Legal Ethics in Writing

8/10/2019 Legal Ethics in Writing

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ETHICS OF LEGAL WRITING

This slide presentation is notmine. Intended for fair use.

Credits to:

Atty. Linda L. Malenab-HornillaProfessor II

Philippine Judicial Academy


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Communication is the one skillthat a lawyer has to master. He

uses it to explain a case to hisclient; to convince the court of histheory of offense or defense or to

just simply give advice on a legalproblem.


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Effective communication occurs when thesender and the receiver have the sameunderstanding of the meaning of themessage. The thought in the message that issent is the same thought that message conveyedto the recipient. There must be a mutualunderstanding between the sender and the

receiver of the transmitted idea or information tobe considered an effective communication.


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. Verbally

In Writing Legal Writing


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PLAGIARISM - Plagiarism is the act ofappropriating the literary composition ofanother, or parts or passages of his writings, orthe ideas or language of the same, and passingthem off as the product of ones own mind.1
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/oct2010/am_10-10-4-sc_2010.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/oct2010/am_10-10-4-sc_2010.html


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it is peculiarly essential that the systemfor establishing and dispensing justice be

developed to a high point of efficiency andso maintained that the public shall haveabsolute confidence in the integrity andimpartiality of its administration.


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22. Candor and fairness

The conduct of the lawyer before the court and withother lawyers should be characterized by candor andfairness.

It is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly tomisquote

the contents of a paper, the testimony of awitness, the language or the argument of opposingcounsel, of the language of a decision or a textbook; orwith knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as authority adecision that has been overruled or a statute that hasbeen repealed, or in argument to assert as a fact that

which has not been proved, or in those jurisdictionswhere a side has the opening and closing arguments tomislead his opponent by concealing or withholdingpositions in his opening argument upon which his sidethen intends to rely.


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CHAPTER II. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGALPROFESSION

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCTHIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS ANDCANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL

COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOIDHARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSINGCOUNSEL.


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Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not,

in his professional dealings,use language which isabusive, offensive orotherwise improper.


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CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THECOURTS

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do anyfalsehood, nor consent to the doing of anyin Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow theCourt to be misled by any artifice.


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Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowinglymisquote or misrepresent the contents of apaper, the language or the argument ofopposing counsel, or the text of a decisionor authority, or knowingly cite as law aprovision already rendered inoperative byrepeal or amendment, or assert as a factthat which has not been proved.


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CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND

MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS

AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD

INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from

scandalous offensive or menacing language

or behavior before the Courts.


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Poor legal writing adversely affects the legalsystem:

Failure to cite adverse authority cuts on time of the court Misrepresenting facts affects integrity of the judicial

process; wastes courts time

Poor writing style burdens the judges to deciphermeanings; wastes courts time


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Some errors that may elicit sanctions:

Failing to state the law and the facts

accurately Poor writing

Lack of civility

plagiarism


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Atty. Adaza, in making it appear that all the respondentshad moved for the lifting of the injunction, gave theimpression that respondent Judge had participated inthat motion. That is another instance showing his

inexperience and unawareness of the practice incertiorari and prohibition cases. Trial judges who aremade respondents in those special civil actions are onlyformal or nominal parties. Therefore, a judge in his

official capacity should not be made to appear as a partyseeking a reversal of an Appellate Court's unfavorableaction on his order or decision (Hon. Alcasid vs. Samson,102 Phil. 735-6; Taroma vs. Sayo, L-37296, October 30,1975, 67 SCRA 508, 514).


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The allegations of the verified petition, which themovants carelessly ignored, show the flagrant falsityof those contentions. The petitioners made out astrong prima facie case for the ex parte issuance of amandatory injunction.

Movants-respondents invoke section 5, Rule 58 of theRules of Court which directs that generally apreliminary injunction should be issued upon notice

and hearing. They also invoke paragraph 17 (15) ofthe Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted by tile Americanand Philippine Bar Associations and b tile Secretary ofJustice in his Administrative Order No. 162 dated

August 1, 1946 (42 0. G, 1803).


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Those canons do not apply to this court, a collegiatecourt. Nor does section j of the Rule 58 apply to thisCourt. It applies to trial judges. The purpose is toprevent them from restoring to the arbitrary, corrupt andabusive exercise of the power to issue injunctions.

Atty. Adaza also cites the rule that injunction operatesupon unperformed acts but not those alreadyconsummated. That ruling refers to preventiveinjunctions, not to mandatory injunctions which requirethe performance of a particular act (Sec. 1, Rule 58 ofthe Rules of Court), such as the mandatory injunction inforcible entry cases (Arts. 539 and 1674, Civil Code; Sec.3, Rule 70, Rules of Court).


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It is obvious that Atty. Adaza's characterization of themandatory injunction as "unjust and a miscarriage of

justice" and as devoid of factual and legal basis isunfounded and unwarranted. He treated a resolutionof this Court as if it were a pleading of an adversarywhich he could assail in unrestrained and abrasivelanguage. His unjustified and disrespectfulcharacterization carries with it obvious derogatoryimplications or innuendos which clearly constitute

direct contempt or contempt facie curiae (Sec. 1, Rule71, Rules of Court; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil.724, 728; De Joya vs. CFI of Rizal, Pasay City Branch,99 Phil. 907,916; Malolos vs. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113;Sison vs. Sandejas, 105 Phil. 1279).


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We hold Atty. Adaza guilty of direct contempt.However, considering his manifest inexperience inappellate court practice, instead of punishing himwith imprisonment or fine, he is hereby severelyreprimanded and warned that a repetition of thesaid act would be more drastically dealt with.


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He ends his petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of

Court to receive the certificate of theundersigned attorney and counsellor-at-lawIN TRUST with reservation that at any timein the future and in the event we regain our

faith and confidence, we may retrieve ourtitle to assume the practice of the noblestprofession.


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The petition has its roots in the denial of hismotion for reconsideration (MR)of an adversedecision against his client, the defendant

Antonio Calero. Atty. Almacen failed to notify the

plaintiff of the place and time for hearing of hisMR. Plaintiff moved for execution of judgmentfor lack of notice. He appealed the decision. TheCourt of Appeals dismissed the appeal based on

Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. BatuConstruction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965(appeal considered a mere scrap of paper)


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moved to reconsider this resolution, urging thatManila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At thesame time he filed a pleading entitled "Latestdecision of the Supreme Court in Support of

Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of thePhilippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417,decided by this Court on May 30, 1966,


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contends that there are some important

distinctions between this case and that of ManilaSurety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction& Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, reliedupon by this Court in its resolution of May 8,1967. Appellant further states that in the latestcase, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30,1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning

the question raised by appellant's motion, theruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in theManila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.


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Court ruled no substantial distinction. Venturanza

case (1962) decided earlier than Manila Surety(1965). Venturanza decision interlocutory and isno no authority on the matter in issue. Atty.

Almacen gave vent to his frustration by filing the

pleading which isis interspersed from beginning to end with theinsolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful andderogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced,against this Court as well as its individualmembers, a behavior that is as unprecedented asit is unprofessional.


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Our conclusion is that the charges against theaccused have been so far sustained as to make it

our duty to impose such a penalty as may besufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning toothers. ...

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court thatAtty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,suspended from the practice of law until furtherorders, the suspension to take effect immediately.


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Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his

duty to correctly inform the court of the law andthe facts of this case. He failed to allege in hiscomplaint the fact that a prior dispute had beenexisting between the parties before the PARAB,thus deceiving the court and giving it aninaccurate appreciation of facts.

In this he is guilty of consenting to if notactual commission of a falsehood before acourt, again in violation of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.3 respondent Atty.Enrique L. Nace is hereby REPRIMANDED forhis misconduct, with a warning that arepetition of the same or similar acts shall be

more severely dealt with.


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There is no denying that the quality of a decisionrendered by the judge such as herein respondent,is a reflection on the integrity of the court indispensing justice to whom it is due. Respondent

was at the very least careless in failing to readcarefully the decision that he signed. In fact, boththe original and amended decisions still containederrors in grammar and syntax indicating that therewas no adequate editing of the decision that wassigned by him.


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We must add, however, that it is not the respondent alonewho must be blamed for such unmitigated faux pas. The

counsel for the parties in the case knew or ought to haveknown the fatal defect of the dispositive portion and theobvious inefficacy of any writ of execution, yet, theplaintiff's counsel still filed a motion for execution, whilethe counsel for the defendants the complainant hereinmerely filed a motion for reconsideration based solely

on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trialbrief and that there was no valid pre-trial order.Obviously, the complainant initially believed in thecompleteness of the decision. As a matter of fact, when heassailed the 25 January 1993 Decision, he alleged thatwhat was amended was a " final decision," a position

totally inconsistent with his claim that the latter was voidas declared by the RTC of Bulacan. As officers of the courtwho owe to it candor, fairness and good faith, 12 bothattorneys should have called the court's attention to theglaring defect of the "dispositive portion" of the 28 June1991 Decision.


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As to the complainant, we note that in his

complaint in this case he alleged under oath thatafter the defendants filed their answer, therespondent "without any hearing, or at least thiscounsel was never notified of any such hearing,"rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision. This is ofcourse inaccurate, if not outright false. What thecomplainant conveniently left out in hiscomplaint was that, as disclosed in the Commentwhich he did not refute, after the defendants'

answer with counterclaim was admitted by thecourt, the case was set for preliminaryconference and thereafter the parties wererequired to submit their position papers and theaffidavits of their witnesses and other evidence.


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xxx The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may havebeen intended by the complainant to give hiscomplaint a strong prima facie case against therespondent. While he was entitled to adopt certainstrategies in his pleadings, he forgot that he owes to thisCourt absolute candor, fairness and good faith. ThisCourt can neither condone nor tolerate attempts tomislead it through suppression of important facts which

would have a bearing on its initial action. Complainantshould, therefore, be admonished to faithfully adhere tothe Code of Professional Responsibility.


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Respondent, Delia T. Sutton, a member of the PhilippineBar, connected with the law firm of Salonga, Ordoez, Yap,Parlade, and Associates, must be held accountable forfailure to live up to that exacting standard expected ofcounsel, more specifically with reference to a duty owingthis Tribunal. She failed to meet the test of candor and

honesty required of pleaders when, in a petition forcertiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appealsdecision, she attributed to it a finding of facts in recklessdisregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its versionas to what transpired. When given an opportunity to makeproper amends, both in her appearance before us andthereafter in her memorandum, there was lacking anyshowing of regret for a misconduct so obvious and soinexcusable. Such an attitude of intransigence hardlycommends itself. Her liability is clear. Only her relativeinexperience in the ways of the law did save her from apenalty graver than severe censure. So we rule.


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on page 5 thereof a portion of the decisionappealed from, summing up evidence for thedefense, and makes reference thereto "findings"of the Court of Appeals, which is not true

on page 6 of the petition, petitioner states,referring to a portion of the same quotation,that the same "are the establisheduncontroverted facts recognized by the Court of

Appeals," which is, likewise, untrue;


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on page 8 of the petition, it is averred "It beingconceded that the two versions recounted above are bythemselves credible, although they are conflicting thesame cannot be binding on, and is therefore, reviewableby the Honorable Supreme Court. Where the findings offact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting], the same[are not binding] on the Supreme Court. (Cesica v.

Villaseca, G.R. L-9590, April 30, 1957)" although, in fact,

no conflicting findings of fact are made in the decisionappealed from;


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on page 9 of the petition, it is alleged that theCourt of Appeals had"affirmed the minimumpenalty of one (1) year and one (1) day imposedby the lower court," although, in fact, minimum

penalty imposed by the trial court was "four(4)months of arresto mayor";

Defense of the firm was enthusiasm andzealousness


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The court saidoptimismwas misplaced. It betrayed onits face more than just a hint of lack of candor, ofminimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in theattribution to the Court of Appeals certain alleged facts

not so considered as such. It was then to say that theleast a far from meticulous appraisal of the matter inissue. Much of what was therein contained did not ringtrue xxx Even with due recognition then that counsel is

expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of aclient's cause, it must never be at the expense ofdeviation from the truth.


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At the same time, the attitude displayed by one of thesenior partners, Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoez, both inthe appearances before the Court and in the pleadingssubmitted, must be commended. He has mademanifest that his awareness of the role properlyincumbent on counsel, especially in his relationship tothis Court, is deep-seated. It must be stated, however,that in the future he, as well as the other seniorpartners, should exercise greater care in thesupervision of the attorneys connected with their law

firm, perhaps inexperienced as yet but nonethelesscalled upon to comply with the peremptory tenets ofethical conduct.


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Further, we cannot countenancerespondents use of the erroneous name inthe Deed of Absolute Sale which he prepared.As complainants cousin and co-heir, it would

lead to utter incredulity if he disavowsknowledge of her name. He cannot justifysuch use by reason of inadvertence ormistake. And in our opinion, we do not need

to divine his motives to call it a reprehensibleact.

Xxx


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Xxx Likewise, respondent should be taken to task for

the false statements he made in his Comment.He denied the existence of attorney-clientrelationship when it truth he was counsel for thecomplainant. Respondent should be remindedthat by taking the lawyers oath, he became a

guardian of truth and the rule of law, and anindispensable instrument in the fair andimpartial administration of justice.


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The Motion for Reconsideration with Motion toInhibit (MRMI) contains insults and diatribesagainst the NLRC, attacking both its moral andintellectual integrity, replete with implied

accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack ofdiligence. Respondent used improper andoffensive language in his pleadings that doesnot admit any justification. Ex. x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the NLRC, First Division, it is ignominiousignorance of the law on the part of thecommissioners concerned.


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If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findingsof fact, the Honorable Commissioners of the FirstDivision are doubly soand with malice thrown in.

Commissioner Dinopol xxx He is a shame to theNLRC and should not be allowed to have anything todo with the instant case any more.

x x x They should have taken judicial notice of thisprevalent practices of employers xxx. If theHonorable Commissioners, of the First Division donot know this, they are indeed irrelevant to real life.


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Xxx It must be remembered that the language vehicledoes not run short of expressions which are emphaticbut respectful, convincing but not derogatory,illuminating but not offensive. A lawyer's languageshould be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful

as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignityof the legal profession. Submitting pleadings containingcountless insults and diatribes against the NLRC andattacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardlymeasures to the sobriety of speech demanded of alawyer.

xxxACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. AlarGUILTY of violation of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. He is imposed a fine of P5,000.00 with STERNWARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the futurewill be dealt with more severely.


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Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, May 10, 2006.

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful andemphatic, it should always be dignified and

respectful, befitting the dignity of the legalprofession. The use of unnecessary language isproscribed if we are to promote high esteem in thecourts and trust in judicial administration.

xxx In Uy v. Depasucat, 455 Phil. 9 (2003) the Courtheld that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,offensive or menacing language or behavior beforethe Courts.


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Atty. Sabino Padilla was found guilty by the RTC judgeof direct contempt for his innuendos that the judgewas not fair and wanted to keep the case.

The SC ruled xxx Malicious attacks on courtshave in some cases been treated as libel, in othercases as contempt of court, and as a sufficientground for disbarment. However, mere criticism

or comment on the correctness or wrongness,soundness or unsoundness of the decision of thecourt in a pending case made in good faith maybe tolerated.


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Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account forwords said in the heat of the moment, because ofchagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for thecourt to condone even contemptuous language. While

judges must exercise patience, lawyers must also

observe temperate language as well. At this juncture,we admonish all lawyers to observe the followingcanons of the Code of Professional Responsibility,which read: "Canon 8. Rule 8.01A lawyer shall not,

in his professional dealings, use language which isabusive, offensive or otherwise improper. "Canon 11A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respectdue to the courts and to judicial officers and shouldinsist on similar conduct by others."


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Xxx Snide remarks or even sarcastic innuendoesdo not necessarily assume that level of contumelyactionable under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules ofCourt

After a perusal of the charges of direct contemptof court, we find that Atty. Padilla's innuendoesare not necessarily disrespectful to the court as tobe considered contumacious. A lawyer's remarksexplaining his position in a case underconsideration do not necessarily assume the levelof contempt that justifies the court to exercise thepower of contempt.


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Judge Bersamin granted the issuance of a

subpoena duces tecum upon a motion ofthe accused. Petitioner objected to theissuance claiming that she and the publicprosecutor should have been informedearlier and furnished a copy consideringthat prosecution was to present evidence.She called this action and the waiting for

the accused, who was late for arraignment,irregular. Judge declared petitioner incontempt.


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Xxx

What we have before us is not without precedent. Time andagain, this Court has admonished and punished, in varyingdegrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful orirreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or thelower courts. 3 Resort by an attorney in a motion forreconsideration to words which may drag this Court down

into disrepute, is frowned upon as "neither justified nor in theleast necessary, because in order to call the attention of thecourt in a special way to the essential points relied upon inhis argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the manyreasons stated in the motion" are "sufficient," and such words"superfluous." 4 It is in this context that we must say that just

because Atty. Armonio "thought best to focus the attention"of this Court "to the issue in the case" does not give himunbridled license in language. To be sure, lawyers may comeup with various methods, perhaps much more effective, incalling the Court's attention to the issue involved. Thelanguage vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic

but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminatingbut not offensive.


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Complainant accused respondent of deceit andgross misconduct. The latter joined a group oftenants who opposed their eviction from a landowned by the complainant claiming they aretenants. After almost three months, the allegedtenants, including Nace, filed a case before theRTC for the annulment of complainant's landtitles claiming that they are the owners of the

land under the old Spanish title.. Magdaluyoaccused Nace of having deliberately committeda falsehood and of forum-shopping.


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The Court concurred with the findings andrecommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesthat Nace should be reprimanded for his unprofessionaland improper acts. There was a violation of theprohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibilityagainst engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

He was, indeed, less than sincere in asserting two conflictingrights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he knew notto be his. What made matters worse was his participation inbringing such claims to court, knowing them to be contradictory

and therefore cannot both be true, though both could be totallyfalse. In this he is guilty of consenting to if not actualcommission of a falsehood before a court, again in violation ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility.


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As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oathto do no falsehood or consent to itscommission and to conduct himself as a

lawyer according to the best of hisknowledge and discretion. The lawyer's oathis a source of obligations and violationthereof is a ground for suspension,

disbarment, or other disciplinary action.Respondent's acts are clearly in violation ofhis solemn oath as a lawyer that this Courtwill not tolerate.


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Complainant maintains that the act ofrespondent Judge in allowing the respondentlawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No.1081-BG and to present it to court as the

latter's work does violence to Rule 1.01, Canon1 of the Code of Professional Responsibilitywhich provides that a judge should be theembodiment of competence, integrity andindependence. Complainant also asserts that in

placing his signature in the complaint notwritten by him, respondent lawyer committeddeceit, which serves as a ground for hisdisbarment.


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xxx If truth be told, the allegations in theinstant petition was ingeniously written todeliberately and maliciously withhold and

suppress the fact that the respondent judge

had already inhibited himself from takingcognizance of Civil Case No. 1518-BG andthat the records thereof had in fact been

transmitted to RTC Branch 33. Therespondent judge, in fact, issued an Order dated23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from thecase.


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In her report, Justice Salonga recommended thedismissal of the complaint againstrespondents, and that complainant beadmonished for filing the frivolous complaint.

Complainant Atty. Marcos V. Prieto is FINEDP5,000.00 for filing a frivolous suit with aSTERN WARNING that a repetition of the same

or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.


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Needless to say, disrespectful, abusive and

abrasive language, offensive personalities,unfounded accusations, or intemperate wordstending to obstruct, embarrass, or influence thecourt in administering justice or to bring it intodisrepute have no place in a pleading.

complainant Romulo SJ Tolentino isREPRIMANDED for breach of Canon 10, Rules10.01 and 10.02 as well as Canon 11, Rule 11.03

of the Code of Professional Responsibility bythreatening respondent judge that if his motionswere not granted, respondent judge would beadministratively charged..


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On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant,Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty ofintercalating a material fact in a decision ofthe Court of Appeals, which he appealed tothis Court on certiorari, thereby altering thefactual findings of the Court of Appeals withthe apparent purpose of misleading thisCourt in order to obtain a favorable

judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was

disbarred from the practice of law.


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Respondent failed to file the appeal to an NLRCdecision on time. He claims that he receivedthe decision of the NLRC on Sept. 10 while thereturn of the registry receipt showed that hereceived it on September 8, 1998. Agravante

lied when he said he received the LaborArbiter's decision on September 10, 1998 inorder to make it appear that his Memorandumof Appeal was filed on time. CommissionerDulay concluded that Agravante misled the

NLRC when he certified in his Memorandum ofAppeal that he received the adverse decision ofthe Labor Arbiter on September 10, 1998.


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CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor,fairness and good faith to the court.

It is codified further in the following rule ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do anyfalsehood, nor consent to the doing of anyin court; nor shall he mislead or allow the

court to be misled by any artifice.


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In the case of Perea v. Almadro, 23 the respondent thereinwas similarly punished for negligence in the discharge ofhis duty as well as misrepresentation committed beforethe court. In said case, the respondent lawyer failed to filea demurrer to the evidence after asking for leave to file thesame. He compounded this transgression by spinningconcocting stories about the loss of the file of his draft,which somehow led him to believe that the pleading hadalready been filed. Finding him guilty of serious neglect ofhis duties as a lawyer and of open disrespect for the courtand the authority it represents, as embodied in Canon 18,Rules 18.03 and 18.04 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of theCode of Professional Responsibility, the Court suspended

the respondent therein from the practice of law for one (1)year and imposed a fine in the amount of Ten Thousand(P10,000.00)

Respondent meted the same penalty.


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MA. CORAZON D. FULGENCIO, complainant, vs. ATTY. BIENVENIDO G.MARTIN, respondent. [A.C. No. 3223. May 29, 2003.]

The Court further held that the respondent violated Rule 10.01 ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer thathe shall not do any falsehood, when he made an untruthfulstatement in the Acknowledgement portion of the documents thatKua personally appeared before him. Respondent was alsosuspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.

MARY DE V. FRAUENDORFF, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JOSE R. CASTRO,Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon CityBranch IX, ZODIAC PHARMACEUTICAL CO., INC. & SAMTOPINVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Counsel for petitioner should in the future be less inaccurate in hisindictments against the Courts. By and large and considering thatcounsel Agcaoili's broadsides may be deemed as manifestation ofexcessive zeal, and, anyway, this is the first occasion he hascommitted such a fault, the Court is inclined to consider remindersand admonitions above as sufficient.


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Xxx The blatant disregard of controlling,

documented and admitted facts not put in issue,such as those summarily ignored in this case; theextraordinary efforts exerted to justify sucharbitrariness and the very strained andunwarranted conclusions drawn therefrom, areunparalleled in the history of this Court . . .

Xxx [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street wasoriginally constructed for the exclusive benefit ofthe residents of Bel-Air Village, or rule that

respondent Court's admission of said fact is"inaccurate," as Ayala's Counsel himself would liketo do but did not even contend, is a manifestationof this Court's unusual partiality to Ayala and putsto serious question its integrity on that account . .


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. . . [i]t is submitted that this ruling is the mostserious reflection on the Court's competence andintegrity and exemplifies its manifest partialitytowards Ayala.

xxx To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of

application for special membership in BAVAxxx without giving any reason therefor, smacksof judicial arrogance . .

xxx [A]re all these unusual exercise of such

arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the currentcampaign of this Court against graft andcorruption in the judiciary be enhanced by suchbroad discretionary power of courts?


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The Supreme Court ruled:To be sure, Atty.Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not toa license to insult the Court with derogatory

statements and recourses to argumenta adhominem. In that event, it is the Court'sduty "to act to preserve the honor anddignity . . . and to safeguard the morals andethics of the legal profession."


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We are not satisfied with his explanation thathe was merely defending the interests of hisclients. As we held in Laureta, a lawyer's "firstduty is not to his client but to theadministration of justice; to that end, hisclient's success is wholly subordinate; and his

conduct ought to and must always bescrupulously observant of law and ethics." 10And while a lawyer must advocate his client'scause in utmost earnest and with the

maximum skill he can marshal, he is not atliberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation,and innuendo.


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Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s ajudge I have learned to live with and acceptwith grace criticisms of my decisions." 13Apparently, he does not practice what hepreaches. Of course, the Court is notunreceptive to comment and critique of itsdecisions, but provided they are fair anddignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended thelimits of fair comment for which he

deserves this Court's rebuke. (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for

three (3) months and fine of 500 pesos


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UP professors accused Justice Mariano del Castillo ofplagiarism in his failure to acknowledge his sources indeciding the case Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

162230, April 28, 2010. In said case, the Court deniedthe petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort womento compel certain officers of the executive department2to espouse their claims for reparation and demandapology from the Japanese government for the abuses

committed against them by the Japanese soldiers duringWorld War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent thecomfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, whichis presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.


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The first paragraph concludes with a reference

to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretaryas a reprehensible act of dishonesty andmisrepresentation by the Highest Court of theland. Xxx

they went further by directly accusing the Courtof perpetrating extraordinary injustice bydismissing the petition of the comfort women in

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.


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Par. 9 reads When it dismissed the Vinuya

petition based on misrepresented andplagiarized materials, the Court decided thiscase based on polluted sources. By doing so,the Supreme Court added insult to injury byfailing to actually exercise its "power to urgeand exhort the Executive Department to takeup the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Itscallous disposition, coupled with falsesympathy and nonchalance, belies (sic)

[betrays] a more alarming lack of concern foreven the most basic values of decency andrespect. (Emphasis supplied).1avvphi1


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The SC views the publication of the statement astotally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash actof misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge isthe ongoing investigation precisely to determinethe truth of such allegations. More importantly,the motion for reconsideration of the decision

alleged to contain plagiarized materials is stillpending before the Court. We made it clear in thecase of In re Kelly3that any publication, pendinga suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, theparties, the officers of the court, the counsel with

reference to the suit, or tending to influence thedecision of the controversy, is contempt of courtand is punishable.


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Further, it says the Court could hardly perceive anyreasonable purpose for the facultys less than objectivecomments except to discredit the April 28, 2010Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Courtshonesty, integrity and competence in addressing themotion for its reconsideration. As if the case on thecomfort womens claims is not controversial enough,the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and inviteresentment against a resolution that would not reversethe said decision. This runs contrary to their obligationas law professors and officers of the Court to be thefirst to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, towhich they owe fidelity according to the oath they havetaken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in theadministration of justice.6Their actions likewiseconstitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 137andRules 1.02 and11.058of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.91awp++il
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Legal Ethics in Writing

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