LAW314 – Constitutional Law · 2018-02-23 · LAW314 – Constitutional Law Macquarie University...
Transcript of LAW314 – Constitutional Law · 2018-02-23 · LAW314 – Constitutional Law Macquarie University...
LAW314–ConstitutionalLawMacquarieUniversitySession1,2016CombinedLecture&TextbookNotesPrescribedText-Winterton’sAustralianFederalConstitutionalLaw:CommentaryandMaterials,3rdedition,2013
WEEK TOPIC PAGEWeekOne FederationandIndependence 3 TheConstitutionandConstitutionalism 6 IndependenceandCitizens–SinghvCommonwealth 9WeekTwo ConstitutionalInterpretation 12WeekThree CharacterisationoftheConstitution 18 TheExternalAffairsPower 18WeekFour TheCorporationsPower 26WeekFive Federalism:StateConstitutionsandInconsistency 39 StateConstitutions 45 Same-sexmarriagecase 49WeekSix Federalism 52 Federalism:FinancialRelations 57 ANationalDocument:EqualTreatmentProvisions 59 FreedomofInterstateTrade 65WeekSeven TheExecutivePower 69 NationhoodandContracting 75 ASummaryoftheExecutivePowerforExams 82WeekEight TheJudicialPower 83 TheFrameworkofChapterIII&BoilermakersCase 87 BoilermakersLimbOne-ExecutiveDetention 92 JudicialPowerNotesforExams 96WeekNine BoilermakersLimbTwo 98 StateCourtsandIncompatibility 103WeekTen ProtectingRights 110 FreedomofReligion 116 Trialbyjury 120WeekEleven ImpliedRightsandFreedoms 121 ImpliedRighttoVote 121 Structuralism–UsingStructuretoImplyRights 123 ImpliedFreedomofPoliticalCommunication 124 ImpliedFreedoms–SummaryforExams 129WeekTwelve Maboandsovereignty 130 TheRacePower;IndigenousRecognitionand
ConstitutionalChange132
WeekFour:TheCorporationsPowerTHECORPORATIONSPOWERTHEINDUSTRIALRELATIONSPOWERSUBSEQUENTISSUES
1. Whichcorporationscanberegulated?2. Whataspectsofthosecorporationscanberegulated?3. Whatcategoriesofpersonsotherthancorporationscanberegulateddue
totheirrelationtoconstitutionalcorporations?WHICHCORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATED?Tradingandfinancialcorporations
• RvFederalCourtofAustralia;ExparteWANationalFootballLeague(Adamson’sCase)(1979)143CLR190
• CommonwealthvTasmania(TasmanianDamCase)(1983)158CLRWHATASPECTSOFTHOSECORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATED?
• Huddart,Parker&CoPtyLtdvMoorehead(1909)8CLR330• ActorsandAnnouncersEquityAssociationofAustraliavFontanaFilmsPty
Ltd(1982)150CLR169,205• CommonwealthvTasmania(TasmanianDamCase)(1983)158CLR1
WHATCATEGORIESOFPERSONSOTHERTHANCORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATEDDUETOTHEIRRELATIONTOCONSTITUTIONALCORPORATIONS?
• ReDingjan;ExparteWagner(1995)183CLR323WORKCHOICESCASECharacterisationIssueRelevanceofConventionDebatesRelevanceofReferendumsThemesandissues
1. Federalism2. ImpactofEngineers3. Interpretation4. Consequences
THECORPORATIONSPOWERSection51(xx)TheParliamentshall,subjecttothisConstitution,havepowertomakelawsforthepeace,order,andgoodgovernmentoftheCommonwealthwithrespectto:…Foreigncorporations,andtradingorfinancialcorporationsformedwithinthelimitsoftheCommonwealth
• ‘Constitutionalcorporations’:shorthandforforeign,tradingandfinancialcorporations.
• ‘Foreigncorporations’:‘formedoutsidethelimitsoftheCommonwealth’NewSouthWalesvCommonwealth(IncorporationCase)(1990)169CLR482,497-8.
THEINDUSTRIALRELATIONSPOWERSection51(xxxv)
TheParliamentshall,subjecttothisConstitution,havepowertomakelawsforthepeace,order,andgoodgovernmentoftheCommonwealthwithrespectto:…ConciliationandarbitrationforthepreventionandsettlementofindustrialdisputesextendingbeyondthelimitsofanyoneState.SUBSEQUENTISSUESWemustundergo1)Interpretationand2)Characterisation.1.Interpretation
• Mainquestion-Whatisthescopeofthepower?• Toanswer-Lookatthemeaningof‘trading’,‘financial’corporation.
2.Characterisation• Mainquestion-whenwillalawbeone‘inrespectof’thecorporations
power?• I.e.mustalawrelatefundamentallytoa‘trading’,‘financial’,or‘foreign’
qualitytobealawinrespectofthecorporationspower?• Or,canalawbeonanymattersolongastheconstitutionalcorporationis
theobjectofcommand?RelevantQuestions
1. Whichcorporationscanberegulated?2. Whataspectsofthosecorporationscanberegulated?3. Whatcategoriesofpersonsotherthancorporationscanberegulateddue
totheirrelationtoconstitutionalcorporations?1.WHICHCORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATED?TRADINGANDFINANCIALCORPORATIONSThecorporationspowerextendsonlytocorporations‘formedwithinthelimitsoftheCommonwealth’.ThismeansthattheCommonwealthdoesnothavethepowertoregulateformationofthosecorporations-IncorporationCase.ThereforetheCommonwealthhadtonegotiatewithallthestatestoenforceuniformcorporationslaw.Howdoweidentifyatradingorfinancialcorporation?Courtshaveconsideredtwotests:anActivitiestestandaPurposetest.ItisshowninQueenslandRail[2015]HCA11(8April2015)thatthepreferredapproachistousebothtests/examinebothfeaturesofthecorporation.RvFederalCourtofAustralia;ExparteWANationalFootballLeague(Adamson’sCase)(1979)143CLR190Issue:wasafootballclubatradingcorporation?Decision:Yes,majorityfocusedontheclub’sactivities.Reasoning
• Withaprimaryfocusonactivities,MasonJlookedtogatereceipts,distributionofincomeagainstclubs,sourcesofincomee.g.broadcasting,sizeofrevenue.Notehealludedtotheclub’spurposeasfinancialgain.
• StephenJindissentlookedattheclub’spurpose,saidtherewasnosharingofprofitsamongstmembersanditspurposewaspromotingthegame.
Remainingissues
• Whatdegreeofactivitymadeacorporationatradingorfinancialcorporation?
o MasonJhadcontrasted‘sufficientlysignificantproportionofitsoverallactivities’with‘soslightandincidental’(e.g.wherechurchesorschoolsengageinsomebutsoslightandincidentalthattheycan’tbeconsideredtradingcorps)(233-4).
• ThisquestionwassettledinStateSuperannuationBoardofVictoriavTradePracticesCommission(1982)150CLR282:
o Majority-Financialactivitiesmustformasubstantialproportionoftotalactivities,evenifothermoreextensivenon-financial(non-trading)activitiesalsotakeplace.
o NotetheminorityviewofGibbsCJandWilsonJ-activitymustbe‘thepredominantandcharacteristicactivity’.
CommonwealthvTasmania(TasmanianDamCase)(1983)158CLRFacts:Hydro-ElectricCommissionwasagovernmentcontrolledcorporationcreatedbytheHydro-ElectricCommissionAct1944(Tas).ItplannedtobuildadamontheFranklinriversysteminTasmaniainordertogenerateelectricitythatwouldbesoldtoconsumers.DecisionandReasoning
• MasonJ(majority):theconnectionofthecorporationwiththegovernmentofastatedoesn’ttakeitoutsidethepower.ItisnotaservantoftheCrown;whileithasasignificantpolicymakingroleandengagesinlarge-scaleconstruction,itcanstillbeatradingcorporation.
• Focusedonactivitiesnotpurposes.RemainingIssues
• Theamountoftradingorfinancialactivitiesofacorporationcanchangeovertime.Thusifwearedefiningtrading/financialcorpsonthebasisofactivities,itsstatusasaconstitutionaltrading/financialcorporationcouldchangeovertime.
QuickendenvO’Connor(2001)109FCR243(FC)
• ‘Substantial’appliedliberally.• HeldthatUniversityofWesternAustraliaisa‘tradingcorporation’
despitetotalrevenuebeingonly18percent.2.WHATASPECTSOFTHOSECORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATED?Differentviewshaveevolvedovertime.TheolderviewHuddart,Parker&CoPtyLtdvMoorehead(1909)8CLR330
• ThecorporationspowerenablestheCommonwealthtorecogniseandprovideforcorporationstooperatebeyondtheirjurisdictionoforigin.I.e.itisaninterstatepower.
• Forexample,thiswouldallowthecommonwealthtoofferlinesofcredittocorporationsoperatinginterstate.Alignswiththereservedstatepowersdoctrine.
• ThecasewasoverturnedbyStricklandvRoclaConcretePipesLtd(1971)124CLR468,484(BarwickCJ)wherenotedthatRPdoctrinehadbeenoverturnedinEngineers.
IsaacsJdissent(393)• Empoweringlawthatdependsonsimplythespecificobjectsofthe
power-aforeign,tradingorfinancialcorporation-whetherinasingleStateorinterstatecanregulateonthesemattersonceidentified.
• Suchcorporationsaredistinguishablefromdomesticcorporationsformunicipal,mining,manufacturing,religious,scholasticorcharitablepurposes.
• ThisdistinctionstillcitedinWorkChoices.HigginsJmajority
• IftheCommonwealthcouldregulateonanymattersolongasitreferredtotheobject(e.g.identifiedfinance,trade,foreign),itcouldregulatetoomuch.
THERELEVANCEOFTRADINGANDFINANCIALOvertime,threeviewshavedevelopedonthescopeofthepower.
1. Narrowview:thecorporationspowerislimitedtotheregulationoftradingactivitiesoftradingcorporationsorfinancialactivitiesoffinancialcorporations.
2. Intermediaryview:thepowerextendstoactivitiesoftradingcorporationsengagedinforthepurposesoftrade.
3. Broadview:itcanbeusedtoregulatetheactivitiesofatradingcorporationinanyrespectwhatsoever.Providedacorporationhasthecharacteristicsthatbringsitwithins51(xx),anyaspectoractivityofthatcorporationcanberegulatedbytheCommonwealth.
Thefirsttwoviewsreflectthe‘distinctivecharacter’test:
• I.e.thefactthecorporationisatrading,financialorforeigncorporationshouldbesignificantinthewaythelawrelatestoit(Wintertonpg520).Thelawshouldberelatedtothataspect.
Thethirdviewreflectsthe‘objectofcommand’test:
• This‘requiresthataconstitutionalcorporationbeanobjectofthecommandofalaw,permittingorprohibitingatradingorfinancialcorporationfromengaginginconductorformingrelationships’(Ibid).I.e.lawneedstousetradingorfinancialcorporationasitssubjectmatterandthenitcanregulateinanymannerconnectingtoit.
Viewone:NarrowviewActorsandAnnouncersEquityAssociationofAustraliavFontanaFilmsPtyLtd(1982)150CLR169,205Directlyregulatingtradingactivitiesofatradingcorporation
• MasonJ205‘Suchalawiswithinpowerbecauseitnecessarilyoperatesdirectlyonthesubjectofthepower-itisalawabouttradingcorporations.’
IndirectlyregulatingtradingactivitiesofatradingcorporationIssue:WhethertheTradePracticesAct1974(Cth)s45D(1)(b)(i)wasvalidunders51(xx).
• Itprohibitedsecondaryboycotts,whichiswhathadoccurred.ItprohibitedtheactorsunionfrompreventingtheatreagentsfromsupplyingFontana(acorporation)withlabour.
• Thiswasnotalawdirectlyonthesubjectoftradeactivitiesbutprotectedatradingcorporationbyregulatingstrikeactions.
• Thetargetofthelegislationwaspreventingsecondaryboycottslikelytoresultineventssuchassubstantiallossofbusiness.
JudgmentsMasonJ
• Thereisnodistinctionbetweenalawprotectingthebusinessofacorporationfromlossordamageandoneoperatingtoprotectthecorporationfrominterferencewithitstradingactivities.Eachprotectsthesubjectofapowerbyoperatingdirectlyonit-207.
• Indicta,saidtheCPdoesnotonlyapplytotradingactivitiesbutmustapplytothesubjectmatter(tradingcorporations).
Murphy
• CP‘enablesParliamenttomakecomprehensivelawscoveringallinternalandexternalrelationsofforeigntradingandfinancialcorporations’(212)
• ThispowerincludesIR. Gibbs(narrowview)
• GivenfederalnatureofConstitution,difficulttosupposethatpowerswereintendedtoextenttotheenactmentofacompletecodeoflawsapplicabletothepersonsnamedinparasxixandxxofCP(181).
• Foreign,tradingandfinancialaspectsmustbesignificantinthenatureofthelawforittobevalid(181).E.g.lawcanonlyrelatetoforeignaspectoftheforeigncorporation.
Viewtwo:IntermediaryviewThisproposesthatthecorporationspowerextendsalsotoactivitiesoftradingcorporationsengagedinforthepurposesoftrade.AnexampleisshownintheTasmanianDamscase.CommonwealthvTasmania(TasmanianDamCase)(1983)158CLR1Facts:
• WorldHeritagePropertiesConservationAct1983(Cth)providedthattheGovernor–Generalcoulddeclarepropertyasapropertytowhichs10appliedifitisbeingorlikelytobedamagedordestroyed.S10(1)defined‘foreign’and‘trading’corporationsascorporationswithinthemeaningofs51(xx)forthepurposeoftheAct.S10(2)prohibitedwithoutminister’sconsent,a‘foreigncorporation’,acorporation‘incorporatedinaterritory’and‘atradingcorporationformedwithinhelimitsoftheCommonwealth’fromengaginginactivitiessuchasdrillinganddeforestation.I.e.sections7and10preventedconstructionoftheGordon-below-Franklindam.
Significance:• Thiscasesignificantlyexpandedtheambitofs51(xx)byrecognising
thatitextendedbeyondtheregulationofthetradingactivitiesoftradingcorporationstoactivitiesundertakenforthepurposeoftheirtradingactivities.ThiswasnotappreciatedbyJusticeGibbs.
• TheActreferredtoactsdonebyatradingcorporation‘forthepurposeofitstradingactivities’10(4)
• ThispossiblymeansthattheCommonwealthcouldregulate,forexamplethebuildingoffactoriesestablishedforproductionthatwouldleadtotrade.
MasonJ
• 146-Therelevantquestioniswhetherthecorporationspowerextendstotheregulationofactivitiesoftradingcorporations,notbeingtradingactivities.I.e.cantheyregulateactivitiesofTC’swhentheseactivitiesaren’ttrading.
• Thesubjectmatterofthepowerispersons,notactivities.• 148-TheproposedrestrictionwoulddenyParliamentpowertoregulate
borrowingbytradingcorporations,despitethefactthepurposeofs51(xx)wastoenablePtoregulatetransactionsb/wcategoriesofcorporationmentionedandthepublic,indeedtoprotectthepublic,shouldtheneedarise,inrelationtotheoperationsofsuchcorporations.
• Rejectsthe‘distinctivecharactertest’(148)whicharguesthatCthcanonlyregulateactivitiesengagedinbyaTCforpurposeoftrading.Hegivesthreereasons:(149)
1. Thatanalysishasnoapplicabilitywhenlookingatfinancialandforeigncorporations.Thescopeoftheirpowerwasn’ttobelimitedbyreferencetotheforeignaspectsofforeigncorporationsandfinancialaspectsoffinancialcorporations.
2. ThisinterpretationfailstogiveeffecttotheprinciplethatlegislativepowerconferredbytheConstitutionshouldbeliberallyconstrued.
3. Thepowerisattachedtoadesignatedtypeoflegalperson,thuswouldseem‘naturallytoextendtotheiractsandactivities’.
• MentionsGriffithJinHuddartat348:theCorporationspowerallowsCthtoregulatecorporationswithregardsto:
o Officersandservantsitmustemploy,conditionsoflabour,remuneration,thuscan‘exercisecompletecontrolofthedomestictradecarriedonbythem’.
• ‘Alawwhichprohibitstradingandforeigncorporationsfromdoinganactisalawabouttradingandforeigncorporations,notwithstandingthatitisalsoalawabouttheactwhichisprohibited’(153).
• Conclusion:thereis‘nosoundreasonfordenyingthatthepowershouldextendtotheregulationofactsundertakenbytradingcorporationsforthepurposeofengagingintheirtradingactivities’.
DeaneJ
• Makestwopoints:1)relationofCPtootherheadsofpowerand2)relationofCPtoappropriatenationalpower.
• 268:‘Thegrantofpowercontainedins51(xx)oftheConstitution…mustnotbereaddownbyreferencetoanypresumptionthatthevariousgrantsofpowercontainedins51shouldbeconstruedasbeingmutuallyexclusive’àseeWorkChoices.
• 270:‘Noonewithknowledgeofthepoliticalandothernon-tradingactivitiesoftradingcorporationsinandsincethedaysoftheEastIndiaCompanywouldsuggestthatthenon-tradingactivitiesoftradingcorporationsareanylessappropriatetobeplacedunderthelegislativecontrolofanationalgovernmentthanaretheirtradingactivities.’
GibbsCJ:maintainedviewthatCPonlyempoweredregulationofactivities‘properlyregardedastradingactivities’(117)
• ConsideredmostoftheactsprohibitedbytheWorldHeritagestatutewere‘preparatorytothetrade’,aimedatconservation,andappliedtoanypersons.Theywerenotconcernedwithtradingcorporationsengagedintradingactivities(118).
DawsonJ
• Federalismconcern317:The‘tradingcorporation’etctagsare‘pegsuponwhichParliamenthassoughttohanglegislationonanentirelydifferenttopic’.PattemptingtoregulateenvironmentalconductofacorporationratherthanitstradingactivitiesthroughtheCP.ReachingintowhatwastraditionallyastatebasedmatterthroughtheCPnotthroughtradingactivities
3.WHATCATEGORIESOFPERSONSOTHERTHANCORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATEDDUETOTHEIRRELATIONTOCONSTITUTIONALCORPORATIONS?ReDingjan;ExparteWagner(1995)183CLR323Facts:
• TasmanianPulp(thecorporationinthiscase)contractedwiththeWagnerstoharvesttimber.TheWagnerssubcontractedtotheDingjan’s.
• TheDingjan’ssoughtareviewandvariationoftheircontract,pursuanttotheIndustrialRelationsAct1988(Cth)whichallowedtheIRCommissiontovarycontractsforunfairness.
• TheActapplied‘inrelationtoacontractrelatingtothebusinessofaconstitutionalcorporation’127C(1)(b).
Issue:• Wassection127C(1)(b)alawwithrespecttothecorporationspower?• ThisarosebecausetheWagner’sandDingjan’swerenotcorporations.It
waspurportingtoregulateathirdpartythroughitscontractualrelationshipwithaconstitutionalcorporation.
Held:
• Thesectionwasinvalidby4:3.MasonCJ,DeaneandGaudronJJdissenting.
Brennan(majority)
• Thelawmustdiscriminatebetweenconstitutionalcorporationsandotherpersons.
• 338-TheActaffectedrightsandobligationsofcontractualparties,regardlessofwhethertheywereaconstitutionalcorporation.Thepowertoaffecttheircontractmayormaynotaffecttherelatedbusinessoftheconstitutionalcorporationatall.Thus,thescopewastoowide.
McHughJ(majority)368
• CorporationspowerallowstheCommonwealthtomakelawsonanysubjectthataffectsthecorporation.
• Aslongasthelawcanbecharacterisedasalawwithrespecttotrading,financialorforeigncorporations,PcanregulatemanysubjectmattersthatareotherwiseoutsidethescopeofCommonwealthlegislativepower.
• However,thelawmusthave‘arelevancetoorconnectionwith’as51(xx)corporation.Itisnotenoughforthelawtorefertothesubjectmatterorapplytothesubjectmatter.
• Itmusthavesignificancetoactivities,functions,relationshipsorbusiness.I.e.givesomebenefitordetrimentaleffect.
• ‘Alawoperatingontheconductofoutsiderswillnotbewithinthepowerconferredbys51(xx)unlessthatconducthassignificance’forconstitutionalcorporations(s51(xx)corporations).
• Alawthatmakestheactivitymerelyaconditionforregulatingtheconductofanotherislikelytobeoutsideofpower.
GaudronJ:Dissent–adoptedinWorkChoices
• Section51(xx)‘istobeconstruedaccordingtoitstermsandnotbyreferencetounnecessaryimplicationsandlimitations’(364)-rejectingconcernsraisedinseveralcases
• CPextendsto‘thebusinessfunctions,activitiesandrelationshipsofconstitutionalcorporations’,andalso‘tothepersonsbyandthroughwhomtheycarryoutthosefunctionsandactivitiesandwithwhomtheyenterintothoserelationships.’365-movementtowardsobjectofcommandtest;identifyingCCasobjectofcommand,oncethisisdone,regulationcanoccuronanynumberofactivitiesrelatingtoitsfunctions,activities,relationsetc.
• Inthiscase–theprovisioninquestioneitherrelatestobeinginacontractwiththecorporationorapartywhoisitselfinacontractwiththecorporation(365-6)
WORKCHOICESCASENewSouthWalesvCommonwealth(WorkChoicesCase)(2006)229CLR1Facts:
• WorkplaceRelationsAmendment(WorkChoices)Act2005(Cth)restructuredworkplacerelationsfor‘constitutionalcorporations’.Thisaffected85%ofworkers.
• Previously,Commonwealthlegislationreliedmostlyontheconciliationandarbitrationpowers51(xxxv).WhereasthisAmendingActreliedlargelyonthecorporationspower.
• Section6ofthenewActincludedinitsdefinitionof‘employers’,constitutionalcorporations.
• Itaimedtocreateanationalworkplacerelationssystembasedonthecorporationspower.
• Fivestates,twounions(withsupportofTasmaniaandTerritories)broughtanactionseekingdeclarationthattheActwasinvalid.
LegalIssues:• Coulds51(xx)(Corporationspower)beusedtorefashionthelegislative
regimethathadpreviouslydependedons51(xxxv)(Conciliationandarbitrationpower)?
• Isalawrequiringcertainemployeeminimumentitlementsinrespectofconstitutionalcorporationsa‘lawwithrespecttosuchcorporations’?[17]
BreakingdownthequestionsA:Processofcharacterisationandinterpretation:
• A1:Whatdegreeofrelevanceorconnectionto‘constitutionalcorporations’isnecessaryforcharacterisationasalawwithrespecttothosecorporations?
• A2:Whatistherelevanceoffederalbalance?• A3:Isthecorporationspower‘readdown’bylimitswithinotherpowers?
(i.e.theconciliationandarbitrationpower).B:DidtheConventionDebatesshedlightonthemeaningofthecorporationspower?C:WasthefailuretoamendtheConstitution(byreferendum)toprovideforageneralIRpowerrelevanttointerpretingthecorporationspower?Relevantprovisions
• Corporationspowers51(xx)-canmakelawswithrespecttoforeigncorporations,tradingandfinancialcorporationsformedwithinthelimitsofthecommonwealth.
• Conciliationandarbitrationpowers51(xxxv)-canmakelawson‘Conciliationandarbitrationforthepreventionandsettlementofindustrialdisputesextendingbeyondthelimitsofanyonestate’.I.e.can’tmakeIRlawsonmattersthatarestatebased.
Plaintiff’sargument
• CommonwealthpowerislimitedbecauseemploymentandIRaretraditionallystatematters.
Judgement
• Majority:GleesonCJ,Gummow,Hayne,Heydon,andCrennanJJ• Dissenting:KirbyJandCallinanJ(separatejudgments)
CharacterisationIssue
A1:Whatdegreeofrelevanceorconnectionto‘constitutionalcorporations’isnecessaryforcharacterisationasalaw‘withrespectto’thosecorporations?Themajoritydiscussedtwodifferenttests:1)Distinctivecharactertest,2)ObjectofcommandtestDistinctivecharactertest(103)
• Proposesthatalawwouldonlybealawwithrespecttothecorporationspowerwhen‘thefactthatthecorporationisaforeign,tradingorfinancialcorporationshouldbesignificantinthewayinwhichthelawrelatestoit’.
• Onthisbasis,theCommonwealthcouldregulateinregardtotradingactivitiesorfinancialactivities.Employmentisnotamatteroftrading,thuswouldfalloutsidethecorporationspower.
RejectionofdistinctivecharactertestMajorityrejectsforthreereasons:
1. Itreliedonpreviouscasesbutthesewerefactspecificandnotrelevant-[141].
2. TheCourtmustnotinterpretapowerbasedonsuspicionoverpower’sfutureandpotentialuse[118].PhadraisedconcernsthatbroadinterpretationwouldgiveCthtoomuchpower-seeparadeofhorriblesconcern;HigginsJinHuddart.
3. Itleavesseriousriskofinvertingtheproperorderofinquiry/constitutionalinterpretation[141]postEngineers.Weknowtheproperorderistoreadpowerbroadlyandthenaskwhetherlawsignificantlyrelatestotheconstitutionalpower(herecorporationspower),regardlessofwhetheritencroachesonstatepower.Wearenottoaskwhetherlawisproperlyanemploymentlawortradinglaw.
Objectofcommandtest
• ACCisanobjectofcommand(law)thatpermitsorprohibitsatradingorfinancialcorporationfromengaginginconductorformingrelationships.
• ProposesthatonceyouidentifytheCC,theCthisthenempoweredtoregulateitsrelationshipsandanyconduct.Oneoftheseisemployment.Itisirrelevantthatemploymentisnotatradingissue.YouwouldjustneedtoidentifyaTCsoastothenregulateitsactivities/relationships.
Adoptionofobjectofcommandtest
• Thecorporationspowerisa‘personspower’(104).‘[T]hepoweristomakelawswithrespecttoparticularjuristicpersons.’
• Distinguishesthisfromapower‘withrespecttoafunctionofgovernment,afieldofactivityoraclassofrelationships’(ibid).
• Inotherwords,oncesufficientlyconnectedtothejuristicperson(theconstitutionalcorporation),thelawmayextendtosubjectmattersbeyond‘foreign’,‘finance’,and‘trade’.
• Tosupportthis,theHCadoptsAt[177]–adoptsGaudronJ’sdissentinReDingian;ExParteWagner(1995)183CLR323,365:Power‘alsoextendstothepersonsbyandthroughwhomtheycarryoutthosefunctions
andactivitiesandwithwhomtheyenterintothoserelationships.’Thisextendstoindustrialrightsandobligations.
• Issue:dowefollowmajorityinDinjanorGaudronJ’sdissentinReDingianwhichwasadoptedinWorkChoices?Gaudron’sdissent!
A2:Whatistherelevanceoffederalbalance?Themajorityrejectedargumentsappealingtofederalbalance.
• See[119],[194],[195].• Itwouldbeanimproperorderofinterpretation.• Interpretationshouldbeginbylookingatthetext.• TheCourtwascriticalofthenotionthatemploymentlawwasreservedto
thestates.• TheCourtshouldnotinterpretinamannerthatbringsintodoubtthe
continuedexistenceofstates.Buthere,federalpowerisstronger.• CourtrecognisedcharacterisationofEngineers:whichshouldbe
understoodinapoliticallightreflectingemergingpoliticalidentityafterWWI.
A3:Isthecorporationspower‘readdown’bylimitswithinotherpowers?
• Section51(xxxv)(conciliationandarbitrationpower)isnotconcernedwithindustrialrelationsassuch,butanarrowercategory.
• Limitsinonepowerdonotrestrictthescopeofanotherpower[50].• Thecommercepowernolongerrestrictsthecorporationspower
(Strickland)sowhyshouldthearbitrationpower?o IfPcanregulateT’sandC’sonwhichCCscandealwithcustomers
orsuppliersofgoods/services,whycanitnotintheexerciseofthesamepowers,regulateTsandCsonwhichCCsmaydealwithemployeesorpotentialemployees?[50].
o ‘Dealingswithemployeesarepartofitstradingpractices’.• Section51(xxxv)doesnotcontainapositiveprohibitionorrestriction
upontheambitofCommonwealthpower[221].Unlikesays116whichpreventstheCommonwealthfromsettingupit’sownreligion.
• Courtalsorejectsdissent’sargumentthatthelawis‘properly’onewithrespecttoindustrialaffairs.
o ‘Todescribealawas“really”,“truly”or“properly”characterisedasalawwithrespecttoonesubject-matter,ratherthananother,bespeaksfundamentalconstitutionalerror.’[51]
o Thiswouldbetheapproachpre-Engineers.Solongasitaffectsconstitutionalaffairs,itcanaffectanynumberofsubjects.
Kirby’sdissentCharacterisation
• Kirbycharacterisedthelawasaboutindustrialrelations.ThiswasderivedfromtheAct’sobject(preventingandsettlingindustrialdisputes,notmentioningcorporations)andtherights/liabilitiesitcreates(which‘properlypertain’topreventingindustrialdisputes’.[478]-[479].
• Hesaiditsvalidityturnsontwoheadsofpower;corporatepowerandtheconciliation/arbitrationpower[480].
• NB:CallinanJagreesAct’struecharacterwasindustrialaffairs(341).Isthecorporationspower‘readdown’bylimitswithinotherpowers?
• Arguesthatthelaw,relyingons51(xx)isattemptingtoovercomea‘safeguard,restrictionorqualification’ins51(xxxv)[483].
• Youcannotmakealawinrelianceupononesubjectmatter(e.g.corporationspower)whenthatlawisproperlycharacterisedasonewithrespecttoanotherheadofpower(suchastheconciliationandarbitrationpower)incircumstanceswherethelatterpowerisaffordedtotheFederalParliament‘’subjecttoasafeguard,restrictionorqualification’’(Schmidt).
• ‘therequirementthatfederallawsoperateindirectlythroughindependentresolutionbywayofconciliationandarbitrationcan,inmyview,properlybedescribedasatypeof“guarantee”.’[518]
Federalbalance
• WemustreadconstinlightofitsFederalcharacteranddesign[470],[471],[491]
• Interstatenesspreservedfederalcharacterofindustrialrelationslaw.[446]
DidtheConventionDebatesshedlightonthemeaningofthecorporationspower?
• Kirby’sview[428],[436].• CallinanJdissenting[690]:twothingsareclearfromtheconvention
debates:1)anyfedpowerrelatingtoindustrialaffairswastobeconfinedtothoseofaninterstatecharacter,2)formercoloniesweretoretainpoweroverinternalindustrialdisputes.IfitwasalwaysthecasethattheCommonwealthcouldappealtotheCPtomakeemploymentlaws,whydidn’tthishappenfromearliestdays?Itdidn’thappenbecausealwaysunderstoodtheCthlimitedbyconciliationandarbitrationpower.
• ThemajoritywerenotkeenonthisuseofhistoryengagedinbyKirbyandCallinan.Retortedthatthedisputedquestionatpresentwasnotonframers’minds[120].
• Majority:supportedbroadappealtocorporationspower.Saidthattheframersdidnotunderstandthatcorporationslawwasstillindevelopmentinthe19thcenturyanddidn’tunderstandthecentralplaceofcorporationsinAustralia’spresenteconomy.
o Arguably,majorityispointingtowardsanationaleconomy.Maybeit’sbettereconomicallytohavethispowerresidewiththeCommonwealth.
Therelevanceofreferendums
• Inthepast,therehadbeensixrelevantreferendumsproposingthattheconciliationandarbitrationpowerbeextendedtoregulateemployeeandemployerrelationships.
• Eachtime,thesefailed.TheConstitutionwasnotamendedtoprovideforageneralindustrialrelationspower.
• Therelevantquestioniswhethersuchfailedamendmentswererelevanttointerpretingthecorporationspower.
• Majority-failuresnotrelevant.[131]-[133].o Qputtoelectoratenotthesameaswhatwe’readdressingnow.A
contraryapproachpresumesthatwhatpeoplehadinmindwasakintorejectingabroad,liberalinterpretationofthecorporationspower.Thisdoesnotfollow.
o Fewreferendumssucceedthustheyshouldn’thavetoomuchweight.
• Kirby-dissent200-201[468].FailuretoamendrelevanttolimitingCPandCAP.
o AuthorityforConstitutionisderivedfromthepeople,repeatrefusalisrelevant.
o TheConstitutionisgroundedonatheoryofpopularsovereignty.Shouldlooktopeopleandwhattheysay.
• CallinanJsimilarlyat299-300[732]-[733].ThemesandIssuesinWorkChoices
1. Federalism2. OngoingimpactofEngineers:methodofinterpretationisbroad.3. Interpretation:Originalism(Kirby,Callinan),Textualism(majority),
Structualist(Kirby-readinlightoffederaldesigncoherently).4. Consequencesarisingfromthedecision.
Federalism
• Kirby[612]:thisCourtneedstorediscoverthefederalcharacteroftheConstitution.Ithasbeenforgotten.Normativelyitisarestraintonpower.Therehasbeenashiftto‘opportunistic’federalism[543]whichwould‘destroytheStatesandtheirexpressandimpliedroleintheConstitution[548]inaprocessofcentralisation[556].
• CallinanJ[777]-[780]:Federalbalancematters,weshouldn’tsubjugaterequirementthatamendmenthappensbyreferendum.Reducingstatepowerisdangerous.
ImpactofEngineers
• Weknowtheproperorderistoreadpowerbroadlyandthenaskwhetherlawsignificantlyrelatestotheconstitutionalpower(herecorporationspower),regardlessofwhetheritencroachesonstatepower.Wearenottoaskwhetherlawisproperlyanemploymentlawortradinglaw.
Interpretation
• Majorityanddissentsusehistorydifferently.• Kirbyhaspropagatedanoriginalistargument,whereasthemajorityhas
beenquiteprogressiveinitsunderstanding.• GregCraven,‘OriginalIntentandtheAustralianConstitution–Coming
SoontoaCourtNearYou?’(1990)1PublicLawReview1066:‘…theHighCourthas,inthemain,departedfromtheintentionsoftheFramersmerelyforthepurposeofreallocatingpowerfromtheregionstothecentre.’
Consequences• Kirbyappealstothedecision’sconsequences[537],[541].Willcausea
radicalreductioninareasofstategovernance(e.g.education,healthcare)ifCthcanregulatebodiesandalltheirrelationships.
• NBmajoritynotedat(86)thatcertaindomesticcorporationswereoutsideTCsorFCs-municipal,mining,manufacturing,religious,scholastic,charitable,scientific,literary(asstatedbyIsaacJinHuddart).
WeekSeven:ExecutivePowerEXECUTIVEPOWERUNDERSECTION61Prerogativepower
• TampaCase:s61maygaincontentfromtheprerogativebutitsnotthesourceofprerogativepower
• CPCFvMinisterforImmigrationandBorderProtection[2015]HCA1ThescopeofSection61-emphasisonresponsiblegovernmentThescopeofSection61-historicalcontextandnationhoodNationhoodpower
• Acombinationofs61+Section51(xxxix)• S61-Allowspowerforpurposeofservingnationalgovernment• S51xxxix(ancillarylegislativepowertos61)‘mattersincidentaltothe
executionofanypowervestedbythisConstitution…intheGovernmentoftheCommonwealth’
• NationhoodpowermorelikelytoarisewherethereisnoconflictwiththestatesTasmanianDams;DavisvCommonwealth
APPROPRIATIONSANDSPENDINGSection81:powertoappropriatefundsfromtheconsolidatedfundEffectsofanappropriationactIssuesarisingunderSection81TheExecutiveOftenreferredtoasthe‘Crown’Includes:
• KingorQueen• Governorgeneral• Ministers(includingPMandCabinet)• Publicservantsemployedbygovernmentdepartments
THEEXECUTIVEPOWERUNDERSECTION61Section61:‘TheexecutivepoweroftheCommonwealthisvestedintheQueenandisexercisablebytheGovernor-GeneralastheQueen’srepresentative,andextendstotheexecutionandmaintenanceofthisConstitution,andofthelawsoftheCommonwealth.’Section61issilentastoscopeofthepower.AccordingtoWinterton,therearesevensetsofpower:
1. Powerconferredonexecutivebystatute.Limitstothesepowersandmeansofholdingtheexecutivetoaccount–administrativelaw
2. PowersalthoughnotconferreddirectlybyastatutearenecessaryorincidentaltotheexecutionandmaintenanceofalawoftheCommonwealth.I.e.whenCthpassesslaws,Executivemaybegrantedpowertoundertakeactionstothatlegislation’simplementation.
3. PowersnecessaryorincidentaltotheadministrationofadepartmentofStateestablishedunders64oftheConstitution-‘TheGovernor-GeneralmayappointofficerstoadministersuchdepartmentsofStateoftheCommonwealthastheGovernor-GeneralinCouncilmayestablish’
4. PowersdefinedbythecapacitiesoftheCommonwealthcommontolegalpersons.SeeWilliamsNo1–Cthargueditcouldmakecontracts.
5. PowersexpresslyconferredbytheConstitution.6. *TheprerogativepowersoftheCrownproperlyattributabletothe
Commonwealth.7. *Inherentauthorityderivedfromthecharacterandstatusofthe
Commonwealthasthenationalgovernment.PrerogativePower
• Itisaformofprimarylegislationthattheexecutivecanundertake.• Traditionalexamples:
o Sovereignhaspowertodeclarewar(prerogativeofwar)o Sovereignpowertodispensewithpunishmentforanycriminale.g.
ifterminallyill(prerogativeofmercy).• Seenasincorporatedinsection61buttheypreexistthatprovision.E.g.
prerogativeinoperation:RuddockvVadarlis(TampaCase)(2001)183ALR1-wasthereaprerogativepowertoexpelaliensorwasthispowernowovertakenbytheMigrationAct?
RuddockvVadarlis(TampaCase)(2001)183ALR1
• Issue:wasthereaprerogativepowertoexpelaliensorwasthispowernowovertakenbytheMigrationAct?
• FrenchJ:Therewasaprerogativepowertoexpelaliensconferredbysection61.TheMigrationActdoesn’tevidenceintentiontotakethispoweraway.
o Section61isthesourceofexecutivepower,nottheprerogative.o Thisisbecauses61is‘apowerconferredaspartofanegotiated
federalcompactexpressedinawrittenConstitutiondistributingpowersbetweenthethreearmsofgovernment’(49).
o However,s61maygainsomeofitscontentfromtheprerogative.o Section61issubjecttothelimitationsimposedbytheConstitution
andlawspassedunderit.o Onthepowertoexclude,usings61:‘Thepowertodeterminewho
maycomeintoAustraliaissocentraltoitssovereigntythatitisnottobesupposedthatthegovernmentofthenationwouldlackunderthepowerconferreduponitdirectlybytheConstitution,theabilitytopreventpeoplenotpartoftheAustraliacommunity,fromentering…’52
• BlackCJ,dissenting:s61doesn’tprovidethisprerogativepowertoexpel,butinanyevent,theActnowprovidesacomprehensivescheme
o Therearedoubtswhethertheprerogativepowertoexpelaliens(andinpeacetime)stillexists.
o Raisesadifficultissue:canaprerogativepowerberevivedafterithasfallenintodisuse?Note:Prerogativepowersarehistorical.UKCourtshave,forexample,statedthatnewprerogativepowerswillnotberecognised.SeeBBCvJohns[1965]Ch32,79perDiplockCJ.
o ‘Itwouldbeaverystrangecircumstanceiftheatbestdoubtfulandhistoricallylong-unusedpowertoexcludeorexpelshouldemergeinastrongmodernformfroms61oftheConstitutionbyvirtueofgeneralconceptionsof‘thenationalinterest’.(12)
• Parliamentthenpassedretrospectivelegislationsothecasenotappealed.CPCFvMinisterforImmigrationandBorderProtection[2015]HCA1(28January2015)
• Facts:InterceptingSriLankanTamilsinAustralia’scontiguouszone(outsideofAustralia’sterritoryatChristmasIsland).DetainedonanAustralianvesselandtakentoIndia–doneundertheMigrationAct1958(Cth)andtheMaritimePowersAct2013(Cth)
• Issue:Whethertherewasapowerunders61orMPAtodetainandremovepeoplefromAustralia’scontiguouszonetoIndia[4].
• Frenchandmajority:o Notnecessarytoconsiderwhethertherewasapowerunder
section61todetainandremovepeoplebecauseMigrationActandMPAgaveAustralianauthoritiespowertodothis.
• HayneandBellJ:o MigrationActdidn’tauthoriseCthactionsandTamilshadbeen
falselyimprisoned.o Unhelpfultoappealtonotionsof‘thedefenceandtheprotectionof
thenation’[143]o SuchstatementsassumedtheCthmusthavethepower[143](See
similarlyHayneJ’scriticismsinPape)o Atcommonlaw,theexecutivecouldonlydetainapersoncould
whenauthorisedbystatute[148];o Thisisunaffectedbyanappealtoprerogativepoweroutsideof
Australianwaters:o ‘ToholdthattheExecutivecanactoutsideAustralia'sbordersina
waythatitcannotlawfullyactwithinAustraliawouldstandlegalprincipleonitshead’[150].
• KiefelJ:o PointedtoideaofBlackCJinVardalisthatitwouldbestrangeto
haveprerogativepowerresurrectedwhenithasn’tbeenusedforcenturies.
o ‘Evenifoneassumes,forpresentpurposes,thataCommonwealthexecutivepowerofthekindcontendedforexistedatFederation,statuteshaveforalongtimeprovidedforpowersofexpulsionanddetention.AsamatterofprincipleanyCommonwealthexecutive
powermayinthosecircumstancesbeconsideredlostordisplaced.’[277]
Scholarlyinterpretationsofthepower
• Blackstone:Powers,rights,immunities,orprivilegesnecessarytomaintaininggovernment,andnotsharedwithprivatecitizens(thisdefinitionwouldmeanadefinablelist).
• Dicey:‘aresidueofdiscretionaryorarbitraryauthority’…‘EveryactwhichtheexecutivegovernmentcanlawfullydowithouttheauthorityoftheActofParliamentisdoneinvirtueofthisprerogative’.ThiswasacceptedinA-GvDeKeyser’sRoyalHotel[1920]2AC508(HL).
Scopeofsection61-emphasisonresponsiblegovernmentEganvWillis(1998)195CLR424at[96]McHughJdiscussingtheConstitutionAct1855(NSW)
• ‘ContemporarymaterialsmakeitclearthattheImperialauthoritiesintendedthatthenewConstitutionwouldbeadministeredinaccordancewiththeprinciplesofresponsiblegovernment.’
• Parliament(asopposedtoExecutive)‘providesthemoneyrequiredforadministrativepurposesbyauthorisingtaxation’appropriatingwheremoneyistobeprovidedandcriticisesmodeinwhichmoneyisspentandinwhichpublicaffairsareadministered.
• Supportindispensabletothosewhoareresponsibleforadministration,butitdoesnotadminister.Thistasklefttoexecutive.
• CallsParliamentthe‘criticisingandcontrollingpower’;incontrasttotheExecutive.
Scopeofsection61-pointingtohistoricalcontextandnationhood• Inthepast,prerogativepowerreferredtoasthe‘nationhood’power–
arisingfromtheinherentrightoftheCommonwealthtoprotectitself;animpliedright(e.g.seditionlaws).ButmorerecentlytheCourthasshiftedtogroundingthisins61,withanancillarylegislativepowerunders51(xxxix).
• Section51(xxxix)enablesParliamenttomakelawswithrespectto‘[m]attersincidentaltotheexecutionofanypowervestedbythisConstitution…intheGovernmentoftheCommonwealth’
• ‘Whilehistoryandthecommonlawinform[s61’s]content,itisnotalockeddisplaycabinetinaconstitutionalmuseum.Itisnotlimitedtostatutorypowersandtheprerogative.Ithastobecapableofservingtheproperpurposesofanationalgovernment.’PapevCommissionerofTaxation(2009)238CLR1,60.
• Aswellasappealingtoprerogative,courthastalkedaboutnationhoodpower,orpowervestedinExecutiveforpurposeofservinganationalgovernment.
NationhoodpowerCommonwealthvTasmania(TasmanianDamCase)(1983)158CLR1
• Facts:WorldHeritagePropertiesConservationAct1983(Cth)allowedforprotectingdeclaredpropertyonbasisthatitispartofAustralia’sheritageandbyreasonoflackorinadequacyofotheravailablemeansfor
protection,it’sappropriatetoprotectbynationalParliamentandGovernment.
• Thenotionofnationhoodunders61notconsidered,ordeniedasaproperuseofthepowerbecauseitarisesmostlikelywherethereisnoconflictwiththestates.
DavisvCommonwealth(1988)166CLR79
• Facts:ConcerningbicentenaryofsettlementinNSW.DavismarketedT-shirtssaying200yearsofsuppressionanddepression.Bicentenniallawsrestricteduseoflogosandwords.
• Held:legislationinvalidbecausetheylackedproportionality.• MasonCJ,DeaneandGaudronJJ:
o ‘Theseresponsibilities[are]derivedfromthedistributionoflegislativepowerseffectedbytheConstitutionitselfandfromthecharacterandstatusoftheCommonwealthasanationalpolity’(92)-thatiswhythereisanationalpower-totakeactionfornationalpurposes.
o ‘theexistenceofCommonwealthexecutivepowerinareasbeyondtheexpressgrantsoflegislativepowerwillordinarilybeclearestwhereCommonwealthexecutiveorlegislativeactioninvolvesnorealcompetitionwithStateexecutiveorlegislativecompetence.’(94)
• BrennanJ:o ‘TheConstitutiondidnotcreateamereaggregationofcolonies,
redistributingpowersbetweenthegovernmentoftheCommonwealthandthegovernmentsoftheStates.TheConstitutionsummonedtheAustraliannationintoexistence’(110)
o Onthatbasis,wecanrecognisethatExecutivehasanationalpower.
o Initiativesthatstrengthenthenationandsupportedbys61:e.g.flagandanthem,nationalinitiativesinscienceandliterature.
o ‘WheretheExecutiveGovernmentengagesinactivityinordertoadvancethenation–anessentiallyfacultativefunction–theexecutionofexecutivepowerisnottheoccasionforawideimpairmentofindividualfreedom’…‘Inmyopinion,thelegislativepowerwithrespecttomattersincidentaltotheexecutionoftheexecutivepowerdoesnotextendtothecreationofoffencesexceptinsofarasisnecessarytoprotecttheefficacyoftheexecutionbytheExecutiveGovernmentofitspowersandcapacities…’(112-3)
§ Contrastingvalidnationalinitiativese.g.flags/anthemwithwhatwasbeingdonehere,byestablishingoverlyrestrictiveandcoercivelawsallowingBicentennialauthoritytofinepeopleforusingflags/logosetc.
CoercivelawsappealingtotheexecutivepowerPape
• ‘absentauthoritysuppliedbyastatuteundersome[other]headofpower…likelytobeansweredconservatively’.
AustralianCommunistPartyvCommonwealth(1951)83CLR1at187:
• ‘Historyandnotonlyancienthistory,showsthatincountrieswheredemocraticinstitutionshavebeenunconstitutionallysuperseded,ithasbeendonenotseldombythoseholdingtheexecutivepower.Formsofgovernmentmayneedprotectionfromdangerslikelytoarisefromwithintheinstitutionstobeprotected.’
• Morereluctanttoallowingcoercivepowersappealingtonationhood.AppropriationsandSpendingSection81:‘AllrevenuesormoneysraisedorreceivedbytheExecutiveGovernmentoftheCommonwealthshallformoneConsolidatedRevenueFund,tobeappropriatedforthepurposesoftheCommonwealthinthemannerandsubjecttothechargesandliabilitiesimposedbythisConstitution.’EffectsofanappropriationAct
• AuthorisesthegovernmenttowithdrawmoneyfromtheConsolidatedTreasuryFund;
• DirectspurposestowhichthemoneycanbeappliedbytheExecutivegovernment;
Issuesarisingundersection811.DoesSection81provideauthoritytospendthemoneyormustthatauthoritybefoundelsewhere?
• Pape:alljudgesagreethatappropriationactdoesn’tprovideExecutivewithauthority.
• Theconsequenceofthisdecisionwasthatnumerousexpendituresthoughtjustifiedbys81nowindoubt.E.g.HayneandKiefelJJsuggestedthatCSIROmightnowbesupportedasanexerciseofthepatentspowerins51(xviii).
2.ArethereanylimitsonhowtheExecutivecanspendpublicmoney?WhatauthorisesExecutivespendingintheabsenceofspecificlegislation?InWilliamsvCommonwealth(2012)weseethattheCommonwealthgovernmentarguedthat:
1. *InherentauthorityderivedfromthecharacterandstatusoftheCommonwealthasthenationalgovernment;
2. PowersnecessaryorincidentaltotheadministrationofadepartmentofStateestablishedunders64oftheConstitution;
3. *PowersdefinedbythecapacitiesoftheCommonwealthcommontolegalpersons(thuswithoutstatutoryauthorisation,maycontractlikeanordinarypersonandthisisatleastcoextensivewiththescopeoffederallegislativepower).Thiswasrejected.
WeekSeven:NationhoodandContractingTheExecutivePowerPapevFederalCommissionerofTaxation(2009)
• Rejectedimpliednationhoodpower• Instead,it’spartofsection61• EPunders61givespowertolegislateinrespecttomatterspeculiarly
adaptedtothegovernmentofanationandwhichcannototherwisebecarriedonforthebenefitofthenation’
• Thispower,combinedwithincidentalpowertolegislate,allowedTaxBonusScheme
• Thelegislationwassupportedbyactionproperforanationalgovernment.
WilliamsvCommonwealth(2012)THEEXECUTIVEPOWERSection61:‘TheexecutivepoweroftheCommonwealthisvestedintheQueenandisexercisablebytheGovernor-GeneralastheQueen’srepresentative,andextendstotheexecutionandmaintenanceofthisConstitution,andofthelawsoftheCommonwealth.’
• Relatesto‘executing’and‘maintaining’theConstitutionandthelawoftheCommonwealth.
• Silentastoscope.• Twocomponents:
o Actionpeculiarlyadaptedtoanationalgovernment(nationhoodpowerPape).
o Contractualcapacitytospend(Williams).PAPEVFEDERALCOMMISSIONEROFTAXATION(2009)238CLR1Facts
• ChallengedvalidityoftheTaxBonusforWorkingAustraliansAct(No2)2009(Cth).
• Section5oftheActcreatedanentitlementtoa‘taxbonus’forcertaincategoriesofAustraliantaxpayers.
• AppropriationsupportingforpaymentsfoundinTaxationAdministrationAct1953(Cth).Takingofmoneyfromconsolidatedfund.
• MrPaperaisesachallenge.Legalissues
• (1)Isanappropriationalonesufficienttoauthoriseexecutivespending?• (2)Ifnot,wasthereasourceofpowertospendtheappropriatedfunds,
andaheadoflegislativepowercapableofsupportingtheTaxBonusforWorkingAustraliansAct(No2)2009(Cth)?
Decision(1)Isanappropriationalonesufficienttoauthoriseexecutivespending?
• Unanimously:ss81and83(appropriationsanddrawingmoney)donotconferasubstantivespendingpower.
• ‘Therelevantpowertoexpendpublicmoneys,beinglimitedbys81toexpenditurefor“thepurposesoftheCommonwealth”,mustbefoundelsewhereintheConstitutionorstatutesmadeunderit.’[8].
• Sections81and83areparliamentarycontrolsoftheexerciseofexecutivepowertoexpendpublicmoneys.Theydonotauthoriseexecutivespending.
(2)Ifnot,wasthereasourceofpowertospendtheappropriatedfunds,andaheadoflegislativepowercapableofsupportingtheTaxBonusforWorkingAustraliansAct(No2)2009(Cth)?Yes,S51(xxxix)givesincidentalpowertolegislateandEPallowsforscheme.(a)Whatunderpinnedtheexecutiveaction(spending)?(b)Whatsupportedthelegislation?
• Section51(xxxix)incidentalpowertolegislate.o ThisenablesParliamenttomakelawswithrespecttomatters
incidentaltotheexecutionofanypowervestedbythisConstitution…intheGovernmentoftheCommonwealth.’
• Thus,toactivateandenliventhisprovision,weneedtofindapowervestedintheCommonwealthgovernment.
• I.e.considerifimpugnedlegislationwasenlivenedbyS61-ExecutivePower.
ConstructionoftheExecutivePower
• Collectionofstatutoryandprerogativepowers(notexercisedbystates)andnon-prerogativecapacities.TheseformpartofbutdonotcompletetheEP:FrenchCJ,Gummow,CrennanandBellJJ[127].Seealso[215]and[228].
• Powerto‘engageinenterprisesandactivitiespeculiarlyadaptedtothegovernmentofanationandwhichcannototherwisebecarriedonforthebenefitofthenation’:VictoriavCommonwealth(1975)134CLR338,397(AAPCase)MasonJ.
• TheCourtdeniedexistenceofanimpliednationhoodpower.Why?Duetoconcernthatgovernmentcouldinvokeimpliednationhoodpowertoovercomeanydivisionofpowersbetweenstates.
o Typicalexamplewouldbeimpliedpowertomakelawsagainstsedition(underminingthegovernment).
• Insteadofbeingimplied,itisfoundwithinsection61EP.• Davis(1988)166CLR79,93-94MasonCJ,DeaneandGaudronJJ:‘the
existenceofCommonwealthexecutivepowerinareasbeyondtheexpressgrantsoflegislativepowerwillordinarilybeclearestwhereCommonwealthexecutiveorlegislativeactioninvolvesnorealcompetitionwithStateexecutiveorlegislativecompetence.’
o I.e.unlikelytofindthatCthcanengageinnationhoodpowerunderEPifitwouldincurcompetitionwithstates.
ChiefJusticeFrenchBelievedthattheTaxBonusschemewaspermissible.At[127],hefocusedon:
• Short-termmeasures;speedandefficacy.• Economicconditionsfacingnationasawhole.• PeculiarlywithincapacityandresourcesofCth.
• Notaffectingdistributionofpowers.Alsosee[133].JusticesGummow,CrennanandBellAlsobelievedthatTaxBonusschemewaspermissiblebutfordifferentreasons.
• Stated(90)thattheEP‘enablestheundertakingofactionsappropriatetothepositionoftheCthasapolitycratedbytheConstitutionandhavingregardtothespheresofresponsibilityvestedinit’.
• GaveamoreexpansivereadingoftheEPthanFrench.TheysaythatunderanappealtonationhoodyoucanundertakepowerappropriatetotheCommonwealthposition.HoweverFrenchfocusesonemergencyandcrisis.
• Nevertheless,theirtestof‘undertakingactions’wassatisfiedbecauseAustraliainGFC.Theyalsoemphasisedhistoricalsignificance[230]-worstcrisissinceGreatDepression.Comparedtonationalemergency.
• SaidthatCthistheonlybodywithresourcescapableofmeetingthenationalemergency.
• However,wouldbeinappropriateifitdistributedstateexecutivestoundertakeownregulation.
JusticesHayneandKiefel(dissent)DidnotsupporttheTaxBonusscheme.Theycriticise:
• Subjectivity:Ascomparedtoprerogativesandcapacities(specific),theyaskedhowCourtscouldpossiblyassesswhichactionsanationalgovernmentisbestplacedtoundertake.
• Aggrandisingexecutivepower:toobroad.• Criticalofrelyingonnotionofemergency[347]:thiswouldjustifyany
actionifwearetrulyinanemergency.• Alternativesmoreappropriate:ifthegovernmentwantstofuelthe
economythengivegrantstostatestobuildroadsorusetaxationpowertoreduceincometaxorgivetaxrebates.
o Counter-argumentevidentinFrench’sreasoning:Appealtospeedandefficacy.Roadstaketoolongandthiswouldbeanimmediateinjectionintobankaccounts.
• Federalism:apowercouldbegreaterthanthedistributionofpowersgrantedtotheCommonwealthifitcandeclareemergenciesorsatisfynotionsthattheCthisbestplacedtoundertakeanaction.Thisistooexpansiveandsubjective.
LingeringQuestionsAreweexpandingtheExecutivePowerifwebroadenitsunderstanding?Whatdoesthisjustify?WILLIAMSVCOMMONWEALTH(2012)248CLR156
• Capacitytocontract.• Limitsonnationhoodpower.
Facts
• Williamschallenged:o NationalSchoolChaplaincyProgramme,ando Fundingagreement(contract)betweenCthandScriptureUnion
QLD(DHFagreement)underNationalGuidelinesissuedbyDepartmentforEducation,ScienceandTraining.
• Notethatthesewerenotauthorisedbystatute.Thus,theCthwasclaimingtospendinabsenceoflegislation;takingmoneyfromconsolidatedfundandarguingthereisanEPtospendmoneyfortheCthtoenterintocontracts.
• FundingwasappropriatedunderannualAppropriationActs.Commonwealth’sargumentsAppealedtoexecutivepower…tospend.Madetwoarguments:
1. (Broadargument):ExecutivepowertospendisunlimitedbecausetheExecutiveenjoyscapacitiessimilartoanyordinaryperson.TheCrownisajuristicpersonandcanenterintocontracts(failed).
2. (Narrowargument):Cthcanenterintocontractswithoutlegislationsolongassubjectmatterofcontractcanbepinnedtoaheadofpower(failed).
NarrowargumentsbytheCommonwealth:
• EPisinallmatters,limitedtosubjectmattersofexpressgrantsofpowerinss51,52and122togetherwith‘nationhood’component(thosepeculiarlyadaptedtothegovernmentofthenation).
• Executivepowertospend(exercisinga‘capacity’)supportedby:o Providingbenefitstostudents(s51xxiiiA)o Contractingwithaconstitutionalcorporation(s51xx).
• Additionalquestion:wasitsupportedbythenationhoodpower(s51xxxix)enlivenedbysection61?I.e.Papethroughcontract.
Commonwealth‘capacities’
• ReferstothingstheCommonwealthcandoasajuristicperson.• Traditionallyunderstoodasonebranchofsection61’scontent.• Juristicpersonscancontract,createtrusts,transferproperty,register
companiesetc.• Thusargueditcanestablishroyalinquiriesandscientificbodies.• TheCtharguedthatconstrainingcontractualcapacitywouldconstrain
otherabilitiesasajuristicperson.HowtheJudgesdivided
• FrenchCJ,Gummow,CrennanandBellJJ:o Rejectedthebroadandnarrowsubmissions.o TheCth’sexecutivepowertospendisnotcoextensivewiththe
potentialscopeofitslegislativepower.o Theschemecouldonlybesupportedbylegislationenactedby
Parliament.• HayneandKiefelJJ:
o Rejectedthebroadsubmission.o Unnecessarytodeterminethecorrectnessofthenarrow
submission.o ClearthattheNSCPcouldnotbethesubjectofavalidlawunders
51.• HeydonJ:
o Unnecessarytodeterminethecorrectnessofthebroadsubmission.
o Acceptedthenarrowersubmission.o ConsideredtheNSCPwaswithinexecutivepowerbecauseitwas
supportedbythelegislativepowerunders51(xxiiiA).
DoestheCommonwealthhavecontractualcapacitytoexpendmoney?No
• ‘TheCthisnotjustanotherlegalperson’[38].Personalcontractsdon’thavetheeffectorpowerlikeCthcontracts.ThelattercanaffectexerciseofpowerbyStateexecutives.Theyaffectverticaldistributionofpower.(CJFrench)See[31],[77].Notethatwemustconsiderthisbutaffectingstatesisn’tacriterionofinvalidity.
o ‘ExpenditurebytheExecutiveGovernmentoftheCommonwealth,administeredandcontrolledbytheCommonwealth,infieldswithinthecompetenceoftheexecutivegovernmentsoftheStateshas,andalwayshashad,thepotential,inapracticalwayofwhichtheCourtcantakenotice,todiminishtheauthorityoftheStatesintheirfieldsofoperation.Thatisnotacriterionofinvalidity.Itis,however,areasonnottoacceptthebroadcontentionthatsuchactivitiescanbeundertakenatthediscretionoftheExecutive,subjectonlytotherequirementofappropriation.’FrenchCJ[37]
o ThisseemsastepbackfromEngineersbecauseit’ssayingwewon’treads61broadlybecausedoingsowoulddiminishcapacityofstates.Yet,notethatFrenchsaidit’snotacriteriaforinvalidity.Ifs61didpermitspendingmoneyhoweveritliked,thenitwouldbepermissible.Butnaturalmeaningofs61doesn’tleadustothatwiderscopebecauseoftheseconcerns(encroachingonStates).
• ItassumesthatExecutiveisspendingitsownmoneyjustasanotherpersonmaydo(Hayne)see[216].
Wastheexecutivepowerco-extensivewithCommonwealth(hypothetical)legislativepower?NoFederalismconcerns:‘Intensionwiththefederalconception’[60].ChiefJusticeFrench
• Thepathofappropriationslegislationisdifferentfromanyotherlegislation.UnderConstitution,theSenatecanrejectoracceptappropriationslegislationbutcannotsuggestamendments.Whereasordinarylegislation-Senatecanproposeamendments.
• NothavinglegislationtosupportcontractualspendingiscontrarytofederalconceptionbecausenolegislationmeansnooversightbySenate.AndtheSenateistraditionallycalledtheState’shouse.
• Havingnolegislationwould‘distorttherelationshipbetweenChIandChIIoftheConstitution’.
• ‘ThefunctionoftheSenateasachamberdesignedtoprotecttheinterestsoftheStatesmaynowbevestigial.’[61]Hepointstopowerfulexecutivesusingpartydiscipline.
• Buttherehasnotbeena‘constitutionalinflation’ofexecutivepower–‘whichmuststillbeunderstoodbyreferencetothe“trulyfederalgovernment”ofwhichInglisClarkwrotein1901andwhich,alongwithresponsiblegovernment,iscentraltotheConstitution.’[61]
• Youneedlegislationtoauthorisecontractualspendingbecauseoffederalism.
• SeealsoKiefelJ[581]onfederalismconcern.Summary(CJFrench)[83]
• TheCommonwealthclaimedthatitsschemewassupportedbyheadsofpower(benefitstostudents;corporations)withoutstatutoryauthorisation.
• Decision:youneedauthorisationforsuchaclaim.• ItdidnotfallwithinrecognisedpartsoftheExecutivePower.
o Wellrecognisedfunctionsofgovernment;grantsbylegislature;prerogativeornationalcharactercomponent.
• RaisesanundecidedquestionWasitnecessaryfora‘nationalgovernment’?ThiswasrelevantbecauseinPapeunders51(xxxix)legislationsupportedbyactionproperforanationalgovernment.ThequestionthusinWilliamswaswhethertheschemecouldbesupportedbylegislationforactionproperforanationalgovernment.GummowandBellJJ[46]
• UnlikePape,notanaturaldisasterornationaleconomicorotheremergency.
• TheStateshavethelegalandpracticalcapacitytodealwiththeissue.• CoulduseSection96.
KiefelJ[599]
• TheExecutivewasrequiringnationalstandards,whichhadrealpotentialforconflictwithState(QLD)standards.Thusunlikelytofinditwasnecessaryfornationalgovernment.
HayneJ(stillpartofmajoritybutdifferentreasons)• Executivepowertospend‘mustbeunderstoodaslimitedbyreferenceto
theextentofthelegislativepoweroftheParliament’[252].PermittingotherwisewouldempowertheCommonwealth(throughs51(xxxix))tolegislateforexpenditurecontrarytodivisionofpowers[248]
• HeisacceptingnarrowsubmissionofCthbutsaysherethereisnopowerthatwouldempowersuchspending.Thereasonforthisisthatbenefittostudentsmeans‘materialbenefit’with‘identifiablestudents’.ConcurringopinionfromCrennanJ.
o Issue:whodecideswhatequalsabenefit?Summary
• Held:onlyacertainexemptclassofCommonwealthcontractscouldbeenteredintowithoutpriorlegislativeauthorisation
o Contractsrelatedorincidentaltotheordinary,well-recognisedfunctionsofgovernmente.g.thoseaboutinternalworkingsofgovernmentdepartment.See[43]FrenchCJ.
• Otherwiseyouneedauthorisationbylegislationappealingtoaheadofpower(withsomesuggestionthatexerciseofnationhoodpowerwillnotrequireadditionallegislativeauthorisation).
• Weareseeingdenialofjuristicpersonality.o Republicancharacter:TheExecutiveasonebranchofgovernment;
shiftawayfrom‘theCrown’;emphasisingdifferentunderstandingtoUK.
• Weseeareemphasisonfederalism.Includingreservingstateexecutivepoweragainstencroachingfederalexecutivepower.
• Nationhoodpower(partofsection61):o Power‘toengageinenterprisesandactivitiespeculiarlyadapted
tothegovernmentofanationandwhichcannototherwisebecarriedonforthebenefitofthenation’VictoriavCommonwealth(1975)134CLR338,397(AAPCase)MasonJ.
• Maysupportcontracting/exerciseofcapacities.Stilllikelytorequirelegislativeauthorisation:pluralityopinioninWilliams.
Issuestoconsider
• Federalandstateexecutivecompetition.• Distributionofpower.
LingeringQuestions
• RaisedbyCJFrench:Isthereaninherentpowertospend,appealingtothenationhoodpower,withoutstatutoryauthorisationunders51(xxxix)?
WeekSeven:ASummaryoftheExecutivePowerforExamsASUMMARYOFTHEEXECUTIVEPOWERTheexecutivepower(s61)contains:
• Oldprerogativepowers• Nationhoodpower
Itdoesnotcontain:• Ageneralcapacitytocontract.Thisargumentputforwardbythe
Commonwealthhasbeenrejected.
PapevFederalCommissionerofTaxation• Nationhoodpower(asapartoftheExecutivepower)enlivenedthe
incidentalpowertolegislatefortheTaxbonus.• Executivecan’tspendonwhateveritlikesunderss81+83.Itcan
spend‘forpurposesoftheCommonwealth’,andsuchpurposesmustbefoundelsewhereinConstitutionorstatutesmadeundertheConstitution.
• However,legislationtospendsupportedbyincidentalpowertolegislates51(xxxix):
o ThisenablesParliamenttomakelawswithrespecttomattersincidentaltotheexecutionofanypowervestedbythisConstitution…intheGovernmentoftheCommonwealth.’
• ThispowertolegislateenlivenedbyExecutivePowers61.o Itwasenlivenedbecause:
§ NorealconflictwithStateexecutiveorlegislativepower§ Needforspeedandefficacytodealwitheconomiccrisis
(French[127])§ NationhoodpowerallowsactionsappropriatetoCth
position(Gummow,Crennan,Bell)§ Cthonlybodycapableofmeetingnationalemergency(Ibid)
WilliamsNo1
• Cthargueditcouldcontractjustlikeanyotherjuristicpersonorelsecontractabsentlegislationaslongastopicmirroredalegislativeheadofpower.Bothargumentsrejectedbymajority.
• Tocontractandspend,Cthexecutiveneedsauthorisinglegislation,andsuchauthorisinglegislationofcourserequiresaheadofpower.
• AuthorisinglegislationcouldnotbeauthorisedbynationhoodpowerunlikeinPape
o Why?Noemergency[46];clearconflictwithstateregulation[599];notamatterfornationalcapacity
o Notethataffectingstatesnotacriterionofinvaliditybutgiventhisconcern,anaturalreadingofs61doesn’tleadustoviewthatitgrantsunlimitedpowertospend.
• Executivepowernotequivalenttolegislativepowerbecauseappropriationslegislationdoesn’thaveoversightbySenate
o Offendsfederalprinciple• Summary:Failedbecause
o Nolegislation+noheadofpowero Didn’tfallwithinpartsofEP:
§ Wellrecognisedfunctionsofgovernmente.g.thoserelatingtointernalworkingsofgovdepartments(thesecontractsdon’trequirepriorlegislation)[43]
§ Nationhood§ Grantsbylegislature
§ PrerogativeWilliamsNo2
• Despitelegislation(absentinWilliamsNo1),itwasinvalidbecausenotsupportedbyaheadofpower.
o Notincidentaltolegislativepowertospend/enterintocontracts.o DistinguishablefromPapewhenthispowerwasenlivenedby
Nationhoodcomponentoftheexecutivepower• Lookedtochaplaincyprogramitself.• CourtrejectedCthargumenttomodifynationhoodpower(itshouldbe
abletopasslawsonmattersthatarereasonablycapableofbeingasseenasofnationalbenefitorconcern[70]:
o TestwasstatedinPape:mustbepeculiarlyadaptedtonationalgovernment–nothere.
o Cthwouldenlargingitspowerthroughconsultation(ithaddiscussedwithstates)insteadofusingconstraintsofthetext.