Language and Islam in Malaysian political speeches

IJSL 2014; 229: 29 – 48

Kamila GhazaliLanguage and Islam in Malaysian political speeches

Abstract: This article compares the discourses on Islam generated by the current and two previous Prime Ministers of Malaysia. As Prime Minister, each of them concurrently held the post of party president of UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) which is the main political party in the coalition government of the country. Political parties in multi-ethnic Malaysia are largely race based parties and members of UMNO are predominantly Muslim Malays. The data are the key-note addresses delivered by the party president at the UMNO General Assembly held annually. As the party president speaks, he expresses the attitudes and ide-ologies of his own group – Malays, Muslims, political entity, presupposing com-mon values and knowledge of history. The article presents findings on how each speaker makes references to Islam in terms of rhetorical structures of texts, repre-sentation of “us” and “them”, and the socio-political changes which result in the production and/or reproduction of discourse and social actions therein. In sum, analysis reveals similarities and differences among the speakers in their refer-ences to Islam. As discourse is ideologically motivated and socially produced, structures and references change as the socio-political environment of the nation evolves.

Keywords: critical discourse analysis, ideology, Malaysia, UMNO, Malay

DOI 10.1515/ijsl-2014-0016

1 Introduction

The census of 2010 shows that Malaysia has a total population of 28.3 million comprising multi-ethnic citizens who are Malays/indigenous groups (67.4%), Chi-nese (24.6%), Indians (7.3%) and Others (0.7%). Malays are predominantly Mus-lims while other religions embraced by the people are Buddhism (19.8%), Chris-tianity (9.2%) and Hinduism (6.3%) (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2010).

Kamila Ghazali: University of Malaya. E-mail: [email protected]

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30 Kamila Ghazali

With Islam as the thematic research object, this article investigates the ideo-logical construction of three prime ministers of Malaysia in their keynote address at the UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) General Assembly. By de-fault, the Prime Minister of Malaysia is also the president of UMNO, which is the leading political party in the government coalition.

UMNO was formed in 1946 and since then Malaysia has witnessed 61 UMNO General Assemblies. Therefore, the UMNO General Assembly is a social practice that is a stabilized form of social activity. According to Fairclough (2001, 2003), a social practice, or at a concrete level, a social event is an “articulation of differ-ent social elements within a relatively stable structure, always involving dis-course”. To illustrate, it articulates the following elements: activities, social rela-tions, objects, time and place, social subjects with beliefs, knowledge and values. As successors to the presidency formulate new strategies for social change and transformation, this study will extrapolate on the linguistic realizations that occur within the texts.

The study employs a discourse analytical approach which simultaneously cannot ignore the socio-political underpinnings which drive the production and reproduction of discourse and social actions. Social scientists (Md Shukri Shuib et al. 2010: 2) propose that in order to analyze Malaysian politics, researchers should consider the following principles:– Politics and social culture are related.– Religion and culture have a significant effect on Malaysian politics.– Tradition and ethnicity are reflected in the system of politics and

administration.– Malay is dominant in politics, and it is believed that if that were to change,

Malaysia would struggle with chaos and turbulence.– The Monarchy is respected and at some levels, provides balance between

power and politics. Rulers are not allowed to participate in politics, how-ever respect for the monarch often helps calm down tension between Malay politicians.

Therefore, in view of that, the linguistic realizations as found in the data are dis-cussed in relation to the relevant principles above.

2 Socio-political settingPolitics in Malaysia is largely race-based and almost all political parties in the coalition government, known as the National Front (Barisan Nasional ), are race-based parties. Apart from the smaller component parties, the main parties in the



Language and Islam in Malaysian political speeches 31

coalition government consist of UMNO (United Malays National Organisation), MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association), and MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress). The three major opposition parties in Malaysia are DAP (Democratic Action Party), PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat or People’s Justice Party) and Pas (Parti Islam se- Malaysia or Pan Malaysian Islamic Party).

Other than UMNO, Pas is the only political party that is Malay-Muslim based and since its inception had been the ideological nemesis for UMNO. Pas had its beginnings in 1951 when the Persatuan Ulamak Se-Malaya (loosely translated as ‘association of Islamic scholars Malaya’) was formed. What began as an asso-ciation of scholars grew to a political Islamic entity, re-named Parti Islam Se- Malaysia (Pas) in 1955, when factions in the group, some of whom were also mem-bers of UMNO, broke away as they were unhappy with the “lackadaisical” attitude of UMNO members towards protecting Malay-Muslim rights and differences in ideologies on the application of Islamic law. Pas, was of the opinion that the UMNO leaders of the time were too lax in their interpretation and understanding of Islamic law as a result of western (colonial) influence. This so-called “secular” reputation of UMNO has been an annoyance for its leaders since the days of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, the first Prime Minister of Malaysia (Muham-mad Ikmal 1996; Heng 1998).

In order to counter accusations of secularism, UMNO leaders attempted to conduct several conciliatory measures but it was not until Dr. Mahathir Mohamad took office as Prime Minister that the issue was handled directly through the implementation of the Islamization policy. The Mahathir ad-ministration decided that the best way to meet the Islamic challenge was with more Islam (Mauzy and Milne 2002). It was during Mahathir’s term as Prime Minister that several concrete steps were taken to imbue progressive Islamic elements in the administration; for instance, the first Islamic bank (Bank Islam) was established, the International Islamic University Malaysia was founded, legal provisions based on Islamic law were introduced, to name a few.

[T]he Mahathir-led pro-Islamic state leadership managed to appropriate and incorporate Islam into their “national” vision by flexibly and pragmatically interpreting and rationaliz-ing the religious doctrines. Their practical implementation of these principles – Islamic universalism in particular – helped lay an inclusive ideological foundation for a newly emerging “Malaysian” nationhood. (Abdelwahab 2010: 73)

In addition, with the aim of moving further away from Western indoctrination, the “Look East Policy” was implemented. In 1982, Mahathir told the UMNO Gen-eral Assembly that Malaysians should emulate the diligence of the Japanese and



32 Kamila Ghazali

Koreans “to rid ourselves of the Western values that we have absorbed” (Khoo 1995: 69).

While within the country, Mahathir contended with local opposition leaders from Pas who accused UMNO of being secular (Kamila 2004), he successfully be-came an important voice of moderation among the international Islamic commu-nity. The world (read: West) perceived Malaysia as a “moderate” Muslim nation (as opposed to a radical, fundamentalist Islamist country (read: Iran)) and this notion of “moderate” Malaysia was propounded further by his two successors.

When Abdullah Ahmad Badawi took office in 2003, he introduced the con-cept or approach of Islam Hadhari or ‘progressive’ or ‘civilized’ Islam that focuses on development. It was an effort to bring the people “back to the basics of Islam, back to the fundamentals as prescribed in the Quran and the hadith which form the foundations for an Islamic civilization” (Mohd Azizuddin 2010: 12)

The ten main principles of Islam Hadhari are:1. Faith and piety in Allah2. A just and trustworthy government3. A free and independent people4. A vigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge5. A balanced and comprehensive economic development6. A good quality of life for the people7. The protection of the rights of minority groups and women8. Cultural and moral integrity9. The safeguarding of natural resources and the environment10. Strong defense capabilities.

The Abdullah administration spent resources in explaining the approach at conferences and dialogue sessions, and disseminated information on it through various publications. Furthermore, this Malay-Muslim concept was “success-fully” exported abroad as Abdullah gave talks on it in the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, New Zealand, Australia and Germany.

At the Global Movement for Justice, Peace and Dignity Conference in Turkey on 23 February 2011, Najib Abdul Razak, the current Prime Minister of Malaysia proclaimed that “. . . the way we have developed our political structure is that Islam plays an integral part in the country’s policies and administration. We can-not separate Islam from the government in Malaysia. But having said that, it is also Islam that is moderate that we apply in Malaysia”.

As will be seen in this article, the previous prime ministers’ preoccupation with Islam in their UMNO General Assembly speeches is not prevalent in Najib’s speeches. On 16 September 2008, Najib introduced the concept of 1Malaysia, which is touted as the policy to celebrate the multi-ethnic diversity that is Malay-




sia. As he proclaims in his blog “What makes Malaysia unique is the diversity of our peoples. 1 Malaysia’s goal is to preserve and enhance this unity in diversity which has always been our strength and remains our best hope for the future” (http://www.1malaysia.com.my).

Islam is intrinsically linked to “being Malay” in Malaysia as the identity of the Malays has always been connected to the religion of Islam (Zainon and Kamila 2011). “Malay” as defined by the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, is “a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language [and], conforms to Malay customs” (The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Article 160: 2). Others have ascribed Malays as those who speak the Malay language, are loyal to the king, and uphold the religion of Islam (Shamsul 1999). Since talking about Islam brings to bear a specifically Malay identity in Malaysia, Islam may not be given prominence in Najib’s local speeches as he champions the unity in diversity cause to inculcate the multi-ethnic and multi-religious identity. References made to Islam in Najib’s speeches given locally are similar to those delivered abroad, in that they emphasize Islam as a way of life (or addin) that expounds moderation and inclusion.

In a speech delivered on 16 May 2011 at the Oxford Islamic Centre, UK, he said, “In Malaysia, Islam is synonymous with moderation, inclusiveness and good governance” (http://www.jpm.gov.my, accessed 7 May 2014).

The above is a common recurring theme expounded at the international stage by all three prime ministers who are the subjects of this article – Mahathir Moha-mad (1981–2003), Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003–2009) and Najib Abdul Razak (2009–present).

3 ApproachThe approach adopted for this article sees a dialectical relationship between discourse and elements of social practice (Fairclough 2001, 2003). As mentioned earlier, the elements of social practice are activities, social relations, objects, time and place, social subjects with beliefs, knowledge and values.

Discourse is ideologically motivated. Van Dijk (2002: 11) argues that, “dis-course makes ideologies ‘observable’ in the sense that it is only in discourse that they may be explicitly ‘expressed’ and ‘formulated’ ”. A discourse analysis leads to an understanding of social interactions and the construction and naturaliza-tion of ideology. Fairclough (2003) distinguishes three categories of critique that are related to critical discourse analysis. The three categories are ideological, rhe-torical and strategic critique. “Whereas ideological critique focuses on the effects of semiosis on social relations of power, and rhetorical critique on persuasion



34 Kamila Ghazali

(including ‘manipulation’) in individual text or talk . . . ‘strategic critique’ focuses on how semiosis figures within the strategies pursued by groups of social agents to change societies in particular directions” (Fairclough 2003: 27).

In order to guide the analysis, the following questions will be explored:1. What are the rhetorical structures of the texts on Islam? Are there similarities

or differences in organizational structure in the sections on Islam among the three speakers as they present their arguments?

2. What are some discourse features that represent “us” and “them”?3. How are processes of social change or maintenance of status quo apparent in

the mobilization of discourse?

The premise of this research is that the micro and macro levels manifest con-currently. Therefore, the president of the party speaks at the UMNO General Assembly while simultaneously speaking as Prime Minister of the country. Thus he is most likely concurrently “ ‘doing’ opposition against another party” (van Dijk 2002: 204). As he speaks as an individual, he expresses the attitudes and ideologies of his own group – Malay, Muslim, political entity, presupposing com-mon values and knowledge of history. Fairclough (1989, 2003) refers to this shared members’ knowledge as “members resources” (MR). “People internalize what is socially produced and made available to them, and use their internalized MR to engage in their social practice, including discourse” (1989: 24).

4 DataThe discussion in this article surrounds the keynote speeches delivered by Maha-thir, Abdullah and Najib at the UMNO General Assembly organized annually as they hold the position of party president and by default, the Prime Minister of the country. The main thrust of this study is Islam within the Malaysian socio- political context as expressed in the speeches of the three subjects at one of the most, if not the most, important of platforms in the nation – the UMNO General Assembly. UMNO is the leading and largest political party in the coalition govern-ment, Barisan National (National Front). Although the UMNO General Assembly has its members as the immediate audience, the meeting is telecast live on na-tional television. Therefore, the leaders and speakers have access to the nation. In addition, the presidential address is published in full in the newspapers the fol-lowing day including its English translation which can be found in all the main English language newspapers. Nowadays with the advent and widespread popu-larity of news on the internet, several websites would also carry the speeches or at least parts of the speeches. This scenario is an explicit illustration of Van Dijk’s




(1993) notion of “discourse and access” wherein powerful social actors not only have “access” or actively control discourse genres, contexts, participants, audi-ence, scope and text characteristics, but also “the access may be organized to enhance its impact given the crucial role of the media” (Van Dijk 1993: 256).

Therefore, the General Assembly is said to be the most important political event in the country when the party meets to debate on key issues. Proposals debated on surround four major themes: economy, education, social welfare and religion (Kamila 2004).

The speeches selected for the current article are those from the years 2003 and 2004 (Mahathir’s last two years); 2004 and 2005 (Abdullah’s first two years); and 2009 and 2010 (Najib’s first two years). Specifically, texts analyzed are re-trieved from only the sections of the speeches as they pertain to the theme “Islam”. I had wanted to see if the discourse was homogenous (normative) or heterogeneous (creative) from president to president especially as it pertains to Islam. So the years were taken in sequential order just as the last two presidents had taken over from the predecessor. Mahathir’s speeches are selected from the last two years he was in office to see if his successor had followed through with the ideological construction which he had maintained for 22 years. “Text” is used in this article to refer to the extracts from the speeches and approached from Fair-clough’s (2003) extended conceptualization as the semiotic dimension of social events.

5 Findings

5.1 Rhetorical structure of argumentation/organization patterns

As mentioned, the texts used for analysis are those only from the sections of the speeches as they pertain to the theme “Islam”. It is pertinent to note here that Najib’s speeches do not have a dedicated section on Islam unlike those of his predecessors. Even though a smattering of religious terms specific to the Islamic register can be found sporadically, they are used without any significant pattern or purpose. It is interpreted that the challenge for Najib is different from that faced by Mahathir and Abdullah and the issue of Islam is not prominent in his agenda. Further discussion on this is given in a Section 5.3, headed Najib Abdul Razak.

In the sections on Islam in Mahathir and Abdullah’s speeches, however, the predominant features of the rhetorical structure are (i) Threat or Problem (ii)



36 Kamila Ghazali

Solution or Answer to Problem. As it is found that Najib does not have a dedicated section on Islam in his speeches, the following is a discussion of rhetorical struc-tures of argumentation only by Mahathir and Abdullah. In the discussion, analy-ses include the discourse as well as the socio-political contexts that ensue.

5.1.1 Mahathir Mohamad

The following is the structure of Mahathir’s speeches in the sections on Islam:i. Challenges faced globallyii. Challenges within the countryiii. Challenges within the partyiv. Solution: revert to the true teachings of Islam/UMNO

Findings indicate that Mahathir spent more time, placing more emphasis on the Problem category than on the Solution category. The extracts provided below are taken from the section on Islam in the (2002) speech.

With regard to (i) challenges faced globally, this structure frames the articu-lation of discourses as he makes intertextual references to current global chal-lenges and events in Islamic history, e.g.:

(1) “Sebelum pun berlaku peristiwa 11 September, agama Islam dan umat Islam sudah dituduh sebagai agama dan orang yang mundur, tidak mampu memer-intah dan membangun nation sendiri dan sering terlibat dengan keganasan. Pandangan ini menjadi lebih buruk selepas 11 September. Hari ini sesiapa yang memiliki nama Islam diberi layanan yang buruk. Mereka ditahan, disoal, diperiksa, diserang, bahkan dibunuh dengan sewenang-wenangnya.”

[Even before the Sept 11 event occurred, Islam, and the Muslim ummah have been condemned as a religion and a people that are backward, unable to ad-minister and develop their own country and often involved in violence. This view became worse after Sept. 11. Today anyone with a Muslim name is given bad treatment. They are detained, questioned, examined, attacked, even killed thoughtlessly.]

With regard to (ii) challenges within the country, although these factual claims are specific to current, global and/or historical events, the arguments are further formulated to relate to local, national events (problems).

(2) “Yang amat malang lagi ialah apabila sahaja pemerintah sesebuah negara Islam cuba membangunkan negara serta ketahanannya dengan mengejar ilmu




dan kecekapan dalam bidang-bidang seperti sains dan teknologi maka akan muncullah kumpulan yang menentang percubaan ini kerana kononnya ini adalah bukti yang pemerintahan adalah sekular dan tidak Islam dan perlu dijatuhkan.”

[What is even more unfortunate is that as soon as the leadership of a Muslim country tries to develop the country and improve its defence capa-bility by acquiring knowledge in science and technology, there will emerge groups which oppose such attempts because according to them (allegedly) this is proof that the Government is secular and unIslamic and must be overthrown.]

The challenges are then recontextualized as challenges faced by the party (iii):

(3) “Walaupun mereka menamakan kumpulan mereka Persaudaraan Islam atau Parti Allah atau Parti Islam, mereka tidak segan-segan membelakangkan ajaran Islam dengan mengkafirkan Pemerintahan negara, dan mereka sanggup membunuh kepimpinan Kerajaan Islam dan orang Islam lain dalam usaha untuk menghalang kemajuan yang mereka dakwa sekular itu.”

[Although they call themselves Muslim Brothers or the Party of Allah or Is-lamic Party, they are not ashamed to turn their backs on the teachings of Islam by declaring that the government leadership is not Muslim, and they are willing to kill the leadership of a Muslim Government and other Muslims in their effort to obstruct development which they assert as secular.]

Finally, the solution (iv) is to follow the true teachings of Islam.

(4) “Inilah perkara-perkara yang perlu diberi perhatian oleh orang Islam dan neg-ara Islam. Mereka perlu betulkan diri mereka, perlu kembali kepada ajaran Islam yang sebenar demi menyelamatkan diri mereka.”

[These are the things which must be given attention to by Muslims and their countries. They must correct themselves; they must go back to the true teach-ings of Islam in order to save themselves.]

There is presupposed common knowledge among all members that the ruling government/UMNO is often accused of being a “secular” organization by the Is-lamic opposition party Pas (see Section 2). By juxtaposing the common mental representation that Pas accuses UMNO of being secular with the notion of dis-approval of developments in science and technology, it is implied that, from the perspective of Pas, acquiring knowledge in science and technology is a “secular”



38 Kamila Ghazali

endeavor and not grounded in Islamic principles. Ultimately, this creates an ideo-logical representation of Pas as regressive and backward.

The employment of akan ‘will’ as a modality of certainty in maka akan mun-cullah (the emergence of groups which oppose such attempts) is presented as truth. The use of kononnya ‘allegedly’, which denotes a proposition as untrue, negates the “proof” that the government is secular.

Following that, discussion on “challenges faced by the nation” is further ex-tended and “recontextualised” (Fairclough 2003) to the topic “challenges faced by the party”. Throughout Mahathir’s speeches at the assembly when he was party president, he warns members not to be fooled by those who “misinterpret” the teachings of Islam (see Kamila 2004). Similarly, in the texts on Islam in the (2002) speech, he alludes to accusations frequently made by Pas that UMNO / the Government is kafir ‘infidel/disbeliever of the Muslim faith’. This is a serious alle-gation and serves as a threat to those in the party who may be influenced by such accusations and break away from the party as history had shown (see discussion in Section 2). However, Mahathir had categorically placed this action of mengkaf-irkan pemerintahan negara ‘declaring the government leadership as not Muslim’ as membelakangkan ajaran Islam ‘turning their backs on the teachings of Islam’. Therefore, those who accused the government leadership as infidels or unIslamic are placed in the “subject position” (Fairclough 1989, 1992) as those who turn their backs and go against the teachings of Islam. In addition, within the same sentence, a coordinating conjunction dan ‘and’ connects this clause to mereka sanggup membunuh kepimpinan kerajaan Islam . . . ‘they are willing to kill the leadership . . .’. The two parallel clauses are provided equal importance and pre-sented as truth. In addition to going against the teachings of Islam, “they” are also described as killers of Muslim leaders in their effort to obstruct development which they assert as secular. This appeal to pathos causes the audience to react emotionally and identify with the speaker’s view point.

With reference to the Solution, the speaker persuades the members that the only solution is to follow the “true teachings of Islam”. The obligatory modality perlu ‘must’ is used repeatedly in providing the answer to the threats presented earlier. It is implied that the “true teachings of Islam” are those expounded by UMNO. In many instances throughout all Mahathir’s speeches at the UMNO Gen-eral Assembly, Islam and UMNO are contextualized as the same (Kamila 2004, 2006). Findings in the current article also prove that both Mahathir and Abdullah place UMNO and the government in the same “subject position” as Islam. This naturalized ideology had been inculcated by Mahathir in his speeches at the Gen-eral Assembly from 1982 to 1996 when the subject position of UMNO and govern-ment policies were equivalent to Islam by means of “classification schemes” and “intertextuality” (Kamila 2004).




5.1.2 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi

As Abdullah tackles the topic of Islam in his speech, the familiar Problem/ Solution structure is again mobilized. But unlike his predecessor, more time is spent on the Solution rather than the Problem. The following is the structure of Abdullah’s speeches in the sections on Islam:i. Challenges in the country and abroadii. Solution: Islam Hadhari

The following are extracts taken from the section on Islam in Abdullah’s speech in 2005.

With regard to (i) challenges in the country and abroad, Abdullah does not elaborately describe the threats or challenges faced. For example:

(5) “Kita juga sedar bahawa Islam dan ajarannya boleh diperalatkan oleh kumpulan-kumpulan tertentu, bukan sahaja di Malaysia tetapi juga di luar negara, untuk tujuan memenuhi agenda sempit.”

[We realize that Islam and its teachings can be used as tools by certain quarters, not only in Malaysia but also in other countries, for the purpose of fulfilling a narrow agenda.]

After briefly presenting the Problem to the party members, Abdullah intro-duces the Solution (ii): Kerana itulah kita perkenalkan pendekatan Islam Hadhari [And that is why we introduce the Islam Hadhari approach]. Following this, Ab-dullah provides an extended illustration of the Solution, i.e., a full description of the concept and objectives of Islam Hadhari.

In 2004, the year after he took office, Abdullah delivered his maiden speech at the UMNO General Assembly when he introduced the Islam Hadhari con-cept, the strategy undertaken was to positively “equate the approach taken by the leadership with the approach of providing guidance in Islam. In so doing, he ap-peals to the people to accept what he has to convey and ultimately to accept his leadership through group mental representations of Islam” (Kamila 2006: 141).

As mentioned, Abdullah took over the role of party president and Malaysia’s Prime Minister in 2003. His first speech as party leader was a major platform to introduce a “re-packaged” form of Islamization he called Islam Hadhari, a con-cept for progressive or civilized Islam that puts a focus on development, consis-tent with the tenets of Islam, and with a primary concern on improving quality of life (Mohd Azizuddin 2010). In the duration of his term, Abdullah’s administra-tion dedicated resources on conducting workshops and seminars on extrapolat-ing the meaning of the concept. He also gave talks abroad on Malaysia’s practice



40 Kamila Ghazali

of “moderate” and “progressive” Islam. Critiques contend that Islam Hadhari is just a new brand attached to an old or existing concept (Kamila 2006; Zainal 2006).

In the structure of his speech on Islam, unlike his predecessor, Abdullah spent more time on the Solution rather than the Problem. It can be surmised that at this point in time, Abdullah saw more need to elaborate on his Islam Hadhari agenda in response to critics who contend that the concept lacked substance and credence (Chong 2006; Kessler 2008) and only served to confuse not only the Malays but also the non-Malays in the country (Kabilan 2011).

The Problem/Solution information structure is strategic as it lends itself to a “reason-why” (Delin 2000) style of argumentation as is commonly found in pol-itical and advertising discourse where a “buy-in” is the ultimate imperative. This style of presentation leads text receivers (audience) to admit that a particular situation presents a problem in their lives. A solution is subsequently offered and justifications provided (Carter and Nash 1990). In the case of Abdullah, there is a need to spend more time on providing an elaboration of the concept (solution) in order to naturalize the ideology and consequently, accept as “common sense” (Fairclough 1989, 1995, 2001).

5.2 “Us” vs “Them”

5.2.1 “Us” vs “Them” in Mahathir

In the Malay language, the first person plural marker has two different forms to distinguish the inclusive (kita) from the exclusive (kami) (Asmah 1993: 79). The first person plural marker kita ‘we’ is widely used as a solidarity marker. In her study on the speeches of Mahathir (1982–1996), Kamila (2004: 69) found that he had as many as five references for kita. They are: (i) we, the people, (ii) we, in UMNO, (iii) we, the leadership in UMNO, (iv) we, the government, and (v) you. On this basis, the section will look at the three speakers’ use of kita to see if they are similar. In addition, this section will also investigate who they define as “them” and how they are defined.

In the sections on Islam in the speeches of 2002 and 2003, the following are some examples of the occurrence of “we/us” as defined by Mahathir. He defines “we/us” as “we who seek justice towards us Muslims” (“kita . . . menuntut supaya mereka berlaku adil kepada kita orang Islam”). In this case, the first reference is to “we, the leadership” and the second is to “we, the Muslim people in the global context”. Mahathir is known for his outspokenness on the global platform and sometimes what he says may irk some western leaders (see Md Shukri Shuib et al.




2010). In the above extract, he makes reference to his speaking opportunity abroad when he sought justice and fairness on behalf of all Muslims so that they did not fall victim to racial/religious profiling in the international space espe-cially after the 9/11 event.

Another occurrence in Mahathir’s speech is with reference to “we, the peo-ple” in “Kita kecewa kerana walau pun mereka sering bercakap berkenaan hak asasi manusia, berkenaan keadilan, tetapi orang Islam nampaknya dikecualikan, tidak berhak dan boleh ditindas bila-bila dan di mana-mana sahaja” [We are frus-trated because even though they often speak of human rights, (and) justice, it seems that Muslims are exempt, do not have rights and can be oppressed any-time, anywhere]. In the same sentence, there is implicit reference to “they”, i.e., the “west” as he presupposes shared knowledge that champions of human rights issues commonly come from the west. There may even be a hint of cynicism as western hegemony imposes its “values” and version of human rights and demo-cracy on the third world and developing nations.

Other instances of “them/they” in Mahathir’s speech are when he implicitly or explicitly refers to the opposition party Pas. For example, “they” are defined as “those who misinterpret the teachings of Islam”, and “those who turn their backs on Islam”.

5.2.2 “Us” vs. “Them” in Abdullah Ahmad Badawi

Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, on the other hand, did not portray “them/they” with reference to the opposition party Pas in the text examined in 2004. In the text of 2005, “they” are referred to as those who used Islam as a tool to fulfill their own agenda. For example:

(6) “Kita juga sedar bahawa Islam dan ajarannya boleh diperalatkan oleh kumpulan-kumpulan tertentu, bukan sahaja di Malaysia tetapi juga di luar negara, untuk tujuan memenuhi agenda sempit . . .”

[We are also aware that Islam and its teachings can be used as a tool by cer-tain groups, not only in Malaysia but also abroad, for the purpose of fulfilling a narrow agenda.]

In this extract, it is inferred that the “local groups” refer to Pas and those “abroad” are the “extremists” or “terrorists” as he continues to describe them as those who are willing to resort to violent acts that kill and cause destruction. In so doing, he categorically places Pas in the same subject position as those extremists from abroad who are willing to cause destruction and unrest.



42 Kamila Ghazali

On the subject of Islam Hadhari, Abdullah expounds on the ruling govern-ment’s success in portraying Islam as progressive and dynamic. This he says is a cause of worry for the opposition party Pas, which he implicitly refers to as the “political group which (mistakenly) consider themselves as the group which has a monopoly on Islam” (“kumpulan politik yang selama ini menganggap Islam sebagai monopoli mereka”).

As can be seen from the two examples above, Abdullah’s reference to Pas is made implicitly. It is only through the same mental representation with the UMNO members can the inference be made.

As briefly mentioned earlier, although “Islam Hadhari is often described as a specifically Malay phenomenon or ‘product’, capable of export” (Abdelwahab El- Affendi 2010: 75), there are also many criticisms leveled at the concept of Islam Hadhari. “Abdullah made it a key point to assert the civilising function of religion in his formulation of a strategy to face the challenge” (Mohd Azizuddin 2010: 4). On the other hand, after all the seminars, roadshows and dissemination of publi-cations on it, many Malaysians were still confused with the concept. Critiques assert that:

. . . generally there was little understanding of how the abstract principles of Islam Hadhari have been, or indeed can be, operationalised. The inability of the Malaysian government under Abdullah to make this abstract concept speak to the everyday realities confronting the Malaysian people, particularly the non-Muslim minority, was made abundantly clear when Islam Hadhari was conspicuously absent in the government’s explanation of how it would address a host of challenges such as the integrity of the judiciary, rising inflation, polarisation wrought by the deepening of Islamic conservatism and perceived encroach-ment on non-Muslim rights. (Mohd Azizuddin 2010: 15)

In analyzing the linguistic realisations of kita ‘we/us’, closer inspection reveals that its identity is as mystifying as the abstract concept of Islam Hadhari as contended above. Firstly, through nominalization and implication, Abdullah dis-tances himself ideationally (O’Halloran 2003: 130) from “we, the people (read: Malays)” in the following:

(7) “Perubahan minda Melayu memerlukan satu tindakan secara menyeluruh, secara drastik, secara sistematik, dan tidak bersifat sektor atau partisan.”

[Change in the Malay mindset needs action that is holistic, drastic, system-atic, and not sectorial or partisan.]

This begs the question, who the agent of change is? The implication that prevails is that the situation for the Malays must be so bad that they need a comprehensive (holistic) change that is “drastic”.




Other examples show that the doer of the action can only be inferred as “we, the leadership” as agency is not included. Simultaneously, the subject position of the Malays can also be implied through what is not stated, i.e. they are confused and lack Islamic understanding. Some examples are:

(8) “Segala bentuk pemikiran yang mengelirukan dan tidak bersesuaian dengan kefahaman Islam perlu dikikis supaya pemikiran dan jati diri bangsa Melayu dapat dibentuk.”

[All forms of thought that is confusing and not suitable to Islamic under-standing must be eradicated so that Malay thought and identity can be shaped.]

(9) “Konsep jihad perlu ditafsirkan secara lebih luas, meliputi aspek kehidupan manusia seperti menuntut ilmu, menguasai sains dan teknologi serta melak-sanakan aktiviti-aktiviti ekonomi.”

[The concept of jihad needs to be interpreted in a wider manner, to include aspects of life, like seeking knowledge, mastering science and technology as well as implementing economic activities.]

(10) “Bangsa Melayu perlu diberikan kefahaman Islam yang membolehkan bangsa menghayati dan mewarisi wawasan ketamadunan global untuk mem-bolehkan bangsa berperanan secara berkesan diperingkat global.”

[Malays must be provided with an understanding of Islam that will enable the race to appreciate and inherit the vision of a global civilization to enable the race to participate effectively on the global platform.]

(11) “Perlu diperbetulkan sebarang salah faham terhadap konsep ilmu agar tidak berlaku pemisahan antara ilmu sekular dengan ilmu agama.”

[Must be corrected (sic), any misunderstanding towards the concept of knowledge in order to prevent the separation of secular knowledge and reli-gious knowledge.]

Finally, it is only at the end of the section when the speaker makes agency ex plicit when he declares:

(12) “UMNO bertanggungjawab melalui perkataan – melalui perbuatan, mencer-minkan imej – membina budaya Islam sebenar.”

[UMNO is responsible through words – through action, reflecting (the cor-rect) image – to develop true Islamic culture.]

Needless to say, the extract above not only determines “we” as the leadership in UMNO, but also implies that only UMNO (and not Pas who misinterprets Islam)



44 Kamila Ghazali

has the responsibility and capability to lead the ummah ‘Muslims’ towards devel-oping the true Islamic culture.

5.3 Najib Abdul Razak

Najib does not follow the path of his two predecessors by including a section on Islam in his keynote addresses in 2009 and 2010. In fact, he has moved away completely from any rhetoric on Islamization as is associated with Mahathir or Abdullah’s Islam Hadhari. In its place, Najib has introduced the 1Malaysia unity ideology which professes the “1Malaysia, People first, Performance Now” slogan.

In only one instance does Najib equate 1Malaysia to Islam in his 2010 speech:

(13) “Dalam hubungan ini lagi, Gagasan 1Malaysia juga adalah selaras dengan nilai-nilai Islam dan semangat yang ditunjukkan sirah Rasulullah S.A.W. dalam pembentukan negara dan ketamadunan Islam terawal di Madinah.”

[In this regard, the 1Malaysia concept is also in line with Islamic values and the spirit shown by the Prophet PBUH in the development of the nation and early Islamic civilization in Madinah.]

Apart from minimal references to practicing Islam in moderation (“UMNO men-jadi parti yang berpegang kepada falsafah ‘wasatan’ yakni bersederhana . . .” [UMNO is a party that holds to the philosophy of moderation]) and sporadic in-stances of Islamic lexical choices (taqwa ‘piety’, siasah ‘political’, muhasabah ‘reflection’, kekhilafan ‘error’), traces of Islam in Najib’s speeches consistently appeared only in the opening of the speeches.

In both speeches examined, Najib opens his keynote address with verses (surah) that are taken from the Quran. The verse cited in the first speech (2009), that is the As-Saff: 4, is on having strength by standing together in unity (“Allah loves those who fight in His cause in rows (ranks) as if they were a solid structure” [Muhammad and Muhammad 1996: 728]). In 2010, he starts his keynote address with two verses. The first is from Al-Baqarah: 143, which is translated as “We have made you a just nation, that you be witnesses over mankind and the Messenger be a witness over you” (Muhammad and Muhammad 1996: 40), and the second is from Al-Imran: 159, which is translated as “And by the mercy of Allah, you dealt with them gently. And had you been severe and harsh-hearted, they would have broken away from about you. So, pass over their faults (forgive them), and ask Allah’s forgiveness for them; and consult them in the affairs” (Muhammad and Muhammad 1996: 107). In both years, even though Najib commences his speeches with Malay translations of verses from the Quran, he does not expand




on the interpretations of the verses nor does he refer to the said verses to relate to situations or circumstances past or present in any way. Simply put, he merely re-gurgitates the translations without any real purpose or reference. In a way, it seems as if it was an obligatory move which he just needed to perform.

The 1Malaysia concept espouses celebration of diversity in Malaysia and does not proclaim to create a homogenous society. Therefore, on that basis much of Najib’s discourse is to create awareness and understanding of his endeavor for cultural acceptance in multi-ethnic and multi-religious Malaysia. In short, for this reason, it is surmised that he would avoid any of the outwardly Muslim- Malay references found in the speeches of his predecessors.

6 Summary of findings and conclusionTo conclude, all three presidents have the same ideological construction of Islam in the nation, i.e. Malaysia is a moderate Muslim country and this is the construct that they disseminate abroad. The definition or expansion of “moderate” is not explicated as it is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that the meaning of “moderate” has also been contentious and Mahathir in recent times (speech at the 45th Annual General Meeting of the Muslim Welfare Organisation of Malaysia [Perkim]) had indicated that there was no such thing as “moderate Muslim”, as Islam itself is a religion of moderation. There had been debates on the meaning of “moderate” and he had wanted to dispel the allegations that being moderate means not practising Islam in full.

All three presidents in this article have been and are still successfully in-volved in speaking engagements abroad to “export” the Malaysian product of the Islam as practiced in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious nation. However, in the speeches at the UMNO General Assembly studied, only Mahathir and Abdullah had consistently dedicated sections of their speeches extrapolating on Islam while Najib did not have a dedicated section on Islam in his speeches.

Mahathir and Abdullah had mobilized a Problem/Solution rhetorical struc-ture in framing their argumentation. Mahathir argues at length the problems and challenges faced by Muslims/UMNO abroad, in the country, and within the party. The solution he presented is for Muslims/UMNO to revert to the true teachings of Islam and at the same time he intertextually makes references to the opposition party Pas’ misinterpretations of Islam.

Similarly, Abdullah also framed his argumentation in the Problem/Solution rhetorical structure. However, he spent less time talking about the problem or challenges. He dedicated more effort in providing arguments on the solution which he contends is the Islam Hadhari approach.



46 Kamila Ghazali

On the other hand, it is found that Najib does not have a dedicated section on Islam in his speeches. When he took over as Prime Minister, foremost in his agenda is the 1Malaysia unity agenda. Both his predecessors had played the Muslim Malay agenda through the Islamization policy (Mahathir) and the same policy re-branded as Islam Hadhari (Abdullah). Mahathir was Prime Minister during the period of Islamic resurgence (Chandra 1986) and his Islamization policy was implemented in concrete terms, for example, by the establishment of Islamic banking, inculcation of Islamic education in schools and the founding of the first Islamic university, the institutionalizing of Islam through the upgrad-ing of the Islamic Affairs Division to the Department of Islamic Advancement of Malaysia (JAKIM) in the Prime Minister’s department, to name a few. But Ab-dullah’s Islam Hadhari was found to be too vague as it did not have concrete implementation guidelines. At the same time, it possibly alienated other races who are non- Muslim. In fact, as Mohd Azizuddin (2010: 14) contends, “some reli-gious officials have taken this policy to further the Islamisation of society” and questions arose on some of the actions taken which were perceived as radical by some quarters.

Najib makes repeated claims in his speeches (2009 and 2010) that the 1Malaysia concept has the same ultimate objectives as those of the founding fathers, i.e. racial unity and celebration of the nation’s diversity. Therefore, a con-tinuance of the Islam Hadhari concept is not topmost in his priority list. In addi-tion, Pas, which was built on the Muslim Malay agenda, does not pose a threat anymore since even they had begun to relax their ideals by forming a coalition with the predominantly Chinese and non-Muslim opposition party DAP (Demo-cratic Action Party) and the PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat). Pas, DAP and PKR are perceived to be diverse in their political ideologies and, especially DAP, would not concede to Pas’ original Islamic ideology to create an Islamic state. In sum, for all the reasons discussed above, it is surmised that there is no necessity for Najib to have a dedicated section to address the Muslim Malay agenda in his speeches.

With reference to “we/us vs. they/them”, Mahathir refers to “we, the leader-ship” and “we, all Muslims” (in the global context). It is inferred that he refers to “we”, the Muslims (in the global context), because Mahathir perceives himself as having the authority to speak on behalf of all Muslims around the world. Find-ings also indicate that Mahathir’s “other” are either “the west(ern) powers” or the opposition party Pas.

Abdullah’s “they” is implicit and they can refer to those who “use Islam as a tool” from abroad (extremists) and local (Pas). His reference to “we/us” is also implicit and it is found that he distances himself from the Malays/Muslims in the mobilization of nominalization. Agency is omitted and it is only at the end of the section when “we, the leadership” is made explicit.




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Language and Islam in Malaysian political speeches

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