Legal analysis of Regulation of Mobile Payment System ... · i DECLARATION I, Jean Marie Vianney...
Transcript of Legal analysis of Regulation of Mobile Payment System ... · i DECLARATION I, Jean Marie Vianney...
KIGALI INDEPENDENT UNIVERSITY ULK
MASTER PROGRAM
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS LAW
P.O BOX: 2280 KIGALI
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
academic Requirements for award of Masters
Degree in Law
By Jean Marie Vianney SIKUBWABO
Supervisor: Dr. George MWAISONDOLA
Co- Supervisor: Lecturer René MUNYAMAHORO
Kigali, September 2014
Legal analysis of Regulation of Mobile
Payment System under Rwandan Law
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DECLARATION
I, Jean Marie Vianney SIKUBWABO hereby declare that, this work entitled “Legal analysis of
regulation of mobile payment system under Rwandan law” is original. It has never been
presented elsewhere. Every part of it is a product of my own research and where other
individual's work has been used, references have been provided. I declare that it will never be
presented anywhere else, and all rights of it are reserved to me.
Jean Marie Vianney SIKUBWABO
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DEDICATION
To Almighty GOD;
To my wife Claudine UMUKUNDWA;
To my beloved daughter Fleurise Chance INEZA;
To my family.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe a great many thanks to many people who helped and supported me during the writing of
this thesis. I thank my supervisor Dr. George MWAISONDOLA, and co-supervisor Lecturer
René MUNYAMAHORO whose help, stimulating suggestions and encouragement helped me
in all the time in the writing of this thesis. Without their patience, encouragement and constant
guidance, I could not have completed this study. I wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to my wife
Claudine UMUKUNDWA for her beyond measure patience and encouragement in my studies.
More particularly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Founder of Kigali
Independent University (ULK), administration, lecturers, and the rest of the staff for the facilities
provided to me in my studies, without whom, furthering my postgraduate studies would have been a
distant reality.
Last, but not least, I thank my family, work colleagues, classmates and friends for their support
and encouragement to pursue my interests. I would like to also express my gratitude to all those
who have not been mentioned in this thesis work but gave me the possibility to complete this
thesis.
Jean Marie Vianney SIKUBWABO
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TABLE OF CONTENT
DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................................... i
DEDICATION .............................................................................................................................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................ iii
TABLE OF CONTENT .............................................................................................................................. iv
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................... xii
GENERAL INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 1
I. Background to the study ........................................................................................................................... 1
II. Scope of the Study ................................................................................................................................... 2
III. Statement of the problem ...................................................................................................................... 3
IV. Hypotheses .............................................................................................................................................. 4
V. Research objectives .................................................................................................................................. 5
VI. The research methodology .................................................................................................................... 5
VII. Significance of the Study ...................................................................................................................... 6
VIII. Structure of the Research .................................................................................................................. 7
CHAPTER I: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW ON MOBILE
PAYMENT ....................................................................................................................................... 8
I.1. Conceptual framework .......................................................................................................................... 8
I.1.1. Conceptual and theoretical perspectives of electronic payments .......................................................... 9
I.1.1.1. Electronic payment system ............................................................................................................... 10
I.1.1.2. Mobile transactions .......................................................................................................................... 11
I.1.2. How is mobile payment processed? .................................................................................................... 12
I.1.3. Mobile phone messaging as means of payments ................................................................................. 13
I.1.4. Importance of introduction of electronic and mobile payments in transactions in Rwanda ............... 14
I.1.4.1. Advantages of mobile payments for the payment service providers ................................................ 15
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I.1.4.2. Advantages of mobile payment for traders and consumers .............................................................. 16
I.1.4.3. General challenges of mobile Payments........................................................................................... 16
I.1.5. Evolution of mobile payment system in EAC region .......................................................................... 17
I.2. Literature review on regulation of mobile payments ........................................................................ 18
I.2.1. Framework for the literature review .................................................................................................... 19
I.2.1.1. Actors in mobile payment services market ...................................................................................... 20
I.2.1.2. The payment service providers in a competitive market .................................................................. 20
I.2.1.3. Application of contingency theory in mobile payment regulation ................................................... 21
I.2.1.4. Review of the findings of related studies and publications in the area of mobile payment system . 21
I.2.2. A comparative study of the factors influencing the mobile payment development in Rwanda .......... 23
I.2.2.1. The role of improved legal, regulatory, and standardization environments in mobile payment
systems in Rwanda .......................................................................................................................... 23
I.2.2.2. Regulatory bodies having the authority to regulate mobile payment system locally and
internationally .................................................................................................................................. 25
I.2.2.3. Power of Consumers and service providers in mobile payment system in Rwanda ........................ 25
I.2.3. Gaps in Rwandan governmental institutions to cooperate for a better implementation of the existing
mobile payment regulations............................................................................................................. 26
I.2.3.1. Failure of National Bank of Rwanda to set out clear mechanisms of implementation of regulation
governing electronic payments ........................................................................................................ 26
I.2.3.2. Failure of RURA in enforcement of regulations of electronic payments in place in Rwanda ......... 27
I.2.3.3. Weakness of telecom companies to comply with obligations specified in license .......................... 28
I.2.3.4. Challenges related to security payments .......................................................................................... 28
I.2.3.5. Challenges related to infrastructure in mobile payment ................................................................... 29
I.2.3.6. Challenges related to the regulatory framework .............................................................................. 30
I.2.3.7. Anticipated effects of e-money on monetary policy ........................................................................ 31
CHAPTER II: ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION OF MOBILE PAYMENTS
IN RWANDA ................................................................................................................................. 32
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II.1. Problems related to the regulation of rights and liabilities of operators of mobile payments and
protection of customers ................................................................................................................. 32
II.1.1. Liabilities of financial institutions for the loss incurred by customers in mobile payment transactions
......................................................................................................................................................... 33
II.1.2. To what extent are the mobile network operators liable for the loss incurred by customers in mobile
payments in Rwanda? ...................................................................................................................... 34
II.1.3. Effects of lack of interoperability between operators of mobile payment service providers to the
consumers ........................................................................................................................................ 34
II.1.3.1. Possible problems caused by interoperability of mobile payment service providers...................... 35
II.1.3.2. Interoperability is not considered as a binding obligation to the payment service providers in
Rwanda ............................................................................................................................................ 35
II.1.3.3. The way forward for implementation of interconnection between payment service providers in
Rwanda ............................................................................................................................................ 36
II.1.3.4. Implementation of interconnection between payment service providers for promotion of
customers’ interests ......................................................................................................................... 37
II.1.3.5. Payment service providers take advantage of weakness of regulatory framework to create indirect
restrictions ....................................................................................................................................... 38
II.1.4. Limited awareness of consumers in mobile payment services of their right and liabilities ............... 39
II.1.5. Lack of services of deposit and withdrawal of money in mobile payment system in Rwanda .......... 40
II.1.6. The problematic of protection of consumers engaging in mobile payment system in Rwanda ......... 41
II.1.6.1. Protection of customers in case of unauthorized mobile payments ................................................ 42
II.1.6.2. Cases of non delivery, late delivery, and non-refunds .................................................................... 43
II.1.6.3. Quid of fraudulent or negligent behaviors of agents of mobile payment service providers having
caused undue payment? ................................................................................................................... 44
II.1.6.4. How does the regulation in place govern the burden of proof for consumers’ claims? .................. 46
II.1.6.5. Lack of fixed physical address of MNO Agents as a challenge to the burden of proof for the
consumers ........................................................................................................................................ 47
II.1.6.6. Effects of anonymity on burden of proof for claims arising in mobile payments .......................... 47
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II.1.6.7. Impact of different regulatory bodies of m-payment on consumer protection in Rwanda ............. 48
II.1.6.8. Protection of consumers in cross-border m-payments ................................................................... 49
II.1.6.9. Lack of international customer protection benchmark in mobile payment system ......................... 50
II.1.7. Impact of lack of harmonized regulatory regime on mobile payments in EAC ................................ 51
II.1.7.1. Regulation of charges in cross-border mobile payment .................................................................. 52
II.1.7.2. Impact of EAC monetary union on mobile payment system as a newly introduced payment system
in Rwanda ........................................................................................................................................ 53
II.2. Effectiveness of mechanisms for disputes resolution in mobile payments available under
Rwandan laws ................................................................................................................................ 54
II.2.1. Alternatives for disputes resolution between merchants and consumers in mobile payment system 54
II.2.3. Regulation of insolvency of mobile payment service providers under Rwandan electronic payments
regulations ....................................................................................................................................... 55
II.2.4. Lack of prudential rules imposed on banks and other financial institutions by the regulation of BNR
......................................................................................................................................................... 55
II.2.5. Regulation of settlement of disputes in mobile payments with cross-border effects in Rwanda ....... 56
II.2.6. Jurisdictional issues in mobile payments disputes resolution with cross-border effects ................... 57
CHAPTER III: MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF MOBILE
PAYMENT SYSTEM IN RWANDA ........................................................................................... 59
III.1. Preventive measures ......................................................................................................................... 59
III.1.1. Measures for prevention of possible risks of interoperability between m-payment service providers
in EAC region .................................................................................................................................. 59
III.1.2. Educational measures of the risks associated with mobile payments to the customers .................... 60
III.1.3. Availability of measures of risk assessment by mobile payment service providers ......................... 61
III.1.4. Measures for prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing under the Rwandan mobile
payments regulatory framework ...................................................................................................... 62
III.1.4.1. Developing Customers Due Diligence measures for prevention of money laundering and terrorism
financing .......................................................................................................................................... 64
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III.1.4.2. Improvement of requirements for eligibility of agents as measure of money laundering and
terrorism financing .......................................................................................................................... 66
III.1.4.3. Making the principal financial institutions liable for acts of their agents in the matter of money
laundering and terrorism financing .................................................................................................. 67
III.1.4.5. Measures of inter-institutions cooperation in the mobile payment services .................................. 69
III.1.4.5.1. Cooperation with FIU-Rwanda National Police for prevention of money laundering and
financing of terrorism ...................................................................................................................... 70
III.1.4.5.2. Establishing a strong cooperation between public and private sectors for effective anti-money
laundering measures ........................................................................................................................ 71
III.1.5. Possible solutions to the consumers in cases of mobile payments errors ......................................... 71
III.1.6. Measures of protection of minors engaging in mobile payments for effective protection of
consumers ........................................................................................................................................ 72
III.2. Regulatory measures ........................................................................................................................ 73
III.2.1. Improving the role of National Bank of Rwanda in conflicts resolution between customers and
mobile payment service providers ................................................................................................... 73
III.2.2. Improvement of role of COMESA clearing house to promote cross-border mobile payments across
the region ......................................................................................................................................... 74
III.2.3. Regulatory measures of insolvency of m-payment service providers for the security of deposits of
funds of the public ........................................................................................................................... 74
III.2.4. Developing online disputes settlement measures for effective cross-border m-payments ............... 75
III.2.5. The necessity of the Rwandan legislator to be vigilant for the challenges related to online disputes
settlement mechanisms .................................................................................................................... 76
III.2.6. The use of connecting factors in cross-border mobile payments disputes settlement ...................... 77
III.2.7. Harmonization of regulations governing the Mobile Payment Service Providers in East African
Community ...................................................................................................................................... 78
III.2.8. The East African Payment System (EAPS) as a solution to cross-border e-payments .................... 79
GENERAL CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 81
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................ 85
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACH: Automated Clearing House
AML: Anti- Money Laundering
Art.: Article
ATM: Automated Teller Machine
BNR: Banque Nationale du Rwanda
BPR: Banque Populaire du Rwanda
CCLIII: Civil Code Book III
CDD: customer due diligence; often used synonymously with KYC (know your
customer)
CFT: combating the financing of terrorism
CPSS: Committee on Payments and Settlement System
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC: East African Community
EDI: Electronic Data Interchange
EFT: Electronic Funds Transfer
e-money: electronic money; refers to the electronic alternative to cash.
Et al.: et alii (and others)
Etc.: et ceatera (and so on)
EU: European Union
FATF: Financial Action Task Force
FIU: financial intelligence unit
GSMA: Groupe Speciale Mobile Association
HTTP: Hypertext Markup Language
ibid: Ibidem (in the same book, same author, and same page)
ICT: Information and Communication Technology
Id: Idem (in the same book, same author, different pages)
ID: Identity Card
IOSCO: International Organization of Securities Commissions.
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IT: Information Technology
KYC: know your customer (refers to a set of due diligence measures taken by a financial
institution to identify a customer and the motivations behind his or her financial
activity. It is a key component of AML/CFT regimes).
KYC: Know Your Customer
M-banking: Mobile Banking
MF: Mobile Fund
MFS: Mobile Financial Service
ML/TF: money laundering/terrorist financing
ML: money laundering
MM: Mobile Money
MMS: multimedia messaging service
MMT: Mobile Money Transfer
MNO: Mobile Network Operator
MTN: Mobile Telecommunication Network
NO: Number
O.G.R.R: Official Gazette of Republic of Rwanda
Op. cit.: opera citato (in the book previously cited)
P: Page
P2P: Person-to-Person
PCCA: Procédure Civile, Commerciale et Administrative
PIN: Personal Information Number
RDB: Rwanda Development Board
RURA: Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency
SACCO: Savings and Credit Cooperatives
SEPA: Single European Payment Area
SIM: Subscriber Identification Module
SME: Small and Medium Size Enterprise
SMS: short-message service; enables users to send text messages from mobile phones.
SMS: Short Message Service
Telecom: Telecommunications Company
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TIGO: Transportable Integrated Geodetic Observatory
ULK: Université Libre de Kigali (Kigali Independent University)
UN: United Nations
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UR: University of Rwanda
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Abstract
The ever-expanding capabilities of mobile phones have made them increasingly powerful
platforms for an impressively wide range of commercial and financial transactions. This study
has investigated the situation of regulation of mobile payment in Rwanda. In that regard, it focused
on challenges of implementation of the existing rules and regulations on electronic payments in
Rwanda especially the mobile payment as a newly introduced payment system that is reaching a
large number of banked and unbanked. Mobile phones have evolved from simple personal
communication devices to become both platforms for commerce and indispensable “lifestyle
infrastructure” that enhances productivity, facilitates financial transactions, and makes life more
convenient and efficient.
This study also attempted to assess the effectiveness of the regulatory framework in place in
Rwanda as well as its impact to the development of this technological advancement. Despite the
progress made by the Rwandan lawmaker, questions still persist in line with protection of the
most vulnerable users and consumers of this new payment methods while they have very limited
knowledge of what should be their rights and obligations, effectiveness of regulation of payment
activities exercised by the telecommunication companies, guarantee of protection to the
consumers available in policies of the payment service providers, this study attempted to
elaborate and propose mechanisms for remedy to these issues.
The study revealed also that the mobile payment system has the potential to reduce payment
challenges for unbanked in Rwanda. However, more education of the public, improvement of the
regulatory regime in place, and improvement of technology is needed to realize its full potential.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
I. Background to the study
The use of technology in commercial activities in recent years in Rwanda has led to the
emergence of various new supporting services in the marketplace. Among these services is the
e-payment which enables payment done via the electronic medium and without involving any
physical cash.
Electronic Payment is a financial exchange that takes place online between buyers and sellers.
The content of this exchange is usually some form of digital financial instrument (such as mobile
wallet, encrypted credit card numbers, electronic checks or digital cash) that is backed by a bank
or an intermediary, or by a legal tender1.
Rwanda is one of the countries where technological developments in the field of
communications in recent years have expanded the methods of contract formation as well as
payment methods to include new ones such as mobile and internet payment methods. The speedy
and complex structure of electronic payment mechanisms make electronic payment transactions
appear to be integrated transactions overall. In reality, advancement in technology and aggressive
adoption of technology at micro or macro level of the economy is seen as one of the critical
success factors to obtain an edge and sustain in the digital economy.2
To this end, the Rwandan government adopted the Vision 2020 and put ICT and finance at the
priority, EDPRS emphasizes the access to finance as a strategy, FSDP (Financial Sector
1 Turban, E., King, D. et al. (2008). Electronic Commerce 2008: A Managerial Perspective, London, Pearson
Education Ltd., p.550. 2Amrik H. (2009). Seeking Fertile Grounds for Mobile Money, available at: http://www.pymnts.com/journal-
bak/lydian-payments-journal-2010/seeking-fertile-grounds-for-mobile-money-2/, accessed on 11/07/2014.
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Development Program)3 defines areas to be developed in payment systems, the Vision and
strategy in payment systems as regulated by the National Bank of Rwanda.4
However, in view of the importance of rapid transactions and payment initiatives, and the gaps in
the current state of knowledge in the field, it is important to provide a knowledge base on mobile
payment that can be employed to identify significant experiences, together with the models being
deployed around the world, especially in developing countries like Rwanda. The biggest
consequence is that developing countries like Rwanda, have to confront challenges of inadequate
technology, and thus, this kind of transaction is related to different problems causing disputes
between the users and dealers, and mostly it may depend on inefficiency of the regulatory system
in place.5
This study investigated the challenges of implementing and using mobile payment in line with
the regulation in place; emphasis was put on regulation of m-payment service providers and
protection of the consumers’ rights.
II. Scope of the Study
This study was limited on mobile payment system; a matter that lies in domain of company law.
It attempted to give a description and analysis regarding how the provisions and features of the
regulation n°07/2010 of 27/12/2010 of the National Bank of Rwanda on electronic fund transfers
and electronic money transactions govern the mobile payment model.
This study attempted to conduct an analytical study on the situations of mobile payments made
in Rwanda from 2010 (the date of promulgation of the regulation n° 07/2010 of 27/12/2010) to
date. In the space, this study has been limited in Kigali city with a special attention to the
identified rural areas of districts in Kigali city. For a comparative purpose, other regional and
international rules and regulations, various studies and case laws have been explored.
3 RUSAGARA, C. (2008). Beyond Banking: Regional Financial Integration, FSDP-The case of Rwanda, session
IV, African Finance for the 21st century, High-level seminar organized by the IMF Institute in collaboration with the
Joint African Institute, Tunis, Tunisia, March 4-5, 2008, p. 8. 4 Id., p. 9.
5 Bassey, C. (2009). Digital Money in a Digitally Divided World: Nature, Challenges and Prospects of e-Payment
Systems in Africa, Oxford: Princeton University Press, p.18.
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III. Statement of the problem
With adoption of mobile payment system, the majority of financial transactions are easily made
between debtors and their creditors in Rwanda. The mobile telephone has functional capabilities
for serving as a virtual bank, internet banking terminal, thereby making it strategic alternative for
bridging the digital divide in Rwanda.
Rwanda is still at infancy stage in use of electronic payment systems, and mobile payment is the
main focus in this study, the regulation of this system is new.6 It is to be realized in this
regulation that the regulator concentrated on electronic payments in general without any focus on
mobile payment method.7
However, it is possible to realize that participants in the mobile payment system hardly
understand their rights and liabilities, thereby acting on unequal terms especially when the
legislator had not clarified any by leaving the situation in a vacuum. Many consumers are not
knowledgeable of their rights related to refund policies, liabilities of customers, merchants and
institutions, flow of data and mechanism for preventing and protecting cyber-crimes and thefts,
conflicts resolution in the mobile payment services providers’ policies, etc.8
Like all things that are new and burdened with visible challenges, mobile payment faces various
challenges in Rwanda. There are many cases of services paid through the use of mobile phone
while the payer has not received the service that they paid for, and refunds never made or made
with very long delays, mobile money transfer without reaching the beneficiaries and not refund
to the sender, cases of funds transferred to the wrong creditors, etc. It is also added the problem
to know who the liable partner is: the transmitter, the operating institution or the intermediary,
and the system of solving such disputes arising in this payment system especially the protection
of consumers.9
6 The Regulation governing electronic fund transfers and electronic money transactions was promulgated in 2010
(Regulation no 07/2010 0f 27/12/2010).
7 The regulation of National Bank of Rwanda does not contain provisions related to mobile payment system. It
consists of a general regulation of electronic fund transfers and electronic money transactions. 8 Chatain, P. L, et al. (2008). Integrity in Mobile Phone Financial Services: Measures for Mitigating Risks from
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Working Paper 146, World Bank, Washington, DC, p. 8. 9 Onyeiwu, S. (2002). Inter-Country Variations in Digital Technology in Africa: Evidence, Determinants and Policy
Implications, UNU-WIDER Discussion Paper no 2002/72 Helsinki: UNU-WIDER, pp. 23-24.
4
Another challenge to examine is the increasing of regional integration whereby there will be
cross-borders payments without mechanisms of cross-border conflicts resolution10
, lack of a
developed regulatory regime at the regional level, lack of interoperability which risks in need of
many mobile devices if the user wishes to transact with different mobile payment service
providers.
Particularly, it is to be suspected that the obstacles to its adoption in Rwanda are not being
investigated deeply to allow implementation strategies to be employed on the basis of reliable
business models. So far, we did not identify any academic papers that may have studied the
regulation of mobile payment system in Rwanda after entering into force of the regulation on
electronic fund transfers and electronic money transactions.
With this observation, there are many interrogations in light with mobile payment system as a
new drive adopted in the payment systems in Rwanda, but this study will be centered on the
following:
1. How does the regulation in place protect the vulnerable consumers vis-à-vis the payment
service providers in mobile payment system in Rwanda?
2. What are the measures to be adopted for improvement of regulation of mobile payment system
in Rwanda?
IV. Hypotheses
Given that electronic cash constitutes a fundamentally new class of electronic payment
instruments, considering the regulation in place and the situations of stakeholders in mobile
payment system, the following hypothesis have been formulated:
1. The National Bank of Rwanda had put in place regulations governing respectively electronic
fund transfers and electronic money transactions and regulation Payment Services Providers.
However, these regulations accuse some lacunae and imperfections in light with regulation of
telecommunication companies engaging in mobile payment activities, rights and liabilities of
10
Up to date, m-payments are made on a limited scare, but the projection is to settle payments on the regional level.
Among EAC member States, different telecommunication companies offer the mobile payment services; having
these telecom companies interoperate will facilitate transactions, but the users will also need to know the liable
partner in cases of infringements.
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operators of mobile payments, protection of vulnerable consumers engaging in this payment
system, and resolution of conflicts arising herein.
2. Preventive and regulatory measures including improvement of regulatory aspects at both local
and regional levels in the matter of e-payment, educational mechanisms that would make the
users of this payment system knowledgeable of their rights and obligations should be the
measures to be adopted for the development and effectiveness of mobile payment system in
Rwanda.
V. Research objectives
Generally, this thesis aims at analyzing how the regulation put in place renders the mobile
payment system more effective and beneficial to the most vulnerable users. Therefore, the
primordial objective of this thesis is to assess the effectiveness of the regulatory framework in
place in line with mobile payment in Rwanda
Particularly, the undertaking of this research aims at:
- elaborating the lacunae and imperfections of the current regulatory framework as well as its
implementation by the operators;
- proving the necessity of promulgation of a law exclusively governing the mobile payment
system in order to guarantee the business transactions without equivocal in Rwanda;
- re-enforcing the awareness of rights and obligations of interveners in mobile payment in order
for them to make reasoned choices when deciding to transact via this payment system;
- proffering solutions to the identified lacunae and imperfections; these will serve as a guide for
future regulations in order to cope with the hindrances of effectiveness of this payment system.
VI. The research methodology
Before making a deep description of research methodology used in writing this thesis, it is
important to remind that hat a technique is what skill the researcher has to get for doing
something while method is the way the researcher has to follow to do something. For one
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method the researcher can use one technique or more; or he can apply one technique for more
than one method.11
In order to verify the above mentioned hypotheses and achieve our
objectives, different methods and techniques have been used:
- The legal dogmatic and comparative methods played an important role in examining existing
local legal regimes and comparing them with international legislations through a descriptive and
analytical discussion;
- With analytical method, the researcher has been able to use facts or information already
available, and analyze these to make a critical evaluation of the material;
- Doctrinal method has served in exploring different writings including books, journals, articles,
laws, case laws, etc;
- An inductive method has also played an important role in this study since from empirical
observations; the researcher has been able to formulate generalizations;
- Through a deductive method, this research has generated hypotheses from particular
theoretical frameworks and then tested these by observing reality.
The research techniques in this study have involved the use of open-ended questionnaires for
payment organizations, banks and individuals in that process of payment, as well as informal
discussions with agents in different departments in payment institutions.
VII. Significance of the Study
Since the entering into force of the regulation no 07/2010 of 27/12/2010 of National Bank of
Rwanda on electronic fund transfers and electronic money transactions, and implementation of
this e-payment system in Rwanda, apart this above mentioned study by IFC, there have not been
any due diligence academic works in this area from the dealers to the users.
11 Ghosh, B.N. (1982.). Scientific Methods and Social Research, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., p. 42.
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This research is significant mostly due to the fact that mobile payment system is now gaining
familiarity in Rwanda while effectiveness of its regulation is still questionable. This payment
system is being implemented by both financial institutions and mobile services suppliers; such an
empirical study plays a crucial role in diagnosing possible challenges and risks, regulatory
lacunae, and guide in adopting adequate measures.
In addition to the main challenges highlighted in this work, exploration of available resources,
analysis of data gathered on the field will focus on the understanding of challenges from the
implementers of this payment system, as well as protection that consumers obtain from the regulatory
framework in place.
VIII. Structure of the Research
This thesis was organized in three main chapters preceded by a general introduction. The first
chapter of a conceptual framework and literature review on mobile payment system has defined
key concepts on which this work is tailored and the theoretical aspects related to mobile
payments. Chapter two was reserved on analysis of effectiveness of regulation of mobile
payments in Rwanda. In this chapter, we analyzed the problems related to weakness of the
regulatory framework in line with protection of consumers of m-payment as well as regulation of
mobile payment activities exercised by the telecom companies. The last chapter proposed the
measures to be adopted for improvement of regulation of mobile payment system in Rwanda.
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CHAPTER I: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW ON
MOBILE PAYMENT
To determine the current state of effectiveness of regulation of mobile payment system in
Rwanda, this research has conducted an extensive exploration and analysis of relevant resource
books and articles published in a wide variety of books and journals of electronic payments since
electronic payment is an interdisciplinary topic (in which mobile payment is included), local and
international regulations in the area.
This chapter had provided an overview of existing literature on mobile payment system. It
consists of conceptual framework that had strived to enhance the understanding of concepts and
theory in light with mobile payment system. The section on literature review has made a scan of
related studies with aim to highlight the gaps in line with regulation of mobile payment system in
Rwanda.
I.1. Conceptual framework
The place of money as a value resource within the payment system of any economy makes the
payment process an important aspect of people’s lives. Hence, while money in its old and new
forms will always remain a key resource for facilitating payment and settlements of financial
obligations12
, the forms of payments and settlements risk change to accommodate new forms of
money and technologies.
Today, one can load airtime in the mobile phone, pay services (subscription on the channels of
television, electricity, airtime, etc.), declare and pay taxes, register a business, debit an account,
etc., via mobile phone. From the general aspect of electronic payment, this is defined as a form
of financial exchange that takes place between the buyer and seller facilitated by means of
electronic communication.13
12
Beck, U. (2002). The silence of Words and Political Dynamics in the World Risk Society, in Logos, pp. 1-18. 13
Art. 2, par. 8 of Regulation n°07/2010 of 27/12/2010 of the national bank of Rwanda on electronic fund transfers
and electronic money transactions defined “Electronic fund transfers system” as a wire transfer network, automated
clearing house, or other communication system of a clearing house or other association of banks through which a
payment order by a bank or other payment service provider may be transmitted to the institution to which the order
9
There are several payment markets that can be identified each using specific forms of money.
“The business-to-consumer payment is used in commercial activities where the merchant is paid
directly by the consumer for goods and services”.14
This type of payment is also called retail
payment. The direct payment between two persons is called person-to- person payment.
“Commerce always involves a payer and a payee who exchange money for goods or
services, and at least one financial institution which links “bits” to “money”. In most
existing payment systems, the latter role is divided into two parts: an issuer (used by the
payer) and an acquirer (used by the payee). Electronic payment from a payer to payee is
implemented by a flow of real money from the payer via the issuer and acquirer to the
payee15
.
Finally, the payment intervening between companies buying and those offering products and
services is referred to as Business-to –Business payment. This thesis focused mainly on business-
to- consumer (including banks, business companies, and mobile service providers), and person-
to-person payments. In this chapter, we will evocate some general features of electronic payment
system briefly, attention will be put on mobile payment, and then on the benefits and challenges.
I.1.1. Conceptual and theoretical perspectives of electronic payments
As explained earlier, there are no enough recently related studies on mobile payment system in
Rwanda. Hence, there are no single or widely accepted theories that explain the regulation of
electronic payment initiatives16
, more particularly, the mobile payments model.
For a better understanding of this work, given also considerable confusion with regard to the
terms which are often used freely in the area of mobile payments, regardless of their original
meanings, the wide use of these inaccurate definitions led us to establish an initial conceptual
basis on which this work will be tailored. In order to understand the concept of mobile payment,
is addressed. See also, Neuman, B. C. & Medvinsky, G. (1996), Net Cheque, Net Cash, and the Characteristics of
Internet Payment Services. The Journal of Electronic Publishing, Vol. 2, Issue 1, p. 64. 14
Radu, C. (2003). Implementing Electronic Payment Card Systems, Artech House, p. 43-47. 15
Asokan, N., Janson, P., et al. ( 2000). Electronic Payment Systems IBM, Research Division, Zurich Research
Laboratory, pp. 1-16. 16 Park, C.H., and Kim, Y.G., Identifying key factors affecting consumer behavior in an online shopping context,
International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, Vol.31, No.1, 2003, pp. 16-29.
10
it is crucial to evocate the notions of electronic payment as a big set in which mobile payment is
included.
I.1.1.1. Electronic payment system
Electronic payment systems work for a variety of aspects. Due to this nature, it is difficult to
produce a widely or universal definition for it. The regulation governing electronic fund transfers
in Rwanda does not define electronic payment system. However, it defines electronic funds
transfers system as17
:
“a wire transfer network, automated clearing house, or other communication system of a
clearing house or other association of banks through which a payment order by a bank or
other payment service provider may be transmitted to the institution to which the order is
addressed.”
According to Humphrey et al.18
, electronic payment refers to cash and associated transactions
implemented using electronic means. Typically, this involves the use of computer networks such
as the Internet and digital stored value systems. The system allows bills to be paid directly from
bank accounts, without being present at the bank, and without the need of writing and mailing
checks.
Electronic payment can also be defined as “payment by direct credit, electronic transfer of credit
card details, or some other electronic means, as opposed to payment by cheque and cash”.19
According to Kalakota and Whinston20
, “electronic payment is a financial exchange that takes
place online between the seller buyer and the seller. The content of this exchange is usually the
form of digital financial instrument (such as encrypted credit card numbers, electronic checks, or
digital cash) that is backed by a bank or an intermediary, or by a legal tender.”
17
See art. 2, para. 8, Regulation no 07/2010 of 27/12/2010 of BNR governing electronic funds transfers and
electronic money transactions, O.G.R.R, no special 30/12/2010.
18 Humphrey, D. B., Kim, M. & Vale, B., (2001), Realizing the gains from electronic payments: cost, pricing, and
payment choice, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 216-234.
19 Agimo (2004). Better Practice Checklist for e-Payment. Australia Government Information Management Office
(online), available: http://www.agimo.gov.au/publications/2000/04/better-practice_checklist_for_epayment, visited
on 19/07/2013. 20
Kalakota, R., & Whinston, A. B. (1997). Electronic commerce: A manager’s guide, Reading, MA: Addison
Wesley Longman, pp. 32-33.
11
I.1.1.2. Mobile transactions
This refers to transactions carried out through mobile technologies and devices. In addition to
mobile payments, it includes every kind of mobile transaction offered by technology, whether it
involves financial values or not21
. In that regard, mobile payments are payments for goods,
services, and bills with a mobile device (such as a mobile phone, smart-phone, or personal digital
assistant) by taking advantage of wireless and other communication technologies.22
Today in Rwanda, one can check prices on different items and goods available in different
markets through E-SOKO system, load airtime, pay for different services including water,
electricity, subscription on channels of television, send money to another partner, just to name a
few.
The Rwandan perspectives in the area of re-enforcing the mobile payment system is to introduce
communicability between what is known as the mobile wallet (mobile account) and one’s bank
account. In this development, the mobile money client will be able to withdraw or deposit
money from or onto the mobile wallet and the bank account respectively. For instance one will
be able to withdraw money from their mobile wallet using an ATM card or even to top up the
wallet through their bank account.23
There are several models of mobile payments that are currently employed worldwide; the
following details were limited on mobile money and mobile banking as standard mobile
payments used in Rwanda up today.
I.1.1.2.1. Mobile banking
Mobile banking can be understood as a set of mobile banking services, involving the use of
portable devices connected to telecommunications networks that provide users with access to
mobile payments, transactions and other banking and financial services linked to customer
21
Alan L. Tyree. (1996). Virtual Cash–Payments on the Internet, 7 Journal of Banking, Finance Law, and Practice,
pp. 35, 139, 233. 22
Chaum, D. (1982). Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments. Advances in Cryptology -Crypto ’82, pp. 199-203. 23
The Independent in an interview with John Bosco Sebabi, the Director of Payment Systems at the BNR, available
at: http://www.independent.co.ug/rwanda-ed/rwanda/7471-airtel-mtn-want-cross-border-cash-
transfer#sthash.rbFBAwkf.dpuf, visited on 18/09/2014.
12
accounts, with or without the direct participation of traditional banking institutions.24
As far as
the mobile businesses in Rwanda are concerned, it is important to notice that this concept can
also be regarded as the banking channel through which the digital mobile services are provided
by the institutions to their clients in their daily purchases and selling transactions.
I.1.1.2.2. Mobile money
Mobile money is mostly related to electronic money which is essentially digital and has
attributes related to mobility and portability, and is equivalent to mobile-money or mobile-cash.
It can be differentiated from other means of electronic payment (such as credit cards, debit cards,
smart cards, etc.) because of its ability to replicate the essential attributes of traditional money,
such as liquidity, acceptability and anonymity.25
Mobile money payment is one of the ways that will enable Rwanda to achieve a comprehensive
framework for e-payments that has been put in place, and driven by a visionary goal to enable a
cashless society by 2017.26
I.1.1.3. Difference between mobile money and mobile banking
With this consideration, it has to be noted that mobile money is distinct from mobile banking by
the fact that mobile banking refers to the situation where a bank account holder is able to transact
via commands from a mobile platform whilst mobile money account holders do not require a
bank account.
I.1.2. How is mobile payment processed?
Typically, there are two main ways by which mobile payments are processed: proximity m-
payments and remote m-payments. Proximity m-payments occur at the point of sale, where
customers use a phone with built-in near field communication (NFC)27
technology to make a
24
Glassman, S., Manasse, M., et al. (1995). The Millicent Protocol for Inexpensive Electronic Commerce System
Research Center, Digital Equipment Corporation, 1995, p. 71. 25
Chaum, D., op.cit., pp. 208. 26
The National Bank of Rwanda (NBR) Annual Report, 2011, p. 90. 27
SMART CARD ALLIANCE, PROXIMITY MOBILE PAYMENTS BUSINESS SCENARIOS: research report
on stakeholder perspectives (July 2008), available at: http://www.smartcardalliance.org/resources/lib/Mobile-
13
purchase at an NFC-equipped point of sale terminal (a POS Terminal). As noted by Vassiliou28
,
customers can make proximity m-payments at either manned (e.g., checkout registers) or
unmanned (e.g., vending machines) points of sale.
Remote m-payments do not require NFC technology or a POS Terminal. Rather, customers use
phones equipped with either short messaging service (SMS), i.e., text messaging, or wireless
application protocol (WAP) technology to make payments any time, any place to either other
individuals or to businesses/merchants.29
On this note, it is important to remind that in Rwanda,
remote mobile payment is the popular payment system with the use of mobile phone; proximity
mobile payment has not been introduced yet.
I.1.3. Mobile phone messaging as means of payments
Several initiatives have emerged for initiating e-payments from mobile phones by using short
messages (SMS). These have also been referred to as mobile payments.30
Vassiliou further
indicates that most m-payments initiatives follow a simple model where the customer (payer)
first identifies him/herself to the merchant by providing his/her phone number or by calling the
merchant.31
Telephone banking or tele-banking is a form of virtual banking that delivers financial services
through telecommunication devices. Under this mechanism, the customer transacts business by
dialing a touch-tone telephone connected to an automated system of the bank. This is normally
done through Automated Voice Response (AVR) technology”.32
Payment-Business-Model-Research-Report.pdf, (hereinafter M-Payments Business Scenarios), visited on
10/05/2014. 28
Vassilliou, C. (2004). Electronic Payment Systems and Marketing: A literature review, Oxford University press,
p. 87. 29
Claire, A. (2011). Regulating New Banking Models that Can Bring Financial Services to All, Challenge
Magazine, Vol. 54, No. 3, May/June 2011, pp. 116-134. 30
Vassilliou, C. (2004). Electronic Payment Systems and Marketing: A literature review, Oxford University press,
p. 131. 31
Id., p. 132. 32
Balachandher, K. G., Santha, V., Norazlin, I. & Prasad, R. (2001). Electronic banking in Malaysia: a note on
evolution of services and consumer reactions. Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 19.
14
Tele-banking has numerous benefits for end users. For the customers, it provides increased
convenience, expanded access and significant time saving. Instead of going to the bank or
visiting an ATM, retail banking serves the same purpose for customers to get the services at their
offices or homes. This saves customers time and money, and gives more convenience for higher
productivity.33
This system has been adopted by many banks in Rwanda, whereby one can send
money to another person, pay invoices, pay various services (electricity, air time, subscription on
Star times, DSTV, etc.).
I.1.4. Importance of introduction of electronic and mobile payments in transactions in
Rwanda
In general, the electronic payment systems are more efficient than the traditional paper- or
account-based payment systems owing to the lower transportation and storage costs (no
significant costs for transport or insurance policies, only communication and storage space
costs). The introduction of electronic payments in Rwanda is viewed to yield these significant
benefits.
In comparison to cash or Check payments, the electronic payment system is faster, safer and
generally more efficient than the manual check system. Electronic payment processing is
automated, so human errors can greatly be minimized. Compared to checks, electronic payments
instructions are safer because a few members of staff handle data entry and processing; data is
secured by passwords and data encryption34
.
Electronic payments provide convenience, so consumers should believe in the convenience of
electronic money35
, whether it means having to visit the ATM to obtain cash or not having to
count out the cash at the point of transaction. This convenience benefits traders as well as banks,
financial institutions, and the service provider institutions. For instance, when consumers swipe
their own cards, use their mobile phones or computers at home and in their offices to pay for a
33
Leow, H. B. (1999). New distribution channels in banking services, banker’s Journal Malaysia, no 110, p. 48-56.
34 E-commerce: Commission proposes a legal framework, Retrieved from
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/eleccomm/999.htm, visited on 22/04/2014. 35
Groeneveld, H. and Visser, A. et al. (1997). Electronic Money and Financial Independence of Central Banks,
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review no 200, March 1997, pp. 69-88.
15
service, debit or credit an account, it lowers labor costs for these institutions. Electronic payment
gives consumers an alternative to paying bills and debts by cash, cheque, money order, etc. Its
main purpose is to reduce cash and cheque transactions.36
We agree with Pariwat and Hataiseere37
when stating that, for the achievement of effective and
efficient retail payment systems, the following considerations that shape the choice of payment
method for consumers and businesses should be taken into account; the convenience, reliability
and security of the payment method, the service quality, involving such features as the speed
with which payment are processed; the level and structure of fees charged by financial
institutions; taste and demographic; and technological advances which have improve the speed,
convenience and flexibility of different payment systems.38
I.1.4.1. Advantages of mobile payments for the payment service providers
This type of electronic payment provides advantages for both customers and the payment service
providers. For the banks, mobile payments provide a unique opportunity to build customer
loyalty, unlock cross-selling propositions and create a more efficient and effective interface for
processing transactions.39
For the telecoms companies, mobile payments offers a viable path for
moving further up the mobile value chain by providing payment and data services40
.
36
Isern, J. & Louis de Koker, (2009). AML/CFT: Strengthening Financial Inclusion and Integrity. CGAP Focus
Note No. 56, August 2009, p. 12. 37
Pariwat, S. & Hataiseree, R. (2004). The use of cash, cheques and electronic payment services in Thailand:
Changes and challenges for efficiency enhancement, Working paper, Payment systems Groups, p.2-73. 38
Cobb A. (2004). The money in circulation. Available at: http://www.ameinfo.com/50050.html, accessed on
26/01/2014. 39
Andrew, M. (2009). Card Fees Pit Retailers against Banks, NEW YORK TIMES, Jul. 2009 16, p. 1. 40
Dahlberg, T., et al. (2003). Trust Enhanced Technology Acceptance Model- Consumer Acceptance of Mobile
Payment Solutions, Presentation at Stockholm Mobility Roundtable Stockholm Sweden May 2223:10, available at:
http://www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/pdf, visited on 10/07/2013.
16
I.1.4.2. Advantages of mobile payment for traders and consumers
Digital money has significant benefits for financial institutions, banks and e-merchants.41
Digital
Money is an electronic payment technology, which can provide anonymous flexible electronic
payment, like paper cash, but with added security requirements needed for internet transactions.
For merchants, mobile payment solutions increase average transaction revenues, increases
customer throughput and provides a more information-rich experience for loyalty and targeting
propositions than other instrument. Mobile devices are increasingly being used during the whole
shopping cycle – to compare prices, view product information, get store locations, and download
coupons.42
Let it be concluded that merchants benefit because there is less cash and check
handling in the system as they have access to a large pool of customers with guaranteed
payment.
I.1.4.3. General challenges of mobile Payments
In the details above, we studied different concepts related to electronic and mobile payments as
well as numerous benefits of electronic payments. Despites these benefits, this new system come
with its own challenges even in the developed world. In Rwanda, many of these challenges are
related to the newness of this system, lack of adequate and modern infrastructure including
computer mobile network used for mobile phone (these will be discussed in depth in chapter II).
It has to be reminded that many amongst the Rwandan population neither have nor operate a
bank account, although the majority of the "un-banked" are economically active in either the
formal or informal sectors of the economy.43
National, regional or international set of laws, rules
and other regulations are important requirements for the successful implementation of mobile
payment schemes. In Rwanda, a regulation on electronic funds transfer has been put in place.
41
Fiallos, F. Wu, L. (2005). Digital Money: Future Trends and Impact on Banking, Financial Institutions, and e-
Business, 2nd
ed., Oxford University press, pp. 23- 31. 42
See also, Oscar H., and Gandy, Jr. (1993). The panoptic sort: a political economy of personal information-critical
studies in communication and in the cultural industries, West view, p. 7. 43
Pousttchi, K. Conditions for Acceptance and Usage of Mobile Payment Procedures, in Giaglis, Werthner, G. M.,
et. al. (2003). M-BUSINESS- The Second International Conference on Mobile Business, Vienna 201-210 (2003),
pp.11-13.
17
I.1.5. Evolution of mobile payment system in EAC region
In the early 2000s, mobile payment services became rapid payment mechanisms, hundreds of
mobile payment services, including access to electronic payments and Internet banking, were
introduced all over the world. Strikingly many of these efforts failed. For example, most, if not
all, of the dozens of mobile payment services available in EU countries and listed in the e-PSO
database in 2002 have been discontinued.44
Initially, fixed-line telephony billing systems were modified to charge mobile telephony. Later,
mobile telephony billing systems were introduced, and used also to charge various mobile
services when such services emerged.45
Rwanda has not made significant difference from other member states of East African
Community in terms of mobile payment system. Considered as a whole regional integration, it is
worth noticing that electronic payment system is a new initiative in the area of economic
development in East African Community46
. Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda all have a
mobile money model led by MNOs.
A study by IFC (2012) reveals that until recently, all four countries’ mobile money systems have
operated only domestic transfers. International transfer from mobile phones has not been allowed
although in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, international transfers from Western Union can be
received in mobile money accounts. However, starting October 2012, M-PESA customers in
Kenya are able to transfer money directly to 35 countries through the international remittance
hub Home-Send, which connects M-PESA with 21 international money transfer platforms.47
In Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, mobile money services are straightforward as are the
regulations; in Kenya, a few more complex services have been developed. In Rwanda, Tanzania,
and Uganda, MNOs’ mobile money services basically relate to storage and transfer of funds as
44 Carat, G. (2002). E-payment systems database – trends and analysis, Technical report, Background Paper No. 9,
Electronic Payment Systems Observatory (ePSO), EUR 20264 EN, Seville, Spain, p. 71. 45
Peirce, M., and O’Mahony, D. (1999). Flexible real-time payment methods for mobile communications, IEEE
Personal Communications 6 (6), pp. 44–55. 46
M-PESA in Kenya is taking the lead in terms of mobile payment in the region. 47
Mwakilishi. (2012). Vodafone takes M-PESA Global, Mwakilishi, October, 2012. Retreived on 23/11/2013 from:
www.mwakilishi.com/vodafone-takes-m-pesa-global.html.
18
well as some basic bill-payment services (e.g. electricity, air time, subscription on television
channels, etc.). Transfers are usually the largest individual transactions, and are an important
benefit for the low-income and rural population.48
In Kenya, the same services are offered, but some other services have evolved including
payments into bank accounts, withdrawals from ATMs, small loans and via partnership with
Equity Bank, access to an interest bearing deposit account (M-KESHO). Electronic payments
especially Mobile payments in Rwanda are still operating on small operations of paying services
such as water, electricity, airtime transferring money to a third person’s account or to the mobile
banking user’s account, etc. Across the EAC, but in Kenya in particular, the success of mobile
money has been widely attributed to the light touch approach to regulation.49
In Rwanda, a
regulation has entered into force since December 2010.
I.2. Literature review on regulation of mobile payments
Every research project, no matter what methodology is being used, needs a literature review as a
precursor to further study; a nexus to that which has been done before. To facilitate the
development of better regulation of mobile payment services, this literature review will help to
understand the lessons of this history by learning what previous studies have discovered about
mobile payments and about the regulation of mobile payment services markets, as well as what
issues have remained unanswered. The aim of this section is to summarize findings from past
mobile payments research, and to suggest promising directions for future research.
There are a number of factors that highlight the significance and usefulness of this literature
review. Firstly, the field has seen a poor number of publications in Rwanda, so, a thorough
review of existing work is missing. Speaking of which, the lack of published literature reviews
48
Neil, D. and Pénicaud, C. (2011). State of the Industry: Results from the 2011 Global Money Adoption Survey,
Mobile Money for the Unbanked, GSMA, p.67. 49
Heyer, Amrik and Ignacio Mas .(2011). Fertile Grounds for Mobile Money: Towards a Framework for Analyzing
Enabling Environments, January 2011. See also Donovan, Kevin. (2012). “Mobile Money for Financial Inclusion.”
In Maximizing Mobile, The World Bank, p. 92.
19
impedes the progress in the field; review articles are critical to strengthening an area as a field of
study.50
Secondly, reviewing existing literature not only leads to a better understanding of the state of the
research in the field, but it also discerns patterns in the development of the field itself. Finally, a
synthesis of existing findings allows researchers not to repeat similar work, and discover
important gaps. In other words, it closes areas where an excess of research already exists, and at
the same time uncovers those areas where research is lacking.51
Another contribution of this literature review is the proposed theoretical framework, around
which the review is organized since the area is still lacking noticed studies in Rwanda. However,
the lack of studies in this field in Rwanda shall not leave the researcher in a closed box.
Therefore, as this study aims at guiding the Rwandan law-maker, a comparative study of existing
findings at the international level will serve of a great importance.
I.2.1. Framework for the literature review
Webster and Watson recommend that the best reviews need to be conceptually structured, and
based on a guiding theory.52
Our framework provides a guiding structure that allows us to
effectively accumulate knowledge, and to interpret previous findings. Because the framework
itself aims to explain relevant factors in the mobile payment systems, basing the literature review
on the framework ensures that the review is comprehensive and holistic, and reveals research
gaps that could otherwise be overlooked.53
This framework will not only help to explain the existing body of knowledge on each factor of
the framework, but, more importantly, it will also provide an overview of the mobile payment
services market, illustrating how the various perspectives and research findings fit together as
50 See also S. Webster, R. Watson. (2002). Analyzing the past to prepare for the future: writing a literature review,
MIS Quarterly 26 (2), xiii–xxiii. 51
S. Webster, R. Watson. (2002), op. cit., p. 3. 52 Ibid.
53 Zmijewska, A. Lawrence, E. (2005). Reshaping the framework for analyzing success of mobile payment
solutions, in: Proceedings of the IADIS International Conference on E-Commerce, Porto, Portugal, December 2005,
pp. 15–17.
20
part of the big picture.54
This framework will also be used to classify past research, to analyze
research findings of classified studies, and to propose meaningful mechanisms that future
research for each factor shall base on.
I.2.1.1. Actors in mobile payment services market
The prime actors in the mobile payment services market are mobile payment service providers
and their customers. Various parties assuming these roles in the market include consumers,
merchants, financial institutions and telecom operators. Additional parties, typically vendors of
handsets, software, networks and other technologies may also be involved. The power and the
interests of these parties impact how technologies and other resources are orchestrated into
mobile payment services, and how these services are offered to and used by the market.
Moreover, mobile payment services compete for the attention of customers and other parties
against physical and electronic payment services.55
Mobile payment services are a natural choice
to pay for mobile services. Yet, to succeed, mobile payment services may have to offer added
value and be available for other relevant payment environments as well.
I.2.1.2. The payment service providers in a competitive market
The competitive factors strategy model studied by Porter, describes both the key role of a mobile
payment service provider, and other market factors. The model applies insights from industrial
organization theory to analyze the competitive environment on the level of business units56
, and
relates the average profitability of the participants in an industry to competitive forces.57
54 Mallat, N., Rossi, M., Tuunainen, V.K. (2004). Mobile banking services, Commun. ACM 47 (5), pp. 42–46. 55
Pousttchi, K., and M. Zenker, M. (2003). Current mobile payment procedures on the German market from the
view of customer requirements, in: Proceedings of the International Workshop on Mobile Commerce Technologies
& Applications (MCTA 2003), Prague, Czech Republic, September 2003, p. 5. 56
Breedveld, E., Meijboom, B., and de Roo, A. (2006). Labor supply in the home care industry: a case study in a
Dutch region, Health Policy 76 (2), p. 144. 57
Karagiannopoulos, G. et al. (2005). Fathoming Porter’s five forces model in the Internet era, The Journal of
Policy Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications 7, p. 66.
21
In addition to the competitive forces within the mobile payments services markets, given also the
main focus of this research, other factors are believed to impact these markets as well, for
example, technology and standards, regulatory activities and legislation, established purchase
and payment habits, or national economy infrastructures.58
I.2.1.3. Application of contingency theory in mobile payment regulation
If we regard a mobile payment services market as the unit of analysis (organization), these other
factors become contingency factors, which influence the performance of the unit but are beyond
the influence and control of that unit, as mobile payment system is a newly introduced payment
system in Rwanda, and its regulatory framework is still at its infancy stage.
In that regard, many unforeseen events may happen, this work had played a preventive role of
these events. Contingency theory therefore is also well suited to classify mobile payments
research and to capture the environmental factors which are characteristic to the mobile payment
services markets.
In the context of mobile payment system, staying focused on the main objectives of this research,
it is natural to stress on regulation, jurisdiction and standardization factors too because financial
services and telecommunication are among the most regulated industries, and the use of
standards is characteristic to telecommunication.
I.2.1.4. Review of the findings of related studies and publications in the area of mobile
payment system
Mobile Payment Services Market and Providers, Merchant Power, Legal/Regulatory and
Standards, as well as New E-Payments have each been the focus of just a few studies in
developing world59. Some articles have studied many factors simultaneously, which may be
important to discover how the factors influence each other. The present section will go through
58
Johnson, G. Scholes, K. (2002). Exploring Corporate Strategy, sixth ed., Harlow, Financial Times, Prentice Hall,
p. 76. 59 Bohle, K. and Krueger, M. (2001). Payment culture matters – a comparative EU-US perspective on Internet
payments, Technical report, Background Paper No. 4, Electronic Payment Systems Observatory (e-PSO), EUR
19936 EN, Seville, Spain, 2001, p. 38.
22
these studies and will try to elaborate gaps related to regulation of mobile payment systems, as
well as possible directions for improvement of this area.
Rwanda is one of the countries in the developing world where new electronic payment systems
are being introduced at an increasing rate. By predictions, the researcher assumes that this trend
will continue for foreseeable future. Early research by IFC Mobile Money Scoping60
undertook
a series of six mobile financial services (MFS) market scoping studies across Sub-Saharan Africa
to identify two countries in which it will provide broad and deep support to accelerate the uptake
of branchless banking services. Rwanda was one of the six countries in which the study was
conducted. A similar study by Ignacio Mas and Dan Radcliffe61
concerned Mobile Payments in
Kenya (M-PESA).
These two studies concluded that information technology has appreciable positive effects on
bank productivity; cashiers’ work, banking transaction, bank patronage, bank’s services delivery,
and customers’ services.62
Margarete Biallas, had conducted an extensive survey of the mobile
payments overview and provided a brief perspective on regulations, financial infrastructure,
payment services provider snapshot, and mobile financial service implementation.63
This study
aimed at identifying efforts and developments of the country in order to partner with the country
for the progress of mobile payments.
The study by IFC on mobile payment in Rwanda focused on several factors mentioned above,
but not on any in details, which called for a new categorization of multiple categories. It also
presented market overviews, summarizing the state of mobile payments, its challenges or
potentials. However, these potentials and challenges were limited to infrastructure and factors
that can make the system operational. If the system is not effectively operational, it may pose
some risks to the users who need protection from the regulatory regime. This aspect had not been
analyzed in that study by IFC.
60
Biallas, M., Ngahu, J. and Stefanski, S. (2012), IFC-World Bank, Mobile Money Scoping Country Report:
Rwanda, February 12-18, p. 1. 61
Mas, I., and Radcliffe, D. (2010). Mobile payments go viral : M-PESA in Kenya, Gates foundation, p. 18. 62
Balachandher, K. G., et al. (2001). Electronic banking in Malaysia: a note on evolution of services and consumer
reactions, Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce, vol. 5, no. 1, p.8. 63
Biallas, M., et al., op. cit., p. 12.
23
I.2.2. A comparative study of the factors influencing the mobile payment development in
Rwanda
Mobile payment research is expected to compare the characteristics of various social, regulatory,
and cultural environments, and to examine which characteristics affect the development and
success of mobile payment system.64
Unfortunately, we did not identify enough academic papers
that would have investigated the development of mobile payment system and its regulation in
Rwanda.
In other different countries, relevant research reports and studies within related fields (other
payment services or wireless communication) have identified specific social and cultural issues
that may be important to mobile payment studies. These include distinguishable payment
cultures in various countries, industry strengths, electronic banking readiness of consumers,
strong mobile phone inclination of certain nations65
; cultural similarity and adoption timing66
;
demographics and lifestyle characteristics, or cultural differences in developed and developing
countries.67
Since we found very limited studies on mobile payment system in Rwanda that would have
addressed such issues, it is especially important for the current and future research to study how
these factors and especially effective regulation can influence the development of mobile
payments system.
I.2.2.1. The role of improved legal, regulatory, and standardization environments in mobile
payment systems in Rwanda
Improvement of legal, regulatory and standardization environment deals with evolving
jurisdiction, regulations and other norms with requirements to comply. These contingency items
64
Takach, G. S. (2004). Computer Law, 2nd
ed., Torofito: Irwin Law, 2003 at 517. T. Scassa & M. Deturbide,
Electronic Commerce and internet Law in Canada, Toronto: CCH Canadian Limited p. 3-22. 65
Bohle, K., Krueger, M. (2001). Payment culture matters – a comparative EU-US perspective on Internet
payments, Technical report, Background Paper No. 4, Electronic Payment Systems Observatory (e-PSO), EUR
19936 EN, Seville, Spain, P. 8. 66
Sundqvist, S. et al. (2002). The effects of country characteristics, cultural similarity and adoption timing on the
diffusion of wireless communications, Journal of Business Research 58 (1), pp. 107–110. 67
Mahmood, M.A. et al. (2004). On-line shopping behavior: cross-country empirical research, International
Journal of Electronic Commerce 9 (1), p. 30.
24
may trigger needs for new or enhanced payment services, and drive or hinder the development of
mobile payments68
. Mobile payments research on this factor is expected to examine the impact
of regulation, legislation and standardization on the development and success of mobile payment
services markets in Rwanda.
Cross-border mobile transactions can be complex due to a complicated web of law and
regulations in the region.69
Previous studies on the regulation of international mobile payment
services suggest that unifying regulation and legal frameworks (we can consider the example of
EU directives in the European Commission) may reduce complexity and support the
development of international mobile payment services.70
Karnouskos and Vilmos present the
Secure Mobile Payment Service (SEMOPS) initiative as an example of an international mobile
payment project that aims at responding to the challenges presented to an international mobile
payment service.71
The process of standardization for mobile payments has been another focus of the prior mobile
payment research.72
The cited studies identify various organizations that aim at standardizing and
developing mobile payment services but also note that none of these organizations has a
dominant role in standardization and that there are differences in the requirements and in the
preferences they set for standards.73
Some studies which have looked at the mobile payment services market from the point of view
of multiple actors have discussed the standardization of mobile payments and emphasized the
need for a technological and organizational consensus between the players in the industry.74
68
Hunter, W. C. & Stephen, G. T. (1991). Technological change in large commercial banks, Journal of Business,
64, no. 3, pp. 331-362. 69
Rawson, S. (2002). E-commerce mobile transactions: mobility and liability: the hazards of handhelds, Computer
Law & Security Report 18 (3), p. 172. 70
Karnouskos, S., and Vilmos, A. (2004). The European perspective on mobile payments, in: Proceedings of the
IEEE International Symposium on Trends in Communications (Sympo TIC), Bratislava, Slovakia, and October 24–
26, 2004. 71
Ibid. 72
Lim, A. (2005). Standardization for different systems of mobile payments: inter-industrial battle, in: Presentation
at Hong Kong Mobility Roundtable, Hong Kong, China, June 1–3, 2005, p. 11. 73
See Lim, A. (2005). Pre-standardization of mobile payments: negotiations within consortia, in: Proceedings of the
Fourth International Conference on Mobile Business (ICMB), Sydney, Australia, July 11–13, 2005, p. 39. 74
See for example, Ondrus, J., and Pigneur, Y. (2006).Towards a holistic analysis of mobile payments: a multiple
perspectives approach, Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 5 (3), p. 246.
25
The current research on regulation of mobile of mobile payment system in Rwanda provides an
informative description on the complexities and problems surrounding these topics. Yet, there
are no good solutions to solve these legislation and standardization issues. Therefore, the current
and future research will focus on how much and kind of legislations needed to support mobile
payment system in Rwanda, and also at the regional level.
I.2.2.2. Regulatory bodies having the authority to regulate mobile payment system locally
and internationally
Previous studies have emphasized the need to unify laws and regulations to facilitate the
developments of international mobile payment services. It may be complicated, however, to
determine the responsibilities and division of work between the national and international
legislative bodies75
.
So far, there are no unified regulatory bodies of mobile payment systems at the international
level; mobile payment markets are still regulate and monitored by local laws.76
Future research should therefore address this question and examine the most optimal
mechanisms and bodies for regulating international mobile payment services.
I.2.2.3. Power of Consumers and service providers in mobile payment system in Rwanda
The truth is that the payment service providers will be able to keep control over the payment
process and mobile network operators will create the new channel by providing mobile network
infrastructure77
. We expected to find research on mobile payment services industry competition
and on the capabilities or lack of capabilities of various players.
75 Dahlberg, T. and Mallat, N. (2002). Mobile payment service development –managerial implications of consumer
value perceptions, in: S. Wrycza (Ed.), Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on Information Systems
(ECIS), Gdansk, Poland, June 2002, pp. 6–8. 76
Andrew, M. (2009). Card Fees Pit Retailers against Banks, NEW YORK TIMES, Jul. 2009 16, p. 1. 77
Dahlberg, T., et al. (2003). Trust Enhanced Technology Acceptance Model- Consumer Acceptance of Mobile
Payment Solutions, Presentation at Stockholm Mobility Roundtable Stockholm Sweden May 2223:10, available at:
http://www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/pdf, visited on 10/07/2013.
26
Considering the lack of vigilant studies in the field of regulation of mobile payment system in
Rwanda, we have emphasized that the regulation of mobile payment in place in Rwanda had
focused more on the Business-To-Consumer (B2C) and C2C scenarios, while B2B mobile
commerce may also need mobile payment services. By mentioning this deficiency in the
literature, we hope that future researchers will open new paths of research addressing the mobile
payment issues related to B2B services and the Rwandan legislator will take account of this in
order to empower the consumers in this payment system.
I.2.3. Gaps in Rwandan governmental institutions to cooperate for a better implementation
of the existing mobile payment regulations
In Rwanda, there are different institutions in charge of implementation of regulations of
electronic payments, improvement of which should be profitable to the most vulnerable citizens.
To this end, there should be effective mechanisms of handling conflicts associated with
electronic and mobile payments78
, establish clear rules regulating market competition because
once it is left in vacuum, it is highly detrimental to the consumers.
As it will be discussed in depth in chapter four, implementation and follow up system of mobile
payments remains unclear since it lies under responsibilities of two distinct institutions, namely
BNR and RURA. This causes consequences to the consumers of this payment system because it
is confusingly to them about how to preserve their rights and interests once they are breached.
I.2.3.1. Failure of National Bank of Rwanda to set out clear mechanisms of implementation
of regulation governing electronic payments
By overseeing payment systems, the National Bank of Rwanda helps to maintain systematic
stability and reduce risk in order to maintain public confidence in payment and settlement
system. The National Bank of Rwanda has the duty to supervise and regulate payment systems,
the last one is to supervise and regulate the activities of financial institutions notably banks79
,
78
Brozolo, L. G. R. D. (2000). International Payments and Conflicts of Laws, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 307, p. 308. 79
see art. 6, para. 3 of the Law n° 55/2007 of 30/11/2007 governing the Central Bank of Rwanda.
27
micro-finance institutions, insurance companies, collective placement companies and pension
funds institutions.
First and foremost, it is worth noticing that the Central Bank’s directives shall be orders or
prohibitions of acting in a certain manner designed for one or more private individuals or legal
entities. The Bank’s regulations, directives and decisions shall be respected by the concerned.80
The National Bank of Rwanda has done notable work of establishing requirements for granting a
license; these include capital requirements81
, strategies for prevention of money laundering and
financing terrorism82
, evidence that RURA (Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency) certified the
technology infrastructure for Payment Service Provider operating their network83
, but, it should
put in place the regulation and requirement for using the mobile payment system. In addition, the
Central Bank should also require to the payment service providers, effective mechanisms of how
the consumers will be protected.
I.2.3.2. Failure of RURA in enforcement of regulations of electronic payments in place in
Rwanda
The law regulating the functions of RURA states that the public utilities that will be under
supervision of RURA include telecommunications, information technology, broadcasting and
converging electronic technologies including the internet and any other audio-visual information
and communication technology.84
In this regard, RURA must fully understand the needs of
service providers and users regarding the efficient interoperability of all national networks and
utility service delivery systems.85
80 See article 56, para. 5 of Law n° 55/2007 of 30/11/2007 governing the Central Bank of Rwanda. 81
See art. 7, Law no 03/2010 of 26/02/2010 concerning the payment system, O.G.R.R n° 9 of 01/03/2010.
82 See art. 4 (9), Regulation n° 06/2012 of 21/06/2012 of the National Bank of Rwanda governing Payment Services
Providers, O.G.R.R n° 29bis of 16/07/2012. 83
See art. 4 (13) Regulation n° 06/2012 of 21/06/2012. 84
See art. 2, law n° 39/2001 of 13th
September 2001 establishing the Rwandan Utility Regulatory with the mission
to regulate certain public utilities. 85
Interoperability is provided for by article 21 of Regulation n° 06/2012 of 21/06/2012 of the National Bank of
Rwanda governing Payment Services Providers.
28
In that regard, the Regulatory Authority may investigate at any time the quality of service
measurement; reporting and recording procedures of a Licensee. In so doing, the Regulatory
Authority may exercise its powers of monitoring and enforcement of obligations.86
As it will be detailed in chapter four, mechanisms for conflicts resolution that arise between
payment service providers and consumers are still questionable. Thus, RURA and BNR will
need to ensure that all stakeholders take responsibility for consumer protection and provide for
the timely resolution of consumer complaints and disputes. Depending on the circumstances,
RURA may act as adjudicator, mediator or arbitrator in disputes that arise between payment
service providers, consumers and other stakeholders.
I.2.3.3. Weakness of telecom companies to comply with obligations specified in license
The liability of telecom companies shall apply to creation, publication and dissemination of
electronic messages on the network, use of such electronic messages in a way that is contrary to
the law is a breach of contractual obligations.87
However, the communication network service
shall continue to fulfill contractual obligations, and obligations specified in the license for
provision of communication network service granted by the Controller.
Even if the law no 18/2010 of 12/05/2010 is relating to the electronic transaction, signature and
electronic signature, the Rwandan legislation still has gaps in putting in place the law regulating
electronic transactions including mobile payments. As there are many specified laws for a
precise matter, considering also that the issue of mobile payment service is getting more
complicated, there should be a specific law on mobile payment system with more focus on the
protection of consumers of this service.
I.2.3.4. Challenges related to security payments
Mobile payment uses technological devices that pose various risks including security risks. The
security challenges that this payment system poses are related to authentication and non-
86
RURA: Regulations for Quality of Service of cellular mobile and fixed networks services, Article 8: Investigation
of the quality of service. 87
See also Bruno-Britz, M. (2005). Is the end of cash at hand?, Bank Systems & Technology no 42, p. 29.
29
repudiation, integrity and privacy. In this regard, it has to be noted that security breaches could
occur at the level of the consumer, the merchant or the issuer, and could involve attempts to steal
consumer or merchant devices, to create fraudulent devices or messages that are accepted as
genuine, to alter data stored on or contained in messages transmitted between devices, or to alter
the software functions of a product. Security attacks would most likely be for financial gain, but
could also aim to disrupt the system.88
Additionally, Loretta J. Mester89
considers that security breaches essentially fall into three
categories: breaches with serious criminal intent (e.g. fraud, theft of commercially sensitive or
financial information), breaches by “casual hackers” (e.g. defacement of web sites or “denial of
service” - causing web sites to crash), and flaws in systems design and/or set up leading to
security breaches (e.g. genuine users seeing / being able to transact on other users’ accounts). All
of these threats have potentially serious financial, legal and reputational implications (these will
be analyzed deeply in chapter II and III).
More importantly in Rwanda, technology is gradually developing with new crimes that the
country has never regulated. Therefore, it is worth mentioning that the more technology
improves, the more crime committed in this sector which are considered as the cyber crime will
improve. To prevent these crimes, the government should put more emphasis in elaborating
specific laws especially for the mobile payment system as it is increasing very fast in our
country.
I.2.3.5. Challenges related to infrastructure in mobile payment
First and foremost, we agree with Olivier Hance and Suzan Dionne Balz when stating that “for
electronic payments to be successful there is a need to have reliable and cost effective
infrastructure that can be accessed by majority of the population”.90
88
Furash & Company. (1994). Banking's Role in Tomorrow's Payment System, Overview 1, p. 29. 89
Loretta J. Mester, The Changing Nature of the Payments System: Should New Players Mean New Rules, Bus.
Rev., (Fed. Res. Bank of Philadelphia), March/April 2000, p.11. 90
Hance, O. and Dionne Balz, S. (1999). The New Virtual Money: Law and Practice, Kluwer Law 423, p. 180.
30
On this consideration, it has to be pointed out that the first focus should be the communication
infrastructure, banking activities and operations that need to be automated. A network that links
banks and other financial institutions for clearing and payment confirmation is a pre-requisite for
mobile payment systems.
However, one can realize that in developing world and in Rwanda in particular, mobile networks
and internet are not easily accessible. “Poor communication infrastructure is one of the reasons
that hinder the e-payment system in Africa”.91
I.2.3.6. Challenges related to the regulatory framework
Differing national views of the nature of electronic money (and what it means to issue electronic
money) have produced fundamentally different approaches to regulation. To some states,
electronic money is the electronic equivalent of a national currency and, therefore, should be
issued only by the state, through its central bank or designees. Widespread use of a "virtual
currency" would raise issues of money supply as well as stability of the currency.92
To others, “electronic money” may be only one piece of the service of moving value from one
owner to another. That service may be composed of a number of steps, some of which could be
carried out by banks or non-banks who bring efficiencies to the process.93
Under this view, the
goals of regulation would be to ensure the safety and soundness of the entire payment system,
consumer protection and other fundamental social policies.
Issues include determining the location of virtual services and appropriate jurisdiction among
government agencies (e.g., banking vs. telecom), as well as with respect to courts. Transparency
of financials is paramount. For services with a cross-border aspect, international harmonization,
such as adoption of treaties or conventions, may come into play.
91
Alan L. Tyree, op.cit. p. 140. 92
Roth, D. (2010). The Future of Money: Cash, Checks, and Credit Cards - Who needs them? The new global
currency is flexible, frictionless, and (almost) free, Wired, March 2010, pp. 70-79. 93
See for example Bass, Thomas A. (1996). The Future of Money, Wired 4.10 (October 1996), available at:
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.10/wriston.html, accessed on 24/11/2013.
31
I.2.3.7. Anticipated effects of e-money on monetary policy
There are different views on adoption of cashless system in line with the monetary policy.
According to Walter Wriston94
, digital currency carried on smart cards was “the revolution that’s
waiting in the woods” and a “technology … on the verge of exploding”. The predicted explosion
has yet to happen. Many monetary economists95
foresee that the demand for central bank money
will not only drastically fall, but also probably disappear altogether, over a foreseeable horizon.
The report of BIS96
postulates that e-money innovations “have the potentials to challenge the
predominant role of cash for making small-value payments” by impression of their greater
convenience, but worries that therefore “they also raise a number of policy issues for central
banks because of the possible implications for central bank’s revenues and monetary policy and
because of central banks' general interest in payment systems.” 97
This chapter on conceptual framework and literature review reviewed an extensive amount of
existing mobile payment studies, proposed a conceptual framework with focus on the theory of
contingency, at the same time, it analyzed possible gaps outlined in the studies related to the
regulation of mobile payment in Rwanda, and a roadmap for future research has been designed.
94
In Bass, Thomas A. (1996). The Future of Money, Wired 4.10 (October 1996), available at:
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.10/wriston.html, accessed on 24/11/2013. 95
Cronin, David, and Kevin Dowd. 2001. “Does Monetary Policy Have a Future?,” Cato Journal 21 (Fall), pp. 227-
244. 96
BIS. (1996). Implications for Central Banks of the Development of Digital Money, Basel: Bank of International
Settlements, p. 2. 97
See also King, Mervyn. (1999). Challenges for Monetary Policy: New and Old, in New Challenges for Monetary
Policy (Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City), pp. 11-57.
32
CHAPTER II: ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION OF MOBILE
PAYMENTS IN RWANDA
This chapter has critically analyzed the effectiveness of regulation of mobile payment system in
Rwanda. Therefore, following the literature review and a description of the research
methodology, this chapter concentrated on a critical study of the problematic related to the
regulation of mobile payment system, it explored the lacunae and imperfections as identified by
data collected from fields. The chapter then presented hindrances to the effectiveness of mobile
payment, which is an important aspect to gain in order to formulate the conclusions and
recommendations.
Beforehand, it is worth reminding that as the participants in mobile payment system have
different interests, they may face conflicts each other that require legal solutions. Especially
regulating rights and liabilities of participants in this sphere, interconnection between the
payment service providers, availing the regulatory regime at the regional level, are important
aspects that have been addressed in this chapter.
II.1. Problems related to the regulation of rights and liabilities of operators of mobile
payments and protection of customers
There is a variety of consumer (and business) protection concerns, though these may vary based
on social expectations. General concerns include the relative obligations of the counterparties,
banks, and mobile service providers, which should be clearly set forth in contracts, system rules,
or regulations.98
Notable among these obligations are loss allocation, as well as the establishment
and maintenance of other appropriate protections against fraud, user error, delays and system
error or loss.
98
The Consumer Perspective, available at: http://dcmscommsreview.readandcomment.com/consumers/, accessed on
12/06/2014.
33
II.1.1. Liabilities of financial institutions for the loss incurred by customers in mobile
payment transactions
The provisions of regulation in place in Rwanda oblige the financial institutions to execute the
payment order made by the sender in a reasonable time.99
It provided that the defaulting
institution, either receiving or beneficiary, will be liable. However, this regulation in place is not
specific on liability of the financial institution in case of non-compliance with this provision. In
this regard, it can be seen that the provision is a simple declaration of obligations of financial
institutions without any binding force.
Considering the point that mobile financial transactions are concluded in a non-facing and
automated manner, given also that it is almost impossible for customers to prove intention or
negligence of the payment service provider, and the point that payment service providers
determine the authentication procedures they have prepared to implement, it would be desirable
to make financial institutions bear all the risk of an unauthorized mobile financial transactions
and loss caused by long delays in executing the transaction, except that financial institutions
prove intention or gross negligence of customers.100
In the case Judd v Citibank101
, though Citibank (the defendant) produced computer printouts
documenting the withdrawals in issue, which printouts were explained (translated) by the bank's
witness, the branch manager, by saying funds were withdrawn at a "cash machine" by either
plaintiff or someone authorized by her to do so, judgment was awarded to plaintiff in the amount
of $800 plus interest and disbursements, because the plaintiff had proven not having withdrawn
the funds, she testified and produced a letter from her employer to the effect that she was at work
on both occasions and could not have made the said withdrawals.
99 Art. 3 on the “execution” provides that payment transfer to beneficiary’s account shall not exceed 72 hours
following the time of receipt by the receiving institution. 100
Article 9 of the regulation no 07/2010 bind the banks to provide procedures for acknowledging loss or theft by the
customers, but it does not clarify liabilities of the institutions in this matter.
101 Dorothy Judd (Plaintiff) v Citibank (Defendant), Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County,
November 3, 1980, 107 Misc.2d 526 (1980).
34
II.1.2. To what extent are the mobile network operators liable for the loss incurred by
customers in mobile payments in Rwanda?
As mobile financial transactions are concluded through mobile network installed by mobile
network operator, in case of transaction errors arising in the course of electronically transmitting
or processing the conclusion of a transaction, there may be cases where not financial institution
but mobile network operator shall be liable for the loss.102
However, in reality, it is almost impossible for customers to clarify whether error was caused by
financial institution or mobile network operator. It would be desirable to make financial
institution compensate customer for damage caused by transaction errors arising in the course of
electronically transmitting or processing the conclusion of a transaction, and then allow financial
institution to exercise right of indemnify over the mobile network operator by proving the
intention or negligence of the mobile network operator.103
II.1.3. Effects of lack of interoperability between operators of mobile payment service
providers to the consumers
Until now in Rwanda, especially for mobile money users, e-money can be transferred between
users of the same network, which does not bring particular newness to the payment methods.
Important concern in this section resides in thinking of ways by which the electronic payment
institutions can be interoperable with capacity to prevent issues resulting from lack of
interoperability.
102
The regulation no 07/2010 of BNR is silent on this aspect of liabilities of network providers for the loss incurred
by the customers. See also 260 CCLIII par 3. 103
Consider for example, Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 916,
437 N.W.2d 213,215, (1989). See also, NORTH CAROLINA: Atl. Coast Mech., Inc. v. Arcadis, Geraghty &
Miller of N.C., Inc., 623 S.E.2d 334, 340 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). Considering the latter case, the service provider
(network provider) should also compensate damages incurred by its customers due to the malfunction of the system.
35
II.1.3.1. Possible problems caused by interoperability of mobile payment service
providers104
Interoperability may complicate settlement of complaints and fraud issues, as it may prove
difficult to identify the responsible network. Prompt settlement of complaints is important in
establishing the credibility of a network and depends on clear responsibility.105
In the current
(closed) system, there is only one network that can be responsible in the case of a complaint, and
MNOs have strong incentives to deal with these. Thus, in a system with interoperability, disputes
relating to cross-network transfers may be challenging to deal with.106
In other countries, bill payment services like utilities are already available from MNO’s – so
MNOs are already able to provide a form of bank interoperability to businesses. Businesses can
also set up their own mobile money accounts to receive payments, without the need for
interoperability with banking.107
II.1.3.2. Interoperability is not considered as a binding obligation to the payment service
providers in Rwanda
Interoperability between payment providers refers to the ability of participants to make payments
across systems. There are two types of interoperability that are relevant here – interoperability
between Mobile Network Operators (MNO) payment systems (e.g. payments from a MTN
Mobile Money user to a TIGO Cash user), and interoperability between MNO payment systems
and the banks (e.g. transfers from a Bank of Kigali account to an MTN Mobile Money account).
While the latter has already developed in several countries (e.g. M-PESA in Kenya, Airtel in
104
There is no provision on interoperability between the payment service providers in the current regulation
governing electronic fund transfers and electronic money transactions in Rwanda. The regulation of BNR on
payment service providers obliges interoperability between the payment service providers (art. 21). 105
Hughes, S. J. (1996). A Call for International Legal Standards for Emerging Retail Electronic Payment Systems,
15 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 197, pp. 47-48. 106
Heeks, R. (2002). Information Systems and Developing Countries: Failure, Success and Local Improvisations, p.
67. 107
UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade law). (2010a). Possible future work on online
dispute resolution in cross-border electronic commerce transactions, Note by the Secretariat, UNCITRAL
Convention, available from http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/electronic-
commerce/2005.Convention.html, visited on 19/05/2014.
36
India), none of them has been achieved in Rwanda, though it is provided in the regulation
governing Payment Services Providers.108
One good step made so far in Rwanda the interconnection through mVisa. I&M Bank & BK and
UOB are interoperable through mVisa. Airtel and I&M Bank are interconnected to provide card
less services more others are in pipeline to interconnect.109
The regulations from the BNR state
“Contracts with exclusivity are not permitted by this regulation unless they are authorized by the
Central Bank”;110
(non-exclusivity has been regulated by the BNR since the beginning of mobile
payment systems in Rwanda).
In an interconnected environment, a customer affiliated with one operator’s mobile money
service would have the ability to send money electronically to the wallet of a customer affiliated
with another operator’s service. It is seen that achieving this level of cooperation can be
challenging: not only can it involve gaining agreement between competitors, but it must also
comply with relevant competition regulations.
II.1.3.3. The way forward for implementation of interconnection between payment service
providers in Rwanda
In Rwanda today, most mobile payments services are closed-loop systems whereby one customer
cannot send a payment to a customer in another system, even within one country. Kenya is a
good leading example on interconnection between mobile payment service providers. For
example: G-Cash has bilateral agreements with several other systems. Western Union links to M-
PESA; BICS’ Home Send is a hub that includes communication protocol as well as FX
conversion; India’s IMPS is multi-bank by design and underpinned by the country’s ACH.111
108
Art. 4 for Application for a license, 6 (c) obliges the applicant to explain how the system is interoperable with
other existing electronic payment systems. See art. 4, Regulation n°06/2012 of 21/06/2012 of the National Bank of
Rwanda governing payment services providers, O.G.R.R n° 29bis of 16/07/2012. 109
Respondent: the National Bank of Rwanda, department of payment 110
Interview with John Bosco SEBABI, D.G. Operations, BNR on November 1, 2013. Article 4 of regulation n°
05/2010 on application for a license, para. d) (i) provides that “description of policies and/or procedures of the system, including: the criteria established for direct and indirect participation into the system, to be safe and non discriminatory”. See regulation n°05/2010, of 27/12/2010 of the national bank of Rwanda relating to the licensing
criteria of operating payment and securities settlement systems, O.G.R.R n° special 30/12/2010. 111
Dunn & Company, Global Payments Survey 2011, Edgar, Reports/3Q-2011, available at: //
https://www.iemarketresearch.com/Members/, visited on 21/03/2014.
37
The National Bank of Rwanda had partnered with Visa Rwanda Ltd112
to meet this end. In the
return, Visa Rwanda Ltd has developed Mobile Visa (m Visa), products that allow mobile
banking service interoperability.
II.1.3.4. Implementation of interconnection between payment service providers for
promotion of customers’ interests
An important note is that on the side of customers, competition is seen as a good advantage by
which they get better services on low costs. In terms of interconnection of mobile payment
service providers, customers can, at low cost, affiliate with multiple mobile money
services. The proponents of banning agent exclusivity generally appeal to increasing competition
in a mature market.113
In the developed world, most mobile accounts are post-paid, so affiliating with multiple
networks implies a doubling of monthly costs. For this reason, it is uncommon for customers to
affiliate with more than one mobile network at a time. In most of the developing world, the
situation is different.
Since opening a new pre-paid mobile account is very inexpensive, and cost is tied directly to
consumption, customers routinely maintain connections with multiple mobile operators, behavior
which is often referred to as “multi-SIMing”114
. In this way, they can avail themselves of
promotions that different mobile operators offer, and select the account that offers them the best
rates or coverage depending on their requirements for each call.115
In addition, in many cases, operators make it possible for registered mobile payment customers
to send money to customers who have not registered for this system (indeed, in most cases, they
need not even have a phone): when they initiate the transfer, they are issued a secret code which
112
Visa is a global payments technology company that connects consumers, businesses, financial institutions and
governments in more than 200 countries and territories to fast, secure and reliable digital currency. 113
Klein, M., and Colin, M. (2011). Mobile banking and financial inclusion. The Regulatory Lessons, the World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 5664, May 2011, the Information Society, vol. 18, no 2, 101-112.
114 A June 2010 survey indicated that 43% of mobile money users in Uganda were multi-siming, while the
proliferation of dual-, tri-, and even quad-SIM phones around the world provides anecdotal evidence for the trend. 115
Ndiwalana, A., Morawczynski, O., and Popov, O. (2010). Mobile Money Use in Uganda: A Preliminary Study,
available at: http://www.mmublog.org/wp-content/files_mf/m4dmobilemoney./pdf, visited on 04/05/2014.
38
they can convey to the recipient and which can be used to collect the transfer at an agent.116
We
call this transaction type an off-net transfer. End-to- end, off-net transfers are usually more
expensive than on-net transfers.
These capabilities are important, because they mean that customers are not restricted to
transacting only with customers affiliated with their own network—or indeed any network at all.
This is the case for mobile banking by which a customer of Banque Populaire du Rwanda may
send money to a third person who does not necessarily have an account in any bank; the later can
withdraw money via “easy cash system”. For the mobile payment service providers, it can be
widely understood that doing so has the potential to deter investment.117
Mandating interconnectivity would presumably be undertaken to promote customers’ interests.
The regulation of BNR provides that “Financial institutions and Mobile Network Operators shall
be interconnected to offer services to virtually all banked and unbanked customers in order to
achieve interoperability and to substantially increase the financial services outreach to the
unbanked communities”118
. This is a simple declaration of obligation because the financial
institutions and Mobile Network Operators in Rwanda provide payment services independently.
II.1.3.5. Payment service providers take advantage of weakness of regulatory framework to
create indirect restrictions
When looking at the reality of things, one can realize indirect exclusivity in electronic money
transfers between operators who are on different networks. Mobile operators intentionally create
significant financial incentives for the senders and recipients of transfers to affiliate with the
same mobile payment network. As an example, for an average-size transfer, MTN Uganda
charges $1.44 for an off-net transfer and $0.31 for an on-net transfer. Transactional partners with
any degree of price sensitivity who transact more than once will find it most economical to pay
116
This system known as “easy cash” has so far been popular in Banque Populaire du Rwanda. It is a way by which
the mobile banking user can send money to a third person without necessarily being a customer in any bank-there is
a need on a registered mobile device. 117
Reserve Bank of India, “Mobile Banking transactions in India - Operative Guidelines for Banks”, October
2008. Available: http://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/, accessed on 28/09/2013. 118
See art. 21, para. 2, Regulation no 06/2012 of BNR.
39
the upfront cost of registering for a new SIM and wallet in order to take advantage of lower per-
transaction costs.119
II.1.4. Limited awareness of consumers in mobile payment services of their right and
liabilities
It is important to notice that key information on consumer rights and potential liabilities
associated with online and mobile payments is not always provided to consumers in a clear,
timely, and transparent manner. Moreover, it is often not clear which of the entities involved in a
payment transaction should be providing information to consumers, what type of information
they should provide, and when, during the payment process, they should be doing so.
In order to solve this issue, information on delivery times, any rights of withdrawal and available
dispute resolution and redress mechanisms (including online and alternative dispute resolution
programs) should be provided to consumers prior to making a payment. In the event of problems
with a transaction, clear information on whom to contact, and how, should also be available to
consumers, by phone, for example, or through a link to a website accessible through the
merchant’s e-commerce platform.120
The regulation of National Bank of Rwanda requires a bank or other payment service provider to
inform the customer for any malfunction of equipment through notices at ATM, POS or other
electronic terminals, notice at its branches or any other mode it deems suitable.121
However, this
article is still silent about notification to be done in relation to mobile payment transactions.
Instead, the regulation governing the payment services providers obliges applicants for a license
to produce signed document describing the contingency and disaster recovery plans for
electronic payment facilities and event scenario/problem management plan/program to resolve or
119
Neil, D., and Leishman, op. cit., p. 26. 120
Mark Flaming, et al., (2011), Consumer Protection Diagnostic Study Kenya, available at:
http://www.fsd.kenya.org/pdf-documents/11-02-22-Consumer-diagnostic-study-pdf/, accessed on 16/06/ 2014. 121
Art. 10, para. 2 (a, b, and c)), Regulation no 07/2010 of BNR
40
address problems, such as complaints, errors and intrusions and the availability of back-up
facilities.122
II.1.5. Lack of services of deposit and withdrawal of money in mobile payment system in
Rwanda
When launching the Airtel money, it was expected that Airtel Cash was going to introduce
communicability between what is known as the mobile wallet (mobile account) and one’s bank
account, by which the Airtel cash client will be able to withdraw or deposit money from or onto
the mobile wallet and the bank account respectively.123
For instance, with this target of Airtel, one will be able to withdraw money from their mobile
wallet using an ATM card or even to top up the wallet through their bank account. Also it makes
possible the transfer of money from one’s mobile account to any bank account.124
Until the date
of this research, we have not found any services of deposit and withdrawal of money through
mobile payments.
In Kenya for example, based on SMS technology, M-PESA lets users make mobile payment
transactions including cash deposits and withdrawals at designated outlets; and loan receipts or
repayments. In this system, cash deposits are converted into a commodity called “e-float” that is
denominated in the same units as the domestic currency.125
Agents facilitate the conversion of
cash to e-float and vice versa. M-PESA users can then use their mobile phone to transfer money
to another mobile phone user, regardless of the recipient’s mobile operator.
122
See art. 4, (8), law no 06/2012 21/06/2012 of the National Bank of Rwanda governing payment services
providers. 123
RWAHIGI, M. (2013).Lack of regulatory framework hampering regional mobile money movement, in the
Independent, available at: http://www.independent.co.ug/rwanda-ed/rwanda/7471-airtel-mtn-want-cross-border-
cash-transfer-pdf/, visited on 17/09/2014. 124
Mr. MASEKA in an interview with the Independent, website pre- cited. 125
Okoth, J. (2009). Regulator gives M‐PESA a clean bill of health, the Standard, 27 January 2009, p.9.
41
II.1.6. The problematic of protection of consumers engaging in mobile payment system in
Rwanda
By analyzing the Rwandan regulation in place, it is still questionable about the protection of
consumers as parties standing on unequal power in mobile payment transactions. The lack of
understanding resides in the fact that the different bodies (banks, MNOs and agents) whose
operations are often overseen by different regulatory bodies also operate under different sets of
regulations.126
Consumers are therefore unclear over what redress rights they have which entity
to turn to if there is a payment-related problem.
In this regard, awareness makes it pertinent for organizations and regulators to emphasize
customer protection especially with the new type of customer being reached innovatively. On a
simple example, the regulation stipulates that “the payment orders sent by the sender or on his
behalf are final and irrevocable. The sender shall not revoke a payment order once it has been
received by the receiving institution, unless otherwise provided by agreement”.127
In
consideration of this article, it is simple to conclude that the legislator has put the consumer in a
closed box with total impossibilities to revoke any undue payment, such as payment order sent to
the wrong receiver.
Rwanda does not make any difference on this issue that has become general in many countries. It
clearly seen that most countries do not provide consumers with many legally binding rights to
remedies and redress in case of defective or undelivered mobile content products.128
In the
United Kingdom, the question as to whether mobile payments, which allow the consumer to
spend up to a certain amount and pay later, may be regarded not as a payment service, but as a
credit agreement, is being considered. If the latter solution was favored, consumers may benefit
126
Banks and financial institutions, and MNOs are regulated by the National Bank of Rwanda for their financial and
payments services, MNOs are regulated by RURA for their communication services. However, the payment agents
are bound by contracts between them and the telecommunication companies. 127
See art. 5. This article contradicts with art. 7 on “erroneous payment orders” given that the later exempt the
solvens (sender) for liability of payment to the wrong accipiens, the greater amount than that intended or duplicate
payment. Once the sender discovers all these scenarios, this regulation should give possibilities of revocation to the
solvens in order to protect his rights. 128
Consumer Focus. (2009). Pocket Shopping, Consumer Focus, December 2009, available at: http:
//www.consumerfocus.org.uk/assets/1/files/2009/06/Pocketshopping./pdf, visited on 26/05/2014.
42
from the chargeback protections offered by the country’s Consumer Credit Act 1974129
, as well
as from the anti-fraud protections.
II.1.6.1. Protection of customers in case of unauthorized mobile payments130
In many countries where e-payments, especially mobile payments have gradually evolved,
strictly regulate unauthorized mobile payments. Rwanda is at a good starting point of regulating
unauthorized electronic funds transfers, but there is still a wide room for improvement in relation
to refunds and revocability of any payment made without attention or authorization of the
payer131
.
In the United States, for example, under the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), consumer liability
for lost or stolen credit cards is very limited. In a case where only the consumer’s credit card
number has been used without any authorization, zero liability applies.132
The settlement requires
the company to credit a consumer’s bill or immediately investigate a consumer’s report that the
calls were made after the phone was lost or stolen.
In the European Union (as well as in Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway), in accordance with the
Payment Services Directive, consumers are entitled to an immediate refund for unauthorized
charges or billing errors.133
It should be noted, however, that the PSD introduces a balance
between consumers and merchants’ liability.
Under this Payment Services Directive, consumers are not held liable only if they notify the
trader as soon as possible or within 13 months of the fraudulent transaction. In France, under the
Monetary and Financial Code, a cardholder is not held liable for a payment which has been made
without his authorization, at a distance, and without any physical usage of the card. As a result,
129
Consumer Credit Act, 1974 130
See also McEvans v Citibank, 96 Misc.2d 142, and Ognibene v Citibank, 112 Misc.2d 219. In this case, bank
customers who were tricked into permitting others to use their bank cards were granted recovery. So, the court
concluded that plaintiff was the victim of a scam which defendant has been aware of for some time. 131
See also art. 5, para.1 of the Regulation of BNR 132
See Goldman, D. (2012). Mobile Pay War: Wal-Mart and Others vs. Google, CNNMONEY, available at:
http://www.money.cnn.com/2012/08/15/technology/mcx-mobile-wallet.doc/, visited on 11/10/2013. 133
(EC, 2007)
43
the issuer is liable to compensate the mobile phone holder for any loss caused by unauthorized
use.134
In Rwanda, banks and financial services are obliged to provide for effective means by which
customers can notify loss, theft, misuse, unauthorized use of cards, written acknowledging
receipt of notifications that enables the customers to verify that he has made a notification and
when such notification was made.135
However, delays in notifications make the customer liable
for the actual loss which occurred136
, except when that portion of the loss exceeds the daily
transaction of the card or an amount of funds standing in the customer’s account.137
II.1.6.2. Cases of non delivery, late delivery, and non-refunds
Problems related to non-delivery, late delivery, non-conforming and faulty products have been
linked to payments through government regulation and/or by payment providers, particularly in
the area of dispute resolution in many countries.138
In Korea, both credit and debit cardholders
can refuse payment if goods are not delivered. In Rwanda, the situation is controversial because
the mobile user pays for the service first, by the use of his mobile device.
In the European Union, under the Directive on Consumer Rights, where a trader has failed to
fulfill his obligations to deliver a product, a consumer is entitled to a refund by the merchant of
any sums paid within seven days from the due date of delivery.139
In Rwanda, there are many
cases of services paid via mobile devices while they are not obtained, long delays in transferring
funds to the beneficiary, transfer of funds greater or lesser than that ordered by the sender, etc.
There is a high contradiction between the consumers and payment service providers in line with
claims related to m-payment: eight out of ten interviewed customers responded that they
experienced cases of non-reception of funds while the operation was successfully done by the
134
OECD, 2007c, op. cit., p. 27.
135 See art. 9, para.1-3, Regulation no 07/2010 of 27/12/2010 of BNR, governing electronic fund transfers and
electronic money transactions, O.G.R.R no special of 30/12/2010.
136 art. 13, para.1, Regulation no 07/2010 of 27/12/2010 of BNR, Law pre-cited.
137 Regulation Regulation no 07/2010 of 27/12/2010 of BNR, art. 14, para.1, (a) and (b), and art. 15
138 (Consumer Focus, 2009).
139 EU Directive 2007/64/EC, article 9.1(c) incorporated by reference from Article 7.1 of EU Directive 2009/110/
EC (2009).
44
sender, four respondents stated that free call line had never given positive response to their
claim, six respondents stated that it took more than two weeks to pursue their claims. However, it
is surprising to see that there are no complaints addressed to the MNO, nor appealed to BNR or
courts.
The regulation in place requires the payment services providers to inform the customers that they
have right to appeal to BNR in case if they are not satisfied with the outcome of his complaint.140
However, under BNR, there is no particular procedure for handling the third party complaints by
BNR. In practice, if any case could be lodged before BNR, it analyses the case and requests the
payment service providers to resolve the complaint. Simply, this clarifies that consumers are not
aware of the procedure for claims and redress, and again, the power to settle any disputes is
conferred to the payment service providers.
In the case Porter v Citibank141
, the plaintiff had proven that “... he had tried to withdraw money
with no success. On two occasions this was done, no money was received, and yet his account
was charged”, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. In Japan, for example, Rakuten, the
country’s leading online commerce platform, introduced mandatory escrow payment services
(Rakuten Anshin Kessai Service, for which there is a charge) for all C2C transactions to address
issues of merchandise non-delivery.142
Interestingly, under this system, payment is not released
to the seller until the buyer actually receives the purchased item.
II.1.6.3. Quid of fraudulent or negligent behaviors of agents of mobile payment service
providers having caused undue payment?
Fraudulent or negligent conducts of officers or agents of financial institutions, merchants who
are linked to the cards or other communication system and mobile operators, are the
140
See article 23 of regulation n°07/2010 of 27/12/2010 of BNR on electronic fund transfers and electronic money
transactions, O.G.R.R no special of 30/2012/2010.
141 Robert Porter (Plaintiff) v Citibank, N. A., (Defendant), Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County,
February 24, 1984, 123 Misc.2d 28 (1984). 142
Mac Carthy, M. and Hillebrand, G. (2010). Viewpoint: Mobile Payments Call For Clear Consumer, in
MARINA, S. and ZERZAN, A. (2009). Groupe speciale mobile assn, Mobile money: methodology for assessing
money laundering and terrorist financing risks, available at: http://www.gsma.com/development.fund/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/amlfinal35.pdf./, accessed on 20/06/2014.
45
circumstances where customer is not liable.143
Regardless of the payment context, there is general
agreement that protection against fraud is a shared responsibility between payment providers and
merchants.144
The latter should in particular ensure that their e-commerce systems are adequate,
transparent, and safe.
Some countries have already taken measures in this regard, implementing regulations, for
example, that limit consumer liability in the case of fraud. Obviously the provider can seek redress
against the agent, but the customer should be able to file a complaint with the provider, who should be
responsible for ensuring data privacy and security.
Thus, providers’ liability for the acts of their agents is a fundamental principle for outsourcing in
financial services.145
With a specific focus on the agents’ actions related to delivery of mobile
payments, ensuring that mobile network providers are liable does not create unlimited liability
and should not create unreasonable burdens on providers.146
On a critical note, it has to be noticed that MNOs do not publicize the recourse options for
lodging complaints against their agents with the same clarity or ubiquity as the pricing structure
or customer service channels. For example, SAFARICOM claims to intervene on customers’
behalf in complaints against agents; nevertheless because their relationship with their agents is
not a legal one, they are only liable to a certain point and not when there are instances of agent
fraud or loss of funds.147
143 Art. 15 of regulation no 07/2010 of BNR on electronic fund transfers and electronic money transactions,
O.G.R.R. no special of 30/2012/2010.
144 BIS Papers no 62 Financial Sector Regulation For Growth, Equity And Stability. Proceedings of a conference
organized by the BIS and CAFRAL in Mumbai, 15–16 November 2011, Monetary and Economic Department
January 2012. 145
Dias, D. and Kate McKee, Protecting Branchless Banking Consumers, available at:
http://www.cgap.org/publications/protecting-branchless-banking-consumers.pdf, accessed on 16/052014. 146
See also Kennison v. Daire, High Court of Australia [1986] HCA 4; (1986) 160 CLR 129, February 20, 1986. 147
Lyman, T., Pickens, M. et al. (2008). Regulating Transformational Branchless Banking: Mobile Phones and
Other Technology to Increase Access to Finance, Focus Note 43, Washington DC: CGAP.
46
II.1.6.4. How does the regulation in place govern the burden of proof for consumers’
claims?
Evidence is an essential element in the case ruling, and it is the demonstration of the truth. This
means that the evidence will be necessary in order to show the truth in the case ruling.148
The
other case is that the burden of proof shall be for the plaintiff who has claimed for his/her rights
(actori incumbit probatio).149
This being said, every plaintiff must prove a claim. Failure to obtain proof, the defendant wins
the case. Likewise, a party who alleges that he/she has been discharged from an obligation that
has been established must prove that the obligation no longer exists (reus in expiendo fit actor).
Failure to do so, the other party wins the case.
In a civil case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the facts and claims asserted in the
complaint. If the respondent, or defendant, files a counterclaim, the respondent will have the
burden of proving that claim. When a party has the burden of proof the party must present,
through testimony and exhibits, enough evidence to support the claim.
In mobile payments, sometimes, the sender receives an SMS that shows that the transactions
have been completed. However, the big concern remains on how the sender of electronic money
may have access to these document while complains occurred.
The regulation of BNR requires the payment service providers to provide effective and
convenient means by which customers can notify loss, misuse, theft, or unauthorized use and
breach of security code.150
They are also required to provide procedures for acknowledging
notifications, and give facilities to the customers to verify whether the notification was
received.151
148
See also, art. 2, Law n° 15/2004 of 12/06/2012 relating to evidence and its production, O.G.R.R special no of
19/07/2004. 149
See art. 9, law no 21/2012 0f 14/06/2012 relating to the civil, commercial, labour and administrative procedure,
O.G.R.R nº 29 of 16/07/2012. 150
In a questionnaire addressed to MTN, Question 1 “How does MTN investigate alleged errors, notify consumers
of the results, and, when appropriate, rectify the errors?”, MTN responded: “ Normally it takes us one day to
investigate any issue escalated by the customer we can notify then through calls or by email or by visiting them.” 151
See art. 9, Law no 07/2010 of BNR on notification of loss, theft or unauthorized use.
47
II.1.6.5. Lack of fixed physical address of MNO Agents as a challenge to the burden of
proof for the consumers
In this section, it has to be reminded that many MNOs Agents do not have the fixed and
registered places where consumers found them for access of data information kept in operating
systems. Moreover, they are considered to be unknown relating to their status in the commerce.
Relating to the ambiguous workers (agents) of the companies in performing their duties, the
Rwandan legislator should elaborate the rules to be followed in order to protect the vulnerable
citizens against the loss as the payment service providers and consumers are on unequal power in
the production of evidences.
II.1.6.6. Effects of anonymity on burden of proof for claims arising in mobile payments
In order to understand how the burden of proof is challenged in electronic and mobile payments
whereby the user stays anonymous in his transactions, it is important to consider the case
Dorothy Judd v Citibank.152
In this case, Judd (plaintiff) was issued a “citicard”, at the time of
validation of this card; the customer had chosen a "personal identification code" which was
known only to the customer.
The issue in this case is whether the testimonies and letter produced by Judd from her employer
to the effect that she was at work on both occasions and could not have made the said
withdrawals is enough to act as evidence of non-withdrawal of the claimed funds. In this regard,
as testified by the bank branch manager, only the customer knew this number — not only was it
known only to the customer, but it was impossible for anyone to retrieve it from the computer,
including employees of the bank.
Referring to US Code, tit 12, § 2403, the court judged in favor of the plaintiff and decided the
following:
152
Dorothy Judd v Citibank, civil court of the City of New York, Queens County, 107 Misc.2d 526 (1980),
November 3, 1980.
48
“An EFT account holder should have no liability for an unauthorized use of his account
unless the depository institution can prove, without benefit of inference or presumption,
that the account holder's negligence substantially contributed to the unauthorized use and
that the depository institution exercised reasonable care to prevent the loss. Negligence in
this instance should be limited to writing the PIN on the card, keeping the PIN with the
card, or voluntarily permitting the account accessing devices, such as the PIN and the
card, to come into the possession of a person who makes or causes to be made an
unauthorized use.”
II.1.6.7. Impact of different regulatory bodies of m-payment on consumer protection in
Rwanda
Before hand, it is important to notice that the inherent problem in Rwanda in the matter of
mobile payment is that there is a lack of coherence in consumer protection and market oversight.
These transactions are driven by different legal duties and powers of individual regulators such
as RURA and the National Bank of Rwanda. Having two regulatory regimes for what is often
from the consumer’s perspective a single product or service can result in different rights and a
divergence in protection for personal and small business153.
As discussed in the details above, mobile payment users may not fully understand which regulations
apply to a payment transaction and how these may differ depending on the possibilities to resolve any
issues arising between them. The lack of understanding results from the fact that a number of
financial and non-financial institutions may be involved in a given payment transaction,
including banks and alternative payment providers, such as MNOs, and other non-bank
institutions operating on the internet.154
As seen above, their operations are often overseen by
different regulatory bodies, which operate under different sets of regulations.
153
Cartwright, P. (2007). The Vulnerable Consumer Of Financial Services: Law Policy And Regulation; and T
Wilhelmsson “The Informed Consumer v the Vulnerable Consumer in European Unfair Commercial Practices Law
– A Comment” in G Howells, a Nordhausen, D Parry and C Twigg-Flesner (eds.) Yearbook of Consumer Law 2007
(Ashgate, 2007) 211, p 213. 154
Cartwright, P. (2007). The Vulnerable Consumer of Financial Services: Law, Policy and Regulation, T
Wilhelmsson “The Informed Consumer v the Vulnerable Consumer in European Unfair Commercial Practices Law
– A Comment” in G. Howells, a Nordhausen, D. Parry and C. Twigg-Flesner (eds.) Yearbook of Consumer Law
2007 (Ashgate, 2007) 211, p. 213.
49
Consumers may therefore find it difficult to determine: what redress rights they have (relating to
correction of orders, returns, exchanges or refunds), which entity to turn to if there is a payment-
related problem, and which regulatory body to appeal to if a problem cannot be resolved with a
merchant directly.155.
II.1.6.8. Protection of consumers in cross-border m-payments
The situation discussed above on the aspect of consumers’ protection is even more complex
when transactions are cross-border. Consumers engaging in online and mobile commerce do not
benefit from the same level of protection when using different payment mechanisms within
jurisdictions156
, which can complicate obtaining redress when a problem arises. In addition,
protection regimes differ from country-to-country, which could discourage cross-border
transactions.
By considering the example of Kenya where e-money services first emerged and have the
deepest level of penetration, it is easy to realize that Kenya has a very unusual regulatory
structure.157
. While mobile phone companies are licensed and supervised by the Communications
Commission of Kenya, mobile payment services are within the mandate of the CBK.158
Both Uganda and Tanzania take a different approach to regulation. In both countries, e-money
licenses are awarded by the central bank (Bank of Uganda and Bank of Tanzania), and are only
given to commercial banks and not to mobile phone companies.
To be more specific, in each country mobile phone companies (such as MTN in Uganda and
Vodacom in Tanzania) manage the network of agents and provide customer services, but are
155
Consider analysis of Giesela Ruhl, G. (2011). Consumer Protection in Choice of Law, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
569 156
Payment News. (2010). MasterCard Releases Prepaid Market Sizing Report, 12 July 2010, available at:
http://www.paymentsnews.com/2010/07/mastercard-releases-prepaid-market-sizing-report.html, accessed on
01/05/2014. 157
Must, B., and Kathleen L. (2010). Mobile Money: Cell Phone Baking in Developing Countries, Policy Matters
Journal, Spring, p. 32.
158 The Kenya Information and Communication Act (1998) Chapter 411A 1(d), available at:
http://www.cck.go.ke/regulations/downloads/Kenya- Information-Communications-Act-Final.pdf, accessed on
20/05/2014.
50
partnered with commercial banks; which are regulated by the central bank.159
In Burundi, the
mobile money service ECONET is run in partnership with the national postal service, and is
regulated by the central bank. In Rwanda, mobile phone companies provide also the mobile
money services160
, while they are regulated by a different authority.161
Therefore, strengthening education and awareness is seen as helping in this regard. Beyond this,
it is important to establish a minimum level of consumer protection across the EAC member
States that would apply no matter regulatory framework is being used within a jurisdiction. The
minimum level of protection could be established by laws and regulations or be less formal.
Until now in Rwanda, individuals who need to transfer money across the world use means like
international money remittance companies, long distance buses or bank transfers.162
In order to
solve this issue, the National Bank of Rwanda (BNR), the regulator of the financial sector and
payments services needs to work on cross border mobile money payment to supplement existing
channels.
II.1.6.9. Lack of international customer protection benchmark in mobile payment system
UNCITRAL adopted its Model Law on International Credit Transfer (MLICT)163
in 1992 in
response to two main changes: the increasing of electronic means in payment orders, and the
shift from a prevalence of debit transfers to a prevalence of the credit transfers. The MLICT is
compatible with paper-based payment orders, but was actually designed with particular reference
to “high speed electronic credit transfers”.164
In its article 1(2), MLICT specifies that “ this law applies to other entities that as an ordinary part
of their business engage in executing payment orders in the same manner as it applies to banks”.
159 Neil, D. (2011). Regulating nonbank mobile money service providers, available at:
http://mmublog.org/blog/regulating-non-bank-mobile-money-service-providers/, accessed on 13/06/2014.
160 Operating mobile money services in Rwanda include MTN mobile money, Airtel money, and Tigo cash.
161 Telecommunication companies in Rwanda are regulated by RURA in their communication services, and they
are at the same time regulated by the National Bank of Rwanda in their payment activities. 162
John Bosco S., Director of Payment Systems at the BNR, in an interview with the Independent, Sunday 7
February 2013. 163
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V. 11 (1994). 164
See, eg., Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Fin. Bank, 677 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D.III.2009).
51
Legislation based on the MLICT would therefore cover mobile payments affected through a
mobile network operator. On this subject, it is important to notice that the MLICT does not
exclude payments to consumers from its scope of application, but, at the same time, does not
deal with consumer protection, an issue that may give rise to challenges.165
II.1.7. Impact of lack of harmonized regulatory regime on mobile payments in EAC
The EAC region has made huge gains in intra-regional trade and increased movement of workers
and families among member states since 2005 but the lack of a convenient and safe way to make
and receive payments has remained an impediment.
On this, it is added consumer protection issues where disputes resolution will need strong
guidelines as cross-border service involves the institutions which are not supervised by the
central bank of one member state and it complicates the oversight of cross-border schemes.166
Speaking of which, different security protocols and business models of stakeholders may
contribute to the delay of the implementation of cross-border mobile money platforms.
In reality, the interoperability is an urgent matter for EAC as a lot of trade is done within the
region involving money movement. The implementation of the interoperability will help to
increase security of funds but at the same time trade level within the region. To this end, for
BNR, the urgent need that the EAC should address in terms of payment systems is to ensure
interoperability among financial institutions in the region which also includes payment systems
like mobile money. Meanwhile, the East African Payment System (EAPS) has been implemented
to facilitate the development of cross-border payments within EAC region but this also is only
still possible at central bank level.167
165
Man, R. (2005). Making sense of payments policy in the information age, 93 GEO.L.J. 633, p. 52. 166
CIA World Fact Book. (2013). Money Transfer Behavior Before and After M‐payments, available at:
http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/, visited on 10/07/2014. 167
RWAHIGI, M. the independent, Sunday 17 February 2013, available at: http://www.independent.co.ug/rwanda-
ed/rwanda/7471-airtel-mtn-want-cross-border-cash-transfer#sthash.rbFBAwkf.dpuf, visited on 11/06/2014.
52
EAC should learn from other regional integrations. Examples of cross-border cooperation
include168
: Directo a Mexico, which is an international funds transfer service between the United
States and Mexico, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), which
consolidates the market and tries to establish a common currency across several countries, the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), which is a model for financial market
integration; and SEPA.169
This sort of heterogeneity in regulatory environment is needed to be
eliminated in the run-up toward the East African Monetary Union.
Major changes were witnessed by the implementation of the Rwanda Integrated Payment
Processing System (RIPPS). RIPPS has been put in place to reduce time lag in payments and
notably to mitigate systemic risk in the financial system of Rwanda. RIPPS goes even beyond
borders to facilitate trade in the East African and the COMESA regions. It has been upgraded to
enable linkage to Regional cross border Payment Systems, the East Africa Payment Systems
(EAPS) and the COMESA Regional Payments and Settlement System (REPSS).170
II.1.7.1. Regulation of charges in cross-border mobile payment
Developments such as the free movement of labor in the bloc increase the need for simplified
financial communication between the countries and mobile money platforms. However, in EAC,
if one wants to send money to another person in any of the EAC member states, one has to
contact a mobile money agent, and hand over the money plus a commission of at least 15% of
the sum on small transactions.171
It is a long and expensive process of money transfer.
Telecommunication companies in Rwanda are ready to roll of more convenient and cheaper
cross-border mobile money platforms but the absence of a regulatory framework is delaying their
roll out.172
Up today, Airtel operates in all the East African member states except Burundi.
168
Boer, R. and de Boer, T. (2010) Mobile payments: market analysis and overview, Innopay, November 2009; and
A Lim, “Inter-consortia battles in mobile payments standardization”, Journal of Electronic Commerce Research and
Applications, vol. 7, issue 2, 2008. 169
The SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) Regulation (EC 260/2012) was adopted in 2012. 170
See Matthew RWAHIGI, website pre- cited. 171
Matthew RWAHIGI, website pre- cited. 172
Clain M., the project manager of Airtel Rwanda, in an interview with the Independent, 17 February 2013.
53
It has to be noticed that Regulations for cross-border mobile money operations would require
legislations on good practices, transaction protection, and financial malpractices like money
laundering. To sum up this section, it is worth noticing that in addition to regulatory policy
focusing on the structure of the market and its infrastructure, the mobile payment instruments
require adequate protection of users.
In particular, in addition to transparency requirements, know-your-customer (KYC) guidelines,
and observance of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regulation, the protection of users’ funds and
their traceability are a must, as well as protection from any risk arising from the use of electronic
means and the intermediation of non-financial agents. Indeed, once service providers are duly
regulated under a risk-based approach and a playing field is ensured in the market to guarantee
competition and competitiveness, all other needs for protection can be addressed under a general
understanding of consumer protection and an adequate consideration of the role of agents.
II.1.7.2. Impact of EAC monetary union on mobile payment system as a newly introduced
payment system in Rwanda
A further and more difficult problem arises in considering how to regulate e-money services that
cross national borders. The EAC Common Market protocol of 2009173
calls for the free
movement of service providers among EAC countries. It is however important to wander
whether this provision applies to telecommunications services, although it would certainly seem
that as the EAC moves toward economic integration, it will be desirable for such services to be
mobile across borders. In this regard, we can conclude that if mobile phone services do cross
borders, it is not hard to imagine that mobile money services will do so as well.
Of course, the existence of separate currencies in the period before full monetary integration
would make the construction of such a system complex, and would introduce new regulatory
issues, and would certainly tax the ability of national regulators to cooperate. This would be all
the more difficult if regulatory structures continued to be a differentiated across countries as they
173
See art. 16 of the Protocol on the establishment of the EAC Common Market
54
currently are. This is another reason why it would be useful to harmonize the form of regulation
of e-money in EAC.
II.2. Effectiveness of mechanisms for disputes resolution in mobile payments available
under Rwandan laws
Effective dispute resolution, minimally at the level of establishing sufficient trust in the system
to encourage its use, is an integral part of any successful payment system (at least any system for
which alternatives is available). An independent and trusted judiciary and/or arbitration-type
process may be called for, especially when considering integration into global markets.
UNCITRAL Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts174
and UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce175
are the most important international
instruments covering those issues.
II.2.1. Alternatives for disputes resolution between merchants and consumers in mobile
payment system
Whenever there are disputes between merchant and customer with respect to the receipt, nature
or quality of the good or service purchased, where payment intermediary is only indirectly
involved, there is a serious interrogation about resolution of these disputes since the customer
does not directly interact with the merchant. In this context, some payment providers have
implemented measures to resolve online disputes related to the receipt, nature or quality of
goods.176
Some countries require such measures through their legal regimes, while in other
countries including Rwanda, these initiatives are quietly absent.
174
UNCITRAL Convention, available from http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/electronic-
commerce/2005Convention.html, visited on 19/05/2014. 175
UNCITRAL Model Law, available from http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/electronic-
commerce/1996Model.html, visited on 19/05/2014. 176
García Álvaro, J. A. (2003). Online Dispute Resolution Uncharted Territory, 7, the Vindobona Journal of
International Commercial Law and Arbitration, p. 180.
55
II.2.3. Regulation of insolvency of mobile payment service providers under Rwandan
electronic payments regulations
Honestly, mobile payment system is still at the infancy phase. Thus, MNOs generally lack
experience in financial services and payments risk and the regulatory and legal governance of
payment systems. As observed by Bourreau and Verdier177
, MNOs offer mobile money to
consumers through the use of agent networks in absence of a bank partnership; they also provide
the clearing and settlement for the prepaid airtime on the mobile handset.178
Mobile money deposits are already operationally ring-fenced from the MNOs’ accounts in
Rwanda – the regulation requires that they are held in aggregate trust accounts in commercial
banks. However, a legal framework to protect these deposits from the MNO (particularly in the
case of bankruptcy) is not yet in place in Rwanda and would be desirable.
In Rwanda again, the granting of a license to an applicant not being an Institution Supervised by
the Central Bank shall be conditional upon delivering of evidence of an insurance policy
covering 100,000,000 Frw for an applicant wishing to provide remittance services and
200,000,000 Frw for an applicant wishing to provide any other payment service; as security for
the funds channeled through the system.179
In the case where deposits exceed the total deposit
insurance, then there may be an issue as to who would repay depositors in the case of a bank
failure.
II.2.4. Lack of prudential rules imposed on banks and other financial institutions by the
regulation of BNR
In mobile payments, MNOs collect funds in exchange for electronically stored value, without
being subject to the full range of prudential rules imposed on banks. Also, there may be models
177
Bourreau and Verdier. (2010). Cooperation for Innovation in Payment Systems:
The Case of Mobile Payments, Telecom ParisTech, Paris, France, pp. 17-18. 178
Id., p. 21. 179
See art.9, para. 5, Regulation no 06/2012 0f BNR. See also, art. 4, (i),c), and art. 6, para. of regulation n°05/2010
of 27/12/2010 of the National Bank of Rwanda relating to the licensing criteria of operating payment and securities
settlement systems.
56
where even if client funds sit in a bank account, they receive a different regulatory treatment than
those applicable to bank deposits.180
Taking the example of Kenya, Funds collected by SAFARICOM for M-PESA, which customers
increasingly use as a short-term savings mechanism, are deposited in pooled trust accounts at
several commercial banks, for the benefit of the customers. In the event of insolvency however,
there is no mechanism in place for customers to claim trust assets.181
This therefore leaves the consumer with no recourse if the said company becomes insolvent.
Therefore, we consider that this brings forth regulatory challenges in that client assets are left
unsecured due to the lack of an effective regulatory framework. Protecting consumer funds are
measures aimed at ensuring funds are available to meet customer demands for cashing out
electronic value.
II.2.5. Regulation of settlement of disputes in mobile payments with cross-border effects in
Rwanda
For payments having cross-border effects, the situation becomes more challenging, even making
it difficult for consumers to know whom to turn to when problems arise. This can result in delays
in consumers having problems resolved in a satisfactory manner, and, in some cases, failures to
obtain redress as consumers may find it difficult to contact sellers directly, and opportunities for
face-to-face discussions may not be possible.
When problems regarding the purchase of goods or services, or the payment itself arise,
consumers need to know who to contact in order to resolve issues in a cost effective manner. One
of the challenges is to design processes which are viable when low-value products are involved.
Another is to have mechanisms in place to deal effectively with transactions involving cross-
border trade.
180
Morawczynski, O. (2009). Exploring the usage and impact of transformational m‐banking, mimeo, pp. 21-22. 181
Consumer Protection Diagnostic Study: Kenya, Financial Sector Deepening. January 2011, p.7.
57
In Europe, this system has gradually evolved. In 2001, the European Commission launched FIN-
NET182
, a financial dispute resolution network of national out-of-court complaint schemes in the
European Economic Area countries (the European Union Member States plus Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway) that are responsible for handling disputes between consumers and
financial services providers (including banks, insurance companies, and investment firms).
This system is a good lesson that EAC member states should take since they are striving to
develop their payment systems. The schemes developed in European Economic Area co-operate
to provide consumers with easy access to out-of-court complaint procedures in cross-border
cases. In the event a consumer in one country has a dispute with a financial services provider in
another country, FIN-NET members will put the consumer in touch with the relevant out-of
court complaint scheme and provide the necessary information about it.183
However, it is possible to realize that many consumers are not well informed about available
dispute resolution schemes, and the potential role of payment providers, particularly in the
mobile payments area184
. In Rwanda, as it has been mentioned above, the situation becomes worse
because consumers are completely unaware of disputes mechanisms that are provided for them (if there
are any).
II.2.6. Jurisdictional issues in mobile payments disputes resolution with cross-border
effects
Beforehand, it is important to remind that many contracts and other forms of legally binding
agreements include a jurisdiction or arbitration clause specifying the parties' choice of venue for
any litigation (called a forum selection clause). Then, choice of law clause may specify which
laws the court or tribunal should apply to each aspect of the dispute. This matches the
substantive policy of freedom of contract.
182
OECD. (2013). Revised Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD, Paris, 2013, available at:
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf, accessed on 05/07/2014. 183
OECD. (2013). website pre-cited. 184
OECD. (2009a). Consumer Education, Policy Recommendations of the Committee on Consumer Policy,
OECD, Paris, October, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/61/44110333.pdf, accessed on 04/07/2014.
58
In this regard, it can be deduced that when a case comes before a court and all the main features
of the case are local, the court will apply the lex fori, the prevailing municipal law, to decide the
case. But if there are "foreign" elements to the case, the forum court may be obliged under the
conflict of laws system to consider whether the forum court has jurisdiction to hear the case185
or
apply lex loci contractus is one of the possible choice of law rules applied to cases testing the
validity of a contract.
In many mobile payment cases however, the locus contractus is difficult to determine, for
example if the contract was concluded at sea or on a moving train, or if the details of the contract
signing were not well documented.186
In this case, it is recommended to have a strong system of
online cross-border disputes resolution. Normally the country in which the defendant lives is the
country with jurisdiction to process the case. In any regional integration, people who normally
live in a particular Member State must, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that
Member State.187
In Europe, if a dispute is against a person or business in a different Member State, the claimant
has to find out which Member State’s courts have jurisdiction to deal with the case. Jurisdiction
in cross border cases is governed by EU Council Regulation (EC) no 44/2001188
on jurisdiction,
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (otherwise
known as the Brussels Regulation).
As observed in this research, the regulatory framework of mobile payments in Rwanda is still at
an infancy stage, thus putting consumers and users of mobile payments on their own risks when
it comes to determining the source of a problem and following up with the company concerned,
many consumers are unaware of the regulations in place. In addition, Mobile Network Operators
work separately; which, apart from complicating access to this modern payment model by
185
Starr Printing Co. v. Air Jamaica, 45 F.Supp.2d. 625 (1999 U.S. Dist.). See also Oceanic Sun Line Special
Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988)165 CLR 197; 79 ALR 9. In this case, the court tested the DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS- the forum is inconvenient; the ends of justice would be best served by trial in another forum; the
controversy may be more suitably tried elsewhere. 186
See Lorenzen.(1919). Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills and Notes, pp. 111-119. 187
Dicey and Morris. (2000). The Conflict of Laws (13th edition) (edited by Albert V. Dicey, C.G.J. Morse,
McClean, Adrian Briggs, Jonathan Hill, & Lawrence Collins). London: Sweet& Maxwell 2000, pp. 87-91. 188
Consider European Council Regulation (EC) no 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, Official Journal L 012 , 16/01/2001 P.
59
requiring the possession of many SIM cards, it is also quite possible that none of the companies
would be willing to take responsibility for addressing a complaint or rectifying the situation
when an issue arises.
CHAPTER III: MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF
MOBILE PAYMENT SYSTEM IN RWANDA
The details above discussed the lacunae and imperfections of regulation of electronic payments
including mobile payment system in Rwanda in comparison with developed mobile payments in
other countries. This last elaborated the measures to be adopted as solutions to be above
mentioned problems in order to improve the potentials of the Rwandan regulatory system in
dematerializing electronic and mobile payments. Mainly, these consist of preventive and
regulatory measures.
III.1. Preventive measures
The telecommunication industry in most countries is regulated on the basis of a public utility,
whereas the banking sector is regulated on the basis of safety and soundness and capital
adequacy. The telecom industry in most countries lacks experience in financial services and there
are possible business risks associated with this expanded role. Furthermore, the regulatory
infrastructures for mobile carriers in many countries are in nascent stages of development with
respect to mobile financial services.189
This section will focus on important measures to be
adopted in order to prevent these risks.
III.1.1. Measures for prevention of possible risks of interoperability between m-payment
service providers in EAC region
Theory and practice suggest that interoperability for mobile money should be approached
carefully. Requiring interoperability while the Rwandan mobile money market is in its infancy,
189 GSM Association (GSMA). (2007). Regulatory Framework for Mobile Money Transfers, available at:
http://www.mobilemoneyexchange.org/Files/8e31752b, accessed on 12/06/2014.
60
with the lowest penetration and highest fees in the EAC, involves significant risks.190
If well-
orchestrated this could benefit the market; but adequate lead-time, support from industry players,
and the right structure will be crucial to success. We can simply deduce that, if these conditions
are not met, Rwanda will run a chance of repeating the mistakes of other countries, with higher
fees and slow growth.
To the extent that agents are shared among MNOs, there may be complications relating to
liability in the case of fraud or misconduct, since the monitoring of the agent is no longer the
responsibility of just one party. There may be a need for guidelines and perhaps arbitration for
dispute resolution. While this does not seem to be a big issue at present (perhaps due to the very
low level of agent sharing), it may yet emerge as one in future.191
By harmonizing the regulatory framework under EAC, there will be a need to ensure that redress
is possible where Regulation has been incorrectly applied, Member States should establish
adequate and effective complaint and redress procedures for settling any dispute between the
payment service users and the payment service providers.
It is also essential to ensure that the competent authorities and out-of-court complaint and redress
bodies, within the Community, actively cooperate for the smooth and timely resolution of cross-
border disputes.192
It should be possible for such cooperation to take the form of an exchange of
information regarding the law or legal practice in their jurisdictions, or a transfer or takeover of
complaint and redress procedures if appropriate.
III.1.2. Educational measures of the risks associated with mobile payments to the
customers
Mobile payment service providers and other regulated entities should take measures of
improving customer due diligence, particularly for higher risk dealings with particular customers
190 Heyer, A. and Mas, I. (2011), Fertile Grounds for Mobile Money: Towards a Framework for Analyzing
Enabling Environments, January 2011, 17.
191 Heyer, A. and Mas, I., op. cit., p. 21. 192
See also, art. 11 of the Regulation (EC), no 924/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
September 2009 on cross-border payments in the Community.
61
and cross-border correspondent banking and other relationships.193
In this regard, MNOs should
take measures for the risks of money laundering or terrorist financing by taking into account the
nature and level of understanding of their customers and agents.
These educational mechanisms will help the customers, not only to be aware of their rights and
liabilities, but also to make informed choices. It is important here to remind that it is also often
difficult for consumers to know what protections they have when purchasing products from
another country. Some governments have alerted consumers about the potential differences in
the protections that may be attached to, respectively, domestic and cross-border online
purchases.194
It is worth noticing that consumers’ capacity to protect themselves from payment fraud and
related security threats should not be overestimated. More may need to be done to ensure that
education is being provided to consumers and that such education is understood and acted on.
There are, however, some weaknesses related to the effectiveness of awareness and education
initiatives. Consumers, and, in particular, children and other vulnerable or disadvantaged
consumers, oftentimes do not know how to stay safe online, despite numerous consumer
education and awareness campaigns.195
III.1.3. Availability of measures of risk assessment by mobile payment service providers
Mobile payments are an area of new technologies where financial institutions (and perhaps other
entities developing such new mobile payments) must take appropriate measures to analyze,
manage, and mitigate risks regarding money laundering and terrorist financing risks.196
193
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 62, at 14-15. For a discussion of international standards in justified
low risk scenarios, see FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST
FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2011), available at:
http://www.fatf.gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/AML%20CFT%20measures%20and%20financial%20inclusion.
pdf/, accessed on 04/05/2014. 194
See OECD, 1999, Section IV, C. 195
EC, 2008, p. 27. 196
See solin, M. & zerzan, A. (2009). GROUPE SPECIALE MOBILE ASS’N , Mobile money: methodology for
assessing money laundering and terrorist financing risks, available at: http://www.gsma.com/development.fund/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/amlfinal35.pdf./, accessed on 20/06/2014.
62
Thus, the financial institutions as well as the MNOs are required to “identify and assess the
money laundering or terrorist financing risks that may arise in relation to the development of
new products and new business practices, including the new delivery mechanisms, and the use of
new or developing technologies for both new and pre-existing products.”197
In that regard, mobile payment service providers should conduct an anti-money
laundering/counter terrorist financing risk assessment prior to the launch of new products,
business practices, or the use of new or developing technologies. The major focus of the
Rwandan legislator should therefore be how mobile payment service providers are monitored in
line with available assessment of risks associated with foreign correspondent banking, pre-paid
cards and mobile banking, cash-intensive businesses, remote deposit capture, private banking,
and other higher risk products, services, customers or geographies.198
The regulation of BNR requires applicants for a license to produce Proof of ability to comply
with all applicable Anti- Money Laundering and Combating of Financing of Terrorism
(AML/CFT) laws, standards and measures, it also requires the applicant to produce an evidence
that RURA (Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency) certified the technology infrastructure for
Payment Service Provider operating their network.199
III.1.4. Measures for prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing under the
Rwandan mobile payments regulatory framework
There are many concerns about risks of money laundering and terrorist financing that may be
associated with new payments methods including online and mobile payments.200
Money
launderers and terrorist financiers can attempt to gain access to a mobile banking account by
stealing a mobile phone with inadequate security features, or by attempting to hack transactions
as they occur via a wireless network, or by tricking customers to disclose their financial account
197
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 62, at 17. 198
PIERRE-LAURENT CHATAIN et al., (2011), Protecting mobile money against financial crimes: global policy
challenges and solutions, p. 16 and 17. 199
See art. 4 (9-13), Regulation no 06/2012 of BNR.
200 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], international standards on combating money laundering and the
financing of terrorism & proliferation – the FATF recommendations (2012), available at
http://www.fatf.gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%.20Recommendations%20(approved
%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May/, accessed on 02/05/2014.
63
information via “mishing”201
attacks or fake bank apps. As telecom firms engage in financial
services across shared networks in cross-border jurisdictions, the benefits of mobile payments,
ubiquity, and rapid settlement may also increase the risk of money laundering in mobile transfer
services.
With potential gaps in regulatory oversight in Rwanda and across EAC, mobile payment actors
may find it possible to evade detection and use multiple mobile phones and accounts to finance
terrorism. Since mobile technology-enabled payments do not require the face-to-face interaction
that takes place with traditional banking, a more opaque and anonymous experience is created
that may permit the opportunity for criminal activity.202
This is increasingly important as mobile
retail payments can occur rapidly and in cross-border environments.
Anecdotally, we can find that there is limited expertise in identifying electronic payments crime
in the communication systems among the EAC member states, therefore, the potential for abuse
should be considered. It is therefore required to have a service-based risk analysis by regulators
to determine new approaches to the oversight of money laundering risk.203
Money-laundering
and terrorism-financing mitigation programs require service providers to institute a meaningful
KYC process that is trusted by all parties to the mobile payment transaction.204
Rwanda is at a good stage in preventing and penalizing money laundering and terrorism
financing crimes. In this regard, the new Penal Code provides for measures of penalizing the
201
A “mishing” attack consists of a text message sent to a mobile phone stating something like “Notice: Issues
Found on Your Account. Please Call this number urgently”. See for eg. Fraud Alert/ID Theft, LINN CNTY, STATE
BANK, available at: http://www.linncsb.com/fraud.asp/, accessed on 03/05/2014. Also, Humberto Saabedra, Fake
Mobile Banking App Discovered in Android Marketplace, MOBILE-FINANCIAL.COM (Jan. 11, 2010), available
at: http://www.mobile-financial.com/news/fake-mobile-banking-app-discovered-android-marketplace/, accessed on
03/05/2014. 202
See also, Cheng, R. (2012). PayPal brings digital wallet to merchants through discover, CNET (Aug. 22, 2012),
available at: http://www./news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57497979-94/paypal-brings-digital-wallet-to-merchants-
through-discover/, accessed on 19/06/2016. 203
Chatain, P. L., et al. (2008). Integrity in Mobile Phone Financial Services: Measures for Mitigating Risks from
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, World Bank Working Paper No. 146, p. 21. 204
For the Inter-state partnership for prevention of crime of money laundering and financing terrorism among EAC
member states, Rwanda has applied for membership in ESAAMLG and procedures for that application are
underway (FIU-Rwanda National Police).
64
crimes of money laundering and terrorism financing205
, and an Anti-money laundering law206
was enacted in 2009.
As mobile commerce advances, it will be necessary for mobile payment service providers to
establish integrated systems of internal controls that respond quickly to suspicious activities. The
risk of anonymity in mobile payments may require the mobile payment service providers to
establish new authentication technologies such as voice recognition and fingerprinting to verify
identification and to employ appropriate know-your-customer programs, particularly at
vulnerable points of a transaction when cash withdrawals may be conducted.207
III.1.4.1. Developing Customers Due Diligence measures for prevention of money
laundering and terrorism financing
In this perspective of customers due diligence, it must be understood that three core notions of
“identification”, “verification” and “monitoring”208
have to be taken into consideration and are
intended to reinforce each other so that the financial institution builds knowledge of the
customer that is crucial from an AML/CFT perspective.
Under the FATF Standards, financial institutions must perform due diligence in order to identify
their clients and ascertain relevant information pertinent to doing financial business with them.
Therefore, customer due diligence policy objectives are to ensure that financial institutions can
effectively identify, verify and monitor their customers and the financial transactions in which
they engage, in accordance to the risks of money laundering and terrorism financing that they
pose.
205
See art. 523, and art. 652-659 of the Rwandan Penal Code, Organic Law n° 01/2012/OL of 02/05/2012
instituting the penal code, Official Gazette nº Special of 14 June 2012. 206
Law no 47/2008 of 09/09/2008 is on prevention and penalizing the crime of money laundering and financing
terrorism and the Presidential Order n°27/01 of 30/05/2011, determines the organization, functioning and mission of
the financial investigation unit, which is under Rwanda National Police. 207
Edgar, Dunn & Company (EDC). (2009). Realizing the Full Potential of Mobile Commerce: Orchestrating
Mobile Payments and Money Transfers, available at:
http://www.paytriot.net/files/ampDRIVE/1/mCommerce9050301.pdf/, visited on 20/06/2014. 208
De Koker, L. (2006). Money laundering control and suppression of financing of terrorism: some thoughts on the
impact of customer due diligence measures on financial exclusion. Journal of Financial Crime. Vol. 13(1). Emerald,
pp. 26-50.
65
Some of the measures that businesses and financial institutions have to take into consideration
include the following:209
a) Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, independent
source documents, data or information;
b) Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify the identity of the
beneficial owner such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial
owner is. For legal persons and arrangements this should include financial institutions taking
reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the customer;
c) Obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship;
d) Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions
undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being
conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk
profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.
Let it be stressed that banks should make reasonable efforts to determine the true identity of all
customers requesting the institution’s services. Therefore, it should be a bank’s explicit policy
that significant business transactions are not conducted with customers who fail to provide
evidence of their identity.210
In order to happen, banks should ensure that business is conducted in conformity with high
ethical standards and that banks should adhere to laws and regulations pertaining to financial
transactions.211
Here, banks should not offer services or provide active assistance in transactions
where the bank has good reason to believe they are associated with money laundering.
More importantly, banks should cooperate fully with national law enforcement authorities to the
extent permitted by local laws or regulations relating to customer confidentiality. No support or
209
Isern, J., and De Koker, L. (2009). AML/CFT: Strengthening Financial Inclusion and Integrity, Focus Note 56.
CGAP, Washington, DC, available at: http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.37862/FN56.pdf/, visited on
20/07/2014. 210 Guy Stessens. (2000). Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model. Cambridge, England,
and New York, New York, United States: Cambridge University Press, p. 92. 211 De Koker, L. (2006), Money laundering control and suppression of financing of terrorism: some thoughts on the
impact of customer due diligence measures on financial exclusion. Journal of Financial Crime, vol. 13(1). Emerald.
pp. 26-50.
66
assistance should be provided to customers seeking to deceive law enforcement authorities
through altered, incomplete or misleading information. Where a bank has a reasonable
presumption that funds on deposit are from criminal activity or that transactions entered into are
for a criminal purpose, the bank should take appropriate measures, including denial of assistance,
severing of the customer relationship, and closing or freezing the account.212
The main issue remains for mobile money transfers done between consumers themselves without
capacity to verify identity of the receiver. This situation becomes more complex when it is cross-
border mobile payments because countries have different policies of registration and supervision
of mobile phone holders.
III.1.4.2. Improvement of requirements for eligibility of agents as measure of money
laundering and terrorism financing
In the matter of electronic money transaction, an agent is any person who provides money or
value transfer service under the direction of or by contract with a legally registered or licensed
remitter (for example, licensees, franchisees, concessionaires).213
Many countries permit a wide
range of individuals and legal entities to be agents for financial institutions. Other countries limit
a list of eligible agents on the basis of a legal form.
For example, India permits a wide variety of eligible agents, such as certain non-profits, post
offices, retired teachers, and most recently, for-profit companies, including mobile network
operators. Kenya requires agents to be for-profit actors and disallows non-profit entities. Brazil
permits any legal entity to act as an agent, but prevents individuals from doing so.214
It seems essential for countries that have different regulatory concerns to balance agent eligibility
requirements (that are essential from an AML/CFT perspective) with the financial inclusion
objective. This question may also require some discussion and consultation with the financial
212 Isern, J., and De Koker, L. (2009), AML/CFT: Strengthening Financial Inclusion and Integrity,
Focus Note 56. CGAP, Washington, DC, available at: http:// www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.37862/FN56.pdf/,
accessed on 26/07/2014. 213
John McDowell and Gary Novis .(2001). Economic Perspectives, U.S. State Department, May 2001, p. 8. 214 Cummings, L. and Stepnowsky, P.T. (2011). My Brother’s Keeper: An Empirical Study of Attorney Facilitation
of Money Laundering through Commercial Transactions, University of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No.
2010-32, University of Maryland, College Park, p. 68.
67
sector (in some countries the list of eligible agents may be very extensive but underused by the
financial actors that may be reluctant to engage agents). It must also be emphasized that retailers
are not necessarily agents of the banking institution.215
The principle of ultimate liability of the financial institution for agents‟ compliance with the
AML/CFT requirements seems almost universal although the extent of liability may differ from
one country to another.
III.1.4.3. Making the principal financial institutions liable for acts of their agents in the
matter of money laundering and terrorism financing
The fact that agents act as an extension of the principal financial institution means that the
processes and documentation, notably for AML/CFT purposes, are those of the principal
financial institution. The main role and duties and how agents have to perform those duties will
be determined by the principal financial institution.216
In that context, it is essential that these
duties are clearly specified in the agency agreement in terms of which the retailer is appointed as
an agent of the principal financial institution.
It seems that in practice, the contracts between the principal financial institution and their agents
vary considerably across countries and markets but common clauses seem generally to include
the duty to perform specified AML/CFT checks, record-keeping and reporting obligations.217
In
determining the AML/CFT role and duties of the agents, it is crucial to take into account the
potential practical limitations faced by retailers (often small shops). Retailers generally have a
partial knowledge of the transactions conducted by the customer (i.e., the transaction conducted
in their respective shops). AML/CFT duties of the agents and the principal financial institution
should be seen as complementary and inclusive.
As indicated above, the FATF requires financial institutions to have appropriate systems and
controls to monitor the transactions of each client, and report to the financial intelligence unit
215
Id. p. 70. 216 Bucy, P. H. (1998). White Collar Crime: Case and Materials, 2
nd Edition, St. Paul Minn: West Publishing Co.,
pp. 13-14. 217 Muller, W. H., Kalin, C. H., & Goldsworth, J. G. (2007). Anti Money Laundering: International Law and
Practice. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data: England, p. 29.
68
any transaction or activity that could be suspected to be related to money laundering or terrorism
financing crimes. This monitoring requirement may require some adjustments in principal-agent
scenarios although the models developed in countries under review seem very similar.
In Mexico for instance, according to AML/CFT legal framework, financial entities are required
to establish systems and mechanisms that allow them to receive online all transactions made
through an agent, in the same way as those carried out in banking offices. The operations carried
out by the agent must be monitored by the financial entities and reported to the FIU in case of
suspicion.218
In addition, financial entities must have automated systems that allow them to develop, among
other things, the functions of detecting and monitoring transactions carried out by client and
must have the purpose of detecting possible unjustified deviations in their transactional profile in
order for the Communication and Control Committee (conformed by high ranking employees of
the financial entities)219
to analyze them and if considered, report them to the FIU.
III.1.4.4. Improvement of technology for prevention of money laundering and terrorism
financing
Mobile payments are an area of new technologies where financial institutions (and perhaps other
entities developing such new mobile payments) must take appropriate measures to analyze,
manage, and mitigate risks regarding money laundering and terrorist financing risks.220
The mobile payment service providers are required to undertake a risk assessment prior to the
launch of new products or business practices, or the use of new or developing technologies.
Thus, the financial institutions as well as the MNOs are required to “identify and assess the
money laundering or terrorist financing risks that may arise in relation to the development of
218 Nader, J. C. (1995). Prentice Hall’s Illustrated Dictionary of Computing, 2
nd edition, National Library of
Australia: Australia, p. 107. 219
Ibid. 220
See solin, M. & zerzan, A. (2009). GROUPE SPECIALE MOBILE ASS’N, , Mobile money: methodology for
assessing money laundering and terrorist financing risks, available at: http://www.gsma.com/development.fund/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/amlfinal35.pdf./, accessed on 20/06/2014.
69
new products and new business practices, including the new delivery mechanisms, and the use of
new or developing technologies for both new and pre-existing products.”221
In that regard, mobile payment service providers should conduct an anti-money
laundering/counter terrorist financing risk assessment prior to the launch of new products,
business practices, or the use of new or developing technologies. The major focus of the
Rwandan legislator should therefore be how mobile payment service providers are monitored in
line with available assessment of risk associated with foreign correspondent banking, pre-paid
cards and mobile banking, cash-intensive businesses, remote deposit capture, private banking,
and other higher risk products, services, customers or geographies.222
The regulation of BNR requires applicants for a license to produce Proof of ability to comply
with all applicable Anti- Money Laundering and Combating of Financing of Terrorism
(AML/CFT) laws, standards and measures, it also requires the applicant to produce an evidence
that RURA (Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency) certified the technology infrastructure for
Payment Service Provider operating their network.223
III.1.4.5. Measures of inter-institutions cooperation in the mobile payment services
Considering the example of India, one of the most promising signs of India’s leadership in
mobile payments comes from the high level of cooperation within the industry itself. On both the
banking and the telecoms sides, one can see players come together and put aside their
competitive differences in order to develop common standards and approaches to mobile
payments.
For a comparative purpose, let us consider the example of India in the matter of inter-institutions
cooperation in mobile payment. In India, all stakeholders – banks, telecoms operators,
technology providers, regulators and government organizations – have created the Mobile
Payments Forum of India (MPFI), and are collaborating to address the market needs.
221
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 62, at 17. 222
PIERRE-LAURENT CHATAIN et al., (2011), Protecting mobile money against financial crimes: global policy
challenges and solutions, p. 16 and 17. 223
See art. 4 (9-13), Regulation no 06/2012 of BNR.
70
And while this may seem like a portent for a deep division between the telecom carriers and the
banks, the reality is that both are working closely with the Reserve Bank of India (the banking
regulator) and the Telecoms regulator to ensure that the industry is moving towards a level of
standardization and interoperability that should allow the development of an open
and interconnected mobile payment ecosystem across the country.224
III.1.4.5.1. Cooperation with FIU-Rwanda National Police for prevention of money
laundering and financing of terrorism
In order to prevent Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism, Rwanda National Police is
enacting regulations aiming at preventing, detecting, fighting and eradicating the crime.225
More
importantly, the following mechanisms have been put in place:226
Formation of FIU, nomination
of money laundering reporting Officers in each commercial bank, formation of fraud forum. In
addition, the following documents were drafted aiming for money laundering and financing
terrorism prevention waiting for approval:
a. Directive on cross border cash declaration,
b. Directive on suspicious transaction for reporting entities,
c. Directive on identification of customers
d. Directive on Record keeping for reporting entities.
e. Directive on Casinos and other Gaming halls
f. Suspicious transaction report form, this was approved and issued to all banks.
i. Various trainings were conducted for capacity building of FIU staff for effective
performance.
224 Carr M. (2009). Framework for Mobile Payment Systems in India, in “Mobile and Ubiquitous Commerce”,
Advanced E-Business Methods. Edited By: Milena M. Head Eldon Y. Li, Information Science Reference, p. 41. 225
Art. 1, Law n° 47/2008 of 09/09/2008 on Prevention and Penalizing the Crime of Money Laundering and
Financing Terrorism. 226
Respondent: department of Financial Investigation Unity in Rwanda National Police.
71
III.1.4.5.2. Establishing a strong cooperation between public and private sectors for
effective anti-money laundering measures
Building up an appropriate and balanced AML/CFT regime based on domestic circumstances
requires extensive coordination among competent authorities and between public authorities and
the private sector. Effective information exchange between the public and private sectors will
form an integral part of a country's strategy for combating money laundering and terrorist
financing while promoting financial inclusion.
To be productive, information exchange between the public and private sector should be
accompanied by appropriate exchanges among public authorities.227
FIUs, supervisors and law
enforcement agencies should be able to share information and feedback on results and identified
vulnerabilities, so that consistent and meaningful inputs can be provided to the private sector.228
III.1.5. Possible solutions to the consumers in cases of mobile payments errors
As mobile financial transactions are concluded through mobile network installed by mobile
network operator, in case of transaction errors arising in the course of electronically transmitting
or processing the conclusion of a transaction, there may be cases where not financial institution
but mobile network operator shall be liable for the loss.229
However, in reality, it’s almost impossible for customers to clarify whether error was caused by
financial institution or mobile network operator. It would be desirable to make financial
institution compensate customer for damage caused by transaction errors arising in the course of
electronically transmitting or processing the conclusion of a transaction, and then allow financial
227 Chatain, P-L., Hernández-Coss, R., Borowik, K. and Zerzan, A. (2008) Integrity in Mobile Phone Financial
Services: Measures for Mitigating Risks from Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Working Paper 146. The
World Bank, Washington, DC, pp. 28-30. 228 Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas. (2011). Updated Anti-Money Laundering Rules and Regulations, available at:
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/regulations/attachments/2011/c706.pdf/, accessed June 2014. 229
Timothy R. McTaggart & David W. Freese, (2010), Mobile Banking: What Banks Need to Know When
Outsourcing Their Platforms, 3 BLOOMBERG L. REP. – BANKING & FIN., no. 11, p. 18.
72
institution to exercise right of indemnify over the mobile network operator by proving the
intention or negligence of the mobile network operator.230
Given that mobile payment systems are at the infancy stage in Rwanda, they have not reached
the level of direct mobile billing services. In order to prevent possible risks related to direct
mobile billing services, it is important to think of possible preventive measures and regulate the
liabilities of operators in this system.231
Therefore, considering deep involvement of issuer of mobile electronic money and mobile
network operator or payment gateway of direct mobile billing service that are not financial
institution, it would be desirable to categorize them as mobile financial business operator and
impose them the same liability of financial institution in case of unauthorized transaction.232
III.1.6. Measures of protection of minors engaging in mobile payments for effective
protection of consumers
Children are actively engaged in purchasing products online and through their mobile devices
without always appreciating the associated risks, and despite the fact that in most countries they
do not have the legal right to enter into commercial transactions.233
One way to protect them is to
ensure that their age and identity is verified online prior to making a purchase. Research
indicates that this is rarely done, with one report pointing out that 76% of purchases made using
mobile devices do not require any age verification step.234
Even where such steps are included,
unlike face-to-face transactions, it can be relatively easy for children to pose as adults online.
It should be noted, however, that age verification tools may not provide the only way to
effectively protect children in online and mobile payments. Instead, there should be the shared
230
See Goldman, D. (2012). Mobile Pay War: Wal-Mart and Others vs. Google, CNN-MONEY (Aug. 15, 2012),
available at: http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/15/technology/mcx-mobile-wallet/, accessed on 16/05/2014. 231
Smith, J. (2011). 9 Banks With iPhone Remote Check Deposit Apps, GOTTA BE MOBILE (June 13, 2011),
available at: http://www.gottabemobile.com/2011/06/13/9-banks-with-iphone-remote-check-deposit-apps/, accessed
on 16/05/2014. 232
The Future of Money. (2012). Where do Mobile Payments Fit in the Current Regulatory Structure?: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. available at:
http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/112-142.pdf/, accessed on 17/05/2014. 233
See article 7 of the law n° 45/2011 of 25/11/2011 on “Capacity to contract”, Official Gazette nº 04bis of
23/01/201. 234
Consumer Focus, 2009, p. 47
73
responsibility between parents, e-commerce, and mobile service providers and payment
organizations, in educating and raising awareness among children about the potential risks
associated with online and mobile purchases and ways to protect themselves against those
threats.235
III.2. Regulatory measures
As discussed in details above, the main challenges are related to regulatory frameworks, which
involve both legal rules and their relationship to private sector measures. In addition, a number
of parties, including financial institutions and non-financial institutions are involved in e-
commerce payment transactions with consumers. The rules governing their operations, which
cover the telecommunications, competition, and financial services regulations areas, as well as
consumer protection (specific to ecommerce and/or payments) may differ.
The regulatory environment governing mobile payments is still at the infancy stage in Rwanda
given that electronic payment system is new and still evolving. It is crucial to promulgate
specific legislation that applies to online and/or mobile payments, while others apply to general
consumer protection, telecommunications, or financial regulation.
III.2.1. Improving the role of National Bank of Rwanda in conflicts resolution between
customers and mobile payment service providers
Generally, the central bank assesses the adequacy of the scheme’s structure and steps in only if
the scheme owner is not doing its job. The central bank has explicit legislative authority over the
stability, as well as the competition and efficiency, of the payments system.236
In that regard, the
central bank’s main objective has been to introduce contestability into all phases of payments,
from provision of stored value to clearing and settlement.237
235
McKay, C., et al. (2012), The Challenge of Inactive Customers, CGAP presentation, available at: http://www.slideshare.net/CGAP/the-challenge-of-inactive-customers/, visited on 03/04/2014. 236
Green E, J. (1999). Money and Debt in the Structure of Payments, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Quarterly Review 23 (spring), pp. 13–29. 237
Cavalcanti, R., and Neil, W. (1999). A Model of private bank-note issue, Review of Economic Dynamics 2
(January 1999), pp. 104–36.
74
Therefore, the Nation Bank of Rwanda should aim at establishing a regime in which nonbanks
can have a role, hoping to stimulate competition and improve payment efficiency. As far as the
customers’ protection is evocated in this study, we find that it is not enough for National Bank of
Rwanda to have established a declarative responsibility of services providers to produce details
of the customer protection measures, including consumer recourse mechanisms and consumer
awareness program when applying for a payment license238
; it should however have provided for
means of recourse when the payment services providers are unable to settle the disputes.
III.2.2. Improvement of role of COMESA clearing house to promote cross-border mobile
payments across the region
The COMESA was established to improve the efficiency of clearing operations and complement
the services of commercial banks as well as facilitate monetary and fiscal policy harmonization
within the region.239
Given the limited amount of convertible currencies in the region, the
COMESA Clearing House was to promote cross-border payment and settlement through the
Regional Payments and Settlement System by allowing businesses to invoice their exports in
national currencies as against the scarce convertible currencies like the United States dollars.240
However, up to date, COMESA has not recorded much achievement in promoting the payment
systems of the member countries and clearing activities were suspended due to the disparate
policies and infrastructure of member countries.
III.2.3. Regulatory measures of insolvency of m-payment service providers for the security
of deposits of funds of the public
While the regular prudential regulation of the bank does provide one line of defense here, a more
direct solution would be to require MNOs to maintain deposit insurance up to the total value of
all deposits. Alternatively, the BNR could place restrictions on what these deposits can be
238
See art. 4 (10), Regulation no 06/2012 of BNR, Law pre-cited. 239
Ulrich, B. (2002). The silence of Words and Political Dynamics in the World Risk Society, in Logos. 1, pp. 11-18. 240 Onyeiwu, S. (2002). Inter-Country Variations in Digital Technology in Africa: Evidence, Determinants and Policy
Implications, UNU-WIDER, Discussion Paper no. 2002/72 Helsinki: UNU-WIDER, p. 22.
75
invested in by the bank (e.g. government debt) that is tied to the aggregate deposit. The BNR
could also require MNOs to split their deposits across multiple banks to diversify bank risk.
Such measures typically include also restrictions on the use of such funds, requirements that such
funds be placed in their entirety in bank accounts or government debt and that there should be a
diversification of floats across several financial institutions.241
In this regard, the regulation in
place should require that the funds backing the mobile money stored value are protected from
institutional risks, such as claims made by creditors in cases of issuer bankruptcy.242
III.2.4. Developing online disputes settlement measures for effective cross-border m-
payments
As Internet usage continues to expand, interest has grown in designing efficient mechanisms for
resolving online shopping and payment disputes. More traditional mechanisms, such as
litigation, can be time consuming and expensive for consumers. Online dispute resolution
schemes are increasingly being explored by stakeholders as a means for resolving disputes in
many countries.
Defined as “a means of dispute settlement whether through conciliation or arbitration, which
implies the use of online technologies to facilitate the resolution of disputes between parties,”
online mediation can provide substantial savings when compared with traditional litigation.243
As concluded at an international conference hosted by the United Nations Commission on
241
Tarazi, M., and Breloff, P. (2010). Nonbank E-Money Issuers: Regulatory Approaches to Protecting Customer
Funds, Focus Note 63, available at:http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.45715/FN_63_Rev.pdf/, accessed on
17/05/2014. 242
Tarazi, M. and Breloff, P. (2010). Non-bank E-Money Issuers: Regulatory Approaches to Protecting Customer
Funds, CGAP Focus Note 63. Available at: http://www.cgap.org/sites/ default/ files/CGAP-Focus-Note-NonbankE-
Money-Issuers-RegulatoryApproaches-to-ProtectingCustomer-Funds-Jul-2010.pdf, accessed 16/05/2014. Art. 7,
Regulation no 06/2012 of BNR requires respectively a minimum capital of 50,000,000Rwf and 100,000,000Rwf for
any other institutions not supervised by the Central Bank and engaging in payment. 243
Neil, D. and Leishman, P. (2011). Building, Incentivizing and Managing a Network of Mobile Money Agents: A
Handbook for Mobile Network Operators, GSMA, London, UK, available at:
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Agent-Networksfull.pdf/, accessed on
21/06/2014.
76
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on 29-30 March 2010, in a cross-border context, online
mediation tailored to small value transactions may be in fact the only cost-effective option for
consumers.244
Part II, Section III, A i) and iii) of the E-Commerce Guidelines requires businesses to provide
consumers with accurate, clear and easily accessible information about themselves (including
their geographic locations) and ways to resolve disputes. Such information and redress
mechanisms are necessary to help strengthen consumer confidence in cross-border
transactions245
, as also provided for in the Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress
Recommendation which calls on member countries to enhance the effectiveness of consumer
remedies in cross-border disputes.
III.2.5. The necessity of the Rwandan legislator to be vigilant for the challenges related to
online disputes settlement mechanisms
While recognizing the benefits that online disputes resolution may bring to consumers, consumer
organizations indicate a number of challenges associated with such procedures. These include a
lack of direct interpersonal contact that may limit consumer ability to explain their problem to a
merchant; and a required degree of consumer knowledge and familiarity with sophisticated web
technology that may be an obstacle for many consumers.246
This situation becomes worse in countries like Rwanda and other EAC member states where the
majority of the mobile payment users are not knowledgeable of technological means and where
technology is still developing. Based on these conclusions, UNCITRAL launched work on the
development of a legal standard online dispute resolution related to cross-border e-commerce
transactions.247
In Rwanda, all the financial institutions and mobile operators have the free call
244
(UNCITRAL, 2010a). 245
See Veniard, C. (2010). How Agent Banking Changes the Economics of Small Accounts, Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation
Paper for the Global Savings Forum, available at
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/financialservicesforthepoor/Documents/agent-banking.pdf/, visited on 21/06/2014. 246
McKay, C., et al. (2012). The Challenge of Inactive Customers, CGAP presentation, available at
http://www.slideshare.net/CGAP/the-challenge-ofinactive-customers.pdf/, accessed on 29/05/2014. 247
The work was held in December 2010 (UNCITRAL, 2010b). Draft procedural rules were discussed at the
Working Group III’s meetings held in May and November 2011 (UNCITRAL, 2011).
77
centers by which customers can present their claims. However, rare solutions have been given
through these phone calls disputes resolution mechanism.248
III.2.6. The use of connecting factors in cross-border mobile payments disputes settlement
In many of the transactions, the parties use a standard purchase order, sales contract, or other
agreement - the same documents are used when the other party is in exporting countries.
However, there are some important differences between domestic and cross-border purchase or
sale transactions that warrant a special look at international contracts249
, and especially when a
contract consists of online or mobile payment.
Many contracts and other forms of legally binding agreement include a jurisdiction or
arbitration clause specifying the parties' choice of venue for any litigation (called a forum
selection clause).250
Then, choice of law clause may specify which laws the court or tribunal
should apply to each aspect of the dispute. This matches the substantive policy of freedom of
contract. Generally, the court will apply the law chosen by the contracting parties in solving their
disputes; otherwise, the court will apply the connecting factors.251
The court facing this issue will choose among these connecting factors in settling the disputes.
Hence, it will either apply the law of the forum (lex fori) to all procedural matters (including,
self-evidently, the choice of law rules), or lex loci for substance matters. Lex loci includes the
law of the place where a transaction physically takes place or of the occurrence that gave rise to
the litigation (lex loci actus), the law of the place where the contract was made (the lex
contractus), and the law of the place where the contract was intended to be performed (the lex
loci solutionis).252
248
Eight out ten interviewed customers, which is 80%, revealed that the free phone calls have never been successful
to their claims. The infringed customer has to wait until the problem is solved, and in many cases, there is no
respondent on the free call line. 249
Dicey & Morris. (2000). The Conflict of Laws, (13th edition) (edited by Albert V. Dicey, C.G.J. Morse, Mc
Clean, Adrian Briggs, Jonathan Hill, & Lawrence Collins), London: Sweet& Maxwell 2000, pp. 87-91. 250
Briggs, A. (2000). The Conflict of Laws, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002, p. 39. 251
Ibid. 252
Dicey and Morris. (2000). the Conflict of Laws, (13th edition) (edited by Albert V. Dicey, C.G.J. Morse,
McClean, Adrian Briggs, Jonathan Hill, & Lawrence Collins). London: Sweet& Maxwell 2000, pp. 87-91.
78
III.2.7. Harmonization of regulations governing the Mobile Payment Service Providers in
East African Community
EAC is inspired by the European Community in the matter of regional integration and
harmonization of legislations. The difference in the payment methods across countries has been
identified as one of the barriers slowing the growth of cross-border e-commerce. As regards
mobile payments in Europe, a lack of open standards for interoperability between card issuers
and mobile network operators has been identified by the European Payments Council (EPC) as a
major barrier to successful commercial deployments.253
In European Community, efforts are underway to expand the scope of electronic payment
schemes, through the development of global standards. An International Council of Payment
Network Operators (ICPNO) has been established to build the framework and establish the rules
and standards for joining the global payment networks. As far as the EAC is concerned on
harmonization of regulations governing mobile payments among its member states, key issues
such as technology, international settlement, legal compliance, security, communications, fee
structures and exchange rate mechanisms have to be prior examined.
In so doing, the policy maker and the regulator could help providers to assess the particular risks
and costs of interoperability at the platform, distribution, and customer level. The policy maker
could also help to ensure that interoperability is not removing healthy competition that drives
financial inclusion (e.g. investments in distribution if third party sharing is implemented in an
immature market).254
Among the EAC member states however, it is difficult to predict for certain
whether interoperability would actually lower costs and expand customer choice – the mobile
money industry is still too new.
253
European Payments Council (EPC), 2010a, p. 52. 254
Narda L. Sotomayor. (2012). Setting the Regulatory Landscape for the Provision of Electronic Money in Peru, in
Innovations, Volume 6, Issue 4, MIT Press, available at
http://www.sbs.gob.pe/repositorioaps/0/0/jer/ddt_ano2012/DT-3-2012_Narda_Sotomayor.pdf/, accessed on
29/03/2014.
79
With this consideration, EAC is advised not to rush because the risk of moving too early (or in
the wrong way) poses two major risks to the industry as a whole.255
These include compliance
costs may increase, making the business case more challenging for providers, and again,
implementing the technical side of interoperability can be complex and distract the operator from
focusing on the basics of the service256
, such as building the distribution network and educating
customers. The timing and cost-effectiveness of any regulatory intervention must be appraised
carefully, and market-led solutions should always be the preferred option.257
Therefore, within the EAC integration, legislators should ensure that consumers are informed
about potential security and privacy challenges they may face in m-commerce and the available
measures which can be used to limit the risks. They should also encourage the development of
security precautions and built in security features.258
Mobile payment operators should be
encouraged to implement data security policies and measures to prevent unauthorized
transactions and data breaches.
III.2.8. The East African Payment System (EAPS) as a solution to cross-border e-
payments
The East African Payment System (EAPS) was launched on November 25, 2013 and links the
Real Time Gross Settlement Systems (RTGSs) of the EAC member States.259
It is also an
initiative of the EAC Central Banks operating in three countries: Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda
while Rwanda and Burundi are expected to join later.
255
Bankable Frontier Associates (BFA) (2012), Interoperability and the Pathways towards Inclusive retail Payments
in Pakistan,” Washington D.C., available at: http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-BFA-Interoperability-
and-the-Pathways-Towards-Inclusive-Retail-Payments-in-Pakistan-Jun-2012.pdf/, accessed on 11/03/2014. 256
See also, Matu Mugo. (2011). Regulation of Banking and Payment Agents in Kenya, in “The Fletcher School:
Leadership Program for Financial Inclusion, Policy Memoranda 2011,” Boston, MA, United States, available at:
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/CEME/publications/media/Fletcher/Microsites/CEME/pubs/papers/MEMOS%20Final.pdf/,
accessed on 01/04/2014. 257
See also, Hannig, A. and Jensen, S. (2010). Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability: Current Policy Issues,
ADBI Working Paper 259. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, available at http://www.adbi.org/working-
paper/2010/12/21/4272.financial.inclusion.stability.policy.issues/, accessed on 29/03/2014. 258 See for example OFT (Office of Fair Trading) (2010a), E-Consumer Protection, A Public Consultation on
Proposals, July 2010, available at: http: www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/consultations/eprotection/oft1252con.pdf/,
accessed on 06/06/2014. 259
Neil, D. (2011). Regulating non-bank mobile money service providers, available at: http://mmublog.org/blog/regulating-non-bank-mobile-money-service-providers/, accessed on 13/06/2014.
80
As explained by Louis Kasende260
, EAPS is a multi-currency system in which payments are
effected using any of the currency of the EAC partner States. In the aspect of cross-border
payments, it is expected to make cross-border payments easier, facilitate safe and efficient
transfer of monetary value within the region, and will be vital in promoting regional trade, as
well as promoting economic integration.
260
Louis K. (Deputy Governor, Bank of Uganda), in a press release of November 25, 2013, available at: https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/media/from_the_bank/EAPS_Goes_Live.html, visited on 16/06/2014.
81
GENERAL CONCLUSION
The expansion of digital technologies has dramatically changed the way in which electronic
communication services are delivered to and accessed by consumers. Mobile phones today
perform more like handheld computers. Mobile phones now are poised to function as payment
devices, allowing users to pay for goods and services and transfer funds. This not only promotes
competition of a wide variety of services and applications that was not possible before, but
consequently requires new regulatory frameworks to tackle issues previously managed in the
separate and distinct domains of broadcasting, telecommunication and online services.
Mobile banking and payment services have grown rapidly in recent years. They have the
potential to offer benefits for some consumers in vulnerable circumstances, but only if the
services are designed in an effective way. Mobile phone services can also offer ways of carrying
out online transactions for some who are not otherwise on the internet. However, a number of
significant barriers need to be addressed if mobile payment services are to be of benefit to all
consumers. Furthermore, the developments raise questions about the effectiveness of regulation
and implications for consumer protection.
Rwanda has joined other East African countries in the dynamic mobile payment industry. The
low income and rural population can benefit substantially from the expansion of this payment
system especially for unbanked. The BNR has done an excellent job in regulating the market so
far, but the way in which it manages the more complex issues of regulation emerging, most
particularly those relating to interoperability, will be important for the development of the
industry.
Regulation of mobile payment, a new technology-based, capital-intensive product is
complicated; ineffective regulation can be a big hindrance to the development of this new
payment system. At the same time, there are regulatory issues pertaining to consumer protection
and risk, especially given the association of e-money with the financial system. Regulation of
mobile payment needs to strike a delicate balance between allowing space for investment and
innovation to flourish and concern for competition, financial risks and consumer protection.
82
In many cases, consumers, merchants and other parties involved in transactions may not fully
understand what legal framework applies to a particular transaction, what the responsibilities are
for the parties in the case of fraud or security problems, or what types of dispute resolution
mechanisms or redress rights may be available to consumers in the event of a problem.
Other issues include general consumer issues, such as unauthorized payment charges, non
delivery, late delivery and non conformity of products, as well as dispute resolution and redress.
Closely related are also issues concerning consumer information, empowerment, and education.
On this list of issues studied in regulation of mobile payment systems, it is important to add the
technical payments issues that are related to transactions. These include security-related issues,
such as digital identity management.
If the barriers can be overcome, mobile payment services could offer benefits to a number of
consumers in vulnerable circumstances, including a convenient way to make payments without
having to carry cash. This research has described and analyzed the various resources, strategies
and tools that regulators need to improve for the enforcement of national laws, rules and
regulations governing mobile payment systems.
In this research, we explored the estate of regulation of mobile payments in Rwanda, with focus
on protection of vulnerable people-customers of this electronic payment system. We elaborated
the weaknesses of the regulatory framework in place in Rwanda in comparison with other
international and regulations in countries where this payment model has been developed.
It has been clarified in this research that the opportunity of making payments by mobile phone
appears to be gaining traction with the Rwandan consumers and businesses. Stakeholders in the
traditional payments model like banks, payment brands and merchants, along with new entrants
like Mobile Payment Service Providers, Mobile Network Operators all are beginning to adopt m-
payment business models. Since the Rwandan mobile payment market is still in its nascent stage,
the Rwandan regulators have not explained clearly how existing laws and regulations apply.
While current regulations are adequate to cover many existing and developing mobile payments
offerings, regulators are aware that there may be a need for additional legislative and rulemaking
83
measures to address any gaps in regulatory coverage. These include providing for means of
recourse to the customers when the payment services providers are unable to settle the disputes.
Based on the above conclusions, the following recommendations have been formulated for
improvement in the regulation of mobile payment system in Rwanda:
1. In Rwanda, mobile payment is a simple aspect under the Regulation of National Bank of
Rwanda on electronic fund transfers and electronic money transactions without clear definition.
It is therefore recommended to promulgate a law on mobile payment system with more focus on
protection of the most vulnerable consumers;
2. Telecommunication companies in Rwanda are engaging in banking activities by receiving the
funds of the public and operating in payments and transfers of electronic money. In that
consideration, they should be bound by the requirements imposed to the banks and other
financial institutions; these include the prudential rules, and risk assessment mechanisms;
2. It is therefore recommended to the Rwandan regulators to ensure that the consumer
implications of developments in mobile phone payment services are fully addressed in regulatory
and consumer protection policy and processes, and that they take full account of the interests of
consumers in vulnerable circumstances;
3. Developments in mobile payment services present challenges for regulations because this is a
new payment model in Rwanda wit challenges that cannot be easily anticipated. Thus,
Regulators and consumer protection bodies must monitor patterns of emerging problems, liaise
with each other, and be prepared to act quickly once issues have been identified in order to
update the rules and regulations;
4. Policy-makers in Rwanda need to grasp the opportunities offered by the numerous national
and international reviews and changes taking place, which have implications for mobile payment
services in order to avoid any equivocal related to this payment system. Consumers should be
informed about the different levels of protection offered by issuers and regulation in place;
84
5. Given that all the telecommunication companies are offering the mobile payment services, it is
crucial for the regulator to make interoperability a mandatory inter-companies partnership for an
effective mobile payment system;
6. In order to ensure effective protection of the vulnerable consumers of mobile payments, the
Rwandan legislator should avail possibilities for recourse to the consumers once they are
infringed by the payment service providers. So far, disputes resolution and any recourse by the
customers are still under the power of the payment service providers. Thus, RURA should act as
an adjudicator or arbitrator in disputes arising between payment service providers, consumers
and stakeholders.
Without assuming to be exhaustive in this research, we have brought our intellectual
contribution; minimal may it be, to the doctrinal arsenal in the matter of mobile payments.
Mobile payment system is a new and gradually evolving area in Rwanda; we have opened doors
for the future researchers in this area. We therefore encourage exploring other aspects of
regulation of this new electronic payment model that we have not been able to cover in our
research.
The Rwandan legislator, in enacting the new rules and drafting model disclosures, should be
mindful of both the unique concerns as well as consumer benefits presented by mobile payments,
and seek to formulate rules that protect consumers while also fostering innovation in this
emerging industry.
85
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