FIRST DIVISIONMARIETTA DUQUE, Complainant,- versus -JUDGE CRISOSTOMO L. GARRIDO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City [presently assigned as Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Carigara, Leyte], Respondent.A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2027Present:pUNO, C.J., Chairperson,CARPIO, Corona,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION,[footnoteRef:1]* JJ. [1: ]

Promulgated:February 27, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NLEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:In a verified letter-complaint[footnoteRef:2][1] dated February 7, 2006 complainant Marietta Duque charged respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, Leyte, with gross violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond ninety (90) days in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 entitled People v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al. [2: ]

Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580. She claimed that the respondent Judge violated Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond the 90 day reglementary period without requesting an extension of time from this Court. She alleged that the prosecution filed its Memorandum submitting the case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but the respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated on January 27, 2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the handling prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.In a 1st Indorsement[footnoteRef:3][2] dated March 22, 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required respondent Judge to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. [3: ]

In his Omnibus Comment[footnoteRef:4][3] dated May 18, 2006, respondent judge denied the accusation that the decision in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 was rendered beyond the 90-day period as prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. [4: ]

He explained that while the last pleading - the Memorandum for the Prosecution - was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case submitted for resolution was issued on September 13, 2005. Respondent further explained that the Decision dated December 12, 2005 was promulgated only on January 27, 2006 because he was on official leave from December 15, 2005 to January 15, 2006 as he left for the United States.Respondent maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural infirmity in the promulgation of the decision even though the complainant and the handling prosecutor, Robert M. Visbal, were not present at that time. He reasoned that the complainant is not entitled to be notified of the promulgation as she is neither the private complainant nor a witness, while the prosecution was duly represented during the promulgation by Prosecutor Edgar A. Sabarre who was also assigned in the RTC. Respondent pointed out that the court had already set the schedule of the promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor Visbal opted not to attend, it was for a reason only known to him.Reacting to respondent's explanation regarding Prosecutor Visbal, the complainant attached to her Reply[footnoteRef:5][4] an Affidavit[footnoteRef:6][5] executed by said prosecutor wherein the latter averred that he was never informed of the date of the promulgation and that he was surprised to learn that respondent judge promulgated the decision in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 with Prosecutor Sabarre appearing in his behalf. [5: ] [6: ]

In his Rejoinder[footnoteRef:7][6] respondent Judge claimed that his track record in deciding cases filed with the OCA bear out that no case of his had been decided beyond the 90-day reglementary period, as some were even decided within thirty (30) and sixty (60) days from the date the case was submitted for decision [7: ]

In a Report[footnoteRef:8][7] dated September 6, 2006, the OCA found respondent judge administratively liable for rendering a decision beyond the 90-day period in violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Additionally, respondent was found to have violated the franking privilege under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 26. The OCA thus recommended: [8: ]

1. That the instant administrative case be Re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.2. That respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido be found Guilty of Undue Delay In Rendering A Decision, in which case he should be meted with a penalty of Fine in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) with a Stern Warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.3. That respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido be Admonished for violating the franking privilege in filing his rejoinder to this administrative case.[footnoteRef:9][8] [9: ]

In the Resolution[footnoteRef:10][9] dated October 9, 2006, the Court noted the letter-complaint, the comment of the respondent judge, the complainants reply, respondents rejoinder thereto and the report of the OCA. [10: ]

Subsequently, by Resolution dated December 11, 2006[footnoteRef:11][10], this Court required the parties to manifest, within ten (10) days from notice, their willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. In compliance thereto, both parties submitted their respective manifestations which the Court duly noted in the Resolution dated March 12, 2007[footnoteRef:12][11]. [11: ] [12: ]

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties.Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit: (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (Emphasis ours)Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows:Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory.[footnoteRef:13][12] The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts.[footnoteRef:14][13] Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.[footnoteRef:15][14] [13: ] [14: ] [15: ]

As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005[footnoteRef:16][15]. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had been submitted for decision. [16: ]

Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts. Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask the Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve it.[footnoteRef:17][16] In this case, granting that it was for a justifiable reason to render a decision or resolve a matter beyond the reglementary period, the respondent could have sought additional time by simply filing a request for extension. Respondent, however, did not avail of such relief. [17: ]

Respondent did not proffer any tenable justification for the delay in rendering the decision. He insisted that it was proper and procedural to first resolve the parties' memoranda before the case may be considered submitted for decision. He, thus, would want the Court to consider his Order[footnoteRef:18][17] dated September 13, 2005 resolving the memoranda of the parties and declaring the case submitted for resolution as the starting point of the 90-day period for deciding the case and not on August 10, 2005, the date when the last pleading was filed. [18: ]

Administrative Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding the submission of memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly provides: x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. (Emphasis ours) A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was still awaiting the parties' memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,[footnoteRef:19][18] the Court held: [19: ]

x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda within the given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not a part of the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence - which even in its absence the court can do on the basis of the judges personal notes and the records of the case - non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a waiver of the privilege. (Emphasis ours)Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction.[footnoteRef:20][19] [20: ]

Under Section 9(1)[footnoteRef:21][20], Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) [footnoteRef:22][21] of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. [21: ] [22: ]

In a case, we held the respondent judge administratively liable for gross inefficiency for delay in the disposition of cases and fined him P20,000.00 considering that he failed to act promptly and decide eight (8) cases within the time prescribed by law and it was not the first time that an administrative case was filed against said judge.[footnoteRef:23][22] [23: ]

In another, the respondent judge failed to decide three (3) cases and resolve eleven (11) motions within the reglementary period. Considering that it was the judge's first offense, the Court imposed a fine of P15,000.00.[footnoteRef:24][23] [24: ]

For failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the prescribed period and taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that it was his first offense, we impose on him a fine of Ten ThousandPesos (P10,000.00).We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent must also be penalized for violation of P.D. No. 26[footnoteRef:25][24] because he filed his Rejoinder to this administrative case taking advantage of the franking privilege. Although such privilege is extended to judges, the same refers only to official communications and papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial proceedings which shall be transmitted in the mail free of charge. The respondent, in mailing his Rejoinder, made it appear that the same is an official court process as the envelope used bears his station and the words FREE FROM POSTAGE. We concur with the OCA that respondent be admonished for such violation. [25: ]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS INEFFICIENCY for delay in the disposition of a case and for which he is FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Presidential Decree No. 26 for which he is ADMONISHED. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of the decision be attached to his personal record. SO ORDERED. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate JusticeWE CONCUR:REYNATO S. PUNOChief JusticeChairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeRENATO C. CORONAAssociate Justice

ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate JusticeRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONA.M. No. RTJ-07-2045 January 19, 2010OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs.JUDGE HARUN B. ISMAEL, Respondent.R E S O L U T I O N CORONA, J.:On April 25 to May 14, 2005, a judicial audit was conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22, presided over by respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael. The judicial audit resulted in the issuance of a memorandum dated June 9, 2005 by the Office of Court Administrator (OCA)1 directing respondent to explain his failure to decide and act on current and inherited cases, as well as to resolve incidents in various cases pending before him, within the reglementary period provided by law.2 Respondent was likewise directed to inform the OCA if cases already submitted for decision or resolution had in fact been decided or resolved within the reglementary period.3 Consequently, respondent was ordered to immediately cease hearing cases in his sala and confine himself to deciding or resolving cases submitted for decision or resolution. In respondents stead, Judge Edilberto G. Absin was directed to handle active cases, other than cases submitted for decision, until respondent could comply with the directives or until he retired.The OCA likewise directed Atty. Insor A. Pantaran to explain the results of the audit, as was required of respondent. Atty. Pantaran was the clerk of court of the RTC of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22 during respondents tenure. Atty. Pantaran complied with the June 9, 2005 memorandum in a letter dated May 19, 2006.4 In its memorandum dated February 26, 2007,5 the OCA noted that respondent failed to fully comply with its directives in the June 9, 2005 memorandum. Neither did he ask for extensions of time within which to comply with the subject directives. On examination of Atty. Pantarans May 19, 2006 letter/compliance, the OCA found that respondent had partially complied with the directives of the June 9, 2005 memorandum, having already decided or resolved some of the cases he was directed to act on. Nonetheless, the OCA established that respondent committed gross inefficiency when he unduly delayed actions in a huge number of cases. The OCA recommended that respondent be fined P20,000. Furthermore, the OCA recommended that Judge Absin be directed to decide and resolve the cases pending in respondents sala. The OCA likewise directed the designation of Judge Loreto C. Quinto6 as assisting judge.The factual findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, we vary the penalty imposed in the light of the circumstances of the case.It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency7 and is not excusable. It is a less serious charge8 and is punishable by either suspension from office without salaries and benefits for not less than one month but not more than three months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.91avvphi1The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.10 Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code11 admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases12 within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.13 We emphasize that the administration of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer.14 As aptly held in Salvador v. Judge Limsiaco:15A judges foremost consideration is the administration of justice. Thus, he should follow the time limit set for deciding cases. xxx Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. It also undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. Decision making, among other duties, is the most important duty of a member of the bench. (citations omitted)Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,16 this administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar.17 Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 118 and 1219 as well as Rules 1.0320 and 12.0421 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael is hereby found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for which he is FINED in the amount of P20,000. Respondent is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED in the amount of P10,000.Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of Administrative Services, the Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant.SO ORDERED.RENATO C. CORONAAssociate JusticeChairpersonWE CONCUR:PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate JusticeANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate JusticeJOSE C. MENDOZAAssociate Justice

SECOND DIVISIONJUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Complainant,- versus -JUDGE MARIA ELISA SEMPIO DIY,Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 225, Respondent.A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248[footnoteRef:26] [26: ]

Present:CARPIO, J., Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA, PEREZ,[footnoteRef:27][footnoteRef:28] and [27: ] [28: ]

MENDOZA, JJ.Promulgated: September 29, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O N MENDOZA, J.:This is an administrative complaint for disbarment and dismissal from judiciary service filed by complainant Judge Adoracion G. Angeles (Judge Angeles) against respondent Hon. Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Judge Sempio Diy), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 225, which stemmed from consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 entitled People of the Philippines v. Proclyn Pacay and People of the Philippines v. P/Insp. Roberto Ganias, respectively. Judge Angeles charges respondent Judge Sempio Diy with Violations of Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; Section 2, Canon 2 and Section 5 Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary; Rule 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; Number 6 of the Code of Judicial Ethics; Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Section 4 paragraph b of Republic Act No. 6713 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; Falsification of Official Documents; and Dishonesty. Complainant urges the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to examine the numerous violations allegedly committed by the respondent and to make an assessment if, indeed, she is still worthy to wear the judicial robe or, if her continued presence on the bench would unduly tarnish the image of the judiciary.[footnoteRef:29][1] [29: ]

In her Comment,[footnoteRef:30][2] respondent Judge Sempio Diy vehemently denies the material allegations in the complaint. She claims that complainants charges are harsh, rash and baseless, calculated merely to harass and destroy the reputation of a younger sister in the profession.[footnoteRef:31][3] [30: ] [31: ]

As synthesized by the OCA in its Report[footnoteRef:32][4] dated May 7, 2010, the facts of the case are as follows: [32: ]

Complainant Judge Angeles alleges that she is the private complainant in the above-mentioned cases which, by order of respondent Judge Sempio-Diy dated 20 June 2008, were submitted for decision, and the promulgation of judgment was set for 11 September 2008. In a subsequent Order dated 8 September 2008, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy moved the promulgation of judgment to 17 September 2008, for the reason that she had a previously scheduled medical consultation concerning a neck ailment. Thereafter, the promulgation of judgment on 17 September 2008 was cancelled and reset to 17 October 2008, with respondent Judge Sempio-Diy citing voluminous case records and health problems as grounds to support her request before the Court of a thirty (30)-day extension.On 17 October 2008, the promulgation of judgment was once again cancelled and reset to 14 November 2008 on account of a second request for extension of time based on the ground that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy had just recently arrived from a trip to the United States where she attended a symposium on religious freedom. Following a third request for extension of time, the promulgation of judgment was reset for the last time to 12 December 2008.Finally, the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was promulgated on 12 December 2008, wherein all the accused, except for accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino, were acquitted. To complainant Judge Angeles, the said Decision was belatedly rendered because there was a lapse of six (6) months from the time it was submitted for resolution to the time it was promulgated. She further avers that her personal examination of the case records revealed that no requests for extension of time to decide the subject cases were made by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy. Likewise, she notes that the case records do not show that requests for extension of time, if any had indeed been made by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy, were granted by the Supreme Court. It is her opinion that such requests and Resolutions of the Supreme Court granting the same should be made integral parts of the case records.As for the reasons proffered by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy for the repeated cancellation and resetting of the dates for promulgation of judgment, complainant Judge Angeles argues that: (1) respondent Judge Sempio-Diys medical check-up could have been done on any other day that would not conflict with the scheduled promulgation; (2) the neck ailment was not as serious as it was made to appear because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy was able to travel abroad to attend a symposium; and (3) the claim that she needed time to study the voluminous case records is not a valid excuse because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy found time to travel abroad instead of attending to her pending cases.In fine, complainant Judge Angeles is adamant in her contention that the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was rendered way beyond the 90-day period prescribed by the Constitution. In addition, complainant Judge Angeles raises another instance where respondent Judge Sempio-Diy is supposed to have incurred unjustifiable delay.As it happened, convicted accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino assailed the Joint Decision by filing an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on 5 January 2009, which the prosecution countered in its Opposition filed on 14 January 2009. However, it was not until 30 July 2009, or more than six (6) months later, that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy issued an Order submitting the incident for resolution, it appearing that the accused through counsel has failed to file the necessary pleading despite the period given by the Court. Less than a month later, or on 24 August 2009, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy resolved the pending matter by denying the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.Despite the denial of the said Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, things did not sit well for complainant Judge Angeles. For her, the Resolution dated 24 August 2009 was belatedly issued by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy. First and foremost, she contends that the incident should have been submitted for resolution upon the filing of the prosecutions Opposition on 14 January 2009. And yet, it was more than six (6) months later, or only on 30 July 2009, that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy issued the Order submitting the said incident for resolution. Secondly, complainant Judge Angeles asserts that there was no basis for the trial court to have to wait for more than six (6) months before submitting the motion for resolution considering that there exists no order in the case records directing the accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino, through counsel, to file the necessary pleading. Asserting that there was no basis for submitting the incident for resolution only after the lapse of six (6) months, complainant Judge Angeles further contends that the Resolution issued by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy on 24 August 2009 denying the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise delayed for a total of more than seven (7) months.To support her assertions, complainant Judge Angeles attached to her COMPLAINT a Certification issued by Benedict S. Sta. Cruz, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 225, Quezon City, wherein the latter attested that, based on the record of People vs. Proclyn Pacay, et al., Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690, it appears that there is no order from the Court directing the defense to file a reply to the Comment/Opposition (to the Motion for Reconsideration) filed by the prosecution on January 14, 2009. She also points out that there appears to be an irregularity in the face of the Order submitting the incident for resolution. In particular, she refers to the date of its issuance July 30, 2009which is written in a different font when compared to the rest of the contents of the said Order. She, therefore, contends that the said date was merely typewritten in lieu of another date which was snowpaked.By failing to decide/resolve the subject cases and the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration within the period mandated by law and jurisprudence, as well as in falsifying official documents, complainant Judge Angeles now stresses, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, New Code of Judicial Conduct, Code of Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials.For her part, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy belies the accusations hurled at her by complainant Judge Angeles in the latters COMPLAINT. In her COMMENT dated 2 December 2009, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy counters that she decided the subject cases in due time and within the extended period granted by the Supreme Court. She maintains that the orders resetting the promulgation of judgment were issued in good faith and in the interest of full transparency, pursuant to her request to decide the subject cases expeditiously.For starters, she notes that she merely inherited the subject cases which had already been previously handled by three (3) other judges from the time they were filed in 1995. Thus, the case records were voluminous.For another, the first resetting of the promulgation of judgment from 11 September to 17 September 2008 was occasioned by her illness, which assertion she substantiated by way of a Medical Certificate. She points out that the setting of the promulgation of judgment on 17 September 2008 is still within the Constitutionally-prescribed 90-day period for deciding the subject cases.As for the three (3) subsequent re-settings, she avers that she timely asked for extensions of the period, all of which were granted by the Supreme Court. To support her claim that she did not incur delay in the promulgation of judgment, she appended to her COMMENT certified true copies of her first and second letters/requests addressed to the then Assistant Court Administrator, Jesus Edwin A. Villasor (now Deputy Court Administrator) and other related documents. These requests were favorably considered by the Court and she was granted an extension of a total of ninety (90) days from 18 September 2008.She likewise attached to her COMMENT a copy of her third letter/request to prove that this was filed prior to the lapse of the original 90-day extended period granted to her. In fine, she insists that there was no unjustified delay when the Joint Decision was finally promulgated on 12 December 2008 as the same was still within the original 90-day extended period reckoned from 18 September 2008. The Courts granting of her third request for an additional thirty (30) days in a Resolution dated 16 February 2009 had, by then, become moot and academic.While she admits that her letters/requests for extension and the Supreme Court Resolutions granting the same were not attached to the voluminous records of the subject cases, she nevertheless manifests that these were kept in a separate folder. With regard to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, she points out that the delay was inadvertently incurred in good faith. During the hearing of the said motion on 29 January 2009, the request of the defense for time to file the necessary pleadings was granted, for which reason, she says, the said motion could not yet be submitted for resolution. She deemed it prudent to give the parties a reasonable period of time within which to submit their adversarial pleadings. To substantiate this contention, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy attached to her COMMENT the transcript of stenographic notes taken on that day and the Minutes of the proceedings of the same day.In the light of the foregoing, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy discredits the import of the Certification issued by the Branch Clerk of Court, Benedict S. Sta. Cruz, by arguing that, while there is no order appearing in the case records directing accused SPO1 Carino to file his Reply to the prosecutions Comment to his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the said directive appears in the Minutes of the hearing conducted on 29 January 2009. She likewise notes that during the said hearing, the said Branch Clerk of Court was not present.Respondent Judge Sempio-Diy likewise attributes the inadvertent delay to the unfortunate crises that befell her, her mother, and the courts personnel sometime in May to July of 2009. She reported to the Office of the Court Administrator that they received a series of death threats which caused, among others, disorientation. Thus, it was only on 30 July 2009, after the semi-annual inventory, that an Order submitting the matter for resolution was issued. She stresses that the incident was resolved within thirty (30) days from its submission. As for the snowpaked correction of the date of the said Order, she avers that this was simply due to a typographical error.[footnoteRef:33][5] [33: ]

Complainant Judge Angeles filed her Reply to respondents Comment and, thereafter, respondent Judge Sempio Diy filed her Rejoinder in amplification of their respective claims. Later, complainant filed her Sur-Rejoinder on February 9, 2010 while respondent filed her Reply to the Sur-Rejoinder on February 18, 2010.In its evaluation, the OCA found that Judge Sempio Diy cannot be held guilty of unreasonable delay in rendering the Joint Decision in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 given her seasonably-filed requests for extension of time. The requests were all granted by this Court in the November 24, 2008 Resolution, giving respondent a total extension period of ninety (90) days from September 18, 2008. The OCA, however, opined that respondent should be administratively sanctioned for incurring delay in the resolution of accused Carinos Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter against Judge Sempio Diy and that she be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for her delayed action on a motion for reconsideration with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.[footnoteRef:34][6] [34: ]

After a judicious review of the records of the case, this Court determines that the findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, We modify the recommended disposition in light of the circumstances of the case.The Court finds no evidence to sustain the charges of delay against Judge Sempio Diy in rendering the Joint Decision in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690. It is the stance of the complainant that Judge Sempio Diy merely sat on the cases for an unreasonable length of time and failed to resolve them within the constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. This constituted gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions. Judge Angeles accuses respondent of concocting requests for extension and making it appear that these requests were granted by this Court. Complainant avers that she perused the records of the consolidated criminal cases but respondents alleged requests for extension and the Courts Resolutions allowing them were nowhere to be found. Complainants contentions fail.Records reveal that Judge Sempio Diy timely sought for three successive extensions[footnoteRef:35][7] of the period to decide the consolidated criminal cases. All requests were favorably considered by this Court.[footnoteRef:36][8] Respondent was granted a total extension period of ninety (90) days to be reckoned from September 18, 2008 or until December 18, 2008. So, the promulgation of Joint Decision on December 12, 2008 was made well within the 90-day extension period. Complainant should have first verified the veracity and accuracy of her allegations from the records of Branch 225, this Court and the OCA, before hurling accusations of dishonesty and slothful conduct against respondent. Truly, respondent was charged with a litany of imagined sins relative to her alleged undue delay in deciding the subject consolidated criminal cases without sufficient proof. [35: ] [36: ]

We hold, however, that there was indeed delay in resolving accused Carinos Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed on January 5, 2009.Respondent Judge Sempio Diy claims that the delay in submitting accuseds motion for reconsideration was due to inadvertence and without bad faith on her part. She explains that she opted to wait for the defense to file its reply to the prosecutions comment on the motion for reconsideration because the offense of which accused was convicted was serious and his liberty was at stake. She adds that the death threats she and the members of her judicial staff received from May to July 2009, caused them disorientation and contributed further to the delay in the resolution of the subject motion. She readily admits that it was only after the semi-annual inventory that the pending incidents in the consolidated criminal cases were considered submitted for resolution in the July 30, 2009 Order. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct[footnoteRef:37][9] admonishes all judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.[footnoteRef:38][10] This is supplemented by Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, requiring judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.[footnoteRef:39][11] [37: ] [38: ] [39: ]

A careful perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes[footnoteRef:40][12] and the Minutes[footnoteRef:41][13] of the hearing held on January 29, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690, would clearly show that respondent indeed gave the defense ten (10) days to submit its reply to the prosecutions comment on the motion for reconsideration and, thereafter, she would resolve all pending incidents in said consolidated cases. As correctly observed by the OCA, the reglementary period to resolve the motion in question began to run from February 8, 2009 or after the lapse of ten days from January 29, 2009. Respondent, however, did not act on the matter and allowed a hiatus in the consolidated criminal cases. A judge cannot choose to prolong the period for resolving pending incidents and deciding cases beyond the period authorized by law. Let it be underscored that it is the sworn duty of judges to administer justice without undue delay under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Judges should act with dispatch in resolving pending incidents, so as not to frustrate and delay the satisfaction of a judgment.[footnoteRef:42][14] [40: ] [41: ] [42: ]

Judge Sempio Diy, having been a member of the judiciary for several years, should not have any trouble disposing the courts business and resolving motions for reconsideration within the required period. Otherwise, she should formally request this Court for an extension of the deadline to avoid administrative liability. Unfortunately, she failed to do that in these cases. Delay in resolving motions and incidents within the reglementary period of 90 days fixed by the law cannot be excused or condoned.[footnoteRef:43][15] [43: ]

Respondents claim of death threats on her and her staff, even if real, would not constitute a valid excuse for her inaction. After all, as member of the judiciary, she must display diligence and competence amid all adversities to live up to her oath of office. Besides, when said threats were received from May to July 2009, the three-month mandatory period for resolving the motion had already expired. Accordingly, respondent cannot rely on said predicament to exonerate her from administrative liability for incurring undue delay in resolving the subject motion. Although it is true that Judge Sempio Diy finally issued a resolution[footnoteRef:44][16] denying accused Carinos motion for reconsideration on August 24, 2009 or within 30 days from the time the incident was submitted for resolution on July 30, 2009, her inaction on the motion for more than 6 months is not excused. [44: ]

It appears that respondent has simply forgotten about the pending motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 after said cases became inactive due to the failure of the defense to submit its reply. The realization of the blunder came only during the semi-annual inventory of the courts cases. This situation could have been avoided had respondent adopted an effective system of record management and organization of dockets to monitor the flow of cases for prompt and efficient dispatch of the courts business. Elementary court management practice requires her to keep her own records or notes of cases pending before her sala, especially those that are pending for more than 90 days, so that she can act on them promptly and without delay. In Ricolcol v. Judge Camarista,[footnoteRef:45][17] the Court declared: [45: ]

A judge ought to know the cases submitted to her for decision or resolution and is expected to keep her own record of cases so that she may act on them promptly. It is incumbent upon her to devise an efficient recording and filing system in her court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management is as much her responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her official functions. The Court reminds the respondent of her duty to closely supervise and monitor the monthly docket inventories to forestall future occurrences of this nature. Pertinently, the Court held in Gordon v. Judge Lilagan:[footnoteRef:46][18] [46: ]

The physical inventory of cases is instrumental to the expeditious dispensation of justice. Although this responsibility primarily rests in the presiding judge, it is shared with the court staff. This Court has consistently required Judges for a continuous inventory of cases on a monthly basis so that a trial judge is aware of the status of each case. With the assistance of the branch clerk of court, a checklist should be prepared indicating the steps to be taken to keep the cases moving. In Juan v. Arias [72 SCRA 404 (1976)], the Court underscored the importance of this physical inventory stressing it is only by this that the judge can keep himself abreast of the status of the pending cases and informed that everything is in order in his court.Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[footnoteRef:47][19] this administrative case against respondent shall also be considered a disciplinary proceeding against her as a member of the bar.[footnoteRef:48][20] Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1[footnoteRef:49][21] and 12[footnoteRef:50][22] as well as Rules 1.03[footnoteRef:51][23] and 12.04[footnoteRef:52][24] of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [47: ] [48: ] [49: ] [50: ] [51: ] [52: ]

In determining the sanction to be imposed on errant magistrates, the Court considers the factual milieu of each case, the offending acts or omissions of the judges, as well as previous transgressions, if any. In the instant case, there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive that could have compelled respondent to delay the resolution of the subject motion. In fact, when respondent found out about the unresolved subject motion in the consolidated cases, she immediately ordered its

submission for resolution on July 30, 2009. In the absence of malice, the delay could only be due to inadvertence. It is significant to note that respondent resolved the motion within thirty days from its submission date which clearly showed her effort to zealously attend to her duties. Lastly, it appears that this is her first infraction and the first time for her to face an administrative complaint of this kind. Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious charge punishable by either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of not more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. However, considering that this is her first infraction due to inadvertence, We believe that admonition will suffice. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Maria Elisa Sempio Diy is found to have been in delay in the rendition of an order in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 and is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in observing the reglementary period for disposing of motions. SO ORDERED. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeChairpersonANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice Associate JusticeJOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate Justice

EN BANCCITY OF CEBU,Complainant, - versus -JUDGE IRENEO LEE GAKO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City,Respondent.A.M. No. RTJ-08-2111(Formerly A.M. No. 05-2207-RTJ)Present: PUNO, C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,[footnoteRef:53]* [53: ]

CORONA,*CARPIO MORALES,AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, andBRION, JJ. Promulgated:May 7, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONNACHURA, J.:Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by the City of Cebu against now retired Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr.[footnoteRef:54][1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Cebu City, for serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, willful violation of rules and laws, judicial interference, tolerating forum-shopping, and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. [54: ]

Following established procedure, the Court initially referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.[footnoteRef:55][2] The OCA later found the respondent judge administratively liable for undue delay in deciding Civil Case No. CEB-29570, and for gross ignorance of the law, which is tantamount to grave abuse of judicial authority, when he violated the doctrine of non-interference in Civil Case No. 30684. The OCA, therefore, recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; the respondent judge be fined P11,000.00 and be suspended without pay for 6 months; and the motion to direct the respondent to compulsorily inhibit himself from all cases pending in his court in which complainant is a party-litigant be denied for being judicial in character.[footnoteRef:56][3] [55: ] [56: ]

Subsequently, the Court designated Court of Appeals Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas to further investigate and evaluate the charges leveled against the respondent. As summarized by the said Investigating Justice, the factual backdrop of the charges is as follows:1) Serious Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law on Two Counts1.a) In Civil Case. No. CEB-26607: Spouses Roque and Fatima Ting vs. City of Cebu, complainant charged respondent judge for having arrogated unto himself the duty which pertains to that of a counsel, when respondent judge called to the witness stand a certain Mr. Darza as witness of the court, when neither parties lawyers in the said civil case were interested to present said person as their witness. During the appointed hearing, respondent judge, by himself, conducted the lengthy examination, without even making an offer of the purpose for which the witness testimony is presented, while the counsels refused to propound any question to the witness.x x x x1.b)The 2nd count under this charge of misconduct, etc., arose from the proceedings in Civil Case No. CEB-29570: Cebu Ports Authority (CPA) vs. City of Cebu. Plaintiff in this case sought a temporary and permanent declaration from the court of respondent judge to enjoin Cebu City from further proceeding with the auction sale of the port and plaintiffs other properties owing to the notice and warrant of levy issued against CPA after the latter refused to pay the real property taxes assessed by the city against it. CPA claimed being exempted from its coverage.Complainant City of Cebu accused respondent judge of procrastinating and virtually sitting on the main case of injunction, which he voluntarily promised to resolve before the end of the month (December 2003). The Order dated 12 December 2003 of respondent judge shows that he suggested not to issue a Temporary Restraining Order, but, nevertheless and quite confusingly, enjoined the parties to observe the status quo, since the decision of the court on the main case of injunction is forthcoming at the end of the month. However, the decision came only on 6 December 2004 after complainant filed an Omnibus Manifestation on 10 October 2004, reminding the judge to make good his former and own commitment. This delay cost the city of Cebu to sustain substantial damages as it miserably failed to collect real property taxes.Complainant additionally accused respondent judge of having calculatingly failed to take judicial notice of a decided case [Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) vs. City of Ilo-Ilo, G.R. No. 109791, July 14, 2003] which the city invoked as case law for the dismissal of the complaint and, at the same time, relied upon by plaintiff CPA to champion in the latters main cause of action. Had the respondent judge considered the case with utmost circumspection, he would have resolved the main issue at the earliest possible time in the citys favor, the main issue in the case of CPA v. Cebu City having been squarely ruled upon already in the cited PPA case.x x x x2) Willful Violation of Rules and Laws, on Four (4) Counts including Two (2) Counts of Judicial Interference.This involves four distinct actions perpetrated in separate incidents involving four cases, namely:2.a) Civil Case No. CEB-26066: Roy Feliciano, et al. vs. City of Cebu, et al. This case is one for Injunction, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction by reason of the defendant-city of Cebus issuance and implementation of a Demolition Order against the houses/structures of Feliciano, et al., the plaintiffs, the latter having physically and publicly occupied a road lot and sidewalk at the North Reclamation Area in Cebu City.During the hearing for the application of TRO, Feliciano, one of the plaintiffs, who took the witness stand, admitted in open court their occupancy of the sidewalk. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which, among others, obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street. The law allows the summary demolition or removal of the structures considered as public nuisance. Thus, on the basis of plaintiffs judicial admission, that they are occupying a sidewalk, the city of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Instead of dismissing the complaint, respondent judge proceeded with the trial. It is for this act that complainant Cebu City in this administrative case accuses respondent judge of willful violation of the foregoing laws and rules.It is further complained that respondent judge in this Feliciano case granted plaintiffs demand to be relocated absent any law to support therefor or lacking proof in plaintiffs pleadings that they were qualified and not disqualified beneficiaries for the relocation and settlement, as required under Sections 16 and 17 of Republic Act. No. 7279; that the afore-cited laws were completely disregarded by the respondent judge, as if they never exist. It is advanced that the act of respondent judge of tolerating plaintiffs violation of certain requirement of the law amounts to his own violation thereof.x x x x2.b)Civil Case No. CEB-29550: Colon Transport Terminal, represented by its Operator, Engr. Renato C. Asegurado, and Inter Urban PUV Terminal, represented by its Operator, Jessie S. Lasaleta, vs. Cebu City Police Traffic Group, et al. (For: Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Mandatory Injunction), referred to hereinafter as, first case.Civil Case No. CEB-29730: Mr. Jessie S. Lasaleta, doing business under the trade name and style Inter Urban PUV Terminal, vs. City of Cebu, et al. (For: Declaration of Nullity of City Ordinance No. 1958, as amended with Prayer for Permanent Injunction), second case for brevity.2.c) Civil Case No. CEB-30411: Simplicio Giltendez, doing business under the name and style Central PUV and V-hire Terminal vs. Cebu City, et al. (For Declaration of Unconstitutionality of City Ordinance No. 1958) third case, hereinafter.Believing that Mr. Lasaleta, the plaintiff in the second case, is guilty of forum-shopping, which position is bolstered by his admission in the Verification and Certification attached to his complaint in the second case, a portion of which states that he reserves to withdraw his name in the first case after the filing of the second, Cebu City posits that the first and second case, or at least one of them should have been dismissed outright by respondent judge, failing which, judge Gako is guilty of willfully violating the rules proscribing forum shopping and for tolerating an act which amounts to direct contempt of court. The city asserts that this issue was raised in its Motion for Summary Judgment in the foregoing consolidated terminal cases.x x x xReferring to the third terminal case, additional charge is posed by complainant against the judge in granting plaintiffs application for TRO, being unfounded and without legal basis. Cebu City, as defendant therein, contended that plaintiff in said case was operating without a business permit, did not comply with the requirements of the local ordinance regulating the operation of the terminal, did not have a Memorandum of Agreement with the city to operate as such, and did not possess the necessary building permit for the structures that were being used in the operation of his business. Judge Gakos act of issuing TRO, therefore, constitutes another violation of the provisions concerning the requirement of granting injunctive relief under the Rules of Court.Likewise, the above Order of respondent judge, granting the application for a TRO, also makes him guilty of interference and total disrespect of what the Court of Appeals (CA) has decided in CA-G.R. SP No. 74053. The CA in this cited case upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 1837. In that CA decision, it was acknowledged that the city of Cebu is authorized to sort out a re-routing of the traffic flow in the spirit of the orderly implementation of the subject ordinance. Said city ordinance was the very basis of the citys re-routing scheme.x x x x 2.d)Civil Case No. CEB-30684: Cebu 3rd District V-Hire Operators & Drivers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, represented by Gina Virgilia A. Sanchez, vs. City of Cebu, et al. (For Declaration of Unconstitutionality of City Ordinance No. 1958, Mandamus with Injunction, and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order).This is the fourth count, of Cebu Citys charge against judge Gako, for willful violation of laws and rules, at the same time, a second count of violation for judicial interference.Relevant to this case is Civil Case No. CEB-27643: Cebu 3rd District V-Hire Operators & Drivers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, represented by Msgr. Jose Diapen, vs. City Counsel of Cebu City, et al. (For Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction), which was raffled to Branch 58, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, where plaintiffs applications for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction were denied by the presiding judge therein, in the Orders dated 3 July 2002 and 21 October 2002. The main case being one for Injunction, the mentioned orders of denial had the effect of disposing the same, and plaintiff neither having appealed therefrom nor questioned said orders, the same already became final and executory.Here, it is contended by Cebu City that despite its effort to bring this fact to the attention of respondent judge, the latter, in open display of judicial arrogance, interfered with these orders of a coordinate and co-equal court by giving due course to Civil Case No. CEB-30684, a case filed in 2004 subsequent to CEB-27643. Respondents act herein likewise constitutes disrespect of a final ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 74053). Worse, said complainant, Judge Gako granted plaintiffs application of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. (3) Other Violations.Complainant is referring to the alleged practice of respondent judge of resorting to injunction-for-sale with the active meddling of a family member; allowing parties to write decisions for him; and failure to rule on Cebu Citys motions for Consolidation and Summary Judgment in the transport cases above-mentioned while allowing the other party to present evidence to prove damages, in effect, proceeding to trial proper without pre-trial.x x x x(4) Violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.Complainant claims that the foregoing acts of respondent also infringe various canons in the Code of Judicial Conduct, viz.:In the Ting case above, Civil Case No. CEB-26607, in addition to being constitutive of willful misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, the act of respondent judge in acting as litigants lawyer, by obtaining the testimony of a person despite the fact that both counsels were not interested in introducing said person as their witness; and the judges act of conducting, by himself, the direct examination thereof, violate Canon 2, Rule 2.01. of the Code of Judicial Conduct: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.; and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.Likewise, in the CPA case, Civil Case No. CEB-29570, respondent judges actuation of reneging to his declaration to resolve the case within a specified period infringes Canon 1, Rule 1.02 of the same Code: A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.Finally, to complainant, all of the foregoing charges relative to the comportment of respondent judge during the proceedings in the cited cases, which earn him the charges of Serious Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law, Willful Violation of Rules and Laws, Judicial Interference on several counts, demonstrate grave incompetence; running afoul to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the cited Code: A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.x x x x [footnoteRef:57][4] [57: ]

After weighing the arguments and the evidence of the parties, the Investigating Justice found the respondent judge liable only for undue delay in deciding Civil Case No. CEB-29570, and recommended the following: WHEREFORE, the above-discussed circumstances considered, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5, be SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for two (2) months, for undue delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. CEB-29570: Cebu Ports Authority vs. Cebu City.As regards the motion for respondents inhibition, Judge Ireneo Lee Gako is advised to voluntarily inhibit from hearing or taking cognizance of the cases pending before him, where complainant is a party-litigant; only with respect to those cases involved in this administrative case.x x x x[footnoteRef:58][5] [58: ]

The Court upholds the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Justice, but modifies the recommended penalty.On the charge that the respondent judge unduly arrogated unto himself the duty of a counsel, in Civil Case No. CEB-26607, by calling a witness to the stand and conducting the latters direct testimony even if the respective counsels were not interested or did not intend to present said person as their witness, the Court finds nothing irregular in the same. Revealed in the hearings of the said case is that the respondent judge intended to obtain enlightenment from the said witness, the project director of one of the signatories to the contract being litigated.[footnoteRef:59][6] In not a few cases, this Court has declared that the trial judge, if he is not satisfied after hearing all the evidence adduced by the parties, may, in the exercise of sound discretion, on his own motion and in furtherance of justice, call additional witnesses or recall some or the same witnesses for the purpose of questioning them himself to enlighten him on particular facts or issues involved in the case.[footnoteRef:60][7] [59: ] [60: ]

As to the four charges of willful violation of laws and rules, the Court finds them without merit. The complainant failed to clearly prove error or ill will on the part of the respondent judge in denying the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-26066. Granting that respondent erred in denying the motion, the complainant should have appealed or petitioned for the issuance of a writ of certiorari. Fundamental is the rule that where the remedies of appeal and/or certiorari are available, recourse to an administrative complaint for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety is improper.[footnoteRef:61][8] [61: ]

We extend the same treatment to the other charges leveled against the respondent particularly those involving his acts in Civil Case Nos. CEB-29550, CEB-29730, CEB-30411 and CEB-30684. The Court finds neither malicious nor corrupt motive in respondents non-dismissal of Civil Case Nos. CEB-29550 and CEB-29730 on account of forum shopping. No viciousness can further be presumed from respondent judges issuance of a temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. CEB-30411, considering that the grant of the injunctive relief in that case was preceded by a thorough consideration of the positions of the parties after the conduct of a hearing.[footnoteRef:62][9] On the charges of judicial interference and disrespect towards a decision of the appellate court, specifically those involving Civil Case Nos. CEB-30411 and CEB-30684, we find the same unavailing. The city ordinance being assailed in these civil cases, as shown by the parties pleadings, is different from those in the earlier 2002 case (Civil Case No. CEB-27643) and in the CA decision alleged to have been interfered with.[footnoteRef:63][10] With regard to the respondent judges failure to rule on complainants motion for consolidation and summary judgment, the facts and circumstances are inadequate to conclude that there was irregularity or misconduct in the said act. [62: ] [63: ]

We note at this point that, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of the judge must not only be erroneous, but most importantly, its issuance is motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motives; because mere error of judgment is not a ground for disciplinary proceedings.[footnoteRef:64][11] To follow a different rule will mean a deluge of complaints, legitimate or otherwise, and our magistrates will be immersed in answering charges against them rather than performing their judicial functions. As we said earlier, appropriate judicial remedies are available to the complainantan appeal or a petition for certiorari to assail the allegedly erroneous orders; hence, recourse to an administrative action against the judge is improper. [64: ]

As to the other violationsthe purported injunction-for-sale and the writing of decisions by the parties themselves, we dismiss the accusations for being hearsay. Other than the bare allegations of the complainant, no evidence has been introduced to support the charges. The presumption of regularity in the respondents performance of his official duties remains. The Court, nonetheless, finds respondent to have transgressed Canon 3[footnoteRef:65][12] of the Code of Judicial Conduct when he did not resolve Civil Case No. CEB-29570 within the constitutionally mandated time frame. His insistence [65: ]

that his decision was not delayed because a settlement between the parties was imminent, thus, he need not render a decision, does not persuade the Court. The records show that on December 12, 2003 the respondent judge declared that he would resolve the case within the month as the issue involved was purely legal. He then ordered the parties to observe the status quo despite his further declaration that he would not rule on the application for injunction.[footnoteRef:66][13] By this order, the parties were made to understand that the case was already for final resolution or decision. [66: ]

The records, nevertheless, are devoid of any order from the respondent judge, from December 12, 2003 to September 26, 2004, that suspended the proceedings on account of the possibility of a compromise by the parties. We note that the discussion on a settlement came about only on September 27, 2004 when a party-plaintiff offered P25M to the defendant to buy peace.[footnoteRef:67][14] Taking into consideration the 90-day period to decide the case,[footnoteRef:68][15] we conclude that the respondent judge should have resolved it within December 12, 2003 to March 12, 2004. Respondent, however, rendered his decision only on December 6, 2004, or after a delay of almost 9 months. The Court finds no valid justification for the said delay, thus, respondent judge is adjudged guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision in the said civil case. [67: ] [68: ]

Section 9(1), Rule 140[footnoteRef:69][16] of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case as a less serious charge, which warrants any of the sanctions in Section 11(B) of the same rule [69: ]

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. As aforesaid, the Investigating Justice, in this case, recommended the penalty of suspension for 2 months without salary and other benefits. The Court cannot, however, adopt the said recommended penalty considering that the respondent already retired from the judiciary on September 20, 2006. The Court emphasizes at this point that respondents retirement from office does not render the present administrative case moot and academic; neither does it free him from liability. Since complainant filed the case when respondent was still in the service, the Court retains the authority to investigate and resolve the administrative complaint against him.[footnoteRef:70][17] [70: ]

Were it not for his retirement, we would have been inclined to adopt the heavier penalty of suspension in view of our previous warnings to him not to commit further infraction.[footnoteRef:71][18] In lieu thereof, the Court imposes a fine of P40,000.00 on the respondent. The fine that we impose shall then be deducted from his retirement benefits. [71: ]

Incidentally, during the pendency of this case, complainant by motion[footnoteRef:72][19] sought an order from this Court directing respondent judge to inhibit himself from handling all the pending cases in his branch in which the complainant is a party-litigant. In view, however, of the respondents retirement, this issue has already become moot and academic. [72: ]

As a final note, we reiterate our incessant reminder that all members of the bench should comport themselves blamelessly in order to advance public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. WHEREFORE, retired Judge Ireneo Lee Gako of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5, is hereby found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. CEB-29570. Respondent is ORDERED to pay the FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.SO ORDERED.ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:REYNATO S. PUNOChief JusticeLEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate JusticeCONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeOn leaveMA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate Justice

On leaveRENATO C. CORONAAssociate JusticeCONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate JusticeDANTE O. TINGAAssociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate JusticePRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYESAssociate JusticeTERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate Justice

ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice EN BANCIMELDA R. MARCOS, Complainant,- versus -JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Respondent.A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062[footnoteRef:73] [73: ]

Present:CORONA, C.J.,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION, PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ,MENDOZA, andSERENO, JJ. Promulgated: January 18, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xD E C I S I O NPer Curiam:The judiciary cannot keep those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. This being so, in the performance of the functions of their office, judges must endeavor to act in a manner that puts them and their conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. They must act with extreme care for their office indeed is burdened with a heavy load of responsibility.[footnoteRef:74][1] [74: ]

At bench is an administrative case filed by Imelda R. Marcos (Marcos) against Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan (Judge Pamintuan), Presiding Judge, Branch 3, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City (RTC), for Gross Ignorance of the Law. THE FACTS:From the records, it appears that on November 15, 2006, Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes (Judge Reyes) dated May 30, 1996 (and modified in the September 2, 1996 order), in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al.Judge Reyes dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R in an order, dated May 30, 1996, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and further, for failure to comply with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994 on forum shopping, the petition is DISMISSED.It is further ORDERED that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to decedents brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.SO ORDERED.The parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the said order but both motions were denied by the RTC for lack of merit in its June 24, 1996 Order.On June 25, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own motion for reconsideration which was also denied in a court order dated September 2, 1996. Ten (10) years later, in an order dated May 9, 2006, Judge Pamintuan set the case for hearing on June 29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner. Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in the case. On August 15, 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estates administrator.This Court further rules that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a mere replica of the original Golden Buddha which has a detachable head, which has been missing since 1971 up to the present, or for a period of thirty five (35) years by now, and has been in unlawful possession of persons who do not have title over it, nor any right at all to possess this original Golden Buddha.Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory order constituted gross ignorance of the law. In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, she argued that final and executory judgments of lower courts were not reviewable even by the Supreme Court. Judge Pamintuan reversed a final and executory order not upon the instance of any of the parties in Civil Case No. 3383-R but motu proprio. He even failed to indicate where he obtained the information that the Golden Buddha sitting in his sala was a mere replica. Marcos claimed that his order was in conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a judgment or final order shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it (his order) is based xxx.In his Comment, Judge Pamintuan argued that Marcos could have just filed a pleading manifesting lack of interest or moving for the recall of the subpoena, but she did not. In fact, her counsel, Atty. Robert Sison, entered his appearance and actually appeared in court. With her appearance through counsel, she subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the court. She should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 15, 2006 Order instead of filing an administrative complaint. As she did not, Judge Pamintuan opined that her lost judicial remedies could not be substituted with the filing of this case.Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, stated that she was not a party in Civil Case No. 3383-R, hence, she could not file a motion for reconsideration. She cited Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides that only the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal. In its Report, dated June 29, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including government owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA pointed out that: As held, execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Bearing this in mind, respondent issued the questioned Order dated August 15, 2006, the pertinent text of which reads:Despite said Order which was issued almost ten (10) years ago, the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas has not taken possession of the Buddha Statuette or the Buddha replica from the Court, thus, this incumbent Presiding Judge, seeing the necessity of finally disposing of the Buddha Statuette physically, and finding out the present statue of the late Rogelio Roxas, ordered the hearing on June 29, 2006. (Italics supplied)xxxxxxxxxWHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estates administrator.Clearly, the questioned Order conforms to the directive of the Court in its previous Order dated May 30, 1996, which provides:It is further ORDERED that the Buddha Statuette in custody of this Court be immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to the decedents brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.And modified in an Order dated September 2, 1996, which reads:WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General is DENIED. The Order of this Court on May 30, 1996 remains insofar as the Buddha statuette is awarded to the state of the late Rogelio Roxas and is at the same time MODIFIED in the sense that the Buddha statuette shall be under the custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas or upon the appointment of his estates administrator.x x xx x xx x xA normal course of proceedings would have been that respondent Judge waits for the proper party to go to court to ask for the release of the Buddha statuette. x x x.However, respondent was being overzealous when he ruled that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a mere replica. Notwithstanding that the same may be his and the litigants opinion during the hearing of June 29, 2006. (sic) He should have borne in mind that there were no issues nor controversies left for consideration in Civil Case No. 3383-R. It must be noted that the Order dated May 30, 1996 (and modified on September 2, 1996) has become final and executory. Hence, issues have been settled and the matter laid to rest. As repeatedly ruled by this Court, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Should judgment of lower courts which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals become final and executory before, or without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of government.It is inexcusable for respondent Judge to have overlooked such an elementary legal principle. Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in its July 31, 2007 Resolution, preventively suspended Judge Pamintuan pending resolution of this administrative case to stop him from committing further damage to the judiciary. Judge Pamintuan moved for reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion for Early Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration and to Submit the Case for Decision.The matter was referred again to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. In its Memorandum dated November 22, 2007, the OCA recommended that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent be GRANTED and that the Order of Preventive Suspension dated July 31, 2007, be LIFTED. Thus, in its December 11, 2007 Resolution, the Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Judge Pamintuan and lifted the Order of Preventive Suspension effective immediately. Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and benefits covering the period of his preventive suspension from August to December 13, 2007. In its June 3, 2008 Resolution, following the recommendation of the OCA, the Court denied said request for being premature and for lack of merit. Now, the Court resolves the complaint against Judge Pamintuan.After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA.Doubtless, the May 30, 1996 Order, which was modified on September 2, 1996, in Civil Case No. 3383-R, has long become final and executory. In his assailed August 15, 2006 Order, Judge Pamintuan made express declarations that were not embodied either in the May 30, 1996 Order or in the September 2, 1996 Order. He ruled that the Golden Buddha in the custody of the court was a fake one, or a mere replica of the original. This may be his opinion or the litigants during the hearing of June 29, 2006 but Judge Pamintuan should have realized that the trial court did not rule on that point in its May 30, 1996 Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order). Insofar as this issue is concerned, the May 30, 1996 Order pertinently reads:Albert Umali anchors his claim on the supposed Memorandum of Agreement between him and the late Rogelio Roxas executed on November 25, 1988. He claims that under this agreement, he and Rogelio Roxas will share in the profits of their business venture, that is, treasure hunting and claim for lost treasure.He adds, however, that the Buddha with this Court is not the genuine Buddha. According to him, he has photographs to prove the existence of the real and genuine golden Buddha. To be sure, this Court is baffled by the foregoing submission of Mr. Umali, if the subject Buddha is not the genuine golden Buddha, and therefore a fake one, it cannot be covered by the memorandum of Agreement.Be it noted that the Memorandum of Agreement speaks of treasure hunting and lost treasure which could refer to things of great value. Based on Mr. Umalis own claim the subject Buddha has no appreciable material value. It is therefore outside the scope of the Memorandum of Agreement. This being the case, what right then does Albert Umali have to demand the return of the subject Buddha to him? On this score alone, this Court should already reject the claim of Mr. Umali over the Buddha now in this Courts custody.x x xx x xx x xNow, as to whether or not there is that controversial golden Buddha different from the one now in custody of this Court, there is none. X x x. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. [Emphases ours]Judge Pamintuan indeed made a serious error in making such a pronouncement in the challenged order. It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.[footnoteRef:75][2] [75: ]

It is inexcusable for Judge Pamintuan to have overlooked such basic legal principle no matter how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be well-informed, thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural rules at all times.When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[footnoteRef:76][3] [76: ]

The Court agrees with the view of OCA that Judge Pamintuan manifested gross ignorance of the law in issuing the questioned August 15, 2006 Order. Verily, he failed to conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that:Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with the rules or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly crucial that judges be acquainted with the law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one not even judges.[footnoteRef:77][4] [77: ]

Notably, this is not Judge Pamintuans first and sole administrative case. In The Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan,[footnoteRef:78][5] Judge Pamintuan was charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused, Arrogance and Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was suspended for one (1) year. [78: ]

In the case of Atty. Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan,[footnoteRef:79][6] he was found guilty of violating Canons 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amounted to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer of the judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He was reprimanded and was sternly warned that a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions would be dealt with more severely. He was also meted a fine of P10,000.00. [79: ]

In a much recent case, Biggel v. Pamintuan,[footnoteRef:80][7] he was charged with manifest partiality, gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, and unjust and malicious delay in the resolution of the incidents in Criminal Case No. 25383-R entitled People of the Philippines v. Emil Biggel, a case for estafa. He was found guilty of violating Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of court business promptly. The Court imposed upon him a fine in the amount of P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. [80: ]

As of this time, there is another administrative case yet to be resolved against Judge Pamintuan filed by one Peter Cosalan for gross ignorance of the law.[footnoteRef:81][8] Although, this is not pertinent in the resolution of this case, it is clear from the other undisputed records that Judge Pamintuan has failed to meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe and place of honor reserved for guardians of justice. As held in the case of Malabed v. Asis:[footnoteRef:82][9] [81: ] [82: ]

Respondent Judge must bear in mind that membership in the judiciary circumscribes ones personal conduct and imposes upon him certain restrictions, the faithful observance of which is the price one has to pay for holding such a distinguished position. x x x His conduct must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system lest public confidence in the judiciary would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and negligent conduct of judges.The Court has held time and again that a judge is expected to demonstrate more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is essential that he be familiar with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled doctrines.[footnoteRef:83][10] [83: ]

As fittingly stated in the case of Borromeo v. Mariano,[footnoteRef:84][11] Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who has a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law. Thus, this Court has had the occasion to hold that: [84: ]

When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judges dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.[footnoteRef:85][12] [85: ]

In this case, the Court finds Judge Pamintuan accountable for gross ignorance of the law. He could have simply been suspended and fined, but the Court cannot take his previous infractions lightly. His violations are serious in character. Having been previously warned and punished for various infractions, Judge Pamintuan now deserves the ultimate administrative penalty dismissal from service. The Court doubts if he ever took seriously its previous warnings that a repetition of his offenses would merit a more severe sanction from this Court. His conduct in this case and his prior infractions are grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As shown from the cited administrative cases filed against Judge Pamintuan, he was liable not only for gross ignorance of the law but for other equally serious transgressions. This Court should, therefore, refrain from being lenient, when doing so would give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this decision.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaFIRST DIVISIONESPINA & MADARANG CO. & MAKAR AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORP. (MAKAR), REPRESENTED BY RODRIGO A. ADTOON, Petitioners,- versus -HON. CADER P. INDAR Al Haj, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Region 12, Cotabato City and its OIC, Branch Clerk of Court, ABIE M. AMILIL, Respondents.A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2257-RTJ)Present:CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO, andVILLARAMA, JR., JJ.Promulgated:December 14, 2011

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