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Laying transoceanic cables on Africa’s shores: a Neo-gramscian study
Derbe, S.T.
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Citation for published version (APA):Derbe, S. T. (2010). Laying transoceanic cables on Africa’s shores: a Neo-gramscian study.
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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
135
Chapter Six: Information Society within a
Restructured Africa
This chapter examines the relationship between African
and global capitalist firms and think tanks in shaping
Africa‘s development ideology.
The first section assesses the African Information
Society Initiative (AISI), which was prepared under the
auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA). The AISI was a blueprint for national policies
designed to bridge the digital divide. Various NGOs, local and
foreign and governmental actors and international
organisations were active participants in the process of
designing AISI. It is argued that the AISI represents a
conscious agency of reproduction of the global ideational and
material structure in Africa.
Currently, the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development
(NEPAD) is in charge of the information society policy of
Africa. The second sub-section, therefore, investigates NEPAD
using the Neo-Gramscian concepts of hegemony and
counterhegemony.
Africa’s Information Society Initiative
The majority of digital divide initiatives are designed,
undertaken and supported by the international development
practitioners, such as the Canadian IDRC (International
Development Research Centre), the Dutch IICD(International
Institution for Communication and Development), and the UK
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
136
DFID (Department for International Development), ITU, USAID
(United States Agency for International Development)47 .
Africa was represented by South Africa in the G-7
ministerial meeting of 1995 in which the agenda for global
information society was set by the US. In the same year, a
conference entitled ―African Regional Symposium on Telematics
for Development‖ was organised by the UNECA, UNESCO, ITU and
IDRC. The participants from Africa included ICT consumer
organisations, ISPs and regulators, whereas external
participants included IT specialists and representatives of
bilateral, regional and international organisations. This
conference reviewed existing initiatives in Africa. It was
then agreed that there is a need to devise national strategies
and policies ―emphasizing market-oriented approaches and
opportunities for partnership between user groups,
telecommunications operators and public authorities‖
(http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Padis/telematics.html).
One of the participants of the conference summed up the
agenda for policy reform as follows:
The real challenge is not technical or financial, but organizational
and political. While there are no technological barriers to rapid
expansion of Internet service in Africa, there are many in the sphere
of obsolete regulatory frameworks that result in constricting
barriers to information access and knowledge expansion.
(http://www.unitednationonline.org/eca_resources/Major_ECA_Websites/p
adis/telemat/africa03.htm).
Therefore, the conference participants decided to lobby
the Organisation of African Union and the G15 Heads of State
meetings to address the issue of information society in
47 According to Zongo (2001), ―there are so many international
development agencies in ICT related projects and activities towards Africa
that it may not be possible to go through a full list of them in [a] short
overview paper‖ (p.20).
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
137
Africa. It was also underlined that more stakeholders have to
be involved to shape the information society policy of Africa.
(http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Padis/telmatcs_comunik.html)
The telematics conference was a watershed event because
it marked the beginning of the information society policy in
Africa. It was followed by the UNECA Conference of Ministers
responsible for social development and planning in 1995, which
passed a resolution, entitled ―Building Africa‘s Information
Highway‖. A High-Level Working Group was appointed to draft an
umbrella policy that will streamline the various Internet
initiatives in Africa in a definite direction
(http://www.uneca.org/aisi/).
The High-Level Working Group, composed of 11 ICT experts,
came up with ―African Information Society Initiative (AISI):
An Action Framework to Build Africa's Information and
Communication Infrastructure" in 1996. The premise of the
framework was that information technologies are tools that
enable low capital investment and efficient exploitation of
Africa‘s vast information resources. The objective of the
framework is to guide African leaders to take advantage of
this technological revolution by opening up their market to
global ICT providers. Hence, mirroring the information
society agenda set forth earlier by various global
organisations, the AISI recommended:
inclusion of the private sector and NGOs in
the national policy making process,
strong protection for intellectual property,
free flow of information within African
countries and to/from the rest of the world,
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
138
liberalisation of national
telecommunications and public broadcasting
services, and
creation of enabling environment for
investment through policy and legislation.
The AISI was endorsed by the Summit of Heads of States of
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at the 64th Ordinary
Session of the Council of Ministers meeting held in Yaoundé,
Cameroon in July 1996. It was subsequently approved by
influential international organisations such as the G8
(http://www.uneca.org/aisi/).
The ECA took up the task of coordinating and guiding the
implementation of the AISI based on this blueprint. The E-
readiness reports prepared by the ECA provided an update on
the investment realities in African countries. It also made
investment scans to indicate the business opportunities
available in Africa (See Scan-ICT at
http://www.uneca.org/aisi/). The ECA also coordinated the
preparation of a common African position at the WSIS. In
general, it played a central role in formulating Africa‘s
position with respect to the ICAIS and other global
information society issues.
In 2002, African leaders introduced another high profile
development blueprint, NEPAD. Hence, NEPAD‘s e-commission for
Africa took over the assignment ―to federate all the ICT
initiatives of the continent and mobilise resources for
funding of the major African projects‖
(http://www.uneca.org/aisi/ Bamako2002/.
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
139
NEPAD, African Development and E-strategies
The first sub-section deals with the origin of NEPAD, its
vision and strategies. The second sub-section assesses
political response to NEPAD from regional and international
political actors. The third sub-section provides an
interpretation of the role and function of NEPAD from a Neo-
Gramscian perspective.
Genesis of NEPAD
A number of political and economic programmes have been
proposed to end the cycle of poverty and conflict in Africa.
The Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, Africa‘s Priority Programme
for Economic Recovery of 1986, the African Alternative
Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-
Economic Recovery and Transformation of 1989 are only a few of
these policy proposals. NEPAD is yet another such initiative
that aims to address the continent‘s economic, political and
social problems (Adedeji, 2002).
The NEPAD initiative was derived from two recovery plans
for Africa drawn up by Presidents Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal
and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The first, called the Omega
Plan for Africa, stressed that the major causes of disparity
in productivity and living standards between developed and
developing countries emanate from the difference in their
respective level of infrastructure. Hence, if the gaps in
physical infrastructure, education, health and agriculture are
bridged, Africa will have the capacity to participate in
global production and trade. The practical problem that needs
to be addressed is, therefore, securing finance for
infrastructure construction. The Omega plan insisted that
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
140
Africa should not rely on foreign aid or debt to finance its
infrastructure projects. Instead, the resources should be
drawn from creation of special drawing rights for Africa,
borrowing from African national treasuries, foreign direct
investment, etc (http:// www.nepad.org.ng /PDF/About% 20Nepad
/planOmega.pdf).
The Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme
(MAP) was the plan contributed by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa.
The MAP was more far-reaching and comprehensive, and it has
been almost entirely incorporated into the final NEPAD
document. NEPAD attributes the impoverishment of the continent
to its colonial legacy, especially to the exploitation of raw
materials for the production of value added products in the
West. Subversion of traditional values, institutions and
structures for imperial ends, and the heritage of a ―weak
capitalist class and weak...accumulation process‖ are the
major features of this legacy. The poor rate of accumulation
in the post-colonial period coupled with a dysfunctional and
corrupt leadership is the single most important obstacle to
Africa‘s economic recovery (OAU, 2001).
NEPAD declared its ―vision and firm conviction" to be the
eradication of poverty in Africa and abolition of the
development chasm between the continent and the international
community. The specific goals to be attained in the medium
term include achievement of an economic growth of 7% per annum
in the next 15 years and attainment of the UN Millennium
Development Goals. The latter include reduction of the
proportion of people living under extreme poverty , infant and
maternal mortality, and increasing student enrolment,
provision of basic health services, etc (Para.1).
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
141
The strategy for economic growth advocated by NEPAD
focuses on increasing and diversifying African exports and
enhancing its competitiveness. The marginalisation of Africa
from the world market is considered the manifestation of its
poverty.
While globalisation has increased the cost of Africa‘s ability to
compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively managed
integration present the best prospects for future economic prosperity
and poverty reduction (Para.28).
The mobility of capital across the globe enables governments and
private entrepreneurs to secure financial resources from global
markets. To sum up, the globalization process offers Africa greater
opportunity for real injection of private funding and risk taking,
creation of new markets and harnessing of increased economic capacity
(Paras. 29-32).
However, according to NEPAD, there are still two major
obstacles to end the marginalisation of Africa. Firstly, the
developed countries have taken advantage of the marginalised
sections of the world due to the absence of fair and just
rules to regulate global integration of economies. NEPAD
insisted, however, that the call for a fair global rule of
business is not only a moral but also an economic imperative.
In the words of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi,
A small minority of the world creates much of current wealth. That
wealth cannot continue to grow indefinitely so long as it continues
to be based on a narrow circle. The base of the wealth creation has
to be expanded to include the rest of the world for it to be
sustained. In the absence of such an expansive process, it is only a
matter of time before the economies of the developed world stagnate
with all the dire consequences of such a phenomenon…Africa‘s
development is thus a necessary means of preventing ultimate
stagnation in the developed world.
...NEPAD is thus based on the recognition of the fact that Africa‘s
development is vital to the realization of the direct material
interest not only of Africans but also of the rest of the world
(Quoted in Abraham, 2003, pp.19-20).
The other obstacle is the failure by African governments
to introduce good governance. NEPAD, thus, vouched to create a
market friendly environment in Africa through its peace,
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
142
security, democracy and political governance initiatives. The
African leaders behind NEPAD have assured their partners that
―the numbers of democratically elected leaders are on the
increase‖ in the continent and, hence, the positive outcome of
this latest initiative is guaranteed (para.42). However,
market assessment reports released by Western economic
institutes in the same year NEPAD came to existence seemed to
negate this assurance. For example, according to the Report of
the Economic Freedom of the World in 2003, except for six
African countries (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia,
Mauritius and Tanzania), the rest have unacceptable legal
structures and weak protection of property rights. Similarly,
the corruption index places most of African countries among
the worst offenders. Only fourteen countries have managed to
put in place enough discipline on their fiscal regime through
spending cuts, reduction of stabilisation funds, and
accelerated privatisation (cited in Loots, 2003).
The African Peer Review Mechanism was created to lock in
the political commitment of each African country. This is a
voluntary mechanism by which member states undertake periodic
review of the policies and practices of one another and exert
peer pressure on the laggards. The review aims to ultimately
ensure that the political and economic processes in the
African countries conform to best practice guidelines
stipulated by their ―development partners‖. By 2008, 29
African states had already gone through the Peer Review
Mechanism (http://www.nepad.org/aprm/; Loots, 2003, p.4).
NEPAD requested foreign financial aid ―to bridge
existing gaps between Africa and the developed countries so as
to improve the continent‘s international competitiveness and
enable it to participate in the globalisation process‖
(Para.95). A large capital inflow, 64 billion USD every year,
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
143
was sought by NEPAD to carry out its plans and programmes. The
partners for development are, thus, expected to provide debt
cancellation, aid and other financing mechanisms in the short
run. However, NEPAD relies on expected private capital flows
to harness the wealth of Africa and achieve its objectives
(Para.144).
The role of ICTs in the integration of Africa into the
global economy is given a special focus in the NEPAD strategy.
The current economic revolution has, in part, been made possible by
advances in information and communications technology (ICT), which
have reduced the cost of and increased the speed of communications
across the globe, abolishing pre-existing barriers of time and space,
and affecting all areas of social and economic life. It has made
possible the integration of national systems of production and
finance, and is reflected in an exponential growth in the scale of
cross-border flows of goods, services and capital (Para.29).
The benefits expected from utilisation of ICTs range from
enhancing opportunities for global trade, investment and
finance to creation of a common regional market and even an
African Union (Paras.104-108). The small size of African
markets is singled out as the major obstacle to attract
foreign direct investment. Thus, by rolling out regional
Internet connectivity, NEPAD aims to link these markets the
global economy.
The e-Africa commission of NEPAD was established early in
2001 with funding from donors such as the World Bank, the
African Development Bank, UK, Japanese, Swiss development
agencies as well as the governments of South Africa and Egypt.
This organ is responsible for ICT initiatives. The commission,
operating in alliance with regional organisations such as
Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC), shapes policy
and regulatory framework to facilitate telecommunications
reform and e-readiness. The fibre optic cable project
discussed in the previous chapter, thus, was one of the tasks
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
144
the Commission set out to accomplish. The plan was to
coordinate all the fibre optic cables into a ring so that
every African country will be connected to the information
superhighway (http://www.eafricacommission.org/).
Foreign and local engagement with NEPAD
The NEPAD development blueprint has received favourable
response from donors and Western governments. More
importantly, the G8 encouraged all partnership agreements to
be undertaken via the organs created under NEPAD (Abraham,
2003).
In contrast, NEPAD has been a subject of serious
criticism by a number of African scholars, civil society
groups and social movements (Bond, 2005a). The first criticism
relates to the elite driven, top-down process of its
inception. NEPAD was initiated by the heads of states of
Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria and Senegal and later submitted
to the G8 for an approval. Questions as to the source and
scope of its authority have not been answered yet (Tandon,
2002, p.10; Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002; Adedeji, 2002;
Matthews, 2004; Mbaku, 2004).
According to Chabal (2002), the very nature of post-
colonial politics in Africa militates against any democratic
process. Neo-patrimonialism and clientilism still define
African politics. Despite the presence of a modern
institutional facade, power is still exercised through
informal patron-client relationship between the ruling elites
and their support base. Chabal cites the civil service system
as an example of just another link for the patrimonial chain
between patrons and clients. Similarly, elections do not have
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
145
the role of establishing accountability but factional
mobilisation, since the principles of legitimacy are still
traditional. Hence, without fundamentally changing the neo-
patrimonial politics of Africa, it is impossible to have
initiatives like NEPAD through a participatory process.
The second theme of criticism is NEPAD‘s development
paradigm, which is understood to be neo-liberalism. Some
scholars have pointed out that NEPAD‘s reliance on foreign aid
leads to a reproduction of colonial/dependency relationships
(Adedeji, 2002). Others have contended that, as experiences of
other countries such as Argentina indicate, foreign direct
investment (FDI) is a risky means to build Africa‘s economy
(Tandon, 2002, p.21). Tandon, thus, recommends that African
governments open their doors to FDI selectively, and not as a
matter of general policy. In particular, the provision of
social services such as electricity, education, health, etc
must not be put in the investment basket. The obligation to
provide basic needs of the people must be placed outside the
vagaries of the market and squarely shouldered by African
governments.
The cooperation paradigm, or partnership, is also
criticised for perpetuating the inequality between donors and
recipients (Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002; Matthews, 2004).
According to Adedeji (2002), the subtle semantic and
conceptual shift from ―cooperation‖ or ―compact‖ to
―partnership‖ since the end of the cold war has culminated
NEPAD. This shift reflects the change in the character of
international relations since the Yaoundé I cooperation
agreement between the then European Economic Community and
Africa in the 1960s. Each successive agreement has reduced the
autonomy of recipients over aid resources by introducing
stringent conditionality. Adedeji argued that with the
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
146
introduction of ―partnership‖, the liberal international
principle of interdependence is no more in the service of
Africa. Consequently, it would be naive to expect the
partnership advocated by NEPAD to signify anything other than
submission of Africa to a neo-liberal discipline.
Finally, academics and civil society groups have
articulated alternative visions for Africa. Adedeji advocated
a revival of the principles which guided the liberation
struggle in Africa, namely: self-reliance, self-sustainment,
the democratisation of the development process, and a fair and
just distribution of the fruit of economic progress. Self-
reliance, which is the core element of this vision, emphasises
import substitution and internal articulation of the economy
(Adedeji, 2002, p.7).
Similarly, the Council for the Development of Social
Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and Third World Network
evaluated NEPAD in their meeting in Accra, Ghana in 2002. The
common position was that current African economic problems
emanate from the international economic order with its
division of labour reinforcing ―domestic weaknesses deriving
from socio-economic and political structures‖. Thus, the
policy measures that are urgently required for the recovery of
Africa were pointed out as follows:
stabilisation of commodity prices,
reform of the international financial
system, the World Bank and the IMF,
an end to IMF/World Bank Structural
Adjustment Programmes,
fundamental changes to the existing
agreements of the WTO regime, as well as
reversal of the attempts to expand the scope
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
147
of this regime to new areas including
investment, competition and government
procurement, and
debt cancellation.
Likewise, a number of radical African social movements,
trade unions, youth and women organisations, and religious,
academic, etc groups, convened in Durban, South Africa in 2002
to denounce NEPAD. The Civil Society Indaba of South Africa,
for instance, specifically addressed each segment of NEPAD‘s
neo-liberal policies including private ownership of
infrastructure, commercial agriculture, debt rescheduling,
etc. They concluded that all these measures are detrimental to
food security, employment, and environmental protection in
Africa. The African Civil Society Declaration that came out of
this meeting articulated an alternative vision for Africa
based on the principles of Human Rights, Self-Reliance, Pan-
Africanism, and a ―developmental participatory state‖
(Bond,2005a,pp.32-35).
Unlike the civil society groups that have been promoting
the neo-liberal principles enshrined in NEPAD, the radical
civil society elements opposed to it remain hardly visible.
The first problem faced by radical civil society groups is
lack of resources to disseminate information, or to carry out
advocacy and lobbying activities. For instance, about 650
activists attended the 2004 Africa Social Forum, which met in
Lusaka, Zambia. Most of the delegates were from neighbouring
countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia. Members from
other parts of the continent were unable to participate due to
material constraints. Besides, organisations, which were
putting up resistance against their governments on issues of
privatisation and environmental degradation, were prevented
from attending this conference (Bond, 2005b).
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
148
In Africa, as elsewhere, there are divisions among civil
society actors as to the stance to be taken against the state
and international financial institutions. Some civil society
actors prefer a critical engagement with both, while others
call for mass action and civil disobedience. This divergence
in commitment is usually presented as a lack of unity leading
to the inability to design an all-Africa social forum.
However, such evaluation of civil society actors seems to be
based on an erroneous theoretical presupposition that civil
society represents a homogenous and autonomous entity. Rather,
the African Civil Society Declaration points the way towards a
resistance bloc that not only opposes the neoliberal path of
NEPAD but also offers an alternative vision.
Framing NEPAD
While there is no dearth of criticism of NEPAD, there are
relatively few attempts to explain why it came about in the
first place. Adedeji (2002, p.11) characterised the
partnership logic of NEPAD as ―a childlike naivety among
African leaders and policy makers‖ in expecting a relationship
with donors based on equality. Tandon (2002, p.25), on the
other hand, commented that the ―road to hell is often paved
with good intentions‖. For these authors, NEPAD arises from a
noble concern to end the spiral of poverty and conflict that
is plaguing Africa. It is only the means that it chose which
is inappropriate to the reality of the continent. According to
these scholars, NEPAD should simply adopt a ―strategy of self-
reliance‖48.
48 Both Adedeji and Tandon emphasised the distinction between
insertion into the global accumulation system as advocated by NEPAD and
controlled integration into the global economy. The suggested path is an
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
149
Tsheola (2002), on the other hand, associated the birth
of NEPAD to the role of South Africa in mediating
globalisation in the continent. He traced the shift to neo-
liberalism in South Africa to the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) policy of 1996. GEAR was committed to
relaxation of exchange controls, reduction of tariff on
imports and privatisation of public assets. These policy
changes affirmed the primary role of capital in the post-
Apartheid recovery of South Africa49.
auto-centred integration in which African countries do not merely adjust to
the system but shape and influence it to their own advantage. Amin stressed
the political goals of integration as follows:
Here we have to look at the challenge of regionalism in another way:
that the bourgeoisie-at the global level or the compradors at various
levels in Africa and elsewhere-look at the problem of regionalism in terms
of common markets and we should be very critical of this view. It is
presented as follows: that if even the Europeans with strong national
economies need to unite by building a common market, we should do the same.
In fact, they have different problems and they have to go beyond a common
market even from the European left point of view (1997, p.8).
49 The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) stated that
the wage of blue collar workers went down by 7% and number of jobs by
171,000 only a year after the introduction of this new policy. At the same
time, the reduction of public expenditure and the push for a slim state has
eclipsed the redistributive goals of the post-Apartheid recovery programme
(Vavi, 1997).
Tsheola also observed that despite the sound macroeconomic
fundamentals set down by GEAR, foreign investment did not materialise. In
fact, there was more capital flight from the country, aided by the
relaxation of foreign exchange control prescribed by the new policy. The
result of this capital outflow was the state expenditure deficit leading to
labour strikes and stoppage. In short, GEAR ensured foreign interests at
the expense of domestic ones.
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
150
South Africa‘s geographical association with Africa,
which is deemed a zone of danger for free enterprise, was
identified as the cause for the lack of FDI. Therefore, GEAR
was later transposed to NEPAD through the active leadership of
Thabo Mbeki. According to Tsheola, in spite of the rhetoric of
―African recovery‖, NEPAD is but a means to attract more FDI
to South Africa itself.
South African economic think tanks and experts have
indeed positively evaluated the NEPAD initiative as a vehicle
for national economic objectives. The President of the
Economic Society of South Africa spelt out the strategic
advantages of corporate expansion of South Africa into the
rest of the continent (Loots, 2005). Firstly, the
profitability of investment in Africa is, on average, higher
than in other regions of the world. Secondly, the perception
of foreign investors about the continent follows a blanket
approach, which tends to lump all of Africa as a single
destination. South Africa and China are becoming major
investors in the continent partly because they do not share
this perception. Therefore, the adoption of ―good policies
within a stable institutional framework‖ such as NEPAD is an
indispensable prerequisite to attract FDI to Africa50.
Akinboade and Lalthapersad-Pillay (2005,) provided a
detailed account of the ―possible pay-offs‖ of the NEPAD
policy framework for South African economic interest.
Accordingly, African countries need the expertise, investment
50 Loots (2003) also extensively analysed the function and role of
the African Peer Review Mechanism in providing such stable institutional
framework. Applying concepts from the New Institutional Economics (NIE),
she outlined the role of institutions such as the Peer Review Mechanism in
reducing uncertainty, promoting efficiency and, therefore, facilitating
good economic performance.
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
151
and concrete business opportunities offered by South Africa
―to kick start their development process‖. Economic contact
with South Africa ―provides an opportunity to procure
internationally traded goods and services at reasonable cost
from an African country‖ (pp.5-6).
More importantly, South Africa offers one of the largest
and most deregulated financial industries with sophisticated
banking and insurance markets. The South African stock
exchange market is an important source of equity financing.
Moreover, South African enterprises have the expertise and the
capacity to construct and maintain transport,
telecommunications and energy infrastructure in other African
countries.
Similarly, what South Africa can get from the rest of
Africa is stated as follows:
During the apartheid years cultural, political and economic sanctions
were imposed against South Africa. As South Africa embraced
democracy, these sanctions were lifted. This opened up the
possibility of corporate expansion of dominant South African firms
into the rest of Africa as a means of maintaining economic viability
and acquiring more competitive strength in a globalizing world. Also
expanding into other parts of Africa could minimize the impact of
policy changes that are introduced under democracy on South African
business interests, and should facilitate the closer integration with
Africa of an otherwise previously isolated country(p. 256).
Amin (2006), on the other hand, situated the NEPAD
initiative and the role of African actors within a broader
critique of global capitalist developments. His major
proposition is that various models of worldwide capital
accumulation rest on social alliances in the centre and
periphery. Accordingly, the colonial, post-colonial and the
current ―globalization‖ phases have depended on different
types of comprador classes in Africa.
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
152
The social blocs in Africa that engaged in the liberation
struggle and then in the NIEO were ―national populist‖ pitted
against the imperial ambitions of transnational capital. The
hegemonic ideas that cemented this bloc included economic
modernisation through industrialisation, internal articulation
of the economy, and creation of internal demand for growth.
According to Amin, these were the foundation for the economic
and social transformation of the third world from the 1950s up
to the 1970s51.
However, the dominance of neo-liberal blocs in the North
and the material limitations in the South later brought about
the reconfiguration of comprador classes in Africa. The debt
burden and the discontinuation of the growth and
industrialisation policies finally eroded national populism.
It could be asked why the governments of the countries of the South
have subscribed to all of these commandments drafted in the
imperialist centres. The response, in general terms, is that we
should look to the social hegemonic blocs mentioned above that make
possible the reproduction of asymmetric globalization. There is a new
comprador class in the countries of the periphery that actually
derives its existence from the new model of globalized liberalism.
This comprador class participates in the new government arrangements
that followed the erosion of the national populist models inspired by
Bandung (Amin, 2006, p.4).
Taylor (2002) has also applied the insights of Neo-
Gramscian theory for his argument that NEPAD has been the
instrument of externally-oriented fraction of capital within
51 Amin distinguished a national populist bloc from a national
socialist one. The former could be useful in combating colonial and neo-
colonial impositions from abroad. Besides, it could play a role in defining
an autonomous development path for Africa. Ultimately, however, the
emergence of a national socialist bloc is a necessary condition to delink
from a capitalist world system. De-linkage is not synonymous with autarchy.
It refers to what Amin calls auto-centred integration with the
international economy.
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153
key African states, mainly: South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria.
These are confronted by inward-looking fractions who rallied
around a nationalist project of de-linkage from the world
capitalist system. However, the new global structure has
provided favourable opportunities for the externally oriented
fraction to prevail in such regional initiatives as NEPAD.
These explanations have some merits when analysed on the
basis of the facts and analysis presented in the previous
chapters of this dissertation. The framing of NEPAD as a mere
extension of South Africa‘s national interest into the rest of
the continent appears to be the most extensively documented
and evidenced of all the different arguments. Lesufi (2004,)
emphasised this argument by pointing out that the presentation
of NEPAD as a collective instrument of African leaders
conceals ―the inequalities among the African states and thus
the real possibilities of reproducing relations of domination
and exploitation among them‖ (pp.813-814). Bond (2006) also
underlined the thesis that South Africa is deploying its
―comparative advantage‖ in the industrial sector in order to
play a semi-imperialist role over other African countries.
Such analysis overemphasises the role of national
interest and disregards the integral role played by
transnational alliance of interests52. The agency of other
actors in Africa in charting out a neo-liberal path of
development is, therefore, underestimated.
52 The Sunday Times, reporting on the July 2003 African Union meeting
in Maputo, stated that Mbeki was viewed by other African leaders as ―too
powerful, and they privately accuse him of wanting to impose his will on
others. In the corridors they call him the George Bush of Africa, leading
the most powerful nation in the neighbourhood and using his financial and
military muscle to further his own agenda‖ (Cited in Bond, 2006, p.112).
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154
It may be instructive to note the evolution of the Open
Access Policy initiative as the key policy instrument to
integrate Africa into the global economy. This initiative was,
from the start, incubated by Internet service providers in
Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria in particular, and in other African
countries, in general, through their continental ISP
association. The Halfway Proposition and Open Access policy
for Africa were the contributions of this association or its
members. These were only later actively supported and even
funded by the South African political and corporate
elite53.However, the advocacy and policy proposals had already
influenced donors and international financial organisations
well before the involvement of the South African government.
Taylor‘s assessment of NEPAD seems to be closer to the
factual evidence offered in the previous chapters of this
dissertation. However, his dichotomy of the present political
actors into external oriented and inward looking ones is not
fully tenable. It may be appropriate to characterise the
difference between the proponents of NEPAD and some civil
society actors and academics who espoused import substitution
and self-reliance .Otherwise, the Open Access versus
Consortium dispute as well as the resistance by African
governments to privatisation and liberalisation of national
telcos did not display any inward looking political or policy
stance. NEPAD‘s emphasis on African ownership of the fibre
optic cable is, thus, specific to proprietary rights over the
assets such as fibre optic cables and landing stations. It
does not aim to reorient the patterns of trade and investment
between Africa and foreign capital.
53 The South African government contributed 3 million Rand to NEPAD
e-Africa commission to supplement its budget for one year (Jensen, 2007,
p.20).
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155
South Africa is indeed the major economic force in Africa
but not the only one. Egypt and Nigeria seek bigger markets
for further accumulation. Egypt is one of those African
countries with indigenous Pan-African operators with a stake
in the global and regional information society policy. MSI and
Orascom, Sudanese and Egyptian private telcos respectively,
have more than fourteen licences in other African countries in
2000 (Gebreab, 2002, p. 9). These corporations have also been
well represented by their state bureaucrats in the NEPAD
blueprint. Egypt, it is to be recalled, was one of the
countries that financed the e-Africa Commission.
South Africa, Senegal and Nigeria, have a relatively
visible preponderance of elites that are part of an emerging
transnational bloc comprised of executives and affiliates of
global corporations, consumerist elites, state bureaucrats as
well as politicians and professionals promoting neo-liberal
policies. The considerable political and discursive power
mobilised to shape African information society by NGOs, ISP
associations, new ICT enterprises is a manifestation of a
transnational class alliance. Likewise, the dispute around the
Open Access versus Consortium models is a conflict between
class fractions, rather than between national interests. ISPs,
mobile providers, ICT entrepreneurs, NGOs, etc, irrespective
of national origin, were supportive of a liberalised
infrastructure provision whereas incumbent telcos were in
favour of a monopoly provision.
Neo-Gramscian studies seem to have neglected the
probability of such class alliance in African social
formations. According to Cox, no dominant class has been able
to establish hegemony in the peripheral regions nor is the
economy developed as in the hegemonic core. In other words, in
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156
the peripheral regions, the state is Hobbesian, where civil
society is undeveloped, and the ruling class is the state
class. Therefore, elites in these regions are not able to
articulate hegemonic ideas that have a social basis and
internal logic. Thus, political change in such circumstances
amounts to superimposition of global capital accumulation over
the old internal power structure (Van der Pijl, 1998).Major
ideological and political shifts in Africa ranging from the
promotion of the New International Economic Order of the 1970s
to the democratisation movement of the 1980s were, thus,
summarily explained as a passive revolution. The ruling class
in Africa is ―too weak to establish hegemony in the sense of
an ideological bond between itself and the masses‖
(Abrahamsen, 1997, p.149).
However, the political processes discussed in this
dissertation suggest that hegemonic politics has also its
place in Africa, albeit to a limited extent. Likewise, NEPAD‘s
neo-liberal agenda was opposed by a coalition of radical civil
society actors at regional platforms. Such opposition is a
prototype of a counterhegemonic exercise against the moral and
political legitimacy of the NEPAD programme. Civil society
groups have been able to forward ideas reflective of African
reality and antagonistic to the hegemony of neo-liberalism.
Hence, there are some empirical indications that a blanket
characterisation of African regional and national politics as
a mere ―transition or conveyor belt‖ of external changes may
be unwarranted54. Rather, concepts such as passive revolution
and hegemony are ideal types whose application in practical
contexts may reveal nuances and variations.
54 Though Amin has noted that national populists had a hegemony in
the 1950s and 1960s, he does not ascribe such hegemony to the new
―comprador classes‖ active in NEPAD.
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In South Africa, GEAR has generally been regarded as a
broad social contract, including civil society, political
parties, and grassroots movements, both radical and moderate,
under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC).
As a hegemonic exercise, GEAR attempts to establish its
legitimacy by invoking black empowerment in the post-Apartheid
period (Adler & Webster, 1995; Bond & Mayekiso, 1996). Such
empowerment generally took the form of ownership and control
of state enterprises by black entrepreneurs. For example, a
black middle class group owned equity in Telkom (Engdahl &
Hauki, 2001, Horowtiz & Curry, 2007).
However, this idea of black empowerment has also been
contested. Labour representatives such as the Congress of
South African Trade Union (COSATU) have asserted that creation
of black or African bourgeoisie merely introduces a class
conflict between (black) capital and (black) labour. Thus,
empowerment is progressive only when it is people centred and
addresses such issues as poverty, urban renewal and gender
balance (Labour Resource and Research Institute, 2001).
A political contestation of comparable degree also took
place in Senegal, as described in the previous chapter, where
telecommunications reforms accompanied the restructuring of
the state. The employees of the monopoly telco retained their
privilege by becoming shareholders in the new private company.
Nevertheless, a consensus was reached after a complex state-
civil society engagement in which traditional authority
figures (marabouts) were also involved along with the urban
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158
middle class55. Certainly, the political forces pitted against
each other had little ideological difference than in South
Africa. Even then, this kind of compromise politics occurred
to a lesser degree in countries like Ghana where privatisation
and liberalisation were carried out after demobilisation of
opposition groups (Noll &Shirley, 2001, p.47).
At the other end of the spectrum are countries like
Ethiopia and Algeria, whose leaders have been the
spokespersons of NEPAD to the outside world. Here the state is
a ―tyranny of cousins‖ and politics is synonymous with armed
struggle or urban riots. In Algeria, telecommunication reform
was carried out in disregard of opposition by labour unions
and political parties (Um, 2004). In Ethiopia,
telecommunication reforms have been muted until the recent
push by international organisations to kick-start the
country‘s accession to the WTO Agreement. These are, indeed,
good examples of passive revolution where a new form of
capitalist accumulation is introduced without altering the
existing social divisions whether based on tradition,
ethnicity, or class. Telecommunication reforms or introduction
of information society policies in such social formations are
means to access foreign debt or aid that will ensure the
continuity of the existing system.
55 These are leaders of Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal with strong
following. They have been able to influence the votes of their followers
and negotiate with political candidates for the presidency (Azam et al.,
2002).