Kosovo Operation Allied Force

RESEARCH PAPER 99/4829 APRIL 1999

Kosovo: Operation"Allied Force"

On 24 March 1999 NATO initiated a campaign of airstrikes, codenamed Operation "Allied Force", againstthe military capability of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY). This paper provides achronological overview of the main events in thecampaign between 24 March and 28 April and detailsthe major developments both in the region andinternationally. It looks at the humanitarian and legalissues that have arisen from the conflict beforeconcluding with a consideration of potential futuredevelopments.

The historical background to the conflict anddevelopments during 1998 are covered by LibraryResearch Papers 98/73, Kosovo, and 98/93, Kosovo:the Diplomatic and Military Options. The build-up tothe NATO action is covered in Library Research Paper99/34, Kosovo: NATO and Military Action, of 24March 1999.

Mick Hillyard

ECONOMIC POLICY & STATISTICS SECTION

HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY

Tim Youngs, Mark Oakes and Paul Bowers

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & DEFENCE SECTION

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Summary of main points

The NATO campaign of air strikes against the military capability of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY), known as Operation Allied Force, entered its sixth week on 28 April1999. NATO has substantially increased its forces in the region since the operationcommenced on 24 March, with over 1,000 combat aircraft now involved. The Alliance hasspecified the conditions that Belgrade has to meet before the air campaign will be halted.These are: an end to all Serb military actions; a withdrawal of all police and paramilitaryforces; agreement on the deployment of an international military force to Kosovo; theunconditional return of all displaced people; unhindered access for relief organisations; and acommitment to work towards a political framework, based on the accords agreed atRambouillet.

In Kosovo itself, the offensive by Yugoslav Army and Serbian interior ministry police unitscontinues, as reports emerge of increased activity by the rebel Kosova Liberation Army(KLA). Ethnic Albanian refugees continue to cross into Albania, FYR Macedonia andMontenegro, but in smaller numbers than at the start of the crisis. Many refugees have madeallegations of widespread brutality on the part of Serbian and Yugoslav troops, includingmass executions, gang rape and the systematic forced detention of men of fighting age.NATO claims there are currently around 100,000 men unaccounted for, but warns the figurecould in fact be much higher. As of 28 April the UNHCR estimated that a total of 603,200had fled the province, with an unspecified number displaced within Kosovo itself.

Tension continues to mount between the pro-Western Montenegrin Government in Podgoricaand the pro-Milosevic Serbian and Federal Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade. Montenegrohas sought to avoid involvement in the conflict with NATO, prompting allegations byBelgrade of treachery on the part of the Montenegrin leadership, and raising fears thatPresident Milosevic may seek to remove Montenegrin President Djukanovic, a move thatcould provoke civil war. The Western leaders have declared their support for Mr Djukanovicand warned Belgrade of unspecified consequences if it tries to destabilise Montenegro.

Russia has strongly criticised the NATO air strikes, but has not provided military assistanceto Belgrade. Instead, Moscow has taken a leading role in attempts to find a diplomaticsolution to the conflict, although the imposition by NATO of an oil embargo against the FRYcould provoke tension if NATO forces attempt to stop and search Russian vessels.Commentators also believe the deployment of NATO troops into Kosovo without Belgradesapproval could prompt the Russian military to break the arms embargo on the FRY.

At present NATO has made no firm decision on sending troops into Kosovo in an offensivecapacity, perhaps aware that such a move could endanger the unity of the Alliance. However,the military options for a ground offensive are currently being updated, and some Westernleaders have indicated that troops be could used in a "permissive" or "semi-permissive"environment without President Milosevics approval, once air strikes have inflicted sufficientdamage on Belgrades military machine. NATO insists, though, that air power alone iscapable of achieving its declared objectives.

CONTENTS

I The Build-up to NATO Action 8

A. Talks Adjourned at Rambouillet 8B. The Start of the Yugoslav Offensive in Kosovo 8

C. Final Diplomatic Efforts 8

II The Start of Operation "Allied Force" 10

A. International Reaction 10

III Chronology of Developments (24 March 28 April 1999) 12A. Week One of NATO Air Strikes (24 - 30 March) 12B. Week Two of NATO Air Strikes (31 March - 6 April) 16C. Week Three of NATO Air Strikes (7 - 13 April) 19D. Week Four of NATO Air Strikes (14 - 20 April) 21E. Week Five of NATO Air Strikes (21 - 28 April) 24

IV The Humanitarian Situation 31

A. The Situation in the Region 31

B. Definition of emergency aid 32

C. Level of UK total emergency aid 34

D. The UK Response to the Kosovo Crisis 37

1. DFID's Objectives 372. Organisation of aid effort 383. The form of UK assistance 38

E. Level of EC aid 41

V War Crimes 42

A. Geneva Conventions 42

B. Genocide Convention 47

C. International Tribunal 50

D. Allegations of War Crimes 51

VI Opinion within the United Kingdom 54

VII Current Developments and Future Prospects 56

A. The Campaign So Far 56

B. Criticisms of NATO 57

C. Attitudes within NATO 58

D. The Oil Embargo 59

E. Main NATO Deployments and the British Contribution 61

1. Operation "Allied Force" 612. Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 623. NATO Kosovo Enforcement Force (KFOR) 624. Operation Allied Harbour/AFOR 635. "Task Force Hawk" 64

F. Possible Outcomes to the Crisis 65

Appendix 1: Summary of NATO forces 69

Appendix 2: Summary of Yugoslav Forces 73

Appendix 3 - UK Ground Forces in FYR Macedonia 77

Appendix 4 - RAF Strike Missions 78

Appendix 5: Airlifts funded by DFID 80

RESEARCH PAPER 99/48

8

I The Build-up to NATO Action

A.

Talks Adjourned at RambouilletOn 19 March 1999 the co-chairmen at the Contact Group-sponsored negotiations atRambouillet, Foreign Ministers Hubert Vdrine of France and Robin Cook, announcedthe adjournment of the talks without agreement from Belgrade. Although internationalmediators succeeded in persuading the ethnic Albanian delegation to sign up to the draftaccords, the Yugoslav delegation continued to object to key aspects, including theproposed deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force to ensure the implementation ofthe accords. NATO had threatened Belgrade with military action if it blockednegotiations.

The failure of the talks led the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe(OSCE) to withdraw the unarmed monitoring force, the Kosovo Verification Mission(KVM), from Kosovo over fears for the safety of its personnel.

B.

The Start of the Yugoslav Offensive in Kosovo

On 20 March, as the monitors withdrew from Kosovo, Belgrade launched a majoroffensive with Serbian Interior Ministry police (Ministarstva unutranjih poslova orMUP) and Yugoslav Army (VJ) forces. During the first four days of the offensive in theMitrovica region and along the Prizren-Djakovica-Pec axis an estimated 20,000 peoplewere forced to flee their homes.1

Under the terms of the October agreement between President Milosevic and US envoyRichard Holbrooke Belgrade had agreed to reduce its forces in the province to the pre-conflict levels of 12,000 VJ troops and 10,000 MUP troops. However, by 23 MarchNATO estimated that Belgrade had massed approximately 16,000 MUP troops and20,000 VJ troops in Kosovo itself with a further 8,000 VJ reinforcements available on theprovincial border.

C.

Final Diplomatic Efforts

In a final attempt to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, Mr Holbrooke travelled toBelgrade for talks with President Milosevic on 22 and 23 March. It became clear, though,after several hours of negotiations that Mr Holbrooke had been unable to persuadePresident Milosevic to comply with NATOs demands.

After briefing Alliance members on the failed negotiations in Belgrade, Mr Holbrookeannounced on 23 March that he was handing over the process to NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana. Mr Solana then announced that he had delegated responsibility to

1 For a map of the region see Library Research Paper 98/73, Kosovo


9

the Alliance's Supreme Commander, General Wesley Clark, to initiate air strikes againstthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), although he gave no indication as to when theaction would begin.

It was also reported that Secretary-General Solana had written to the leaders of Albania,Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia), Romania, andSlovenia to assure them of support from the Alliance in the event of a threat to theirsecurity from the Yugoslav military. He stressed that their countries' security was of"direct and material concern" to the Alliance and emphasised that NATO would find itunacceptable if the FRY were "to threaten the territorial integrity and independence" ofits neighbours.2

In Belgrade the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Momir Bulatovic, declared a state ofemergency, calling for the mass mobilisation of reserves and placing the Yugoslav armedforces on a high state of alert.

2 Times, 25 March 1999


10

II The Start of Operation "Allied Force"Shortly after 20:00 GMT on 24 March 1999 the first air strikes by NATO forces werereported against targets around Pristina, the provincial capital of Kosovo. NATOSecretary-General Javier Solana declared:

Clear responsibility for the air strikes lies with President Milosevic who hasrefused to stop his violent action in Kosovo and has refused to negotiate in goodfaith. 3

In a televised address to the American public on 25 March President Clinton warned that:"If President Milosevic will not make peace, we will limit his ability to make war."4 Hecited three objectives for the NATO action:

First, to demonstrate the seriousness of Nato's opposition to aggression and itssupport for peace. Second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing andescalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks.And third, if necessary, to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovoby diminishing its military capability.5

Mr Clinton also warned that a failure to act now could lead to a wider war throughout theBalkans, potentially involving Greece and Turkey, although this view was disputed by theGreek government.

A.

International Reaction

The international reaction to the NATO air strikes was mixed. The UN Security Councilmet in emergency session, with two of the permanent members, Russia and China, callingfor an end to what they termed the illegal military action".6 The Chinese President, JiangZemin, said that violence "does not resolve problems. Indeed it makes them morecomplex."7 In apparent deference to domestic political pressure, the Russian President,Boris Yeltsin, issued a stark warning of the potential consequences of the NATO action:

This means war in Europe, possibly even more. It is an extremely serious stepand to take such a step without the United Nations Security Council is more thanincomprehensible. Of course we are doing all that we can, but we cannot doeverything. We could, but conscience does not allow it.8

3 Financial Times, 25 March 1999

4 Independent, 25 March 1999

5 ibid.

6 "Russia condemns Nato at UN", BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk , 25 March 1999

7 Guardian, 25 March 1999

8 ibid.


11

Mr Yeltsin also ordered a freeze in Russia's relations with NATO and deputies in theRussian lower house of parliament, the Duma, called for military assistance to beprovided to Belgrade. In response to the domestic pressure the Foreign Minister, IgorIvanov, claimed that the NATO action had rendered the UN arms embargo on Yugoslavianull and void, although the Russian Government gave no indication that it was intendingto supply military equipment to the FRY.9

On 26 March Russia put forward a draft resolution in the UN Security Council, co-sponsored by non-Council members Belarus and India, calling for an immediate halt toNATO attacks and an urgent resumption of negotiations. The motion was supported bytwo permanent members, Russia and China, and also by Namibia. However, the otherthree permanent members (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) all votedagainst, as did the remaining members of the Council: Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil,Canada, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Netherlands and Slovenia. Therefore, as the motionfailed to win the minimum nine votes required for a majority, the votes against of France,United Kingdom and United States did not count as vetoes.10 NATO leaders expressedsatisfaction with what they perceived to be extensive support for their position within theCouncil. Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, declared on 31 March:

It was the UN Security Council that, last week, considered a resolution from theRussians condemning the NATO action. That resolution was defeated by 12 votesto three, the biggest defeat of a resolution since 1993.11

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, made the following statementon the NATO action:

It is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use offorce may be legitimate in the pursuit of peaceAs Secretary-General I havemany times pointed out, not just in relation to Kosovo, that under the [UN]charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaininginternational peace and security - and this is explicitly acknowledged in the NorthAtlantic Treaty. Therefore, the council should be involved in any decision toresort to the use of force.12


10 MoD web site at http://www.mod.uk/news/kosovo/unsc260399.htm

11 HC Deb 31 March 1999, c1217

12 Guardian, 25 March 1999. For a detailed examination of the legal issues surrounding the NATO action,

see Kosovo: NATO and Military Action, Library Research Paper 99/34, 24 March 1999


12

III Chronology of Developments (24 March 28 April 1999)A.

Week One of NATO Air Strikes (24 - 30 March)The Military Campaign

The initial wave of attacks on 24 March involved eighty allied aircraft and US and Britishships in the Adriatic. Details of the initial attack were provided in a press briefing bySecretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, and Chief of the Defence Staff,General Sir Charles Guthrie, on 25 March. Sir Charles said:

The first targets, which were mainly facilities associated with the Yugoslavian airdefence system, were hit just after 7 o'clock. Assets used included air-launchedcruise missiles, fired by US B-52 aircraft, which had taken off from RAF Fairfordin Gloucestershire earlier in the day, and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles firedby USN ships and, for the first time, by HMS SPLENDID. Follow-on attackswere conducted by manned tactical aircraft, including RAF Harrier GR-7s, basedin southern Italy, using Paveway 2 Laser Guided Bombs. Other targets includedfacilities associated with military units directly involved in aggression withinKosovo. 13

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley Clark, stated at a pressconference at NATO headquarters on 25 March that:

We're going to systematically and progressively attack, disrupt, degrade,devastate and ultimately, unless President Milosevic complies with the demandsof the international community, we're going to destroy his forces and theirfacilities and support.

On the first night of operations three Yugoslav MiG 29s were shot down - two by USpilots, one by a Dutch pilot. The first night represented the debut of the B-1 Stealthbomber in combat. On the night of 26 March two more MiG 29s were shot down by USF15s over eastern Bosnia. On 27 March a US F-117 Stealth fighter went down outsideBelgrade. The pilot was rescued several hours after the crash. On the same day NATOSecretary-General Solana announced that the Alliance was moving into phase two of itsmilitary campaign:

A few moments ago, I directed SACEUR to initiate a broader range of airoperations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I have taken this decision with the support of all Allied governments which aredetermined to bring a halt to violence in Kosovo and to prevent furtherhumanitarian catastrophe.14

13 MOD web site at http://www.mod.uk

14 Press statement by Javier Solana, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int


13

NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said the intention was to target tanks and artillery thatwere being used against civilians in Kosovo.

During the week targets were hit around the whole of the FRY, including sites aroundBelgrade, Novi Sad, Pristina in Kosovo, and Podgorica in Montenegro. Bad weathersignificantly hampered many operations. On 29 March all six RAF Harrier GR7s takingpart in bombing raids on Pristina were forced to return without dropping their bombs dueto poor weather. Similar problems affected Harrier operations on 31 March, 1 and 2April. In response to such problems, the US Department of Defense announced on 29March, the deployment of five B-1B Lancer bombers (along with approximately fifteenadditional aircraft) which have an all weather capability.

The Situation in the Region

Reports from Kosovo indicated that thousands of civilians were being forced to flee theirhomes. NATO claimed it had evidence that Serbian and Yugoslav forces were drivingpeople out of Pristina and the town of Orahovac, and it was reported that the town of Pecwas virtually empty after VJ and MUP units started shelling and burning buildings on 26March.

Ethnic Albanian refugees alleged that Yugoslav forces were torching villages andthreatening the civilian population with death if they did not leave immediately. Therewere also reports of several alleged massacres by Federal units. By 30 March the UNHigh Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that an estimated 94,000 ethnicAlbanians had been forced out of Kosovo since the start of NATO military action on 24March.15 A UNHCR representative said:

The pattern that emerges is paramilitary forces arriving, rounding people up andtelling them at gunpoint to go. So we are seeing officially sanctioned ethniccleansing of the Albanian population.16

On 29 March NATO claimed it had convincing proof that Fehmi Agani, a prominentfigure in Dr Rugova's LDK party and one of the negotiators at Rambouillet, had beenexecuted by Yugoslav forces, although the report remains uncorroborated.17 Furtherreports claimed that a number of other leading ethnic Albanians had been killed byFederal forces, including Bajram Kelmendi, a human rights lawyer, and Baton Haxhiu,editor-in-chief of the Albanian language newspaper, Koha Ditore.18



17 Financial Times, 1 April 1999



14

Resistance from the KLA appeared to be patchy, but Albanian TV reported on 30 Marchthat the KLA had ordered a general mobilisation, calling on all men aged between 18 and50 to "fulfil their military duty to liberate Kosovo." Reports from the province claimedthat KLA fighters were stopping ethnic Albanian men from fleeing.19

In neighbouring FYR Macedonia hundreds of ethnic Serbs rioted on 25 March in thecapital, Skopje, in protest at the NATO air strikes. The crowd damaged vehicles outside ahotel housing monitors from the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission that was withdrawnon 20 March. Firebombs were thrown at the US embassy and vehicles set alight. FYRMacedonia has an ethnic Serb population of approximately 40,000, comprising roughlytwo per cent of the country's total population of 1.9 million.

In Greece, which has strong historical and religious ties to Serbia, several demonstrationswere held against the NATO action.

On 29 March the Albanian Parliament called the Yugoslav actions in Kosovo a crimeagainst humanity in the heart of Europe and appealed to NATO to send ground troopsinto Kosovo to halt the conflict.20

Diplomatic Moves

On 29 March the British Ministry of Defence published a list of people believed to beaccountable for war crimes, including President Milosevic, the head of state security,Lieutenant-General Radomar Markovic, and other top commanders believed to beinvolved in the campaign in Kosovo. Mr Robertson said attempts were being made tosplit the military hierarchy in Belgrade, declaring:

There are decent people inside that structure who do want to hold on to Kosovobut who do not want to go down in history as successors to the Nazis. They arethe group of people that the message has to get through toI dont believe for aminute that there is unity of purpose within the whole regime.21

Responding to claims that the refugee crisis had been precipitated by NATO militaryaction, Prime Minister Tony Blair told the House of Commons on 29 March:

Let us be clear where the responsibility for the refugee crisis lies. It is not NATObombing that has caused the refugee crisis; it is the policy of brutality andrepression against innocent Kosovar Albanian people.22

He added:


20 ibid. 30 March 1999


22 HC Deb 29 March 1999, c739


15

For every act of barbarity, every slaughter of the innocent, Milosevic must bemade to pay a higher and higher price.23

On 30 March the Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, held six hours of talks inBelgrade with President Milosevic in an attempt to find a negotiated settlement to theconflict. At the conclusion of the talks Mr Milosevic said that, if NATO halted its airstrikes, he would reduce his forces in Kosovo and allow all peaceful refugees to return tothe province if they are Yugoslav citizens. However, many Kosovar Albanians do nothold Yugoslav passports. Mr Primakov also said later that Belgrade would insist thatNATO end its support for the KLA. There were some unsubstantiated reports thatBelgrade was willing to accept a peacekeeping observer force comprising neutral nationsand also Russia.24

However, NATO leaders swiftly rejected President Milosevic's proposal. The GermanChancellor, Gerhard Schrder, speaking on behalf of the EU, said: This is no basis for apolitical solution,25 and the US State Department spokesman, James Rubin, declared thatthe proposal fell "far short of what is necessary in order for NATO to stop its aircampaign."26 Mr Rubin went on to say:

Our position is clear. Milosevic must halt the offensive against the KosovarAlbanians, withdraw his forces and embrace a settlement based on theRambouillet framework.27

Defence Secretary George Robertson dismissed calls for a break in NATOs bombingcampaign, saying: Any pause by us would lead to a multiplication of the ethniccleansing.28

In Italy the governing coalition came under increasing strain as the former Communistswithin the government warned that they were considering withdrawing their ministers ifthe NATO action continued.29

On 30 March President Yeltsin reiterated his opposition to the NATO action, but saidRussia would not become involved in the conflict:

Russia has made her choice, and will not allow herself to be drawn into armedconflict. I will do everything for a speedy cessation of military action.30

23 HC Deb 29 March 1999, c739



26 ibid.

27 ibid.



30 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 March 1999


16

B. Week Two of NATO Air Strikes (31 March - 6 April)The Military Campaign

During the second week of operations Yugoslav units, ammunition dumps and other sites,primarily in Kosovo, were targeted. NATO also expanded the operations scope toinclude communication lines and major transportation routes, in order to isolate Yugoslavforces operating in Kosovo. The Ministry of Interior and other buildings in the centre ofBelgrade were hit by NATO cruise missiles. On 1 April a bridge over the Danube in thenorthern city of Novi Sad was destroyed.

On 31 March, three US soldiers from "Task Force Able Sentry" (formerly part of the UNPreventative Deployment Force in FYR Macedonia) were captured by Serbian forcesclose to the Macedonia/Kosovo border.

US forces and equipment continued to deploy to the region. On 1 April the deployment of12 additional F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter/bombers was approved by US Secretaryof Defence, William S. Cohen. On 4 April the US announced the deployment of 24Apache AH-64 helicopters and 18 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) to Albaniaunder the designation "Task Force Hawk". According to the Department of Defense,"Task Force Hawk" will, enhance NATOs ability to conduct tactical operations againstspecific Federal Republic of Yugoslavia units in Kosovo, especially during periods oflimited visibility and poor weather.31

On 3 April Mr Cohen announced that the USS Theodore Roosevelt battle group wouldremain in the Mediterranean to support Operation "Allied Force". The battle group wasscheduled for deployment to the Persian Gulf. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USSTheodore Roosevelt, is one of the most modern in the US fleet. On 6 April aircraft fromthe carrier became involved in air operations for the first time. On the same day the USNavy announced that the USS Nassau Amphibious Ready Group would remain on stationin the Adriatic past its scheduled 13 May return-home date.32

Russia dispatched an intelligence-gathering vessel to the Adriatic to monitor the situation.


On 31 March several thousand ethnic Albanian refugees arrived at the Macedonian borderfrom Pristina after reportedly being forced onto trains at gunpoint by Serbian forces.Large numbers of Serb civilians were also believed to have fled Kosovo due to the

31 US Department of Defense web site at http://www.defense.mil For further details on "Task ForceHawk" see section VIIc

32 ibid.


17

conflict. By 2 April an estimated 634,000 people had been displaced from their homes inKosovo, representing one third of the pre-war population.33 FYR Macedonia and Albaniaappealed to the international community for more assistance to copy with the increasingnumbers of refugees seeking sanctuary on their territory.

NATO accused the authorities in Belgrade of trying to erase the identities of thousands ofethnic Albanians by destroying their property deeds, birth and marriage certificates, andother records. In the House of Commons the Defence Secretary said that the actions ofBelgrade's forces in Kosovo were "not just murder but premeditated murder."34

In early April the French newspaper, Le Monde, reported that the German Governmenthad obtained a detailed plan drawn up by Belgrade for the mass deportation of the ethnicAlbanian population from Kosovo. The document for the operation, known as OperationHorseshoe, could, if proven authentic, provide important evidence for any futureattempts to prosecute the leadership in Belgrade for war crimes. According to theGerman Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping:

Operation Horseshoe began in Kosovo in November 1998 It shows that theYugoslav Army and police had planned, and then started, to drive people out ofcertain parts of Kosovo, from November until the Rambouillet negotiationsbegan.35

The worsening humanitarian situation in the region led the OSCE to announce that someof its resources would be transferred to the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies inAlbania and FYR Macedonia.36 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, SadakoOgata, warned on 4 April:

Kosovo's neighbours are swamped and they are no longer able to cope with theinflux. All nations must now help to save lives.37

Albania confirmed on the same day that it would accept 100,000 refugees from FYRMacedonia after the Government in Skopje expressed fears that the influx of largenumbers of ethnic Albanians could destabilise the country's ethnic balance.

The Macedonian Prime Minister, Lupco Georgievski, criticised the West for failing toprovide adequate assistance for the refugee crisis:

The people in Brussels (NATO headquarters) started the war and left for Easterholidays. They left the problem for Macedonia.38


34 Guardian, 1 April 1999

35 Times, 9 April 1999

36 UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update, 1 April 1999 from UNHCR web site at http://www.unhcr.ch/news/



18

On 7 April 30,000 refugees were moved overnight from FYR Macedonia to Albania bythe Macedonian authorities. The Yugoslav authorities temporarily closed the bordercrossings to Albania and FYR Macedonia. NATO accused Belgrade of using ethnicAlbanians as "human shields" against the air strikes.

In Montenegro, the second republic alongside Serbia in the Yugoslav federation,President Milosevic replaced the top military commander, General Milorad Martinovic,with a close ally, General Milorad Obradovic, raising fears that Belgrade was preparing tomove against the pro-western government of Montenegrin President Djukanovic. Themove prompted a swift reaction from NATO leaders, with Foreign Secretary Robin Cookwarning President Milosevic on 2 April against exploiting the crisis in the region toundermine his political opponents in Montenegro:

Milosevic should know now not to create trouble in Montenegro. He already is inenough trouble himself. He does not have the resources or the time to fight onanother front. Do not think of trying to open up another front in Montenegro.39

Diplomatic Moves

NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana called on Yugoslavia to "stop all repressive andcombat activity and withdraw its forces from Kosovo, and accept arrangements in whichall refugees can return safely to Kosovo under protection of an international securityforce."40 This appeared to indicate that NATO would be willing to send some form ofescort force to protect returning refugees, perhaps even prior to the signing of a peacedeal.

In Belgrade the Russian ambassador to Yugoslavia held talks on 4 April with IbrahimRugova, the self-declared president of Kosovo. The ambassador contradicted NATOclaims that Mr Rugova was under house arrest by saying that the ethnic Albanian leaderwas safe and free to move.41

On 6 April Belgrade declared a unilateral cease-fire as a "good-will gesture" over theOrthodox Easter weekend.42 NATO dismissed the move as a diplomatic ploy and said itwould continue the air campaign until its objectives were met. Belgrade also reportedthat President Milosevic had held talks with the ethnic Albanian leader, Dr Rugova, insearch of an agreement that would enable refugees to return home. NATO claimed DrRugova was acting under duress.

Criticism of the NATO action by Russian ministers and officials continued, with ForeignMinister Igor Ivanov stating on 31 March that:

38 CNN web site at http://www.cnn.com , 7 April 1999


40 ibid. 5 April 1999

41 ibid. 6 April 1999

42 Independent, 7 April 1999


19

The real goals of those who masterminded, imposed, and are now expanding theNATO aggression against Yugoslavia is to establish NATO's unquestionablediktat in the Balkans. Yugoslavia was a weak spot in these plans. Therefore it hadto be hit in order to undermine its military and economic potential. Washington isalready working out options of Kosovo's separation from Yugoslavia ordismemberment of the province in practical terms. The implementation of suchplans presupposes not only the strengthening of Albanian guerrilla units, but alsothe commencement of a ground operation.

In an attempt to ensure continued Russian involvement in the diplomatic process thechairman of the OSCE, Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollenbaek, travelled toMoscow for talks with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov. Mr Vollenbaek declared:

It is important that Russia should continue to be involved and we will see if thereis any way that they can assist in finding a solution.43

C. Week Three of NATO Air Strikes (7 - 13 April)The Military Campaign

Week three witnessed a further escalation of NATOs air campaign, particularly withinKosovo. On 7 April General Wesley Clark described the operation as having two clearfronts, with NATO forces conducting strategic strikes against Yugoslav army and specialpolice force headquarters and infrastructure in and around Belgrade, whilstsimultaneously increasing tactical strikes against Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo.44The NATO tactics in Kosovo were outlined on 12 April by US Defence Secretary,William Cohen:

We are systematically choking off the Yugoslav army and security forces inKosovo by cutting their supply lines. As we isolate and weaken the Serb forces inKosovo, we are launching aggressive attacks against troops on the ground byhitting staging areas, headquarters and forces in the field.45

On 8 April NATO decided to send 8,000 troops to Albania to help with the humanitarianeffort. An important development for the deployment of future NATO forces was theannouncement on 11 April by Albania that it was placing its military infrastructure,including installations, ports and airspace, at NATOs disposal. On the same day MrCook confirmed that the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible was being diverted from the Gulfto the Adriatic. On 12 April a passenger train in south-eastern Serbia was hit by twomissiles from a NATO fighter, reportedly killing ten people.


44 Department of Defense web site at http://www.defenselink.mil

45 ibid.


20

On 13 April General Wesley Clark requested 300 more aircraft from the US and acomparable increase from other NATO members for use in Operation "Allied Force". Theadditional aircraft fell into three main categories ground attack, air suppression, andtankers. General Clark said that the additional planes would allow him to strengthen andintensify the air campaign. On the same day the UK announced that an additional 1,800troops, supported by 14 Challenger tanks and 40 Warrior armoured vehicles, were beingdeployed to FYR Macedonia, bringing the total of UK military personnel in Greece,Albania and FYR Macedonia to 6,300.


On 13 April the Montenegrin Foreign Minister, Branko Perovic, rejected the vote in theFederal Yugoslav Parliament of 12 April to join with Belarus and the Russian Federation,claiming that the vote was not legitimate. He also warned that the relationship betweenSerbia and Montenegro was coming under increasing pressure:

With every day that passes there is less and less likelihood that we can remain inthis federation.46

The Government of FYR Macedonia ruled out the use of its territory for an "aggressive"NATO ground intervention into Kosovo, but repeated it would permit NATO to use thecountry as a staging post for a peace-keeping force to police a negotiated settlement.47

Diplomatic Moves

On 7 April the NATO spokesman spelt out the Alliance's conditions for an end to the airstrikes:

a verifiable end to all Serb military actions and the immediate end of violenceand repression;

the withdrawal of all Milosevics military police and paramilitary forces; the stationing in Kosovo of an international military force; the unconditional and safe return of refugees and internally-displaced

persons; unhindered access for the humanitarian relief organisations; and finally, the credible assurance of a willingness to work towards a political

framework based on the Rambouillet Agreement.48

On 9 April President Yeltsin warned that Russia would step in if NATO launched aground offensive against the FRY:

46 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 April 1999

47 Independent, 10 April 1999

48 NATO Press Conference 14 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int


21

I have already told Nato, Americans and the Germans: Don't push us to militaryaction, since that will certainly lead to a European war or even a world war,which is inadmissible. Nato wants to launch ground operations, it wants tosimply seize Yugoslavia and make it their protectorate. We cannot permit that.Russia is not going to get involved in the conflict unless the Americans push us toit.49

The speaker of the Russian Duma, Gennady Seleznyov, claimed that President Yeltsinhad ordered Russian strategic missiles to be targeted at NATO nations involved inOperation "Allied Force", although this was later dismissed by the Kremlin as incorrect.50

It was reported on 11 April that NATO officials were considering a major reconstructionproject for the Balkans similar to the Marshall Plan for Europe in the aftermath of WorldWar II.51 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for an integration strategy with"an explicit goal to transform the Balkans from Europe's primary source of instability intoan important part of its mainstream."52

D. Week Four of NATO Air Strikes (14 - 20 April)The Military Campaign

On 14 April Operation "Allied Harbour" was announced by NATO. The ACE MobileForce (land) was earmarked for deployment to Tirana to help in stabilising thehumanitarian crisis.

On 14 April Yugoslav sources reported that NATO aircraft had attacked several convoysof ethnic Albanian refugees near the town of Djakovica killing approximately 64 people.Pictures on Yugoslav TV purported to show civilian vehicles destroyed in the attack, butthe Pentagon initially insisted that NATO fighters had only struck a military convoy nearDjakovica, and suggested that perhaps Yugoslav forces were to blame for the civiliancasualties. On 16 April NATO admitted responsibility for the attack, but said that thecivilian deaths were a tragic accident and vowed to continue the campaign.

NATO said satellite intelligence showed an additional 8,000 Yugoslav forces had beensent to Kosovo, raising the total number of MUP and VJ troops in the province to around43,000.53

200 VJ troops crossed briefly into Albania on 20 April but withdrew after a shortconfrontation with Albanian forces. The UN reported that 250-300 VJ soldiers had also


50 New York Times, 9 April 1999

51 Sunday Times, 11 April 1999


53 New York Times, 20 April 1999


22

entered the UN demilitarised zone on the strategically important Prevlaka peninsulabetween Croatia and Montenegro. The Prevlaka peninsular forms the northern part of theentrance to the major Yugoslav naval port of Kotor and is seen as vital by both Zagreband Belgrade. The Croatian Ambassador to the UN lodged an official protest with theSecurity Council, demanding an immediate withdrawal of Yugoslav forces.

On the same day NATO forces struck several bridges and radar sites, and destroyed theheadquarters of President Milosevic's ruling Socialist Party in Belgrade. NATO claimedthe building housed "vital elements in the control apparatus of President Milosevic'sregime."54 The attack indicated an increasing willingness on the part of NATO to strike atelements of the Yugoslav President's power structure.


Further tens of thousands of Kosovar refugees were reported to be crossing into Albaniaand FYR Macedonia with an additional 200,000 believed to be on the move withinKosovo itself. NATO estimated that at least 3,200 people had died during the fighting ofthe previous few weeks.55

On 15 April US Defence Secretary Bill Cohen told the Senate that the KLA had not beendefeated by the Yugoslav offensive:

The bombing campaign will shift the military balance decisively in favour of theKLA. Milosevic would then face a choice between either a Nato-backed peaceagreement, or confronting a situation in which the KLA is resurgent.56

On 16 April a Yugoslav army lieutenant, captured by the KLA two days earlier, washanded over to the US Army in Tirana. The Yugoslav foreign ministry claimed this wasclear evidence of "cooperation and coordination between the terrorists and the US-ledNATO forces."57

NATO alleged that Yugoslav forces were organising "grave digging chain gangs", andthe US ambassador-at-large for war crimes said that the scale of atrocities in Kosovocould be considerably higher than originally believed, with over 100,000 ethnic Albanianmen missing.58

The KLA claimed on 20 April that it was massing thousands of troops west of the town ofMitrovica to defend around 250,000 civilians trapped by the fighting. A KLA spokesman


55 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 17 April 1999


57 Agence France Presse, 21 April 1999



23

expressed the fear that Belgrade may try to depopulate the entire northern and easternregions of the province with the aim of establishing a partition.

The UNHCR claimed that as of 19 April 1999 there were 359,000 refugees in Albaniaand 132,700 in FYR Macedonia. An additional 73,000 ethnic Albanians were believed tohave been displaced to Montenegro.

On 16 April the Montenegrin Government came under increasing pressure from the Serbminority in the republic to provide more support for Belgrade, prompting a call fromPresident Djukanovic for the NATO air strikes to end, and for Belgrade to halt its part inthe conflict. Mr Djukanovic said the NATO action was damaging his country's movestowards democracy.59

The newly appointed commander of the VJ in Montenegro, General Milorad Obradovic,wrote to the government in Podgorica on 19 April insisting that the Montenegrin Ministryof the Interior be placed under direct control of the VJ. President Djukanovic refused,stating that the idea was "unacceptable".60

On 20 April VJ units deployed to Montenegro's only border crossing with Croatia anddemanded that the Montenegrin police units hand over control. Again Mr Djukanovicrefused to back down, declaring:

Our policy is that the border between Montenegro and Croatia should becontrolled by ourselves and the forces of the Ministry of the Interior. This willremain so.61

It was also reported that VJ forces had cleared a number of Muslim villages inMontenegro close to the border with Kosovo.

Diplomatic Moves

On 15 April 1999 a peace proposal from the German government was leaked, calling for:

A suspension of air strikes if President Milosevic begins withdrawing his forces fromKosovo

An outright halt once withdrawal is complete UN authorisation of an international military force A transitional administration for the territory Relief agencies start work in Kosovo as soon as possible after a plan is agreed Return of refugees and reconstruction



61 ibid.


24

Chancellor Schrder said the proposal was in line with NATO's objectives and was notintended to water them down. Washington described the plan as "constructive", butinsisted that there would be no cease-fire until Belgrade complied with NATO's demands.

On 18 April President Clinton warned that the Balkans would not be secure untilPresident Milosevic left power, saying Serbia needed a democratic transition, "for theregion cannot be secure with a belligerent tyrant in its midst."62

On the same day Belgrade announced it was breaking off diplomatic relations withAlbania and accused the Government in Tirana of complicity in NATO's campaign and oflaunching attacks across its border.63

E. Week Five of NATO Air Strikes (21 - 28 April)The Military Campaign

On 21 April Alliance planes hit the official residence of President Milosevic on theoutskirts of Belgrade. A Yugoslav Minister accused NATO of attempting to "assassinatethe president of a sovereign country."64 NATO, however, maintained the residence was alegitimate military target and denied that it was trying to hit the President himself.Pentagon spokesman, Ken Bacon, declared:

We are not targeting President Milosevic or the Serb people. We are targeting themilitary and the military infrastructure that supports the instruments of oppressionin Kosovo Much of the military and security forces are run out of a variety ofresidences and office buildings throughout the country, particularly in theBelgrade area. They are all interconnected.65

On 22 April NATO hit the Serbian state television station in Belgrade, killing at least 10people. NATO defended the strike, claiming the station was a legitimate target and a"ministry of lies". A NATO spokesman declared that the attack "must be seen as anintensification of our attacks at the very brains of Milosevic's military apparatus andleadership."66 The Government in Belgrade said the attack was a "monstrous crimewithout precedent in history."67 The International Federation of Journalists protested toNATO, saying the Alliance had pledged to avoid hitting civilian targets.68 The Italian


63 ibid.



66 ibid.

67 ibid.

68 BBC Ceefax, 23 April 1999


25

Foreign Minister, Lamberto Dini, also questioned the attack, declaring: "I disapprove.The question of television wasn't, I believe, part of the plan."69

The first Apache helicopters arrived in Albania on 21 April, and two days later the USDefence Secretary, Bill Cohen, announced that an additional 2,000 troops, 15 AbramsMBTs, 14 Bradley IFVs, and a howitzer battery would be sent to Albania to support theApaches. The move brought the number of US troops in Albania to around 5,000.70William Cohen also announced the deployment of a further 30 KC-135 equivalent tankeraircraft, air crews and support personnel to the Balkans. This represented the first trancheof the additional 300 aircraft requested by SACEUR. On 26 April a fully armed Apachehelicopter crashed during a training exercise in Albania.

On the same day the last remaining bridge over the Danube in Novi Sad was destroyed.The 27 April NATO operations concentrated on targeting assembly areas, Serb Army andSpecial Police Infrastructure and key petrol, oil and lubricants facilities. NATO alsoattacked facilities at Podgorica airfield in Montenegro, a radio relay site and a munitionsstorage area. A television transmitter on top of the Socialist party HQ building inBelgrade was also attacked. President Clinton signed the Presidential Select Reserve Call-up, which gives Secretary Cohen the authority to call up as many as 33,100 reservists.According to the DOD, the call-up will be sequential with the first group likely to numberaround 2000 involved in air refuelling and logistical backup. The Hungarian defenceminister, Dr Janos Szab, announced that NATO tanker aircraft are to be stationed nearBudapest.

On 27 April General Sir Charles Guthrie provided the following summary of the effectNATO attacks have had on Yugoslav forces since the conflict began:

Overall, Nato has now conducted 474 attacks, covering 227 individual sites. Weestimate that we have destroyed over 70 combat aircraft out of a total of 450,including 23 out of 83 of the critical aircraft types MiG29s and MiG21s. As aresult of this success the Serb Air Force has not had the will to face Nato in theair.

We have also destroyed 9 of the strategic surface to air missile radar systems. Wejudge that remaining SAM systems are now reluctant to operate, fearing furtherlosses. We have damaged 9 of Serbias 17 military airfields, 4 of them severely.40 aircraft hangars have been destroyed and a further 31 have been damaged.

The Serbian integrated air defence system is not yet inoperable, but we know thatSerbian commanders are seriously worried about the impunity and accuracy withwhich Nato aircraft are able to strike at Milosevics forces on the ground. In

69 Times, 24 April 1999



26

addition, we know that the infrastructure supporting the Serb military is nowcreaking under the weight of regular and carefully targeted operations.

The damage we have inflicted on Serbian oil refining and distribution operationsis particularly heavy, with both of their oil refineries put out of action, and 16storage depots attacked. Serbia is dependent now on reserve stocks and imports.

We have also succeeded in causing severe disruption to Serb militarycommunications systems. 31 fixed communications sites have been attacked,including 19 key sites between Belgrade and the southern former Republic ofYugoslavia.

A further example of the way in which the Serb infrastructure is being takenapart, piece by piece, is the damage so far inflicted on lines of communication. Inall, more than 20 road and rail bridges have been damaged or destroyed. Ofparticular strategic significance is the River Danube which cuts the country inhalf. Of the 9 major bridges over the Danube, 5 have been destroyed, 1 has beendamaged and 3 are still fully serviceable. With actions such as these we aim torestrict as far as we reasonably can the movement of Serb forces within thecountry, and also the movement of supplies.

We have also made a particular and direct impact on Serbian ability to conductoperations in Kosovo. All railway lines serving Kosovo have been cut, togetherwith 3 of the 8 roads. In addition, one-fifth out of all major ammunition storagedepots have been significantly damaged, and almost one-fifth of all armybarracks have been attacked.

On 23 April NATO leaders at the 50th anniversary summit in Washington issued astatement on Kosovo, in which they declared the Alliance's commitment to the security ofthe countries in the Balkan region:

13. We will not tolerate threats by Belgrade regime to the security of itsneighbours. We will respond to such challenges by Belgrade to its neighboursresulting from the presence of NATO forces or their activities on their territoryduring this crisis.71

On 25 April Romania and Slovenia granted NATO forces access to their airspace foroperations. FYR Macedonia also agreed to the stationing of additional British andGerman forces on its territory, which, once deployed, would take the number of NATOpersonnel in FYR Macedonia to around 16,000.72

As of 28 April Bulgaria had yet to grant access to its airspace, although approval ofNATO's request was believed to be imminent. In the event that approval is granted,additional Alliance planes could be sent to Turkey for attacks through Bulgarian airspace.

71 Statement on Kosovo, NATO PR, 23 April 1999



27


In Kosovo KLA forces continued to mount hit and run raids against Serbian forces in thefield. NATO reported that VJ units were continuing their operations in the Rogovamountain region west of Pec with the intention of creating a "cordon sanitaire" aroundKLA supply and reinforcement routes.73 NATO claimed that 35,000 buildings had beendamaged in 550 settlement areas in Kosovo since March 1998.74

In an interview on US television on 21 April President Milosevic denied his Governmentwas operating a policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo:

There was never a policy of this country and my policy to expel any citizen ofYugoslavia from any part of this country I believe that when aggression stops,when bombing stops, then it will be very easy to continue (the) political process.75

He also blamed NATO for the refugee crisis that had developed:

When they started their damn bombing and they started their dirty aggressionagainst this country, there was not one single refugee. When they startedbombing, refugees appeared, of course, as a result of bombing, and everybodyknows it.76

However, on 25 April the first sign of open dissent emerged within the leadership inBelgrade when the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and former opposition leader, VukDraskovic, called for the country's leadership to stop deceiving the population:

The men running this country must tell the people clearly where we stand andwith whom we stand, tell them... what will remain of Serbia in 20 days if thisdreadful bombing goes on We should tell them: 'Don't expect anything fromworld opinion, nor from the collapse of Nato, nor from Russia.'77

Mr Draskovic, who is not a member of President Milosevic's inner circle, warned thatRussia was likely to seek a compromise with NATO over Kosovo, rather than risk aconfrontation. In a further interview with the BBC on 26 April Mr Draskovic indicatedhis support for a UN peacekeeping force with Russian involvement to be deployed to theprovince:


74 ibid.


76 ibid.



28

I would like to have UN forces without forces from Nato countries - we mustapproach a settlement and a settlement must be based on the resolution of theSecurity Council of the United Nations.78

On 27 April it was reported that the privately-run TV station that had carried MrDraskovic's comments had been taken off the air by the Yugoslav Army. Mr Draskovicdenounced the move, saying:

In the case Mr Milosevic supports this, I am ready to stand up against MrMilosevic. We will enter the streets and demonstrate against this anti-democraticdecision. 79

However, on 28 April it was announced that Mr Draskovic had been dismissed for"jeopardising respect for the federal government."80

The day before, another senior Yugoslav official, Goran Matic, a minister from theYugoslav United Left party of Mr Milosevic's wife Mirjana Markovic, indicated that adiplomatic resolution to the conflict could be imminent. Mr Matic, who is closer than MrDraskovic to Mr Milosevic's inner circle, said he believed that "this will be the week inwhich the basic outline of an agreement on Kosovo can be firmed up." He went on to saythat the conflict could be resolved as quickly as "both sides can bring elements ofrationality to the problem," although he insisted that the Belgrade's official positionremained one of opposition to an armed international presence in the province.81

On 22 April several thousand people demonstrated in the Montenegrin capital, Podgorica,against the NATO air strikes. However, the demonstration, organised by the oppositionSocialist People's Party, failed to attract as much support as the organisers had hoped.

On 25 April 161 ethnic Albanian refugees arrived in the United Kingdom and weregranted exceptional leave to remain for twelve months. On 27 April the flow of refugeesout of Kosovo resumed as over 5,000 ethnic Albanians crossed into FYR Macedonia.

Diplomatic Moves

On 22 April the Russian special envoy to Yugoslavia, former Prime Minister ViktorChernomyrdin, announced that talks with President Milosevic had yielded agreementfrom Belgrade for an "international presence" under the control of the UN. MrChernomyrdin gave no clarification on whether the force would be armed, leadingPresident Clinton to declare:


79 ibid.


81 International Herald Tribune, 28 April 1999


29

If there is an offer for a genuine security force, that's the first time Mr Milosevichas done that, and that represents I suppose some sort of step forward.82

However, Belgrade subsequently denied that it had agreed to a military force, statinginstead that it had proposed an unarmed UN observer force.83

NATO air strikes were reported to have done considerable damage to Yugoslavia'spetroleum supply system, including the two refineries at Novi Sad and Pancevo.However, the Financial Times reported on 23 April that crude supplies had continued toarrive after 24 March from countries such as Italy, Greece and also the United Kingdom,although the damage to the refineries apparently was preventing Belgrade from producingrefined gasoline, diesel or jet fuel. To halt any further supply of oil the EuropeanCommission agreed on 23 April to prohibit the supply and sale of petroleum andpetroleum products to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. To ensure that Belgrade couldnot replenish its supplies from other sources, NATO indicated its intention to impose anoil embargo on the FRY.84

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov declared his country would not be party to anenforced oil embargo, raising fears that Russian vessels might try to break the blockade.However, on 25 April Defence Secretary George Robertson said he did not anticipate anyRussian move, stating that: The refuelling of the Serb machine is not on Russiasagenda.85

The US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, held talks on 27 April with RussianForeign Minister Igor Ivanov and special envoy Victor Chernomyrdin to co-ordinateefforts towards finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Mr Talbot described thetalks as "intense and constructive",86 but cautioned that the task was extremelycomplicated.87

Mr Cook also declared his desire for Russia to be "part of the solution to the Kosovocrisis", and indicated that Russia's previous opposition to a international military presencein Kosovo appeared to be changing:

[The Russians] are now willing to recognise that that international presence, to becredible, had to be a military presence. That is welcome. Of course to becredible, it would have to be a military presence that really did reassure theKosovar Albanians.88



84 For further information on the oil embargo see Section VII D



87 International Herald Tribune, 28 April 1999

88 "Interview by the Foreign Secretary", Robin Cook, BBC World Service, London, 27 April 1999, from

FCO web site at http://www.fco.gov.uk


30

It was expected that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan would travel to Moscow for talkson 29 or 30 April and there were signs that another diplomatic initiative by the Russianspecial envoy was imminent.


31

IV The Humanitarian Situation

A.


The fighting in Kosovo has provoked a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions. Asof 28 April the UNHCR estimated that there were 367,200 refugees in Albania, 142,650in FYR Macedonia, 15,000 in Bosnia and more than 63,000 displaced Kosovars inMontenegro. The US State Department reported on 22 April that "at least an additional650,000 Kosovars appear to be internally displaced persons." That would meanapproximately 1.5 million ethnic Albanians, or three-quarters of the estimated 1998population, have been forcibly expelled from their homes.89

The international community has responded to the humanitarian crisis by setting upcamps in the region and flying some refugees out for temporary residency in thirdcountries. Table 1 below details the numbers of refugees evacuated to third countries:

Table 1: Humanitarian evacuations of Kosovar refugees from FYR of Macedonia from 5

April through 28 April 1999 (figures subject to daily verification)90

ArrivalsReceiving Country28 April Total

Austria - 811Belgium - 676Croatia * - 188

Czech Republic 115 115Finland 147 481France 592 1,777

Germany - 9,974Iceland - 23Israel - 106

Netherlands 157 1,011Norway 162 1,732Poland - 635Spain - 103

Sweden 157 444Switzerland - 33Turkey ** 263 5,407

United Kingdom - 161TOTAL *** 1,593 23,677

89 Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, Fact Sheet based on information from U.S. Government sources, 22 April

1999, from the US State Department web site at http://www.state.gov90

UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update, 28 April 1999 from UNHCR web site at http://www.unhcr.ch


32

* Croatia: of whom 88 bilaterally without UNHCR/IOM involvement** Turkey: of whom 1,980 without UNHCR/IOM involvement (source: Turkish

government)*** Total: of whom 2,068 without UNHCR/IOM involvement

The following section looks at the British and EU response to the crisis, after an initialdescription of how such aid fits in with the UK's overall approach to internationaldevelopment.

B. Definition of emergency aid

In recent years, humanitarian aid or assistance has become a rigorously defined category ofUK assistance called emergency aid.

Emergency aid combines food aid, disaster relief,refugee relief and disaster preparedness, and generally involves the provision of material aid(including food, medical care and personnel), finance and advice to:

-save and preserve lives during emergency situations and in the immediate post-emergency rehabilitation phase

-cope with short and longer term population displacements arising out ofemergencies91

The Department for International Development's (DFID's) objectives for emergency aidwere set out in its White Paper (Eliminating World Poverty)92. The relevant extract isreproduced below.

Disasters and Emergencies

Disasters, both natural and man-made, and often recurrent, are a significantburden on poor societies. The root causes of poverty tend to leave poor peoplenot only more exposed to hazards, but also less able to cope in the event of adisaster. Our objectives in assisting countries to deal with disaster are not only tosave lives through emergency relief, but also to protect and rebuild livelihoodsand communities, and reduce vulnerability to future disasters. In responding todisasters, we aim to provide swift, appropriate and cost-effective financial,material and technical assistance, based on analysis of actual need. We shallendeavour to do this in ways that encourages [sic] the participation of allstakeholders in decisions that affect their lives, builds [sic] local capacity and laysa solid foundation for rehabilitation and recovery. The UKs capacity to respondto disasters overseas will be strengthened through tapping the vast reservoir ofavailable skills and building partnerships within the public and private sectors toensure that all players are used to their best comparative advantage. In alldisaster work, our responsibility must be first and foremost to those affected.

91 British Overseas Aid 1992/93-1996/97

92 Eliminating World Poverty: A challenge for the 21st century, Cm 3789


33

Disaster preparedness and prevention will be an integral part of our developmentco-operation programme. We shall work with disaster-prone partner countries todevelop systems for the better management of man-made hazards and, wherefeasible, natural hazards, so as to reduce their human impact. The multitude ofactors involved in humanitarian work underlines the importance of internationalco-operation based on sound principles. Hence we shall encourage system-wideagreement on common performance standards and a code of ethical conduct fororganisations involved in humanitarian work, and will seek to implementguidelines already agreed within the OECD. We shall work for, and co-operatewith, a more effective and efficient multilateral humanitarian system, building onthe capabilities of UN institutions, the Red Cross Movement, other internationalorganisations and NGOs. Within the EU, we shall also work closely with othermember states and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) toensure more consistent joint policies and approaches.93

In April 1998, DFID published Principles of a New Humanitarianism as a guide to itshumanitarian assistance operations. According to DFID, the benefit of this approach isthat its humanitarian relief is provided in a "principled and accountable manner, while atthe same time addressing the underlying causes for the crises."94 The values andstandards underpinning DFID's humanitarian work are outlined below.

Principles of a New Humanitarianism

we will seek always to uphold international humanitarian and human rights laws andconventions;

we will seek to promote a more universal approach in addressing humanitarian needswherever they arise. People in need - wherever they are - should have equal statusand rights to assistance;

our humanitarian policy will seek to work with other efforts aimed at tackling theunderlying causes of a crisis and building peace and stability;

we will seek to work with other committed members of the international community,and in particular seek collaboration across the North/South divide to secure betterinternational systems and mechanisms for timely joint humanitarian action;

we will agree 'ground rules' that prevent diversion of humanitarian goods andcollusion with unconstitutional armed groups;

we will be impartial: our help will seek to relieve the suffering of non-combatantswithout discrimination on political or other grounds with priority given to the mosturgent cases of distress;

we will seek the best possible assessment of needs, and a clear framework ofstandards and accountability from those who work to deliver our assistance;

we will encourage the participation of people and communities affected by crises tohelp them find durable solutions which respect their rights and dignity;

we will, where possible, seek to rebuild livelihoods and communities, and buildcapacity to reduce vulnerability to future crises;

93 Source: DFID's White Paper

94 DFID Annual Report 1999, page 94, Cm 4210


34

we recognise that humanitarian intervention in conflict situations often poses genuinemoral dilemmas. We will base our decisions on explicit analyses of the choices opento us and the ethical considerations involved and communicate our conclusionsopenly to those with whom we work.95

C. Level of UK total emergency aid

The outturn for the UK's total development budget in 1997/98 was 2,059 million, of whichsome 196 million (9%) was provided in the form of emergency aid. Of this 196 million,90 million was provided as UK bilateral emergency aid with the remaining 106 millionbeing provided through the UN and EC. In short, the UK provided 46% of emergency aidthrough bilateral channels, 44% through the EC and 10% through the UN.

Table 2 below shows the total level of UK spending on emergency aid for the five mostrecent years. In 1997/98 UK bilateral emergency aid was divided up between disaster relief(65 million or 72%), refugee relief (10 million or 11%), food aid (9 million or 10%) anddisaster preparedness (6 million or 7%).96 The amount (9.8 million) spent on refugeerelief in 1997/98, was the lowest figure for some years.

The ten largest recipients of UK bilateral emergency aid are set out in table 3 below. Inaddition to UK bilateral emergency aid, DFID also funds emergency programmes throughthe UN and the EC. These figures are also set out in table 2.

95 DFID Annual Report 1999, page 95, Cm 4210

96 See DFID Departmental Annual Report 1999 page 93

Table 2

Emergency Aid1 thousand

1993/94 1994/95 1996/96 1996/97 1997/98

BILATERAL

Food Aid2 46,206 37,603 26,149 14,779 9,027Disaster Relief3 114,308 146 353 93,803 88,344 65,127Refugee Relief 17,331 22 383 19,348 12,704 9,808Disaster Preparedness 1,755 2,998 2,740 4,449 5,872

Total Bilateral Emergency Aid 179,601 209,346 142,041 120,278 89,832

MULTILATERAL

UNITED NATIONS

UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs 101 1,600 207 243 173UN High Commission for Refugees 18,847 15,055 16,046 5,036 10,000UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) 9,000 6,000 6,666 8,140 10,067

TOTAL UN EMERGENCY AID 27,948 22,655 22,919 13,419 20,240

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

EC Food Aid (Emergency Provision) 35,960 28,466 32,301 25,265 20,455EC Disaster Relief5 45,800 45,821 50,949 67,944 61,181EC Refugee Relief5 11,200 6,650 12,030 9,553 2,665EDF - Emergency and Refugee Allocation 8 500 24,916 15,446 4,159 1,842

TOTAL EC EMERGENCY AID 101,460 10,590 110,726 106,921 86,143

Total Multilateral Emergency Aid 129,408 128,508 133,645 120,340 106,383

Total Emergency Aid4 309,009 337,848 275,686 240,618 196,215

Notes 1. Emergency aid includes disaster relief, emergency food aid, short term refugee relief and disaster preparedness. 2. DFID channels assistance through the World Food Programme and NGOs as a means of providing emergency food aid. These amounts are recorded as bilateral food aid as DFID has control over the decisionto provide such food aid to a particular destination.Regular non-emergency provisions of food are notincluded in this table.3. DFID provides funding to certain UN Agencies for their humanitarian assistance programmes inindividual countries. These amounts are recorded as bilateral disaster relief as DFID has influence over thebilateral disaster relief as DFID has influence over the use and destination of the funds.4. DFID programme and GPEX expenditure are the same.5. From 1995/96 EC Refugee Relief is included in the EC Disaster Relief totals shown in Table 8, but isshown separately here.Source Internaitonal Development Statistics 1993/94 to 1997/98

Table 3

Top Ten Recipients of UK Bilateral Emergency Aid1995/96 1996/97 1997/98

Country m Country m Country m

States of ex-Yugoslavia (1) 38 States of ex-Yugoslavia (1) 42 States of ex-Yugoslavia (1) 20Angola 11 Rwanda 8 Monsterrat 12Rwanda 9 Afghanistan 7 Sudan 5Iraq (2) 7 Iraq (2) 6 Iraq (2) 3Malawi 6 Angola 6 Ethiopia 3Zambia 5 Monsterrat 6 Rwanda 3Ethiopia 5 Republic of Tajikistan 4 Afghanistan 3Afghanistan 5 Kenya 3 Malawi 2Sudan 4 Sudan 3 Burindi 2Liberia 3 Liberia 3 Angola 2

(1) Includes emergency aid to all the successor states of ex-Yugoslavia(2) There is no Uk aid to the government of Iraq. The amounts recorded as flows to Iraq are emergency aid provided through UN agencies and NGOs for Irqi citizens.Source: Statistics on International Development 1993/94 to 1997/98


37

D. The UK Response to the Kosovo Crisis97

1. DFID's ObjectivesDFID is responsible for the British Government's humanitarian effort arising from theKosovo crisis. DFID's objectives are to:

provide speedy assistance to refugees to relieve suffering and save lives; promote the protection of the dignity and rights of refugees including the

provision of reliable information to them, and the reunification of families; encourage a climate of opinion in refugee hosting countries in the region that

is tolerant towards refugees, and supportive of the international presence thatseeks to assist them;

prepare adequately for new contingencies such as further refugee exodus, orsignificant movements between refugee hosting countries; and for theprovision of humanitarian assistance within Kosovo as soon as access ispossible;

plan for the return of refugees to Kosovo and the transition from emergencyhumanitarian relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

In practical terms, DFID's programme of assistance is currently engaged in:

bolstering the role of UNHCR as the lead agency for refugee protection andassistance;

strengthening the in-country operating capacity of UNHCR, WFP, other UNagencies, Red Cross and NGOs which have the principal mandates to providehumanitarian assistance;

working with host governments to strengthen their capacity to plan and co-ordinate international and national assistance efforts;

advising and co-operating with the humanitarian assistance efforts of theNATO forces in the region;

providing logistical and other practical support (through airlifts, cargohandling equipment, transport assets, and logistic experts) to overcomepractical constraints in assistance delivery;

providing material inputs (e.g. medical supplies, food, tents and blankets,water, sanitation and other requirements for refugee camps) for the use ofbeneficiaries, focusing particularly on the most vulnerable);

providing financial and other technical inputs to resource, expand and sustainhumanitarian programmes that have been started;

directly managing humanitarian assistance projects where implementingpartners are not available, and there is no alternative to direct DFIDoperations.

97 Many of the details of the UK effort have been taken directly from the Update Briefing from DFID of

19 April 1999.


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2. Organisation of aid effort

As part of a multinational aid effort, the UKs humanitarian programme needs to be partof a well co-ordinated system. The UK assistance to the Kosovo crisis is managed by theConflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) of DFID. CHAD has establishedHumanitarian Field Support Offices in Albania and FYR Macedonia to work alongsidethe respective British embassies to ensure effective communication with hostgovernments, NATO, UNHCR and other agencies, and other donors.98 The Field Officesare also responsible for the initial and rapid appraisal of further proposals for DFIDassistance, supervising direct DFID-managed projects, and facilitating the work of thepartners.

There is also an emphasis on working with local partners, not least in an effort to mobilisethe refugees' own efforts. Although DFID supports the procurement of locally producedgoods, it is also mindful of the need to mitigate, as far as possible, any adverse effects on thelocal economy and the local host population.

3. The form of UK assistance99

On 3 April 1999 the UK government announced that it had made a further 10 millionavailable to boost the humanitarian relief effort for Kosovo refugees, bringing the totalUK Government (bilateral) commitment to 20 million.100

The second 10 million tranche would come from the Treasurys contingency reserve,which although within the Government's spending total, is outside DFID's budget.

An outline of the types of assistance provided by UK aid was given by Baroness Amos on14 April. Her written answer is reproduced below.

Baroness Amos: Since 24 March, the Department for International Developmenthas already spent or committed about 8 million assistance to the Kosovorefugees, including over 1.5 million for air transportation and cargo, 16,000 foran airport handling package for Tirana and 400,000 for a truck convoy forAlbania. We have to date agreed cash grants of 0.82 million to UN agenciesand 3.274 million to NGOs and the Red Cross. Further expenditure anddisbursements are currently being considered.

An additional 3 million was made available for humanitarian assistance to thepeople of Kosovo between April 1998 and March 1999: of this, 1.5 million wasallocated to the UN and 1.5 million to UK-based NGOs.101

98 In terms of working with non-governmental organisations, there is, for obvious reasons, a preference for

working with NGOs with previous experience of working in the region.99

During the 12 months prior to the NATO air strikes DFID channelled over 3 million through variousNGOs.

100 "Clare Short to visit Macedonia and Albania, UK gives an additional 10 million for Kosovo Refugees",DFID PR, 20/99, 3 April 1999


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Since then further details of specific forms of assistance have been made available. Thefollowing section outlines some specific examples of the humanitarian assistance that hasbeen provided by DFID.

Funding airlifts

DFID has enabled United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), WorldHealth Organisation (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP) and other operationalagencies to deploy quickly personnel and immediate relief supplies to the refugees.

Since 30 March there have been some 30 flights carrying over 1,000 tons of tents,blankets, food, medical kits and other emergency supplies for Albania and FYRMacedonia.102 Further flights are planned to transport emergency relief items includingblankets, tents, cooking utensils, water and sanitation equipment.

Providing logistics support

An airport logistic cell has been set up by DFID at Tirana airport to speed up the flowof aid into Albania: operations staff, 4 forklift trucks and other aircraft handlingequipment have been flown in. DFID is providing a similar aircraft-handling package,including a team of 12 operators, for Skopje airport in FYR Macedonia.

DFID is providing a convoy of five trucks and drivers to support UNHCRs reliefoperations in Albania: the trucks arrived in Tirana on 16 April.

Setting up Refugee Camps and providing Humanitarian Supplies

DFID has assisted NATO in the establishment of two camps with a current totalcapacity of 40,000 refugees at Brazhde/Stankowic in FYR Macedonia. DFID, in co-operation with UNHCR, has overseen the civilianisation of these camps and thetake-over of service provision by NGOs.

DFID is setting up a camp for 5,000 refugees in co-operation with UNHCR and NATOnear Elbasan in southern Albania, and has offered to establish and run two new refugeecentres in Tirana on behalf of the Albanian Government.

DFID has funded the purchase and transportation of 14 World Health Organisation(WHO) emergency health kits to FYR Macedonia, and seven kits for Albania - thesewill cover the needs of 210,000 people for 3 months.

DFID is helping to establish contingency stockpiles of food, tents and blankets in theregion to enable the rapid provision of assistance to the internally displaced in Kosovoas soon as access to them can be obtained.

101 HL Deb 14 April 1999, c123-4w

102 Details are given in the table at Appendix 5


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Personnel Providing Specialist to Albania and FYR Macedonia.

A team of 12 people has been provided to run the truck convoy in Albania. 2 airoperations and aircraft handling experts in Tirana. 7 professional staff to manageDFID programme in Albania, including logistics, health, water and sanitation, andcamp planning specialists.

5 professional staff to run DFID programme in FYR Macedonia, including logistics,health and water and sanitation specialists. 12 air operations staff under recruitment forSkopje.

Cash grants to International Agencies

500,000 to World Food Programme (WFP) to transport food supplies to the refugees.

250,000 to UNICEF for programmes in Montenegro.

1 million for the International Organisation for Migration for regional programmes,including refugee registration, public information and training and capacity building.

2.5 million to the British Red Cross for immediate relief supplies and to helpestablish a refugee family tracing system to help those who have been separated to getin contact with their relations and be reunited with them. This is to be implementedthrough the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/International Federationof the Red Cross (IFRC).

72,000 to IFRC for relief logisticians

Resourcing NGOs humanitarian operations

Oxfam (300,000 for relief programmes in Albania) Save the Children Fund (300,000 for regional relief programmes) Childrens Aid Direct (102,000 for relief programmes in Albania) Action Against Hunger (99,600 for a feeding programme in FYR Macedonia) Finnish Red Cross (27,500 for lighting for refugee camps in FYR Macedonia) International Centre for Humanitarian Reporting (78,800 for radio programmes

and distribution of radios) Merlin (140,000 for health care programmes in Albania) Christian Aid (600,000 for relief programmes in Montenegro and Albania) Project Hope (100,000 for a regional medical aid programme) Salvation Army (145,000 for mobile canteens in Albania) ADRA (200,000 for food distribution in Albania) CAFOD (100,000 for relief programmes in Albania) War Child (350,000 for a mobile bakery programme in Albania)

New NGO projects are now being approved on a daily basis by the DFID offices inSkopje and Tirana, using their delegated authority from DFID HQ.


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E. Level of EC aid

The EU General Council agreed on 8 April 1999 to provide PLOOLRQ167 million);comprising million (100 million) for direct assistance to Kosovo refugees and million (67 million) for budgetary aid to the governments of FYR Macedonia,Albania and Montenegro.

The EU's direct assistance to the refugees is channelled through NGOs and the UNHCR.The budgetary assistance is provided to the governments of the three neighbouringcountries. In addition, the EU will be working with the International FinancialInstitutions (IFI), such as the International Monetary Fund. Planning for a programme ofreconstruction and development once the conflict is over remains at an early stage.


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V War Crimes

There are various issues relating to war crimes which may have been or may yet becommitted in the course of the conflict. Many would claim that Mr Milosevic and otherpolitical, military and paramilitary figures in the FRY have committed war crimes in thecourse of their actions concerning Kosovo. NATO has been at pains to stress its efforts toavoid transgressing the laws of war in its attacks on the military capability of the FRY. Inparticular, the treatment of civilians is relevant to the actions of both the FRY and NATO.There is already an International Tribunal, set up in reaction to the Bosnia conflict, whichcan try those accused of war crimes in Kosovo.

Two of the most relevant texts are the Geneva Conventions and the GenocideConvention, although a range of others could also be of interest.

A.

Geneva Conventions

General Outline

The four treaties adopted in Geneva in August 1949, known as the Geneva Conventionsor the Red Cross Conventions (they were sponsored by the Red Cross movement), are themost widely respected basic undertakings in the humanitarian field of the laws of war.They build on previous conventions in this field, and set out provisions for the protectionof various types of victims of armed conflicts. The First Convention covers wounded andsick in armed forces in the field, the Second covers wounded, sick and ship-wrecked inarmed forces at sea, the Third covers prisoners-of-war, and the Fourth covers civilians.Two Additional Protocols were adopted in 1977. These develop and widen the scope ofapplication of the Conventions beyond armed conflicts solely involving states. Protocol Idoes this in relation to international conflicts, and also supplements the provisions of theConventions in other ways, Protocol II does it in relation to civil wars.

The Geneva Conventions and Protocols have a wide measure of support and, inparticular, the common articles which are shared by each of the Conventions are regardedas declaratory of customary international law. Violations defined in the Conventions asgrave breaches constitute war crimes and are subject to universal jurisdiction, meaningthat any state may try any suspect regardless of their nationality and of where the allegedoffence took place. Grave breaches include wilful killing, torture, inhuman treatment,wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury, biological experiments, extensivewanton destruction of property not justified by military necessity, and, in relation tocivilians, unlawful deportation, transfer or confinement and taking of hostages.103Protocol I adds to the list attacks on civilians and various other attacks (such as

103 First Geneva Convention, Articles 49 and 50; Second Geneva Convention, Articles 50 and 51; ThirdGeneva Convention, Articles 129 and 130; Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 146 and 147. The Firstand Second Conventions set out the same grave breaches, the Third and Fourth repeat these withadditions.


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indiscriminate ones) likely to cause excessive loss of life or injury to civilians or damageto civilian objects.104

UK and FRY Are Parties

The UK signed the Geneva Conventions on 8 December 1949 and ratified them on 23September 1957. War crimes were made an exception to the rule of territorial jurisdictionby the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, so that war crimes committed abroad by foreignersmay be dealt with by British courts. The UK signed the Additional Protocols on 12December 1977, but did not ratify immediately, as it had concerns over many aspects oftheir application. These included the definition of those groups to be covered (successiveGovernments sought to exclude terrorist groups) and the question of whether Britishpolicy on nuclear weapons would be in conflict with the provisions in the Protocols onindiscriminate attacks. Eventually these obstacles were considered to have beenovercome, and the UK ratified the Additional Protocols on 28 January 1998.

Yugoslavia signed the Conventions on 10 February 1950 and ratified them on 21 April1950; it signed the Additional Protocols on 12 December 1977 and ratified them on 11June 1979. In general the British Government regards the FRY as being bound by theobligations entered into by Yugoslavia, and this applies to the Geneva Conventions andProtocols.105 On its establishment the FRY made clear its intention to strictly abide by allthe commitments that the So

Kosovo Operation Allied Force

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