thecivilian personnel office, equalemployment opportunity office,and the command.

• Providing counsel to the familyadvocacy Case ReviewCommittee.

• Serving as the command ethicscounselor.

• Providing international andoperational law assistance, toinclude advice and assistance toimplement the DoD Law of WarProgram.

• Assisting with litigation in whichthe United States has an interest.

• Operating the command’s legalassistance, claims, procurementfraud, federal magistrate court,victim-witness assistance, andmilitary justice trainingprograms.

• Assisting in implementingtraining programs for reservecomponent legal personnel andunits.

• Providing legal adviceconcerning intelligenceactivities.

The Deputy Staff Judge Advocate(DSJA) is the second most senior judgeadvocate. While the SJA is the principallegal advisor to the command, the DSJA,acting for the SJA, is responsible for theorganization, administration, andfunctioning of the OSJA; superviseslegal services at a location during split-based operations (e.g., the Army ofExcellence Corps DSJA supervises legaloperations at the Corps Rear CommandPost, or acts as provisional rear SJAwhen the SJA deploys with thecommanding general); and managescollective training for all legal personnel.

Division Chiefs are responsible forproviding all legal support within aparticular core legal discipline, such asmilitary justice or legal assistance. Theysupervise judge advocates, civilianattorneys, legal specialists, and civilianlegal support staff in the delivery of legalsupport within the particular discipline;advise the SJA concerning all mattersfalling within the scope of the particulardiscipline; and train subordinates in thelegal skills required by the discipline.

Judge advocates perform legalduties in one or more particular legaldisciplines under the supervision of theSJA and Division Chief. They reviewactions for legal sufficiency; investigatefactual matters related to legal actions;write legal opinions; advisecommanders, staff officers, andpersonnel; participate in staff workinggroups or teams; prepare legal actions;advocate before courts-martial andadministrative decision-making bodies;and provide legal assistance and other

FM 27-100

2-12

necessary client services to soldiers andtheir family members. Judge advocatessupervise legal specialists and civilianlegal support staff, who assist in theperformance of these functions.

Civilian Attorneys assigned to theSJA office perform legal dutiesdescribed in the previous paragraph,except advocating before courts-martial.They regularly provide great depth ofexpertise in a particular legal discipline.They also have supervisoryresponsibilities, which may includeDivision Chief responsibilities.

The Legal Administrator, a warrantofficer with special training in law officemanagement and operations, serves asChief of the Administrative Division andperforms the following duties:

• Coordinates personnel actions forofficers, NCOs, enlisted soldiers, andcivilians.

• Serves as resource manager:develops fiscal requirements,executes program budget guidance,authenticates funding obligations,monitors expenditures, and managesthe Internal Control Program.

• Serves as information managementofficer (IMO), supportingcorrespondence, telecommunica-tions, records management,automation, micrographics, forms,printing and publication, and visualaids.

• Serves as Security Officer.

• Monitors and certifies trainingrecords for all assigned and attachedpersonnel.

• Advises the SJA on methods ofimproving the administration of legalservices.

• Manages manpower staffing andutilization programs.

• Implements Army Law LibraryService policies, procedures, andsystems.

• Reviews and authenticates militaryjustice and administrativedocuments.

The Chief Legal NoncommissionedOfficer (CLNCO) is the senior enlistedsoldier in the section and performs thefollowing duties.

• Serves as principal advisor to theSJA, commanders, and their staffsconcerning all legal specialists andparalegals.

• Ensures common soldier skillproficiency of all legal personnel,and MOS proficiency of all legalspecialists.

• In coordination with the SJA,manages taskings by installation andhigher headquarters.

• Provides technical supervision oflegal specialists performing duties insupport of the SJA, DSJA, andDivision Chiefs.

• Reviews military justice andadministrative documents and files.

• Supervises technical training of alllegal specialists located atsubordinate brigades and battalions,including legal specialists deployingas part of a separate legal section or aBrigade Operational Law Team(BOLT). Ensures timely legal tech-


2-13

nical and automation training,including use and care of the RDL.

• Assists the Legal Administrator inmonitoring and certifying trainingrecords for all assigned and attachedpersonnel.

• Ensures logistical support for eachteam in the SJA section, to includeprocurement, issue, turn-in,accountability of equipment, andpreparation for predeployment,deployment, and redeployment.

• Coordinates the assignment of legalspecialists.

• In conjunction with the DSJA, servesas liaison between unit staff sectionsand the OSJA to coordinate fieldtraining.

• Revises and updates the enlistedportion of the SJA's Field StandardOperating Procedures (FSOP).

Legal Specialists (all NCOs andenlisted soldiers with 71D MOS)provide paralegal and clerical support inall core legal disciplines under thesupervision of the SJA, Division Chief,and judge advocates. They investigatethe facts relating to legal actions,conduct legal research, prepare legaldocuments, schedule appointments,assist clients under the supervision of anattorney, provide all logisticalarrangements for courts-martial oradministrative hearings, review legaldocuments and actions for technicalaccuracy, process claims, maintainrecords and statistics, and preparereports of legal actions. Legal specialistswith the additional skill identifier (ASI)C5 are court reporters. In addition to theabove duties, they record and transcribe

verbatim proceedings of courts-martial,administrative proceedings, Article 5tibunals, and other proceedings asrequired by law or regulation.

Legal specialists at the battalion andbrigade provide commanders basicparalegal services under the technicalsupervision of the SJA and subordinatejudge advocates. They act as liaisonsbetween their units and the OSJA. Theyprepare legal and administrativedocuments such as records of nonjudicialpunishment, adverse administrativeseparations, courts-martial documents,powers of attorney, will worksheets,confinement orders, preliminary criminalinvestigation and AR 15-6 investigationreport forms, Article 139 claimsinvestigation report forms, and statisticalreports concerning legal actions. Theymaintain offical files for all unit legalactions. They apprise the commander ofthe status of all command legal actions.

Legal specialists must be proficientin managing a legal office in the field insupport of operations. They must knowhow a commander and his staff operatein a tactical operations center (TOC) orother headquarters structure. They mustalso perform traditional NCOfunctions−training and taking care oftroops. In addition to legal, staff, andoffice skills, 71D personnel must train toproficiency in soldier common tasks.They must be able to survive on thebattlefield, and be able to help othersoldiers survive.

Finally, legal specialists maintain adeployment legal office package (forms,supplies, equipment, references, etc.)ready to deploy in support of the legaloffice and the command. When

FM 27-100

2-14

required, the legal specialist providesadministrative support during SoldierReadiness Processing (SRPs), andEmergency Deployment ReadinessExercises (EDREs), and to any othermobilization preparation process.

Civilian Legal Support Staff mayinclude paralegals, court reporters, legalclerks, legal secretaries, and othersupporting staff who provide paralegaland administrative support under thesupervision of the SJA, Division Chiefs,judge advocates, and civilian attorneys.

2.1.8 Command Judge Advocates

A Command Judge Advocate (CJA)is the senior judge advocate in a legaloffice serving a commander who is not ageneral court-martial conveningauthority, and who is not otherwiseauthorized an SJA. The CJA is thecommander's personal legal advisor forall matters that affect the morale, goodorder, and discipline of the commandand is a member of the commander'sspecial staff. The CJA's relationship tothe commander, subordinatecommanders, and staff is similar to thatof an SJA. The Regimental JudgeAdvocate of the Ranger Regiment is anexample of a CJA.

The CJA supervises the legalspecialists. With their assistance, theCJA provides legal support in requiredlegal disciplines to the commander andthe staff. Normally, the host installationOSJA will provide legal support in thedisciplines of legal assistance, militaryjustice, and claims. Nevertheless, a CJAmay provide such services in accordancewith the policies of the commander andthe SJA of the host installation or the

next higher command, and consistentwith professional responsibilityrequirements.

Law Center Officers in Charge (OICs)

An OIC of a Law Center is a judgeadvocate responsible for supervising theprovision of all legal services in adesignated military community. TheLaw Center is a branch office of a seniorheadquarters SJA office. Law Centersare particularly common in Europe.Unlike CJAs, OICs typically areresponsible to provide legal support inall core legal disciplines and to superviselegal services provided by law centerpersonnel. The OIC typically advises theinstallation and tactical commanders inthat community.

2.2 JOINT LEGALORGANIZATIONS44

Legal organizations are embedded ineach joint organization, including theOffice of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs ofStaff; each unified, specified, andsubordinate unified command; and eachjoint task force. Army legalorganizations support armyorganizations designated as a componentcommand, or otherwise a part of a jointorganization.

2.2.1 The Office of the LegalCounsel to the Chairman, JointChiefs of Staff

The Office of the Legal Counseladvises the Office of the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff concerning the legalbasis for conducting operations, rules ofengagement, and other international anddomestic law affecting operations.


2-15

2.2.2 Unified, Specified, andSubordinate Unified CommandStaff Judge Advocates

SJA offices in these commandsprovide legal support to the command.Their specific organization and functionsvary according to the mission of theUnified, Specified, or SubordinateUnified Command. Nevertheless, theseoffices are composed of an SJA or LegalAdvisor, judge advocates with requiredspecialities from various services, legalspecialists, and civilian employees.These offices provide legal advice ininternational and operational law, law ofthe sea, air and space law, militaryjustice, administrative law, civil law,claims, legal assistance, and any otherrequired areas of law.

2.2.3 Joint Task Force Staff JudgeAdvocate

When a Combatant Commanderforms a Joint Task Force (JTF), thecombatant command SJA designs andstaffs the JTF SJA office based on theJTF mission and organization. The JTFSJA provides the legal services requiredby the JTF, supervises legal services inorganizations subordinate to the JTF,and coordinates additional legal supportthrough the combatant command SJA.The JTF SJA will receive technicalsupervision from the combatantcommand SJA and will exercisetechnical supervision over legalpersonnel in organizations under JTFoperational control.

2.3 MULTINATIONAL FORCELEGAL ORGANIZATIONS

Legal organizations may beembedded in multinational headquartersto provide legal advice and support tomultinational military operations.45

These multinational headquarters mayderive their authority from the UnitedNations, a regional alliance, a bilateral ormultilateral international agreement, anad hoc coalition agreement, or acombination thereof.46 Regardless of theapplicable international legal authority,U.S. Forces and personnel remainsubject to the U.S. National CommandAuthorities (NCA) and domestic law.

Legal organizations in multinationalheadquarters provide advice concerningcommand authority, the legal basis foroperations, rules of engagement and theuse of force, the status of multinationalforces, and other issues. Legal advisorsin multinational headquarters must findlegal solutions that satisfy the legalstandards of the international communityand each troop contributing nation, ormust forward issues to superior nationaland international authorities forresolution.

2.4 PROVIDING ARMY LEGALSUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS

All the legal organizations describedabove provide legal support tooperations in the deployment theater andat home station throughout all stages ofthe mobilization and operation. Organiclegal organizations provide support tounit C2, sustainment, and supportoperations. JAGSOs and other reservecomponent judge advocates, such as thejudge advocate sections GSUs, augmentorganic legal support in required corelegal disciplines. SJAs of superiorcommands provide technical legal

FM 27-100

2-16

supervision and support to subordinateunits. OTJAG, the Field OperatingAgencies (USALSA & TJAGSA), andCLAMO provide additional requiredtechnical legal support.

The challenge for the SJA is toprovide legal support to operations thatmeets the organization’s mission-specific requirements. The SJA meetsthis challenge by detailing operationallawyers (judge advocates) to each keyoperational cell (e.g., G-3 Plans, G-3Operations, Information Operations,targeting cells, tactical command posts,civil military operation centers, andBrigade main CPs), providing all corelegal disciplines at each division or corpscommand post and home station, andcoordinating technical legal supervision,technical legal support, andaugmentation requirements.

2.4.1 Overview of Operational LawSupport

Operational Law (OPLAW) is thatbody of domestic, foreign, andinternational law that directly affects theconduct of operations. OPLAW taskssupport the command and control andsustainment of military operations,including the military decision-makingprocess and the conduct of operations.OPLAW supports the commander’smilitary decision-making process byperforming mission analysis, preparinglegal estimates, designing the operationallegal support architecture, wargaming,writing legal annexes, assisting in thedevelopment of Rules of Engagement(ROE), and reviewing plans and orders.OPLAW supports the conduct ofoperations by maintaining situationalawareness; advising and assisting with

targeting, ROE implementation, andinformation operations. Judge advocatesperforming OPLAW also provide orfacilitate support in the core legaldisciplines. Therefore judge advocatesperforming OPLAW must be well-versed in all core legal disciplines,skilled in managing legal operations, andeffective in relations with militarycommanders and staffs. The generalOPLAW support concept is depicted inFigure 2-3, below.


2-17

THEA

TER

CO

RPS

DIV

ISIO

NB

RIG

ADE

& B

ELO

W

X

XXX

XX

OFF

ICES

OF

THE

STA

FF J

UD

GE

AD

VOC

ATE

FED

ERA

L SU

PPO

RT

REG

ION

S

CO

NU

SIN

STA

LLA

TIO

NS

&O

RG

AN

IZA

TIO

NS

DEP

AR

TMEN

T O

F TH

E A

RM

YO

FFIC

E O

F TH

EJU

DG

E A

DVO

CA

TE G

ENER

AL

U.S

. AR

MY

LEG

AL

SER

VIC

ESA

GEN

CY

APO

D

APO

E

CIN

C

THEA

TER

UN

ITS

SOF

&JO

INT

UN

ITS

DIV

ISIO

N &

DIV

ISIO

NU

NIT

S

POW

ER P

RO

JEC

TIO

NPL

ATF

OR

MS

U.S

. AR

MY

LITI

GA

TIO

NC

ENTE

R

U.S

. AR

MY

CLA

IMS

SER

VIC

EUS

AR L

SOs

LEG

AL S

UPPO

RTO

RGA

NIZA

TIO

NSTH

E JU

DGE

ADVO

CATE

GEN

ERAL

’SSC

HOO

L

USAR

MSO

sM

OBI

LIZA

TIO

NSU

PPO

RTO

RGA

NIZA

TIO

NS

AC

TIVE

&R

ESER

VEC

OM

PON

ENT

UN

ITS

LAA

WS

LEG

AL

AU

TOM

ATI

ON

AR

MY-

WID

ESY

STEM

(WO

RLD

-WID

E N

ETW

OR

K)

CO

RPS

&C

OR

PSU

NIT

S

CO

MPA

NY

BA

TTA

LIO

N

BR

IGA

DE

&B

RIG

AD

EU

NIT

S

SOF

&JO

INT

UN

ITS

SOF

&JO

INT

UN

ITS

SOF

&JO

INT

UN

ITS

DO

D A

ND

OTH

ERG

OVE

RN

MEN

TAL

AG

ENC

IES

GC

SS-A

RM

YG

CSS

-AR

MY

GC

SS-A

RM

YG

CSS

-AR

MY

CSS

CS

CSS

CS

GC

CS

GC

CS -

A

-A C

SSC

SC

SSC

S

LAA

WS

LAA

WS

LAA

WS

LAA

WS

MC

S

AFA

TDS

FAAD

C2

ASA

SC

SSC

S MC

S

AFA

TDS

FAAD

C2

ASA

SC

SSC

S

Lega

l Req

uest

Lega

l Ser

vice

sUS

AR L

egal

Per

sonn

el F

low

Mob

ile L

egal

Tea

ms

Figu

re 2

-3.

OPL

AW

Sup

port

Con

cept

FM 27-100

2-18

Organizations on the left side of thediagram (DoD and other governmentagencies, OTJAG, CLAMO, USALSA,USARCS, and TJAGSA) providetechnical legal support. Immediately totheir right are depicted OSJAs, whichsupport their parent organizations anddeploy to provide required legal support.Beneath these are depicted LSOs, whichdeploy to augment organic legal support.MSOs support force projection and othermobilization and CONUS sustainmentbase missions, and can deploy as afollow-on mission. LSOs and MSOs arecomposed of LSTs, which provide legalsupport in a variety of disciplines.Within the deployment theater, organiclegal organizations provide legalsupport, and are augmented by LSOs andLSTs (depicted by small circlesthroughout the theater, corps, division,and brigade areas) as required.

Legal organizations provide OPLAWsupport throughout all stages ofmobilization and operations in thedeployment theater and at home station.Legal personnel organic to deployingactive and reserve component unitssupport their units and unit personnel.Legal personnel organic to installationsprovide home station legal support.Legal personnel organic to nondeployingunits at the installation may providehome station support subject to their unitreadiness and operations. MobilizedLSOs deploy to the theater to supportdeployed forces; however, they may beemployed in CONUS prior todeployment to assist MSOs consistentwith the LSO’s requirements to prepareand deploy.

MSOs provide legal supportthroughout CONUS during all stages of

mobilization to active and reservecomponent units, organizations,installations, soldiers, and familymembers. Upon mobilization, they willbe assigned to active componentFORSCOM subordinate commands(most likely a Continental United StatesArmy or CONUSA). They may beplaced under the operational or tacticalcontrol of mobilization stations or RSCs,or of STARCs, in the event the STARCis mobilized or federalized. Duringpeacetime, MSOs assist USAR andARNG personnel in Personnel ReadinessPrograms. During the stages ofmobilization, MSOs provide legalsupport for:

• mobilizing USAR and ARNG unitsat home station in Soldier ReadinessProcessing;

• mobilization stations during peaksurges of mobilization anddeployment;

• family members of mobilized USARand ARNG personnel at homestation or mobilization stations;

• mobilization stations during peaksurges of redeployment anddemobilization;

• redeployed and demobilized USARand ARNG personnel and familymembers at home station.

Finally, MSOs may be required todeploy and provide legal support todeployed forces. For more information,consult Army Regulation 500-5, ArmyMobilization and Operation Planningand Execution System (AMOPES).47

The diagram also depictscommunication and automation linkagesfrom the company area to the CONUS


2-19

sustaining base. Each Judge advocatemust be linked to the Army BattleCommand System (ABCS), particularlyto Maneuver Control System – Phoenix(MCS-P), to Global Combat SupportSystem – Army (GCSS-A), and to legalinformation networks through the LegalAutomation Army-Wide System(LAAWS). Only then will judgeadvocates know the situation and havethe complete and current legalinformation required to provide theproactive, timely, and accurate legaladvice that will empower and sustain theforce.

Not depicted in the diagram, but vitalto effective legal support, are theequipment and transportationrequirements. Legal organizations mustbe as capable as the units they support.The OSJA element in a corps, division,or brigade Command Post must have theworkspace, communications andautomation capabilities, andtransportation assets to function incoordination with the staff. Othercritical equipment requirements includeradios linked with tactical nets, globalpositioning devices, and the RDL. (TheRDL and its components are discussedin Chapter 4.) In addition, many legalfunctions require mobility: the SJAmust travel to supervise legal services(as must the DSJA when managing legalservices at another command post);foreign claims and war crimesinvestigation teams must travel toinvestigate claims and potential warcrimes; judge advocates must attendJoint Military Commission meetings andmeetings with internationalorganizations, nongovernmentalorganizations, and private volunteerorganizations; trial and trial defense

counsel must travel to counselcommanders or clients and investigatecases.

2.4.2 Tailoring Operational LawSupport

The SJA begins tailoring legalsupport to an operation by analyzingMETT-TC (mission, enemy, troops,terrain and weather, time available, andcivilian considerations) to determine thepotential legal issues, the extent ofsupport required within each core legaldiscipline, and the legal resourcesavailable. Substantial and helpfulinformation is available to assist the SJAin this analysis in the Operational LawHandbook, which is published annuallyby the International and Operational LawDepartment at TJAGSA, and in lessonslearned on file with CLAMO.

Next, the SJA must design the legalsupport architecture for the operation.There are two requirements: first, judgeadvocates, and any required legalspecialists, must deploy with each keyoperational cell; second, the SJA mustprovide support in all core legaldisciplines to both the deployed forceand home station, even if support insome disciplines is not deployed. Theserequirements place significant demandsupon the legal organization. SJAs mustconsider the need for augmentation andaddress concerns through legal technicalchannels.

To meet these two requirements,there are two complementary strategies.First, the SJA may deploy a legalorganization equipped to provide supportin all legal disciplines. This structuremay contain a proportionate slice from

FM 27-100

2-20

each division. (Significant efficienciesare obtainable by deploying personnelskilled in multiple legal disciplines.Therefore, SJAs must ensure that judgeadvocates and legal specialists aretrained in multiple disciplines.) Second,the SJA may deploy legal support in aparticular legal discipline, whileproviding other legal support from thehome station or other location. (Forexample, if a commander deploys anorganization to perform a mission ofbrief duration and likely to involveclaims issues, the SJA may deploy all orpart of the claims division.) Theseapproaches are not mutually exclusive;they may be blended to meet missionrequirements.

Finally, the SJA must coordinatetechnical legal supervision and support.Judge advocates receive technical legalsupervision (i.e., guidance, direction, andassistance in the discharge of theirduties) from TJAG and SJAs of superiorcommands.48 Judge advocates mayreceive technical legal support (i.e., legalinformation or expertise) from any Armylegal organization. Technical legalsupervision and support normally followthe chain of command. In jointoperations, or when Army units areoperationally controlled by other Armyorganizations, technical supervisionfollows operational control; superiorparent and supported headquartersshould both provide required technicalsupport. Nevertheless, technicalsupervision and support arrangementsmust be coordinated for each specificcore legal discipline. For example,military justice supervision and supportcould either lie with the parent commandor the joint headquarters. In allied orcoalition legal organizations, technical

legal supervision will be dual (nationaland international). SJAs supportingallied or coalition organizations mustcoordinate thoroughly to define theparameters of technical legalsupervision, as well as to resolve themyriad legal concerns arising duringoperations.

2.5 SUMMARY

TJAG heads and directs all legalservices in the Army, and provides legalsupport for operations at all levels ofcommand. Embedded legalorganizations (OSJAs or CJAs) in theactive and reserve components and injoint organizations provide operationallaw and core legal discipline support totheir parent organizations. Special legalunits (JAGSOs) augment legal supportas required by the mission. Judicial andtrial defense services are provided byindependent legal organizations in orderto preserve the integrity of the militaryjustice system. Joint and multinationallegal organizations provide operationallaw support and supervise legaloperations of subordinate units withinthe parameters of international anddomestic law.

SJAs tailor, or task organize, legalsupport for each specific operation, bydetailing judge advocates and anyrequired legal specialists, to all keyoperational cells, providing support in allcore legal disciplines to the deployingforce and home station, and ensuringeffective technical legal supervision andsupport. The result is responsive,proactive, flexible, and expandable legalsupport in every operationalcontingency.


3-1

3 OPLAW AND CORE LEGAL DISCIPLINES SUPPORTINGARMY OPERATIONS

_____________________________________________________________________________

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The last chapter described legalorganizations supporting operations, andhow SJAs tailor, or task organize, toprovide legal support to operations. Thischapter describes OPLAW and the corelegal disciplines (military justice,international law, administrative law,civil law, claims, and legal assistance)that Army legal organizations provide.Subsequent chapters will provideinformation about legal support tospecific types of military operations.

As discussed in the previous chapter,legal support to each operation mustconsider the organization’s mission-specific requirements, and include legalsupport in OPLAW and each core legaldiscipline. OPLAW and the core legaldisciplines contribute directly to thecommand and control (C2), sustainment,and personnel service support requiredby the organization. Different aspects ofa core legal discipline may support C2,sustainment, or personnel servicesupport. For example, foreign claims area sustainment function, while personnelclaims are personnel service support. Itis important that SJAs tailor legalsupport (OPLAW and core legaldisciplines) to the organization’smission-specific requirements.Therefore, this chapter will describeOPLAW and the core legal disciplines,what tasks are performed, where they areperformed, and how they support eachphase of an operation frompremobilization through demobilization.

CONTENTS PAGE

INTRODUCTION.............................. 3-1

OPLAW............................................ 3-2

MILITARY JUSTICE......................... 3-3

INTERNATIONAL LAW.................... 3-6

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.................... 3-7

CIVIL LAW.............………................. 3-9CLAIMS............................................ 3-11

LEGAL ASSISTANCE...................... 3-13

SUMMARY....................................... 3-15

FM 27-100

3-2

3.2 OPLAW

OPLAW is that body of domestic,foreign, and international law thatdirectly affects the conduct ofoperations.

OPLAW supports the command andcontrol of military operations, to includethe military decision-making process andthe conduct of operations. OPLAWsupports the military decision-makingprocess by performing mission analysis,preparing legal estimates, designing theoperational legal support architecture,wargaming, writing legal annexes,assisting in the development and trainingof Rules of Engagement (ROE), andreviewing plans and orders. OPLAWsupports the conduct of operations bymaintaining situational awareness, andadvising and assisting with targeting,ROE implementation, and informationoperations. OPLAW also involves theprovision of core legal disciplines thatsustain the force.

SJAs normally provide OPLAWsupport at each Brigade Headquarters(Main CP), and at each key operationalcell at every higher level of command(TAC CP, Main CP, Rear CP, G-3 Plans,G-3 Operations, Information Operations,and Targeting Cell). OPLAW support isalso provided at each joint andmultinational headquarters. Somemissions will also require OPLAWsupport at battalion level, or inspecialized units or operational cells.This is increasingly the case in peaceoperations and disaster relief.

As OPLAW directly affects theconduct of military operations, its tasksmust generally be performed throughout

all phases of any operation, from beforemobilization through demobilization.Nevertheless, the OPLAW JudgeAdvocate’s (OPLAW JA’s) focus willchange during these phases. The focusduring premobilization, mobilization,and predeployment will be on OPLAWmilitary decision-making functions. Thefocus shifts toward tasks related to theconduct of operations from deploymentthrough demobilization. During allphases, however, the OPLAW JA mustprovide or facilitate support in core legaldisciplines required to sustain theorganization.

Before mobilization, OPLAW JAsand legal specialists should conductcontingency planning, deploymentpreparation, and training. OPLAW JAsmust proactively develop staff skills andrelationships at all times, not merelybefore deployment. Deploymentpreparation, a cooperative effort betweenthe OPLAW JA, the CLNCO, the LegalAdministrator, and other key personnel,should include developing SOPs,identifying deploying personnel,marshaling resources, and establishingliaisons. Training before mobilizationshould develop legal personnel in theirsoldiering and legal skills, providemission-related legal information to unitpersonnel, integrate legal personnel intounit training events, and establishrelationships with reserve componentlegal personnel who will support legaloperations upon mobilization.

During mobilization andpredeployment, OPLAW JAs, with theassistance of legal specialists, shouldreceive and integrate mobilized legalpersonnel who are supporting deployingand non-deploying units; conduct


3-3

mission briefings for deployingpersonnel regarding ROE, generalorders, code of conduct, law of war, andother appropriate legal topics; conductfinal mission planning; and coordinatelegal support for individual deploymentreadiness.

During deployment and entry,OPLAW tasks related to the conduct ofoperations become more critical.OPLAW JAs must maintain situationalawareness to provide effective adviceabout targeting, ROE, and legal aspectsof current operations (includinginformation operations). For this reason,judge advocates should deploy with theirRDLs, vehicles, radios, and globalpositioning devices in a sequence thatensures their presence in key operationalcells at all times. Deploying legalspecialists help the OPLAW JA maintainsituational awareness during theoperation by attending briefings,monitoring email traffic, tracking thebattle, and providing other requiredassistance. Upon entry, OPLAW JAsmust organize and coordinate thedelivery of legal services in all core legaldisciplines in accordance with the legalannex to the OPLAN or OPORD.Finally, even during fast-pacedoperations, OPLAW JAs must continueto perform OPLAW military decision-making process functions in support ofthe staff’s operational planning.

During redeployment anddemobilization, OPLAW JAs and legalspecialists must perform severalrecovery tasks: assist the redeploymentof legal personnel and equipment,participate in the command’s after-actionreviews and lessons learned processes,and catalogue and retain legal files and

journals. SJAs should forward afteraction reports and all pertinent legaldocuments, memoranda, email, et cetera,to the CLAMO, and integrate them intofuture contingency planning, deploymentpreparations, and training.

3.3 MILITARY JUSTICE

Military justice is theadministration of the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice (UCMJ), and thedisposition of alleged violations byjudicial (courts-martial) or nonjudicial(Article 15, UCMJ) means. The purposeof military justice, as a part of militarylaw, is “to promote justice, to assist inmaintaining good order and discipline inthe armed forces, to promote efficiencyand effectiveness in the militaryestablishment, and thereby to strengthenthe national security of the UnitedStates.”49

TJAG is “responsible for the overallsupervision and administration ofmilitary justice within the Army.”50 Thecommander is responsible for theadministration of military justice in theunit, and must communicate directlywith the SJA about military justicematters.51

There are three components ofmilitary justice, each with its distinctfunctions. First, the SJA is responsiblefor military justice advice and services tothe command. The SJA advisescommanders concerning theadministration of justice, the dispositionof alleged offenses, appeals ofnonjudicial punishment, and action oncourt-martial findings and sentences.52

The SJA supervises the administrationand prosecution of courts-martial,

FM 27-100

3-4

preparation of records of trial, thevictim-witness assistance program, andmilitary justice training.53

Second, the Chief, United StatesArmy Trial Defense Service “exercisessupervision, control, and direction ofdefense counsel services in the Army.”54

Judge advocates assigned to the TrialDefense Service advise soldiers andrepresent soldiers before courts-martial.These judge advocates also representsoldiers in adverse administrativehearings.

Third, the Chief Trial Judge, UnitedStates Army Trial Judiciary providesmilitary judges for general and specialcourts-martial, supervises militaryjudges, promulgates rules of court, andsupervises the military magistrateprogram.55 Military Judges assigned tothe Trial Judiciary preside over courts-martial, exercise judicial independencein the conduct of courts-martial, conducttraining sessions for trial and defensecounsel, and perform or supervisemilitary magistrate functions.56 Militarymagistrate functions include the reviewof pretrial confinement and confinementpending the outcome of foreign criminalcharges; and the issuance of search,seizure, or apprehension authorizations.57

Military justice services are semi-centralized to facilitate timely, efficientdelivery. Normally, courts-martial areprocessed at theater, corps, division, orother headquarters commanded by ageneral court-martial conveningauthority. Joint Force Commanders, andArmy Brigade and BattalionCommanders also have court-martialconvening authority, and may requiresupport to conduct courts-martial. Trials

may be held at the main or rearcommand post. The convening authoritymay designate where the court-martialwill meet IAW Rules for Courts-Martial(RCM) 504(d) and RCM 906(b)(11) andconsistent with rulings of the militaryjudge. SJAs provide military justiceadvice to general court-martialconvening authorities, including JointForce Commanders with general court-martial authority. Other judge advocatesprovide military justice advice tosubordinate commanders. Legalspecialists in battalion, squadron, andhigher headquarters prepare and managemilitary justice actions, and provideother technical legal and administrativesupport for military justice. As thesituation requires, LSTs specializing incriminal law may assist theater, corps, ordivision military justice operations. Inmultinational organizations, each troopcontributing nation is responsible for thediscipline of its military personnel.Thus, the U.S. element of themultinational organization will requiremilitary justice support.

Trial defense and judiciary servicesare provided on an area basis under theindependent supervision and control ofthe U.S. Army Trial Defense Service andU.S. Army Trial Judiciary, respectively.Trial Defense Counsel will normally belocated with SJA sections at theater,corps, and division, from where theytravel throughout the operational area toprovide advice and services as farforward as required. Military Judges arenormally collocated with SJA sections attheater, corps, and division, dependingupon judicial workloads. As thesituation requires, LSTs specializing intrial defense or judiciary services assistwherever needed in the theater. The


3-5

Chief, U.S. Army Trial Defense Service,and Chief Trial Judge, U.S. Army TrialJudiciary, supervise Defense Teams andMilitary Judge Teams, respectively.

Military justice support musttransition through the phases of militaryoperations smoothly, providingcontinuity in jurisdiction and responsivesupport to the deployment theater andhome station. Critical to success areprior planning, mission training, andstaff augmentation.

Before mobilization, the primaryfocus is planning. The SJA’s planningfor military justice operations shouldinclude the preparation of key personnelfor deployment, the identification andmarshaling of resources and personnel tosupport split-based operations, theidentification and alignment of court-martial convening authorities, theguidance for disposing of pending casesupon deployment, the selection of court-martial panels in the deployment theater,the content of a general order for theoperation, the strategy for supportingmilitary justice in the deployment theaterand at the home station, and thecoordination of support for trial defenseand judiciary services.58 The supportingRegional Defense Counsel (RDC) mustdevelop an operation support strategy,prepare personnel for deployment, andmarshal resources. Of particularimportance are the RDC’s plans formobility in theater and technicalsupervision of deployed DefenseCounsel. The supporting Chief CircuitJudge must likewise plan for operations.

During mobilization andpredeployment, the SJA must executethe military justice transition and

conduct mission training. Transitiontasks may include aligning theconvening authority structure for thedeployment theater and home station,ensuring units and personnel areassigned or attached to the appropriateorganization for the administration ofmilitary justice, requesting oraccomplishing required designations ofhome station convening authorities,transferring individual cases to newconvening authorities when necessary,and publishing a general order for theoperation.59 Mission training will includebriefings to deploying and home stationcommanders concerning military justiceoperations, and briefings to deployingsoldiers concerning the terms of thegeneral order for the operation.60

During deployment and entry, theSJA must ensure the military justicesupport arrangements are in place andoperating properly. The SJA shouldensure orders assigning units andpersonnel clearly indicate whichcommander has nonjudicial punishmentand court-martial authority. Reardetachment commanders at the homestation will require military justicetraining, which should emphasize thecommander’s authority andresponsibility, and the prevention ofunlawful command influence.61 Finally,the SJA should expect an increase in thehome station military justice workload,and must ensure that resources areproperly allocated between thedeployment theater and home station.62

During redeployment anddemobilization, the SJA transitionsback to the original home stationmilitary justice structure. This willnormally include returning to the

FM 27-100

3-6

original convening authority structure,ensuring units and personnel areassigned or attached back to theappropriate organization for theadministration of military justice,revoking the designations of homestation convening authorities establishedfor the operation, transferring individualcases, and rescinding the general orderfor the operation.

3.4 INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law is the application ofinternational agreements, internationalcustomary practices, and the generalprinciples of law recognized by civilizednations to military operations andactivities. Within the Army, the practiceof international law also includes foreignlaw, comparative law, martial law, anddomestic law affecting overseas,intelligence, security assistance, counter-drug, and civil assistance activities.63

The SJA's international lawresponsibilities include: implementationof the DoD Law of War (LOW)Program, including LOW training,advice concerning the application of theLOW (or other humanitarian law) tomilitary operations, the determination ofenemy prisoner of war (EPW) status, andsupervision of war crime investigationsand trials; assistance with internationallegal issues relating to U.S. forcesoverseas, including the legal basis forconducting operations, status of forcesagreements, and the impact of foreignlaw on Army activities and personnel;the monitoring of foreign trials andconfinement of Army military andcivilian personnel and their dependents;assistance with legal issues inintelligence, security assistance, counter-

drug, and civil assistance activities;advice to the command concerning thedevelopment of internationalagreements; and legal liaison with hostor allied nation legal authorities.64

Normally, the SJA providesinternational law support at the main andrear command posts in Army ofExcellence divisions and corps, andmain command posts in Force XXIdivisions and corps, TAACOM or TSCheadquarters, Theater Armyheadquarters, and each joint andmultinational headquarters. In addition,international law support may berequired at brigade and battalionheadquarters.

International Law tasks will varyfrom phase to phase, but are designed toensure operational capability and supportinternational legitimacy throughout allphases of an operation.

Before mobilization, internationallaw planning is preeminent. The SJAand international law attorneys mustthoroughly understand the contingencyplan and the international law affectingthe planned operation. They must ensurethe contingency plan complies withinternational legal obligations, includingobligations to EPWs and civilians. Theymust also identify and obtain relevantinternational agreements (e.g., status offorces agreements, exchanges ofdiplomatic notes, and acquisition andcross-servicing agreements), identifyrequirements for additional agreements,and forward these requirements throughhigher headquarters to the propernegotiation authority. International lawplanning objectives include informingthe commander and staff of the


3-7

international legal obligations on theforce, minimizing legal obligations ortheir effects on the force, protecting thelegal status of unit personnel, ensuringrights of transit, and providingresponsive and economical host nationsupport. At the same time, internationallaw attorneys are responsible for trainingunit personnel on the LOW and otherinternational law affecting potentialoperations.

During mobilization andpredeployment, establishing liaison andbriefing deploying personnel are theprincipal international law tasks. TheSJA should establish liaison with theInternational Committee of the RedCross (ICRC), the country team for thearea of operations, legal officials in thehost nation, and other government,nongovernmental, international, andprivate voluntary organizations, asdirected by the commander. Thepurposes of this liaison are to establishproductive relationships that will helpsustain the operation; coordinate thelegal aspects of the deployment andentry; confirm understanding ofagreements concerning status of forces65,rights of transit, basing, and host nationsupport; and provide assurance ofcompliance with international legalrequirements. Briefings to deployingpersonnel should cover the legal basisfor the operation, the legal status ofdeploying personnel, relevant countrylaw, guidance on the treatment ofcivilians in the area of operations,66 andthe applicability of the LOW or otherhumanitarian law.

During deployment and entry, theSJA’s principal international law tasksare advising the command and managing

legal processes. These tasks requirecontinuous liaison with the countryteam, host nation legal officials, theICRC, and other agencies related to theoperation; and effective integration intothe headquarters staff. Advice to thecommand may involve the law of war,including advice to the EPW team;interpretation of internationalagreements; treatment of civilians orforeign diplomats; assistance tointernational organizations, U.S. or hostnation government organizations, non-government organizations (NGOs), orprivate volunteer organizations (PVOs);civil affairs; and other international legalmatters. Legal processes include theinvestigation and trial of war crimes,Article V tribunal proceedings, foreigncriminal trials of U.S. personnel, foreigncivil or administrative proceedings, andproceedings conducted under occupationor martial law.

During redeployment anddemobilization, the SJA's internationallaw priority is to resolve legal issuesremaining from the deployment orrelating to redeployment. Significanttasks may include coordinating the legalaspects of base closures, resolving hostnation support issues, managing warcrimes investigations, monitoringforeign criminal proceedings, andcoordinating with the ICRC forrepatriation of prisoners of war.

3.5 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Administrative law is the body oflaw containing the statutes, regulations,and judicial decisions that govern theestablishment, functioning, andcommand of military organizations. Thepractice of administrative law includes

FM 27-100

3-8

advice to commanders and litigation onbehalf of the Army involving manyspecialized legal areas, includingmilitary personnel law, governmentinformation practices, investigations,relationships with private organizations,labor relations, civilian employment law,military installations, and governmentethics.67

Administrative law attorneysperform the following functions: advisecommanders, review actions, and litigatecases involving military personnel law;advise Army officials regarding theirobligations under the Freedom ofInformation Act (FOIA) and PrivacyAct; advise investigating officers, reviewinvestigations for legal sufficiency, andadvise appointing authorities concerninginvestigative findings andrecommendations; advise Army officialsconcerning support for and relationshipswith private organizations; advise Armyofficials concerning labor relations,including certifying and negotiating withlabor unions, grievances and arbitration,and unfair labor practice allegations;advise Army officials concerning therecruiting, hiring, evaluating, anddisciplining of employees, and representthe Army in litigation arising fromemployee grievances and discriminationcomplaints; advise installationcommanders concerning the legalauthorities applying to militaryinstallations; and advise Army personnelconcerning government ethics, andsupervise the command financialdisclosure and ethics training programs.68

Administrative law support is usuallyprovided at brigade headquarters, mainand rear command posts in Army ofExcellence divisions and corps, main

command posts in Force XXI divisionsand corps, COSCOM headquarters, andat each higher army, joint, andmultinational headquarters. Because ofthe vast scope of issues they face,administrative law attorneys, especially,must be capable of conducting specifictechnical legal research and writing.

Administrative law support must beprovided during all phases of anoperation. The legal researchcapabilities and technical supportstructure must be robust to providespecialized legal knowledge and theflexibility to resolve different issues asan operation moves through its phases.

Before mobilization, administrativelaw attorneys must identify the issueslikely to arise in the operation andprovide policy guidance in the OPLAN.Consideration of the likely legal issuesmust take into account the participatingorganizations – joint, allied or coalition,international, non-governmental, andprivate. The plan should include policyguidance concerning access by non-DoDpersonnel to unit facilities and services.69

During mobilization andpredeployment, administrative lawattorneys must provide prompt guidanceto commanders concerning militarypersonnel issues that typically ariseimmediately before deployment, such asconscientious objection and family careplan failures.70 They should also briefdeploying personnel concerning issuesarising in the theater, e.g., family careplans and foreign gifts.71

During deployment and entry,administrative law attorneys will provideadvice and assistance with the legal


3-9

issues that arise in theater. They shouldbe prepared to spend considerable timeand effort on command investigations, asthese may have a significant impact onthe unit and mission.72 They must also,even in a deployed environment,supervise the government ethicsprogram, including the filing of financialdisclosure forms.73

During redeployment anddemobilization, administrative lawattorneys will assist with issues thatarise, and will continue to manage thelegal aspects of ongoing investigationsand other actions as they redeploy tohome station.

3.6 CIVIL LAW

Civil law is the body of lawcontaining the statutes, regulations, andjudicial decisions that govern the rightsand duties of military organizations andinstallations with regard to civilauthorities. The practice of civil lawincludes contract law, fiscal law,environmental law, as well as manyother specialized areas of law.74

Contract law is the application ofdomestic and international law to theacquisition of goods, services, andconstruction. The practice of contractlaw includes battlefield acquisition,contingency contracting, bid protests andcontract dispute litigation, procurementfraud oversight, commercial activities,and acquisition and cross-servicingagreements.75

The SJA’s contract lawresponsibilities include furnishing legaladvice and assistance to procurementofficials during all phases of the

contracting process, overseeing aneffective procurement fraud abatementprogram; and providing legal advice tothe command concerning battlefieldacquisition, contingency contracting,Logistics Civil Augmentation Program(LOGCAP), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs), thecommercial activities program, andoverseas real estate and construction.

Legal counsel must participate fullyin the acquisition process, makethemselves continuously available totheir clients, involve themselves early inthe contracting process, communicateclosely with procurement officials andcontract lawyers in the technicalsupervision chain, and provide legal andbusiness advice as part of the contractmanagement team.76 To accomplish this,SJAs usually provide contract lawsupport at the main and rear commandposts in Army of Excellence divisionsand corps, main command posts in ForceXXI divisions and corps, COSCOM,Theater Support CommandHeadquarters, and each higher army andjoint headquarters. Contract law advicemay also be required at brigade orbattalion headquarters. SJAs shoulddeploy a contract law attorney withcontracting Early Entry Modules (EEM).OPLAW JAs supporting a DISCOM orCOSCOM should be trained in contractlaw. Expertise may be required at themultinational command headquarters toadvise concerning internationalacquisition agreements.

Fiscal law is the application ofdomestic statutes and regulations to thefunding of military operations, andsupport to non-federal agencies andorganizations.

FM 27-100

3-10

The SJA’s fiscal law responsibilitiesinclude furnishing legal advice on theproper use and expenditure of funds,interagency agreements for logisticssupport, security assistance, and supportto non-federal agencies andorganizations.

SJAs usually provide fiscal lawsupport at the main and rear commandposts in Army of Excellence divisionsand corps, main command posts in ForceXXI divisions and corps, DISCOM,COSCOM, TAACOM/ TSCheadquarters, and each higher army andjoint headquarters. Expertise may also berequired at the multinational commandheadquarters to advise concerninginternational support agreements.

Environmental law is the body oflaw containing the statutes, regulations,and judicial decisions relating to Armyactivities affecting the environment toinclude navigable waters, near-shore andopen waters and any other surface water,groundwater, drinking water supply, landsurface or subsurface area, ambient air,vegetation, wildlife, and humans.77

Overseas, host nation law may alsoaffect Army operations.

SJAs provide legal advice andservices on all aspects of environmentalmatters, to include representing Armyactivities in environmental litigation andat hearings before local, state, or federalagencies in coordination with the Chief,Environmental Law Division, USALSA,and the Department of Justice (DoJ);monitoring state and federalenvironmental legislative and regulatorydevelopments; providing adviceconcerning the appropriateness of any

environmental enforcement activities;and reviewing all draft environmentalorders, consent agreements, andsettlements with Federal, state, or localregulatory officials before signature.78

SJAs usually provide environmentallaw support at the main and rearcommand posts in Army of Excellencedivisions and corps, main commandposts in Force XXI divisions and corps,DISCOM, COSCOM, Theater SupportCommand Headquarters, and eachhigher army and joint headquarters.

Civil lawyers must support allphases of an operation;79 nevertheless,the issues and requirements they facewill change during each operationalphase.

Before deployment, planning andtraining are the primary concerns.Contract lawyers assist the planning forcontracting by identifying the legalauthorities for contracting, obtainingrelevant acquisition agreements orrequesting their negotiation, helping thecontracting team to define requirementsand to establish procurement proceduresfor the operation, and reviewing thecontracting support plan for legalsufficiency. Fiscal lawyers assist theplanning by identifying fundingauthorities supporting the mission.Environmental lawyers assist theplanning by providing legal adviceconcerning environmental reviews andenvironmental requirements in the areaof operations, and by reviewing plans toensure plans address environmental lawand policy requirements. Theenvironmental plan should addresspolicies and responsibilities to protectthe environment, certification of local


3-11

water sources, waste management,hazardous material management,protection of flora and fauna,archeological and historical preservation,and the base field spill plan.80

During mobilization andpredeployment, support to thecontracting and real estate EEMs isimportant. A contract lawyer shoulddeploy with the contracting EEM; anenvironmental lawyer should deploywith the real estate EEM. In preparationfor deployment, these judge advocates orcivilian attorneys must marshalresources, assist the EEM’s finalcoordination to include confirmingwarrants, funding sources andenvironmental legal requirements, andestablish liaison with the country team intheater. Upon arrival in theater, thecontract lawyer and environmentallawyer support the EEM missions offacilitating the deployment and entry offorces. The environmental lawyershould ensure an environmental surveyis completed to provide a baselineagainst which later claims for damagemay be assessed.81

During deployment and entry, civillaw support must be responsive to forcerequirements. SJAs must plan foradditional contract law and fiscal lawsupport as the theater matures, becausecontracting and fiscal issues willincrease in number and complexity.82

SJAs should encourage the use ofAcquisition Review Boards, as thesepromote prudent management ofresources and proactive resolution oflogistical support issues.83 SJAs mustmaintain close coordination with theorganization’s environmental team andcivil affairs section, and liaison with the

country team and local environmentallegal authorities.

During redeployment anddemobilization, civil lawyers supportforce redeployment and close-out.Contracts for subsistence, temporarylodging, or transportation are required toallow logistics units to redeploy. Duringclose-out, contract and environmentalclaims or disputes will arise. Civillawyers help contracting and real estateofficials resolve claims or disputes.When claims or disputes are notresolved, the civil lawyer will supportthe contracting and real estate personnelwho are responsible for litigation.84 Civillawyers are normally required until allforces leave the area, and thereforenormally redeploy last. Even afterredeployment, unresolved contractingand environmental issues may requirelegal support.

3.7 CLAIMS

The Army Claims Programinvestigates, processes, adjudicates, andsettles claims on behalf of and againstthe United States world-wide “under theauthority conferred by statutes,regulations, international andinteragency agreements, and DoDDirectives.”85 The Claims Programsupports commanders by preventingdistractions to the operation fromclaimants, promoting the morale ofArmy personnel by compensating themfor property damage suffered incident toservice, and promoting good will withthe local population by providingcompensation for personal injury orproperty damage caused by Army orDoD personnel.86 Categories of claimsinclude claims for property damage of

FM 27-100

3-12

soldiers and other employees arisingincident to service, torts alleged againstArmy or DoD personnel acting withinthe scope of employment, and claims bythe United States against individualswho injure Army personnel or damageArmy property.87

The Secretary of the Army (SA)heads the Army Claims System.88 TJAGsupervises the Army Claims Programand settles claims in accordance withdelegated authority from the SA.89 TheU.S. Army Claims Service (USARCS)administers the Army Claims Programand designates area claims offices,claims processing offices, and claimsattorneys.90 SJAs, or other supervisoryjudge advocates, operate eachcommand’s claims program andsupervise the area claims office (ACO)or claims processing office (CPO)designated by USARCS for thecommand.91 ACOs and CPOs are thenormal claims offices at Armyinstallations that investigate, process,adjudicate, and settle claims against theUnited States; and identify, investigate,and assert claims on behalf of the UnitedStates.92 Claims attorneys at each levelsettle claims within delegated authorityand forward claims exceeding thatauthority to the appropriate settlementauthority.93

Claims must be investigated and paidin an area of operations.94 Inmultinational operations, unlessotherwise specified in applicableagreements, a troop contributing nationis generally responsible to resolve claimsarising from its own operations. Foreignclaims against the U.S. will normally beresolved by the service assigned claimsresponsibility for the area. Claims

attorneys should consult DoD Directive5515.8, Single-Service Assignment ofResponsibility for Processing of Claims(June 1990). U.S. personnel claims willnormally be resolved by the parentservice. Army claims services arenormally provided in the main or rearcommand posts in Army of Excellencedivisions and corps, main commandposts in Force XXI divisions and corps,the Theater Support Commandheadquarters, and Theater Armyheadquarters. While claims services arecentrally processed at these locations,claims personnel must travel throughoutthe area of operations to investigate,negotiate, and settle claims.

Before mobilization, commandersshould appoint unit claims officers(UCO); UCOs document and reportincidents to claims offices that mightresult in a claim by or against the UnitedStates.95 The SJA and Chief of Claimsshould develop the claims architecturefor the planned operation, and providetraining for deployable claims attorneys,legal specialists, and UCOs. The claimsarchitecture should prescribe thetechnical chain of claims authority,identify additional required claimsprocessing offices or foreign claimscommissions, and describe the claimsprocedures applying during theoperation. Claims architecture planningfactors include the type and duration ofdeployment, the area to which deployed,the existence of international agreementsgoverning the presence of U.S. personneland the processing of claims, host nationlaw, and service claims responsibility forthe area.96 Claims procedures shoulddescribe how claims are received,investigated, processed, adjudicated, andpaid.97 Training for claims personnel


3-13

should cover foreign claims procedures,prevention of property damage andpersonal injury, investigative techniques,and documentation of preexistingdamage.98

During mobilization andpredeployment, SJAs and Chiefs ofClaims should provide preventive lawadvice concerning home station storageof personal property, and informationbriefings to deploying personnel abouttheater claims policies, includingpolicies concerning any types or amountsof personal property for whichcompensation will not be paid. SJAsand Chiefs of Claims should alsocoordinate with USARCS to facilitatethe appointment of Foreign ClaimsCommissions or Claims ProcessingOffices.99

During deployment and entry,claims personnel establish the claimsoperation and perform claims services.When establishing the claims operation,the senior claims attorney in theatershould inform host nation authoritieshow claims will be processed, provideinformation to the local population aboutclaims procedures, and obtain translationservices and local legal advice.100 Criticalat this point are efforts by claimspersonnel and UCOs to document theexisting condition of base camps, unitlocations, or transportation routes; gooddocumentation at the beginning of anoperation will enable accurate paymentof legitimate claims and preventpayment of fraudulent or inflatedclaims.101 The digital camera that is acomponent of the RDL is very useful forthis purpose. When performing claimsservices, the senior claims attorneyshould coordinate with UCOs to assist

them with claims investigations; withCivil Military Operations (CMO) tofacilitate liaison with local officials,learn about local customs, and provideCMO personnel information aboutclaims procedures; and with militarypolice and military intelligencepersonnel to share information.102

Throughout the operation, claimspersonnel must travel throughout thearea of operations to receive, investigate,and pay claims.103

During redeployment anddemobilization, the senior claimsattorney must ensure all filed claims arepaid, closed, or transferred to a claimsoffice with post-deploymentresponsibility for the area. Claimspersonnel at home station must beprepared to receive and process claimsby deployed personnel for damage toproperty damaged in storage duringdeployment.

3.8 LEGAL ASSISTANCE

“Wherever you have judge advocatesamong soldiers, you will have thepractice of Legal Assistance.”104

Captain Nicole Farmer

Legal assistance is the provision ofpersonal civil legal services to soldiers,their family members, and other eligiblepersonnel.105 The mission of the ArmyLegal Assistance Program is “to assistthose eligible for legal assistance withtheir personal legal affairs in a timelyand professional manner by – (1)Meeting their needs for help andinformation on legal matters; and (2)Resolving their personal legal problemswhenever possible.”106 “From an

FM 27-100

3-14

operational standpoint, the mission oflegal assistance is to ensure that thesoldiers’ personal legal affairs are inorder prior to deployment, and then, inthe deployment location, to meet thesoldiers’ legal assistance needs asquickly and as efficiently as possible.”107

The Army Legal Assistance Programpromotes morale and discipline, andthereby contributes directly to missionaccomplishment.

Legal assistance attorneys, and legalstaff working under their supervision,provide legal assistance in a variety ofsettings, including combat readinessexercises, premobilization legalpreparation (PLP), soldier readinessprogram processing (SRP),demobilization briefings, noncombatantevacuation operations, client interviews,informal requests for assistance, federaland state income tax assistance, andpreventive law programs.108 Theyprovide extensive legal services:ministerial and notary services, legalcounseling, legal correspondence,negotiation, legal document preparationand filing, limited in-courtrepresentation, legal referrals, andmediation.109 They handle a wide varietyof cases: family law, estates, realproperty, personal property, economic,civilian and military administrativematters, torts, taxes, and civiliancriminal matters.110

Legal assistance is provided at theTheater Army headquarters, TheaterSupport Command headquarters, mainand rear command posts in Army ofExcellence divisions and corps, andmain command posts in Force XXIdivisions and corps, and as required atbrigade or lower echelons.111 While each

service and each troop contributingnation is responsible to provide legalassistance for its personnel, some legalassistance may be required at joint ormultinational headquarters.

Before mobilization, active andreserve component SJAs should conductregular and proactive preventive lawprograms, resolve legal concerns ofsoldiers, their families, and other eligiblepersonnel prior to deployment, and planfor mobilization and deploymentprocessing. In conducting suchprograms, SJAs should coordinate withand involve the reserve component judgeadvocates (such as MSO JAGSOs or thejudge advocate sections of GSUs) whichwill be assigned to assist theirorganizations upon mobilization, or withwhom they have developed trainingassociations. Preventive law programsprovide information to service membersand families that enable them to avoidlegal problems, or to identify concernsand seek prompt assistance.112 RegularSRP processing, along with reservecomponent PLP, ensures soldiers andemergency-essential civilian employeeshave their legal affairs in order and areprepared for deployment. Because legalneeds may not be met upon deployment,SJAs must plan to provide legalassistance to large numbers of personnelpreparing to deploy. SJAs must alsoplan to provide legal assistance topersonnel in the deployment theater andfamily members at home station,mobilization stations, or elsewhereduring the operation.113 The MSOs andthe judge advocate sections of the GSUsdescribed in Chapter 2 provide SJAs thecapability to provide this surge andsustainment legal assistance.


3-15

During mobilization andpredeployment, the SJA and Chief ofLegal Assistance should manage SRPprocessing, coordinate with the local barand courts concerning current legalassistance issues or stays required by themobilization or deployment, providelegal assistance briefings for familymembers, and resolve as many legalconcerns as possible beforedeployment.114 SRP processing shouldreview, at a minimum, Soldiers’ GroupLife Insurance (SGLI) beneficiarydesignations, requirements for wills orpowers of attorney, the existence ofSoldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Actissues or any pending civilian or militarycharges, the receipt of GenevaConvention briefings, and family careplan concerns.115 Providing advance SRPpackets to deploying soldiers enablesthem to consider their legal needs inadvance, to come to the SRP with theinformation needed to processefficiently, and to leave with the legalproducts and advice they require.116

During deployment and entry,SJAs must provide legal assistance bothin the deployment theater and at homestation. Due to the special attorney-client relationship and the possibility ofconflicting interests betweencommanders and soldiers, the SJAgenerally designates specific judgeadvocates as legal assistance attorneys.Because of the increased demand forlegal assistance services duringdeployments, the SJA may allow judgeadvocates who are not legal assistanceattorneys to provide legal assistanceservices when consistent withprofessional standards. The SJA willrely heavily on the judge advocatesassigned to GSU supporting the

installation and the MSO supporting thedeployment. Also, the SJA may seeksupport from the Senior DefenseCounsel, who may assign Trial DefenseCounsel to provide legal assistanceconsistent with the Trial Defensemission.117 In theater, legal assistanceattorneys should be prepared to resolvethe full range of legal assistance cases,and to provide federal and state incometax assistance.118 The Chief of LegalAssistance in theater, should establishliaison with the U.S. Consulate, andensure effective communication andcourier service between legal assistanceoffices in theater and home station.119 Athome station, in addition to providinglegal assistance to the home station, thelegal assistance office must providerequired assistance to deployed legalassistance attorneys and provide legalassistance briefings to familymembers.120

During redeployment anddemobilization, the SJA and Chief ofLegal Assistance must resolve legalassistance matters in the deploymenttheater, or coordinate to ensure they areresolved after redeployment, and resolvematters at home station that arose orremained unresolved during theoperation.

3.9 SUMMARY

The JAGC providescomprehensive legal support tooperations across the spectrum andthroughout all phases of militaryoperations. Staff Judge Advocatesensure OPLAW and core legaldisciplinary support at each level ofcommand from the theater throughbrigade, and at lower echelons as

FM 27-100

3-16

required. This chapter described, ingeneral terms, what legal support isprovided. The following chapters willdescribe how legal support is provided tospecific types of operations.


4-1

4 LEGAL SUPPORT IN THEATER OPERATIONS_____________________________________________________________________________

Theater command structures andcampaign planning originated in WorldWar II and have existed, with variations,ever since. In the 1980s, duringdigestion of the hard lessons of Vietnam,the services . . . adopted [the] concept ofan intermediate level of war, betweenthe strategy from Washington and thetactics of the battlefields. Operationalart received its formal designation in the1982 version of the Army's Field Manual100-5, with the other services closelyfollowing. The present flowering of jointdoctrine, still in progress, has beenmarked in Congress by the passage ofthe Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Atlast, the United States has begun toplace in print ideas and techniques inferment since the time of Lincoln andGrant . . .

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel K. BolgerSavage Peace121

CONTENTS PAGE

THE THEATER................................ 4-2

Key Terms and Distinctions..... 4-2Communications Zone and

Combat Zone......................... 4-3Strategy..................................... 4-3Structures of Command and

Coordination........................ 4-4Command, Control, and

Support Relationships.......... 4-8

PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING........................................... 4-10

Planning.................................... 4-11Functions of Staffs................... 4-11The Military Decision Making

Process.................................. 4-12Decision Making in a Time-

Constrained Environment..... 4-18SJA Planning, Decision-

Making, and Orders............... 4-20LEGAL SUPPORT IN THEATER..... 4-21

Introduction.............................. 4-21Overseas Presence and Force

Projection.............................. 4-21Legal Support in Theater......... 4-23The United States as a

Theater................................... 4-24Technical Channels.................. 4-24

MATERIEL 4-25Legal Automation 4-25Mobility..................................... 4-28Communications...................... 4-29

TRAINING........................................ 4-30Principles of Training............... 4-30Mission Essential Task Lists... 4-32Planning for Training............... 4-35

LEGAL SUPPORT AND SPECIALOPERATIONS.................................. 4-36

Legal Support and SpecialOperations............................. 4-38

Legal Support and Civil Affairs 4-39

FM 27-100

2

Though many Law of War problems arose, . . . judgeadvocates [in theater] also dealt with a significant numberof other legal issues. . . . As so aptly stated by one judgeadvocate involved, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, "You canonly tell the C.O. that he can't shoot the prisoners so manytimes. You reach a point at which when the boss has runout of beans and bullets, has certain equipmentrequirements, and has the locals clamoring to be paid forproperty damage, you have to be prepared to provide thebest possible legal advice concerning these issues as well."

Lieutenant Colonel David E. GrahamOperational Law-A Concept Comes of Age122

4.1 THE THEATER

Operational art is best understoodwithin the context of a theater, ageographical area outside the continentalUnited States for which a Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of a unified commandhas been assigned militaryresponsibility.123 The theater is thesetting within which United Statescommanders determine when, where,and for what purpose major forces willbe committed. It is the setting intowhich forces are deployed and laterinserted into or withdrawn fromoperations. It is the setting within whichoptimal effect can be made of theresources of personnel, materiel, andtime because the commander isconsciously employing them to achievedesired strategic ends.124

Legal support to operations is thecomprehensive set of professional legalfunctions and disciplines needed tosupport worldwide operations. Due tothe modern national security structure ofthe United States, these worldwideoperations involve military forcesprojected into and within theaters.Accordingly, judge advocates must have

a detailed understanding of the terms,distinctions, and structures of commandand coordination associated with theateroperations. They must also understandseveral separate but complementaryrelationships of command, control, andsupport that are exercised withintheaters.

4.1.1 Key Terms and Distinctions

Theaters may be described as eithercontinental, i.e., European Command(EUCOM), Central Command(CENTCOM) or Southern Command(SOUTHCOM), or maritime, i.e.,Pacific Command (PACOM), or littoralbased on their dominant geographiccharacteristics.125 A unified combatantcommander who has a geographic areaof responsibility— recall that the CINCsof Transportation Command(TRANSCOM), Special OperationsCommand (SOCOM), StrategicCommand (STRATCOM), and SpaceCommand (SPACECOM) do not—isalso referred to as a theatercommander.126 United States JointForces Command (USJFCOM), formerlyAtlantic Command (ACOM), maintainsits Atlantic area of responsibility.


4-3

Because unified commands werecreated following World War II tointegrate the separate services into anefficient warfighting team,127 a CINC'stheater is sometimes called a theater ofwar, regardless whether combatoperations are taking place within it.This theater of war may be subdividedinto subordinate theaters of operations,which may be further subdivided intoareas of operations (AO). The CINChas great freedom to organize his theater,and he will frequently designate otherareas of significance, such as jointoperations areas (JOA), joint zones(JZ), and joint rear areas (JRA).

4.1.2 Communications Zone andCombat Zone

One traditional organizational devicedivides the theater of war into acommunications zone (COMMZ) and acombat zone (CZ). The COMMZ andthe CZ are contiguous and do notoverlap.128 The COMMZ is the rear partof a theater of operations, and it containsthe lines of communications, air and seaports, establishments for supply,maintenance, field services, personnelsupport, health services and evacuation,and other agencies required for theimmediate support and maintenance ofthe field forces. The COMMZ reachesback to the continental United States orto another CINC's area of responsibility.

The CZ is the territory forward of theCOMMZ. In the European theater, theboundary line falls at the Army grouprear boundary: that is, everythingforward of the Army group rearboundary was the CZ. The CZ is the arearequired by operational and tactical

forces for the conduct of operations.The depth of the CZ depends on theforces involved, the nature of plannedoperations, the lines of communications,the terrain, and enemy capabilities.Normally, the CZ is divided into corpsand division areas.

Noncombat contingencies andcontingencies that involve sporadic orisolated combat create the need foralternatives to the CZ device. Acontingency is "[a]n emergencyinvolving military forces caused bynatural disasters, terrorists, subversives,or by required military operations."129

Contingencies cause CINCs to designateareas of conflict (AOC), geographicareas where hostilities are imminent, andareas of assistance (AOA), areas whereforces conduct humanitarian assistanceor other support operations unopposed.130

Commanders, SJAs and other Armyleaders deploying forces to a theater ofoperations must understand yet anotherdistinction. A developed or maturetheater is typically one in which theUnited States has an existing overseaspresence, to include a support structureof communications, logistics, airdefense, ports, etc. An undeveloped orimmature theater lacks one or more ofthese features. When projecting force toan immature theater, leaders mustchoose between creating a support basein the theater or operating with externalsupport.131

4.1.3 Strategy

The President, in collaboration withseveral executive branch departmentsand agencies, develops the NationalSecurity Strategy. In turn, the Chairman

FM 27-100

4-4

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops theNational Military Strategy to assist thePresident and the Secretary of Defense(who are called the National CommandAuthorities or NCA) in directing thearmed forces toward broader nationalsecurity goals.

Currently, the National MilitaryStrategy describes two fundamentalstrategic military objectives derived fromthe National Security Strategy.132

• Promote peace and stability throughdeterrence, peacetime engagementactivities, and active participationand leadership in alliances; and,when necessary,

• Defeat adversaries.

The overlapping and interrelatedstrategic concepts that allow the militaryto achieve these objectives are strategicagility, overseas presence, powerprojection, and decisive force, which arediscussed more fully later in this chapter.

The CINCs develop theater strategiesconsistent with the two national strategicdocuments. The development of theaterstrategy involves careful analysis of theMETT-TC unique to the theater.133

The development of separate theaterstrategies permits the creation of aUnified Command Plan (UCP). ThePresident approves the UCP, which setsforth basic guidance to all unifiedcombatant commanders; establishes theirmissions, responsibilities, and forcestructure; delineates the geographicalboundaries of CINC areas ofresponsibility (related but technicallydistinct from theaters of war); andspecifies functional responsibilities forfunctional combatant commanders.

4.1.4 Structures of Command andCoordination.

Operations within a theater areinvariably joint and often multinational.They also often involve manygovernmental agencies,nongovernmental organizations, andprivate organizations. Judge advocatescannot practice operational law withoutknowing the various key players in atheater and the structures through whichthe CINC orchestrates unified actionamong them. Judge advocates mayconsult the Joint Staff Officers Guide,Armed Forces Staff College Publication1 (1997) for further information. Unifiedaction is the wide scope of actions—including the synchronization of militaryactivities with those of governmental andnongovernmental agencies—taking placein a theater. Unified action integratescombinations of single-service, joint,multinational and interagency activitiesto achieve a military end state thatsupports the strategic end state.134

4.1.4.1 Joint

The term joint, as the definition ofjoint task force implies, refers to militaryactions involving two or more militarydepartments: Army, Navy/MarineCorps, Air Force. It may also refer to theactions of two or more elements of thesame service that are commanded byseparate CINCs, such as Armymechanized infantry and Army specialforces.

A joint task force (JTF) consists ofelements of two or more services (AirForce, Army, Navy, Marines) operatingunder a single commander. The


4-5

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), as wellas the CINCs, may establish JTFs, whichare created to perform theater missionshaving specific limited objectives ormissions of short duration.

There are other types of jointcommand. One of these is thesubordinate unified command, which,unlike a JTF, has broader, enduringobjectives or missions. Examples ofsubordinate unified commands areAlaskan Command (ALCOM), U.S.Forces Japan (USFJ), and U.S. ForceKorea (USFK), all of which fall withinthe area of responsibility of CINCPACOM. Another type of joint forcethat a CINC may create within a theateris the functional component command,which focuses on operationalresponsibilities that cut across servicelines. The four types of functionalcomponent commands are the Joint forceland component command (JFLCC), theJoint force air component command(JFACC), the Joint force maritimecomponent command (JFMCC), and theJoint force special operations componentcommand (JFSOCC).

The judge advocate will encounter agreat number and variety of joint boards,cells, and other joint organs within atheater. For instance, land forcesparticipate in the joint targeting processas defined by the Joint ForceCommander (JFC), a generic term for acommander of the various joint forcesoutlined in the previous section of thischapter. JFCs may delegate targetingoversight functions to a subordinatecommander, or they may establish aJoint Targeting Coordination Board(JTCB) within their staff either as anintegrating center for this effort or as a

JFC-level review mechanism. While theJTCB maintains a campaign-levelperspective-and thus is not involved inselecting specific targets and aim pointsor in developing attack packages-anOPLAW JA must serve on this board.

There are many other examples. Forinstance, the JFC may establish a seriesof joint logistics centers, offices, andboards to coordinate the joint logisticseffort. Judge advocates may be calledupon to furnish legal advice to theseorganizations, which include thefollowing:

• Joint Transportation Board.• Joint Movement Center .• Joint Petroleum Office.• Joint Civil-Military Engineering

Board.• Joint Facilities Utilization Board.• CINC Logistic Procurement Support

Board.• Theater Patient Movement

Requirements Center.• Joint Blood Program Office.• Joint Mortuary Affairs Office.• Joint Materiel Priorities and

Allocation Board.

4.1.4.2 Multinational (Combined)

The term multinational describesoperations conducted by more than onenation. The term used within the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)for multinational operations is"combined," which means "[b]etweentwo or more forces or agencies of two ormore allies."135 Multinational operationstake place within alliances, such asNATO, or coalitions.

FM 27-100

4-6

• An alliance is a result of formalagreements between two or morenations for broad, long-termobjectives. Alliances may afford theparticipant nations the time toestablish formal, standardagreements for broad, long-termobjectives. Alliance nations strive tofield compatible military systems,establish common procedures, anddevelop contingency plans to meetpotential threats in a fully integratedmanner.

• A coalition is an ad hoc arrangementbetween two or more nations forcommon action. Nations usuallyform coalitions for focused, short-term purposes. In successfulcoalitions, all parties agree incommitment, even if the resourceseach invests are disproportionate.While each nation has its ownagenda, each also brings value to thecoalition, perhaps solely to addlegitimacy to the enterprise.

4.1.4.3 Interagency

The term interagency describesactivity between or among the militarydepartments, the combatant commands,and one or more nonmilitary executivedepartments or agencies. Interagencycoordination rests on principles in theConstitution, and a process governingthat coordination was established in theNational Security Act of 1947. Nationallevel oversight of the interagencyprocess comes from the NationalSecurity Council. Detailed guidance forInteragency Coordination During JointOperations is in JOINT PUBLICATION 3-08: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

DURING JOINT OPERATIONS, Volumes Iand II (9 October 1996).

A key vehicle for interagencycoordination is the Country Team, abody headed by the Chief of Mission, thesenior United States diplomat in aforeign country and usually someoneholding Ambassadorial rank in theUnited States foreign service.136 Becausea representative of the United StatesAgency for International Development(USAID) typically serves in the CountryTeam, and because USAID has a leadrole in coordinating the efforts of NGOsand PVOs in foreign lands, theseorganizations also fall under theumbrella of interagency coordination.However, United States military forcescoordinate directly with NGOs andPVOs, often through the vehicle of aCivil-Military Operations Center(CMOC) or Humanitarian OperationsCenter in a disaster relief operation.

4.1.4.4 The Army in a TheaterCommand

A major component of the concept ofmodern theater operations is this: whenthe Army operates outside the UnitedStates, the area to which the Army forcesdeploy is the responsibility of a unifiedcombatant commander. He providesstrategic direction and operational focusto his forces by developing strategy,planning the theater campaign,organizing the theater, and establishingcommand relationships for effectiveunified action.

Where combatant commanders havea continuing requirement for landcombat power or support, Army forcesare assigned to their respective


4-7

commands. In addition to forcesassigned in peacetime, a documentcalled the Joint Strategic CapabilitiesPlan (JSCP) apportions major Armyforces by type to a CINC for deliberateplanning. In response to crises or actualsituations, Army forces are allocated tothe CINC. The combatant commanderresponding to a crisis rarely hassufficient Army units assigned to meetoperational requirements. The SECDEFthrough CJCS directs other CINCs tosupport the engaged combatantcommander with augmentation forces.Augmentation forces pass to thecommand of the supported CINC at aspecific location or circumstance,designated transfer of authority (TOA).

Army forces in a joint force operatewithin a single chain of command thathas two distinct branches—one foroperations and another foradministration and logistics. TheSecretary of the Army is responsible forthe administration and support of allARFOR—a term that denotes Armyheadquarters and forces assigned to ajoint force commander or multinationalcommand. The Secretary of the Armyfulfills this responsibility through theArmy service component command(ASCC) aligned with each of thecombatant commands. The ASCCprovides support to the Army Forces(ARFOR) through administrativecontrol (ADCON), which is subject tothe combatant command (COCOM)authority vested in all combatantcommanders.

Each unified and subordinate unifiedcommand includes an ASCC, whichconsists of the ASCC commander and allthose elements under his command. The

ASCC commander maintains theADCON link between his forces andDepartment of the Army;simultaneously, the ASCC maintains theoperational link with the theater CINC(i.e., COCOM link). The ASCC plansand executes support operations tosustain ARFOR within the theater (Title10 U.S.C. Chapters 303 and 305), andprovides support to other services inaccordance with executive agentresponsibilities (Title 10 U.S.C. Chapter6).

ASCC responsibilities are describedin Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action ArmedForces. Operational responsibilitiesinclude:

• Recommending to the CINC orsubunified commander the properemployment of Army componentforces.

• Accomplishing operational missionsas assigned.

• Selecting and nominating specificunits of the Army for assignment tosubordinate theater forces.

• Informing the CINC of Armylogistics support effects onoperational capabilities.

• Providing data to supportingoperation plans as requested.

• Ensuring signal interoperability.

Army commanders at all levels areresponsible to the ASCC for conductingArmy-specific functions such as internaladministration, discipline, training,normal logistics functions, and forservice intelligence matters andoversight of intelligence activities toensure compliance with laws, policies,and directives.

FM 27-100

4-8

4.1.5 Command, Control, andSupport Relationships

The distinction between COCOM toADCON is better understood within thecontext of the full array of command,control, and support relationships. Fourof the relationships stem from what areknown in joint doctrine as "commandauthorities."

• Combatant Command• Operational Control• Tactical Control• Support

The three additional relationshipsstem from other authorities.

• Coordinating Authority• Administrative Control• Direct Liaison Authorized

Practice of operational law requiresfamiliarity with this full array.

• Combatant Command. COCOM isthe command authority authorizedby Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 164,or as directed by the President in theUCP to combatant commandcommanders (unified or specified).COCOM provides full authority toorganize and employ commands andforces as the combatant commanderconsiders necessary to accomplishassigned missions. This authorityenables the CINC to organize andemploy his commands and forces,assign tasks, designate objectives,and give authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations,joint training, and logisticsnecessary to accomplish theassigned missions. The CINCnormally exercises COCOM through

his service component commanders.COCOM is not transferable.

• Operational Control. Commandersat or below the combatantcommander exercise operationalcontrol (OPCON). OPCON isinherent in COCOM and is theauthority to perform the functions ofcommand over subordinate forces.The CINC may delegate OPCON tohis subordinates. OPCON is themost authority with whichsubordinates can direct all aspects ofmilitary operations and joint trainingneeded to accomplish any assignedmission. A commander withOPCON may control forces fromone or more services. OPCON doesnot normally include the authority todirect logistics, administration,discipline, internal organization, orunit training. The service componentcommander retains his serviceresponsibility and authority forforces under OPCON of anothercommand. Judge advocates must beaware of how the U.S. and NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) use the term and must notinterchange the U.S. sense with theNATO sense. The NATO termOPCON more closely resembles theU.S. definition of TACON.

• Tactical Control. The CINC usesTACON to limit the authority todirect the tactical use of combatforces. TACON is authoritynormally limited to the detailed andspecified local direction ofmovement and maneuver of thetactical force to accomplish anassigned task. TACON does notprovide organizational authority oradministrative and support


4-9

responsibilities. The servicecomponent continues to exercisethese authorities.

• Support. The CINC identifiessupport relationships for one forceto aid, assist, protect, or logisticallysupport another force. Thesupporting force gives the neededsupport to the supported force.Establishing supported andsupporting relationships betweencomponents is a useful option toaccomplish needed tasks. Thisconcept applies equally to alldimensions of the joint forceorganized by the CINC. Eachsubordinate element of the jointforce can support or be supported byother elements. Normally anestablishing directive is issued tospecify the purpose of the supportrelationship, the effect desired, andthe scope of the action to be taken.Joint Pub 0-2 states, "Unless limitedby the establishing directive, thecommander of the supported forcewill have the authority to exercisegeneral direction of the supportingeffort." The execution of generaldirection includes the designationand prioritization of targets orobjectives, timing and duration ofthe supporting action, and otherinstructions necessary forcoordination and efficiency. Thesupporting commander isresponsible for ascertaining theneeds of the supported commander.The supporting commander mustfulfill those needs from within theexisting capabilities, priorities, andrequirements of other assignedtasks. The categories of support aregeneral, mutual, direct, and close.

! General Support.General support providesdesignated support to anentire supported force and notto any particular subdivision.General support is the mostcentralized supportrelationship. For combatunits, this relationshipprovides the most flexibilityfor influencing the battleduring conduct of operationsand is used when the enemysituation is unclear. It is morecommonly used in thedefense than the offense.

! Mutual Support. Mutualsupport describes actions thatunits provide one anotheragainst an enemy because oftheir assigned tasks, theirpositions relative to oneanother and to the enemy, andtheir inherent capabilities.

! Direct Support. Directsupport provides designatedsupport to a specific forceand authorizes the supportedforce to seek this supportdirectly. The supporting forceprovides support on a prioritybasis to the supported force.Also, the supporting forcemay provide support to otherforces when it does notjeopardize the mission or putthe supported force at risk.The authority to accomplishsupport of other than directlysupported forces rests withthe higher tactical oroperational commander butalso may be delegated. Anexample of this support is

FM 27-100

4-10

when the elements of ageneral support artillerybrigade assigned a directsupport mission are divertedtemporarily to support a forceother than the designatedforce.

! Close Support. Thefourth alternative, closesupport, is that action of thesupporting force againsttargets or objectives that aresufficiently near thesupported force as to requiredetailed integration orcoordination of thesupporting action with thefire, movement, or otheractions of the supportedforce.

• Coordinating Authority.Coordinating authority is aconsultation relationship betweencommanders, but not an authority toexercise control. The CINC andother subordinate commandersdesignate coordinating authority toassist during planning andpreparation for actual operations.The CINC specifies coordinatingauthority to foster effectivecoordination; however, coordinatingauthority does not compel anyagreements.

• Administrative Control.Administrative Control (ADCON) isthe direction or exercise of authoritynecessary to fulfill militarydepartment statutory responsibilitiesfor administration and support.ADCON may be delegated to andexercised by service commanders atany echelon at or below the service

component command. Thesecretaries of military departmentsare responsible for the administrationand support of their forces assignedor attached to unified commands.The secretaries fulfill thisresponsibility by exercising ADCONthrough the service componentcommander of the unified command.ADCON is subject to the commandauthority of the combatantcommander.

• Direct Liaison Authorized. DirectLiaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) isthe authority granted by acommander at any level to asubordinate commander tocoordinate an action directly with acommand or agency within oroutside the command. DIRLAUTHis a coordination relationship, not acommand relationship.

4.2 PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING

The practice and delivery of legalsupport in theater operations require fullparticipation of legal personnel in theplanning and decision-making processesof their commands. It also calls uponSJAs and DSJAs to adhere to time-honored principles in their own planningand decision-making. This part of thechapter outlines these processes andprinciples.

4.2.1 Planning

The art of planning is not to predict,but to anticipate. The most certain wayto constrain unpredictability is to seizethe initiative, maintain the momentum,and exploit success. Setting the terms of


4-11

battle at the outset and never letting theenemy recover should be the aim ofevery plan for offensive and defensiveoperations. Every success must beexploited, and every exploitation mustlead to the next success. Planning,therefore, never loses its focus onexecution. The plan is a continuous,evolving framework that maximizesopportunities -- a point of referencerather than a blueprint. Because theplanning process itself generatescommon understanding, planning has avalue that extends beyond the plan itself.

Success in planning rests on theability to accomplish four tasks:

• Understand the full scope of thesituation.

• Analyze the situation to discern whatis important -- the key elements ofoperational design.

• Devise simple, effective, and flexibleplans.

• Prepare the force to execute thoseplans.

According to Field Manual 100-5,Operations, plans reflect a fundamentaloperational design—a linkage of ends,ways, and means. Key conceptual toolsthat express this design include:

• Strategic end state.• Objectives.• Lines of operation.• Mission• Commander's intent• Concept of operations• Battlespace• Rules of engagement

4.2.2 Functions of Staffs

All staffs perform five commonfunctions:

• Providing Information—The staffcollects, collates, analyzes, anddisseminates information that flowsinto the headquarters. The staffrapidly processes and providessignificant elements of thisinformation to the commander. Thestaff is always sensitive to changesin the battle that may warrant thecommander's attention.

• Making Estimates—The staffprepares estimates to assist thecommander in decision-making. Astaff estimate consists of significantfacts, events, and conclusions (basedon current or anticipated situation)and recommendations on howavailable resources can be best used.Efficient planning depends oncontinuing estimates by staffofficers. Failure to make theseestimates may lead to errors andomissions in the development of acourse of action.

• Making Recommendations—Staffofficers make recommendations toassist the commander in reachingdecisions and establishing policies.Staff officers also offerrecommendations to one another andto subordinate commanders. In thelatter case, recommendations are forassistance only; they do not carryimplied command authority.

• Preparing Plans and Orders— Thestaff prepares and issues plans andorders to carry out the commander'sdecisions, ensuring coordination ofall necessary details. Thecommander may delegate authority

FM 27-100

4-12

to staff officers to issue plans andorders without his personal approval.

• Supervise the Execution ofDecisions—The staff assists thecommander by ensuring thatsubordinates carry out the commanddecision. Staff supervision relievesthe commander of much detail, keepsthe staff informed of the situation,and provides the staff with theinformation needed.

At battalion level and higher, thecommander is authorized a staff to assisthim. Field Manual 101-5, StaffOrganization and Operations containsdetailed guidance on the composition,organization, and functions of militarystaffs and on the preparation of plans andorders. The Joint Operations Planningand Execution System (JOPES) containssimilar guidance for joint staffs.

4.2.3 The Military Decision MakingProcess

Decision-Making. Decision-makingis part of operational art. A commanderand staff will continually face situationsinvolving uncertainty, questionable orincomplete data, and multiplealternatives. They must determine notonly what to do, but also whether adecision is necessary. Good decisionsresult from a logical and orderly processthat consists of:

• Recognizing and defining theproblem;

• Gathering the facts and makingassumptions needed to determine thescope of and the solution to theproblem;

• Developing possible solutions to theproblem;

• Analyzing and comparing possiblesolutions; and

• Selecting the best solution to theproblem.

Military command posts typicallyapply this basic decision-making andproblem-solving model in two contexts:first, when they are preparing estimatesof the situation prior to issuing anoperations plan or order, and, second,when they are preparing staff studies insearch of solutions to specific problems.The estimate is the principle problem-solving vehicle in tactical andoperational settings; the staff study is thenorm in administrative settings. Thissection discusses only the former.

Estimates. The estimate of thesituation involves collection and analysisof relevant information for developing,within the time limits and availableinformation, the most effective solutionto a problem. The staff officer preparesa staff estimate in order to provideconclusions and recommendations to thecommander. The commander uses acommander's estimate to arrive at adecision. Estimates may be written, butare usually a mental process followingthe problem-solving format outlinedabove. Army doctrine calls uponcommanders and staffs to reviseestimates continuously—throughout themilitary decision making process—asfactors affecting the operation change, asnew facts are recognized, as assumptionsare replaced by facts or are renderedinvalid, or as the mission changes.

Staff estimates analyze the influenceof factors within particular staff officers'fields of interest on the accomplishmentof the command's mission. In


4-13

coordination with other staff officers, theofficer preparing an estimate developsfeasible courses of action, and thenanalyzes and compares those feasiblecourses of action. The results areconclusions and recommendations.

These conclusions are presented tothe commander, who thus may hear apersonnel estimate, an intelligenceestimate, an operation estimate, a logisticestimate, a civil-military operationsestimate and any other desired staffestimates before arriving at his ownestimate. The commander bases hisestimate on the METT-TC, on personalknowledge of the situation, on ethicalconsiderations, as well as on the staffestimates. The result is a decision,which can be incorporated into a plan ororder and then executed by subordinateunits.

Receipt of Mission. The parallelestimates developed by staff andcommander are the heart of the elaboratedecision-making process. The decision-making cycle begins upon receipt of amission, which the higher headquartersassigns or the commander simplydeduces from formal or informalcommunications with his seniorcommanding officer. Even beforeclosely analyzing the mission, thecommander at this point may seek moreinformation about the current situationand about the mission itself, and he mayor may not ask the staff to assist him atthis early point.

Mission Analysis. The commanderthen conducts a rather formal missionanalysis so as to obtain a clearunderstanding of what it is he is beingasked to do. Mission analysis involves

identifying the tasks that must beperformed, the purpose to be achievedthrough accomplishing the assignedtasks, and the limitations on his unit'sactions, if any. Some tasks will bespecified in the operation plan or orderreceived from higher headquarters.Other tasks may be implied. Thelimitations a commander may discernwill include a variety of constraints uponeither the operation or the planningprocess. Examples are phrases in ahigher headquarters order that specify"Be prepared to . . . , " "Not earlier than .. . ," "Not later than . . ." Time is afrequent limitation.

Restated Mission. The restatedmission is what results from thecommander's mission analysis. Itbecomes the basis of the commandersand staff estimates. If these are written,it is paragraph 1. Later, when thecommander issues the operation plan ororder, this restated mission will beparagraph 2 of that document.

Planning Guidance. Thecommander may provide planningguidance to the staff when he announceshis restated mission or at any other pointin the process. The goal is to provide acommon point of departure for thedifferent staff elements withoutintroducing bias into their estimates. Hemay, for instance, issue definiteguidance on whether and how aparticular weapons system will be used.He may request that a particular courseof action be developed or eliminatedaltogether. The frequency, amount, andcontent of planning guidance will varywith the mission, time available,situation, information available, and

FM 27-100

4-14

experience of the commander and thestaff.

Course of Action Development.Relying upon the restated mission, anyplanning guidance, and estimates, thecoordinating staff officers then preparecourses of action. The ongoing estimateprocess is interactive within a particulardecision cycle.137 Staff officersexchange information while concurrentlyanalyzing how relevant factors fromtheir disciplines affect the courses ofaction. Furthermore, the development ofcourses of action itself is interactive.The operations officer (U-3/J-3/G-3/S-3)will frequently sketch the tentativeschemes of maneuver and supportingfires (see section below on plans andorders) he is considering as part of theoperations estimate. The intelligenceofficer (U-2/J-2/G-2/S-2) or logisticsofficer (U- 4/J-4/G-4/S-4) might quicklyidentify one of these schemes ofmaneuver as not feasible,138 enablinganother course of action to be developedbefore a series (usually three) of coursesof action is formally incorporated intothe staff estimates that are briefed to thecommander.

Course of Action Analysis (WarGaming). The chief of staff or executiveofficer ensures that staff estimates arecoordinated, that differences of opinionare identified and resolved, and that onlyissues requiring the commander'spersonal attention are presented to himfor decision. However, he must takegreat care not to gloss over orcompromise genuine issues for the sakeof presenting a common option to thecommander. In some units, the Chief ofStaff consolidates the various staffestimates and presents one overall staff

estimate to the commander. TheCourses of Action contained in theestimates are war gamed to determinestrengths, weaknesses, and details.

Course of Action Comparison andSelection. The commander considersmodifying the courses of actionevaluated in the staff estimates and wargamed, and then, if necessary, returnsthem for another round of analysis andcomparison by the staff. If satisfied withthe courses of action as formulated, thecommander is to compare all of thecourses of action validated by the staff asfeasible. Then he makes a decision byadopting the one he thinks is optimal.

Course of Action Approval. Havingdecided on a course of action toaccomplish the mission, the commanderannounces his decision and concept tokey members of the staff. Subordinatecommanders may also be present. Theconcept is the commanders descriptionof how he visualizes the conduct of theoperation. The commander mayannounce his decision and concept orallyand in sufficient detail so staff officersand subordinate commanders understandwhat they must do and, if necessary, canexecute the operation without furtherinstructions.

The staff prepares and issues a planor order that expresses the commander'sdecision and concept of the operation.Plans and orders may be under constantrefinement from the moment they areissued. After a decision is transmitted tounits for execution, facts and situationsthat pertained when the order waspublished may change. The commander,the staff, and subordinate commandersand staff receive feedback through


4-15

reports and personal observations, andthey use feedback to evaluate whetherthe mission is understood and, later,whether it is being accomplished.

Plans and Orders. The staffdevelops an operation plan (OPLAN)from the course of action selected by thecommander, specifying that at aparticular time or under certainconditions that OPLAN will be issued asan operation order (OPORD). Whenforces are to conduct an operationimmediately, the staff prepares anOPORD without putting it on the shelfas an OPLAN. Army doctrine recognizesfive distinct types of combat orders.

• The operation order (OPORD) is thefirst type. It gives subordinatecommanders the essentialinformation needed to carry out anoperation, namely, the situation, themission, the commander's concept,the assignment of tasks, and thesupport and assistance to beprovided.

• The second type is the warningorder (WARNO). A warning ordergives preliminary notice of actions ororders that are to follow. Thepurpose behind a warning order is togive subordinates maximum time forpreparation. They have noprescribed format but should containfour essential elements—theaddressees, the nature of theoperation, the time of the operation,and the time and place the OPORDor OPLAN is to be issued.

• The third type is the fragmentaryorder (FRAGO). A FRAGO isnormally used to issue supplementalinstructions to a current OPORDwhile the operation is in progress. It

may be written but often is oral.Although doctrine prescribes noformat for the FRAGO, commandstypically write them in the basicformat of the five-paragraph OPORDto prevent confusion. The OPLAWJA must have timely access toFRAGOs to ensure compliance withthe LOW, ROE, and other legalrequirements.

• The fourth type is the servicesupport order (SSORD). TheSSORD provides the plan for servicesupport of operations, includingadministrative movements. Itprovides information to supportedelements and serves as a basis for theorders of supporting commanders totheir units. SSORDs may be issuedeither with an OPORD or separately,when the commander expects theCSS situation to apply to more thanone operation plan or order. Atdivision and corps levels ofcommand, the SSORD may replacean OPORD's service support annex.If that happens, the staff refers to theexistence of the SSORD in paragraph4 of the OPORD.

• The fifth type of combat order is themovement order. The movementorder is a stand-alone order thatfacilitates an uncommitted unit'smovement. The movements aretypically administrative, and troopsand vehicles are arranged toexpedite their movement and toconserve time and energy when noenemy interference (except by air) isanticipated. Normally, thesemovements occur in thecommunications zone. The G4 (S4)has primary coordinating staffresponsibility for planning and

FM 27-100

4-16

coordinating movements. However,he receives assistance from othercoordinating and special staffofficers (such as the G3 (S3), PM,MP, transportation officers, andmovement-control personnel). TheG4 (S4) is also responsible forpreparing, publishing, anddistributing the movement order.

All types of orders should meetgeneral standards of clarity, internalconsistency, and completeness. Ordersshould use doctrinally-established terms.They should be sufficiently detailed topermit subordinate commanders toaccomplish the mission without furtherinstructions. They should be sufficientlydetailed to permit subordinatecommanders to know what other unitsare doing. They should be focused onessential tasks. They should not limitthe initiative of subordinate commandersby prescribing details of execution thatlie within their province. They shouldnot include qualified directives such as"try to hold," or "as far as possible."

Standing operating procedures(SOPs) are indispensable to effectiveorders. SOPs detail how forces willexecute unit-specific techniques andprocedures that commanders standardizeto enhance effectiveness and flexibility.Commanders and other leaders use SOPsto standardize routine or recurringactions not needing their personalinvolvement. They develop SOPs fromdoctrinal sources, applicable portions ofthe higher headquarters' publishedprocedures, the commander's guidance,and techniques and proceduresdeveloped through experience. The SOPmust be as complete as possible so thatnew arrivals or newly attached units can

quickly become familiar with the unit'snormal routine. In general, SOPs applyuntil commanders change them to meetaltered conditions or practices. Thebenefits of SOPs include—

• Simplified, brief combat orders.

• Enhanced understanding andteamwork among commanders,staffs, and troops.

• Established synchronized staff drills(battle drills).

• Established abbreviated oraccelerated decision-makingtechniques.

The operations officer is responsiblefor preparing, coordinating,authenticating, publishing, anddistributing the command's tactical andadministrative SOP, with input fromother staff sections. There is noprescribed form, but subordinate unitSOPs should follow, insofar as possible,the form of the next higher headquartersSOP.

The Operation Order. The body ofthe basic OPORD consists of the taskorganization and five main paragraphs.The task organization indicates theinternal ordering of elements foraccomplishing a specific mission as wellas the command relationships betweenunits.

• Paragraph 1 (Situation) of theOPORD always contains threesubparagraphs: enemy forces,friendly forces, and attachments anddetachment. OPLANS contain afourth subparagraph: assumptions.The purpose of paragraph 1 is simplyto give an overview of the generalsituation so subordinate commanders


4-17

have an understanding of theenvironment in which they will beoperating. This paragraph containsno orders. Paragraph 1b contains themission of the higher headquarters,the missions of the units on the leftand right, the missions of the units tofront and rear, and the missions ofother elements supporting the higherheadquarters mission.

• Paragraph 2 (Mission) is a clear,concise statement of the task to beaccomplished. It contains the who,what, when (date-time group), where(generally grid coordinates) and why.As mentioned in the previoussection, the mission statement is therestated mission generated by thecommander's mission analysis. Themission statement does not containsubparagraphs.

• Paragraph 3 (Execution) containsthe guts of the OPORD—thecommander’s intent and foursubparagraphs. The commander'sintent states why the force has beentasked to accomplish its assignedmissions, what results are expected,how they facilitate future operations,and in broad terms, how thecommander visualizes achievingthose results. It also describes thedisposition and condition of thecommand following missionaccomplishment.

! Subparagraph 3a, the concept ofthe operation, is the samecommander's concept articulatedfollowing estimates during thedecision-making process outlinedabove. It is a word picture ofhow an operation is to beexecuted with sufficient detail toensure appropriate action by

subordinates. It includes thescheme of maneuver, whichaddresses the placement andmovement of major maneuverelements. It also provides theprimary mission of eachmaneuver element. The firesportion of this subparagraphcontains a brief summary of allcritical fires that will support thescheme of maneuver. Theconcept subparagraph also mayaddress civil affairs, intelligence,electronic warfare, engineers, andother support crucial tomaneuver.

! Subparagraph 3b, tasks tomaneuver units, lists units thatare organic, attached or OPCONto the issuing headquarters.Each maneuver unit is listed in aseparate subparagraph in theorder in which each was listed inthe task organization. Missionsor tasks not listed in the conceptof operation are stated clearlyand concisely. Thissubparagraph does not state tasksif those tasks are showngraphically on an operationoverlay that may be annexed tothe OPORD. Nor does it statetasks that appear in thecoordinating instructionssubparagraph.

! Subparagraph 3c, tasks to combatsupport units, is self-explanatory.

! Subparagraph 3d, coordinatinginstructions, contains instructionsand details applicable to two ormore subordinate elements.Rules of engagement may belisted here, as well as in an annexto the OPORD.

FM 27-100

4-18

• Paragraph 4 (Service Support),contains a statement of the logisticaland personnel arrangements insupport of the operation that are ofinterest to supported units. Lengthydetails may be included in an annexand referenced here. At division andhigher levels of command, referencefrequently will be made to anadmin/log order.

• Paragraph 5 (Command and Signal)contains information pertaining tocommand and control of the unit.

! Subparagraph 5a, command,includes the locations of thethree command posts (tactical,main, and rear) of the issuingunit, axis of displacement (if notshown graphically on anaccompanying overlay), and thelocation of the command group,as well as the location of thealternate command posts. Thissubparagraph may also containliaison requirements if these aredifferent from those stated in theSOP.

! Subparagraph 5b containsmission- specific informationpertaining to communications.As a minimum, it must containan index of the signal operationinstructions (SOI).

Annexes are separate documentsattached to plans and orders. Theyprovide details in specific areas withoutcomplicating the basic order. Anappendix amplifies a particular annex.Annexes and appendices use the five-paragraph operation order format whento do so makes sense. The missionparagraph of each annex prescribes the

mission of the units or elementsperforming the actions directed withinthe annex. Annexes are letteredalphabetically using capital letters.Appendices are numbered serially withArabic numerals. Rules of engagementfor the operation are contained in AnnexE to the OPLAN or OPORD, while legalsupport matters are contained inAppendix 4 to Annex I (ServiceSupport).139 Other annexes andappendices in the OPORD may containimportant information for legalpersonnel.

4.2.4 Decision Making in a Time-Constrained Environment.

The two sections immediatelypreceding this one describe what isreferred to today as the MilitaryDecision-Making Process (MDMP).This deliberate model was the only onetaught by the Army to its officers in the1980s. Today, the MDMP remains thepreferred process for analyzing in detaila number of friendly force optionsagainst the full range of reasonable andavailable enemy options. It is preferredfor developing an OPLAN when time isrelatively unconstrained. It remains thesubject matter for baseline instruction ondecision-making in the Army's systemfor leader development and reflects time-honored principles. However, the Armyrecognizes a modified version of theMDMP for use in decision cycles thatoccur after operations commence. Somerefer to this as the "combat decision-making process" or "CDP," although theMDMP remains the only doctrinallyrecognized "process." The CDP is bestunderstood as selectively shortening theMDMP without substantially changingit. In theory, the MDMP is not intended


4-19

to be a rigid, lockstep approach toarriving at a decision;140 in practice, itmay become unwieldy, particularly whenfaced with an enemy commander whomay gain great advantage by shorteninghis decision cycle.

The CDP strives to prevent thecommander- as military operationsinvolve ever more technical and complexsystems-from being submerged in vastoceans of information generated by thestaff. The CDP seeks to give thecommander the information he trulyneeds. It seeks to produce decisions thatare "close enough" and have the virtue ofbeing quickly made and passed ontosubordinates for decentralized execution.

The CDP abbreviates the MDMPusing four primary techniques.141 Thefirst is to increase the commander'sinvolvement, allowing him to makedecisions during the process withoutwaiting for detailed briefings after eachstep.

The second technique is for thecommander to become more direct in hisguidance, limiting options. This savesthe staff time by focusing members onthose things the commander feels aremost important.

The third technique, and the one thatsaves the most time, is for thecommander to limit the number of COAsdeveloped and war gamed. In extremecases, he can direct that only one courseof action be developed. The goal is anacceptable COA that meets missionrequirements in the time available, evenif it is not optimal.

The fourth technique is maximizingparallel planning. Parallel planningmeans that several echelons conduct theMDMP at the same time.142 Althoughparallel planning is the norm,maximizing its use in a time-constrainedenvironment is critical. In a time-constrained environment, the importanceof warning orders increases as availabletime decreases. A verbal warning ordernow is worth more than a written orderone hour from now. The same warningorders used in the full MDMP should beissued when the process is abbreviated.In addition to warning orders, units mustshare all available information withsubordinates, especially IntelligencePreparation of the Battlefield (IPB)products, as early as possible.

While the steps used in a time-constrained environment are the same,many of them may be done mentally bythe commander or with less staffinvolvement than during the full process.The products developed when theprocess is abbreviated may be the sameas those developed for the full process;however, they may be much less detailedand some may be omitted altogether.

One important feature of the CDP isemphasis on the Commander's CriticalInformation Requirements (CCIR). TheCCIR are developed and refinedbeginning at the mission analysis step ofthe MDMP,143 but their role isparticularly central to the CDP. CCIRenable the commander to reduce theabundant information generated duringoperations to a useable amount. Theyidentify unknown items of informationthat are so crucial to the commander'sdecision-making process that knowledgeor ignorance of them will directly affect

FM 27-100

4-20

success in the operation. By definition,the CCIR ensure that informationtransmitted to the commander ismeaningful to him and can be processedby him prior to making a decision, evenif the decision-making process has beenabbreviated.

Typical CCIR include the followingquestions:

• Can the unit still meet thecommander's intent?

• Where is the enemy? Doingwhat? How?

• Where are the friendlies? Doingwhat? How?

• What is the posture of the forcein the next 6 hours, 12 hours,etc.?

• Where will the friendlies be in 6hours, 12 hours, etc.?

• What are the problems of theenemy and how can we exploitthem?

• What are our problems and howcan we correct them?

• What are the opportunities of theenemy and how can we denythem?

• What are our opportunities andhow can we exploit them?

• Do we need to change ourconcept? Task organization?Mission?

Paragraph 3d of the OPORD containsthe CCIR.

4.2.5 SJA Planning, Decision-Making, and Orders.

The SJA also adapts the sameorderly processes used by the commandto plan, decide, and issue ordersregarding the section's practice and

delivery of OPLAW. The SJA assists theplanning, decision- making and ordersprocesses of the command through theOPLAW JA, who reviews all plans andorders for operational law issues,contributes to staff estimates, andotherwise aids in operational design andexecution. In particular, the SJA andDSJA ensure that the section developsand continually revises its SOP, takingevery opportunity to separate boilerplatefrom truly useful material.144 An SJAsection SOP (and each division or teamSOP) must be a living document that isused in day-to-day functions and isfrequently updated.

The SOPs are always works inprogress. Judge advocates and legalpersonnel pour into the SOPs thosechecklists and procedures that come outof their own experience. They mustincorporate information that is builtupon the experience of others, such aslessons learned from military operationsin Haiti, the Persian Gulf, or theBalkans. Still, the SOPs must be put tothe test through field application.Development is a constant and iterativeprocess.

4.3 LEGAL SUPPORT INTHEATER

4.3.1 Introduction.

A solid grasp of the theater andassociated concepts introduced in thefirst part of this chapter makes possible amore precise understanding of how legalsupport is practiced and delivered.When Army forces are not actuallyconducting operations in a theater, theJAGC supports the mission of the Armyand its major commands within CONUS


4-21

to prepare those forces for eventualemployment by a CINC within a theater.That preparation is a massive job, and itconsists of everything necessary toorganize, train, and equip Army forces"primarily for prompt and sustainedcombat incident to operations on land"and "for the effective prosecution ofwar."145

The day-to-day mission ofreadiness—organizing, training, andequipping forces for operations—inevitably involves Army commandersand judge advocates in legal issues,questions, and cases that may seem onlyremotely "operational." Judge advocatesserving throughout the major commandsof the Army and in the FOAs of TJAGwill often, properly, conceive ofthemselves as practicing within a narrowportion of a single legal discipline.

Hence the judge advocate defendingthe Army in multibillion-dollarenvironmental litigation is practicing"federal litigation" and "environmentallaw" within the Civil Law discipline.That judge advocate is also principallydischarging the advocate role. Hence thejudge advocate investigating a majorallegation of procurement fraud may bepracticing Contract Law within the CivilLaw discipline while dischargingprincipally a "judge" role. Hence theStaff Judge Advocate at a CONUSinstallation where advanced individualtraining is conducted may be counselorto the commander on detailed criminallaw issues pertaining to improperrelationships between instructors andtrainees. In these and countless otherexamples from the daily legal practice ofuniformed attorneys in CONUS, legalsupport reverts to its component core

disciplines. These core legal disciplinesalso dominate the technical languageused to describe that daily practice.

For the environmental litigator, theprocurement fraud investigator, and thetraining installation SJA in theseexamples, the terms “legal support tooperations” and "OPLAW" serve asreminders of the readiness challenge thatunderwrites all of their work. It alsoreminds them of the need to remaingenerally competent across all legaldisciplines in case their nextassignments are to theaters. All judgeadvocates must be prepared to deliverlegal support to operations.

4.3.2 Overseas Presence and ForceProjection.

Force projection follows a generalsequence, although stages overlap intime and space (for instance,mobilization and deployment may becontinuous and occur simultaneously orsequentially). Force projection includeseight stages,146 each of which can beexpected to generate OPLAW issues.

• Mobilization Stage. This is theaugmentation of active componentcapability in preparation for war ornational emergency. It includesactivating all or part of the reservecomponents as well as assemblingand organizing personnel, supplies,and materiel. The mobilizationsystem, which is explained in ArmyRegulation 500-5, The ArmyMobilization and OperationsPlanning System (AMOPS),147

includes five levels:

! Selective mobilization.

FM 27-100

4-22

! Presidential selectedreserve call-up.

! Partial mobilization.! Full mobilization.! Total mobilization.

• Predeployment Stage. Activities inthis stage ensure units are preparedto execute operations based upontheir designed capability. It mayinclude weeks or months ofequipment refitting or training at amobilization station.

• Deployment Stage. This stagerequires forces to use strategic assetsand host nation support, if availableto move to the theater of operations.Force mix, combat capability, andsustainment must be flexible toeffect changes during this operation.May include use of an IntermediateStaging Base close to the area ofoperations.

• Forced Entry Stage. Operations inthis stage may be in direct support ofhost nation or forward presenceforces. Conditions may require entryin the absence of both under opposedor unopposed conditions.

• Operations Stage. This stage mayinclude the full range of operations—operations in war, operations otherthan war, and domestic operations.

• War Termination and Post-conflictOperations Stage. This may includerestoring order, reestablishing thehost nation's infrastructure, andpreparing forces for redeployment.

• Redeployment and ReconstitutionStage. This stage removes forces nolonger required for post conflictoperations, rebuilds unit integrity,

and accounts for soldiers andequipment.

• Demobilization Stage. This is theprocess by which units, individuals,and materiel transfer from active toreserve status.

Each of these stages may triggerissues from any of the six core legaldisciplines (see Chapter 3). However,some legal issues are particularlycharacteristic of certain stages. Thusreserve component personnel law issuesfrequently arise in mobilization.Conscientious objector applications andassociated legal issues can be expectedduring mobilization and deployment.Transit agreements, host nation laborlaws and other matters sounding ininternational, comparative, and foreignlaw can be expected in the deploymentphase. Rules of engagement andinternational law will be particularlyimportant during the entry phase. Fiscallaw issues may be prominent in post-conflict—and so on.

4.3.3 Legal Support in Theater

Army legal personnel serve at severallevels within a theater. Thus the ArmyService Component Command (ASCC)and numbered Army include an SJAsection. The ASCC has overallresponsibility for providing andsustaining Army forces and conductingoperations, however, the ASCCcommander may direct a numberedArmy commander to control the conductof operations. The corps, division, andseparate brigade commands subordinateto the ASCC also include SJA sections,as do various supporting theater armyarea commands (TAACOMs) or Theater


4-23

Support Commands (TSCs), areasupport groups (ASGs), army specialoperations commands, and other unitsand functional commands (i.e., personnelcommands, medical commands, engineercommands, etc.) in theater. Theheadquarters of smaller commands ofArmy forces frequently include CJAsections. See generally Chapter 2, whichdescribes generic SJA, OIC, and CJAresponsibilities.

Army judge advocates may alsoserve as legal advisors to theater CINCs,or as part of a legal advisor's section.Similarly, they may be assigned to serveon other joint staffs, such as the staff of aJoint Task Force or of a Joint LandComponent Commander. This isparticularly common when the Armycommander in one of these joint forces isalso the Joint Force Commander. Thestaffs of alliance or coalition militaryorganizations also frequently includeUnited States Army judge advocates.

Regardless of the level at which theyserve, judge advocates and other legalpersonnel must be organic and dedicatedto these organizations in order to ensureresponsive, effective OPLAW support.148

Judge advocates assigned to Armyunits within an ASCC must learn themissions and characteristics of thoseunits. Distinctive features and missionsabound, but there are common featuresthat reflect the strategic and operationalpurposes these units are designed toserve. This section will describe thefeatures of TAACOMs/TSCs, ASGs,corps, and corps support groups. Thecommon features of Army divisions andbrigades are discussed in Chapter 5.

• Theater Area Army Command(TAACOM) or Theater SupportCommand (TSC). A TAACOM, orTSC, has three missions. First, itprovides all combat service support,except movement control, to unitslocated in or passing through itsassigned area. This support includesthe provision of legal services tosoldiers and units without organiclegal assets. Second, theTAACOM/TSC supports the corpswith specified logistics support andcoordinates area- related functions,such as populace control, with hostnation elements. Third, theTAACOM/TSC is responsible forrear operations in its assigned area.The TAACOM/TSC accomplishesits support missions of supply,maintenance, and personnel servicesthrough area support groups (ASG).

• Area Support Group (ASG). Thenumber of ASGs in a theater ofoperations depends on the size of theCOMMZ and the number of troopssupported. Normally, one ASG isassigned to a TAACOM/TSC forevery 15,000 to 30,000 troopsreceiving support in the COMMZ.The area an ASG supports dependson the density of military units andmateriel requiring support, politicalboundaries, and identifiable terrainfeatures.

• Corps. Corps are the largest tacticalunits in the United States Army andare the instruments by which higherechelons of command conductmaneuver at the operational level.The Army tailors corps for thetheater and the mission. Oncetailored, corps contain all thecombat, combat support, and combat

FM 27-100

4-24

service support required to sustainoperations for a considerable period.Corps consist of a headquarters thatplans, directs, controls, andcoordinates the corps operations andthe mix of combat, combat support,and combat service support units.The Army Service ComponentCommander may assign to the corpsdivisions of any type required by thetheater and the mission. Corpspossess support commands and areassigned combat and combat supportorganizations based on their needsfor a specific operation.Nondivisional units commonlyavailable to corps to weight theirmain effort and to perform specialcombat functions include armoredcavalry regiments, field artillerybrigades, engineer brigades, airdefense artillery brigades, aviationbrigades, and separate infantry orarmored brigades. Military policebrigades, civil affairs brigades,chemical brigades, and psychologicaloperations battalions are combatsupport organizations often found incorps. Special operations forces alsomay support corps combat operationsas required, particularly when a corpsis conducting an independentoperation. Corps combat servicesupport organizations are thepersonnel group, the finance group,the corps support command, andJAGSOs.

• Corps Support Command(COSCOM). The COSCOM is thecorps' principal logisticsorganization. It provides supply,field services, transportation,maintenance, and medical support tothe corps' divisions andnondivisional units. The COSCOM

is not a fixed organization andcontains a mix of subordinate unitsas required by the size andconfiguration of the corps.

4.3.4 The United States as a Theater(Domestic Operations).

This is addressed separately inChapter 7.

4.3.5 Technical Channels.

The command channel is the direct,official link through which oneheadquarters passes orders andinstructions to subordinateheadquarters.149 The command channellinks one commanding officer toanother. A technical channel is a linkbetween two headquarters that transmitsorders, instructions, advice,recommendations, and informationinappropriate for the command channelbecause of their volume, specificity, orroutine nature.150

The practice and delivery of legalsupport in operations rely heavily ontechnical channels. As described earlier,many modern legal problems arecomplex, demanding expertise andinformation that will only rarely reside ata single echelon of command. Technicalchannels—particularly when linked toexpertise and information available atCLAMO and TJAGSA—make synergypossible even for judge advocates facingproblems in distant theaters.

Those judge advocates and theirsupported commands benefit from twoseparate channels, corresponding to thetwo branches of the chain of commandfor Army forces in a joint force. Recall


4-25

from earlier in this chapter that onebranch of that chain of command is foroperations and the other foradministration and logistics. Similarly,one technical channel carriesinformation and legal expertiseassociated with operations (commandand control functions); the other carriesinformation and expertise associatedwith administration and logistics(sustainment and personnel servicessupport functions).

For example, the SJA advising the10th Mountain Division at the start ofmilitary operations in Haiti in Septemberof 1994 used a technical channel that ranthrough the ASCC SJA (who was alsothe JTF SJA) to the USACOM (nowUSJTFCOM) SJA to the legal advisorfor the CJCS. This channel providedvaluable guidance on rules ofengagement and other operationalmatters. The SJA of the 10th MountainDivision also used a technical channelthat ran through the ASCC toFORSCOM and then to Army OTJAG.This channel provided valuable guidanceon a wide variety of legal issues relatingto administration and logistics.

Of course, legal issues sometimeswill not fall neatly into command andcontrol, sustainment, and personnelservice support categories. Also, manycomplex legal issues will requireexpertise from several legal disciplines.In these situations, SJAs achieve synergyon a legal issue by tapping whicheverchannel contains the necessaryinformation or expertise. Often, bothchannels must be consulted on the sameissue. This approach is consistent withthe JAGC operating as a single largelegal organization, whereby its several

members are expected to support eachother with information and expertisenecessary to assists their clients.

4.4 MATERIEL

All legal personnel must be wellequipped and highly trained in order topractice and deliver legal support in atheater of operations. The most criticalcategories of equipment are legalautomation, mobility, andcommunications. Training of legalpersonnel, meanwhile, must beconducted according to the Army'sprinciples of training.

4.4.1 Legal Automation

The JAGC requires a dedicatedsystem of automation to provideresponsive legal services at all echelonsof command. That system is the LegalAutomation Army-Wide System(LAAWS). LAAWS integrates legalinformation and services into a networkthat projects automated legal servicesdown to battalion level and permitssharing of appropriate legal workproduct. LAAWS provides forstandardized software throughout theJAGC and includes modules anddatabases for all core legal disciplines.LAAWS programs process, transmit,receive, and display essentialinformation. Legal references compiledby LAAWS are available in compactdisk and via databases on the JAGCInformation Network (JAGCNet atwww.jagcnet.army.mil), a work groupconsisting of more than seventycomputer servers and thousands ofclients throughout the world. SJAsections, the military judges, and defensecounsel all use LAAWS and the

FM 27-100

4-26

JAGCNet, which are critical to theaccuracy and responsiveness ofoperational legal services. Judgeadvocates also require access toclassified databases and informationthrough Secret Internet Protocol RouterNetwork (SIPRNET).

The standard package of legalautomation equipment is the RucksackDeployable Law Office and Library(RDL).151 The RDL is a set of computerhardware, software, and networkingproducts, which are updated periodically,and currently provide the judgeadvocate or legal specialist the followingcapabilities in a man portable bundle:

• word processing, database,spreadsheet, form-filler, andother necessary software that iscompatible with commandsoftware

• legal document production• convenience copying• cellular voice communication• wire line and non-wire facsimile

(with satellite communicationcapability)

• wire line and non-wire e-mailand digital communication (withsatellite capability)

• photography and digitaltelecommunication ofphotographs

• legal research with import todocument capability

The RDL is, and must remain,completely compatible with standardArmy communications equipment, andbe fully integrated into appropriate partsof the Army Battle Command System(ABCS), to include the Army GlobalCommand and Control System

(AGCCS), the Army Tactical Commandand Control System (ATCCS), theGlobal Combat Support System—Army(GCSS-A), and the Force XXI BattleCommand-Brigade and Below System(FBCB2) (see FM 24-7, ARMY BATTLECOMMAND SYSTEM: SYSTEMSMANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES).

The RDL consists of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment. It isdefined by capabilities, not particularmodels or brand names. Thesecapabilities will be upgraded astechnology advances, to remaincompatible with joint and Army systems.The basic RDL package is describedbelow, less technical specifications. Thetechnical specifications wereintentionally omitted from this chapterbased on the rapid evolution oftechnology, rapid development ofsoftware applications that requireincreased processing power, and thesubstantial increase of data that isrequired to be processed, manipulated,and transmitted in an ever decreasingamount of time. Specific detailsregarding hardware and softwaretechnical requirements can be located bycontacting CLAMO or the JAGCProponent, Combat DevelopmentsDepartment, Organization and MaterielBranch, located at TJAGSA,Charlottesville, Virginia. Its currentconfiguration is as follows:

• a laptop computer (with sufficientprocessor and memory capabilities tointeract with ABCS, to conductefficient research from electronicdatabases, and to store a largevolume of required legal referencesand products with removable harddrive for secure storage of classifiedinformation.


4-27

• CD ROM reader (preferably internal)• scanner-printer (battery backup)• PCMCIA fax modem (cellular phone

and satellite telephone up-linkable)• digital camera• digital audio card and microphone• hard-shell case• full range of software• full range of legal references on

compact disks and/or hard drive

RDL requirements are based uponstaff functions, OPLAW (C2 andSustainment) responsibilities, operationsat key operational nodes, core legaldiscipline tasks, and mobilityrequirements.

The SJA, DSJA, LegalAdministrator, and CLNCO perform thestaff functions of providing advice andorganizing, sustaining, controlling,supervising legal services throughout thearea of operations and training legalpersonnel. They each require an RDL toprovide legal advice to the command, toaccess legal technical support, and toexercise legal technical supervision.OPLAW JAs designated to serve in aBOLT or the TAC CP (or other mobileor fixed command cells or commandposts) and in planning and operationcells, each require an RDL. The RDL isrequired to access ABCS, LAAWSnetworks, and other secure or controlledcommunication systems, and to performcore legal discipline tasks in locationsaway from the main and rear CPs orapart from other legal sections located inthe main or rear (based on organizationaldesign and where the legal function isperformed). Of utmost importance is theability to interact with communicationand network systems capable of

transmitting privileged information orcommunications (e.g., defense counseland client; legal assistance attorney andclient), classified materials and mattersof national security. Each elementwithin the SJA section (as well as themilitary judge and trial defenseelements) requires an RDL to performtasks relating to its core legal discipline.Additional RDLs are required for judgeadvocates within divisions of the SJAsection who must travel throughout thearea of operations to provide services(e.g., claims judge advocates, trialcounsel, and legal assistance attorneys).

LSOs and MSOs require RDLs tocommand the organization and superviselegal services. LSTs require RDLs toperform tasks related to core legaldisciplines, and additional RDLs foreach judge advocate who must travelthroughout the area of operations.

CONUS based legal organizationswhich support mobilization operations,or which are part of the BaseEngagement Force or Base Generatingrequire RDLs to support operations.These organizations also include thelegal training organizations of TJAGSA,legal NCOES, and legal sections ofDivision Training and Exerciseelements, and Training Centers.

Finally, other judge advocates andlegal specialists in all legal organizationsrequire components of the RDL toperform their legal duties (one laptopcomputer per attorney and one computerfor 80% of the legal specialists).

The RDL equips judge advocatesdeploying to theater with the basic loadof legal references, country-specific

FM 27-100

4-28

materials, and forms necessary to spotand resolve the most common legalissues that will arise during acontingency operation. Digitaldatabases, such as that maintained by theJoint Electronic Library and CLAMO,contribute to the achievement of thisgoal by furnishing current legalreferences and recent lessons learnedfrom exercises, the Combat TrainingCenters, and deployments around theworld. The availability of CD-ROMwriting equipment at division and corpsstaff judge advocate sections makespossible the storage of massive amountsof material on compact disk in the daysimmediately prior to deployment to orwithin a theater. Much of this materialmay be obtained during thepredeployment period from theexploding numbers of legal referencesites on the World Wide Web. When thedeployed judge advocate element isincapable of resolving an issue, the RDLalso provides the capability to requestand receive advice in digital format fromtechnical judge advocate channels.

Because it is a set of capabilitiesrather than a fixed package of hardwareand software, the RDL permits theJAGC to continue to harness the rapidimprovements in the marketplace.Because it is a standard set ofcapabilities, the RDL provides acommon basis to permit training,organizing, and equipping OPLAW JAsand legal personnel.

Despite advances in informationtechnology, legal personnel must alwaysbe prepared to provide operationalsupport. Therefore, legal personnelshould deploy with paper copies ofrequired references and forms.

4.4.2 Mobility

Embedded legal personnel depend onthe units to which they are assigned orattached for transportation. Separatelegal organizations, such as LSOs orMSOs, require organic transportationassets. Sufficient vehicles are requiredfor legal personnel, i.e., the SJA/CJAand his staff, military judges, anddefense counsel. The number and typeof vehicles will depend on thecommander's requirements for legalservices. Normally, however, acommander should dedicate four HighMobility Multipurpose WheeledVehicles (HMMWV), one 5 ton truck,and four cargo trailers to a division orcorps SJA section and one HMMWVand one cargo trailer to each CJAsection. Additionally, the commandershould dedicate one HMMWV withtrailer to each military judge in theaterand one HMMWV with trailer to eachtrial defense section. Mobility servesthree distinct functions:

• Control of Legal Assets. The SJAis responsible for the delivery oflegal services throughout the area ofoperations. The SJA supervises andexercises administrative control overSJA section personnel. Toadminister legal services effectively,the SJA must know what, where, andwhen legal services are required anddirect the appropriate employment oflegal personnel. The SJA must beable to provide technical advice andguidance to subordinate judgeadvocates. Moreover, as the primarylegal advisor to the commander, thesubordinate commanders, and thestaff, the SJA must have the mobility


4-29

necessary to be when and whererequired.

• Effective Delivery of OperationalLaw and Personnel ServiceSupport. Judge advocates and legalspecialists provide legal services tolower echelons of command. Judgeadvocates require mobility forseveral reasons, including:investigating allegations of warcrimes and violations of the UniformCode of Military Justice; receiving,investigating, and paying foreignclaims; performing legal liaisonthroughout the theater; providinglegal assistance; and advisingcommanders on time-sensitive,mission-essential legal problems,particularly those encountered duringoperations other than war.

• Service of Geographic Zones.Military judges provide judicial legalservices on a geographic basis. Theyare assigned to the United StatesArmy Judiciary with duty station atcorps and echelons above corps.Courts-martial will be conducted inthe accused's unit's area of operationsand as far forward in the unit's areaof operations as the commanderdeems appropriate. Trying courts-martial as far forward as possiblewill minimize disruption of the unit,provide better availability ofwitnesses, and speed theadministration of military justice.Military judges must have themobility to preside over courts-martial and perform magistrateduties where and when needed.Defense counsel provide defenselegal services to the units for whichthey are assigned responsibility or ona geographic basis. Defense counsel

must have the mobility to interviewand consult with widely scatteredclients and witnesses, and representtheir clients before courts-martialand adverse administrativeproceedings.

4.4.3 Communications

Modern theater operations willfrequently take place in a fluid, chaotic,and lethal environment in whichmobility will be constrained. Legaladvice will be time-sensitive and oftencritical. Judge advocates must beassured access to communications thatlink them with the commander, thesubordinate commanders, the staff, andthe SJAs at higher echelons. In additionto digital communications across theArmy Battle Command System, judgeadvocates must use combat net radios(CNR), area common user (ACU)telephones, Army Data DistributionSystem (ADDS) equipment, andBroadcast System (BDCSTS)equipment, where necessary.

4.5 TRAINING152

4.5.1 Principles of Training153

Staff judge advocates must have atraining philosophy. Training affordsstaff judge advocates as well ascommanders the opportunity to exploreand surmount the variety of problemsand challenges that will always confrontthem. When a staff judge advocate takesthis attitude, most of his or herproblems—and those of the section—will be met and solved in the course ofregular training, and thus will cease to beproblems. The same attitude will prevailagain over new problems.

FM 27-100

4-30

Training must address both thesoldier and the lawyer—tactical skillsand legal skills. Soldier training shouldaddress common soldier skills, such asuse and maintenance of weapons, NBCprotection and decontamination, landnavigation, first aid, and radioprocedures—how to shoot, move, andcommunicate. Training applies just ascrucially to legal research, writing,advocacy, case and project organization,automation, maintenance, and safety.Training is all-encompassing and shouldbe related to everything lawyers andlegal personnel do to support thecommander on the battlefield.

The key to all successful training liesin raising the quality of individual skillsand the teamwork of small sections orunits. Success in everything from abattle or other real world militaryoperation to large scale legalrepresentation is dependent on thecoordinated effort of a number of smallunits of diverse types working togetherto accomplish a mission. Other thingsbeing equal, the military force with thebest-trained small units will prevail, andthe legal organization with the best-trained small teams will prevail. Even ifother things are not equal, superiortraining at the individual and smallsection level will often carry the day.

Staff judge advocates prepare foroperations in a theater by adhering to theArmy's principles of training. There arenine.

1. Train As A Combined Arms AndServices Team. "Combined armsand services" is a technical termreferring to military actions thatintegrate combat functions (infantry,armor, and aviation), combat supportfunctions (field artillery, air defenseartillery, and engineers), and combatservice support functions (logistics,personnel services, and healthservices).154 The example providedin Field Manual 25-100, Trainingthe Force, is that of the divisioncommander who trains regularly withhis entire "slice" of "basic combat,combat support, and combat servicesupport systems." SJAs recognizethat this first principle mandates notonly that they support the command'sdesire to conduct collective trainingwith a full "slice" of judge advocatesupport, but also that the training ofan SJA section itself must integrateclaims, legal assistance, militaryjustice, administrative law, civil law,international law, and all otheraspects of legal support tooperations. It also means that theSJA must coordinate with reservecomponent legal elements to havethem participate in major exercises.

2. Train As You Fight. This principledemands that training take placeunder realistic conditions.Operations in Panama, the PersianGulf, northern Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia,and other places confirmed that legalissues are some of the mostchallenging the command and staff

Principles of Training1. Train As A Combined Arms And

Services Team2. Train As You Fight3. Use Appropriate Doctrine4. Use Performance-Oriented Training5. Train To Challenge6. Train To Sustain Proficiency7. Train Using Multiechelon Techniques8. Train To Maintain9. Make Commanders The Primary

Trainers


4-31

will face. They must be incorporatedinto collective training events, just assmoke, noise, chemical attacks,battlefield debris, loss of key leaders,and cold weather must beincorporated.

3. Use Appropriate Doctrine. Trainingmust conform to Army doctrine.Recall that one of doctrine's roles isto reflect a shared vision that canserve as the basis for planning,organizing, leading, equipping, andtraining the force. We are a doctrine-based Army. Army doctrine iscontained in Field Manual 100-5,Operations and supporting doctrinalmanuals, such as this one. Armytraining doctrine is contained inField Manual 25-100 as well as inField Manual 25-101, BattleFocused Training. Judge advocatesmust be conversant in thesereferences.

4. Use Performance-OrientedTraining. Soldiers and lawyers learnbest by doing, by putting their handsand minds on the implements theywill be required to use when the realtest of combat or deployment comes.The Army stresses use of a full rangeof training aids, devices, simulators,and simulations (TADSS) to take theindividual or unit being trained outof the sterile classroom and into apractical situation that reproduces theconditions under which they must beable to perform. The Army’s fourCombat Training Centers, with judgeadvocate observer-controllers ortrainers at each, provide the mostrealistic training. An SJA invokesthis principle whenever he and theChief of the Criminal Law Teamorganize rehearsals of trial counsel's

opening statements, examinations,motions arguments, or closingarguments. SJAs also invoke thisprinciple when they insist that RDLsand other equipment are brought tothe field and that every divisiongenerates its standard productsduring exercises.

5. Train To Challenge. SJAs and otherjudge advocate leaders neverapologize for the challenging trainingthey plan and execute. OPLAWdemands tough, realistic trainingthat challenges legal personnelphysically and intellectually. Suchtraining builds competence andconfidence by developing and honingskills. It inspires excellence bygiving each individual a glimpse ofhow daily activities fit into thebroader mission and by fosteringinitiative, enthusiasm and eagernessto learn.

6. Train To Sustain Proficiency. TheSJA section must always be ready todeploy; it must be vigilant not to"peak" and then have proficiencydrop as time passes, skills decay, andnew people replace experiencedpeople.

7. Train Using Multi-echelonTechniques. Field Manual 25-100tells us that "[t]o use available timeand resources most effectively,commanders must simultaneouslytrain individuals, leaders, and units ateach echelon in the organizationduring training events." Thisprinciple not only demands that legalspecialists perform individual tasks(e.g., disassemble and assemble M16rifle, fill in the blocks of anonjudicial punishment form) butalso demands that the claims division

FM 27-100

4-32

and the entire SJA section performcollective tasks (e.g., process,investigate, adjudicate, and pay aforeign claim; administer the militaryjustice system, etc.). Qualitytraining exercises are so rare thatleaders must make them count onmany different levels.

8. Train To Maintain. The upkeep ofequipment and weapons is as much apart of training as using theequipment expertly. Legal personnelroutinely perform virus checks andother diagnostics, change printercartridges, and protect our equipmentby ensuring that all work areas arekept clean and dry. They frequentlydraw and maintain all of the tentage,vehicles, weapons, and equipmentthey will need in real deployments toa theater of operations.

9. Make Commanders The PrimaryTrainers. Commanders areresponsible for the training andperformance of their units. Theypersonally ensure that exercises arebased on real world missionrequirements, identify the applicableArmy standards, assess the currentlevel of proficiency, provide therequired training resources, anddevelop training plans designed tocreate proficient individuals, leaders,and units. Similarly, SJAs—withcommand support—must be theprimary trainers of their section.

4.5.2 Mission Essential Task Lists(METL)

Mission essential tasks are collectivetasks in which an organization must beproficient to accomplish some portion ofits mission in a theater. The Mission

Essential Task List (METL) for an SJAsection consists of the mission essentialtasks on which the section focuses itstraining. The METL concept wasconceived in recognition that units andorganizations cannot achieve and sustainproficiency on every possible trainingtask. "METL development" is not onlyapplicable to corps and divisions andbrigades; it also applies to subordinateelements, such as the staff, and-withinthe staff itself-the SJA section, as well asin JAGSOs.

METL are Required. Field Manual25-100 states that all active componentand reserve component organizations—MTOE as well as TDA organizations—should prepare METLs.155 Commandgroups and staff elements at each leveldevelop METLs for their areas ofresponsibility. The next highercommander in the chain of commandapproves each organization’s METL.Staff METLs are approved by theorganization’s commander or Chief ofStaff. The SJA and the DSJA156 developand present a recommended METL inconsultation with the separate teamchiefs; they are also the staff agencyresponsible for approval and assistanceof development of METLs byLSOs/MSOs war-traced to theircommand, as well as the SJA sections ofother RC units (such as GSUs) assignedto their command.

Collective Tasks. SJAs andLSO/MSO commanders consult theMETL of the organization their sectionsor units support along with "externaldirectives" that relate to the wartime orcontingency deployment role they andtheir sections are expected to serve.These include the Uniform Code of


4-33

Military Justice and various otherprovisions of Title 10 of the UnitedStates Code, certain articles of theGeneva Conventions,157 authoritiesmandating operational law support,158

Army Regulation 27-1, Judge AdvocateLegal Services,159 and other regulatorysources. SJAs and LSO/MSOcommanders also consult Army and jointdoctrinal references including this fieldmanual.160 From these diverse sources,they identify all of the possible collectivetasks on which to train.

Choose the METL. SJAs andLSO/MSO commanders then select fromthis long list of possible tasks a smallerset of tasks on which the SJA section orLSO/MSO would have to be proficientin order to accomplish their wartime orcontingency missions. The smaller setof tasks becomes their METLs. Byproceeding in this manner, they can besure that training efforts will beconcentrated on the most importantcollective tasks required to accomplishtheir mission. Note five important thingsabout METL development.

• First, mission essential tasksmust apply to the entireorganization-the list does notinclude tasks assigned solely tosubordinate organizations, suchas the Claims or Legal AssistanceTeams.

• Second, the availability ofresources does not affect METLdevelopment. The METL is anunconstrained statement of thetasks required to accomplishwartime or contingency missions.

• Third, when units are based inCONUS rather than deployed

forward in a theater, deploymentitself is often captured on the list.

• Fourth, because the SJAsection—unlike an infantrybrigade—conducts daily supportfunctions, the METL mayaddress differences betweengarrison and deploymentoperating conditions.

• Fifth, the SJA or LSO/MSOcommander establishes noprioritization of tasks within theMETL. By definition, all tasksare essential to ensureaccomplishment of the mission.

Although the missions (and thereforethe METLs) of Army divisions vary, asample SJA section METL for a divisionbased in the CONUS might look asfollows:

Establish conditions and standards.

After identifying these missionessential tasks, the division SJA and theDSJA (or LSO/MSO commanders)establish supporting conditions andstandards for each task. These

Mission Essential Task List

• Provide Command Legal Advice andServices (battle task)

• Plan and Provide Legal Services toSoldiers

• Plan and Conduct International LegalOperations (battle task)

• Deploy and Sustain OperationalReadiness (battle task)

• Sustain Garrison Legal Services

FM 27-100

4-34

conditions and standards that relate to atask are referred to as a trainingobjective. In the course of developingthe standards of proficiency to whichthey need to train the section, they alsoidentify collective sub-tasks as well asindividual tasks that supported thesection's performance of each missionessential task.

Standards should measure whetherthe section is responsive, effective, andefficient in meeting the needs of thecommand. Measures of responsivenessmight include command adviceprocessing time, time between a criminaloffense and preferral of charges, timerequired to process a claim, and a time aclient must wait for an appointment withan attorney. Measures of effectivenessmight include how frequently a legalissue surprises the command, the qualityof legal reasoning, opinions, andproducts, the level of judge advocateintegration into the staff, how frequentlyoperational law advice is followed by thecommand, and the quality of advocacy.Measures of efficiency might includehow well personnel use automationtechnology, and the extent to whichprocedures are standardized.

Battle Tasks

After they review and approve theMETLs, the Division Commander andChief of Staff select battle tasks. Abattle task is a mission essential task thatis critical to the next higherorganization's performance of a missionessential task of its own. Here, the nexthigher organizations are the DivisionCommand Group and Staff. Althoughthe SJA and the DSJA (or LSO/MSOcommanders) regard all of the tasks on

the METL as having equal priority, theCommander and Chief of Staff in thisexample have made an allocationdecision about scarce training resourcesand have elected to give emphasis duringtraining evaluations to three of the fivetasks. These are battle tasks for theDivision Staff.

The METL development processthen continues as the SJA and the DSJAhelp guide each of the separate divisionchiefs (operational law, claims, militaryjustice, administrative law, civil law,legal assistance, international law)—todevelop METLs for their elements. Inaddition, they guide the BOLTs in thedevelopment of the BOLT METLs.LSO/MSO commanders do the same forLSTs.

Throughout this process,SJAs/DSJAs and LSO/MSOcommanders mentor subordinates toensure that the METLs andcorresponding training objectivesdeveloped accurately reflect tasks thatwill be essential to missionaccomplishment in wartime. Throughleadership and personal example, theyguarantee that METL development is adynamic process and that all sectiontraining is directed toward METL tasks,conditions, and standards.

4.5.3 Planning for Training.

Training Assessment. Once theyhave developed and received approval ofa METL, SJAs/DSJAs and LSO/MSOcommanders then conduct trainingassessments. They compare currentproficiency with the standards listed foreach mission essential task. They use allavailable evaluative material to make


4-35

this comparison, to include consultationswith the separate team chiefs. Then theydevelop a training strategy to achieve a"trained" proficiency level in eachsupporting collective subtask andindividual task.

Throughout this process, they consultthe commander's training guidancedocuments, which identify majortraining events.161 In this way, they areable to incorporate Combat TrainingCenter rotations and other majorexercises into the training plan.

Training Guidance. Soon aftertaking command, a commander issuescommand training guidance and an up-to-date long-range training calendar forthe unit. The SJA and the DSJA presentand receive approval of the SJA sectionMETLs during the one of the quarterlytraining briefs or semi- annual trainingbriefs early in the commander's tour.This same process applies to the METLsof the LSOs/MSOs, as well as RC unitswith embedded judge advocate sections;however, the training briefs by whichtheir METLs are reviewed and approvedmay be presented to their peacetimechains of command in addition to, or inlieu of, presentation to the their wartimegaining commanders.

Training briefs produce a trainingcontract between commanders and SJAor LSO/MSO commanders. Thecommanders provide resources andprotect the SJA sections or LSOs/MSOsfrom unprogrammed taskings. SJAs andLSO/MSO commanders then lock in andexecute approved training plans. Thisshared responsibility helps maintainpriorities, achieve unity of effort, and

synchronizes actions to achieve qualitytraining and efficient resourcing.

The training briefing is a highlight ofthe commander's leader developmentprogram. It provides the commander anopportunity to coach and teachsubordinates on the fine points of hisphilosophy and strategies in all aspectsof warfighting, to include doctrine,training, force integration, and leaderdevelopment. It enables the SJA andassigned LSOs/MSOs to gain a betterunderstanding of how their missionessential training relates to the battle-focused training programs of theircommanders and peers.162

The SJA or LSO/MSO commanderalso uses this training managementprocess to mentor and build an effectivesection, and foster a positive leadershipclimate. Because many of the sub-tasksrequire professional as well as militaryjudgment on the part of junior andrelatively inexperienced judge advocates,the importance of well-rehearsed,monthly officer Leader DevelopmentProgram (LDP) sessions and continuinglegal education (CLE) courses atTJAGSA cannot be overstated. The SJAshould not overlook the importance oforientation programs for newcomers,regular leader development sessions fordivision chiefs and noncommissionedofficers, the development of off-the-shelfprograms of instruction on rapidlychanging areas of the law, dining-ins,staff rides, no-notice alerts, and regularsection meetings.

4.6 LEGAL SUPPORT ANDSPECIAL OPERATIONS

FM 27-100

4-36

Judge advocates in theater operationswill serve in or alongside a variety ofspecial operations units. Specialoperations routinely have legalimplications that cannot be discernedwithout general background informationabout special operations doctrine,capabilities, and organization. This partof the chapter provides that informationwhile also describing distinctive tasksthat OPLAW JAs and legal personnel inspecial operations units are called uponto perform.

Special operations are actionsconducted by distinctively organized,trained, and equipped military andparamilitary forces to achieve military,diplomatic, economic, or informationalobjectives by unconventional means.United States special operations forces(SOF) consist of Army, Navy, and AirForce units. Special operations occurfrequently in hostile, denied, orpolitically sensitive areas across the fullrange of military operations.163

The theater CINC will often plan ajoint special operations effort. Whenthis occurs, a Joint Special OperationsTask Force (JSOTF), created by theCINC, is given responsibility to executethe operations in accordance with thejoint plan. It is important to recognizethat the JSOTF and the forcescomprising it form a separate task force.Nevertheless, the CINC may place theJSOTF under the OPCON of anotherJTF, or designate elements to serve indirect support of subordinate unitcommanders for portions of the theateroperations.

The five principal missions ofspecial forces are

• Unconventional Warfare• Direct Actions• Special Reconnaissance• Foreign Internal Defense• Counterterrorism

As "collateral activities," specialoperations forces may participate insecurity assistance, humanitarianassistance, antiterrorism, counterdrugoperations, personnel recovery, and otherspecial activities. Most of these termshave technical meanings. Detailedinformation about special operations iscontained in Field Manual 100-25,Doctrine for Army Special OperationsForces.

Special operations during war and inother hostile environments usually occurdeep in the enemy's rear area or in otherareas void of conventional maneuverforces. They may also extend into theterritory of hostile states adjacent to thetheater. While each special operationsaction may be tactical in nature, itseffects often contribute directly totheater operational or strategic objectivesin support of the theater campaign plan.Special operations may seek eitherimmediate or long-range effects on theconflict.

Typical SOF missions includeinterdicting enemy lines ofcommunication and destroying militaryand industrial facilities. SOFdetachments may also have missionsassociated with intelligence collection,target acquisition, terminal guidance forstrike aircraft and missile systems,personnel recovery, and location ofweapons of mass destruction. Somedetachments conduct psychologicaloperations (PSYOP) to demoralize the


4-37

enemy and collect information in theenemy's rear areas. Some SOF organize,train, equip, and advise resistance forcesin guerrilla warfare for evasion andescape, subversion, and sabotage. Theywork with indigenous people in regionsof conflict in support of United Statesnational interests. They add depth to thecampaign, forcing the enemy to deploysignificant combat forces to protect hisrear area.164

Special Operations Forces. Thereare five types of Army SOF:

• Special Forces units arespecifically organized, trained,and equipped to conduct specialoperations. They conduct all ofthe principal special operationsmissions and collateral activities.

• Ranger units are rapidlydeployable, airborne-capable, andtrained to conduct joint strikeoperations with, or in support of,special operations units of allservices. They can also conductstrike missions in support ofconventional operations and canoperate as conventional lightinfantry units when properlyintegrated with other combined-arms elements.

• Special Operations Aviationunits are specialized aviationassets dedicated to conductingspecial operations missions.They provide a mix of short,medium, and long-range lift andlimited light-attack capabilities.They support all principal andcollateral mission areas and canconduct autonomous specialreconnaissance and direct-actionmissions.

• Psychological Operations(PSYOP) forces are employed toinfluence favorably the attitudesand behaviors of specific foreignaudiences and reduce the will,capacity, or influence of hostileforces to wage war or otherwisethreaten U.S. interests. PSYOPforces are equipped withaudiovisual, print, loudspeaker,and radio and TV broadcastingcapabilities to support friendlyforces. Their activities often aresensitive and have significantpolitical and occasionally legalimplications.

• Civil Affairs forces are employedto enhance relationships betweenmilitary forces and civilianauthorities and populations infriendly, neutral or hostile areasof operations. Civil affairs forcesare used to reduce civilianinterference and to gain popularunderstanding, support, andcompliance with measuresrequired to accomplish themission. They also engage in thetype of activities associated withthe operation of civil governmentand its institutions, population,and resources.

4.6.1 Legal Support and SpecialOperations165

Special operations missions arelegally and politically sensitive,particularly in the absence ofinternational armed conflict. Thecommander must consider not onlytraditional law of war issues, but also therequirements of domestic United Stateslaw (such as fiscal, security assistance,and intelligence oversight laws or

FM 27-100

4-38

Department of Defense Directivesrelating to PSYOP) and broaderinternational law requirements (such asthose in mutual defense treaties and hostnation support agreements).

Army special operations forces(SOF) receive OPLAW support from theSJA, United States Army SpecialOperations Command (USASOC) andthe SJA, United States Army CivilAffairs and Psychological OperationsCommand (USACAPOC). Additionally,a judge advocate is required by, andassigned to, each special forces group;psychological operations group; specialoperations aviation regiment; rangerregiment; and civil affairs command,brigade, and battalion. These judgeadvocates provide responsive legaladvice to the commander as required.

An OPLAW JA assigned to a specialoperations unit has many of the sameresponsibilities as judge advocates inother units. For example, the judgeadvocate must provide legal assistanceconsistent with professionalresponsibility requirements, assist thecommander in administering militaryjustice, and participate in administrativeseparation proceedings.

A Special Operations OPLAW JA'sprincipal duty is to serve the counselorfunction for commander and staff. Todo so, he must accomplish thepredeployment preparation (to includethe equipment and training tasks)discussed earlier in this chapter. Judgeadvocates assigned to special operationsforces may deploy with their units deepin enemy territory where access to otherlegal resources is nonexistent.Accordingly, the legal references and

other capabilities of the RDL loomparticularly significant, as docommunications links with technicallegal channels.

In addition to preparing fordeployment to a theater, specialoperations OPLAW JAs mustaccomplish the tasks similar to thoseassigned to the OPLAW JA in a Corpsor Division SJA section. They mustattend planning sessions for alloperations, including exercises; reviewall operations, contingency, and exerciseplans and orders for compliance withdomestic, foreign, and international lawand applicable policy and regulations;and be available to provide legal servicesduring military operations.

All soldiers must receive law of wartraining commensurate with their dutiesand responsibilities. Special operationsOPLAW JA, with the assistance of legalspecialists, provide training that not onlyaddresses conventional law of war issuesbut also addresses issues unique tospecial operations.

4.6.2 Legal Support and CivilAffairs166

Civil affairs operations are politicallyand legally sensitive because theyinvolve the interrelationship between theUnited States military forces andcivilians in the area of operations.Domestic, international, and foreignlaws regulate and influence civil affairsoperations. Commanders and civil affairspersonnel must have ready access tolegal personnel for mission-essentiallegal services. Violations of the law orlocal moral standards by United Statesmilitary personnel risk alienating the


4-39

local populace and jeopardizing thepublic support required for United Statesmilitary and political objectives.

Civil affairs operations address therelationship between military forces,civil authorities, and the population of afriendly or occupied country. Civilaffairs operations concern the effectcivilians have on military operations andthe economic, social, and political effectmilitary operations have on civilians. Amajor civil affairs mission is to mobilizecivilian support for United Statesmilitary operations and politicalobjectives in war and peace. Civil affairsoperations:

• Support the commander in theconduct of military operations.

• Support the commander inmeeting legal obligations andmoral standards regarding thelocal populace.

• Further the national andinternational policies of theUnited States.

Civil affairs operations arecoordinated military activities thatinfluence, develop, or control indigenousinfrastructures in operational areas. Theyinvolve conventional and specialoperations missions (e.g., foreigninternal defense and unconventionalwarfare) or may be pursuedindependently in support of UnitedStates country teams. They may includeUnited States, allied, and indigenoussecurity forces; civil authorities; non-government agencies; and the localpopulace. Civil affairs operationsinclude:

• Mobilizing civilian support forUnited States military andpolitical objectives.

• Preventing civilian interferencewith the mission.

• Facilitating host nation supportand establishing liaison withcivilian authorities.

• Supplementing intelligenceefforts at the operational andtactical level.

• Providing civil administration ormilitary government in foreignterritory.

• Controlling the localnoncombatant population;detaining enemy collaborators;and exercising military controlover private, public, and enemyproperty.

The U-5/J-5/G5/S-5 /Civil-MilitaryOperations (CMO) Officer:

• Is the principal staff assistant tothe commander in civil affairsmatters, including all mattersconcerning political, economic,and social aspects of militaryoperations.

• Acts as liaison between themilitary forces, civil authorities,and people in the area ofoperations.

• Coordinates actions in which theforce employs psychologicaloperations techniques to supportcivil affairs objectives.

Because civil affairs units supportingthe command normally have organiclegal advisors, responsibilities forproviding legal advice relating to civilaffairs must be clear. The civil affairs

FM 27-100

4-40

judge advocate advises the civil affairsunit commander. The SJA (or the Chiefof the BOLT in a conventional brigadetask force supported by civil affairselements) of the supported command isthe sole legal advisor to the supportedcommander. Furthermore, the SJA ofthe supported command is the technicalsupervisor for all legal personnel in CAunits that are assigned, attached or underthe OPCON of the supported command.In all cases, legal advice within thesupported command and supporting civilaffairs units must be thoroughlycoordinated.

Judge advocates assigned to civilaffairs units are the primary legaladvisors to those organizations. Thesenior judge advocate of the unit is theunit's command judge advocate (CJA)and, therefore, is a member of thatcommander's personal and special staff.Civil affairs judge advocates providemission-essential legal services to theunit, including OPLAW support, asrequired by the commander. A civilaffairs unit's CJA will coordinate withthe SJA of the command to which thecivil affairs organization is assigned orattached for technical guidance andsupervision.

Judge Advocate General ServiceOrganizations (JAGSO) may be detailedto corps, TAACOMs/TSCs, and theaterarmies to assist with civil affairs legalmatters.

The practice and delivery of legalsupport are critical to properly advisingand assisting the commander in fulfillinghis legal obligations and complying withmoral standards regarding local civilians.Legal obligations derive from domestic,

international, and, when applicable,foreign law. During armed conflicts, theFourth Hague Convention of 1907 andthe 1949 Geneva Convention Relative tothe Protection of Civilian Persons inTime of War set forth many of thecommanders’ legal obligations. In theabsence of armed conflict, relevant legalsources frequently include the 1951Convention Relating to the Status ofRefugees, United States statutes anddecisions pertaining to immigration, andexecutive branch materials relating topolitical asylum and temporary refuge.As a matter of DoD policy, the ArmedForces of the United States will complywith the law of war during all armedconflicts, however such conflicts arecharacterized, and with the principlesand spirit of the law of war during allother operations.167 In practice, it hasbeen U.S. policy to comply with the lawof war in operations other than war, tothe extent practicable and feasible.168

The International Covenant of Civil andPolitical Rights and other human rightstreaties, as well as various host nationlaws according individual rights tocitizens may also apply in a givensituation.

For these missions, it is essential toconsider local customs and traditions,cultural and religious considerationsappropriate to the area of operations, andestablished principles of humanity.RDLs must thus not only include CDscontaining comparative and foreign legalmaterials; they must also include countrystudy materials of a more general nature.

The SJA or BOLT of the supportedcommand, the U-5/J-5/G-5/S-5, and thecivil affairs CJA will coordinate toprovide the following legal services to


4-41

their commanders during all phases ofcivil affairs operations:

• Planning Phase.! Assisting in the preparation

of, and reviewing, civilaffairs plans for consistencywith the law and nationalcommand authorities’(NCA’s) guidance.

! Preparing the legal section ofthe civil affairs area studyand assessment.

! Providing predeployment CAtraining as required.

• Combat Operational Phase.Providing advice on:! Population control measures.! Targeting to minimize

unnecessary collateraldamage or injury to thecivilian population.

! Treatment of dislocatedcivilians, civilian internees,and detainees.

! Requests for political asylumand refuge.

! Acquisition of private andpublic property for militarypurposes.

! Psychological operations andtheir effects on the civilianpopulace.

• Stability and ConsolidationPhase.! Providing advice on and

disposing of claims submittedby local civilians.

! Providing advice on thejurisdiction of local courtsover United States militarypersonnel and activities.

! Providing advice onhumanitarian and civicassistance issues.

! Providing advice on disasterrelief.

! Assisting in the creation andsupervision of militarytribunals and other activitiesfor the proper administrationof civil law and order.

! Assisting civil administrationactivities, including:

! The establishment andoperation of local judicial andadministrative agencies.

! The closing and reopening oflocal courts, boards, agencies,and commissions.

! Defining the jurisdiction,organization, and proceduresof local governmentinstitutions.


5-1

5 LEGAL SUPPORT IN WAR_____________________________________________________________________________

Whenever Army forces are called uponto fight, they fight to win. Army forces incombat seek to impose their will on theenemy . . . Victory is the objective, nomatter the mission. Nothing short ofvictory is acceptable . . .

Field Manual 100-5,Operations169

In 1970, with all the [1st CavalryDivision] lawyers located at the divisionmain headquarters, such activities asinterviewing witnesses for trial, advisingconvening authorities located outside ofPhuoc Vinh and, in some instances,actively conducting trials at firebases,required traveling by air. Additionally,troops normally did not come intoheadquarters for personal legalassistance or to file claims; judgeadvocates brought legal services to them. . . [T]hanks to the division chief ofstaff, Col. Edward C. Meyer, ahelicopter was dedicated one-half day aweek for use by the Army lawyers. Itwas known as the "lawbird" on the daysit flew.

Colonel Frederic L. Borch IIIJudge Advocates in Combat170

CONTENTS PAGE

THE LIMITS OF WAR...................... 5-2

PHASED AND NESTEDOPERATIONS.................................... 5-3

CONCEPT OF LEGAL SUPPORT INWAR................................................... 5-4

Command and Control,Sustainment, PersonnelService Support.............. 5-4

Command and Control............. 5-4Sustainment.............................. 5-5Personnel Service Support...... 5-6

THE CORE LEGAL DISCIPLINESIN WAR............................................ 5-7

Administrative Law.................... 5-8Claims....................................... 5-8Civil Law..................................... 5-8Military Justice........................... 5-8International Law...................... 5-8Legal Assistance...................... 5-9

ORGANIZATION FOR WAR………... 5-9Theater Legal Structure……… 5-9Army Service Component

Command............................... 5-9Command Posts....................... 5-10Judge Advocate Disposition.... 5-11Brigade Command and Control

Facilities.................................. 5-22

MATERIEL IN WAR........................... 5-24

TRAINING FOR WAR........................ 5-25

FM 27-100

5-2

5.1 THE LIMITS OF WAR

In war, military force is the state'sprimary means to achieve victory.Among the categories of conflictbetween states, war is the most violentand the most dangerous. A modernnation at war—because of the enormityof the resources engaged and thedestructiveness of the meansemployed—will frequently perceive thewar as "total" and "absolute."171 Forthose fighting it, war will appear to spellvictory or defeat, with no middle groundbetween those stark alternatives.172

A commander leads his forces tomilitary victory in war by practicingoperational art. He directs attacksagainst enemy centers of gravity.173 Heand the enemy commander are bothconstantly looking for an edge, for theopportunity to gain and maintain theinitiative. Often it is the side that canadjust most rapidly that will gain thisedge and go on to win. The commanderseeks to outthink the enemy commanderand thus give United States troops theadvantage over their foes. This is often amatter of giving the enemy commandermore problems to solve in a given timethan he and his organization can possiblyhandle. It is a matter of exhausting theenemy's options, breaking the coherenceof his operation, and forcing him to fighton our terms. Finally, it is a matter ofphysically defeating or destroying him.174

Throughout history, a definingfeature of wars has been that theyinclude periods of intense, armedcombat; soldiers, sailors, airmen andmarines physically defeating enemy unitsby killing enemy soldiers, sailors,airmen, and marines in battles. For the

individuals involved, sometimes reducedto fighting with bayonets or their barehands, war is totally consuming. Itabsorbs every ounce of energy, will, andstamina, with nothing left in reserve. Insuch circumstances, war is absolute. It islife or death.

Yet the popularized notions of "totalwar," "absolute war," and "unlimitedwar" are misleading. As Peter Paret, oneof Clausewitz' modern interpreters, haswritten, “If war were one short,uninterrupted blow, preparations for itwould tend toward totality, because noomission could ever be rectified.” But inreality war is always a longer or shortersuccession of violent acts, interrupted bypauses for planning, the concentration ofeffort, the recovery of energy—all on thepart of two or more antagonists, whointeract. A variety of elements withinthe opposing societies, the "free will" ofthe leadership, which may or may notconform to the objective realities, andthe political motives of war, willdetermine the military objective and theamount of effort to be expended. "Waris merely the continuation of policy byother means."175

Thus, the term "unlimited war" doesnot accurately describe even prolongedlarge-scale conflicts in which forcessuffer heavy casualties. To be sure, asClausewitz says, war is "an act of force,and there is no logical limit to theapplication of that force." But "[i]n thereal world, the absolute is alwaysmodified . . . ."176

Legal support in war involves thestudy and application of those limits ourgovernment formally imposes on thewaging of war. In conjunction with


5-3

national policy, law regulates when,where, how, and against whatcommanders and soldiers we mayemploy weapons. Law creates theprocedures and military courts by whichgood order and discipline are maintainedwithin the force, within the ranks ofcaptured enemy prisoners of war, andthroughout occupied territories. Lawensures that supplies and equipment areprocured in a manner that frustrateswaste, fraud, and abuse of publicmoneys. Law governs the mobilizationof the reserve component. Lawfulregulations articulate formal policies foreverything from the taking of wartrophies by United States forces to theconduct of official investigations. Thelaw, even in war, continues to treat eachsoldier as an individual person, capableof drawing a Last Will and Testament,making contracts, incurring debts,getting married, paying child support, orfiling an income tax return.

5.2 PHASED AND NESTEDOPERATIONS

Military operations during war arenot uniformly intense through time. Thisfact bears heavily upon the intensity ofdemand for the different functional areasand legal disciplines. The preconflictand postconflict phases of wartimeoperations will often resemble militaryoperations other than war (MOOTW) inthe character of legal issues generated.

Commanders use phasing becauseoperational art requires them to shiftemphasis from one operational categoryto another.177 For example, elements ofthe Third U.S. Army deployed to SaudiArabia in 1990 primarily as a show offorce to deter aggression against that

country. The Third Army's operationalfocus shifted to the defense whenenough forces arrived to make thatpossible. It shifted to the offensive whenit launched a ground attack to destroy theIraqi Army. Following the successfuloffensive, the Third Army's operationalfocus shifted to post-conflict operationsdesigned to restore essentialinfrastructure in Kuwait. Branches andsequels in the plan account for the needto shift emphasis as a mission unfolds.

In addition to conducting differentcategories of operations over time, unitssometimes conduct different categoriesof operations simultaneously. Oneheadquarters may have subordinate unitsfocused on different categories ofoperations, all operating in the context ofthe higher commander's intent. Thelarger the unit, the more this nesting ofunlike operations is likely to occur. Forexample, a corps conducting offensiveoperations may have several brigade-sized units engaged in offensiveoperations while the rest of the corpsconducts defensive operations. Some ofits other units may be conductingsupport operations to aid battlefieldrefugees.

The smaller the unit, the more likelythe entire force will focus on thedominant operation. A divisionconducting a mobile defense, forexample, may employ one brigade toconduct delaying actions (defensiveoperations) , and two brigades to strikethe decisive blow (offensive operations).On the other hand, a company in theattack often employs all assets in theoffense.

FM 27-100

5-4

Some units may conduct roughly thesame activities regardless of the categoryof operation they are conducting. This isparticularly true for combat servicesupport forces and certain combatsupport forces such as signal elements.Others may have to perform significantlydifferent tasks. An infantry companyconducting a movement to contactexecutes a different set of tasks than itdoes when conducting a disasterresponse.

In this regard, the distinctionbetween war and MOOTW should notbe relied upon by SJA sections to createtwo wholly separate approaches totraining and operations. While largescale deployments to prosecute wars willmore likely involve classic offensive anddefensive operations, they will alsofrequently include stability and supportoperations. As the next chapter explains,stability and support operations, whetherduring war or MOOTW, may presentparticularly tough and sustainedchallenges to operational law assets.

5.3 CONCEPT OF LEGALSUPPORT IN WAR

5.3.1 Command & Control,Sustainment, Personnel ServiceSupport

Legal support in the preparation forand execution of war will cut across allthree functional areas and vary inproportion throughout an operation.After the initial surge of personnelsupport during the mobilization anddeployment of forces, the practice ofOPLAW—the C2 and sustainmentfunctions described in Chapter 3—in warwill dominate the legal landscape. The

issues are fast-paced, require constantsituational awareness, and can affect acommander’s options by expanding orlimiting his courses of action. This isnot to say, however, that legal personnelservices are any less critical to providinglegal support in operations. Whendelivered properly, legal personnelservices may appear transparent to thecommander. A loss of discipline, ormorale failure where soldiers are overlyconcerned about problems at home,however, would not.

5.3.2 Command and Control (C2).

The American way of war is toemploy overwhelming force at thedecisive point, but it is also to respectlegal limits. In order to achieve theformer, commanders and staffs mustknow the precise extent of the latter. Inthe early phases of an operation(mobilization and predeployment), theSJA must deliver operational law adviceby introducing information about thelegal aspects of command authority andthe legal limitations on war into theMDMP. Judge advocates serve ascounselor, providing recommendationsabout how missions can beaccomplished within the law and,frequently, dispelling misconceptionsthat a law or treaty precludes variouseffective courses of action. OPLAW JAsparticipate in targeting and informationoperations cells; implement, draft, andtrain soldiers on ROE; advisecommanders on policies relating toconduct and discipline; ensure war plancompliance with the Law of War andcustomary international law; and ensuresoldiers have a basic understanding inthe treatment of non-combatants,


5-5

protected markings, and other particularsof the Law of War.

Defining General Courts-MartialConvening Authorities both in thetheater of operations and in garrisonmust be done early and with precision.Transferring pending actions to new ordifferent convening authorities willrequire extensive technical channelcommunication. In split-basedoperations, commanders must decide toeither leave their flag at the garrisons,take the flag command with them, orseek out a new rear provisionalconvening authority. Certainly in war,SJAs must plan on incorporating thereserve component into the conveningauthority process. In the future,federalized National Guard or UnitedStates Army Reserve Commanders maylead active component units into battle.Such an order of battle may necessitateSecretary of the Army action definingand designating new conveningauthorities such that the commander canensure good order and discipline for allU.S. forces under his command intheater.

As the Army moves throughdeployment and into offensive ordefensive operations, judge advocatescontinue to provide critical sustainmentand personnel service support. Duringactual combat operations, however,OPLAW JAs will focus most of theirattention on C2 legal support—targeting,ROE, Information Operations (IO),dealing with enemy prisoners of war(EPW), use of mines, the applicability ofthe Chemical Weapons Convention,fratricide investigations, and so forth.

At the conclusion of or duringextended pauses in combat operations,judge advocates will continue to providelegal support in all three functionalareas. The main effort of legal support,however, will turn back to sustainmentand personnel service support. After theU.S.’s successful prosecution of armedconflict, commanders and judgeadvocates may have to deal with theenormous obligations that accompanythe law of occupation or implementinginternational agreements or mandatesthat will follow conflict. Commanderscan also again return their attention totaking care of soldiers and redeploymentto home station.

5.3.3 Sustainment

The DoD Dictionary definessustainment as “[t]he provision ofpersonnel, logistic, and other supportrequired to maintain and prolongoperations or combat until successfulaccomplishment or revision of themission or of the national objective.”178

This is the second prong of operationallaw. For legal support to operations,sustainment includes legal issues that cutacross most of the legal disciplines.Like C2, failure to recognize andresolve—proactively if possible—sustainment issues can limit acommander’s options on the battlefield.Complicating virtually every aspect ofsustainment is the joint andmultinational nature of modern militaryoperations. The very presence ofmultiple coalition partners spread acrossseveral sovereign states, requirescommanders and judge advocates to lookat sustainment issues not only from aninternational law perspective, but also in

FM 27-100

5-6

light of the often restrictive domesticlaw.

During all phases of an operation,OPLAW JA must know and understandthe privileges and immunities that existor do not exist for U.S. forces and thecivilians that accompany the force. Warplans may call for Intermediate StagingBases stretching across severalinternational boundaries, command postsin various countries, or deploymentdirectly into a hostile territory. In all ofthese cases, judge advocates must seekout and understand applicable Status ofForces Agreements, StationingAgreements, of other applicable treatiesor international agreements. Movingpersonnel and supplies into the theater ofoperations may require multipletransiting agreements.

Even though fiscal and contractconstraints in war will be less onerousthan in Military Operations Other ThanWar (MOOTW), U.S. domestic law isnot waived. Even in war, commandersare still stewards of taxpayers’ moneyand subject to strict scrutiny—sometimes long after the end ofhostilities. In virtually any theater ofoperations, commanders will needimmediate contracting capability to hirelocal nationals and purchase items suchas water, food, lumber, fuel, andlubricants. Coalition partners mayrequire extensive support from U.S.forces, thus creating a need forAcquisition and Cross-ServicingAgreements (ACSAs). Every judgeadvocate, regardless of the type ofoperation, must have an understandingof what money is available, when, andfor what purpose. With reliance ontoday’s Logistics Civil Augmentation

Program (LOGCAP), and contractors onthe battlefield, commanders mustaddress everything from their status onthe battlefield to handling discipline witha large civilian force. Beforedeployment, OPLAW JAs must developa foreign claims process that will protectboth the U.S. and the claimant. Judgeadvocates must help the commanderresolve issues concerning federalizingNational Guard forces, mobilizing theUSAR, and dealing with non-governmental and private organizationsin the theater of operations.

5.3.4 Personnel Service Support

There can be little doubt that themain effort of legal support to operationsduring mobilization and predeploymentlies with the routine administration ofmilitary justice and the provision of legalassistance through Soldier’s ReadinessPrograms. While the nuts and bolts ofthe administration of justice or theprovision of legal assistance servicesmay remain in abeyance during offensiveor defensive operations, the limitedcharacter of war implies an importantrole for deployed lawyers serving asjudges in courts-martial or within thecontext of other proceedings andprocedures. It also implies an importantrole for lawyers serving as advocates forthe Army or for individual soldierscharged with crimes or in need ofpersonal legal assistance.

While the operational law supportduring the early phases of an operationare critical to the success of the mission,proactive work in the administration ofjustice will ensure that the foundation ofthe American Army—good order anddiscipline—is scrupulously managed


5-7

allowing commanders to fight and winour nations wars.

While still at home station, whetherthis is from a CONUS or OCONUSinstallation, legal assistance services forour soldiers and family members willconsume the majority of judge advocateresources. In recognition of theimportance of legal assistance to thedeploying force, the Army is committedto ensuring that every soldier that needsor desires a Last Will and Testament orPower of Attorney has one. Answeringquestions about taxes, providing legalhelp for family members duringdeployment, participating in the set upand success of the command’s familysupport group network, and helpingreserve component soldiers with legalissues arising from mobilization are justa few areas that encompass legal supportto operations during mobilization anddeployment. The delivery of these keyand essential services result in enhancedsoldier morale as our soldiers worry lessabout concerns at home. This immenseamount of work will occur only throughthe extensive legal support provided bythe reserve component. While the LegalSupport Organization (LSO) has awarfighting mission and will primarilydeploy with the Staff Judge Advocateinto the theater of operations, theMobilization Support Organization(MSO) will provide "surge support"legal services to mobilization stationsduring all phases of the operation(mobilization, predeployment,deployment, combat operations, post-conflict, and redeployment). Theyprovide this support by supplementingthe capabilities of their installation legaloffices, as augmented under theirMOBTDAs and by the judge advocate

sections or assigned GSUs.Furthermore, they will providesupplemental legal services to otherinstallation legal offices in support oftheir area responsibilities to providelegal services to the dependents ofdeployed AC and RC soldiers. Finally,they will provide legal services at otherlocations, such as STARC offices andARNG installations, RSC offices andinstallations, and elsewhere.

5.4 THE CORE LEGALDISCIPLINES IN WAR

Contrary to the popularized notionthat legal complications wither awayduring wartime, unit histories and after-action reports attest that issues will arisein all six core legal disciplines. Perhapsthe only generalization that may bestated about legal support in wartime,particularly OPLAW, is that a number oflegal provisions in diverse disciplineswill become clearly applicable withoutthe need for drawing elaborate analogiesthat is present during many MOOTW.This is so because these provisions hingeon the existence of "war" or "combat" or"international armed conflict," thoughthe legal definitions of these and relatedterms vary from document to document.It remains useful for judge advocates touse the legal discipline structure as itenhances professional educationaltraining and reflects the most efficientdelivery of legal services in the garrisonenvironment. A unique characteristic ofbeing a judge advocate is that the legalmission continues, both in garrison andthe deployed environment.

FM 27-100

5-8

5.4.1 Administrative Law

Administrative separations,conscientious objector applications,implementation of general orders, thehandling of war trophies, officialinvestigations into fratricides and otherincidents, and distribution of medicalcare are among the many issues that willarise.

5.4.2 Claims

While claims arising from damageoccurring as a result of combat will notgenerally be cognizable, claimsnevertheless may still be payable insome circumstances under the ForeignClaims Act, the Military PersonnelClaims Act, and a variety of otherstatutes and international agreements.Prompt and correct processing,adjudication, and payment of foreignclaims will be necessary to maintaingood will toward United States forces bylocal civilians.

5.4.3 Civil Law

Unless provisions are exempted orrelaxed, the Federal AcquisitionRegulation (FAR) still applies, includingrules concerning full and opencompetition. Similarly, the basic fiscalcontrols on appropriated funds—namelythose constraining availability ofappropriations as to purpose, time, andamount—still apply. Environmentalconsiderations will include documentingenvironmental conditions and changesthereto in areas of operations, reportingimproper modification of environmentalconditions as a method or means ofwarfare, and ensuring environmental

safety and integrity for the well being ofsoldiers.

5.4.4 Military Justice

The need for an efficient and justdisciplinary system will never be moreurgent than in war. This corecompetency of OPLAW JAs will beheavily practiced, as non-judicialpunishment, courts-martial of all types,and perhaps even military commissionswill be convened. The "time of war"provisions of the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice will be in effect,increasing the feasibility of courts-martial in forward areas.

5.4.5 International Law

Common Article 2 of the fourGeneva Conventions will be triggered bythe state of "international armedconflict" that exists during a true war.This will cause a great number ofprovisions in the law of war to becomeclearly applicable to the conduct ofUnited States and enemy forces.Commanders and staffs will requireinterpretations of many nuances of thelaw of war as they relate to the targetingof objectives and the treatment of thewounded and sick, captured prisoners,and civilians. Soldiers will directlyapply the "soldier's rules" which theylearn in basic training.179 Although thelaw of war, and in some circumstancesUnited States military law, will displaceportions of the law of the foreign countrywhere our forces have deployed, most ofthe default legal rules will be those ofthe foreign country. If the United Statesis fighting the war within a coalition,domestic legal issues associated withsecurity assistance will likely arise. War


5-9

Powers Resolution reporting may benecessary. Other federal statutes,executive branch materials, and courtdecisions relating to national securitymay be applicable.

5.4.6 Legal Assistance

United States soldiers in war willcontinue to hail from all fifty states andthe Territories. They will continue torequire wills and to face taxation,divorces, indebtedness, child custodyand support disputes, and a wide rangeof lawsuits, many of these aggravated bylong deployment. Some reservecomponent soldiers will be wrongly firedby employers. Legal assistance attorneyswill use a wide variety of tools availableunder federal and state law on behalf oftheir soldier-clients.

5.5 ORGANIZATION FOR WAR

5.5.1 Theater Legal Structure

As discussed in detail in Chapter 4,the Theater SJA distributes availablelegal resources to facilitate delivery ofthe full spectrum of legal services. TheSJA achieves economies of scale andspecialization and maintains theflexibility to shift priorities of legaltheater support as necessary. JAGCpersonnel are embedded in therequirements and authorizationdocuments of the Army ServiceComponent Command (ASCC), thetheater army area commands(TAACOMs) or theater supportcommands (TSCs), area support groups(ASGs), Army special operationscommands, and other units andfunctional commands (e.g., personnel

commands, medical commands, engineercommands, etc.) in theater.

Legal support to operations will takeplace during war within a theater. Aunified combatant commander in chief(CINC) will command all United Statesforces in the theater and may also servein a separate capacity as the commanderof multinational forces. The CINC,through his SJA or legal advisor, willalso establish policy for the employmentof all operational legal assets in thetheater, which are typically assigned,attached, or serving in direct support ofseveral different echelons.

The CINC has this policy-settingauthority as a matter of law, but theunderlying rationale is rooted in an age-old principle for effective warfighting.This principle is known as unity ofcommand; it holds that forces should beunder a single responsible commanderwith the requisite authority to direct allforces in pursuit of a unified purpose.180

5.5.2 Army Service ComponentCommand

The CINC's legal advisor willcoordinate closely with the TJAGs of theseparate services, with the SJA for theASCC, and with the SJAs for the corpsand divisions within the ASCC to devisea concept for employment of operationallaw resources. With the exception ofproviding trial judges and trial defensecounsel—which are detailed centrallyfrom USALSA—the SJA sections forthe divisions within the ASCC areresponsible for practicing operationallaw and providing legal support tooperations across all legal disciplines inassigned geographic areas.

FM 27-100

5-10

5.5.3 Command Posts

The practice and delivery ofoperational law in a division requiresunderstanding of the command post(CP). The CP of a division is theprincipal facility employed by thecommander to command and controlcombat operations. A division'scommand post is frequently spoken of inthe singular, but a division commandernormally deploys his command post inthree echelons or facilities. These arethe tactical command post, the maincommand post, and the rear commandpost. Note, emerging doctrine in theForce XXI digitized divisions may useonly two command posts—a tacticalcommand post (sometimes referred to asthe DTAC or TAC1) and a main CP.Both of these CPs are larger than theirArmy of Excellence Division tactical CPand main CP counterparts. The digitizeddivision, however, may have no rear CP.Judge advocates in command postsprovide operational law support andprovide or facilitate support in core legaldisciplines required to sustain theorganization, as described in Chapter 3.

CPs are organized and set up tooperate on a 24-hour basis. Thisincludes operating while displacing.Shifts must be established that provideenough personnel to operate the CP andalso the required expertise to makedecisions. There should not be a "firstteam" and "second team" approach.Both shifts must be capable of efficientCP operation. Command grouppersonnel are not included in the shifts.

The shift officer-in-charge (OIC)—also referred to as the "battle captain"—

is the focal point for informationmanagement. He controls allinformation going in and out of thecommand post. In addition to managinginformational flow, the battle captain isresponsible for updating the currentoperations, maps, and charts. Toaccomplish his duties, the OIC musthave guidance from the commander,XO, and S- 3, a thorough knowledge ofthe TAC SOP, current orders, thesynchronized matrix, executionchecklist, and other command andcontrol tools, and subordinate unit plansand graphics. The shift OIC is assistedby the shift noncommissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC). The shift NCOICsupervises all updating of maps andcharts to ensure all information isexchanged. He supervises monitoringradios and maintenance. He ensuresjournals are properly prepared andprepares all reports for the OIC'sapproval.

The tactical CP (sometimes called"TAC CP;" or, in rapidly deployeddivisions, the "Assault CP;" or inAirborne and Air Assault Divisions theJoint Airborne and CommunicationsCenter Command Post, or JACC/CP; oras TAC1 in the Digitized Division) is theforward echelon of the Division's CP.The concept behind the TAC CP is thatit is close to the brigade commanders'CPs so that the division commander candirectly influence current operations.The rule of thumb is that the TAC CPshould be within FM radio range of thecommitted brigades. The AssistantDivision Commander for Maneuver(ADC-M) normally leads the TAC CP.This is a lean apparatus, typicallyconsisting of about a dozen officers anda few NCOs operating out of a few


5-11

vehicles or tents.181 Judge advocates inthe TAC CP provide advice regardingROE, LOW, and other OPLAW matters.They also maintain situational awarenessto identify and resolve legal concernsbefore they become distracters.

The main CP is the primary divisionCP. Whereas the TAC CP focuses oncommanding and controlling currentoperations, the main CP focuses onsustaining current operations and onplanning future operations. It should belocated out of enemy medium artilleryrange so that the enemy must take aspecial effort to knock it out if it is ableto find it. The officer in day to daycharge of the main CP is the DivisionChief of Staff. The Division Commandernormally commands from the main CP,though he will frequently travel to theTAC CP, to the rear CP, to subordinateunit CPs, or wherever he can bestexercise his will. The main CP is a muchbigger operation than the TAC CP,consisting of more than 50 officers,NCOs, and enlisted soldiers. TheDivision Headquarters Company movesthe main CP when it has to move, and itsecures the main CP from attack. TheDigitized Division’s Main CP, whilehaving various cells to include anInformation Operations cell, can be anextended distance from the DTAC orTAC1 making appropriate mobility andcommunication capabilities a must tomaintain situational awareness.

The rear CP focuses on everythingelse— essentially the massive job ofsustaining current and futureoperations—and remains prepared tocontrol current operations if the TAC CPor main CP cannot function. The rearCP's main concerns are

synchronization/direction of combatservice support; terrain management;security of the rear area; and movementof tactical units, personnel, mail, andlogistics. The Assistant DivisionCommander for Support (ADC-S)normally leads the rear CP, which iscollocated with the CP of the DivisionSupport Command (DISCOM), thebrigade-sized element dedicated tologistical support of the division. Therear CP is in the division's rear area,though this does not imply it will bespared enemy attack. To the contrary, adivision's rear area contains many of thedivision's most lucrative targets. Therear CP does not exist in the DigitizedDivision.

5.5.4 Judge Advocate Disposition

Frequently, when direct, immediatelegal advice is required, the OPLAW JAwill deploy with the TAC CP (or, inrapidly deployable divisions, with theassault CP). Division commanders willelect to use an augmented TAC CP orassault CP when split-based operationsare necessary. Split-base operationsinvolve a forward and a rearward CPseparated by great distances and linkedby reliable communications. Thesecommunications enable the passing ofstaff work electronically from a securearea (the location of the rearward CP) toa combat zone (the location of a forwardCP) and back again. The forward andrearward CPs are designed based onMETT-TC by beginning from the TACCP/ assault CP and rear CP models andthen dividing functions from the mainCP model. When the TAC CP is thusaugmented, the OPLAW JA frequentlydeploys with it. In the digitized division,OPLAW JAs are positioned in the

FM 27-100

5-12

DTAC/TAC1 to render immediateOPLAW advice, particularly within theC2 function.

As a general rule, however, Armydoctrine for division operations locatesthe OPLAW JA in the main CP.Because the Division Commandernormally commands the division fromthe main CP, the SJA will locate himselfthere, with the OPLAW JA. The SJAand the OPLAW JA will normally divideoperational law duties in the main CP,which include participation in the DeepOperations Coordination Cell (DOCC). Each of these judge advocates is amember of the DOCC, which identifiesand plans attacks on deep, high-payofftargets and whose members include theDivision Artillery (DIVARTY)Commander, the Deputy Fire SupportCoordinator (DFSCOORD), the DeputyG-3 for Plans, and a G-2 representative.Within the main CP, these judgeadvocates will locate themselves withthe G-3 plans element. Note, emergingdoctrine may push the DOCC forward tothe TAC CP; this would require a judgeadvocate in the TAC.

OPLAW duties in the main CP (or,when appropriate, in the TAC CP/assault CP) involve the counselorfunction and the core legal disciplinessupporting the command and control,and sustainment of battlefieldoperations. Judge advocates providelegal support to combat service supportand personnel service support operationsfrom the rear CP or other supportlocation. The SJA and CJA introducerelevant operational law considerationsinto DOCC planning and the MDMP byinterpreting ROE.

The DOCC uses a methodologyknown as decide-detect-deliver-assess.This methodology is explained in detailin Field Manual 6-20-10, Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for TheTargeting Process.182 This manual isessential reading for the OPLAW JA andSJA.

The bulk of the SJA section deployswith the combat service support cell ofthe rear CP183 The SJA will positionhimself with this element as necessary toensure the provision of professional legalservices, but the DSJA normallysupervises the performance of legalduties in the rear CP (or sustainmentcell). These duties comprise bothOPLAW functions (C2 andsustainment), personnel service support,and all six legal disciplines. While alllegal personnel in the SJA section mustbe capable of resolving issues across thisentire range of duties, the practice anddelivery of OPLAW from within thecombat service support cell will bemarked by significant division of labor.The volume of legal issues arising andthe number of judge advocates availablewill compel and permit particular judgeadvocates to concentrate on certainfunctions and disciplines. In this way,the section will take advantage of specialexpertise of judge advocates.

The remainder of the division SJAsection deploys with the command postsof subordinate brigades, brigade-sizedcommands, or separate battalions. TheSJA will determine which subordinatecommands are directly supported byjudge advocates serving as Chiefs ofBrigade Operational Law Teams(BOLTs). In making this determination,the SJA will consider METT-TC and the


5-13

principles of tailoring in Chapter 2.BOLTs are discussed later in thischapter.

Army Service ComponentCommand. The Army ServiceComponent Command (ASCC) OSJAstructure must be tailored to support C2,sustainment, and support operations forthe deployed force. Army legalpersonnel serve at several levels within atheater. The Army Service ComponentCommand (ASCC) includes an SJAsection. The corps, divisional, andseparate brigade commands subordinateto the ASCC also include SJA or CJAsections, or BOLTs, as do varioussupporting theater army area commands(TAACOMs) or theater supportcommands (TSCs), area support groups(ASGs), Army special operationscommands, and other units andfunctional commands (e.g., personnelcommands, medical commands, engineercommands, etc.) in theater. The SJA isthe senior judge advocate in the ASCC.The SJA is assisted by the DSJA, otherjudge advocates, a legal administrator(warrant officer), the CLNCO, and legalspecialists. Judge advocates are alsolocated in theater command, group,regiment, and brigade headquarters.Legal specialists are also located intheater command, group, regiment,brigade, and battalion or squadronheadquarters. Continuous, reliablecommunication networks, both secureand non-secure, and RDL linkages withthe tactical command and controlnetwork and the unclassified Internet(including LAAWS) are essential toprovide legal support throughout thetheater. Accurate and timely OPLAWadvice to the commander depends ontactical communication linkages. For

example, in a digitized headquarters,operational attorneys must haveimmediate access to MCS-Phoenix.Judge advocates must be diligent tocomply with information and operationalsecurity requirements when using theseresources.

The ASCC SJA is a member of theASCC commander’s personal andspecial staffs. The TAACOM/TSC SJAis the senior JA within that structure anda member of the TAACOM/TSCcommander’s personal and special staff.In their respective organizations, theyprovide advice on all aspects of law andmilitary operations. They supervise thedelivery of legal services throughout thetheater of operations and are a technicalchannel conduit. The SJA requiresdedicated transportation assets/supportto perform these functions throughoutthe area of operations.

Judge advocates in the ASCC’s EarlyEntry and Operations/IntelligenceModules support the commander andstaff in the conduct of militaryoperations. On a twenty-four (24)-hourper day basis, they integrate proactivelegal support into all aspects of theconduct of operations. They supportcurrent operations and plans. Judgeadvocates in the TAACOM/TSC EarlyEntry Module (EEM) provide similarsupport to TAACOM/TSC early entryoperations. This includes the criticalrole of providing legal review and advicefor contracting actions.

Judge advocates in the ASCC MainModule provide specialized legalknowledge, training, and experience insupport of theater-wide operations. Theyprovide centralized services, along with

FM 27-100

5-14

any additional support requirementsunable to be filled by judge advocateslocated in subordinate units. Judgeadvocates of the TAACOM/TSC providesimilar support throughout theTAACOM/TSC and its subordinateunits. Judge advocates in the ASCCRear Module support rear operations andassist contracting officers in the theaterrear.

Legal specialists in the ASCC andTAACOM/TSC headquarters work insupport of the SJA section and OPLAWJAs. They work under the supervisionof judge advocates, collect information,conduct research, and preparedocuments. They support judgeadvocates and commanders and assist inthe delivery of legal services. Somelegal specialists are specially trainedcourt reporters, who compile verbatimrecords of judicial and otherproceedings. The CLNCO supervisesand trains legal specialists throughoutthe theater of operations. Legalspecialists in battalion, squadron, group,regiment, and brigade headquartersprovide professional and ministerialsupport of legal actions. Under thesupervision of judge advocates, theyprovide the critical forward assistancefor the judge advocates and facilitate thedelivery of legal services and the judgeadvocates’ legal advice.

Corps. The SJA is the senior judgeadvocate in the corps. The SJA isassisted in the corps headquarters by theDSJA, other judge advocates, a legaladministrator (warrant officer), theCLNCO, legal specialists, and JAGCcivilian personnel. Judge advocatessupport the corps support command(COSCOM), and each group, regiment,

and separate brigade headquarters.METT-TC dependent, the SJA can taskorganize legal support below separatebrigades. Legal specialists support eachgroup, regiment, separate brigade, andbattalion or squadron headquarters.Continuous, reliable communicationnetworks, both secure and non-secure,and RDL linkages with the tacticalcommand and control network and theunclassified Internet (includingLAAWS) are essential to provide legalsupport throughout the theater. Accurateand timely OPLAW advice to thecommander depends on tacticalcommunication linkages. For example,in a digitized corps, OPLAW JAs musthave immediate access to MCS-Phoenix.Judge advocates must be diligent tocomply with information and operationalsecurity requirements when using theseresources.

The SJA is a member of the corpscommander’s personal and special staffs.The SJA provides legal advice to thecommander on all aspects of law andmilitary operations. The SJA supervisesthe delivery of legal services throughoutthe corps and exercises operationalcontrol over all JAGC personnelassigned to the corps. The SJA providestechnical supervision and providessupport as necessary to division, separatebrigade, and armored cavalry regimentjudge advocates within the corps. TheSJA exercises operational control overadditional legal assets, legalorganizations, or legal teams that areassigned to the corps area, exceptmilitary judges who performindependently under the U.S. Army TrialJudiciary, and Defense Counsel whoperform independently under the U.S.Army Trial Defense Service. The SJA


5-15

task organizes legal assets to provideresponsive legal support throughout thecorps areas of operation, and as farforward on the battlefield as necessary.The SJA requires dedicatedtransportation assets/support to performthese functions throughout the area ofoperations.

The DSJA acts for the SJA,administers the full range of legalservices throughout the area ofoperations, mentors legal personnel,supervises legal operations in the Armyof Excellence Corps Rear CommandPost, or at other separate locations, andplans collective training.

Judge advocates in the corps tacticalcommand post advise the corpscommander and the battle staff on legalissues associated with the conduct ofmilitary operations. On a twenty-fourhour per day basis, they integrateproactive legal support into all aspects ofthe conduct of operations.

Judge advocates located at the corpsmain command post provide specializedknowledge, training, and experience insupport of corps-wide operations. Theyprovide operational law and core legaldiscipline support at the main CP. Theysupport group, regimental, command,and brigade judge advocates.

Judge advocates in the corps G3plans and operations sections,information operations, or otheroperational cells provide legal adviceand assistance in support of plans,targeting operations, and currentoperations in the corps main commandpost.

Judge advocates at the Army ofExcellence corps rear command post, orother support location, providespecialized knowledge, training, andexperience in support of corps rearoperations. They are prepared to assumethe mission of the corps main legalsection. They provide centralized legalservices relating primarily to personnelsupport operations, but they also assistthe SJA with C2 and sustainment legalsupport as required.

Legal specialists in the corpsheadquarters work in support of theOSJA and OPLAW JAs. They workunder the supervision of judgeadvocates, collect information, conductresearch, and prepare documents. Theysupport judge advocates andcommanders and assist in the delivery oflegal services. Some legal specialists arespecially trained court reporters whocompile verbatim records of judicial andother proceedings. The CLNCOsupervises and trains legal specialiststhroughout the corps.

Judge advocates in the COSCOM,group, regiment, and separate brigadeheadquarters provide legal support to thecommanders in all functional areas (toinclude subordinate commanders at alllevels), staffs, leaders, and soldiers of theunit. In addition to OPLAW duties, theCOSCOM judge advocate may be taskedto provide or coordinate for contract lawadvice in support of the COSCOM.

Legal specialists in the COSCOM,group, regiment, brigade, battalion, andsquadron headquarters support theprocessing of legal actions. Under thesupervision of judge advocates, theyprovide the critical forward assistance

FM 27-100

5-16

for the judge advocates and facilitate thedelivery of legal services and the judgeadvocates’ legal advice.

Division/Separate Brigade/ArmoredCavalry Regiment.

The division SJA section is thelowest-echelon, organic, full-serviceelement of legal support to operations.It is modular—capable of being tailoredto provide legal support for specificmissions that may be undertaken duringa war. It also features significantsynergy—a product of bringing togetherdiverse, technically skilled legalprofessionals and providing them theinformational and legal researchinfrastructure necessary for tacklingcomplex legal issues.

Each division receives the organicfull- service operational legal support ofa complete SJA section becausedivisions are depended upon to fightbattles and engagements (the tacticallevel) in such a way as to achievesuccess at the operational level. AnArmy corps is two or more divisions. AnArmy division is a unit that combines initself the necessary arms and servicesrequired for sustained combat.

There are different types ofdivisions— armored, mechanized, lightinfantry, airborne, and air assault, — andnot all of these types are exclusive. Forinstance, airborne divisions are capableof all missions assigned to light infantrydivisions.

The essence of a combat division isthat it trains and fights as a team, and ithas the necessary equipment to fight fora significant time. Although Army

doctrine designates the corps as thelargest tactical organization, the divisionis the largest organization that regularlytrains as a team. A typical light infantrydivision has three infantry brigades (eachcomprising three battalions), an aviationbrigade, a brigade-sized artilleryelement, a brigade-sized logisticalsupport element, and a number ofseparate battalions. In rough terms, itconsists of about 18,000 soldiersequipped with rifles, machine guns,mortars, anti-tank missiles, bridgingequipment, air defense missiles, artillerytubes, helicopters, and other weaponsand equipment.

A typical mechanized infantrydivision has two mechanized and onearmored brigade (sometimes referred toas "maneuver brigades"), an engineerbrigade, an aviation brigade, a brigade-sized artillery element, a brigade-sizedlogistical element, and a number ofseparate battalions. The maneuverbrigades will include, as a whole, fivemechanized and five armored battalions,task organized by the divisioncommander according to METT-TC. Atypical armored division features thesame capabilities as the mechanizedinfantry division except that it has twoarmored brigades and one mechanizedbrigade. These maneuver brigades in thearmored division will include, as awhole, six armored and four mechanizedbattalions task organized into brigadesaccording to METT-TC.

This manual focuses on division SJAsection deployment during war or otherprolonged operations because thedivision is the focus of Armywarfighting doctrine. However, thedivision SJA section model also


5-17

provides a guide for achieving the properbalance of modularity and synergy inSJA sections that support corps,TAACOMs/TSCs and other largecommands. Although militaryoperations other than war (MOOTW)sometimes require the deployment ofentire division SJA sections, militaryoperations in war invariably require suchdeployment. In war, the division SJA isthe ultimate practitioner of OPLAW. Hepositions himself at all times to supportthe division commander, who mustconstantly strive to link the employmentof soldiers and materiel to strategic aims.The division SJA organizes the sectionas necessary to provide professionallegal services at all subordinate echelonsof command.

The SJA is the senior judge advocatein the division. The SJA is assisted inthe division headquarters by the DSJA,other judge advocates, a legaladministrator (warrant officer), theCLNCO, and legal specialists. Judgeadvocates support each brigade toinclude the division artillery(DIVARTY), the Engineer Brigade, andDISCOM headquarters. Legalspecialists also support each brigade,battalion, or squadron headquarters.Continuous, reliable communicationnetworks and RDL linkages to C2,sustainment, and support systems andLAAWS are essential to provide legalsupport throughout the division.Particularly in digitized divisions, wherebrigades may have extraordinary lines ofcommunication, brigade judge advocatesmust be prepared to provide allfunctional areas of legal support acrossall six legal disciplines. For this tooccur, the OPLAW JA must have accessto the commander and continuous secure

and non-secure communication andautomation capabilities. Judgeadvocates must be diligent to complywith information and operationalsecurity requirements when using theseresources.

The SJA is a member of the divisioncommander’s personal and special staffs.The SJA provides legal advice to thecommander on all aspects of law andmilitary operations. The SJA supervisesthe delivery of legal services throughoutthe division and exercises operationalcontrol over JAGC personnel assigned tothe division and its subordinate units.The SJA requires dedicatedtransportation assets/support to performthese functions throughout the area ofoperations.

The DSJA is normally the secondmost senior judge advocate. The DSJAacts for the SJA, administers the fullrange of legal services throughout thearea of operations, mentors legalpersonnel, supervises the brigade judgeadvocates, and plans collective training.

Judge advocates in the OSJA providespecialized legal knowledge, training,and experience in support of divisionC2, sustainment, and support operations.They provide centralized services andaugment brigade judge advocates. TheJAGC provides OPLAW support andcomprehensive legal services in corelegal disciplines throughout all phases ofmilitary operations. Mission, enemy,terrain, troops, time available, andcivilians (METT-TC) impact the preciselocation for delivery of services.OPLAW support is provided as part ofan overall plan for delivery ofcomprehensive legal services. OPLAW

FM 27-100

5-18

support is generally provided at thedivision tactical operations center,division G-3 plans and operationssections, division information operationscell, targeting cell, and each brigadeheadquarters. Based on missionrequirements, OPLAW support may beprovided to battalion and smaller-sizedorganizations.

Legal specialists in the divisionheadquarters work in support of the SJAand OPLAW JA. They work with, andunder the supervision of, judgeadvocates, collect information, conductresearch, and prepare documents. Theysupport judge advocates andcommanders and assist in the delivery oflegal services. Some legal specialists arespecially trained court reporters whocompile verbatim records of judicial andother proceedings. The CLNCOsupervises and trains legal specialiststhroughout the division.

Judge advocates in the division’sTAC CP advise the division commander,the assistant division commander, andthe battle staff on legal issues associatedwith the conduct of military operations.On a twenty-four (24)-hour per daybasis, they integrate proactive legalsupport into all aspects of the conduct ofoperations.

Judge advocates in the division G3plans, operations, or informationoperations sections provide legal adviceand assistance in support of plans, ROE,targeting operations, and currentoperations in the division main CP. Thecommander or SJA may task organizehis judge advocate support to optimizesituational awareness, such as providing

dedicated legal support to the emerginginformation operations (IO) cell.


5-19

Figure 5-1

The above diagram depicts one model of judge advocate organization tosupport provide legal support to the emerging digitized division. Judgeadvocates are task organized to maximize situational awareness given thepotentially enormous division battlespace made possible by technologicaladvances. Note that the BOLT may be hundreds of kilometers from theDivision Main.

1st BCT1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D)

3-5 Bn 71Ds

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate Digitized Division

Sustainment Cell:SJA, Legal Admin (CW3), CLNCO6 JAs: Chfs, LA, MJ, Ad/Int’l Law

2 MCS Operators (71Ds)9 71Ds

TAC1 / DTAC2 JAs (12 Hour Shifts) in DOCC

1 MCS Terminal

2d BCT1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D)

3-5 Bn 71Ds

Aviation Brigade1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D)

3-5 Bn 71Ds

Division Artillery1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D)

3-5 Bn 71Ds

DIVISION MAINInfo Opns/G3 Ops Cell:

2 JAs (DSJA + 1)2 71Ds/2 MCS Oper (2 71Ds)

G3 Plans/Exercises Cell (PLEX):2 JAs

FM 27-100

5-20

1st Brigade1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D)

3-5 Bn 71Ds

Office of the Staff Judge AdvocateArmy of Excellence Division

Engineer Brigade 1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D)

3-5 Bn 71Ds

Division Support CMD(DISCOM)

1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D) 3-5 Bn 71Ds

Division MainSJA + 2 JAs

2 71Ds

Division RearDSJA

7 JAs: DSJA, Chiefs of Operational Law, Claims, Intn’l Law, Admin Law, Legal Assistance, Military Justice

1 Legal Administrator (Warrant Officer), 1 Chief Legal NCOIC, 22 71Ds

2d Brigade1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D)

3-5 Bn 71Ds

3d Brigade1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D)

3-5 Bn 71DsDivision Artillery1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D)

3-5 Bn 71Ds

Division Tactical CP (TAC)1 JA

Aviation Brigade1 JA, 1 NCOIC (71D)

3-5 Bn 71Ds

Figure 5-2

Another model of judge advocate organization based on the Army ofExcellence.


5-21

The Brigade Operational Law Team(BOLT). The SJA task organizesOPLAW support to commanders, staffs,and soldiers of a brigade combat team(BCT) or brigade task force. The SJAidentifies early, the Brigade JudgeAdvocate, who serves as Chief of theBOLT. This judge advocate is usuallythe trial counsel for that brigade while ingarrison. The BOLT also includes thelegal specialists assigned to thesupported BCT. The legal issues facingbrigade judge advocates may extendacross the full spectrum of OPLAW andthe core legal disciplines. Although it istrained and equipped to identify issuesacross all three functional areas and thesix disciplines of legal support tooperations, the challenge for the BOLTis always to achieve requisite synergy toresolve complex legal questions withinparticular disciplines. Often, thissynergy can be achieved only bycommunicating with the division SJAsection and other judge advocates intechnical channels.

The division SJA, in consultationwith the DSJA, determines whichsubordinate units within the division willbe directly supported by BOLTs. TheSJA considers METT-TC in making thisdetermination, paying particularattention to the likely complexity andvolume of legal issues the subordinateunit will face and to the ability of theunit to receive OPLAW support fromassets located with division commandposts. The legal specialists thatcomprise the BOLT are under thesupervision of the brigade judgeadvocate and provide the critical forwardassistance for the brigade judge advocateand facilitate the delivery of legalservices across the brigade combat team.

The provision of timely and accuratelegal support requires the combined teamof the legal specialist and the brigadejudge advocate. There are instances,however, when a brigade judge advocateis required to support more than onebrigade. Further, a judge advocatedeploying with the brigade may haverequirements to support otherorganizations within the area ofoperations. These variables emphasizethe brigade judge advocate’s need formobility and communication capability.

The DISCOM BOLT should havetraining or experience in contract law.In addition to other legal duties, theDISCOM brigade judge advocate may betasked to provide or coordinate forcontract law advice in support of theDISCOM.

Judge advocates and legal specialistsserving in BOLTs must understand thecapabilities and role of brigade-sizedunits in the Army. The brigade is thefirst unit in the infantry or armoredsoldier's upward chain of command thatincludes a full range of soldiers who dotasks very much different from his own.A brigade task force includesinterrogators, counterintelligenceoperatives, attack helicopter pilots,howitzer crew chiefs, Marine Corps airand naval gunfire liaisons (ANGLICO),heavy anti-tank weapon gunners,bulldozer operators, air defense gunners,fuel bladder technicians, enginerepairmen, water purifiers, ambulancedrivers, physicians, and graves registrars.The brigade is the smallest unit in theArmy that must integrate all of the sevenbattlefield operating systems—intelligence, maneuver, fire support,mobility/survivability, air defense,

FM 27-100

5-22

combat service support, battlecommand—into a potent whole.Brigade task forces that deploy withBOLTs and brigade surgeons are also thesmallest units in the Army that have theirown legal and medical professionals inthe field. For a more detailedexplanation of brigades and how they areorganized and fight, see, e.g., DEP’T OFARMY FIELD MANUAL 71-3, THEARMORED AND MECHANIZED INFANTRYBRIGADE (8 Jan. 1996); DEP’T OF ARMYFIELD MANUAL 71-123, TACTICS ANDTECHNIQUES FOR COMBINED ARMSHEAVY FORCES: ARMORED BRIGADE,BATTALION TASK FORCE, AND COMPANYTEAM (30 Sep. 1992).

The BOLT must be present in theTOC or TAC, have access to thecommander, and have the training,mobility, secure communications andequipment to provide the right answersat the right time and place. Legal supportto operations contributes to several otherbattlefield operating systems in additionto combat service support. The mostprominent of these is the command andcontrol system, but intelligence,maneuver, fire support, mobility/countermobility/ survivability, and airdefense also require OPLAW support.In serving within these other systems,the BOLT must be prepared both toidentify and resolve the full range oflegal issues—across the legal functionalareas and core legal disciplines—byinserting sound analysis andrecommendations into the brigade'sMDMP.

Legal support to operations must bemanaged with careful attention to whatcan and must be done at each echelon ofcommand. Accordingly, the BOLT

cannot and does not attemptenvironmental litigation, legalrepresentation in foreign legal systems,review of high dollar-value contracts,convening of general courts-martial,conclusion of international agreements,drafting of inter vivos trusts, review ofForeign Military Sales cases and otherhighly technical services. The BOLTseeks to practice preventive law and toidentify the full range of legal issues thatneed to be raised to higher echelons.

5.5.5 Brigade Command andControl Facilities

Judge advocates serving as Chiefs ofBOLTs must understand the brigadecommand and control facilities. Theyare adept at obtaining information fromthe flow of messages into and out ofthese facilities, at inserting importantinformation into that flow, at helping thebrigade staff determine what ingredientthe decision process needs, and insupplying the needed ingredient.

The brigade has four types ofcommand and control facilities: thecommand group, the tactical CP, themain CP, and the rear CP. Like thecommand posts discussed at divisionlevel in Chapter 5, the brigade CP mustbe able to ensure that the commander iscontinually abreast of the developingsituation that subordinate commandersare provided with the means toaccomplish their assigned missions.

The brigade command group is atemporary organization consisting of thebrigade commander and other soldiersand equipment required to performcommand group functions. The primaryfunction of the command group is to


5-23

influence the immediate action throughthe commander's personal presence.Other functions include observing thebattlefield, synchronizing the battle, andproviding planning guidance. Thecommand group moves forward from thetactical CP. The command groupsometimes operates from a commandand control helicopter.

The tactical command post (TACCP) fights current close operations,provides the commander with combatcritical information, and disseminatesthe commander's decisions. It issupervised by the brigade S-3 and isusually as far forward as the battalionmain CPs. The TAC CP should strive tohave redundant abilities in personnel andequipment at the main command post.

The main command post monitorsthe current battle, executes planned deepattacks, and plans future operations. Itcoordinates operations throughout thebrigade sector and keeps higherheadquarters informed. It is supervisedby the brigade executive officer (XO)and includes staff personnel representingall facets of brigade operations. Thetactical operations center (TOC) is theoperations cell within the maincommand post.

The forward support battalion (FSB)commander supervises the rearcommand post, which is collocated withthe forward support battalion CP. Therear CP is responsible foradministrative/logistic functions. Therear CP or the direct support artillerybattalion main CP is usually designatedas the brigade alternate CP. The forwardsupport battalion commander isresponsible for fighting rear operations.

An infantry brigade must maintaincontinuous, synchronized operations. Toestablish the necessary "battle rhythm" tomake this happen, the brigade makesoptimal use of scheduled conferencecalls, shift change briefings, and battleupdate briefs (BUBs). The brigadecommander conducts conference callswith his subordinate commanders atregular intervals shortly after thedivision conference calls. The shiftchange brief is supervised by theoutgoing TOC shift OIC and is designedto exchange information between theoutgoing and incoming shifts. It can alsoserve as a commander's update, but theprimary audience is the incoming shift.Battle Update Briefs are called on an as-needed basis to update the TOC oncurrent and significant events.

Occasionally, when he can beexpected to make a direct contribution tocurrent operations, the brigade judgeadvocate will deploy with the TAC CPor accompany the brigade commandgroup. As a general rule, however, thebrigade judge advocate will deploy withthe main CP. Because the brigadecommander normally commands thebrigade from the main CP, this is theoptimal position for the brigade judgeadvocate. The brigade judge advocate,supported by the brigade legal specialist,will provide OPLAW support in themain CP, which will includeparticipation in the brigade's targetingprocess. When in the TOC at the mainCP—as opposed to the TAC or assaultCP—the brigade judge advocate or legalspecialist should locate themselvesadjacent to the PSYOP and civil affairselements.

FM 27-100

5-24

The brigade level legal specialists ofthe BOLT deploy with the rear CP, at theadministrative and logistics operationscenter (ALOC). They are supervised intheir OPLAW duties by the BOLTelement in the main CP. The brigadejudge advocate and legal specialistcommunicate regularly with theremainder of the BOLT in the rear CP.They also periodically travel there toprovide leadership and guidance, toprovide legal assistance and completeother tasks that cannot be attempted inthe main CP, and to ensure that legalspecialists are utilized in support of theoperational law mission.

The present manual identifies theBOLT as the model of modular legalsupport to an Army unit smaller thandivision size. Many of theorganizational principles defining theBOLT can be applied to good effect inthe modular legal support teams thatdeploy with special operations elements.For example, the SJAs of United StatesArmy Special Operations Command andUnited States Army Special ForcesCommand face the same challenges ingenerating synergy around the legalchallenges that confront the Group JudgeAdvocates and OPLAW teams thatdeploy with special forces groups.Although the unique mission of specialforces groups will inevitably raisedistinct legal questions (see thediscussion of special operations inChapter 4), these judge advocates andteams, like BOLTs, must be able toidentify a broad range of legal issues,and coordinate those issues with highertechnical channels, while focusing on aband of issues critical to sound decision-making by command and staff.

5.6 MATERIEL IN WAR

The practice and delivery of legalsupport in war may be marked by heavyand persistent demand for administrativelaw, contract, or fiscal law opinions,foreign claims adjudication, for adviceon United States obligations under treatyor foreign legal provisions, and forinterpretations of domestic securityassistance statutes. It will likely requirethe convening of courts-martial. It willrequire the provision of a high volume oflegal assistance services. As discussedearlier, critical legal support within thepersonnel service support function willsurge during predeployment, then remainat a relatively constant volume once intheater. OPLAW—C2 andsustainment—will surge upon entry intothe theater with command and controlissues dominating legal support duringcombat operations and sustainmentissues just before and after combatoperations. As communicationsimprove and weapons lethality continuesto increase the battlespace, judgeadvocates must be linked into the tacticaland non-tactical communicationsystems. To effectively provideOPLAW advice to the commander at thecritical time and place on the battlefield,judge advocates must remain aware ofthe tactical situation and have access tothe commander.

The materiel that accompanies thedivision SJA section must be sufficientin types and quantities to meet theserequirements. Chapter 4 described ingeneral terms the automation, mobility,and communications equipmentnecessary for OPLAW elements toaccomplish their missions.


5-25

The materiel requirements of theSJA section in prolonged, large-scaleoperations are not limited to automation,mobility, and communicationsequipment. CD ROM and hard copybooks and forms are also needed to backup essential references, or for frequentuse or consultation.

The need for courts-martial tomaintain good order and discipline willrequire the establishment of a courtroom,judge's chamber, deliberation room, andprivate locations suitable forinterviewing witnesses or the accused bycounsel. The frequency of reference toreported case precedents may justify thedeployment of hard copy case reportersto augment the cases contained oncompact disk. Also, adequate furniture,lighting, court reporter equipment,supplies for the creation of exhibits, anda means for photocopying keydocuments will be essential to theachievement of justice and due processclose to the forward line of troops.

In war, the adequate provision ofprofessional legal services at all echelonsof command (to include the companies,battalions, brigades, divisions, and corpsmaking up the tactical level) requirescourts-martial to be conducted in theater.Discipline in a combat zone is ill-servedby courts-martial conducted far awayfrom the dangers of war.

5.7 TRAINING FOR WAR

The training challenge in today andtomorrow’s military is immense. Judgeadvocates must balance the ever-presentmission in garrison with the need todeploy and provide our commanders andsoldiers with the full range of legal

support in operations. Like their non-legal counterparts, legal personnel mustbe aware of and train with emergingtechnologies—global positioningdevices (GPS), night vision devices,vehicles, communication means, andautomation software and hardware. Alllegal personnel should be well read onemerging joint and army doctrine andtrain on individual soldier skills at everyopportunity (e.g., SJA section leaderdevelopment programs, unit exercises,deployment to the Army’s CombatTraining Centers).

The division SJA, in conjunctionwith the DSJA, CLNCO, and LegalAdministrator, trains the SJA section forwartime deployment using Armytraining doctrine, the application ofwhich to OPLAW was described inChapter 4.

The SJA section's METL is thesingle most important product forconducting battle focused training. TheSJA and DSJA must use the processdescribed in Chapter 4 to develop andassess METLs of LSOs/MSOs and/or thejudge advocate sections of other RCunits within their subordinate wartracechain of command. This process shouldbe part of the training associationrelationships between SJA sections andRC units, such as the trainingrelationships created and fosteredpursuant to FORSCOM Regulation 27-1,Judge Advocate Training AssociationProgram (15 Jun 1998).

In planning training to developproficiency on all mission essentialtasks, Battle Command TrainingProgram (BCTP) rotations should begiven special emphasis. The BCTP is

FM 27-100

5-26

the only combat training center with thespecific mission of providing stressfuland realistic training to corps anddivision staffs on their METLs. SJAsand DSJAs, in conjunction withCLAMO and judge advocate observer-controllers detailed to the BCTP, mustensure that OPLAW issues are fully andrealistically integrated into BCTProtations. Integration of legal issues thathave arisen during deployments isessential not only for the effectivetraining of the SJA section; it is essentialfor the effective training of the commandand staff.184


6-1

6 LEGAL SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR

_____________________________________________________________________________

United States military operations in the Republicof Haiti in 1994 and 1995 represented acomprehensive and stunningly successfulapplication of law to fluid and challengingcircumstances. Many Americans will recall thetense beginning, when a large combat forceentered Haiti peacefully on terms negotiated in the11th hour by duly empowered civilianrepresentatives of the United States. ManyAmericans also will recall how these operationssoon achieved the ouster of a dictator, the returnto power of an elected Haitian president, and theremoval of a threat to regional peace and security.These aspects of the Haiti deployment not onlyreaffirmed the rule of law, they also held asymbolic and political importance that arousedgreat popular interest.

Yet other significant applications of law tookplace day-to-day, at the individual and unit level.Infantry privates balanced initiative with restraintunder the rules of engagement while confrontingpotentially hostile Haitians. Supply clerksdistributed food and other items that had beenpurchased strictly in accordance with acquisitionand appropriations laws. Military policementreated Haitian detainees pursuant both tointernal rules and to standards derived frominternational treaties. Investigating officersperformed their duties thoroughly and fairly ingathering evidence about incidents of allegedmisconduct. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, andmarines remained undistracted by personalconcerns, enjoying a sense of security provided bystatutory programs of life insurance and legalassistance. With very few exceptions, these menand women in uniform also scrupulously followedorders given by their chain of command, justifyinga disciplinary system acknowledged by Congressand the courts to be essential to missionaccomplishment.

Center for Law and Military OperationsLaw and Military Operations in Haiti,1994-1995 185

CONTENTS PAGE

INTRODUCTION.............................. 6-2

STRATEGIC CONCEPT................... 6-3THEATER CONCEPT...................... 6-3

Political Objectives................... 6-4Legal Complexity...................... 6-4Mission Complexity.................. 6-4Command and Control............. 6-4Interagency Coordination........ 6-5

THE ARMY’S ROLE IN MOOTW..... 6-5Arms Control............................. 6-6Combating Terrorism............... 6-6Counter-Drug Operations......... 6-6Enforcement of Sanctions and

Exclusion Zones....................6-6

Humanitarian Assistance......... 6-6Nation Assistance..................... 6-7Noncombatant Evacuation

Operations.............................6-7

Peace Operations..................... 6-7Recovery Operations................ 6-8Show of Force Operations....... 6-8Strikes and Raids..................... 6-8Support to Insurgencies.......... 6-9Operations under Armistice

Conditions……………………6-9

ORGANIZATION OF LEGALSUPPORT........................................ 6-9LEGAL ASPECTS OF C2,SUSTAINMENT, AND SUPPORTOPERATIONS..................................

6-9

Legal Basis for Operation........ 6-10Status of Forces....................... 6-10International and Interagency

Relationships......................... 6-11Use of Force and Rules of

Engagement (ROE)................6-11

Treatment of Civilians.............. 6-12Fiscal Responsibility................ 6-13Intelligence Oversight.............. 6-14

LEGAL TNG REQUIREMENTS 6-14

LEGAL EQUIP REQUIREMENTS…. 6-15

SUMMARY....................................... 6-15

FM 27-100

6-2

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The last chapter described legalsupport to operations in war. Thischapter describes legal support tomilitary operations other than war(MOOTW) outside the United States.The next chapter describes militaryoperations within the United States.

MOOTW are “[o]perations thatencompass the use of militarycapabilities across the range of militaryoperations short of war. These militaryactions can be applied to complementany combination of the other instrumentsof national power and occur before,during, and after war.”186

Although MOOTW and war mayoften seem similar in action, MOOTWfocus on deterring war and promotingpeace while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations toachieve national objectives or to protectnational interests. MOOTW are moresensitive to political considerations andoften the military may not be the primaryplayer. More restrictive ROE and ahierarchy of national objectives arefollowed. MOOTW are initiated by theNational Command Authorities and areusually, but not always, conductedoutside of the United States.187

There are many types of MOOTW,several having multiple components:arms control, combating terrorism,support to counter-drug operations,enforcement of sanctions and exclusionzones, ensuring freedom of navigationand overflight, humanitarian assistance,nation assistance, noncombatantevacuation operations, peace operations,protection of shipping, recovery

operations, show of force operations,strikes and raids, support to insurgency,and operating under armisticeconditions.188

MOOTW present significant legalchallenges to judge advocates. First,they must understand and relate thenational and international political andlegal frameworks affecting the specificoperation. These frameworks affectcommand authority, ROE, and thesuccess of operations more than they doin war. Second, they must frequentlyadvise commanders concerning therelationships between internationalforces, joint forces, non-governmentalagencies, private voluntaryorganizations, and U.S. governmentalagencies. Third, they must forgeconsensus among joint, international,government, and private organizationson legal issues, thereby promoting unityof effort and mission legitimacy. Fourth,they must identify and resolve technicallegal issues in specialized, fluid, anduncertain operational situations.

To assist judge advocates whosupport MOOTW, this chapter willdescribe the strategic and theaterconcepts common to MOOTW, theArmy’s role in MOOTW, uniqueconsiderations for organizing legalsupport for MOOTW, prominent legalissues affecting command and control,sustainment, and support operations inMOOTW, and legal training andequipment requirements. Judgeadvocates should also read current jointand army doctrinal publications onMOOTW.189


6-3

6.2 STRATEGIC CONCEPT

United States security strategy callsfor U.S. leadership abroad – “we mustlead abroad if we are to be secure athome . . .”190 As a result, the U.S. “mustbe prepared and willing to use allappropriate instruments of nationalpower to influence the actions of otherstates and non-state actors.”191 Thisleadership requires engagement withU.S. political, economic, and militarypower to shape the internationalenvironment and to promotedemocracy.192

U.S. engagement will bemultinational and multidisciplinary.“Durable relationships with allies andfriendly nations are vital to our security.A central thrust of our strategy is tostrengthen and adapt the securityrelationships we have with key nationsaround the world and create newrelationships and structures whennecessary.”193 The United States will usean integrated approach to address threats,including superior military forces, astrong diplomatic corps, and foreignassistance program.194 Frequently,military operations will be in asupportive role or will support a leadagency.195

“[O]ur national military objectivesare to Promote Peace and Stability and,when necessary, to DefeatAdversaries.”196 The first of theserequires MOOTW.

Components of these objectivesinclude peacetime engagement anddeterrence,197 and may involve any of avariety of military activities. Militaryactivities such as international exercises,

Partnership for Peace, foreign militarysales, and military-to-military contactspromote stability, build coalitions,enhance interoperability, and promotedemocracy.198 Counterdrug andcounterterrorism operations protectAmericans and other nationals, and fightdrug and terrorist organizations throughinternational cooperation, intelligenceand technical support, and nationassistance.199 Peacekeeping operationssupport peace agreements and facilitatelong term settlements throughdeployment of military units to monitorand perform other assigned tasks.200

Arms control prevents conflict andreduces threat through treaty verification,weapons security, and weapons seizure,dismantling, or destruction.201

Noncombatant evacuation operationsprotect American citizens abroad andother selected persons by extractingthem from a dangerous location to a safehaven.202 Sanctions enforcement of U.S.policy decisions and UN SecurityCouncil resolutions includes militaryoperations to interdict movement,prohibit activities in a specific area, orensure freedom of navigation.203 PeaceEnforcement operations apply militaryforce to maintain or restore internationalpeace and security.204 Military activitiesalso support diplomatic activities such aspeacemaking, peace building, andpreventive diplomacy.205

6.3 THEATER CONCEPT

There are several unique aspectsof the MOOTW theater: the primacy ofpolitical objectives, legal complexity,mission complexity, command andcontrol, and interagency coordination.

FM 27-100

6-4

6.3.1 Political Objectives

“Political objectives drive MOOTWat every level from strategic totactical.”206 Political directives willauthorize and prescribe militaryoperations.207 Political organizationsfrequently take the lead role.208 Politicalconsiderations affect how the militaryconducts operations.209 Politicalimplications may affect the success ofthe military operation, or require changesin the operation.210 “Having anunderstanding of the political objectivehelps avoid actions which may haveadverse political effects. It is notuncommon in some MOOTW, forexample peacekeeping, for junior leadersto make decisions which have significantpolitical implications.”211

6.3.2 Legal Complexity

MOOTW theaters are legallycomplex for three reasons. First, unitsconducting MOOTW cannot rely solelyon traditional law of war rules regardingthe use of force, but must develop ROEthat accomplish the mission and protectthe force consistent with internationallaw and political directives.212 Second,MOOTW frequently involve national,multinational, and international legalauthority.213 Reconciling the legalconcerns of each nation, or concernsbetween the U.S. and an internationalorganization, is a challenging task.214

Third, the legal issues arising duringMOOTW may be specialized and widelyvaried. Commanders will require legaladvice in international law, host nationlaw, fiscal law, security assistance,command authority, and other issues.215

6.3.3 Mission Complexity

MOOTW missions occursimultaneously and sequentially, andinvolve extensive contact with civilians.“Noncombat MOOTW may beconducted simultaneously with combatMOOTW, such as HA [humanitarianassistance] in conjunction with PEO[peace enforcement operations]. It isalso possible for part of a theater to be ina wartime state while MOOTW is beingconducted elsewhere within the sametheater.”216 Commanders must plan totransition from war to MOOTW, or fromMOOTW to combat.217 The mission inHaiti transitioned from sanctionsenforcement to peacekeeping, andincluded plans for simultaneousnoncombatant evacuation and eitherforced or semi-permissive entry intoHaiti.218

MOOTW missions are complex alsobecause of their impact on civilians.Commanders must be prepared to collecthuman intelligence concerning political,cultural, and economic factors affectingthe operation,219 to conduct publicaffairs, civil affairs, and psychologicaloperations,220 to provide humanitarianassistance,221 to develop ROE thatprotect the force without causing civiliancasualties,222 to process civiliandetainees,223 to process requests fortemporary refuge or asylum,224 and toperform other tasks as the missionrequires.

6.3.4 Command and Control

In MOOTW, Theater C2 mustaccount for multinational forces andmyriad other organizations. NationalCommand Authorities (NCA) and Joint


6-5

Command and Control (C2) over theU.S. military remain generally the sameas in war.225 The President will never“relinquish . . . command authority . . .but . . . may . . . place U.S. forces underthe temporary operational control of acompetent . . . commander.”226

Multinational forces may employseveral C2 options: the lead nationoption, in which one nation providesmost of the forces and exercisesoperational control of the multinationalforce; the parallel option, in which amandating organization selects acommander, each nation contributesproportionally to the staff, and eachnation provides the commander somedegree of operational control; and theregional alliance option, in which anexisting multinational headquartersexercises C2.227 The United NationsMission in Haiti is an example of theparallel option.228 Operation JointEndeavor in Bosnia is an example of theregional alliance option.229

6.3.5 Interagency Coordination

Coordination with U.S. agencies,nongovernmental organizations, andprivate voluntary organizations isessential to understand the situation andsociety involved, 230 and to ensure unityof effort.231 “For MOOTW outside theUnited States, the lead agency willnormally be the Department of State(DOS) and the U.S. Ambassador willcoordinate U.S. activities through anestablished Country Team withrepresentation from all U.S. departmentsand agencies in that country, includingDOD.”232 A Civil-Military OperationsCenter (CMOC) can provide effectivecoordination with nongovernmental and

private voluntary organizations.233 Fortynongovernmental and private voluntaryorganizations were in Haiti;234 four-hundred were in Bosnia.235 Becausethere are so many agencies andorganizations, each with its uniqueauthority and capabilities, judgeadvocates should consult the referencesin footnote 189 of this chapter for morespecific information.

6.4 THE ARMY'S ROLE INMOOTW

The Army’s role in MOOTW outsidethe United States is to perform specificDoD missions, normally as part of ajoint force, normally under the lead ofDoS, and in coordination with U.S.government, nongovernmental, andprivate voluntary organizations.236 Thesemissions involve myriad legal concerns,the most important of which areaddressed later in this chapter.

The doctrine on the types ofMOOTW, and the interrelationshipsbetween them is developing. Thissection will describe common ArmyMOOTW missions outside the UnitedStates: arms control, combatingterrorism, counter-drug operations,sanctions enforcement, humanitarianassistance, nation assistance,noncombatant evacuation operations,peace operations, recovery operations,show of force, strikes and raids, supportto insurgencies, and operations underarmistice conditions. Because doctrineis developing, judge advocates shouldconsult the current doctrine whenplanning or conducting an operation.

FM 27-100

6-6

6.4.1 Arms Control

Arms control is a plan, based uponinternational agreement, that governs thenumbers, types, or characteristics ofweapon systems, or the strength,organization, equipment or employmentof armed forces.237 Potential armymissions include verifying treatyprovisions, seizing weapons of massdestruction, escorting weapon deliveries,or disposing of weapons.238 The armymay also participate in confidencebuilding measures, includinginspections, base visits, and equipmentdemonstrations.239

6.4.2 Combating Terrorism

Combating terrorism includesantiterrorism and counterterrorism.240

Antiterrorism involves “defensivemeasures used to reduce thevulnerability of individual and propertyto terrorist acts, to include limitedresponse and containment by localmilitary forces.”241 Antiterrorismprograms are comprehensive; theyinclude threat analysis, vulnerabilityassessments, information security,operations security, personnel security,physical security, crisis managementplanning, tactical measures to contain orresolve incidents, training, and publicaffairs.242 “A well-planned, systematic,all-source intelligence andcounterintelligence program isessential.”243 Counterterrorism is aspecial operations mission that involves“offensive measures taken to prevent,deter, and respond to terrorism.”244

Response measures “include preemptive,retaliatory, and rescue operations.”245

6.4.3 Counter-Drug Operations

While counter-drug operationsprimarily support U.S. law enforcementagencies,246 they also support the nationaldrug control strategy goal of breakingforeign sources of supply.247 Counter-drug support to foreign nations isprovided through security assistanceprograms and civil-military operations.248

Security assistance programs provideequipment needed to meet the drugthreat, services related to the equipment,and training in drug enforcement whengranted exceptions to restrictions onpolice training.249 Civil-military counter-drug operations in foreign countriesinclude providing information about thehost nation drug culture, cooperativeprograms to reduce drug trafficking,providing collateral intelligence to hostnation authorities, and assisting hostnation information programs.250

6.4.4 Enforcement of Sanctions andExclusion Zones

Sanctions and exclusion zoneenforcement are coercive measures toenforce decisions of competent nationalor international authorities.251 Themilitary objectives are to establishbarriers to the flow of goods, or toprohibit certain activities in specificgeographic areas.252 OperationsSUPPORT DEMOCRACY off Haiti in1993, SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq in1992, and DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia in1993 are examples of sanctions andexclusion zone enforcement.253

6.4.5 Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian Assistance operations“relieve or reduce the results of natural


6-7

or manmade disasters or other endemicconditions such as human pain, disease,hunger, or privation in countries orregions outside the United States.”254

Military support is intended tosupplement other agencies, and mayinclude command and control,operational planning, intelligence,logistics, or security.255

6.4.6 Nation Assistance

“Nation assistance is civil or militaryassistance (other than HA [humanitarianassistance]) rendered to a nation by U.S.forces within that nation’s territoryduring peacetime, crises or emergencies,or war, based on agreements mutuallyconcluded between the United States andthat nation.”256 Nation assistanceincludes security assistance, foreigninternal defense, and humanitarian andcivic assistance programs providedunder Title 10 U.S. Code Section 401.257

Security assistance provides defensearticles, training, and services under theForeign Military Sales Program, ForeignMilitary Financing Program,International Military Education andTraining Program, Economic SupportFund, and Arms Export Control Actsales.258 Foreign Internal Defense is aSpecial Operations mission that enablesforeign nations to fight subversion andinsurgency.259 These missions includesupport to security assistance, joint andcombined exercises, exchange programs,civil-military operations, sharingintelligence and logistical support, andcombat operations when approved byNational Command Authorities.260

Humanitarian and civic assistanceprograms are “provided in conjunctionwith military operations and exercises,and must fulfill unit training

requirements that incidentally createhumanitarian benefit to the localpopulace.”261 This assistance may takethe form of medical, dental, andveterinary care, and rudimentaryconstruction.262

6.4.7 Noncombatant EvacuationOperations

Noncombatant evacuation operationsevacuate U.S. citizens and selected non-U.S. persons from a foreign country.263

These operations normally include “swiftinsertions of a force, temporaryoccupation of an objective, and aplanned withdrawal upon completion ofthe mission.”264 Depending upon thespecific mission and situation, theseoperations may require medical anddental support, combat search andrescue, mortuary affairs, public affairs,psychological operations, and commandand control warfare.265 Evacueeprocessing may occur in country or in asafe haven,266 and may involve searchingand segregating personnel, inspecting forrestricted items, providing logistical,medical, and chaplain support, andrequests for asylum or temporaryrefuge.267

6.4.8 Peace Operations

Peace operations “support diplomaticefforts to reach a long-term politicalsettlement and [are] categorized aspeacekeeping operations . . . and peaceenforcement operations.”268 Militaryoperations such as preventivedeployment, military-to-militarycontacts, or other MOOTW may alsosupport preventive diplomacy,peacemaking, or peace building.269

FM 27-100

6-8

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) are“military operations undertaken with theconsent of all major parties to a dispute,designed to monitor and facilitateimplementation of an agreement . . . andsupport diplomatic efforts to reach along-term solution.”270 PKO tasks arespecific to the mission and may includeobserving and monitoring compliance,investigating alleged violations,negotiating and mediating with theparties, supervising cease-fires or otheraspects of the agreement, and assistingcivil authorities.271 PKO planningconsiderations include, but are notlimited to, compliance with theinternational mandate, terms of reference(TOR), and Status of Forces Agreement(SOFA); coordination withnongovernmental organizations andprivate voluntary organizations;coordinating the sources and fundingresponsibilities for logistical support;methods for collecting information;developing rules of engagementrestrictive enough to comply with themandate and robust enough to protectthe force; procedures for addressingforeign claims; and procedures forhandling dislocated civilians.272

Peace Enforcement Operations(PEO) “are the application of militaryforce or the threat of its use, normallypursuant to international authorization,to compel compliance with resolutionsor sanctions designed to maintain orrestore peace and order.”273 PEO tasksare also mission specific and mayinclude “enforcement of sanctions andexclusion zones, protection of HA,operations to restore order, and forcibleseparation of . . . parties” and conductinginternment or resettlement operations.274

PEO planning considerations are similar

to PKO, but also include more emphasison intelligence collection, fire support,mobility and survivability; and ROE thatenable the use of force to compelcompliance while minimizing collateraldamage.275

6.4.9 Recovery Operations

“Recovery operations are conductedto search for, locate, identify, rescue, andreturn personnel or human remains,sensitive equipment, or items critical tonational security.”276 They may occur ineither friendly or denied areas.277

6.4.10 Show of Force Operations

Show of force operationsdemonstrate U.S. resolve throughincreased visibility of military forces toinfluence respect for U.S. interests ordefuse a situation.278 These operationsmay include formation of a joint taskforce, repositioning of forces, patrolling,or conducting exercises.279

6.4.11 Strikes and Raids

“Strikes are offensive operationsconducted to inflict damage on, seize, ordestroy an objective for politicalpurposes. . . . An example of a strike isOperation URGENT FURY, conductedon the island of Grenada in 1983.”280 “Araid is usually a small-scale operationinvolving swift penetration of hostileterritory to secure information, confusethe enemy, or destroy installations. . . .An example of a raid is Operation ELDORADO CANYON conducted againstLibya in 1986, in response to the terroristbombing of U.S. Service members inBerlin.”281


6-9

6.4.12 Support to Insurgencies

Support to Insurgencies includesU.S. logistic and training support, butnormally not combat operations, for anorganized movement to overthrow aconstituted government.282 An examplewas U.S. support to the Mujahadinresistance in Afghanistan during theSoviet invasion.283

6.4.13 Operations Under ArmisticeConditions

An armistice suspends militaryoperations by mutual agreement betweenthe belligerent parties. If its duration isnot defined, the belligerent parties mayresume operations at any time, providedalways that the enemy is warned withinthe time agreed upon, in accordance withthe terms of the armistice.284 Forexample, the Korean ArmisticeAgreement signed on 27 July 1953,shapes the conduct of military operationson the Korean peninsula and there arespecific Armistice Rules of Engagementfor the Korean theater. Consequently,judge advocates stationed in theRepublic of Korea must be familiar withthe Korean Armistice Agreement andother sources of international lawdealing with armistice agreements.

6.5 ORGANIZATION OF LEGALSUPPORT

The legal support organizationfor MOOTW is generally as described inChapter 2. Nevertheless, because eachMOOTW is unique, SJAs must tailorlegal support, and must coordinatetechnical legal supervision, technicalsupport, and augmentation requirementsfor the specific situation and mission.

When tailoring legal support forMOOTW, SJAs should considermission-specific requirements for legalduties and skills. MOOTW requirejudge advocates to perform additionalmission-specific duties.285 Duringoperations in Haiti, for example, legalpersonnel supported refugee operationsin Panama and Cuba, the JointInterrogation Facility, the Joint LogisticsSupport Command, and the UnitedNations Mission in Haiti headquarters.286

In Bosnia, judge advocates supportedeach Battalion Task Force, a level ofcommand lower than normal, and servedas advisors to Joint MilitaryCommissions.287 During bothoperations, split-based operationsgenerated requirements for additionallegal resources.288

6.6 LEGAL ASPECTS OF C2,SUSTAINMENT, AND

SUPPORT OPERATIONS

While SJAs must always providesupport in OPLAW and the core legaldisciplines described in Chapter 3, SJAsshould pay special attention to thefollowing prominent legal concernsarising in MOOTW outside the UnitedStates. Although this section outlinesonly the principal concerns, the potentialMOOTW missions, situations, andcorresponding legal issues are myriad.Therefore, legal personnel shouldconsult the Operational LawHandbook289 and other legal sources fordetailed information about the legalaspects of various types of MOOTW.

FM 27-100

6-10

6.6.1 Legal Basis for the Operation

The legal basis for an operationderives from international and domesticlaw, and the decisions of competentauthority.290 It may be expressed in U.N.Security Council Resolutions, regionalsecurity organization resolutions,international agreements, U.S. NationalCommand Authorities decisions, orders,mandates, terms of reference, or otherforms. While U.S. National CommandAuthorities consider international anddomestic legal authority when orderingmilitary operations, judge advocatesadvising military commanders mustknow the legal basis for the operation fortwo important reasons.

First, a clear understanding of thelegal basis promotes the legitimacy ofthe operation. “A clear, well-conceived,effective, and timely articulation of thelegal basis for a particular mission willbe essential to sustaining support athome and gaining acceptance abroad.”291

Therefore, OPLAW JAs mustunderstand the legal basis and briefcommanders, enabling them “to betterplan their missions, structure publicstatements, and conform their conduct tonational policy.”292 Commanders'statements and conduct contribute tolegitimacy by demonstrating adherenceto law and authority.293 Commandersand judge advocates must also educatethe soldiers about the operation’spurpose and legal basis. Informing thesoldiers will help their morale andimprove their ability to communicateand cooperate with local civilians, othernations’ forces, and nongovernmentalorganizations.

Second, the legal basis of theoperation guides the commander inmany ways. It may affect the operation’spurpose,294 scope,295 timing,296 andROE;297 the status of personnel;298 thecommand’s relationships with militaryand non-military organizations;299 andthe applicable funding authorities.300

Therefore, OPLAW JAs must obtain andstudy all relevant internationalorganization resolutions andinternational agreements, the mandate,the terms of reference, and highercommand orders. Furthermore, OPLAWJAs must be diligent throughout theplanning and conduct of the operation toincorporate legal guidance from thesedocuments into the relevant portions ofall operations plans and orders.

6.6.2 Status of Forces

The status of forces is of criticalconcern to commanders duringMOOTW overseas.301 Because thejurisdictional default to the Law of theFlag does not normally apply inMOOTW, numerous legal issuesaffecting the success of the operationmust be resolved, including host nationcriminal and civil jurisdiction, authorityto conduct law enforcement activitiesincluding trials by courts-martial, claimsagainst the U.S. or U.S. personnel,authority for U.S. forces to carry armsand use force, force protection, entry andexit requirements, customs and taxliability, contracting authority, authorityto provide health care without a localmedical license, vehicle registration andlicensing, communications support,facilities for U.S. forces, hiring of localpersonnel, authority to detain or arrest,and provisions for transferringcustody.302 These issues can become


6-11

significant issues for the SJA and theentire command.303

SJAs and OPLAW JAs must identifyand resolve status of forces issuesbeginning early in the planning processand continuing throughout the operation.There are several strategies available toresolve status concerns. First, look toexisting agreements, which should beavailable at the Unified Command,Component Command, or Internationaland Operational Law Division,OTJAG.304 Second, consider the needfor additional agreements and inform theproper authority under Army Regulation550-51 of any requirements.305

Agreements can be negotiated during orafter operations.306 Third, considerwhether conventions on the status ofUnited Nations personnel apply and areadequate.307 Fourth, consider whether anagreement is unnecessary because theLaw of the Flag applies or there is ajurisdictional vacuum.308 Finally, wherecompliance with host nation law isrequired, inform the command of theserequirements and consider measures tomitigate the impact on the operation.

6.6.3 International & InteragencyRelationships

Information describing the basicrelationships existing between militaryorganizations, and with non-militaryagencies and organizations is providedearlier in this chapter, and in referencescited in footnote 5. Commanders willencounter three general concernsinvolving international and interagencyrelationships that require judge advocatesupport: questions concerning commandauthority,309 requirements for legal

liaison and coordination,310 andconflicting legal concerns.311

SJAs and OPLAW JAs must performseveral important tasks relating to theseconcerns. They must advisecommanders about their legal authorityin relation to other commands, agencies,and organizations. They must coordinatelegal advice and actions with all relevantcommands, agencies, andorganizations.312 They must performliaison as directed by the commander,which may include liaison with theInternational Committee of the RedCross and legal officers in other troopcontributing nations, participating in theCivil-Military Operations Center, andgiving briefings for the Joint MilitaryCommission.313 Finally, they must takethe initiative to find innovative solutionsto conflicting legal concerns.314

6.6.4 Use of Force & Rules ofEngagement (ROE)

The general principles and judgeadvocate tasks relating to theinterpretation, drafting, dissemination,and training of ROE discussed inChapter 8 and the Operational LawHandbook apply in MOOTW.315 Thegeneral purposes of ROE—toaccomplish the mission and protect theforce—also remain valid.316 U.S. forceswill always retain the inherent right ofself-defense.317 The Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) StandingROE (SROE) will generally, but notalways, apply in MOOTW.318

Nevertheless, there are severalunique ROE concerns in MOOTW.“ROE in MOOTW are generally morerestrictive, detailed, and sensitive to

FM 27-100

6-12

political concerns than in war . . .”319

Restrained, judicious use of force isnecessary; excessive force underminesthe legitimacy of the operation andjeopardizes political objectives.320

MOOTW ROE considerations mayinclude balancing force protection andharm to innocent civilians or non-military areas,321 balancing missionaccomplishment with politicalconsiderations,322 protecting evacuees“while not having the authority topreempt hostile actions by proactivemilitary measures,”323 enabling soldiersto properly balance initiative andrestraint,324 determining the extent towhich soldiers may protect host nationor third nation civilians,325 and the use ofriot control agents.326 In multinationaloperations, developing ROE acceptableto all troop contributing nations isimportant.327 Being responsive tochanging ROE requirements is alsoimportant.328

SJAs and OPLAW JAs will be muchmore involved in ROE interpretation,drafting, dissemination, and trainingduring MOOTW.329 Interpretation mustconsider not only the SROE or otherapplicable higher headquarters ROE, butalso the legal authority for the operation,mandate, and specific politicalobjectives.330 Drafting must addressconsiderations such as those discussed inthe previous paragraph, and account forthe specific concerns of each troopcontributing nation.331 Disseminationmust be prompt and responsivethroughout all levels of command, fromthe appropriate political authority to theindividual soldier.332 Training shouldinclude vignettes, in which soldiers role-play expected situations and train torespond in accordance with the ROE.333

6.6.5 Treatment of Civilians

SJAs and OPLAW JAs facesignificant challenges regarding thecommander’s legal obligations towardcivilians: determining an individual’sstatus, identifying the specific legal rulesthat apply, and applying legal rules in awide variety of operational situations.Generally, while the law of war will notnormally govern MOOTW, DoD Dir.5100.77 and Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01require U.S. forces always to apply theprinciples of the law of war in MOOTWas a matter of policy.334 Beyond this,however, the issues become complex.

The legal complexity relates to thethree challenges identified above. Thestatus of civilians encountered mayinclude U.S. civilians, host nationcivilians, third country civilians,diplomats, media, criminals, host nationcivilian officials, armed civilian groups,international organization employees,non-governmental and private voluntaryorganization personnel, refugees,contractors on the battlefield, and otherpersonnel.335 The applicable law willalways include the principles of the Lawof War, and may also include thecustomary international law of humanrights, the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, human rights treaties,provisions of Protocols I & II, or hostnation law.336 The operational situationsmay include maintaining public order,337

applying military force,338 providinghumanitarian assistance,339 processingevacuees,340 media relations,341 handlingrefugees or requests for asylum,342

enforcing civilian compliance with


6-13

mandates,343 detentions,344 or othersituations.

SJAs and OPLAW JAs must performseveral important tasks relating to thetreatment of civilians. First, they mustbegin early in the planning process toidentify the situations in which civilianswill be encountered and the applicablelaw.345 Second, as noted in the previoussection, they must include guidancerelating to the treatment of civilians inthe ROE. Third, the SJA mustcoordinate with Civil Affairs personnelregarding the SJA’s role as the sole legaladvisor to the commander.346 Fourth,they must be immediately accessible forlegal advice as situations occur.347 Fifth,they must ensure that detention ofcivilians is lawful: that detention isbased upon proper authority; that theconditions are adequate; and thatprocedural safeguards are honored.348

6.6.6 Fiscal Responsibility

U.S. fiscal law applies to U.S. forceseven when they are part of amultinational force or support U.N.,NATO, or other allied or coalitionoperations. Congressional controls existto ensure prudent use of publicresources, and to promote foreign policyobjectives.349 For an overview of fiscallaw issues and funding sources, SJAsand OPLAW JAs should consult theOperational Law Handbook.350

Fiscal law issues will pervade theMOOTW theater.351 They will arise inall types of MOOTW.352 They will relateto a wide variety of activities, includingtraining, humanitarian and civicassistance, construction, medical care,transportation, maintenance, LOGCAP,

post exchange privileges, morale andwelfare programs, and other activities.353

Requests for support may come from thehost nation, U.S. agencies, allies andcoalition partners, local civilians, non-government and private voluntaryorganizations, international militaryheadquarters, the Army itself, and othersources.354 SJAs and OPLAW JAs mustbe prepared to expend substantial timeand effort with fiscal issues.355

SJAs and OPLAW JAs shouldconsider the following procedures andstrategies when resolving fiscal issues.First, review all operational plans forcompliance with fiscal law.356 Second,as early as possible in the planningprocess, determine what logisticalsupport agreements exist or are required;many fiscal issues can be resolvedthrough effective use of supportagreements.357 Third, analyze fiscalissues using this six-step analysis:358

• Determine the commander’sintent.

• Define the mission and specifictask to be performed.

• Break down the mission intodiscrete parts.

• Find the funding authority andappropriation, considering bothU.S. funding sources and otherfunding sources.359

• Articulate the rationale for thespecific expenditures.

• Seek approval from higherheadquarters when necessary.

Fourth, recommend that the commanderestablish multidisciplinary logistics and

FM 27-100

6-14

acquisition boards; provide legal adviceto these boards.360 Fifth, considerinnovative solutions learned from recentexperiences.361

6.6.7 Intelligence Oversight

MOOTW require “multi-disciplined,all-source, fused intelligence;” humanintelligence may be the most usefulcomponent.362 Intelligence support iscritical to all types of MOOTW.363

Intelligence collection in MOOTWfocuses on “political, cultural, andeconomic factors that affect thesituation” rather than on an enemy’smilitary capability.364 As a result,intelligence collection andcounterintelligence operations involvesubstantial contact with non-governmentorganizations, private voluntaryorganizations, the local populace, andallied or coalition partners.365 Because ofsensitivities that exist when workingwith non-military organizations or inU.N. operations, it is frequentlyappropriate to use the term “informationgathering” rather than “intelligencecollection.”366

Many intelligence organizations haveorganic legal support; nevertheless, SJAsand OPLAW JAs must provideintelligence law advice to their ownorganizations in the development andoversight of operations.367 Therefore,SJAs and OPLAW JAs must be familiarwith the legal rules relating tointelligence operations,368 have thesecurity clearances required to accessrelevant information,369 and be preparedto resolve sensitive intelligence lawissues.370 Technical legal support fromSJA, U.S. Army Intelligence and

Security Command can assist SJAs andOPLAW JAs with these issues.

6.7 LEGAL TRAININGREQUIREMENTS

The general training principles andprocedures in Field Manual 25-100,Field Manual 25-101, and chapter 4 ofthis manual apply to MOOTWtraining.371 In particular, SJAs mustalways ensure all legal personnel areproficient in individual skills such asland navigation, handling classifiedmaterial, first aid, weapons qualification,etc.,372 and that legal organizations areproficient in collective tasks relating toOPLAW and the core legal disciplines.Training for MOOTW, like training forwar, requires legal personnel to receiveand provide individual and collectivetraining, and to train with the units theysupport.373

Nevertheless, MOOTW requiremission-specific skills. First, judgeadvocates must have political-militaryskills.374 In Bosnia, the legal advisor tothe Joint Military Commission advisedthe commander on the application of theDayton Accords and draftedcorrespondence to the military andpolitical factions.375 Other judgeadvocates coordinated multinationalROE, provided advice concerningpersons indicted for war crimes, andcommunicate with government and non-government organizations.376 Second,deployed legal organizations must havehost nation expertise - an understandingof the local law, and the ability tocommunicate in the local language.377

Third, deployed legal personnel mayrequire specialized expertise. SpecialOperations units, which conduct many


6-15

MOOTW missions, require legaladvisors who know special operationsmissions, structure, doctrine, andtactics.378 In Haiti, experts in civilianlegal and judicial functions wererequired to assist the newly restoredAristide government.379

SJAs should emphasize thefollowing aspects of MOOTWindividual training: situational trainingexercises involving ROE, individualreadiness training for the specificoperation, and interagency andinternational cooperation.380 Training ininteragency and internationalcooperation should improve culturalawareness, understanding of the roles ofvarious organizations, and consensus-building skills.381

SJAs should become heavilyinvolved in MOOTW mission rehearsalexercises (MRE). First, SJAs mustbecome involved early in MRE planningto ensure the legal aspects of the specificmission are integrated into the missionrehearsal exercise scenario. Second,SJAs should ensure the scenarioaddresses training needs of twoaudiences: the command and staff at allechelons, and their legal personnel.Third, SJAs should ensure thatdeploying legal personnel participate inthe exercise with their supported units.382

Fourth, SJAs should ensure thatexperienced and well-trained legalpersonnel act as observer-controllers.SJAs of superior commands mustprovide or coordinate the technicalsupport required to ensure the success ofthe MRE.

6.8 LEGAL EQUIPMENTREQUIREMENTS

The facilities and equipmentgenerally required to provide legalsupport described in Chapter 2 aresufficient for legal support to MOOTW.Recent experience in MOOTW confirmsthe requirements for the RDL, Internetaccess, electronic legal researchcapabilities, connectivity with tacticalcommand, control, and communicationsystems, secure communication andstorage capabilities, and dedicatedvehicles.383 SJAs and OPLAW JAs mustensure that RDLs are pre-loaded with thesoftware packages and research materialsrequired for the operation, that battleboxes are adequately supplied, and thatother military equipment and officesupplies are on hand, and ready foruse.384

6.9 SUMMARY

MOOTW present significantchallenges to judge advocates. Theymust master the complex political andlegal frameworks common to MOOTW,provide competent advice concerning theroles of various organizations involvedin an operation, forge consensus amongnumerous military and non-militaryorganizations, and resolve technical legalissues. Thorough understanding of thestrategic and theater concepts, diligentparticipation in the planning and conductof MOOTW, and mastery of theprominent legal issues are essential toaccomplishment of the military missionand political objectives.


7-1

7 THE UNITED STATES AS A THEATER_____________________________________________________________________________

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Although a theater of operations, asdiscussed in Chapter 4, is technicallydefined as an area "outside thecontinental United States," emergenciesor other circumstances may arise inwhich a senior commander must providesupport within the United States. Thatis, he must determine when, where, andfor what purpose tactical forces,equipment, or other support will becommitted in support of strategic aims.Judge advocates supporting operationstaking place in the U.S. practiceOPLAW and provide legal support tothese operations much the same as judgeadvocates deployed overseas do forforeign operations. Statutes, numerousDepartment of Defense Directives, andother materials define the parameters ofmilitary support to domestic operations.Judge advocates that provide legalsupport to these operations must have adetailed understanding of the variousprograms, and their underlying legalauthorities, that make up the domesticsupport arena. This chapter applies tooperations in the U.S., including Alaska,Hawaii, Puerto Rico and other U.S.territories and possessions.

Generally, domestic operations fallinto three categories: military support tocivil authorities (e.g., disaster relief);military support to law enforcement(e.g., civil disturbances, counterdrugoperations); and military support toterrorism response (to include thoseinvolving weapons of mass destruction)(described later in this chapter asEmerging Threats in the ContinentalU.S.). This chapter will address each ofthese categories with a view toward thespecialized nature of training and

preparation legal personnel require forthese operations.

Commanders and their judgeadvocates must understand that the DoDplays a support role in domesticoperations. DoD acts in support ofanother federal, state, or localgovernment or agency, known as thelead agency. Judge advocates mustprepare to work closely with allappropriate organizations and agenciesto help the commander stay within therestrictive boundaries of law and policycharacteristic of military support in theUnited States.

CONTENTS PAGE

INTRODUCTION.............................. 7-1ORGANIZING AND EQUIPPINGJUDGE ADVOCATES...................... 7-2TRAINING JUDGE ADVOCATES.... 7-2MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVILAUTHORITIES................................. 7-3

General...................................... 7-3Authorization for Military

Support.................................7-3

Lead Agency and Military Role 7-4Rules on the Use of Force........ 7-5

MILITARY SUPPORT TO LAWENFORCEMENT.............................. 7-6

CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPS....... 7-6General...................................... 7-6Authorization for Military

Support.................................. 7-7Lead Agency and the Role of

the Military............................. 7-7Rules on the Use of Force........ 7-8COUNTER-DRUG OPS.............. 7-9General...................................... 7-9Authorization for Military

Support.................................. 7-10Lead Agency and the Role of

the Military............................. 7-11Rules on the Use of Force........ 7-11

TERRORISM.................................... 7-12

FM 27-100

7-2

7.2 ORGANIZING ANDEQUIPPING JUDGE

ADVOCATES

For an SJA, organizing andequipping judge advocates to deliverlegal support to domestic operations isno different than it is for war oroperations other than war. Based on theMETT-TC model (the variance beingthat the enemy could be an actualdisaster, potential threats to forceprotection in a civil disturbance, orterrorists), the SJA will task organize hislegal support to support the commandand troops in the operation. The SJAshould develop formal or informaltraining associations with Legal SupportOrganizations, Reserve SupportCommands, or the Army National Guardto obtain the benefit of the experiencedreserve component support embeddedtherein. The National Guard (non-federalized in a Title 32 status) willlikely play a significant role in alldomestic operations; therefore, SJAsinvolved in domestic support operationsshould develop such trainingassociations with National Guard judgeadvocates. SJAs can expect small taskforce-sized units that are logisticallyheavy in terms of troops and mission.Despite the potentially small size of

units that may be called upon to provideassistance, any domestic operation willbe legally intensive. While operationscovered in other chapters in thepublication focus mostly on judgeadvocate support to brigades and largerorganizations, judge advocates shouldexpect to support battalion-sized andsmaller units in domestic operations.

7.3 TRAINING JUDGEADVOCATES

Most judge advocates have littleexperience or training in domesticoperations. This, coupled with thelegally intensive nature of militarysupport to domestic operations, is thereason that this chapter focuses ontraining. TJAGSA’s Operational LawHandbook and CLAMO are two trainingresources for domestic operations. Thegeneral training principles describedpreviously in chapters 4 and 5 remain thesame. Lessons learned from pastoperations indicate a need for judgeadvocates to plan, develop legalexpertise, and train for the use of themilitary to respond to domestic events—disasters, civil disturbances, and terroristthreats. That added need is the focus ofthis chapter.


7-3

7.4 MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES.

This is merely a snapshot of the law on military support to civilianauthorities. As is true across all legal disciplines, judge advocates musthave access to and stay current in all law relevant to operations.Normally, specific legal references are not included in doctrinalpublications. The special nature of domestic operations, however, makestheir inclusion prudent.

7.4.1 General

The Department of Defense (DoD)will cooperate with and provide militaryassistance to civil authorities as directedby and consistent with applicable lawand policy. DoD has specified that theSecretary of the Army is the approvalauthority for emergency military supportin response to natural or man-madedisasters. Any military support thatrequires Combatant Command-assignedpersonnel or equipment will beapproved by the Secretary of Defense,after review by the Chairman, JointChiefs of Staff (CJCS). The rulesconcerning military support to civilianauthorities do not address non-federalized National Guard assets asapproved by the state’s Governor insupport of State and local civilianagencies.

7.4.2 Authorization for MilitarySupport

While state governments haveprimary responsibility for responding todisasters, federal law provides severalmeans by which federal resources canassist State governments in responding.The President can authorize DoDsupport by:

• Using the Presidential 10-dayemergency authority under theStafford Act to perform work for thepreservation of life and property(e.g., removing debris/wreckage,restoring essential publicfacilities/services)

• By declaring a “major disaster” at therequest of a State Governor

• By declaring an “emergency” at therequest of a State Governor

• 18 U.S.C. 1385, Posse Comitatus Act.• 42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq., as amended (the Stafford Act).• 44 CFR Part 206, Federal Emergency Management Agency.• DoD Dir. 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, 15 Jan 1993.• DoD Dir. 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, 18 Feb 1997.• DoD Manual 3025.1M, Manual for Civil Emergencies, Jun 1994.• AR 500-51, Support to Civilian Law Enforcement, 1 Aug 1983.• FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, Jul 1993.• NGB 500-1/ANGI 10-8101, 1 Feb 1996.• Domestic Disaster Assistance Primer, 1993.

FM 27-100

7-4

• Be declaring an “emergency” wherethe federal government has exclusiveor preeminent responsibility andauthority (e.g., bombing of a federalbuilding)

Further, civil authorities—defined asnonmilitary Federal, State, or Localgovernment agencies—may askcommanders to take immediate steps tosave lives, prevent human suffering, ormitigate great property damage whenimminent serious conditions exist from acivil emergency or attack. When such acondition exists and time does notpermit prior approval through commandchannels, commanders are authorized(subject to existing supplementaldirection—subsequent notificationprocedures) to take the necessary actionto respond—this is called ImmediateResponse Authority. Conditions thatmay require such a response include therescue, evacuation, and emergencytreatment of casualties; emergencyrestoration of power; or fooddistribution.

7.4.3 Lead Agency Concept and Roleof Military

Once the National CommandAuthorities determine the need toprovide federal support, the FederalEmergency Management Agency(FEMA) takes the lead in domesticdisaster relief. The Federal ResponsePlan assigns primary or supportingagency responsibility for each of 12Emergency Support Functions (ESF)—transportation, communications,firefighting, public works andengineering (ESF 3), information andplanning, mass care, resource support,health and medical services, urban

search and rescue, hazardous materials,food, and energy. DoD is the supportingagency in all ESFs except for ESF 3(DoD is the designated lead agency forESF 3). FEMA can task organizevarious agencies—as the lead orsupporting agency—across the ESFs.For example, FEMA may task organizefor a particular disaster response makingthe DoD the lead agency for ESF 1(transportation).

DoD has no authority to providedisaster relief independent from FEMA(except for Commanders’ actions undertheir Immediate Response Authority, andfor military support concerning federalproperty). Also, FEMA is thereimbursement authority for disasterrelief expenditures. Providing militarysupport before FEMA requests thesupport may make subsequentreimbursement difficult and may resultin an unauthorized expenditure of DoDfunds. Commanders should consider allrelevant fiscal procedures in planningdomestic operations.

Commanders and their judgeadvocates must also consider legalrestrictions on the use of militarypersonnel for law enforcement purposesin all domestic operational planning andexecution. The Posse Comitatus Actprecludes military personnel, in supportof disaster relief, from acting in a lawenforcement capacity (e.g., securitypatrols or traffic control in civilianneighborhoods). Active Duty militarypersonnel may not execute civil lawseven when requested to do so by stressedlocal law enforcement officials. Theserestrictions do NOT apply to non-federalized National Guardsman. Judgeadvocates must develop a detailed


7-5

understanding of the limitations andexceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act.

7.4.4 Rules for Use of Force

The Chairman of the Joints Chief ofStaff Standing Rules of Engagement(SROE) do not apply to domesticdisaster relief operations. Commandersand their judge advocates must payparticular attention to any guidance onthe Rules for Use of Force (the term“ROE” is not used for domesticoperations) in the execute order or in anysubsequent orders or directives. Whilemost disaster relief operations will occurin a non-hostile environment, soldiersneed to know the applicable Rules forUse of Force. DoD Directive 5210.56,Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying ofFirearms by DoD Personnel Engaged inLaw Enforcement and Security Duties(25 February 1992), provides guidancepertaining to the authorized use ofdeadly force which may be applicable.A situation where soldiers might beconfronted with use of force situations

might include a civil disturbance (e.g.,looting) that occurs during disaster reliefoperations. Other state and localagencies, and perhaps non-federalizedNational Guardsman, are responsible forlaw enforcement functions—not federaltroops. Again, the Posse Comitatus Actdoes not apply to the non-federalizedNational Guard. Commanders must bemindful, however, of force protectionand the welfare of their soldiers. Propertraining will ensure soldiers understandthe rules on the use of force in domesticoperations.

Finally, commanders must abide byand consider specified laws and policyon intelligence restrictions, electionsupport restrictions, chaplain activities,payment of claims, debris removal,donated property, environmentalcompliance, support to relief workers,and the use of volunteers when planningand executing disaster relief and othertypes of military support operations inthe United States.

FM 27-100

7-6

7.5 MILITARY SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

Military support to law enforcement includes many categories of support. A complexgroup of laws governs this support. This section will address two of those categories:civil disturbance operations and counter-drug operations.

7.5.1 Civil Disturbance Operations

This is merely a snapshot of the law on military support to civilianauthorities. As is true in all legal disciplines, judge advocates must haveaccess to and stay current in all law relevant to operations.

7.5.1.1 General

The commitment of federal troops todeal with domestic civil disturbancesmust be viewed as a drastic measure oflast resort. Their role, therefore, shouldnever be greater than is absolutelynecessary under the circumstances.Commanders should take every measureto avoid the perception of an “invadingforce.” A joint task force designated torespond to a civil disturbance should

project the image of a restrained andwell-disciplined force whose solepurpose is to help the area by helpingrestore law and order with minimal harmto people and property and with duerespect for all law abiding citizens.

Just as they are primarily responsiblefor disaster relief, State and localgovernments are primarily responsiblefor protecting life and property andmaintaining law and order in the civilian

• 18 USC 1385. (Posse Comitatus Act).• 10 USC 331-334. (Civil Disturbance Statutes).• DoD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), 4 Feb

1994.• DoD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, 18 Feb 1997.• DoD Directive 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 21

Feb 1986, reissued incorporating Change 1, 20 Dec 1989.• DoD Civil Disturbance Plan ("Garden Plot"), Feb 1991.• AR 500-50, Civil Disturbances, 21 Apr 1972• AR 500-51, Support to Civilian Law Enforcement, 1 Aug 1983.• NGR 500-1/ANGI 10-8101, Military Support to Civil Authorities, 1 Feb 1996.• FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 Nov 1985.• FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, Jul 1993.• MCO 3000.8B, Employment of Marine Corps Resources in Civil Disturbances, 30 Jul

1979.• MCO 3440.7, Marine Corps Ass't to Civil Authorities, 1 Jan 92.


7-7

community. The President has,however, both Constitutional and federallegal authority to use federal armedforces to suppress insurrections anddomestic violence.

7.5.1.2 Authorization for MilitarySupport

Civil disturbances are group acts ofviolence and disorders prejudicial topublic law and order (e.g., the 1992 LosAngeles riots) in the 50 states, theDistrict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, andU.S. possessions and territories. TheU.S. military can support civilian lawenforcement agencies but such supportshall maintain the “primacy” of civilianauthority. While commanders and judgeadvocates must again understand thePosse Comitatus Act and consider itsrestrictions on military personnelperforming law enforcement functions inthe U.S., domestic law provides forexceptions to such use in some civildisturbance situations. These exceptionsallow the President to federalize themilitia of other states and use themilitary to suppress any insurrection,domestic violence, unlawfulcombination, or conspiracy under certaincircumstances. Other than thesespecified circumstances, the militarymay not be used to deal with civildisturbances except in certain emergencysituations. Immediate federal response,even under emergency circumstances, islimited to necessity and is not based onany underlying statutory authority.Those emergency circumstances include:

• When necessary to prevent loss oflife or wanton destruction ofproperty, or to restore governmentalfunctioning and public order. These

sudden and unexpected civildisturbances (including civildisturbances incident to earthquake,fire, flood, or other such calamityendangering life) occur if the localauthorities are unable to control thesituation and circumstances precludeobtaining prior authorization by thePresident.

• When State or local authorities areunable or decline to provide adequateprotection for Federal property orFederal governmental functions.

With today’s communicationcapabilities, commanders should makeevery effort to obtain prior approvalthrough the chain of command beforeresponding to either of these emergencysituations. If prior communication isimpossible, commanders should seekPresidential authorizations through thechain of command even while applyingemergency support.

7.5.1.3 Lead Agency Concept andRole of Military

The Department of Justice (DoJ) isthe lead federal agency for civildisturbance operations. The AttorneyGeneral’s on-scene representative isknown as the SCRAG (Senior CivilianRepresentative of the Attorney General).The DoD has designated the Departmentof the Army (DA) the DoD’s executiveagent for military assistance for civildisturbances (MACDIS). The Directorof Military Support (DOMS) is DA’saction agent for MACDIS. Aftercoordination with the Chairman, JointChiefs of Staff (CJCS), DOMS issuesguidance to the three combatantcommanders (USJFCOM, USPACOM,

FM 27-100

7-8

and USSOCOM) responsible forplanning and executing MACDIS (recallthat this is a support role). USJFCOMhas delegated authority to FORSCOM toconduct MACDIS in the USJFCOM areaof operations. This gives theFORSCOM Commander operationalcontrol over joint forces assigned to aMACDIS mission. As is the case for alldomestic operations, military forcesremain under military control at alltimes.

Army and Air National Guard forceshave primary responsibility for providingmilitary assistance to state and localgovernments. They will normally servein a state active duty status (Title 32status) under state command. In extremecircumstances, the President mayfederalize National Guard forces (Title10 status). During the 1992 Los Angelescivil disturbance, the Presidentnationalized the California NationalGuard.

7.5.1.4 Rules for Use of Force

MACDIS operations can involveNational Guard, Army, and Marines andwill require working with federal, state,and local law enforcement authorities.Like other joint or combined operations,MACDIS operations require consistentrules for use of force that all supportingservices understand and to the extentpossible, all services should trainrelevant forces on these rules.Commanders should use situationaltraining exercises to embed theprinciples of the use of force set forth inthe DoD Civil Disturbance Plan—Garden Plot. Subject to CINC or CJCSmodification, the Garden Plot rules for

use of force include several basicconcepts.

• Use minimum force at all times.• Warning shots are not permitted• Deadly force may be used in very

limited circumstances• Use of arming orders (as

situation escalates, arming orderstatus affects the posture ofsoldiers and Marines on theground)

• Use of Tactic, Techniques, andProcedures for MACDIS (e.g.,use of riot control formations,pressurized water, sniper-fire,shotguns, etc.).

In addition to guidance on Rules forthe Use of Force, Garden Plot containsmany helpful annexes for commandersand judge advocates when planning andexecuting civil disturbance operations.Again, SJAs must ensure that their judgeadvocates are trained and ready for theseoperations. Some of the topics coveredin Garden Plot are:

• Loaning military equipment tonon-DoD federal agencies

• Leasing military equipment tonon-federal agencies

• Authority of military to detain ortake civilians into custody

• Authority of military to searchpeople and property


7-9

7.5.2 Counter-Drug Operations

This is merely a snapshot of the law on military support to civilianauthorities. As is true in all legal disciplines, judge advocates must haveaccess to and stay current in all law relevant to operations.

7.5.2.1 General

DoD's primary counter-drugmission—in support of federal, state,local, and foreign civilian lawenforcement agencies (CLEAs)—is thedetection and monitoring of aerial andmaritime transit of illegal drugs into theUnited States. Detection is defined asdetermining the presence of aircraft orvessels by visual or electronic means.Monitoring is tracking or maintainingcontinuous knowledge of the location ofa suspected aircraft or vessel. DoDassets do not apprehend, physicallyinterrupt, or force down aircraft orvessels. DoD is the single lead agency

of the federal government for thisdetection and monitoring mission. Notethat this is both a domestic andinternational mission. Other federallegislation emphasizes the role of DoDin counter-drug operations. Inconsultation with the Director ofNational Drug Control Policy, theSecretary of Defense shall integrate aneffective communications network of thecommand, control, communications, andtechnical intelligence assets of the U.S.that are dedicated to the interdiction ofillegal drugs into the U.S. Otherlegislation requires SECDEF to devoteresearch and development activities to

• 18 USC 1385, Posse Comitatus Act.• 10 USC 371-382, Chapter 18 - Military Support For Civilian Law Enforcement

Agencies.• DoD Dir. 5525.5, DoD Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials

(w/change one), 21 Feb. 1986.• DoD Dir 5525.10, Using Military Working Dog Teams to Support Law Enforcement

Agencies in Counter-drug Missions, 17 Nov. 1990.• CJCS Instruction 3710.01A, DoD Counter Drug Operational Support, 23 Apr. 1997

(Draft) (Under Revision).• CJCS Instruction 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, 1 Oct.

1994.• Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counter-drug Operations, 17 Feb. 1998• AR 500-51, Support to Civilian Law Enforcement, 1 Aug. 1983.• AR 700-131, Loan and Lease of Army Materiel, 4 Sep. 1987.• NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, National Guard Counter-drug Support to Law

Enforcement Agencies, 30 Sep. 1993.• FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, Jul. 1993.• NAVMC 2915, Counter-drug Campaign Plan, 23 Nov. 1993.

FM 27-100

7-10

technologies to improve DoD's detectionand monitoring mission.

Joint Task Forces (JTF) or JointInter-Agency Task Forces (JIATF)provide unity of command in theaccomplishment of the detection andmonitoring mission. For example, JTF-6, located at Fort Bliss, TX, is currentlyresponsible for the Southwest Borderregion and all other continental U.S.support to CLEAs. The combatantcommands establishing these JTFs maydevelop policy guidance on a variety oflegal issues such as intelligenceoversight, rules for the use of force, etc.

The National Guard is a criticalsource of military support to CLEAs.The National Guard (non-federalized) isnot subject to the restrictions of thePosse Comitatus Act (discussed above).Thus, the Guard has more flexibility thanfederal forces in conducting counter-drug support operations. However, theNational Guard Bureau has imposed anumber of policy restrictions on counter-drug operations. State law willdetermine whether the Guard maylegally support a particular operation.

Operating under state law andNational Guard regulations, these unitsconduct counter-drug operations in allstates and territories. National Guardunits provide 16 types of support, whichare listed in National Guard Regulations.Federal support to the National Guardcounter-drug effort is in providingfederal funding (after a Governorsubmits a counter-drug plan to DoS) tocertain counter-drug missions.Importantly, National Guard forces (non-federalized) engaged in counter-drugsupport operations using federal fundsand under federal guidance remain a

state militia force and are not considereda federal force for purposes of the PosseComitatus Act or for any other purpose.However, National Guard membersengaged in such operations are coveredby the Federal Tort Claims Act withoutlosing their non-federal status.

7.5.2.2 Authorization for MilitarySupport

The following is a list of the types ofDoD missions undertaken in support ofcivilian law enforcement agencies(CLEAs).

• DoD Support to CLEAs. DoDhas specific statutory authority tosupport certain activities ofCLEAs (e.g., 10 U.S.C. 371-382).

• DoD support for non-CLEAs. Inspecified circumstances, federallaw permits DoD to support otherfederal, state, and local agenciesthat have a counter-drug roleeven though the agencies are notCLEAs.

The Secretary of Defense, throughthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave authorityto unified commanders to approvecounter-drug-related deployments ofDoD personnel in support of CLEAs andnon-CLEAs. The key document inunderstanding these two counter-drugsupport missions is the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff Delegation ofAuthority Instruction (CJCSI 3710.01A,23 Apr. 1997). This document includesdescriptions of permissible DoD support,legal considerations, and guidance on thefiscal aspects of providing counter-drugsupport. Although the federal law andpolicy governing counter-drug


7-11

operations are extensive and complex,commanders and judge advocates mustunderstand the types of support that DoDcan not provide to CLEAs in domesticoperations.

• Posse Comitatus Act. Theprohibition on the use of themilitary for law enforcementpurposes is discussed throughoutthis chapter.

• DoD personnel may not conductor fund any activity whichincludes or permits directparticipation by a member of theArmy, Navy, Air Force, orMarine Corps in a search,seizure, arrest, or other similaractivity unless otherwiseauthorized by law.

• DoD personnel may notaccompany U.S. CLEAs onactual counter-drug fieldoperations, or participate in anycounter-drug activities wherehostilities are imminent, unlessauthorized by the NationalCommand Authorities.

• DoD may not provide anysupport that will adversely affectmilitary preparedness. TheSecretary of Defense is theapproval authority for the use ofpersonnel and certain equipment(e.g., arms, ammunition, tacticalvehicles, etc.).

There is extensive federal law andpolicy on DoD’s domestic andinternational role in supporting counter-drug operations. Commanders and SJAscharged with supporting this specializedmission should ensure that judge

advocate actually supporting theseoperations have electronic access to thefull spectrum of legal resources, receive(time permitting) all available counter-drug training opportunities, and knowand understand the use of technicalchannels within the JAGC.

7.5.2.3 Lead Agency Concept andRole of the Military

DoD counter-drug missions arestrictly in support of civilian lawenforcement agencies. Even where DoDserves as the single lead agency for theFederal Government (detection andmonitoring of aerial and maritime transitof illegal drugs into the U.S.), this role isin support of federal, state, local, andforeign CLEAs.

7.5.2.4 Rules for Use of Force

For counter-drug operations takingplace outside of the continental U.S., theChairman of the Joints Chief of StaffSROE apply. The SROE are discussedat length in Chapter 8.

For counter-drug operations takingplace within the continental U.S., judgeadvocates and commanders must turn toAtlantic Command and Joint TaskForce-6 for directives, guidelines, andpolicy on the use of force.

FM 27-100

7-12

7.6 EMERGING THREATS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES(TERRORISM)

Due to our military superiority, potential enemies, whether nations or terrorist groups,may be more likely in the future to resort to terrorist acts or other attacks againstvulnerable civilian targets in the United States instead of conventional militaryoperations.

A National Security Strategy for a New CenturyThe White House—October 1998

The federal government, in concert withstate and local governments andagencies, will respond to acts ofterrorism occurring in the United States.In general, the federal government’sresponse will include the restoration oforder and delivery of emergencyassistance. Presidential DecisionDirective (PDD) 39, signed in June1995, establishes U.S. policy, andassigns responsibilities, concerningdomestic terrorism. PDD 62, signed inMay 1998, lays out the ExecutiveBranch’s vision and the correspondingassignment of responsibilities for acoordinated U.S. response to acts ofterrorism involving weapons of massdestruction (WMD). PDD 62 directs theDepartment of Justice (DoJ), actingthrough the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI), to take the leadresponding to acts of terrorism usingWMD. The Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) supportsthe FBI in preparing for and respondingto the consequences of such an incident.

As part of the DomesticTerrorism Program, the Department ofDefense (DoD), along with many otheragencies, will provide specifiedcapabilities and assets in support of theFBI, FEMA, and other federal, state, and

local governments as part of anintegrated consequence managementprogram. As part of this Program, theDoD will maintain units to assist inWMD consequence management and tohelp train emergency response personnel.This training may include exercises orother forms of training. Further, theDoD will help train the Army NationalGuard and other reserve assets for theirrole in assisting local authorities inmanaging the consequences of a WMDattack.

Again, like other forms ofmilitary support to domestic operations,judge advocates must have a detailedunderstanding of the laws, regulationsand policies addressing terrorism and theroles of federal and state agencies.Judge advocates must recognize that aterrorist attack on the United Statesinvolving WMD will likely entail amassive, joint, and inter-agency responsethat will cross federal, state, and localgovernment lines. Time to respond maybe of the essence and command andcontrol lines may be unclear or confused.Further, a well-organized, trained, andequipped military may have the tendencyto step in and take “charge.” Absentdirection from the NCA (akin to adeclaration of martial law), federal


7-13

military commanders must rememberthat DoD remains in a support role toassist DoJ, the FBI, FEMA or other leadagency with primary responsibility andoverall control of the mission.


8-1

8 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT_____________________________________________________________________________

War is tough, uncompromising, andunforgiving. For soldiers, the rigors of battledemand mental and physical toughness andclose-knit teamwork. Between the anxiety ofbattle, soldiers spend long hours doingroutine but necessary tasks in the cold, wetweather and mud, moving from position toposition, often without hot meals, cleanclothes, or sleep. In war, the potential forbreakdown in discipline is always present.The Army operates with applicable rules ofengagement (ROE), conducting warfare incompliance with international laws andwithin the conditions specified by the highercommander. Army forces apply the combatpower necessary to ensure victory throughappropriate and disciplined use of force.

Field Manual 100-5, Operations

It is not uncommon in MOOTW, for examplepeacemaking, for junior leaders to makedecisions which have significant politicalimplications.

Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrinefor Military Operations Other than War

CONTENTS PAGE

INTRODUCTION................................ 8-2

ROE DEVELOPMENTCONSIDERATIONS………………….. 8-2

Commander’s Responsibility… 8-2Purposes of ROE…………... 8-2Drafting Considerations………. 8-3Situation Considerations….. 8-4Definitions & Key Concepts….. 8-5Types of ROE…………………… 8-6

CJCS STANDING ROE..................... 8-7

THE I-D-D-T METHODOLOGY......... 8-9

Interpret...................................... 8-9Draft............................................. 8-10Disseminate................................ 8-13Train............................................ 8-13

FM 27-100

8-2

8.1 INTRODUCTION

OPLAW provides vital linksbetween the strategic and tactical levelsof conflict. The strongest of these linksare often rules of engagement (ROE).ROE enable mission accomplishment,force protection, and compliance withlaw and policy. While ROE are alwayscommanders' rules, the interpretation,drafting, dissemination, and training ofROE are also the business of OPLAWJAs.

Every chapter of this manual recordsthe importance of ROE to the practice ofOPLAW. ROE integrate many of the sixdisciplines of legal support to operationsand epitomize the counselor function ofOPLAW JAs. Development of expertisewith ROE is a prominent duty andresponsibility of SJAs. Involvementwith ROE places judge advocates firmlywithin the command and control ofoperations. Theater operationsimplement the ROE established byCommanders in Chief (CINCs) ofcombatant commands. Corps andDivision Deep Operations CoordinationCells (DOCCs), or InformationOperations Cells of the future, rely uponOPLAW JAs to incorporate ROEconsiderations into the targeting process.Military operations other than war(MOOTW) tend to be characterized byROE demanding greater restraint inapplying combat power, a factor thatcreates great challenges for judgeadvocates deployed with forward brigadetask forces.

8.2 ROE DEVELOPMENTCONSIDERATIONS

8.2.1 Commander's Responsibility

ROE are commanders' rules for theuse of force. Operations personnel areprincipally responsible to ensure that theROE further operational requirements.OPLAW JAs assist the commander tointerpret, draft, disseminate, and trainROE because all ROE must conform tointernational law, because a Departmentof Defense Directive and serviceregulations give military attorneys a rolein ROE compliance, and because theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff hasdirected that attorneys will review alloperations plans and participate intargeting meetings of military staffs.

Also, the Hague and GenevaConventions contain disseminationprovisions that encourage theinvolvement of judge advocates in ROEmatters. A provision of the 1977Protocol I to the 1949 GenevaConventions—which though not ratifiedby the United States is considereddeclarative of customary internationallaw on this point—expressly mentionsthe role of "legal advisors."

8.2.2 Purposes of ROE

ROE are driven by three sets ofconsiderations: policy, legal, andmilitary. An example of a policy-drivenrule is Executive Order 11850, whichprohibits first use of riot control agentsand herbicides without Presidentialapproval. An example of a legal-drivenrule is the prohibition, "hospitals,churches, shrines, schools, museums,and any other historical or cultural sites


8-3

will not be engaged except in self-defense." An example of a military-driven rule is the commonly encounteredrequirement for observed indirect firesfor the purpose of effective targetengagement. ROE are not the same asfire control measures. Fire controlmeasures are implemented bycommanders based on tacticalconsiderations. An example of a firecontrol measure serving tacticalpurposes is the common requirement inground operations that the artillery tubesorganic to a unit will not fire beyond adesignated fire support coordination line(FSCL); this ensures an efficient divisionof labor between fires controlled at onelevel and those controlled by higherlevels of command. Moreover, it helpsprevent fratricide by indirect fire.

The purposes of ROE quite oftenoverlap; rules implementing strategicpolicy decisions may serve anoperational or tactical military goalwhile simultaneously bringing U.S.forces in compliance with domestic orinternational law. As a result, troops inthe field may not always appreciate thereasons why a leader fashioned aparticular rule.

ROE must evolve with missionrequirements and be tailored to missionrealities. ROE should be a flexibleinstrument designed to best support themission through various operationalphases and should reflect changes in thethreat.

8.2.3 Drafting Considerations

Operational requirements, policy,and law define ROE. ROE alwaysrecognize the soldier’s right of self-

defense, the commander’s right andobligation to self-defense, and America’snational right to defend itself and itsallies and coalition partners againstaggression. In the Standing Rules ofEngagement (SROE) for U.S. Forces,the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide baselineguidance and procedures forsupplementing this guidance for specificoperations. Effective ROE areenforceable, understandable, tacticallysound, and legally sufficient. Further,effective ROE are responsive to themission and consistent with unitinitiative.

In all operations, ROE may imposepolitical, operational, and legallimitations upon commanders.Withholding employment of particularclasses of weapons or exempting theterritory of certain nations from attackare examples of such limitations. At thetactical level, ROE may extend tocriteria for initiating engagements withcertain weapon systems (for example,unobserved fires) or reacting to attack.

Effective ROE comply withdomestic and international law,including the body of international lawpertaining to armed conflict. Thus, ROEnever justify illegal actions. In allsituations, soldiers and commanders useforce that is necessary and proportional.

Effective ROE do not assign specifictasks or drive specific tactical solutions;they allow a commander to quickly andclearly convey to subordinate units adesired posture regarding the use offorce. In passing orders to subordinates,a commander must act within the ROEreceived. However, ROE never relievethe commander from his responsibility to

FM 27-100

8-4

formulate the end state, objectives,mission, and other elements ofoperational design. Commanders at alllevels continually review the ROE toensure their effectiveness in light ofcurrent and projected conditions in theirarea of operations.

8.2.4 Situation Considerations -METT-TC

A given operational setting isdescribed by the factors of mission,enemy and threat, terrain and weather,troops, time available, and civilianconsiderations (METT- TC). Thesituation is the context that dominatesevery aspect of planning, includingROE. Across the range of potentialmilitary operations, commanders canencounter situations of bewilderingcomplexity. This complexity is reduced,at the operational and tactical levels ofconflict, by applying the conceptualtemplate of METT-TC.

• Mission establishes the purposeof the operation.

• Planners must consider thedispositions, equipment,doctrine, capabilities, andprobable intentions of anEnemy—actual and potential.The current conflict environmentis increasingly characterized byshades of gray in which enemies

are less apparent. Commandersalso evaluate potential threats tomission success, such as disease,political instability, andmisinformation.

• Terrain and weather affectmobility, concealment,observation, cover, avenues ofapproach, and the effectivenessof military operating systems.

• The commander must considerthe nature of Troops—hismilitary capabilities. Troopcharacteristics such as numbers,mobility, protection, training, andmorale influence plans for theiremployment.

• Time available for preparationand execution of the mission iscritical and can dramaticallyinfluence the scope and nature ofthe plan.

• Civilian considerations are a keyfactor of the situation across theentire range of operations.Attitudes and activities of thecivilian population in the area ofoperation influence the outcomeof military operations. Refugeesand humanitarian assistancerequirements are frequentconcerns, not only in stabilityoperations or support operations,but also in conventional combat.Interagency operations bring tobear the civilian resources ofDoD, non-DoD components ofthe government, and privatevoluntary and nongovernmentalorganizations, therebymultiplying the effectiveness ofour operations.

M—Mission E—Enemy (and threat) T—Terrain (and weather) T—Troops-------------------------------- T—Time Available C—Civilian Considerations


8-5

8.2.5 Definitions and Key Concepts

ROE are defined in Joint Publication1-02 as "directives issued by competentmilitary authority which delineate thecircumstances and limitations underwhich United States forces will initiateand/or continue combat engagementwith other forces encountered." A fewexamples illustrate the broad range ofrules that fall within this definition:requiring an F-111 crew to confirm thatall target acquisition systems areoperable to bomb a Libyan barracksabutting a civilian population center;prohibiting entry by U.S. Navy ships intoterritorial seas or internal waters of aneutral nation; or authorizing aninfantryman at a guard post to use deadlyforce against saboteurs of mission-essential equipment.

Wartime Versus Standing ROE. Ingeneral, ROE differ in wartime to reflectthe increased justification for usingforce. Wartime ROE permit U.S. forcesto open fire upon all identified enemytargets, regardless of whether thosetargets represent actual, immediatethreats. By contrast, the SROE, whichwill be discussed later in this chapter,merely permit engagement in individual,unit, or national self-defense. Most legalgrounds for international use of forceduring peacetime are traceable to self-defense. Wartime ROE are familiar tounits and soldiers because battle focusedtraining concentrates on wartime tasks.Individual Army privates and officertrainees in all occupational specialtiesreceive instruction and undergoevaluation on basic wartime rules, suchas "attack only combat targets" and "donot destroy property unless required bythe necessities of war." In war, national

leaders will seek to make the ROE nomore restrictive than international law.

Necessity and Proportionality. Theprinciples of necessity andproportionality help define the peacetimejustification to use force in self-defenseand are thus fundamental tounderstanding ROE for MOOTW. Thenecessity principle permits friendlyforces to engage only those forcescommitting hostile acts or clearlydemonstrating hostile intent. Thisformulation—a quite restrictive rule forthe use of force—captures the essence ofpeacetime necessity under internationallaw. In 1840, Secretary of State DanielWebster articulated the essence of thenecessity rule. He wrote that use offorce in self-defense is justified only incases in which "the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming andleaving no choice of means and nomoment for deliberation." The rule ofnecessity applies to individuals as wellas to military units or sovereign states.

Definitions of "hostile act" and"hostile intent" complete the meaning of"necessity." A hostile act is an attack orother use of force. Hostile intent "is thethreat of imminent use of force." Theprecise contents of these definitionsbecome sensitive when the ROEdescribe specific behaviors as hostileacts or equate particular objectivecharacteristics with hostile intent. Forinstance, the ROE might define a foreignuniformed soldier aiming a machine-gunfrom behind a prepared firing position asa clear demonstration of hostile intent,regardless of whether that soldier trulyintends to harm U.S. forces.

FM 27-100

8-6

The principle of proportionalityrequires that the force used bereasonable in intensity, duration, andmagnitude, based on all facts known tothe commander at the time, to decisivelycounter the hostile act or hostile intentand to ensure the continued safety ofU.S. forces. As with necessity, theproportionality principle reflects anancient international legal norm.

8.2.6 Types of ROE

Mere restatement of the core legalprinciples of proportionality andnecessity does not indicate specificallyenough the circumstances under whichsoldiers may fire weapons in national,unit, or individual self-defense. Nor dothese principles articulate the myriadrestrictions that a commander mayimpose on a force to serve the non-legalpurposes mentioned above. Commandsinsert numerous types of specific rulesinto ROE annexes and soldier cards toelaborate further the rules of necessityand proportionality and to dictate preciseterms of restrictions that are not derivedfrom law. The following descriptions oftypes of rules permit OPLAW JAs andothers to speak with precision aboutROE.

• Type I - Hostility Criteria.Provide those making decisionswhether to fire with a set ofobjective factors to assist indetermining whether a potentialassailant exhibits hostile intentand thus clarify whether shotscan be fired before receiving fire.

• Type II - Scale ofForce/Challenging Procedure.Specify a graduated show offorce that ground troops should

use in ambiguous situationsbefore resorting to deadly force.Include such measures as givinga verbal warning, using a riotstick, or perhaps firing an aimedwarning shot. May place limitson the pursuit of an attacker.

• Type III - Protection of Propertyand Foreign Nationals. Detailwhat and whom may be defendedwith force aside from the lives ofU.S. soldiers and citizens.Include measures to be taken toprevent crimes in progress or thefleeing of criminals.

• Type IV - Weapons ControlStatus/ Alert Conditions.Announce, for air defense assets,a posture for resolving doubtsover whether to engage.Announce for units observingalert conditions a series ofmeasures designed to adjust unitreadiness for attack to the levelof perceived threat. Themeasures may include some orall of the other functional typesof rules.

• Type V - Arming Orders. Dictatewhich soldiers in the force arearmed and with what weaponsand ammunition. Specify whichprecise orders given by whomwill permit the loading andcharging of firearms.

• Type VI - Approval to UseWeapons Systems. Designatewhat level commander mustapprove use of particularweapons systems. Perhapsprohibit use of a weapon entirely.

• Type VII - Eyes on Target.Require that the object of fire be


8-7

observed by one or more humanor electronic means.

• Type VIII - Territorial orGeographic Restraints. Creategeographic zones or areas intowhich forces may not fire. Maydesignate a territorial—perhapspolitical—boundary, beyondwhich forces may neither fire norenter except perhaps in hotpursuit of an attacking force.Include tactical control measuresthat coordinate fire and maneuverby means of graphic illustrationson operations map overlays.

• Type IX - Restrictions onManpower. Prescribe numbersand types of soldiers to becommitted to a theater or area ofoperations. Perhaps prohibit useof U.S. manpower in politicallyor diplomatically sensitivepersonnel assignments requiringallied manning.

• Type X - Restrictions on PointTargets and Means of Warfare.Prohibit targeting of certainindividuals or facilities. Mayrestate basic rules of the law ofwar for situations in which ahostile force is identified andprolonged armed conflict ensues.

8.3 CJCS STANDING ROE

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffInstruction 3121.01, Standing Rules ofEngagement for U.S. Forces (SROE) isthe keystone document in the area ofROE. It provides implementationguidance to CINCs on the inherent rightof self defense and the application offorce for mission accomplishment. It is

the result of an all-service review andrevision of the former JCS PeacetimeRules of Engagement (PROE). TheSROE apply to all U.S. forces—withlimited exceptions for MultinationalForce (MNF), Civil Disturbance, anddisaster relief operations—and isdesigned to provide a common templatefor development and implementation ofROE across the range of militaryoperations. The SROE are divided intothree principle sections or enclosures:

Enclosure A (Standing Rules ofEngagement): This enclosure details thegeneral purpose, intent and scope of theSROE, emphasizing the commander'sright-—and obligation—to use force inself-defense. Critical principles—suchas unit, national, and collective self-defense, hostile acts and intent, and thedetermination to declare forces hostile-—are addressed as foundational ele-ments of all ROE. Appendices providespecific guidance with respect to thescope of authority to use force, delega-tion of authority to declare forces hostileand exercise the right of national self-defense, and application of the principleof proportionality, and they address spe-cial considerations associated withpeacekeeping, command, control andinformation warfare (C2I), counterdrug,and noncombatant evacuationoperations. In addition, force-specific(i.e., seaborne, land, and air) appendicesdetail indicators of hostile intent, geo-graphic limitations of authority, andother concerns that are particular tooperations within the defined forcestructure.

Enclosure B (Supplemental Mea-sures): Supplemental Measures aremenu lists of ROE measures that may be

FM 27-100

8-8

adopted, requested, granted, or not usedat all. Supplemental measures found inthis enclosure enable the commander toobtain or grant those additionalauthorities necessary to accomplish anassigned mission. Tables of supple-mental measures are divided into thoseactions requiring NCA approval, thosethat require either NCA or CombatantCommander approval and those that maybe delegated to subordinate com-manders. It is important to rememberthat the SROE are fundamentally per-missive in nature, allowing a commanderto use any weapon or tactic available andemploy reasonable force to accomplishhis mission. Supplemental measuresprovided in Enclosure B are intended toserve as a planning tool. Inclusion in theSROE supplemental list does not suggestthat the commander needs to seekauthority to use any of the listed items -that only occurs when incorporated intoROE issued for a specific operation.Supplemental ROE relate to missionaccomplishment, not to self-defense, andnever limit the commander's inherentright and obligation of self-defense.

Enclosure C (Compendium andCombatant Commanders' SpecialROE): Enclosure C contains a list ofeffective CJCS directives providingROE guidance and Area ofResponsibility specific rules ofengagement submitted by the CombatantCommanders. Those special ROEaddress specific strategic and politicalsensitivities of the CombatantCommander's AOR and must beapproved by CJCS. They are included inthe SROE as a means to assist com-manders and units participating in oper-ations outside their assigned AORS.

The SROE also contain technicaldefinitions of self defense:

• Self Defense: The SROE do notlimit a commander's inherentauthority and obligation to use allnecessary means available and totake all appropriate action in self-defense of the commander's unitand other U.S. forces in thevicinity.

• Unit Self Defense: The act ofdefending elements or personnelof a defined unit—as well as U.S.forces in the vicinity thereof –against a hostile act or intent. Asapplied to the soldier on theground, unit self-defenseincludes the concept ofindividual self-defense.

• National Self Defense: The actof defending the U.S.; U.S.forces; and in certaincircumstances, U.S. citizens andtheir property, U.S. commercialassets, other designated non-U.S.forces, foreign nationals and theirproperty, from a hostile act orhostile intent. As a subset ofnational self-defense, the act ofdefending other designated non-U.S. citizens, forces, property,and interests is referred to ascollective self-defense.Authority to exercise nationalself-defense rests with the NCA,but may be delegated underspecified circumstances;however, only the NCA mayauthorize the exercise ofcollective self-defense.

The SROE distinguish between theright and obligation of self-defense—


8-9

which is not limited—and use of forcefor the accomplishment of an assignedmission. Authority to use force inmission accomplishment may be limitedin light of political, military or legalconcerns, but such limitations have noimpact on the commander's right andobligation of self-defense.

Once a threat has been declared ahostile force, United States units andindividual soldiers may engage withoutobserving a hostile act or demonstrationof hostile intent. The basis forengagement becomes status rather thanconduct. The authority to declare a forcehostile is given only to particularindividuals in special circumstances.Appendix A to Enclosure A of theSROE contains guidance on thisauthority.

8.4 THE I-D-D-TMETHODOLOGY

Commanders and staffs at allechelons use the Interpret-Draft-Disseminate-Train (I-D-D-T)methodology to incorporate ROE intothe conduct of military operations.OPLAW JAs participate in all fourfacets of this methodology. Each facet isconnected with and influences the

others, and together the facets describe aprocess of continuous refinement andrevision. The facets in the I-D-D-Tmethodology are interactive rather thansequential.

In joint task forces and at higher jointechelons, the I-D-D-T methodology isconducted by an ROE Planning Cell.The ROE Cell consists of the J-3, the J-2, the J-5, and the SJA or designatedrepresentatives, in addition to otherspecial staff officers as appropriate. TheJoint Task Force J-3 is responsible forROE in crisis action planning, and theROE Cell provides a formal planningstructure through which the J-3 caneffectively perform this responsibility.

At corps and divisions, the I-D-D-Tmethodology is conducted by themembers of the Deep OperationsCoordination Cell (DOCC) and anyInformation Operations Cell, inconjunction with their duties in thetargeting process. At brigade level, theBrigade Judge Advocate coordinatesthroughout the military decision-makingprocess with the S-3 and with all staffofficers engaged in targeting to ensurethat the I-D-D-T methodology isconducted.

8.4.1 Interpret

At the operational and tactical levelsof conflict, commanders and staffs mustinterpret the ROE issued by higherheadquarters. At the theater level, theCINC and his staff must interpret theSROE and any mission-specific ROEthat may emanate from CJCS or theNational Command Authorities.Interpretation of ROE demands skillsthat are well-honed in the legal

1.1.1.1 I-D-D-TMethodology

InterpretDraft

DisseminateTrain

FM 27-100

8-10

profession and specifically cultivatedwithin the "judge" function of legalsupport to operations. Thus, while thecommander will ultimately determinewhat a rule issued by higherheadquarters demands of his command,OPLAW JAs will provide expertassistance.

The interpretive expertise of theOPLAW JA begins from a thoroughfamiliarity with the SROE. It relies uponaggressive research to find all operationsplans, orders, messages, standingoperating procedures, treaties andcoalition documents, directives, andregulations that purport to establish orchange the ROE. It demands carefulorganization of these documents(chronologically, by issuingheadquarters) to determine which isauthoritative on which point. It requiresskill at reconciling two rules that appearto contradict by considering broaderimperatives contained in the text of therules or other guidance as well asclearheaded reasoning from anyavailable precedents as to how thecontradictory rules have been interpretedin the past. It presumes intimateknowledge of the "facts" of the militaryoperation and sufficient knowledge ofstaff organization and procedures togather information from those who canprovide additional needed facts.

The OPLAW JA’s contribution tothe interpretation of ROE sometimesrequires more than the skills of textualconstruction and factual analysis,however. In some situations, theOPLAW JA will be the sole member ofthe ROE Planning Cell, the DOCC, orthe staff possessing the necessarytraining in objectivity and impartiality to

state unpleasant interpretations of ahigher headquarter’s ROE. This requiresconstant situational awareness madepossible through secure and nonsecurecommunication nodes, mobility, thecommander’s task organization ofplacing OPLAW JAs in command postsas discussed in earlier chapters.

8.4.2 Draft

In some operations, ROE will be top-driven, meaning that a higher echeloncommander—for instance a CINC—establishes ROE that must bedisseminated verbatim to all lowerechelons. The preference of militarydoctrine, because it preserves lowerechelon initiative, is for ROE to be top-fed, meaning that a higher-echeloncommander establishes rules forimmediate subordinate echelons. Thesesubordinate echelons in turn disseminateROE that are consistent with those ofhigher headquarters but tailored to theparticular unit's mission. These methodsmay also coexist within a particularoperation, as some rules may be top-driven while others may be subject todiscretion on the manner ofdissemination and thus top-fed.

When the rules are not top-driven,commanders and staffs from theaterlevel down to brigade draft ROE fortheir commands. At theater and JTFlevels, the drafting of ROE results inAppendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) toAnnex C (Operations) of the operationsplan (OPLAN) or operations order(OPORD), in accordance with the JointOperations Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES), Joint Publication 5-03.At corps, division, and brigade level, thedrafting of ROE results in Annex E to


8-11

the OPLAN or OPORD in accordancewith Army doctrine. Army doctrine alsocalls for the integration of ROE in thecoordinating instructions subparagraphof paragraph 3 (Execution) of the bodyof the OPLAN or OPORD.

JOPES and Army doctrine provideminimal guidance as to the contents andformat of these ROE documents.Standing operating procedures (SOPs),which exist in part to enable OPLANsand OPORDs to be brief, frequentlyprovide extensive content and formatguidance. This guidance, in turn,typically draws heavily upon the SROE,incorporating both standing rules andsupplemental rules according to acommand-specific format that isperiodically updated and continuouslytrained. Appendix E to Enclosure B ofthe SROE contains a message format bywhich CINCs request and receivesupplemental ROE.

The drafting of ROE in the contextof multinational operations presentsadditional challenges. The SROE statethat United States forces assigned to theoperational control (OPCON) of amultinational force will follow the ROEof the multinational force unlessotherwise directed by the NationalCommand Authorities (NCA). TheSROE further state that United Statesforces will be assigned and remainOPCON to a multinational force only ifthe combatant commander and higherauthority determine that the ROE for thatmultinational force are consistent withthe policy guidance on unit self-defenseand with the rules for individual self-defense contained in this document.When U.S. forces, under United StatesOPCON, operate in conjunction with a

multinational force, reasonable effortswill be made to effect common ROE. Ifsuch ROE cannot be established, U.S.forces will exercise the right andobligation of self-defense contained inthe SROE while seeking guidance fromthe appropriate combatant command.

Participation in multinationaloperations may be complicated byvarying national obligations derivedfrom international agreements; i.e., othermembers in a coalition may not besignatories to treaties that bind theUnited States, or they may be bound bytreaties to which the United States is nota party. United States forces still remainbound by U.S. treaty obligations even ifthe other members in a coalition are notsignatories to a treaty and need notadhere to its terms.

A multinational partner’s domesticlaw, policy, and social values may alsoeffect multinational planning at thestrategic and operational level. Lessonslearned from recent multinationalexercises and operations reflectsignificant differences in how variouscountries understand and view theapplication of military force through theROE. These factors can severely limitor expand a Multinational Commander’sability to use a national contingent’scapabilities. Legal advisors at all levelsof planning can assist in theinterpretation and drafting of ROE.

The United States places animportance on the ROE that othernations may not share, attaches meaningto terms with which other nations' forcesmay not be familiar, and implementsROE within a context of doctrine thatmay differ markedly from that of other

FM 27-100

8-12

nations. When operating with forcesfrom non-English-speaking countries,these differences will be accentuated.Energetic participation by operationallawyers in the drafting process helpsensure that final ROE products reflectthe legitimate interests of all sides. Insuch circumstances, United States forcesbenefit by having a completed draft (i.e.,the SROE) available as a basis fordiscussion. When developing ROE inconjunction with the United Nations,diplomatic or policy constraintsoccasionally dictate language peculiar toUnited Nations operations. In thesecases, the availability of a complete,preferred alternative (again, the SROE)give United States forces a medium withwhich to communicate their concerns.

The sound drafting of ROE willadhere to several principles:

• Consider the METT-TC. Themission will drive the ROE, andas an operation unfolds in phases,the mission may triggersignificant shifts in the ROE.The existence of enemy forces orother threats will change theROE from conduct-based rules tostatus-based rules with respect tothose threats that have beendeclared hostile forces. Theterrain will limit the feasibility ofcertain force options. Thecapabilities and level of trainingof friendly troops will determinewhether certain ROE need to bespelled out in the order. Theamount of time available maydictate both what force optionscan be used and what prepara-tions can be made to implement aparticular rule. The presence or

absence of civilians willinevitably raise questions aboutwhom friendly forces can protectunder the ROE.

• Push Upward on the DraftingProcess. The SROE provides themeans to request supplementals.Use such requests. If the METT-TC suggests a ROE that is notcontained in the higherheadquarters annex, push asuggested rule to the higherheadquarters for approval. Keepin mind, however, that the SROEare permissive, as discussedabove.

• Avoid Restating Strategy andDoctrine. ROE should not beused as the means to statestrategy or doctrine. A commonmistake of the inexperienced is toattempt to use the ROE annex toaccomplish something for whichan entire system exists in Armydoctrine.

• Avoid Restating the Law of War.ROE should not restate the lawof war. Commanders may desireto emphasize an aspect of the lawof war that is particularlyrelevant to a specific operation(e.g., see Desert Storm ROEregarding cultural property), butthey should not include anextensive discussion of theHague Regulations and GenevaConventions.

• Avoid Restating Tactics.Because the purposes of ROE(political, legal, military) aresometimes difficult to discern, aboundary line drawn upon anoperations overlay may be the


8-13

result of a commander's conceptof operations whilesimultaneously transmitting arule of engagement stemmingfrom political considerations.Still, many phase lines, controlpoints, and other fire and tacticalcontrol measures have nomeaningful connection topolitical or legal considerations.These measures belong in otherportions of the OPLAN orOPORD, not in the ROE.

• Avoid Safety-RelatedRestrictions. ROE should notdeal with safety-relatedrestrictions. Certain weaponsrequire specific safety-related,pre-operation steps. Theseshould not be detailed in theROE, but may appear in thetactical or field SOP.

• Avoid Excessively Qualified Lan-guage. ROE are useful andeffective only when understood,remembered, and readily appliedunder stress. Well formulatedROE anticipate the circumstancesof an operation and provideunambiguous guidance to thesoldier, sailor, airman and marinebefore he confronts a threat.

8.4.3 Disseminate

The OPLAN or OPORD annex isonly the minimum means ofdisseminating the ROE. The annex ateach echelon will build upon thecommand's SOP, which is the primary,continuous means of disseminating thoseROE that tend to appear in successiveoperations. Various methods effectivelycapture dissemination across a

command. The Commander, S3/G3/J3,and SJA must determine its system onquickly and efficiently disseminatingchanges in the ROE and train its staffand subordinate commandersaccordingly.

When particular ROE issued byhigher headquarters are not anticipatedin the TACSOP, the OPORD annexmust state these rules outright, withoutreference to an ROE menu item. Also,the commander and staff must providemission-specific ROE training fordeploying soldiers. Judge advocatesmust be prepared to assist in thistraining. While never a substitute fortraining, an ROE card is often helpful asa ready reference to soldiers at the lowestlevel—this is done in virtually everyinstance.

8.4.4 Train

ROE must be disseminatedthroughout the force and reinforced bytraining and rehearsal. Soldiers executein the manner they train; they will carryout their tasks in compliance with theROE when trained to do so. In today’soperations, where a single soldier’saction can change not only the tacticalbut the strategic and political setting, it isvital that commanders and judgeadvocates disseminate and train ROE toall lowest levels. All trainingopportunities should reinforce ROE andteach soldiers how to apply the basicrules of self-defense. Individual and unitpreparation for specific missions mustincorporate training that challengessoldiers to apply mission-specific ROE.In crisis response situations, ROEtraining may consist of leaders andsoldiers receiving and training on the

FM 27-100

8-14

mission-specific ROE en route to thedeparture airfield. In that case, theknowledge gained on the basic rules ofself-defense and scenario-specific,situational ROE during past scheduledtraining enables commanders andsoldiers to better understand and adhereto the crisis situation ROE. Whenpreparing for missions such aspeacekeeping or disaster relief,commanders should remember that thesemissions normally require soldiers to usegreater restraint and discipline than inoffensive or defensive operations.

ROE should always includesituational training. This situationaltraining should challenge soldiers inemploying weapons, levels of force, andother ROE. Situational trainingexercises (STXs) focus on one or a smallgroup of tasks— within a particularmission scenario—and require thatsoldiers practice until the tasks can beexecuted to some pre-establishedstandard. Trainers refer to thesescenarios unofficially as "vignettes," andto this type of training as "lane training."To conduct STXs on ROE, acommander, judge advocate, or othertrainer places a soldier in a particularsimulated operational scenario and thenconfronts him with an event, such as thecrashing of a traffic checkpoint barrierby a speeding vehicle. The trainerevaluates the soldier's response, andafterward discusses alternative responsesavailable within the ROE. The STXbrings to life abstract rules contained inwritten ROE, giving the soldier concreteterms of reference within which todetermine his response. In this way, thesoldier achieves the balance betweeninitiative and restraint so important tosuccess, particularly in MOOTW. The

SJA must be prepared to assist inproviding ROE training, includingvignette-driven training, and to ensurethat subordinate SJAs are involved inproviding similar assistance for ROEtraining.

The SROE articulate baselineprinciples that are useful in conductingsoldier training within STXs, prior to adeployment. These principles can berestated within an acronym that permitsindividual common task training (CTT)by establishing a standard against whichto evaluate the soldier's response duringthe STX. One training device thatcaptures the baseline SROE principles isthe mnemonic RAMP. The box belowoutlines the elements of R-A-M-P,which when used within a context ofrepetitive and varied situational training,inculcates effective responses underconditions of stress. Because R-A-M-Pprinciples incorporate necessity andproportionality, RAMP training providesa solid framework upon which mission-specific ROE training can build.Nevertheless, legal personnel must assistsoldiers in understanding that R-A-M-Pself-defense principles are not asubstitute for mission-specific ROEtraining.

In all ongoing operations, butparticularly in volatile and rapidlychanging peace operations, commandersmust conduct continuous refreshertraining. Commanders in Bosniaeffectively developed and updatedsituational ROE training based on actualrecorded events that took place in thetheater of operations from previousweeks. In the gray zone surroundingROE in peace enforcement operations,commanders, with their OPLAW JAs,


8-15

must continually hone their soldiers’ability to balance initiative and restraint.

R-A-M-PR - Return Fire with Aimed Fire. Returnforce with force. You always have the rightto repel hostile acts with necessary force.A - Anticipate Attack. Use force if, butonly if, you see clear indicators of hostileintent.M - Measure the amount of Force thatyou use, if time and circumstances permit.Use only the amount of force necessary toprotect lives and accomplish the mission.P - Protect with deadly force only humanlife, and property designated by yourcommander. Stop short of deadly forcewhen protecting other property.


Glossary-1

GLOSSARY

ABCS Army Battle Command SystemAC-RC Active Component-Reserve ComponentACCA Army Court of Criminal AppealsACO Area Claims OfficeACOM Atlantic Command (ACOM will be redesignated USJFCOM on or

about 1 Oct 99)ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing AgreementACU Area Common UserADCON Administrative ControlADDS Army Data Distribution SystemAGCCS Army Global Command and Control SystemADC-M Assistant Division Commander-ManeuverADC-S Assistant Division Commander-SupportAJAG Assistant Judge Advocate GeneralAJAG/CLL Assistant Judge Advocate General for Civil Law and LitigationAJAG/MLO Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and OperationsAJAG/OPNS Assistant Judge Advocate General for Operations, a United States

Army Reserve Individual Mobilization AugmenteeALCOM Alaskan CommandALOC Administrative/Logistics Operations CenterALLS Army Law Library ServiceAMOPES Army Mobilization Planning and Execution SystemAMOPS Army Mobilization and Operations Planning SystemANGLICO Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison CompanyAO Area of OperationsAOA Areas of AssistanceAOC Areas of ConflictAOE Army of ExcellenceAR Army RegulationARFOR Army ForcesARNG Army National GuardARNG Spec Asst The Army National Guard Special Assistant to The Judge

Advocate GeneralASCC Army Service Component CommanderASG Area Support GroupASI Additional Skill IdentifierAssault CP Assault Command Post, a TAC CP in a rapidly deployed divisionATCCS Army Tactical Command and Control System

BCT Brigade Combat TeamBCTP Battle Command Training ProgramBDCSTS Broadcast SystemBDE Brigade

FM 27-100

Glossary-2

BN BattalionBOLT Brigade Operational Law TeamBUB Battle Update Brief

C2 Command and ControlC2I Command, Control, and InformationCA Civil AffairsCAAF Court of Appeals for the Armed ForcesCENTCOM Central CommandCCIR Commanders' Critical Information RequirementsCD Compact Disc; Counter DrugCDD Combat Developments Division, TJAGSACDP Combat Decision-Making ProcessCD-ROM Compact Disc, Read-Only MemoryCIMIC Civil-Military Information CenterCINC Commander in ChiefCJA Command Judge AdvocateCJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffCJCSI Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionCJCS SROE Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of EngagementCLAMO Center for Law and Military OperationsCLE Continuing Legal EducationCLEA Civilian Law Enforcement AgencyCLNCO Chief Legal Noncommissioned OfficerCMO Civil-Military OperationsCMOC Civil-Military Operations CenterCNR Combat Net RadiosCOA Course of ActionCOCOM Combatant CommandCOL ColonelCOMMZ Communications ZoneCONUS Continental United StatesCONUSA Continental United States ArmyCOSCOM Corps Support CommandCOTS Commercial-off-the-shelfCP Command PostCPO Claims Processing Office; Civilian Personnel OfficeCPT CaptainCTC Combat Training CenterCTT Common Task TrainingCZ Combat Zone

DAD Defense Appellate DivisionD-D-D-A Decide-Detect-Deliver-AssessDEP'T Department


Glossary-3

DFSCORD Deputy Fire Support CoordinatorDIRLAUTH Direct Liaison AuthorizedDISCOM Division Support CommandDIVARTY Division ArtilleryDOCC Deep Operations Coordination CellDoD Department of DefenseDoD Dir. Department of Defense DirectiveDoJ Department of JusticeDOMS Director of Military SupportDOS Department of StateDSJA Deputy Staff Judge AdvocateDTAC Division TAC CPDTLOMS Doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldiers

EEM Early Entry ModulesESF Emergency Support FunctionsEPW Enemy Prisoner of WarEUCOM European Command

FAR Federal Acquisition RegulationFBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command-Brigade and Below SystemFBI Federal Bureau of InvestigationsFCA Foreign Claims ActFCC Foreign Claims CommissionFEMA Federal Emergency Management AgencyFM Field ManualFOIA Freedom of Information ActFORSCOM Forces CommandForce XXI Force Twenty-One, the digitized ArmyFRAGO Fragmentary OrderFSB Forward Support BattalionFSCL Fire Support Coordination CellFSCORD Fire Support CoordinatorFSOP Field Standard Operating Procedures

G-1 Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, PersonnelG-2 Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, IntelligenceG-3 Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and PlansG-4 Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, LogisticsG-5 Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil AffairsG-6 Corps and Division Assistant Chief of Staff, Information

ManagementGAD Government Appellate DivisionGCM General Court-MartialGCMCA General Court-Martial Convening Authority

FM 27-100

Glossary-4

GCSS-A Global Combat Support System—ArmyGPS Global Positioning System

HA Humanitarian AssistanceHCA Humanitarian and Civil AssistanceHMMWV High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

IAW In Accordance WithICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIO International Organization; Information Operations; Investigating

OfficerI-D-D-T Interpret-Draft-Disseminate-TrainIMA Individual Mobilization AugmenteeIMO Information Management OfficerIPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

J-1 Manpower & Personnel Directorate of a Joint StaffJ-2 Intelligence Directorate of a Joint StaffJ-3 Operations Directorate of a Joint StaffJ-4 Logistics Directorate of a Joint StaffJ-5 Plans Directorate of a Joint StaffJ-6 Command, Control, Communications, Computer Systems

Directorate of a Joint StaffJA Judge AdvocateJAGC Judge Advocate General's CorpsJAGCNet Judge Advocate General's Corps Network (www.jagcnet.army.mil)JAGSO Judge Advocate General Service OrganizationJAWE Judge Advocate Warfighting ExperimentJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJFACC Joint Forces Air Component CommandJFC Joint Force CommanderJFCOM Joint Forces Command (the successor organization to ACOM)JFLCC Joint Forces Land Component CommandJFMCC Joint Forces Maritime Component CommandJFSOCC Joint Forces Special Operations Component CommandJIATF Joint Inter-Agency Task ForceJMC Joint Military Commission; Joint Movement CenterJOA Joint Operations AreaJOPES Joint Operations Planning and Execution SystemJP Joint PublicationJRA Joint Rear AreasJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities PlanJSOTF Joint Special Operations Task ForceJTCB Joint Targeting Coordination BoardJTF Joint Task Force


Glossary-5

JTTP Joint Tactics, Techniques, and ProceduresJZ Joint Zones

LAAWS Legal Automated Army-Wide SystemLDP Leadership Development ProgramLOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation ProgramLOW Law of WarLSO Legal Support OrganizationLST Legal Support TeamLTC Lieutenant Colonel

MACDIS Military Assistance for Civil DisturbancesMain CP Main Command PostMAJ MajorMCS Maneuver Control SystemMCS-P Maneuver Control System - PhoenixMDMP Military Decision Making ProcessMETL Mission Essential Task ListMETT-TC Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, Time Available, and Civilian

ConsiderationsMNF Multinational ForcesMOB MobilizationMOBTDA Mobilization Table of Distribution and AllowanceMOOTW Military Operations Other Than WarMOS Military Occupational SpecialtyMPCA Military Personnel Claims ActMRE Mission Rehearsal Exercise; Meals Ready to EatMSG Master SergeantMSO Mobilization Support Organization

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNBC Nuclear, Biological and ChemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNCO Noncommissioned OfficerNCOIC Noncommissioned Officer in ChargeNG National GuardNGO Non-governmental OrganizationNGR National Guard RegulationNMS National Military StrategyNSS National Security Strategy

OC Observer-ControllerOCONUS Outside the Continental United StatesOIC Officer in ChargeOOTW Operations Other Than War

FM 27-100

Glossary-6

OPCON Operational ControlOPLAN Operations PlanOPLAW Operational LawOPLAW JA Operational Law Judge AdvocateOPORD Operations OrderOSJA Office of the Staff Judge AdvocateOT Observer-TrainerOTJAG Office of the Judge Advocate General

PACOM Pacific CommandPCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association

(modem and network cards for notebook computers)PDD Presidential Decision DocumentPEO Peace Enforcement OperationsPFC Private First ClassPKO Peace Keeping OperationsPLEX Plans/Exercises CellPLP Premobilization Legal PreparationPPTO Personnel, Plans, and Training OfficePROE Peacetime Rules of Engagement (superseded by the JCS SROE)PSYOP Psychological OperationsPVO Private Voluntary Organization

R-A-M-P Learning device for ROE training. Return Fire with Aimed Fire-Anticipate Attack-Measure the Amount of Force-Protect withDeadly Force only Human Life and Property Designated by theCommander

RCM Rules for Courts-MartialRDC Regional Defense CounselRDL Rucksack Deployable Law Office and LibraryRear CP Rear Command PostROE Rules of EngagementRSC Regional Support CommandRSG Regional Support GroupRTDT Regional Trial Defense Team

S-1 AdjutantS-2 Intelligence OfficerS-3 Training and Operations OfficerS-4 Supply OfficerS-5 Civil Affairs OfficerSA Secretary of the Army; Security AssistanceSECDEF Secretary of DefenseSFC Sergeant First ClassSGLI Soldiers' Group Life Insurance


Glossary-7

SGT SergeantSIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router NetworkSJA Staff Judge AdvocateSOCO Standards of Conduct OfficeSOCOM Special Operations CommandSOI Signal Operation InstructionsSOF Special Operations ForcesSOFA Status of Forces AgreementSOP Standard Operating ProceduresSOUTHCOM Southern CommandSPACECOM Space CommandSPC SpecialistSROE Standing Rules of EngagementSRP Soldier Readiness Program ProcessingSSCR Single-service Claims ResponsibilitySSCRA Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief ActSSG Staff SergeantSSORD Service Support OrderSTANAG Standardization AgreementSTARC State Area CommandsSTRATCOM Strategic CommandSTX Situational Training Exercises

TAACOM Theater Army Area CommandTAC CP Tactical Command PostTACC1 Tactical Command Post in a Digitized DivisionTACON Tactical ControlTACSOP Tactical Standard Operating ProceduresTADSS Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and SimulationsTAJAG The Assistant Judge Advocate GeneralTDA Trial Defense ServiceTDT Trial Defense TeamTOA Transfer of AuthorityTOC Tactical Operations CenterTOE Table of Organization and EquipmentTOR Terms of ReferenceTJAG The Judge Advocate GeneralTJAGSA The Judge Advocate General's School, ArmyTRANSCOM Transportation CommandTSC Troop Support CommandTTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military JusticeUCO Unit Claims OfficersUCP Unified Command Plan

FM 27-100

Glossary-8

UN United NationsUSACAPOC United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

CommandUSACCA United States Army Court of Criminal AppealsUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentUSALSA United States Army Legal Services AgencyUSAR United States Army ReserveUSARCS United States Army Claims ServiceUSASOC United States Army Special Operations CommandUSATDS United States Army Trial Defense ServiceUSC United States CodeUSCA United States Code, AnnotatedUSJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command (the successor organization

to ACOM)USFJ United States Force, JapanUSFK United States Forces, Korea

WARNO Warning OrderWMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

XO Executive Officer


Index-1

A

ABCS · 2-19, 4-26, 4-27Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements · 3-9, 5-

6Administrative Control · 4-7, 4-8, 4-10Administrative Law · v, 2-3, 1, 5-8Advocate · i, iii, v, vii, ix, x, 1-1, 1-4, 1-9, 2-1, 2-2, 2-

3, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-10, 2-11, 2-14, 2-15, 3-2, 4-21,4-33, 4-40, 1, 5-7, 5-11, 5-21, 5-23, 5-25, 8-9, 1-2,1-3, 1-4, 1

Agency · iii, vi, 2-1, 2-3, 4-6, 7-1, 7-5, 7-8, 7-12, 7-13AJAG · 2-3, 2-4, 2-5Alliance · 4-6ALLS · 2-5AO · 4-3Area Support Group · 4-23ARFOR · 4-7Arms Control · v, 1, 6-7Army Battle Command System · 2-19, 4-26, 4-30Army Law Library Service · 2-5, 2-12Army National Guard · iii, x, 2-1, 2-3, 2-6, 2-7, 7-3, 7-

13Army of Excellence · 3-6, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-14,

5-10, 5-15Army Reserve · iii, x, 2-1, 2-3, 2-7, 2-10, 5-5Army Service Component Command · v, 4-23, 4-24,

1, 5-9, 5-13ARNG · 2-6, 2-18, 5-7ASCC · 4-7, 4-23, 4-25, 5-9, 5-13, 5-14Assistant Judge Advocate General · 2-3, 2-4, 2-5Automation · iv, 2-19, 1, 4-25, 4-26

B

Battle Command Training Program · 5-26BCTP · 5-26BOLT · 2-13, 4-27, 4-35, 4-40, 4-41, 5-21, 5-22, 5-24Brigade · v, 2-13, 2-16, 3-2, 3-4, 1, 5-12, 5-16, 5-17,

5-21, 5-22, 5-23, 8-9Brigade Judge Advocate · 5-21, 5-23, 8-9Brigade Operational Law Team · 2-13, 5-12, 5-21

C

C2 · iii, v, vi, 1-2, 1-6, 2-16, 3-1, 4-26, 4-27, 1, 5-4, 5-5, 5-12, 5-13, 5-15, 5-17, 5-22, 5-24, 1, 6-5, 6-6, 6-10

Center for Law and Military Operations · 2-3, 2-5, 2-16, 2-18, 2-19, 3-3, 4-25, 4-28, 5-26, 1, 7-3

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff · 2-15, 4-4, 6-12,6-13, 7-11, 8-2, 8-7, 1, 1-6, 1-7

Chemical Weapons Convention · 5-5Chief Legal Noncommissioned Officer · 2-10, 2-12

CINC · 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-21, 4-36, 5-9, 7-9, 8-10

Civil Affairs · iv, 1, 4-38, 4-39, 6-14Civil Disturbance · vi, 7-7, 7-9, 8-7Civil Law · v, 2-3, 2-5, 4-21, 1, 5-8Civil Military Operations · 3-13Civil Military Operations Center · 4-6, 6-6Civilian · 2-12, 2-14, 4-41, 7-8, 8-4CJA · 2-14, 4-23, 4-28, 4-40, 4-41, 5-12, 5-13CJCS · vi, 4-7, 4-25, 6-12, 7-4, 7-8, 7-9, 1, 8-7, 8-8,

8-10Claims · v, 1-3, 2-1, 2-2, 2-5, 3-11, 3-12, 3-13, 4-33,

1, 5-8, 7-11CLAMO · 2-3, 2-5, 2-16, 2-18, 2-19, 3-3, 4-25, 4-28,

5-26, 1, 7-3CLNCO · 2-8, 2-10, 2-12, 3-2, 4-27, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15,

5-17, 5-18, 5-25CMOC · 4-6, 6-6COCOM · 4-7, 4-8Combat Service Support · viii, 1-9Combat Service Support Control System · 1-9Combat Zone · iv, 1, 4-3Command · iii, iv, v, vii, x, 1-1, 3, 1-6, 2-1, 2-8, 2-11,

2-14, 2-15, 2-19, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-14, 1, 4-2, 4-4,4-5, 4-6, 4-8, 4-18, 4-23, 4-24, 4-26, 4-30, 4-33, 4-34, 4-38, 1, 5-4, 5-9, 5-10, 5-11, 5-13, 5-15, 5-22,5-24, 5-26, 1, 6-3, 6-5, 6-8, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-15,7-5, 7-12, 8-10, 8-11, 1

Command and Control · iii, v, vi, 1-2, 1-6, 2-16, 3-1,4-26, 4-27, 1, 5-4, 5-5, 5-12, 5-13, 5-15, 5-17, 5-22, 5-24, 1, 6-5, 6-6, 6-10

Command Judge Advocate · iii, 2-1, 2-14Command Post · v, 2-11, 2-19, 3-2, 4-27, 1, 5-10, 5-

11, 5-12, 5-15, 5-18, 5-22, 5-23, 5-24Commander · vi, 2-4, 2-15, 4-5, 4-11, 4-20, 4-23, 4-

24, 4-34, 5-10, 5-11, 5-12, 7-9, 1, 8-2, 8-8, 8-11, 8-13

Communications Zone · iv, 1, 4-3Continental United States Army · 2-10, 2-18Contract Law · 2-3, 4-21CONUS · 2-6, 2-7, 2-10, 2-18, 2-19, 4-21, 4-28, 4-33,

5-7CONUSA · 2-10, 2-18Core Legal Discipline · i, viii, 1-1

administrative law · viii, 1-2, 1-4, 2-8, 2-15, 3-1, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 4-31, 4-35, 5-24

civil law · viii, 1-2, 1-4, 2-8, 2-15, 3-1, 3-9, 3-11, 4-31, 4-35, 4-42, 7-5

claims · vii, viii, 1-2, 4, 1-4, 1-9, 2-2, 2-5, 2-8, 2-11, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-19, 2-20, 3-1, 3-11, 3-12,3-13, 4-27, 4-29, 4-31, 4-32, 4-35, 4-41, 1, 5-6,5-8, 5-24, 6-9, 6-11, 7-6

international law · vii, viii, 1-2, 1-4, 1-8, 1-10, 2-2,2-16, 3-1, 3-2, 3-6, 3-7, 3-9, 4-22, 4-31, 4-35, 4-38, 4-39, 5-4, 5-5, 6-5, 6-10, 6-13, 1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-5

legal assistance · vii, viii, 1-2, 1-4, 2-8, 2-11, 2-12,2-14, 2-15, 3-1, 3-13, 3-14, 3-15, 4-27, 4-29, 4-31, 4-35, 4-38, 1, 5-6, 5-7, 5-24, 1

FM 27-100

Index-2

military justice · vii, viii, 1-2, 1-4, 2-1, 2-8, 2-11, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-20, 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 4-29, 4-31, 4-32, 4-35, 4-38, 5-6

Corps · i, vii, ix, 1-1, 2-5, 2-11, 4-4, 4-24, 4-39, 5-14,5-15, 5-21, 7-12, 8-2, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4

Corps Support Command · 4-24COSCOM · 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 4-24, 5-14, 5-15Counsel · iii, 2-1, 2-8, 2-15, 3-4, 3-5, 3-15, 5-14Counselor · iii, 1-1, 1-5Counter-Drug · v, vi, 1, 6-7, 7-10Counterterrorism · 4-36, 6-7Country Team · 4-6, 6-6Court-Martial · 5-5CP · 3-2, 4-27, 5-10, 5-11, 5-12, 5-15, 5-18, 5-22, 5-

23, 5-24CSS · viii, 4-15CSSCS · 1-9

D

Deep Operations Coordination Cell · 5-12, 8-2, 8-9, 8-10

Department of Defense · 2-2, 2-11, 2-18, 3-6, 3-11, 3-12, 4-38, 4-41, 5-5, 6-6, 6-13, 7-1, 7-4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-8, 7-9, 7-10, 7-11, 7-12, 7-13, 7-14, 8-2, 8-4

Department of Justice · 3-10, 7-8, 7-13, 7-14Department of State · 6-6Deputy Staff Judge Advocate · 2-10, 2-11, 2-13, 2-19,

4-20, 4-27, 4-33, 4-34, 4-35, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-17, 5-21, 5-25

Digitized Division · 5-10, 5-11DOCC · 5-12, 8-9, 8-10DoD · 2-2, 2-11, 2-18, 3-6, 3-11, 3-12, 4-41, 5-5, 6-6,

6-13, 7-1, 7-4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-8, 7-9, 7-10, 7-11, 7-12,7-13, 7-14, 8-4

DoD Law of War Program · 2-2, 2-11DoJ · 3-10, 7-8, 7-13, 7-14DoS · 6-6, 7-11DSJA · 2-10, 2-11, 2-13, 2-19, 4-20, 4-27, 4-33, 4-34,

4-35, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-17, 5-21, 5-25Duties · 7-6

E

Environmental Law · 2-3, 3-10Exclusion Zones · v, 1, 6-7

F

Federal Emergency Management Agency · 7-5, 7-13FEMA · 7-5, 7-13, 7-14Field Operating Agencies · iii, 2-1, 2-3, 2-16Fiscal Law · 2-5Force Projection · iv, 1, 4-21Force XXI · ix, 3-6, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-14, 4-26,

5-10Foreign Claims · 3-13, 5-8

FORSCOM · 2-6, 2-10, 2-18, 4-25, 5-25, 7-9FRAGO · 4-15Functional Areas · vii

G

GCSS-A · 1-9, 2-19General Order · viiGeneva Conventions · i, 4-33, 5-8, 8-2, 8-13

H

Humanitarian Assistance · v, 1, 6-7

I

ICRC · 3-7Information Operations · ix, 2-16, 3-2, 5-5, 5-11, 5-18,

8-2, 8-9Intelligence · vi, 4-19, 5-13, 1, 6-15Interagency · iii, v, vi, 1-6, 4-6, 1, 6-6, 6-12, 8-4International · iii, v, vi, 1-1, 1-7, 2-3, 2-5, 2-19, 3-6, 3-

7, 4-6, 4-41, 1, 5-8, 1, 6-8, 6-12International Committee of the Red Cross · 3-7, 6-12International law · 3-6Interpret-Draft-Disseminate-Train · 8-9IO · 5-5, 5-18

J

JAGC · i, viii, ix, 1-1, 1-9, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-10, 3-15, 4-21, 4-25, 4-28, 5-9, 5-14, 5-17, 7-12

JAGSO · x, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 4-40JCS · 8-7Joint Chiefs of Staff · iii, 2-1, 2-14, 2-15, 4-4, 6-12, 6-

13, 7-4, 7-8, 7-11, 8-2, 8-3, 8-7, 1, 1-6, 1-7Joint Command · 6-6Joint Force · 3-4, 4-2, 4-5, 4-23, 1-7Joint Force Commander · 3-4, 4-5, 4-23Joint Military Commission · 2-19, 6-10, 6-12, 6-15Joint Operations · 4-6, 4-12, 8-11Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan · 4-7Joint Task Force · iii, 2-1, 2-15, 4-5, 4-23, 4-25, 4-36,

7-11, 7-12, 8-9, 8-10JTF · 2-15, 4-5, 4-25, 4-36, 7-11, 8-10Judge · i, iii, v, vi, vii, ix, x, 1-1, 1-2, 3, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5,

1-6, 1-8, 1-9, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-9,2-10, 2-11, 2-12, 2-14, 2-15, 2-16, 2-19, 2-20, 3-2,3-4, 3-5, 3-15, 4-4, 4-5, 4-8, 4-20, 4-21, 4-23, 4-26,4-29, 4-31, 4-33, 4-36, 4-38, 4-40, 1, 5-4, 5-6, 5-7,5-10, 5-11, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-17, 5-18, 5-21, 5-22, 5-23, 5-24, 5-25, 6-3, 7-1, 7-3, 7-5, 7-13,8-9, 8-13, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1

Judge Advocate · i, iii, v, vi, vii, ix, x, 1-1, 1-9, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-10, 2-11, 2-14, 2-15, 3-2, 3-


Index-3

3, 3-15, 4-5, 4-15, 4-20, 4-21, 4-33, 4-38, 4-39, 4-40, 1, 5-7, 5-11, 5-12, 5-13, 5-17, 5-18, 5-21, 5-23,5-24, 5-25, 7-3, 8-9, 8-10, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1

Judge Advocate General Service Organization · x, 2-7,2-8, 2-9, 4-40

Judge Advocate General’s Corps · i, viii, ix, 1-1, 1-9,2-6, 2-7, 2-10, 3-15, 4-21, 4-25, 4-28, 5-9, 5-14, 5-17, 7-12

Judge Advocate General's Corps · 1-1, 2-5

L

LAAWS · 1-9, 2-19, 4-26, 4-27, 5-13, 5-14, 5-17Law of the Flag · 6-11, 6-12Law of War · i, vii, 2-2, 2-11, 3-6, 3-7, 2, 4-15, 5-4, 5-

11, 8-12Lead Agency · vi, 7-1, 7-5, 7-8, 7-12Legal Administrator · 2-10, 2-12, 2-13, 3-2, 4-27, 5-

25Legal Assistance · v, 2-2, 2-3, 3-13, 3-15, 4-33, 1, 5-9Legal Automated Army-Wide System · 1-9, 2-19, 4-

26, 4-27, 5-13, 5-14, 5-17Legal Organizations · iii, 2-1, 2-6, 2-7Legal Specialist · 2-8, 2-13Legal Support Organization · 2-7, 2-10, 2-18, 4-33, 4-

34, 4-35, 4-36, 5-7, 7-3Legal Support Team · 2-7, 2-8, 2-10Legitimacy · iii, 1-1, 1-2, 1-10Liaison · 4-8, 4-10LOGCAP · 3-9, 5-6, 6-14Logistics Civil Augmentation Program · 3-9, 5-6, 6-14LOW · vii, 3-6, 3-7, 4-15, 5-11LSO · 2-7, 2-10, 2-18, 4-33, 4-34, 4-35, 4-36, 5-7, 7-3LST · 2-7, 2-8, 2-10

M

Main CP · 3-2, 5-11Maneuver Control System · 1-9, 2-19Materiel · 4-5MDMP · iv, 1, 4-12, 4-18, 4-19, 4-20, 5-4, 5-12METL · iv, ix, 1, 4-32, 4-33, 4-34, 4-35, 5-25METT-TC · vi, 2-19, 4-4, 4-13, 5-11, 5-12, 5-14, 5-

16, 5-17, 5-21, 7-3, 8-4, 8-12Military Decision Making Process · 4-18, 4-19, 4-20,

5-4, 5-12Military Decision-Making Process · 4-18Military Justice · v, 1-4, 2-1, 2-4, 2-11, 3-3, 4-29, 4-

33, 1, 5-8Military Operations Other Than War · v, 5-3, 5-4, 5-6,

5-7, 5-17, 1, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-8, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16, 1, 8-2, 8-5, 8-14, 1

Military Support to Civil Authorities · vi, 7-4Mission · iii, iv, v, vii, ix, 1-1, 1-2, 1-8, 3-5, 1, 4-6, 4-

11, 4-13, 4-17, 4-20, 4-32, 5-17, 1, 6-5, 6-6, 6-10,8-4

Mission Essential Task List · iv, ix, 1, 4-32, 4-33, 4-34, 4-35, 5-25

Mission Rehearsal Exercise · 6-16Mobility · iv, 1, 4-28Mobilization Support Organization · 2-8, 3-14, 3-15,

4-33, 4-34, 4-35, 4-36, 5-7MOOTW · v, 5-3, 5-4, 5-6, 5-7, 5-17, 1, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5,

6-6, 6-8, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16,1, 8-2, 8-5, 8-14, 1

MRE · 6-16MSO · 2-8, 3-14, 3-15, 4-33, 4-34, 4-35, 4-36, 5-7

N

Nation Assistance · v, 1, 6-8National Command Authorities · 3, 2-15, 4-4, 4-41, 6-

3, 6-5, 6-8, 6-11, 7-5, 7-12, 7-13, 8-8, 8-10, 8-11National Guard Bureau · x, 2-6, 7-11National Military Strategy · viii, 4-4, 1-6, 1-7National Security Strategy · viii, 1-6, 4-3, 4-4, 7-13, 1-

6NCA · 3, 2-15, 4-4, 4-41, 6-3, 6-5, 6-8, 6-11, 7-5, 7-

12, 7-13, 8-8, 8-10, 8-11

O

Office of the Judge Advocate General · 2-1, 2-3, 2-16,2-18, 4-25, 6-12

Office of The Judge Advocate General · iii, 2-1OPCON · 2-6, 4-8, 4-17, 4-36, 4-40, 8-11Operation · vi, 2-18, 4-16, 1, 6-6, 6-9, 6-11Operation Plan · 3-3, 3-8, 4-15, 4-18, 4-19, 8-11, 8-13Operational Control · 2-6, 4-8, 4-17, 4-36, 4-40, 8-11Operational Law · i, iii, vii, 1-1, 2-1, 2-3, 2-5, 2-13, 2-

16, 2-19, 2, 4-29, 5-12, 5-21, 6-10, 6-12, 6-14, 7-3Operations Law · iv, 2-16, 2-18, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-9, 3-

15, 4-5, 4-15, 4-20, 4-21, 4-22, 4-23, 4-27, 4-28, 4-32, 4-36, 4-38, 4-39, 4-40, 5-4, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-11,5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-17, 5-18, 5-21, 5-22, 5-24, 5-25, 5-26, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13, 6-14, 6-15,6-16, 7-1, 8-2, 8-9, 8-10, 8-15

Operations Order · 3-3, 4-15, 4-16, 4-17, 4-18, 4-20,8-11, 8-13

OPLAN · 3-3, 3-8, 4-15, 4-18, 4-19, 8-11, 8-13OPLAW · i, iii, iv, vii, 1-1, 2-1, 2-3, 2-5, 2-13, 2-16,

2-18, 2-19, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-9, 3-15, 2, 4-5, 4-15, 4-20, 4-21, 4-22, 4-23, 4-27, 4-28, 4-29, 4-32, 4-36,4-38, 4-39, 4-40, 5-4, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-11, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-17, 5-18, 5-21, 5-22, 5-24, 5-25,5-26, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16, 7-1,7-3, 8-2, 8-9, 8-10, 8-15

OPLAW Judge Advocate · 3-2OPORD · 3-3, 4-15, 4-16, 4-17, 4-18, 4-20, 8-11, 8-

13Order · 4-16, 8-2OTJAG · iii, 2-1, 2-3, 2-16, 2-18, 4-25, 6-12Overseas Presence · iv, 1, 4-21

FM 27-100

Index-4

P

PDD · 7-13Peace Enforcement · 6-4, 6-9Peace Operations · v, ix, 1, 6-8Peacekeeping · 6-4, 6-9Personnel Claims · 5-8Personnel Service Support · v, 4-29, 1, 5-4, 5-6Planning · iv, 2-18, 1, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-20, 4-22, 4-

35, 4-41, 8-9, 8-10, 8-11Plans · 2-16, 3-2, 4-12, 4-15, 5-12Presidential Decision Directive · 7-13Private Voluntary Organizations · 1-7PSS · v, 4-29, 1, 5-4, 5-6PVO · 1-7

R

RAMP · 8-14RC · 4-33, 4-35, 5-7, 5-25RDL · x, 1-9, 2-13, 2-19, 3-13, 4-26, 4-27, 4-28, 4-38,

5-13, 5-14, 5-17, 6-16Rear CP · 3-2Recovery Operations · v, 1, 6-9Regional Support Commands · 2-10, 2-18, 5-7Reserve Component · 4-33, 4-35, 5-7, 5-25ROE · vi, 2-16, 3-2, 3-3, 4-15, 5-5, 5-11, 5-12, 5-18,

1, 6-3, 6-5, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13, 6-14, 6-15,6-16, 7-6, 7-12, 1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4, 8-5, 8-6, 8-7, 8-8,8-9, 8-10, 8-11, 8-12, 8-13, 8-14, 8-15

RSC · 2-18Rucksack Deployable Law Office and Library · x, 1-9,

2-13, 2-19, 3-13, 4-26, 4-27, 4-28, 4-38, 5-13, 5-14, 5-17, 6-16

Rules of Engagement · vi, 2-16, 3-2, 3-3, 4-15, 5-5, 5-11, 5-12, 5-18, 1, 6-3, 6-5, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16, 7-6, 7-12, 1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4, 8-5, 8-6, 8-7, 8-8, 8-9, 8-10, 8-11, 8-12, 8-13, 8-14,8-15

S

SECDEF · 4-4, 4-5, 4-7, 7-4, 7-10, 7-11, 7-12Secretary of Defense · 4-4, 4-5, 4-7, 7-4, 7-10, 7-11,

7-12Secretary of the Army · 2-1, 2-2, 3-12, 4-7, 5-5, 7-4Service · iii, v, viii, x, 1-1, 1-2, 3, 1-9, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-

5, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 2-12, 3-4, 3-12, 4-18, 4-23, 4-24,4-29, 4-40, 1, 5-4, 5-6, 5-9, 5-13, 5-15, 6-9

Show of Force · v, 1, 6-9SJA · i, iii, iv, ix, 1-9, 2-1, 2-3, 2-6, 2-9, 2-10, 2-11, 2-

12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-16, 2-19, 2-20, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-15, 1, 4-20, 4-21, 4-23, 4-25, 4-26, 4-27, 4-28, 4-29, 4-31, 4-32, 4-33,4-34, 4-35, 4-36, 4-38, 4-39, 4-40, 4-41, 5-4, 5-7,5-9, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-17, 5-18, 5-21,

5-24, 5-25, 5-26, 6-12, 6-14, 6-15, 7-3, 8-9, 8-13,8-14, 1

SOFA · 5-6, 6-9Soldier Readiness Processing · 2-10, 2-14, 2-18, 3-14,

3-15SOP · 4-16, 4-18, 4-20, 5-10, 8-13Special Operations · iv, ix, 1, 4-2, 4-36, 4-37, 4-38, 5-

24, 6-8, 6-15SROE · 6-12, 6-13, 7-6, 7-12, 8-3, 8-5, 8-7, 8-8, 8-9,

8-10, 8-11, 8-12, 8-14SRP · 2-10, 2-14, 2-18, 3-14, 3-15Staff Judge Advocate · i, iii, iv, ix, 1-9, 2-1, 2-3, 2-6,

2-9, 2-10, 2-11, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-16, 2-19,2-20, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-15,1, 4-20, 4-21, 4-23, 4-25, 4-26, 4-27, 4-28, 4-29, 4-31, 4-32, 4-33, 4-34, 4-35, 4-36, 4-38, 4-39, 4-40,4-41, 5-4, 5-7, 5-9, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-17, 5-18, 5-21, 5-24, 5-25, 5-26, 6-12, 6-14, 6-15,7-3, 8-9, 8-13, 8-14, 1

Standing Operating Procedure · 4-16, 4-18, 4-20, 5-10, 8-13

STARC · 2-6, 2-18, 5-7State Area Command · x, 2-6Status of Forces · vi, 5-6, 1, 6-9, 6-11Status of Forces Agreement · 6-9Status of Forces Agreements · 5-6Strikes · v, 1, 6-9Sustainment · v, vii, 4-27, 1, 5-4, 5-5

T

TAACOM · 3-6, 3-10, 4-23, 4-24, 5-13, 5-14TAC CP · 3-2, 4-27, 5-10, 5-11, 5-12, 5-18, 5-23TACON · 4-8Tactical Control · 4-8Tailoring · iii, 2-1, 2-19TAJAG · 2-3Targeting · 3-2, 4-5, 4-41, 5-12TDS · 2-3, 2-5, 2-9, 3-4, 5-15Technical Channel · iv, 1, 4-24Terrorism · v, vi, 1, 6-7, 7-13The Assistant Judge Advocate General · 2-3The Judge Advocate General’s School · 2-1, 2-5, 2-6,

2-16, 2-18, 2-19, 4-25, 4-28, 4-36, 7-3Theater · iv, v, vi, ix, 3-6, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-14, 1, 4-

5, 4-6, 4-23, 4-24, 1, 5-9, 6-5, 7-1, 8-2TJAG · i, iii, vii, 2-1, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-10, 2-20, 3-

3, 3-12, 4-21TJAGSA · 2-1, 2-5, 2-6, 2-16, 2-18, 2-19, 4-25, 4-28,

4-36, 7-3Training · iv, vi, ix, 2-6, 2-7, 3-2, 3-12, 1, 4-25, 4-28,

4-30, 4-31, 4-35, 5-25, 5-26, 6-8, 6-13, 6-15, 6-16,7-3, 1

Trial Defense Service · 2-3, 2-5, 2-9, 3-4, 5-15Trial Judiciary · 2-1, 2-4, 2-7, 2-9, 3-4, 5-14TSC · 3-6, 3-10, 4-23, 4-24, 5-13, 5-14


Index-5

U

Unified Command Plan · 4-4Uniform Code of Military Justice · 1-4, 2-1, 2-4, 2-9,

2-11, 3-3, 4-29, 4-33, 5-8United Nations · 2-15, 6-6, 6-10, 6-12, 8-12US Army Claims Service · 2-1, 2-5, 2-18, 3-12, 3-13

US Army Legal Services Agency · 2-1, 2-3, 4, 2-4, 2-9, 2-16, 2-18, 3-10, 5-9

USAR · 2-18, 5-6

W

War Powers Resolution · 5-9Weapons of Mass Destruction · 7-13


Endnotes-1

1 In this manual, "operations" include war and MOOTW, but not garrison operations.2 See DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS at v (1993).3 See generally MAJOR PAUL H. HERBERT, COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE, LEAVENWORTH PAPER NO. 16,DECIDING WHAT HAS TO BE DONE: GENERAL WILLIAM E. DEPUY AND THE 1976 EDITION OF FM 100-5,OPERATIONS 3-9 (1988) (describing the function of doctrine in an army and charting the modern practice ofpublishing doctrine in manuals).4 TIMOTHY T. LUPFER, COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE, LEAVENWORTH PAPER NO. 4, THE DYNAMICS OFDOCTRINE: THE CHANGES IN GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 55 (1981).5 KNOWLEDGE AND SPEED: BATTLE FORCE AND THE U.S. ARMY OF 2025, THE 1998 ANNUAL REPORT ONTHE ARMY AFTER NEXT PROJECT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, Headquarters, U.S. Army Trainingand Doctrine Command, (7 December 1998).6 Major General Walter B. Huffman, Address at the Judge Advocate General’s Corps World WideContinuing Legal Education Plenary Session (October 1997).7 THE ARMY LAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, 1775-1975, 12-13 (1975).8 417 U.S. 733, 742 (1974) (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955), Orloff v.Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953), and Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)).9 DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY VISION 2010, 2. Represented by the acronym LDRSHIP.10 DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS (June 1993).11 See THE ARMY LAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, 1775-1975, 105(1975).12 LTC Michelle M. Miller, Former Task Force Eagle Staff Judge Advocate, 1998-1999.13 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT at Canons 1 to 7 (1972).14 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-26, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS at Rules 3.1 to 4.4(1 May 1992).15 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, 8.16 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, ExecutiveSummary, The Strategy, Elements of Strategy, Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crises (1997).17 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY VISION 2010, 5.18 See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ONE TEAM – ONE FIGHT – ONE FUTURE, 8; Search of RequirementsDocument System, Department of the Army (21 Sep 1999).19 THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 7 (October 1998).20 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, EXECUTIVESUMMARY, Executive Summary, The Strategy, National Military Objectives (1997).21 See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY VISION 2010, 8,922 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, The JointForce, Characteristics of a Full Spectrum Force (1997); CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINTVISION 2010, 9.23 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, The JointForce, Characteristics of a Full Spectrum Force, Interoperable (1997).24 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, 28-29.

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 2

25 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, ExecutiveSummary, The Strategic Environment – Opportunities and Challenges (1997).26 THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 13 (October 1998).27 See THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 14-22 (October 1998).28 THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 22 (October 1998).29 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, 31.30 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ONE TEAM – ONE FIGHT – ONE FUTURE, 13.31 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, 11.32 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, 13-15.33 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, LEGAL ASSISTANCE, Paragraph 2-3 – Legal Assistance Offices(10 March 1989).34 See THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 2 (October 1998).35 THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 13 (October 1998).36 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1 – The JudgeAdvocate General (3 February 1995).37 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-2 – TheAssistant Judge Advocate General (TAJAG) (3 February 1995).38 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-3 – TheAssistant Judge Advocate General for Civil Law and Litigation (AJAG/CLL) (3 February 1995).39 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-4 – TheAssistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and Operations (AJAG/MLO) (3 February 1995).40 See 10 U.S.C. section 806b; Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations at 2-3 & 4-32 (31 May 1997).41 Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations at 2-3 & 4-32 (31 May 1997).42 See 10 U.S.C. section 806b; Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations at I-3 (31 May 1997).43 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, paragraph 5-2,Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (3 February 1995).44 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (24 February1995); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for LegalSupport of Military Operations (detailing the organization and responsibilities of joint and joint legalorganizations) (to be published).45 See, e.g., ARMY LAW., August 1995, at 40-41 (describing the multinational headquarters and legal staff ofthe United Nations Mission in Haiti); and CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1994-1998, at 210-213 (diagramming multinational legalorganizations in IFOR and SFOR) (13 November 1998).46 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 43-53; Army Law., August 1995, at 40-42; Center for Law and MilitaryOperations, Law and Military Operations in Haiti, 1994-1995, at 16, 45, & n.32 (11 December 1995); andCenter for Law and Military Operations, Law and Military Operations in the Balkans, 1994-1995, at 43, &209-213 (13 November 1998).47 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 500-5, ARMY MOBILIZATION, ANNEX L, LEGAL SERVICES (19 June1998).


Endnotes-3

48 DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1v –Responsibilities for assignment and direction of members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, and 3-2b,Use of judge advocate officers (3 February 1995).49 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, United States (1995 edition), Part I (Preamble), Paragraph 3.50 DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, Paragraph 1-4 – Responsibilities (24 June1996).51 See 10 U.S.C. A. section 806b (West 1998).52 See 10 U.S.C. A. section 806, 834, and 860 (West 1998); DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-10, MILITARYJUSTICE, Paragraph 3-3 – Action by the superior authority (24 June 1996).53 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, Chapter 5 – Procedures for Courts-Martial;Paragraph 18-6 – General; and Paragraph 19-7 – Course development and Instruction (24 June 1996).54 DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, Paragraph 6-3 – Organization (24 June 1996).55 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, Paragraph 8-1d – Chief Trial Judge;Paragraph 8-6 – Detailing of military judges; Paragraph 8-8 – Rules of court; Paragraph 9-4 – Supervisionof military magistrates (24 June 1996).56 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, Paragraph 8-4 – Functions and duties ofmilitary judges (24 June 1996).57 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, Paragraph 9-3 – Powers of militarymagistrates (24 June 1996).58 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Chapter 20 (1998); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998, at 170-181 (1998).59 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 20-1 through 20-3 (1998); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998, at 170-173 (1998).60 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 20-2 (1998); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998, at 173-174 (1998).61 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS1995-1998, at 173-174 (1998).62 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS1995-1998, at 178 (1998).63 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1g –International and Operational Law responsibilities (3 February 1995).64 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1g –International and Operational Law responsibilities (describing TJAG’s international law responsibilities);Paragraph 5-2a – Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (stating in subparagraph a – General, that“the supervisory JA has responsibilities generally corresponding to those discharged by TJAG with relationto HQDA,” and describing in subparagraph a(7) the international law responsibilities of the supervisory JA)(3 February 1995); DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS, Paragraph 1-9e –International Law (3 September 1991); INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 2-1 (1998);CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998, at 76 (1998).

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 4

65 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS1995-1998, at 79 (1998).66 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS1995-1998, at 121 (1998).67 See DEP’T OF ARMY REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1 – The JudgeAdvocate General, subparagraph e (3 February 1995).68 See DEP’T OF ARMY REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1 – The JudgeAdvocate General, Paragraph 2-1z − Ethics responsibilities, and Paragraph 5-2 – Responsibilities ofsupervisory judge advocates (3 February 1995).69 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, Page 184 (13 November 1998).70 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, Page 182 (concerning family care plans) (13 November 1998).71 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, Page 185 (concerning foreign gifts) (13 November 1998).72 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, Page 185-6 (13 November 1998).73 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, Page 186 (13 November 1998).74 See DEP’T OF ARMY REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1 – The JudgeAdvocate General, subparagraphs h, i, k, m, n, o, and w, (describing patents, copyrights, inventions, tradesecrets, procurement fraud, trademarks, and regulatory law, in addition to contract, fiscal, andenvironmental law) and Paragraph 5-2 – Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (3 February 1995).75 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 5-2a(3)(a) –Contracts (stating that the supervisory judge advocate’s contract law responsibilities include “acquisitionplanning, contract formation, bid protests, contract performance, contract dispute litigation, fiscal law,procurement fraud and oversight of procurement fraud programs, taxation, government furnished property(GFP), labor standard compliance, real property, non-appropriated funds (NAFs), commercial activities andbankruptcy.”) (3 February 1995); OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEP’T OF ARMY, LEGALSERVICES STUDY REPORT, Volume II – Subcommittee Reports, Section C – Contract and Fiscal Law,Paragraph 6 – Functional Tasks (March 1998).76 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 15-4 – Principlesof contract law practice (3 February 1995).77 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 200-1, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT, Glossary(citing the elements of the environment) (21 February 1997).78 See DEP’T OF ARMY REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1 – The JudgeAdvocate General, subparagraph w, and Paragraph 5-2 – Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (3February 1995); DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 200-1, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT,Paragraph 1.17 – The Judge Advocate General (21 February 1997).79 See, e.g., DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 15-1 –General (stating, “it is important that commanders and their contracting officers receive the best possiblelegal support in planning, executing, and administering these contracts, from definition of the requirementthrough contract close-out, including disputes and contract litigation.”) (3 February 1995).80 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 14-10 (1998) (citing DEP’T OF DEFENSE,JOINT PUB. 4-04, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CIVIL ENGINEERING SUPPORT, II-8 (26 September 1995)).


Endnotes-5

81 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS1995-1998, at 168 (1998).82 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS1995-1998, at 53 and 142-154 (1998).83 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS1995-1998, at 143-144 (1998).84 See, e.g., DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 15-5a –Disputes support (3 February 1995).85 DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-1 – Purpose (quoted language relating to thepurpose of the Army Claims System) (31 December 1997); see also OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL, DEP’T OF ARMY, LEGAL SERVICES STUDY REPORT, Volume II – Subcommittee Reports, SectionB – Claims, General Description of Function, subparagraph a (March 1998); DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL 27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS, Paragraph 1-9b – Claims (3 September 1991).86 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23-1 (1998).87 See OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEP’T OF ARMY, LEGAL SERVICES STUDY REPORT,Volume II – Subcommittee Reports, Section B – Claims, General Description of Function, subparagraph b(March 1998).88 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-5 – Command and organizationalrelationships (31 December 1997).89 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1j – Claimsresponsibilities (3 February 1995); DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-5 –Command and organizational relationships (31 December 1997).90 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1j – Claimsresponsibilities (3 February 1995); DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-9 – TheCommander, USARCS (31 December 1997).91 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 5-2 –Responsibilities of supervisory judge advocates (3 February 1995); DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20,CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-17 – Operations of claims components (31 December 1997).92 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-17 – Operations of claims components(31 December 1997).93 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 1-17 – Operations of claims components(31 December 1997).94 See OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEP’T OF ARMY, LEGAL SERVICES STUDY REPORT,Volume II – Subcommittee Reports, Section B – Claims, Environment in Which Services Are Performed,subparagraph a (March 1998).95 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS, Paragraph 2-2d(1)(a) (31 December 1997); DEP’T OFARMY, PAMPHLET 27-162, CLAIMS, Paragraph 2-2c(4) – Unit Claims Officers, and Paragraph 2-34a – UnitClaims Officer (1 April 1998); INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23-6, 18(1998).96 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23-19 (1998).97 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Pages 23-4, 7, & 20 (1998); CENTER FOR LAW AND

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 6

MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, Pages 154-5, 9(describing the effect of international agreements concerning Bosnia on the investigation, processing, andadjudication of claims during Operation Joint Endeavor), and Page 162 (recommending establishment ofpolicy concerning what property will be deemed reasonable to possess in theater for purposes of thePersonnel Claims Act) (13 November 1998).98 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23-6, 18 (1998).99 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23-19 (1998).100 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23-19, 20 (1998).101 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, Page 161 (13 November 1998).102 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23-18 through 20 (1998); CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, Page158 (13 November 1998).103 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 23-8 (1998); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, Page 157-8 (13November 1998).104 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, Page 181 (quoting CPT Nicole Farmer, Chief of Legal Assistance, 1st Armored Division Fwd)(13 November 1998).105 See 10 U.S.C.A. section 1044 (West 1998).106 DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICES, Paragraph 2-1l – Legalassistance responsibilities (3 February 1995); see also DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, ARMY LEGALASSISTANCE PROGRAM, Paragraph 2-1a – General (10 September 1995).107 INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 22-1(1998).108 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, Paragraph 3-2 – Types oflegal assistance services (10 September 1995).109 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, Paragraph 3-7 – Types ofservices (10 September 1995).110 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, Paragraph 3-6 – Types ofcases (10 September 1995).111 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, Page 181 (13 November 1998).112 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, Paragraph 3-3 – General,and Paragraph 3-4 – Preventive law measures (10 September 1995).113 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, Paragraph 2-1b(1) –Readiness (10 September 1995).114 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Pages 13-3 and 13-10 (1998).


Endnotes-7

115 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Pages 22-1 through 22-8 (1998).116 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, Page 183 (13 November 1998).117 See DEP’T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, Paragraph 1-4c – (10September 1995); see CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998, Page 181 (noting Trial Defense Counsel support for legal assistance) (13November 1998).118 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, Page 183 (noting an extensive tax program despite the availability of filing extensions) (13November 1998).119 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 22-9 (1998).120 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Page 22-9 (1998).121 Daniel K. Bolger, Savage Peace: Americans At War In The 1990s 92 (1995).122 Lieutenant Colonel David E. Graham, Operational Law (OPLAW): A Concept Comes of Age, Army L.,Jul. 1987, at 9.123 Unless otherwise noted, the terms used in this chapter are defined at various places in the followingreferences. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY ANDASSOCIATED TERMS (1 Dec. 1989) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 1-02]; DEP'T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUB. 3-0,DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS (1 Feb. 1995) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 3-0]; DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL 100-7, DECISIVE FORCE: THE ARMY IN THEATER OPERATIONS (1995). There are frequently minordifferences in the definitions cited, and the decision to side with one definition or another has been madebased on factors such as specificity of context and currency of the publication or definition.124 See generally FM 100-7, Chapter 1, supra note 123.125 The dominant geographic characteristic of a littoral theater is a peninsula or coastline. See FM 100-7,supra note 123, at 2-18; JOINT PUB. 3-0, supra note 3, at IV-17.126 See FM 100-7, supra note 123, at v.127 See generally FM 100-7, Chapter 2, supra note 123.128 See JOINT PUB. 1-02, supra note 123, at 89. The 1991 version of FM 27-100 discussed the COMMZand the CZ in Chapter 5. See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS (1991)[hereinafter FM 27- 100].129 JOINT PUB 1-02, DEP’T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS at 117 (23March 1994, as amended through 6 April 1999).130 See FM 100-7, supra note 123, at 2-21.131 This essential distinction appears in Chapter 7 of the May 1996 Draft FM 27-100. See THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, DEVELOPMENTS, DOCTRINE, AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT, FIELDMANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS 7-2 (May 1996) (Draft) [hereinafter MAY 1996 DRAFT].132 This summary is adapted from FM 100-7, supra note 123, at 2-3.133 See discussion of the METT-TC factors in FM 100-7, Chapter 3 supra note 123.134 See generally DEP'T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUB. 0-2, UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (24 February 1995).

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 8

135 JOINT PUB 1-02, DEP’T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS at 86 (23 March1994, as amended through 6 April 1999).136 Since the 1950s, Presidents have declared what is now enshrined as law in 22 U.S.C. § 3927, namely thatthe Ambassador is in charge of all elements in the United States Government in a host country (excludingmilitary forces under command of a United States military commander, such as military units in Korea andGermany). Some Ambassadors invoke this principle more aggressively than others, but almost all utilizethe management device of the "country team." The country team, with the Chief of Mission at its head, isthe principal means by which a mission bonds itself together as a cooperative, coordinated, well-informedstaff: In its broadest sense, the "team" is all the elements-and all the men and women-of the Americanmission in a foreign country. More narrowly, it is a management tool-a council of senior officers, heads ofthe various sections of the mission, working together under the Ambassador's direction to pool their skills,resources, and problems in the national interest. United States Foreign Service Institute, The Team: TheAmbassador Sets the Pace 1 (undated 3 page information paper widely distributed to individuals receivingForeign Service training). No formal directive delineates the composition or functions of the CountryTeam. The Ambassador determines the type of team that best suits the needs of a particular country.Typical membership at large posts includes the Deputy Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, the chiefs of thepolitical and economic sections of the embassy, the Security Assistance Officer, the Agency forInternational Development mission, and the United States Information Service (USIS). It also usuallyincludes one or more of the military attaches and the agricultural attaché. See generally DEFENSEINSTITUTE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT, THE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE 105-06(18th ed., 1998) [hereinafter Management Of Security Assistance]; DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-20, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (5 Dec. 1990).137 A simplistic view of the cycle conceives a circle consisting of four iterative stages: information;planning; decision; and execution. SEE UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE,STUDENT TEXT 100-9, THE TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS at 1-1 (July 1993) [hereinafter ST 100-9].138 A course of action is defined as feasible if it will accomplish the mission, can be supported withavailable resources, and is consistent with ethical standards of warfare.139 See FM 101-5, DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS, H-33and H-34 (1997).140 See ST 100-9, supra note 137, at 1-3 to 1-5.141 See FM 101-5, supra note 139, at 5-27 to 5-28.142 See FM 101-5, supra note 139, at 5-5.143 See FM 101-5, supra note 139, at 5-7 to 5-8.144 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, 82D AIRBORNE DIV., SOLDIER'S HANDBOOK ANDOFFICE METL (13 June 1997); CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW, V CORPS, DEPLOYMENTSTANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE (1989); OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, 25TH INFANTRYDIVISION (LIGHT), DEPLOYMENT STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE AND OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK(1987); OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT), DEPLOYMENTSTANDARDS AND PROCEDURES: A HANDBOOK TO GUIDE THE TRANSITION TO WAR (17 Sept. 1992); OFFICEOF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, DEPLOYMENT HANDBOOK (1993).145 22 10 U.S.C. § 3062.146 This summary is adapted from FM 100-7, supra note 123, at 6-15, and DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL100-11, FORCE INTEGRATION, CHAPTER 2, SECTION IV, Force Projection Operations (15 Jan. 1995).147 See genrally DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 500-5, ARMY MOBILIZATION (7 June 1996). See also DEP'T OFARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-17, MOBILIZATION, DEPLOYMENT, REDEPLOYMENT, DEMOBILIZATION (28 Oct.1992).


Endnotes-9

148 Variations of this statement appeared in Chapter 6 of both the 1991 version and the 1996 draft version ofFM 27-100.149 See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS at I-2 and I-3(1997).150 See id; DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY, para. 2-2 (29 Apr. 1988) [hereinafterAR 600-20].151 For further information on the material in this section, see generally CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE WARFIGHTING EXPERIMENT (JAWE): FINAL REPORT (1997).152 Compare material in this part to DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, Training the Force, Chapter 6(15 Nov. 1988).153 Material in the next three sections has been adapted from the following sources: DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL 25-100, TRAINING THE FORCE (15 Nov. 1988); DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 25-101, BATTLEFOCUSED TRAINING (30 Sep. 1990); LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARTHUR S. COLLINS, JR., COMMON SENSETRAINING (19??xx); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, IN THE OPERATIONS CENTER: A JUDGEADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO THE BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM (1996); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, TACKLING THE CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENT: A JUDGE ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO THEJOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER (1996).154 Do not confuse "combined" in this sense with the term "combined operation," which "involves themilitary forces of two or more nations acting together in common purpose." See, e.g., DEP'T OF ARMY,FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS 5-1 (1993) [hereinafter FM 100-5]. The lines of command forcombined task forces created pursuant to formal, stable alliance relationships between nations will generallyfollow principles predetermined by the alliance agreement. The lines of command for combined task forcesarising from a temporary coalition follow no set principles and are negotiated on an ad hoc basis. See id.155 See to DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, Training the Force, at 2-4 (15 Nov. 1988).156 See the discussion of the DSJA in THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, DEVELOPMENTS,DOCTRINE, AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS, Chapter2 (May 1996) (Draft).157 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to theProtection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,U.N. Doc. A/32/144, art. 82, reprinted in DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-1-1 [hereinafter DA PAM 27-1-1,PROTOCOL I], also reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 ("The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Partiesto the conflict in time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, toadvise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this Protocoland on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces in this subject.").158 See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (9 Dec. 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 5810.01, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DODLAW OF WAR PROGRAM (12 Aug. 96); Memorandums, Joint Chiefs of Staff, MJCS 59-83 (1 June 1983)and MJCS 0124-88, (4 Aug. 1988);subject: Implementation of DoD Law of War Program; Message,292030Z OCT84, FORSCOM, subject: Review of Operations Plans.159 DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICE, paras. 2-1, 3-2, 4-2, 5-2a(7) (1995).160 A list of thirteen of these references appears at INT'L AND OPERATIONAL L. DEP'T, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 1-2 (JA422) (7thed. 1998) [hereinafter OP. LAW HANDBOOK].161 These training guidance documents also frequently describe the following: Commander’s trainingphilosophy, mission essential task list and associated battle tasks, combined arms training, major trainingevents and exercises, leader training, individual training, mandatory training, standardization, training

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 10

evaluation and feedback, new equipment training and other force integration considerations, resourceallocation, and training management. See FM 25-100, supra note 153, at 3-5 to 3-6.162 Id. at 3-17.163 The material contained in this section is closely adapted from the following sources: FM 100-5, supranote 154 at 2-20; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, PUBLICATION 3-05, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS(Oct. 1992); DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 33-1, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (Jul. 1987); JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF, PUBLICATION 3-53, JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE (Feb. 1987);DOCTRINE FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS (Oct. 1992); DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 41-10, CIVILAFFAIRS OPERATIONS (11 Jan. 1993); DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-25, DOCTRINE FOR ARMYSPECIAL FORCES (12 Dec. 1991).164 "Depth" is one of the five tenets of Army operations. It is "the extension of operations in time, space,resources, and purpose.". What is "most important" about depth is "that in any operation the Army musthave the ability to gain information and influence operations throughout the depth of the battlefield." Seegenerally FM 100-5, Chapter 3, supra note 154.165 Compare the material in this section with the 1991 Version of FM 27-100, DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL 27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS.166 Compare the material in this section with the 1991 Version of FM 27-100, DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL 27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS.167 DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, paragraph 5.3.1 (9 Dec 98);CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, 5810.01, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OFWAR PROGRAM (12 Aug 96).168 Memorandum From Hays Parks to the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General (1 Oct 90).169 DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS, 2-6 (June 1993).170 Colonel Frederic L. Borch III, Judge Advocates in Combat.171 PETER PARET, NAPOLEON AND THE REVOLUTION IN WAR, IN MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY FROMMACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE 123, 129, 136 (Peter Paret ed. 1986) [hereinafter Makers of ModernStrategy] ("In [Napolean's] hands all conflicts tended to become unlimited, because openly or byimplication they threatened the continued independent existence of his antagonists.").172 QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 1322 (1942).173 See, e.g., DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS, at 6-7 and 6-8 (June 1993).174 This paragraph closely follows the language of General Fred Franks in TOM CLANCY AND GENERALFRED FRANKS, JR. (RET.), INTO THE STORM: A STUDY IN COMMAND 148 (1997).175 PETER PARET, Clausewitz, in MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY, supra note 171, at 186, 200 (quoting Carlvon Clausewitz, On War bk. I, ch. I, pp. 87 (1818) (Peter Paret and Michael Howard trans. and ed. 1984).176 Id. at 199. See also RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, American Strategy from its Beginnings through the FirstWorld War, in MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY, supra note 171, at 408, 409-10 ("Just as the limitations ofeighteenth-century European war can be exaggerated, however-testimony about the restrained conduct oftroops marching through a district does not often come from inarticulate peasants-so conversely, historiansmay tend to exaggerate the readiness of early Americans to turn toward absolute war. Colonial Americansermons and political tracts reflect an awareness and acceptance of the European conception of the just andtherefore limited war, which was becoming increasingly codified in such works AS EMERICH DE VATTEL'SDROIT DES GENS of 1758. On occasion, the standards of jus ad bellum and jus in bello were applied to evenIndian wars, as when the Connecticut government refused to assist Massachusetts in an Indian conflict thatConnecticut judged unjust. If it was much more common to consider the Indian outside the protection ofthe Christian laws of war, the Americans nevertheless explicitly acknowledged those laws as applicable totheir own conflicts with Europeans, even amid the violent emotions of the American Revolution.").


Endnotes-11

177 See FM 100-5, DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS, 6-9 (June 1993).178 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATEDTERMS, 452 (As amended through 29 June 1999).179 See DEP'T OF ARMY, STP 21-1-SMCT, SOLDIER'S MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS, SKILL LEVEL 1 546 (1Oct. 1994) (Task No. 181-906-1505) ("Conduct Combat Operations According to the Law of War").180 See FM 100-5, DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS, 2-5 (June 1993).181 See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 71-100, DIVISION OPERATIONS, at 3-5 (28 Aug. 1996).182 See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-20-10, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR THETARGETING PROCESS at 4-16 (8 May 1996) ("During certain operations, personnel and agencies that willsupport the targeting process could include the following: staff judge advocate. . . ").183 See FM 71-100, DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 71-100, DIVISION OPERATIONS, at 3-13 and 3-14 (28Aug. 1996).184 The final five paragraphs of this part of the chapter paraphrase observations made by BG JohnAltenburg, then Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and Operations, "Training, Mentoring,and Teambuilding Within the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate," Presentation to the World-WideContinuing Legal Education Conference, at The Judge Advocate General's School in Charlottesville,Virginia, in Oct. 1996.185 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY,LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 1-2 (11 December 1995) (footnotes omitted).

186 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY ANDASSOCIATED TERMS, 300, (23 March 1994, as amended through 7 December 1998).

187 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, vii (16 June 1995).

188 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, Chapter III (16 June 1995) (describing current joint doctrinal types of MOOTW); Comparewith U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS, 2-32 & 33 (Revised Final Draft of 23March 1998) (describing emerging, but not approved Army doctrine that titles these operations StabilityOperations and Support Operations).

189 See generally, e.g. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (16 June 1995); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FORFOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) (26 June 1996); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTPFOR ANTITERRORISM (17 March 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICSTECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS (12 February 1999); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS (17 February 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATIONOPERATIONS (30 September 1997); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS (14 June1993) (pending revision); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-20, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOWINTENSITY CONFLICT (5 December 1990) (pending revision); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-23,PEACE OPERATIONS (30 December 1994) (pending revision); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-23-1, HA MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (31 October 1994).

190 THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 1 (October 1998).


FM 27-100

Endnotes- 12

192 See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 1-14(October 1998).



195 See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 8 (October1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), I-4(26 June 1996); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, III-2,3 (17March 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, I-8(Figure I-3) & IV-6 (17 February 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS,TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, vii (30 September 1997).

196 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, ExecutiveSummary, The Strategy, National Military Objectives (1997).

197 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, ExecutiveSummary, The Strategy, Elements of Strategy (1997).

198 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, TheStrategy – Shape, Respond, Prepare Now, Elements of the Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now,Promoting Stability (1997).

199 See THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 15-18 (October1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, III-1,2 (17 March1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, I-2,3 (17February 1998).

200 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THANWAR, III-12 (16 June 1995).

201 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE USA, TheStrategy – Shape, Respond, Prepare Now, Elements of the Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now,Preventing or Reducing Conflicts and Threats (1997); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINTDOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, III-1,2 (16 June 1995).

202 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, III-11 (16 June 1995); see also Headquarters, Department of the Army, Joint Plan for DoDNon-combatant Repatriation (11 August 1999).

203 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, III-4 (16 June 1995).


205 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-23, PEACE OPERATIONS (30 December 1994) (pendingrevision).

206 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, I-2 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).


Endnotes-13

207 See, e.g., CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 12 (11 December 1995) (quoting theUN Security Council Resolution 940, authorizing member states “to form a multinational force . . . to useall necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership . . . the prompt return ofthe legitimately elected President . . . and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment . . . “S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., S/RES/940 (1994)); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS,THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THEBALKANS, 1995-1998, 39-42 (13 November 1998) (describing the Dayton Peace Accord and UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1031 applicable in the Balkans).

208 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONSOTHER THAN WAR, I-2 (16 June 1995) (noting DoD’s supportive role to DoS in Humanitarian Assistance);THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, III-2 (17 March 1998) (statingthat DoS is the lead agency for terrorism outside the U.S.); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4,JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, I-8 (Figure I-3) (17 February 1998) (noting DoS as lead agency forcoordinating US supply reduction strategies); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINTTACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, I-2 (30September 1997) (noting that the Ambassador is the senior U.S. authority responsible for the evacuation).

209 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), III-9,10 (26 June 1996) (noting as military planning considerations host nation sovereignty, the requirement toidentify political threats, and the impact of political concerns on rules of engagement).

210 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, I-2 (16 June 1995).

211 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, I-2 (16 June 1995).

212 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, I-2 (16 June 1995) (“A single act could cause significant military and political consequences . .. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the politicalobjective.”).

213 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, IV-9 (16 June 1995); see also CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 12-24(11 December 1995) (describing the Multinational Force and UN Mission in Haiti); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 41-42 (13 November 1998) (describing the framework andcomposition of the Implementation Force in Bosnia).

214 See, e.g., CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 58-61 (13 November 1998)(describing efforts to reconcile concerns between nations in the rules of engagement for the ImplementationForce in Bosnia).

215 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONSOTHER THAN WAR, IV-9 (16 June 1995); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FORFOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), II-8 & App A (26 June 1996); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, I-8, IV-5, & App B (17 February 1998).

216 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, I-6 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted); see also, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 14

07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), I-5 to I-14 (26 June 1996) (describing various types ofMOOTW that may support foreign internal defense).

217 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, ix, x, I-7, & I-11 (16 June 1995).

218 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 12-24 (11 December 1995).

219 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, IV-2 (16 June 1995).

220 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, IV-6 & 7 (16 June 1995).


222 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), III-7(26 June 1996).

223 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, VI-6 (17 March 1998);THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, I-10 (17 February1998).

224 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, VI-9 (30 September 1997).

225 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, vii & ix (16 June 1995) (“MOOTW are initiated by the National Command Authorities . . .”“Command and control are overseen by the joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates . . .”); seealso THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), viii &ix (26 June 1996); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, ANDPROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, II-6 (30 September 1997).




229 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 41 (13 November 1998).

230 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, ix (16 June 1995).

231 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, II-3 (16 June 1995).

232 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, IV-8 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).


Endnotes-15

233 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, IV-7 (16 June 1995); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 93-4 (11December 1995); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 44 (13 November1998) (discussing the Civil-Military Cooperation Team, or CIMIC, which performed the CMOC function).


235 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 43-4 (13 November 1998).

236 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, ix & IV-8 (16 June 1995).




240 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, III-2 (16 June 1995); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FORANTITERRORISM, I-1 (17 March 1998).

241 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, I-1 (17 March 1998).

242 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, IV-1,2 (17 March1998).

243 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, V-1 (17 March 1998).

244 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, I-2 (17 March 1998); THEJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR,III-3 (16 June 1995).

245 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, III-2 (16 June 1995).


247 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, I-3 (17February 1998).


FM 27-100

Endnotes- 16


250 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, IV-7,8 (17February 1998).

251 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, III-3,4 (16 June 1995).



254 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, III-4 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted).

255 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, III-4 through 8 (16 June 1995); see also THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.6,FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS, (to be published) (The draft describes the types ofmissions as relief missions, dislocated civilian support missions, security missions, and technical assistanceand support functions.).





260 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), viii(26 June 1996).


262 See 10 U.S.C.A. section 401(West 1998); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINTDOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, III-10 (16 June 1995).

263 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, III-11 (16 June 1995); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS,TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, vii (30 September 1997).

264 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FORNONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, vii (30 September 1997).

265 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, V-12 through 14 (30 September 1997).


Endnotes-17

266 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, x (30 September 1997).

267 See generally, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, ANDPROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, Chapter VI (30 September 1997).

268 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, III-12 (16 June 1995) (emphasis omitted); see also THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, I-6,7 (12 February 1999).

269 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, III-13,14 (16 June 1995); see also THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINTTACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, vii (12 February 1999).

270 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FORPEACE OPERATIONS, I-6 (12 February 1999) (emphasis omitted).

271 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, II-11 through 14 (12 February 1999).

272 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, II-17 through 24 (12 February 1999).

273 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FORPEACE OPERATIONS, I-7 (12 February 1999) (emphasis omitted).

274 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FORPEACE OPERATIONS, III-4 (12 February 1999) (emphasis omitted), and III-4 through 6 (describing each taskand including internment and resettlement operations).

275 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, III-7 through 13 (12 February 1999).








FM 27-100

Endnotes- 18


284 HAGUE CONVENTION (IV) RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND, ANNEX TO THECONVENTION, 1 Bevans 631 (signed Oct. 1907 at the Hague).285 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, ix (16 June 1995); See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.6, FOREIGNHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, x (to be published).


287 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 50 & 82-84 (13 November 1998).

288 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 25 (11 December 1995) (noting therequirement for reserve component legal personnel to deploy, and describing requirements for home stationsupport to emergency operations centers, predeployment legal assistance, and technical support to deployedlegal personnel); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 82 & 187-9 (13November 1998) (noting the need for full-time legal support to the Joint Military Commission, for apermanent deputy staff judge advocate in Bosnia, and for reserve augmentation to perform the home stationmission).

289 INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Chapter 14 (1998).

290 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Chapter 2 & Page 8-10 (1998).

291 INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 2-1 (1998).

292 INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 2-1 (1998).

293 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, II-5 (16 June 1995).

294 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 48 (11 December 1995) (citing SecurityCouncil Resolution 940 as authorizing the multinational force to restore the Aristide government andestablish a secure environment).

295 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, I-21 (12 February 1999) (“In PO [peace operations], the force generally conductsoperations based on a mandate that describes the scope of operations.”); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 76 (13 November 1998) (listing legal authorities and operational documentsdefining the scope of the Bosnia mission).


Endnotes-19

296 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 48 (11 December 1995) (regarding thetiming of deployment); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 76 (13 November1998) (regarding timelines for action).

297 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 8-9 (1998); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 76-7 (13 November 1998) (noting that the GFAP providedbroad justification for the use of force, and rules for controlling entity armed forces).

298 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 8-9 (1998); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 76-7 (13 November 1998).

299 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, I-22 (12 February 1999) (noting that terms of reference describe commandrelationships and coordination requirements); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 48-9(11 December 1995) (describing the Carter-Jonassaint agreement’s provision regarding the relationshipbetween U.S. forces in Haiti and the Haitian military and police); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 76-7 (13 November 1998) (stating that the GFAP had provisions regarding thestatus of police forces, and mandating joint military commissions).

300 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 8-9 (1998).

301 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONSOTHER THAN WAR, IV-9 (16 June 1995) (citing the prominence of logistics elements in MOOTW and theirobligation to adhere to applicable status of forces agreements); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), V-3 (26 June 1996) (noting the application of status offorces agreements to foreign internal defense operations); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3,JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, I-21 (12 February 1999) (notingthe status of forces agreement as a key document in peace operations); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINTPUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, I-10 (17 February 1998) (describing the affect of the statusof forces agreement on jurisdiction, taxation, and claims arising during counter-drug operations); THE JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANTEVACUATION OPERATIONS, B-1,2 (30 September 1997) (describing the affect of status of forces agreementson jurisdiction, procurement, and customs issues arising in noncombatant evacuation operations).

302 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 12-9 to 12-26 (1998).

303 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 50-51 (11 December 1995) (“As soon as . . .the Aristide government had resumed power, some agreement became necessary to define the legal status ofUnited States troops . . . Otherwise, these troops would be subject to Haitian laws that could impede theiractivities and frustrate the . . . objectives that impelled their deployment.”); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 151 (13 November 1998) (“In Hungary . . . the demand forcontractor compliance with host nation law was strong enough to cause the creation of a legal advisor

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 20

position to the USAREUR liaison team. In response to Hungarian income tax claims, the contractor heldfive million dollars . . . Ultimately, the Hungarian government refunded the money . . .”) (footnotesomitted).


305 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 12-1 (1998) (citing DEP’T OF ARMY,REGULATION 550-51, FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND NATIONAL: AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FORNEGOTIATING, CONCLUDING, FORWARDING, AND DEPOSITING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (1 May1985)).

306 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 12-1 (1998) (“SOFAs were concludedwith Grenada and Kuwait after combat operations in those countries.”); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS INHAITI, 1994-1995, 52 (11 December 1995) (noting that the SOFA with Haiti was concluded three monthsafter the operation began); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 151 (13November 1998) (noting the resolution of contractor liability for income taxes through the OmnibusAgreement).

307 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 8-11,12 (1998).

308 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 8-11 & 12-1 (1998).

309 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FOR ANTITERRORISM, L-2 (17 March1998) (containing a table listing the jurisdictional authorities for responding to terrorism at various phasesof an incident); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, ANDPROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, I-2 (30 September 1997) (describing therelative roles of the Ambassador and JTF Commander in noncombatant evacuation operations); CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 76-77 (13 November 1998) (describing the IFORcommander’s authority in relation to the Entity Armed Forces).

310 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, ANDPROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, x, I-14 & 15, (12 February 1999) (noting coordination and liaisonrequirements in peace operations with military organizations, international organizations, non-governmentorganizations, private voluntary organizations, & Department of State agencies); THE JOINT CHIEFS OFSTAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANTEVACUATION OPERATIONS, V-5, & B-1 (30 September 1997) (describing liaison and coordinationrequirements with embassy and local officials, higher headquarters, Department of State agencies, non-government organizations, private voluntary organizations, and host nation government agencies).

311 See, e.g., US ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE, LEGAL GUIDE TO PEACE OPERATIONS, 25 (1 May 1998)(describing guidance to U.S. commanders supporting U.N. operations who receive orders that may violateU.S. or international law); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 43, 91, & 96-97(11 December 1995) (describing concerns about consistency of rules of engagement with each nation’spolicies, fiscal constraints on logistical support for U.S. government agencies, and guarantees of loyaltyfrom U.S. commanders to the U.N.); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE


Endnotes-21

GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 61 (13November 1998) (describing concerns participating nations may have about riot control agents and thedefinition of hostile intent).

312 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 127-128 (13 November 1998)(describing the value of JAGC technical chain coordination, and innovative methods for effectingcoordination of legal matters among all troop contributing nations – publishing the Joint MilitaryCommission Handbook, weekly meetings of Judge Advocates, legal specialist work exchanges, andexchange of liaison officers).

313 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 94-95 (11 December 1995) (noting JudgeAdvocate participation in Civil-Military Operations Centers and the value of Judge Advocate liaison withthe ICRC); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 60-61 & 131 (13 November1998) (recommending Judge Advocate liaison with legal personnel of other troop contributing nations, anddescribing Judge Advocate participation in Joint Military Commission meetings).

314 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 43-44 (11 December 1995) (recommendingthe Judge Advocates take the initiative in developing acceptable rules of engagement); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 59-62, 112-114, & 153 (13 November 1998) (describinginnovative methods for developing workable rules of engagement, procedures used to resolve questionsabout the legality of local entity checkpoints, and the solution for repairing vehicles used to supportNATO).


316 See Captain Glenn Bowens, Legal Issues in Peace Operations, PARAMETERS, 58 (Winter 1998-1999).

317 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3121.01,STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR US FORCES, Enclosure A, paragraph 2a (1 October 1994).

318 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, I-10 (17February 1998) (stating that counter-drug operations are conducted under the Standing ROE); THE JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANTEVACUATION OPERATIONS, A-1 (30 September 1997) (noting the applicability of the Standing ROE inNEO, as well as the existence of a specific section in the ROE on NEO); but see CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 58 (13 November 1998) (stating that the Standing ROE werenot in effect for U.S. Forces in IFOR in Bosnia).

319 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THANWAR, II-4 (16 June 1995).

320 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, II-4 (16 June 1995); see also THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FORFOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), I-14 (26 June 1996) (stating the requirement for judicious use of forcein foreign internal defense missions); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 34-35(11 December 1995) (noting that either over-tentativeness or over-aggressiveness can hinder the mission);

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 22

CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY,LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 57 (13 November 1998) (“The ill-adviseduse of force could eliminate this perception of impartiality and re-ignite the conflict.”).

321 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), IV-24 (26 June 1996); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, ANDPROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, I-8 & III-11 (12 February 1999).

322 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, I-22 (12 February 1999).

323 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FORNONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, I-2 (30 September 1997).


325 See Captain Glenn Bowens, Legal Issues in Peace Operations, PARAMETERS, 59 (Winter 1998-1999);CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY,LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 37-39 (11 December 1995).

326 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, V-5 (30 September 1997); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 69-70 (13 November 1998).

327 See Captain Glenn Bowens, Legal Issues in Peace Operations, PARAMETERS, 59-60 (Winter 1998-1999); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, I-22,23 (12 February 1999); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995,43 (11 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 61 (13 November1998).

328 See Captain Parker, JAG Integration into OOTW TOC Operations (visited Feb. 23, 1999)<http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/feb94/pt3feb.htm>; THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINTTACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, I-22 (12 February 1999); CENTER FORLAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 36-39 (11 December 1995).

329 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 35 (11 December 1995) (citing Major MarkS. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV.27, 52-54 (1994); Colonel W.H. Parks, USCMR, No More Vietnams, UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTEPROCEEDINGS, 27-28 (March 1991)).

330 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 8-9 (1998); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 76-7 (13 November 1998) (noting that the GFAP providedbroad justification for the use of force, and rules for controlling entity armed forces).

331 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 43-45 (11 December 1995) (encouraging


Endnotes-23

Judge Advocates to take the initiative in multinational ROE development); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 59-62 (13 November 1998) (describing concerns about specificissues and definitions, and discussing a strategy of developing agreeable general ROE and allowingcontributing nations to apply more restrictive provisions).

332 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 36-39 (11 December 1995) (recounting anincident in Haiti in which delay was tragic:

[ROE] [c]ards containing the additional guidance [concerning protection of civilians,approved on 6 September] were not issued until 21 September. In the meantime, ROEhad jumped into news headlines around the United States. . . . on 20 September Haitianpolice and militia brutally beat demonstrating Aristide supporters. Among the personsbeaten was a coconut vender, who died after about five minutes of continuous clubbing,in view of United States soldiers, and after some of the fatal attack had been videotaped.Networks and newspapers in the United States widely reported the killing and thedecision of the soldiers not to intervene.

footnotes omitted); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 60, 62, 71 (13November 1998) (recommending use of ROE matrices, ROE cards in each soldiers language, and ROEBattle Books as means to ensure responsiveness).

333 See Captain Parker, JAG Integration into OOTW TOC Operations (visited Feb. 23, 1999)<http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/feb94/pt3feb.htm>; CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995,40-42 (11 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 63-64(13 November 1998).

334 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 11-2 (1998) (citing THE JOINT CHIEFS OFSTAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 5810.01, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DODLAW OF WAR PROGRAM (12 August 1996); see also DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5100.77,DoD Law ofWar Program, 5.3.1. (9 December 1998).

335 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, ANDPROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, I-1 (30 September 1997); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 37-39 & 79-84 (11 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 102-4, 112-4, 125-6, & 139-41(13 November 1998).

336 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 10-7 to 10-10, & 11-3 to 11-14 (1998)(discussing civilian protection law applicable in MOOTW, citing The 1977 Protocol Additional to theGeneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts(Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; and The 1977 Protocol Additional tothe Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the Protections of Victims of Non-International ArmedConflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 1391; and reprinting theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights).

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 24

337 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, II-13 (12 February 1999); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995,37-39 (11 December 1995).

338 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, III-11 (12 February 1999).

339 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, II-14 (12 February 1999).

340 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, VI-3 to VI-5, & Appendix D (30 September 1997).

341 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 79-84 (11 December 1995); CENTER FORLAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 139-141 (13 November 1998).

342 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR PEACE OPERATIONS, II-24 (12 February 1999); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINTTACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, VI-9 (30September 1997).

343 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 102-4, 112-4, 125-6, & 137-9 (13November 1998) (referring to enforcement of weapons policies, monitoring of checkpoints, apprehension ofpersons indicted for war crimes, and election support).

344 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, B-1 & 2 (30 September 1997); CENTER FOR LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 63-72 (11 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 109-110 (13 November 1998).



347 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURESFOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, VI-3 to VI-5 (30 September 1997) (discussing evacuationcenter procedures, many of which require legal advice); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995,93-4 (11 December 1995) (recommending Judge Advocate participation in the CMOC); CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 113 & 125-7 (13 November 1998) (noting that U.S. forcessought legal advice as they came across checkpoints, and describing the immediate need for JudgeAdvocates upon apprehension of a person indicted for war crimes).

348 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 63-72 & fn 203 (11 December 1995)


Endnotes-25

(describing the legal authority for detention, the detention facility, and the extensive Judge Advocate role inthe release determination process); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 109-110(13 November 1998) (describing the legal authority and procedural safeguards).

349 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, I-4 & I-8(17 February 1998) (citing Foreign Assistance Act provisions prohibiting U.S. personnel from conductingforeign law enforcement, and prohibiting security assistance to governments with records of human rightsviolations (22 U.S.C. A. sections 2291 & 2304 (West 1998))).


351 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 141 (13 November 1998) (quotingMajor Kurt Mieth, “[a]gain and again, especially in operations other than war, everyone wants to drink fromthe American luxury logistical fountain.” Interview with Major Kurt Mieth, SFOR Legal Advisor’s Office,at Sarajevo (2-23 Feb. 1998)).

352 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONSOTHER THAN WAR, IV-9 (16 June 1995) (“Logistics personnel must also be familiar with and adhere to anylegal, regulatory, or political restraints governing US involvement in the MOOTW.”) (emphasis omitted);THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), II-8 (26June 1996) (noting ‘legal restrictions and complex funding sources” involved in foreign internal defense);THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FORPEACE OPERATIONS, II-19 (12 February 1999) (discussing U.N. reimbursement procedures); THE JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, IV-3 (17 February 1998) (“Thereare many legal restrictions on the use of CD funds.”).

353 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID),III-7, IV-21, A-1, & G-2 (26 June 1996) (relating to training, humanitarian and civic activities,construction, and medical support); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 129-139 (11December 1995) (relating to medical care, post exchange privileges, military air requests, LOGCAP,construction, training, and humanitarian and civic assistance); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 143-153, & 184 (13 November 1998) (relating to morale and welfare,LOGCAP, construction, humanitarian and civic assistance, maintenance, post exchange privileges, andmess hall services).

354 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID),IV-22 (26 June 1996) (relating to the host nation); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995,141 (11 December 1995) (relating to U.S. agencies); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, 141-154, & 184 (13 November 1998) (relating to allies and coalition forces, local civilians,non-governmental organizations, NATO headquarters, and the Army’s R&R program).

355 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 142 (13 November 1998) (“Fiscaland procurement issues were the most pervasive and time consuming of sustainment issues, and perhaps ofall three categories of legal support to military operations (command and control, sustainment, andpersonnel service support).”).

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 26

356 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID), II-8& III-7 (26 June 1996).

357 See, e.g., Captain Glenn Bowens, Legal Issues in Peace Operations, PARAMETERS, 65-66 (Winter 1998-1999) (recommending use of section 607 and acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, 22 U.S.C. section2357 & 10 U.S.C. section 2342, respectively); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 142(11 December 1995) (relating to the value of a section 607 agreement); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARYOPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 142 (13 November 1998) (recommending broader use of NATO Basic PurchaseAgreements and Basic Ordering Agreements).

358 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 25-5 (1998) (describing in detail this six-step process).

359 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 25-5 to 25-20 (1998) (discussing variousU.S. funding sources); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, ANDPROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, II-19 (12 February 1999) (discussing U.N. reimbursementprocedures); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 142 (11 December 1995) (regardingsection 607 procedures for U.N. reimbursement); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS,1995-1998, 142 & 153-4 (13 November 1998) (proposing consideration of other than U.S. funding sources,and citing an example of NATO funding).

360 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 136 (11 December 1995) (noting thatreliance on LOGCAP in Haiti was not always the way to meet requirements and recommending thatcommanders and staffs consider all options); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGEADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 143-4 (13 November 1998) (citing the joint acquisition board as “a success story from Bosnia” anddescribing its functions).

361 See, e.g., CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 129-131 & 141 (11 December 1995)(describing how Judge Advocates resolved requests for medical care, post exchange privileges, and militaryair travel requests, and recommending raising issues to higher headquarters for resolution); CENTER FORLAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 153-4 & 184 (13 November 1998) (describing howJudge Advocates resolved a NATO request for the U.S. to repair a NATO vehicle, and recommending earlyresolution of policy concerning access to the post exchange).


363 See, e.g., THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.1, JTTP FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID),IV-20 & 21 (26 June 1996) (describing considerations involved in providing intelligence assistance duringforeign internal defense operations); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.2, JTTP FORANTITERRORISM, V-1 (17 March 1998) (“Intelligence and counterintelligence are the first line of defense inan AT [antiterrorism] program.”) (emphasis omitted); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.3,JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS, x (12 February 1999)(“Intelligence is critically important to a PK [peace-keeping] force, not only for mission success but to


Endnotes-27

protect the force.”) (emphasis omitted); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.4, JOINTCOUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, IV-3 (17 February 1998) (“[Intelligence] is the foundation upon which the CD[counter-drug] operational effort is built.”) (emphasis omitted); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.5, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS, IV-1 to 3 (30 September 1997) (describing intelligence products provided for noncombatant evacuationoperations planning).




367 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 15-1 (1998) (“It is imperative thatoperational lawyers consider them [intelligence law aspects of operations] when planning and reviewingboth operations in general and intelligence operations in particular.”).

368 See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Chapter 15 (1998) (listing and discussingthe principal references on intelligence law).


370 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 58-63 (11 December 1995) (describingissues arising in Haiti concerning interrogation of a U.S. person for force protection reasons, interrogationprocedures for personnel in the detention facility, and use of intelligence contingency funds).

371 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 25-100, TRAINING THE FORCE (1988); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELDMANUAL 25-101, BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING (1990).

372 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 159 & 166-7(11 December 1995).

373 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 197 (13 November 1998)(recommending training with supported units as means to build relationships with supported units andimprove the soldier skills of legal personnel).

374 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07.6, FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, IV-4(describing the need for personnel with political-military skills to coordinate with numerous organizationsand to liaison with policy-makers and the diplomatic community) & IV-15 (describing legal coordinationrequired for ROE in multinational operations and legal advice and assistance required for relationships withnon-military organizations) (to be published).

375 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 80-82 (13 November 1998).

FM 27-100

Endnotes- 28

376 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, (13 November 1998) 59-61(describing coordination of rules of engagement), 125 (discussing persons indicted for war crimes), & 130-131

Consider one judge advocate major . . . for example. He liaisoned with the U.N. mission,the U.N. Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Cooperation andSecurity in Europe (OSCE), the International Police Task Force headquarters, the Pope’sstaff . . . the President of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia . . . and the Minister ofJustice . . . He represented SFOR in two cases before local courts, and draftedmemorandums of agreement between SFOR and Bosnian entity-level civil aviationauthorities . . . .

377 See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHERTHAN WAR, IV-9 (16 June 1995); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATEGENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 148-9 & 155-6(11 December 1995); CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’SSCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 79 (13 November1998).



380 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 40-42, 89-93 (11 December 1995); CENTERFOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 63-67 & 130-131(13 November 1998).

381 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 89-93 (11 December 1995); CENTER FORLAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 130-131(13 November 1998).

382 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 63-64(13 November 1998).

383 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995, 158-159 (11 December 1995); CENTER FORLAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 161, 170, 179, & 192-198(13 November 1998).

384 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998, 193-197(13 November 1998).

Legal Support to Operations - · PDF fileand personnel supporting Army operations. Legal...

Documents

Transcript of Legal Support to Operations - · PDF fileand personnel supporting Army operations. Legal...