LEARNED ABOUT RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY OF...
Transcript of LEARNED ABOUT RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY OF...
LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT
RESILIENCE AND
SUSTAINABILITY OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
T.D. O’RourkeThomas R. Briggs Professor
of EngineeringCornell University
TOPICS• Critical Infrastructure and
Resilience
• Case Histories• Christchurch• San Francisco• Los Angeles• New York City
• Key Issues
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: EVOLVING CONCEPT
• 1980s: Emphasis on Public Sector (e.g., highways, bridges, airports, public transit, airports, & solid/hazardous waste facilities)
• After 911: Expansion to 17 Sectors in US National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN (2006)
• Agriculture/food• Defense industries• Energy systems• Public health• Nat’l monuments• Banking/finance• Drinking water• Chemical facilities• Commercial
• Dams• Emergency services• Nuclear power• Information tech• Telecom systems• Postal/shipping• Transportation• Government
LIFELINE SYSTEMS• Electric Power
• Gas and Liquid Fuels
• Levee and Flood Protection
• Telecommunications
• Transportation
• Wastewater Facilities
• Water Supply
Water Supply
Electric Power
Telecom
Gas/Liquid Fuels
Transportation
Waste Disposal
INSTITUTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCIES
RESILIENCE• Governmental Policies,
Community Planning, Infrastructure Management
• Rockefeller Fndn Review (2011)• Engineering Resilience• Systems Resilience• Complex Adaptive Resilience
DARFIELD & CHRISTCHURCH EARTHQUAKES
Christchurch EQ
Darfield EQ
DARFIELD & CHRISTCHURCH EARTHQUAKES
• 2010 Darfield Earthquake• 7.0 Mw
• No deaths, ~ $ 4 billion losses
• 2011 Christchurch Earthquake• 6.1 Mw
• Hundreds dead, Christchurch CBD destroyed
• Combined earthquake losses > $20 billion losses, potentially > 15 - 20% GDP
CHRISTCHURCH LIQUEFACTION
Cubrinovski (2011)
CHRISTCHURCH GAS DISTRIBUTION
Gas Distribution System Areas of Severe Liquefaction
GAS SYSTEM INTERDEPENDENCIES• Telecommunications
• Communication during emergency response
• Transportation System• LPG delivery at Port and by truck/train
• Electric Power• Heated water to vaporize LPG
• Water Supply• Water for LPG vaporizer• Sprinkler system for fire protection
LESSONS ABOUT RESILIENCE• Engineering Resilience
• HDPE pipelines with fusion welds
• System Resilience• Dispersion & redundancy of key facilities• Gas storage within system• Contracts for emergency works
• Adaptive Resilience• Bicycles not trucks in heavy traffic• Isolation of CBD from gas
BURWOOD (HORSESHOE LAKE)
• Replaced Damaged AC and PVC Piping After Darfield EQ with HDPE Pipelines
• No HDPE Pipelines Damaged After Darfield EQ
Severe Liquefaction
Moderate Liquefaction
NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE
• Prior to EQs, Residential Building Insurance Provided by National Government
• After EQs, Reinsurance Industry Reluctant to Securitize Risk
• Four-fold Increase in Insurance Rates, with More Projected
LAND USE POLICY(Christchurch EQ Recovery Authority)Land Repair Prolonged & Uneconomic
As of 27 June 11 Christchurch
infrastructure uninsurable
200 km
N
San Francisco
5 km
120 km2
Zones of Soil Liquefaction
Zone of liquefaction induced deformation
=
N
0 1 km
Zones of Soil Liquefaction
1906 SAN FRANCISCO PIPELINES
• >300 Breaks in Distribution Network
• Ruptured Trunk Lines at Locations of Liquefaction (Especially Along Mission Creek)
• 23,200 Severed Service Connections
AUXILIARY WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM (AWSS)
WATER SUPPLY & FIRE MODELING
• NSF-supported Research
• AWSS Hydraulic Model (Cornell)
• Fire Model (EQE)
• Bond Measure Passed to Upgrade AWSS
• Portable Water Supply System (PWSS)
0 1 km
Zone of liquefaction induced deformation
Marina
South of Market
Foot of Market
Mission Creek
1989 LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE
AWSS
0 1 km
Zone of liquefaction induced deformation
Marina
South of Market
Foot of Market
Mission Creek
1989 LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE
MARINA
1989 LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE
FIRE
FIRE
LESSONS ABOUT SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE
• 1986 Bond Issue for AWSS Upgrade
• 2010 Bond Issue for AWSS Upgrade
• For 24 Years Depended on the Stewardship of a Handful of Individuals
• Transfer from Fire Department to Public Utilities Commission
• Need to Harmonize Institutional Cultures
200 km
N
Los Angeles
40 km
• 4.0 Million Customers• 12,000 km Pipelines
LOS ANGELES
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM• Simulates 12,000 km
pipelines & facilities• Comprehensive seismic
& geohazards• Special software for
damaged hydraulic network analysis
• System risk & reliability• Water & electric
interaction• Economic/social impacts
MULTI-MODAL SIMULATION
Combined Simulation for Permanent Ground
Deformation & Seismic Wave Effects
Probabilistic Simulation for System-wide Seismic
Wave Effects
Simulation for Ground Failure, Accidents,
Human Threats
SHAKEOUT SCENARIO
• 7.8 Mw EQ onSan AndreasFault
• Largest USCivil DefenseExercise
• 5.4 MillionParticipants
SYSTEM SERVICEABILITY INDEXSSI is the ratio of water available at all system nodes
after the EQ to water available before the EQ
LA Reservoir
Encino Reservoir
Hollywood Reservoir
Stone Canyon Reservoir
13.6 M m314.8 M m3
13.6 M m3
5.4 M m3
Disinfectant By-Products
10 km10 km
N Highest Population
Density
LESSONS ABOUT RESILIENCE• Impact of Environmental Regulations
on System Operations
• Community Impact on System Operations
• Advanced Simulations of Key Importance for System and Adaptive Resilience
• Emergency Response Strategy for Major Earthquakes
NEW YORK CITY
10 km
800 sq km
NEW YORK CITY WATER SUPPLY
Delaware Aqueduct
NEW YORK CITY WATER SUPPLY
• 18 Reservoirs & 3 Controlled Lakes
• > 5000 km2 of Watershed
• 1.2 Billion gallons/day
Delaware Aqueduct
Catskill Aqueduct
LESSONS ABOUT SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE
• Water Supply is the Most Critical Infrastructure for NYC
• 3rd NYC Water Tunnel under Construction from 1970 -2020
• Requires 50 Years of Persistent Political and Economic Support
• Long Term Commitment under Highly Variable and Changing Conditions
LEADERSHIP & PUBLIC OUTREACH
KEY ISSUES• Improve Concepts of Critical
Infrastructure
• Institutional Cultures and Interdependencies Critically Important for Resilience & Sustainability
• Need to Account for Socio-Political Processes
• Advanced Simulations of Key Importance for System and Adaptive Resilience
KEY ISSUES
• Insurance Critical for Infrastructure Sustainability
• Political Leadership Essential
• Backstop All Models with Case Histories or Observations of Actual System Performance; Be Involved in Real Projects and Real Organizations