CONSTITUTIONAL LAWCONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DEFINITION: The study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority as represented by the three inherent powers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.120Manila Prince v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)HELD: A Constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.What is the Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy? Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997] [Bellosillo])CLASSIFICATIONI. Written vs. Unwritten1. Written one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents.2. Unwritten consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions, and certain common law principles.II. Conventional vs. Cumulative1. Conventional an enacted constitution, formally struck off at a definite time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or ruler.2. Cumulative result of political evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method.III. Rigid vs. Flexible1. Rigid one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process.2. Flexible one that can be changed by ordinary legislation. The Constitution of the Philippines is written, conventional and rigid

ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION1. Broad Not only because it provides for the organization of the entire government and covers all persons and things within the territory of the State but more so because it is supposed to embody the past, to reflect the present and to anticipate the future. The constitution must be comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency.2. Brief It must be brief and confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend.3. Definite Ambiguity in its provisions will result in confusion and divisiveness among the people, and perhaps even physical conflict. Exception: Found only in those cases where the rules are deliberately worded in a vague manner, like the due process clause, to make them more malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of new conditions and circumstances.ESSENTIAL PARTS OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION1. Constitution of Liberty Series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of these rights. ARTICLES II, III, IV, V, and, XII.2. Constitution of Government Series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration and defining the electorate. ARTICLES VI to XI3. Constitution of Sovereignty Consists of provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about. ARTICLES XVIIINHERENT POWERS OF THE STATETAXATION - Power of the State to demand enforced contributions for public purposes.POLICE POWER - Power of the State to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare of the public. Use of property is regulated for the purpose of promoting the general welfare.

EMINENT DOMAIN - Power of the State to take private property for public use upon paying to the owner a just compensation to be ascertained according to law.XXX..XXXPOLICE POWERMMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836, March 27, 2000, 1st Div. [Puno]HELD: Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative 122boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. The exercise of the police power lies in the discretion of the legislative department. No mandamus is available to coerce the exercise of the police power. The only remedy against legislative inaction is a resort to the bar of public opinion, the refusal of the electorate to return to the legislature members who, in their view, have been remiss in the discharge of their duties. Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508 (1991)HELD: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas" and "Salus populi est suprema lex." Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., p. 896) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. LAC, supra). PASEI v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)HELD: The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. "Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens.""The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. Police power may sometimes use the taxing power as an implement for the attainment of a legitimate police objective.123Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208 (1987)HELD: "The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. "It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation'." Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The power of eminent domain could also be used as an implement of the police power. Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, 321 SCRA 106 (1999)Q. What powers of the State are involved in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)? Discuss.HELD: The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.Republic v. MERALCO, 391 SCRA 700 (2002)Q. Discuss why rates to be charged by public utilities like MERALCO are subject to State regulation.HELD: The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police power of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulations of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as the use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation. In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered.However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the service rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329 SCRA 314 (2000)Q. Discuss the nature of the authority of local government units to issue or grant licenses or permits.HELD: The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508 (1991)HELD: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFIof Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S., p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.Philtread Workers Union [PTWU] v. Confesor, 269 SCRA 393, March 12, 1997HELD: Article 263(g) of the Labor Code (vesting upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to the national interest and thereafter, assume jurisdiction over disputes in said industries) does not interfere with the workers right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and the employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference.The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, it will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy.REQUISITESLAWFUL SUBJECT: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police powerLAWFUL MEANS: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals The first requisite simply means that the subject of the measure is within the scope of the police power, that is, that the activity or property sought to be regulated affects the public welfare. As long as the object is the public welfare and the subject of regulation may be properly related thereto, there is compliance with the first test requiring the primacy of the welfare of the many over the interests of the few. Even if the purpose be within the scope of the police power, the law will still be annulled if the subject is sought to be regulated in violation of the second requirement. In Constitutional Law, the end does not justify the means. The lawful objective, in other words, must be pursued through a lawful method; that is, both the end and the means must be legitimate. Lacking such concurrence, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Phil 580 (1915)HELD: There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign mto any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their own views for what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature. If a law relates to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, it is within the scope of the police power of the State. Within such bounds the wisdom, expediency, or necessity of the law does not concern the courts. "It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditions affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about 'the greatest good of the greatest number.' Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction." From whatever direction the social, economic, or general welfare of the people is menaced, there is legal justification for the exercise of the police power; and the use of private property may be regulated or restricted to whatever extent may be necessary to preserve inviolate these declared essentials to the well being of the public. It has long been recognized that uses of private property which are offensive to the senses of smell of hearing may be so regulated or segregated as to disturb as little as possible the pursuits of other persons.It is not the adoption of a new principle but simply the extension of a well-established principle to hold that the police power may also regulate and restrict uses of private property when devoted to advertising which is offensive to the sight. The indiscriminate use of outdoor advertising tends to mar not only natural outdoor landscapes but whatever of civic beauty has been attained by the expenditure of public moneys for parks, boulevards, and buildings. The widespread agitation in many European countries, as well as in the United States, against the so-called billboards the most common form of this kind of advertising shows that they are a source of annoyance and irritation to the public and interfere with the proper enjoyment of outdoor life by the general public. This justifies their suppression or regulation to the extent that they interfere with the right of the public. Taxicab Operators of MM v. BOT, 117 SCRA 597 (1982)HELD: Petitioners farther take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because of roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and evens graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained.At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exist so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 48 [1970]. It may also regulate property rights. (Samson vs. Mayor of Bacolod City, 60 SCRA 267 [1974]. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". (The Constitution of the Philippines, Second Edition, p. 548.) Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324 (1986)HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing aworthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not thenon-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed tocoerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of sanctions,the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleteriouseffects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the actnot as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for nonpaymentof a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmakingbody to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts malain se are not the only facts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered bysociety as inherently wrong, hence not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflictson the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. Thestate can do this in the exercise of its police power.DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 (1989)FACTS: The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National MedicalAdmission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. Afterthree (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMATfor the fourth time.HELD: The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subjectand a lawful method.The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. Itis the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession isnot infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives andhealth.The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of thelaw nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medicalschools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to bedoctors.While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutionalright to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved;and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has theresponsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or,no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will bestpromote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one whowants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced.Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not forcehis entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as apianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this careermay be for others.127The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. TheConstitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or courseof study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those betterprepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in ouralready crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him,have been tested and found wanting.Sangalang v. IAC, 176 SCRA 719 (1989)ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and OrbitStreets to vehicular traffic?HELD: There is no merit in BAVA's claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit andJupiter Streets amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law orexpropriation without just compensation. There is no taking of property involved here. Theact of the Mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of police power.Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for justcompensation. However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden ofshowing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Streetwas unjustified, or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The fact that it has led to the loss ofprivacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the Municipality's effort to ease vehiculartraffic in Makati. Certainly, the duty of a local executive is to take care of the needs of thegreater number, in many cases, at the expense of the minority.Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197 (1994)Q. May solicitation for religious purposes be subject to proper regulation by the State in theexercise of police power?HELD: Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slightinconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, aState may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in thecommunity, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish hisidentity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State islikewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest ofpublic safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guarantees of the free exercise ofreligion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said that a lawadvancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interferingwith the free exercise of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimentaleffect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the publicinterest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonablyobstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, eventhough the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute aprohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissibleobstacle to its exercise.Villacorta v. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 (1986)HELD: Regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community. As society becomes moreand more complex, the police power becomes correspondingly ubiquitous. This has to be sofor the individual must subordinate his interests to the common good, on the time-honoredjustification of Salus populi est suprema lex.In this prolix age, practically everything a person does and owns affects the public interestdirectly or at least vicariously, unavoidably drawing him within the embrace of the policepower. Increasingly, he is hemmed in by all manner of statutory, administrative andmunicipal requirements and restrictions that he may find officious and even oppressive.It is necessary to stress that unless the creeping interference of the government inessentially private matters is moderated, it is likely to destroy that prized and peculiar virtueof the free society: individualism.128Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must not bedeprived of the right to be left alone or, in the idiom of the day, "to do his thing." As long ashe does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly curtailed.We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorateinto an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called"general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness.Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of theindividual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public.This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the policepower only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the generalwelfare clause.David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006May a Law be declared unconstitutional because of the illegal acts done in pursuant of itsimplementation?FACTS: Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate direct injury.In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, theywere arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary ofPeople Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimedthat on February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives raided and ransacked without warranttheir office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible source ofdestabilization. Again, the basis was PP 1017.And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their memberswere turned away and dispersed when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, tocelebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I.A perusal of the direct injuries allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that theyresulted from the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.ISSUE: Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis ofthese illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render itunconstitutional?HELD: Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalidalthough they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity forabuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to bedetermined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the enddesired, not from its effects in a particular case. PP 1017 is merely an invocation ofthe Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress allforms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired whichprompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing thepolice, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizensconstitutional rights.Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that itsimplementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which thevalidity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for theexercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. This islogical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutionaljust because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judgingfrom the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majorityof the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional along time ago.Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485 (2000)Q. How should laws that grant the right to exercise a part of the police power of the Statebe construed?Held: Lest the idea gets lost in the shoals of our subconsciousness, let us not forget thatPAGCOR is engaged in business affected with public interest. The phrase affected withpublic interest means that an industry is subject to control for the public good; it has been129considered as the equivalent of subject to the exercise of the police power. Perforce, alegislative franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public interest and involves anexercise of police power. The familiar rule is that laws which grant the right to exercise apart of the police power of the state are to be construed strictly and any doubt must beresolved against the grant. The legislature is regarded as the guardian of society, andtherefore is not presumed to disable itself or abandon the discharge of its duty. Thus,courts do not assume that the legislature intended to part away with its power to regulatepublic morals. The presumption is influenced by constitutional considerations. Constitutionsare widely understood to withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain away theirpolice power for the power to protect the public interest is beyond abnegation.It is stressed that the case at bar does not involve a franchise to operate a publicutility (such as water, transportation, communication or electricity) the operation of whichundoubtedly redounds to the benefit of the general public. What is claimed is an allegedlegislative grant of a gambling franchise a franchise to operate jai-alai. A statute whichlegalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed and everyreasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the powers and rights claimed underits authority.POWER OF EMINENT DOMAINWho May Exercise?Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137, March 14, 2000The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by itsauthorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case isthat the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individualswith greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the Constitution and the laws moresedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes withthat right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of ah individual without hisconsent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation.Exercise of Eminent Domain by LGUsMunicipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998[Panganiban]The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which maydelegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU maytherefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized byCongress and subject to the latter's control and restraints imposed "through the lawconferring the power or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, whichdelegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for itsexercise.Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the powerof eminent domain:1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chiefexecutive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursueexpropriation proceedings over a particular private property.2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or forthe benefit of the poor and the landless.3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of theConstitution, and other pertinent laws.4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the propertysought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domainpursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with thefirst requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution ismerely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary innature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for anordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all theSanggunian members.130Requisites for Proper Exercise1- Taking of private property2- Public use/purpose3- Payment of just compensation4- Valid offer to buy and refusal of offerTAKING in the Constitutional Sense> May include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of thevalue of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses fro which the property wasintended.Requisites for a valid taking:1. Exproprietor must enter a privateproperty2. Entry must be for more than amomentary period3. Entry must be under warrant orcolor of authority4. Property must be devoted to publicuse or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected5. Utilization of the property must bein such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoymentTaking under Eminent Domain distinguished from Taking under the PolicePowerPPI v. COMELEC, [G.R. No. 119694. May 22, 1995.]To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions specified inSection 2 of Resolution No. 2722, amounts to "taking" of private personal property for publicuse or purposesxxxThe extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimistemporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of thecompulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaperpublishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed. Thetaking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but notwithout payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessityof paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided byrespondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPIreads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free printspace for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers todonate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. Thethreshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to beexamined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effectthe taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondentComelecxxxSimilarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has beengranted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislativeauthority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement andadministration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to beassumed. . . . Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.TELEBAP, Inc. v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998 [Mendoza]In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do notown the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals andimages. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise isa mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with theperformance by the grantee of some form of public service.Consequently, a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional rightto be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion ofhis fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the governmentfrom requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as aproxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which arerepresentative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred fromthe airwaves. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, noprivate property is taken by the requirement that they provide airtime to the Comelec.131Meaning of Public UseTraditional Concept: The number of actual beneficiaries determines public purpose. Ifthe benefits redound in favor of individuals, then the purpose is not public.Concept of vicarious benefit: Abandons the traditional concept. The purpose is publicas long as the society in general is indirectly benefited, i.e. conversion of a slum area into amodel housing community. There is a vicarious advantage to the society.Filstream International Incorporated v. CA, 284 SCRA 716, Jan. 23, 1998 [Francisco]The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquireprivate lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fidetenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does notdiminish its public character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelterfor all who need them.Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexibleconcept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion ofindirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing.Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, 349 SCRA 240, Jan. 16, 2001, (Public UseRequirement; Payment of Just Compensation)In the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for thelegitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term "necessary", in this connection, does notmean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for thestated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The respondent cannot attain aself-sustaining and viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surroundingareas are hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with theirproperties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other facilities is better served ifrespondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.The Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for aparticular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of theimprovement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement,the existence of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it,the suitableness of the location selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature todetermine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views forthose of the representatives of the people.In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessityand expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially politicaland not judicial in their character.The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of theamount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within areasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot beconsidered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences ofbeing immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or morebefore actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 46 Payment of justcompensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of expropriationis issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the delay toconstitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must bedeliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice.Payment of Just CompensationJust compensation is described as a full and fair equivalent of the property taken from theprivate owner by the exproprietor. This is intended to indemnify the owner fully for the lossshe has sustained as a result of the expropriation.Just compensation = actual or basic value of the property+ consequential damages- consequential benefits (which should not exceed theconsequential damages)The basic or market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by partieswilling but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.132Acquisition of Easement of Right-of-WayThe exercise of the power of eminent domain does not always result in the taking orappropriation of title to the expropriated property; it may only result in the imposition of aburden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss or title or possession. Inthis case, while it is true that the plaintiff is only after a right-of-way easement, itnevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested y theimposition by the plaintiff upon the defendants that below said transmission lines, no planthigher than 3 meters is allowed. (NPC v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1)How expropriation may be initiated? Two Stages in Expropriation of LandRepublic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000,The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise thepower of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the factsinvolved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not dismissal of the action, "of condemnationdeclaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,for the public use or purpose declared in the complaint, upon the payment of justcompensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint"xxx.The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by thecourt of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by thecourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissionersxxxIt is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have beencompleted. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over theproperty passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has beencompleted and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains withthe registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to anowner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the Stateultimately to acquire it through expropriation.Is prior unsuccessful negotiation a condition precedent for the exercise ofeminent domain?SMI Development Corporation v. Republic, 323 SCRA 862, Jan. 28, 2000Current effective law on delegated authority to exercise the power of eminent domain isfound in Section 12, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:SEC. 12. Power of Eminent Domain The President shall determine when itis necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain inbehalf of the National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, wheneverhe deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in theproper court.The foregoing provision does not require prior unsuccessful negotiation as a conditionprecedent for the exercise of eminent domain. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court ofAppeals, the President chose to prescribe this condition as an additional requirementinstead. In the instant case, however, no such voluntary restriction was imposed.When Ownership transferred to ExpropriatorRepublic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from theowner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudenceon this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.When may the Expropriator enter the Property?Upon receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or noresponse from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by DARof the compensation in cash or in Land Bank Bonds in accordance with this Act, the DARshall take immediate possession of the land xxx (Land Bank v. CA & DAR v. CA)When used as Implement of Police Power133Power of Eminent Domain is utilized as an implement of Police Power to promote the welfareof the people.It is the Constitution itself which mandated the pursuit of Agrarian Reform Program toaddress once and for all the plight of the landless and the poor which for centuries has beenthe source of discontent and unrest. (ASLP v. Sec. DAR)POWER OF TAXATION- Does the power to tax include the power to destroy?The power to tax includes the power to destroy if it is used as an implement of the policepower (regulatory) of the State. However, it does not include the power to destroy if it isused solely for the purpose of raising revenue. (ROXAS vs. CTA)NOTES: > If the purpose of taxation is regulatory in character, taxation is used to implementthe police power of the state. > If the power of taxation is used to destroy things, businesses, or enterprises andthe purpose is to raise revenue, the court will come in because there will be violationof the inherent and constitutional limitations and it will be declared invalid.- Taxes distinguished from Licenses Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329 SCRA 314, March 31, 2000, EnBanc [Purisima]The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as toencompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals,comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatoryin nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercisedfor a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of thispower.The power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always beexercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of allconcerned to due process and equal protection of the law.Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to dobusiness and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particularprofession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second isissued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. Abusiness permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage inbusiness or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the otherhand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice orexercise of his or her profession. The Life-Blood DoctrineTaxes are the life-blood of the Government and their prompt and certainavailability are an imperious need. (CIR v. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105)The existence of the government is a necessity; the main source of thegovernment is taxes. These are the life-blood of the government. Thegovernment will not be able to survive and continue to perform its functionswithout taxes. (CIR v. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 8)- Can taxes be subject to off-setting or compensation? Philex Mining Corporation v. CIR, 294 SCRA 687, Aug. 28, 1998 [Romero]Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that thegovernment and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. Thereis a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to theGovernment in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government inits sovereign capacity. It must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a tax isthat it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain. Hence, a tax does notdepend upon the consent of the taxpayer. If any taxpayer can defer the payment134of taxes by raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund orcredit, this would adversely affect the government revenue system. A taxpayercannot refuse to pay his taxes when they fall due simply because he has a claimagainst the government or that the collection of a tax is contingent on the resultof the lawsuit it filed against the government.- Tax Exemptions Sec. 28[3], Art. VI, 1987 ConstitutionSECTION 28. (3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonagesor convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, andall lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, andexclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shallbe exempt from taxation. Sec. 4[3], Art. XIV, 1987 ConstitutionSECTION 4. (3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profiteducational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively foreducational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon thedissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions,their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.Proprietary educational institutions, including thosecooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptionssubject to the limitations provided by law including restrictions ondividends and provisions for reinvestment. CIR v. CA, 298 SCRA 83, Oct. 14, 1998 [Panganiban]Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for theYMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the abovecited provision, itmust prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification nonstock,non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to beexempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educationalpurposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence wassubmitted by private respondent to prove that it met the said requisites.- Who may grant tax exemptions? Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, Dec. 9, 1998 [Panganiban]The power to tax and to grant exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to acertain extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28(4), Article VI of theConstitution, specifically provides: No law granting any tax exemption shall bepassed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of theCongress. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, evenunder the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.- Tax Treaties; International Juridical Double Taxation CIR v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87, June 25, 1999, 3rd Div.[Gonzaga-Reyes]The RP-US Tax Treaty is just one of a number of bilateral treaties which thePhilippines has entered into for the avoidance of double taxation. The purpose ofthese international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal legislations ofthe contracting parties in order to help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxationin two different jurisdictions. More precisely, the tax conventions are drafted witha view towards the elimination of international juridical double taxation.International juridical double taxation is defined as the imposition ofcomparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in respect of thesame subject matter and for identical periods.The apparent rationale for doing away with double taxation is to encouragethe free flow of goods and services and the movement of capital, technology andpersons between countries, conditions deemed vital in creating robust and135dynamic economies. Foreign investments will only thrive in a fairly predictableand reasonable international investment climate and the protection againstdouble taxation is crucial in creating such a climate.THE BILL OF RIGHTSTHE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS Sec. 1, Art. III, 1987 ConstitutionSECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equalprotection of the laws. Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31, Dec.12, 1997 [Romero]When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be madebetween matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, proceduraldue process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," whilesubstantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the proceduresby which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc[Puno, Dissenting Opinion]Proceeding from this premise of relativism of rights, I venture the view thateven assuming arguendo respondent's weak claim, still, the degree of denial ofprivate respondent's rights to due process and to information is too slight towarrant the interposition of judicial power. As admitted in the ponencia itself, anextradition proceeding is sui generis. It is, thus, futile to determine what it is.What is certain is that it is not a criminal proceeding where there is an accusedwho can claim the entire array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Let it bestressed that in an extradition proceeding, there is no accused and the guilt orinnocence of the extraditee will not be passed upon by our executive officials norby the extradition judge. Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant todetermine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by anextraditee. Indeed, an extradition proceeding is summary in nature which isuntrue of criminal proceedings. 18 Even the rules of evidence are different in anextradition proceeding. Admission of evidence is less stringent, again because theguilt of the extraditee is not under litigation. It is not only the quality but even thequantum of evidence in extradition proceeding is different. In a criminal case, anaccused can only be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In anextradition proceeding, an extraditee can be ordered extradited "upon showing ofthe existence of a prima facie case." If more need be said, the nature of anextradition decision is different from a judicial decision whose finality cannot bechanged by executive fiat. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000, En Banc[Puno]Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, whenit is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determinationshould be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and whenthey are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be"condemned to suffer grievous loss." We have explained why an extraditee hasno right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extraditionprocess. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US ExtraditionTreaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence againsthim once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know thebasis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of theformal petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarilywithheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodatethe more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potentialextraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis ofthe request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extraditionproceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equalbranch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by ourConstitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations.136Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balancewhich can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from the administrativestage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors thatwill come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on privaterespondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to dueprocess which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide toresist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial ofdue process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party. People v. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163, Jan. 24, 2001, 1st Div. [Kapunan] [Voidfor Vagueness Doctrine]Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficientlyexplicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part willrender them liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that "fails to give a personof ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden bythe statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrestsand convictions," is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague orindefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for anoffense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario: As a rule, a statute or actmay be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "ofcommon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to itsapplication." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates dueprocess for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fairnotice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretionin carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Governmentmuscle. Lumiqued v. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125, Nov. 18, 1997 [Romero]The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writingand in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused duringcustodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked orrejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrativeinquiry.While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times beakin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party inan administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective ofthe nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself,and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated withcounsel.The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by theConstitution or the law. Fabella v. CA, 282 SCRA 256, Nov. 28, 1998 [Panganiban]In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include thefollowing:(1) The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution ofproceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights;(2) A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance ofcounsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defendone's rights;(3) A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as toafford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee ofhonesty as well as impartiality; and(4) A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidencesubmitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the recordsor made known to the parties affected.Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process isembodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to beheard. Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 220 SCRA 536, march 30, 1993, EnBanc [Bellosillo] (When prior notice and hearing may be dispensed with)137We held that a previous hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does theconstitutional requirement of due process demand that the correctness of theMonetary Board's resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation of firstadjudged before making the resolution effective.One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing; bank runswould be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process,fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entirebanking community." Admittedly, the mere filing of a case for receivership by theCentral Bank cab trigger a bank run and drain its assets in days or even hoursleading to insolvency even if the bank be actually solvent. The procedureprescribed in Sec. 29 is truly designed to protect the interest of all concerned, i.e.,the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself, and the general public,and the summary closure pales in comparison to the protection afforded publicinterest. At any rate, the bank is given full opportunity to prove arbitrariness andbad faith in placing the bank under receivership, in which event, the resolutionmay properly nullified and the receivership lifted as the trial court may determine. TAN vs. BARRIOS, [G.R. Nos. 85481-82. October 18, 1990.]In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, inprinciple, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing ornot yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be noretroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal,rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of theOlaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Onlyin particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there wasserious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of thesentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of theconstitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, isno longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment againsthim is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of dueprocessxxxThe public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without orin excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of thedispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority torefile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been triedand acquitted by Military Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It isan unreasonable application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will besearched in vain for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had everfaced a court martial, much less those who had been acquitted by such bodiesmore than a decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. hereinxxxThe doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against thepetitioners and their co-accused before Military Commission No. 1. The principleof absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians shouldnot be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of thepetitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations oftheir constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the militarycommission that heard and decided the charges against them during the periodof martial law, had been affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs. Military CommissionNo. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came before us.Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the informationagainst the petitioners would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not inconstitutional logic.THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE Sec. 1, Art. III, 1987 ConstitutionSECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equalprotection of the laws. TELEBAP, Inc. v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998 [Mendoza]There are important differences in the characteristics of the two media whichjustify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. Because of the138physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, ofnecessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them. There isno similar justification for government allocation and regulation of the printmedia.From another point of view, the SC has also held that because of the uniqueand pervasive influence of the broadcast media, [n]ecessarily x x x the freedomof television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than thefreedom accorded to newspaper and print media. ISAE v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000, 1st Div. [Kapunan]Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the LaborCode. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lessercompensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work ofequal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer todiscriminate in regards to wages in order to encourage or discourage membershipin any labor organization. X x xThe foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction thelong honored legal truism of "Equal pay for equal work." Persons who work withsubstantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similarconditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School(International School, Inc.), its "international character" notwithstanding. People v. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163, Jan. 24, 2001, 1st Div. [Kapunan]A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in itsoperation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye andunequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminationsbetween persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial ofequal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are notprosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutoryclassification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty,although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equalprotection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair onits face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treatedalike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in itan element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on theface of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may onlybe shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another notto be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is notpresumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination." People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3, 2000, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago]We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not areasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties ofthe office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisonersinterrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrestand confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all thosebelonging to the same class.THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Sec. 2, Art. III, 1987 ConstitutionSECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except uponprobable cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and thewitnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or things to be seized.139 Sec. 3, 2nd par., Art. III, 1987 ConstitutionSECTION 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or thepreceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in anyproceeding.Requisites of Valid Search Warrant and Warrant of Arrest Government of the USA v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002, EnBanc [Panganiban] [Vitug, Dissenting Opinion] (Is Prior Notice and HearingRequired before Judge Issues Warrant of Arrest in Extraditionproceeding?)1. On the Basis of the Extradition LawIt is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, usesthe word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualificationwould be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrestwarrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving factsand arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present suchfacts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer beconsidered immediate. The law could not have intended the word as a meresuperfluity but, on the whole, as a means of impairing a sense of urgency andswiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy isnot as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected tomake an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the materialthen available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression aprima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regardsthe arrest and detention of the accusedxxxIt is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impressionfrom these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whetherthe accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to bestserve the ends of justice. He could have determined whether such facts andcircumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person tobelieve that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact,he actually concluded from these supporting documents that probable causedid exist.We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing thepetition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from thePetition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having alreadydetermined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judgegravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion ofJimenez.Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of theanswer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. Inconnection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word hearing isnotably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at thatstage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bearsemphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary (See Sec. 9,PD 1069) in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to themore reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with ahearing every little step in the entire proceedingsxxxVerily x x x sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the requestfor their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give themample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor theLaw could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both wouldhave been defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.2. On the Basis of the ConstitutionEven Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez,does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrestxxx140To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, theConstitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation ofcomplainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement tonotify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.In Ho v. People (280 SCRA 365, October 9, 1997) and in all the cases citedtherein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearingjust for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance ofa warrant of arrest. All we required was that the judge must have sufficientsupporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at thevery least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existenceof probable cause.In Webb v. De Leon (247 SCRA 652, 680, per Puno, J.), the Court categoricallystated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing awarrant of arrest x x x.At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merelyfurther examine complainants and their witnesses (Ibid; citing Allado v. Diokno,233 SCRA 192, May 5, 1994). In the present case, validating the act ofrespondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and hiswitnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entiresystem. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to presentevidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant ofarrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses atthis stage if he so desires in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such aprocedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blowntrial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main casesuperfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature ofextraditions.That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action isnot sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of theaccused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one not the opposite would be justified in view of respondents demonstratedpredisposition to flee.Determination of Probable Cause is a Judicial Function Abdula v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1, Feb. 18, 2000, 3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes]The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purposedifferent from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there isreasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense chargedand should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, onthe other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued againstthe accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediatecustody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both shouldbase their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should beno confusion as to their distinct objectives.Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely onthe report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of awarrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of theprosecutors report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to chargethe accused for an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge mustdecide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than theprosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on theexistence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. Thisresponsibility of determining personally and independently the existence ornonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basiclaw of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of thejudge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only theinformation and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much ofthe records and the evidence on hand as to enable the His Honor to make hispersonal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutorsrecommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutorenjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official dutiesand functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the141Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probablecause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held thata judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or thereport of the investigating officer.Particular Description of Place to be Searched or Persons or Things to beSeized People v. Estrada, 296 SCRA 383 [Martinez]The applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and theperson or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. In thepresent case, it must be noted that the application for a search warrant wasaccompanied by a sketch of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of privaterespondent with a large "X" enclosed in a squarexxxWith this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe theresidential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as tosegregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound.But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the placeto be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of privaterespondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of privaterespondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned searchwarrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement. People v. CA, 291 SCRA 400, June 26, 1998 [Narvasa]It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different fromthat stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view whenthey applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in thewarrant itself, not what applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented inthe proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.Instances of Valid Warrantless Searches1- Search incidental to a lawful arrest2- Consented search3- Stop & frisk4- Plain view5- Search on a moving vehicle6- Customs search7- Check pointsSearch Incidental to a Lawful Arrest People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, June 17, 1999, En Banc [Davide]While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected todiscover dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission ofthe crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate controlwhere he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a validarrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines thevalidity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a largemajority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext forconducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawfularrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.Consented Search People v. Leila Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, Dec. 18, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza]Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposureof their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack ofsubjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to142recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport securityprocedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism hascome increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to boardan aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as wellas checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should theseprocedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches areconducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that suchsearches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of thesafety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated withairline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public addresssystems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to searchand, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject toseizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinaryconstitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not applyto routine airport procedures.(Her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since itwas effected upon the discovery