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The 1990s witnessed an increasingly forceful presence ofpanchayats in many Indian states. As the 73rd and 74thconstitutional amendments came into effect in April 1993,

many states devolved new powers and responsibilities to localelected bodies. In this wave of democratic decentralisation orpanchayati raj, the Kerala attempt has been unique in its scope,intensity and innovation. The ‘People’s Campaign’, as thedecentralisation process came to be called in Kerala, sought notmerely to transfer administrative power from the state govern-ment to the panchayats, but to elicit people’s participation indevelopment. It was expected to bring about “certain basicattitudinal changes towards the development process” and a“radical transformation of the development culture of the state,which is a necessary requisite for successful participatorydecentralisation” [Isaac 2000]. The People’s Campaign waspathbreaking in more ways than one: it evolved strategies toinvolve the grama sabha, i e, the people in the process of planning;the elected body closest to the people, the grama panchayats,rather than district and block panchayats, were its main agencies;it encompassed a plethora of strategies, planning, mobilising,building consensus, enhancing capacities. As it unfolded, theinitiative encountered many triumphs as well as blocks. This isa story that offers remarkable insights.

This paper attempts to comprehend and analyse the successesand shortcomings of the People’s Campaign in Kerala. It firstdeals with the context in which this initiative was taken, thenaddresses the initial conceptualisation and planning of thecampaign and implementation in the initial years. This is drawnfrom available documents and interviews with some of the majoractors of the campaign. The paper then seeks to present thesituation on the ground on the basis of a case study of 10 gramapanchayats in Palakkad district in May-June 2001. It needs tobe stated at the outset that this case study is small and exploratoryin nature, and the facts and issues that emerge would need tobe investigated further on a larger scale. The attempt in thispaper is not to arrive at some ‘final’ findings but to understand

the dynamics of the panchayats and to explore and highlightemerging issues.

Implications of ‘Kerala Model of Development’Implications of ‘Kerala Model of Development’Implications of ‘Kerala Model of Development’Implications of ‘Kerala Model of Development’Implications of ‘Kerala Model of Development’for Panchayati Rajfor Panchayati Rajfor Panchayati Rajfor Panchayati Rajfor Panchayati Raj

The process of decentralisation in Kerala can only be under-stood against the background of the distinct socio-economicconditions, political process, topography, history and culturalcontext of the state. Kerala has attracted worldwide attention forits high human development indicators (HDIs) in a low economicgrowth context, and a fair amount of development literature hasgrown around the ‘Kerala model’. Within India, Kerala has thelowest population growth rate, highest female literacy and lowestinfant mortality rate, and these indicators are comparable to thoseof high-income countries. The Physical Quality of Life Indexis estimated to be the highest in Kerala among Indian states, andthe availability of roads as well educational, health and otherservices is well above the national average. The ready availabilityof infrastructure and facilities in the immediate neighbourhoodhas narrowed down the rural-urban differences that are pro-nounced in the case of other Indian states. The key aspects ofgovernment initiatives that have brought about these develop-ments are land reform accompanied by high investment in health,education and social welfare [Dreze and Sen 1996; Franke 1992;Rammohan 2000; Sebastian 1997].

Yet there are many areas of concern in the state’s economy,in terms of slow economic growth, limited industrial investmentand the budget deficit. Though in 1951 Kerala’s per capita SDPwas higher than the all India average, in 1991-92 it was only80 per cent of the all India average. Industrial investment in thestate is low and unlike the other south Indian states economicliberalisation has brought little investment to Kerala. The stategovernment has been facing a budgetary deficit since the mid-1970s, and from the late 1980s, the fiscal crisis has deepened.However, in spite of the low per capita SDP, household

Kerala’s DecentralisationIdea in Practice

This paper attempts to comprehend and analyse the successes and shortcomings of thePeople’s Campaign in Kerala. Although Kerala’s socio-economic context and political culturehave placed it in a unique position to realise the goal of democratic decentralisation, and the

campaign itself is a remarkable example of the state’s capacity for intelligent publicmobilisation, it was found that the plan implementation faced some major hurdles. On thebasis of a case study conducted in Palakkad district, the author also looks at the actual

follow-up events and the impact of political affiliations, staffing issues, and lack of technicalexpertise on the course of project implementation. The paper argues that the discourse ondecentralisation in Kerala also has relevance for the whole country, as the People’sCampaign has offered a new paradigm for participatory planning. The issues it has

thrown up can help to focus attention on what needs to be done to make decentralisation ameaningful exercise in other states.

RASHMI SHARMA

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 2003 3833

consumption is high. Though Kerala accounts for only 3.22 percent of India’s population, its share in total consumption is inthe range of 10 to 15 per cent. Apart from strong measures takenfor equitable distribution of resources, this is also a result of thefact that the state’s economy has strong linkages with nationaland international markets. Kerala is a major producer of primaryproducts of export such as rubber, coffee and pepper. Kerala’seducated labour force has been able to exploit opportunitieswithin India as well as internationally, and remittances from theGulf have been an important factor in the state’s economy. Bysome estimates, remittances are estimated to have added 50 percent more to the state income [George 1997; Jacob 1997].

Kerala’s remarkable achievements in land reform, literacy andhealth have been attributed to public action by scholars [Drezeand Sen 1996; Franke 1992]. Nearly a third of Kerala’s adultpopulation is affiliated to mass organisations such as trade unions,peasant associations and student, youth and women’sorganisations. These are supplemented by a wide variety of sportsclubs, theatre and art groups, science movements and voluntaryorganisations [Isaac 2000]. An example is the Kerala ShastraSahitya Parishad (KSSP), a people’s science movement, and anorganisation of committed voluntary workers from all walks oflife. Its units function at the village, sub-district, district and statelevel. It raises resources through publication and sale of booksand donations from the public, and also receives money fromstate and central governments for specific projects. KSSP hasplayed a key role in promoting literacy and education in the stateand also in the decentralisation process. The People’s Campaignin Kerala needs to be viewed in the context of a spiritedpolitical process, where voters have alternately elected Leftist(CPI and CPM-led) governments and coalitions led by theCongress, regularly voting the existing government out.Currently, the two key political players in Kerala are the LeftDemocratic Front (LDF, the CPM and its allies), and the UnitedDemocratic Front (UDF, the Congress and its allies). The People’sCampaign is an initiative of the LDF, which won elections inMay 1996. However, in May 2001, the UDF was voted back intopower.

Kerala’s special socio-economic context and political culturehas important repercussions for the process of decentralisation.The state’s achievements in literacy and the heightened awarenessof and sensitivity to public issues among the people and politicalleaders place it in a unique position to make village planninga reality. The feudal relations that threaten and vitiate grass rootsdemocracy in other parts of the country are no longer a seriousforce in Kerala. Numerous cultural and literacy voluntaryorganisations all over the state may be seen as added strengths.Alternatively, it has been argued that in the production of exportcommodities, participatory planning becomes more difficult andless meaningful. Land is used to produce commodities for theexternal market and the local economy is influenced considerablyby events in these markets. In Kerala, increased commercialisationof agriculture has led to a new class of landowners who arepowerful, but are increasingly alienated from the villagers. Theirrelations with the village population are purely monetary, theirlifestyles alien to those of the majority, and many of them donot live in the village [Radhakrishnan 1997]. At present, theprices of rubber and other cash crops have crashed to an all-timelow, causing an acute economic crisis in the state. Remittancesfrom the Gulf are declining as cheaper labour from elsewherebecomes available. This is also the context in which Kerala’sdecentralisation needs to be viewed.

Moreover, the fact that a majority of the people in the stateare affiliated to or sympathisers of major political organisationsis a dynamic that has very complex implications fordecentralisation, as this paper will show. Political organisationshave their own structures, styles of functioning and priorities.Power in many of these organisations is also centralised, whichcan affect democratic decentralisation adversely. Additionally,the rise of social and religious groups, many allied to politicalorganisations, fragments village communities [Radhakrishnan1997]. Also, strong employees’ unions, organised at the statelevel, that are often better at bargaining for benefits than atpromoting commitment, do not form the best support structurefor decentralisation. As this article is written, the state is paralysedby an indefinite strike by government employees protesting thewithdrawal of certain benefits by the state government becauseof the fiscal crunch. These factors impinge upon people’s capacityfor participatory planning for their villages.

History of DecentralisationHistory of DecentralisationHistory of DecentralisationHistory of DecentralisationHistory of Decentralisation

As Isaac (2000), a committed participant and observer, haschronicled the story of the People’s Campaign in Kerala, theprocess is an articulation of the vision of E M S Namboodiripad,developed over many years. Communist involvement with localbodies began in 1952, when they won elections to the MalabarDistrict Board. When the Communist Party came to power in1957, the report of the administrative reforms committee, chairedby then chief minister E M S Namboodiripad, argued for a two-tier set up of panchayats and municipalities, at the grass rootsand a district council. The functions and powers of the panchayatsenvisaged included not only civic functions and developmentalduties, but also significant responsibilities in revenue adminis-tration and a number of regulatory functions. However, as a resultof the rapid changes of ministries in Kerala, Namboodiripad’svision could not be translated into action.

At this time, grama panchayats were formed in the state in thelate fifties and early sixties. Their activities consisted mostly ofpublic works such as roads and buildings. The limitation of theseactivities may be gleaned from the fact that the establishmentcharges were a major claimant of the income of grama panchayats,and that these institutions did not play an important role inKerala’s successful attempts to universalise education [EconomicReview 2000]. In later years, legislation for panchayati raj inKerala followed a wavering trajectory. Isaac (2000) notes thatthe 1960 and 1961 legislations were watered-down versions ofthe draft bills prepared by the Communist ministries. In 1967,a second ministry led by EMS again sought to introduce the Keralapanchayati raj bills, but could not. In the early 1970s, districtplanning offices were set up and a number of methodologicalexercises for district planning were carried out, though these hadlittle operational significance. A Kerala District AdministrationBill was passed in 1979 while A K Antony was chief minister,but could not be implemented. In the mid-1980s, the specialcomponent plan (SCP) and tribal sub-plan (TSP) were decentralisedto be prepared at the district level. However, this planning wasundertaken mostly by officials, with very little popular parti-cipation [Isaac 2000]. When the LDF ministry was formed in1987, it again attempted to implement the act. In 1989-90, thestate government provided every village panchayat with an untiedgrant [Economic Review 2000]. In 1990, elected district councilscame into being. It was hoped that with greater devolution ofpower to these councils, they would become genuine district

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governments. However, with the change of government in 1991,the plan allocation to district councils was reduced drastically[Isaac 2000].

Meanwhile, the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments wereapproved by parliament, and the government of Kerala, like otherstate governments, had to pass legislation in conformity with the73rd and 74th amendments. Subsequently, the Kerala PanchayatiRaj Bill was introduced in March 1994 by the UDF government,modified after sharp criticism from the Marxists and it was thislegislation that was in force when the People’s Campaign waslaunched [Isaac 2000; Vijayanand 2000]. The Kerala PanchayatiRaj Act 1994 endowed the grama panchayats with substantialpowers and functions. They have to be convened at least twicea year. The grama panchayat is to present before the grama sabhathe financial accounts, work report and a statement of develop-ment activities intended. The law also mandates that the recom-mendations of the grama sabhas be given due consideration byall three tiers of the panchayats. If any decision of the gramasabha cannot be implemented, the reasons must be presented atthe next grama sabha. The grama sabhas are to participate in thepreparation and monitoring of panchayat development plans, tomobilise resources through voluntary labour and help in theselection of beneficiaries. In Kerala, the PRIs are non-hierarchi-cal, i e, the district panchayat has no ‘control’ over the blockand grama panchayats [Isaac 2000].

The first elections for the three-tier panchayati raj were heldin September 1995 and the panchayats came into being onOctober 2, 1995.1 Today in the state there are 991 gramapanchayats, 53 municipalities, five municipal corporations, 152block panchayats and 14 zilla panchayats. Compared with otherstates, the grama panchayats in Kerala are of a much larger sizewith an average population of 25,199 (1991 census). This largesize provides the ‘right size’ for several development services,especially viable areas for public health centres, veterinaryhospitals, and krishi bhawans. However, it makes direct partici-pation by the village more difficult. Moreover, with large gramapanchayats and a small number of districts (14), there are fewfunctions that can be performed exclusively by the blockpanchayats. A comprehensive government order was issued inSeptember 1995, transferring various institutions and staff to thethree-tier panchayats. The budget of 1996 had a separate docu-ment that spelt out the detailed grants in aid and schemes trans-ferred to local bodies. In 1995-96, the untied grant to the panchayatswas Rs 30 crore. In 1996-97, this was increased to Rs 143 crore[Economic Review 2000; Vijayanand 2000].

In May 1996 as the Left Democratic Front government cameto power, it set up a committee on decentralisation of powersunder the late S B Sen. This committee laid down clear andcoherent first principles in its inception report in August 1996,recommending “maximum decentralisation of powers to enablethe elected bodies to function as autonomous units with adequatepower, authority and resources to discharge the basic respon-sibility of bringing about economic development and socialjustice” [Vijayanand 2000]. Subsequently, the strategy adoptedby the state was not of gradual financial devolution to localgovernments in accordance with perceived improvement in theircapacities, but of a swift and substantial increase in the transferof untied resources. A review of the utilisation of untied fundsthat devolved to panchayats in 1996-97 revealed that local bodiesdid not make plans, but tended to divide funds equally amongward members for various works. Still, the state governmentdecided to earmark an even higher amount of 35-40 per cent of

state plan outlay for projects and programmes drawn up by localbodies [Economic Review 2000]. But simultaneously the pes-simism about local bodies was sought to be counteracted byworking out detailed strategies to ensure genuine participationand planning.

Clearly, before the People’s Campaign in 1996, strong pro-ponents of democratic decentralisation existed in the state, asfor more than four decades the Communists had supported theempowerment of local bodies in Kerala. Moreover, the Com-munist Party had been in power many times and had also pushedthis agenda at several points of time. Yet it was only in 1996that the vision could become a reality. Moreover, as is describedin a later section, the people’s campaign developed some uniqueprocesses to generate a public discourse and involve people inthe process of planning for development. The question then arisesas to why this initiative matured at this particular point of time,and why and how it took the precise form that it did in Kerala.

There can be little doubt that the 73rd and 74th constitutionalamendments provided a much needed rallying point. Notably,the Kerala Panchayat Raj Bill was passed by the UDF governmentand transformed into the people’s campaign by the LDF govern-ment. One impact that the 73rd and 74th amendments definitelyappear to have had is to dilute opposition to decentralisation.Yet the constitutional amendments do not explain the uniqueprocess of planning of the people’s campaign. For this, we haveto look more carefully at factors specific to Kerala.

While the Kerala model (of development) has been celebratedby many, by the 1990s, even the most sympathetic observers hadbegun to express concerns about poor economic growth and theproblems of low productivity and unemployment in the state[Dreze and Sen 1996]. The economic crisis in the state, especially itslow economic growth, was a major driving force for the people’scampaign. Intensive involvement of people in the process of deve-lopment, which became the hallmark of Kerala’s decentralisation,was a bid to move out of the poor economic growth and lowproductivity syndrome by encouraging people’s initiative andtransforming the whole work culture in the state. ForNamboodiripad, the question was “whether the organised strengthand political consciousness of our people can be used to increaseproduction and productivity…I must emphasise the importanceof democratic decentralisation in this context” (Namboodiripad1994 quoted in Isaac 2000). During interviews, some influentialactors of the campaign expressed a feeling of vulnerability inthe context of globalisation, fuelled by the crashing prices of cashcrops, and viewed the empowering of local democratic bodiesas an antidote to this perceived threat. Hopes were expressedthat local self government institutions (LSGIs) would resist anti-people decisions more effectively. In the International Congresson Kerala Studies of 1994, organised by the AKG Centre forResearch and Studies of which EMS was the director, attendedby nearly 700 scholars and 1600 other people, Kerala was seento be in a grave crisis. While industrialisation and infrastructuredevelopment required determined state-level intervention, adecentralised development strategy was more suited for the pettyproduction centres and for basic services [Isaac 2000].

Additionally, several people’s organisations in Kerala, espe-cially the KSSP, had been experimenting with small develop-mental projects. Many micro level development initiatives in thestate in vegetable cultivation, water conservation and animalhusbandry, especially those of the KSSP, were seen to havesucceeded [Isaac 2000]. The people’s campaign sought, amongother things, to replicate these. This led to the consistent

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 2003 3835

involvement of resource persons and volunteers from suchorganisations in the people’s campaign, and many of the meth-odologies of the planning process were either adopted from suchsmall-scale projects or developed by people.

This learning however was not totally scientific and systematic.For example, a precursor was the people’s resource mappingprogramme that sought to map local resources with local parti-cipation in 25 pilot panchayats, the basic model for which grewout of intensive interaction between KSSP activists and theCentre for Earth Science Studies. The quality of this exercisevaried across the panchayats. From these 25 panchayats, Kalliasseriwas selected as a site to carry out an experiment in local planningin 1993 which involved several KSSP activists and took nearlythree years. This experiment was then sought to be replicatedin five panchayats, as it was pointed out that Kalliasseri panchayathad some special characteristics: it was CPM-supported and hada strong branch of KSSP. But before this could be done, thepeople’s campaign was launched.

Another point that needs to be considered here is the fact thatwith increasing politicisation and fractiousness, decision-makinghas become a difficult process at the state level. In such a situationit can be hoped that as at decentralised levels issues are clearerand players are fewer, it may be easier to move forward. Thusdecentralisation was also seen an antidote to increasing polarisation[Vijayanand 2000]. There appears to have been a perception thatif the issues of development are presented to the people them-selves, consensus around solutions is more likely to emerge. Or,the fractiousness that ensues as different interests clash incentralised systems would be dissipated as local issues areaddressed by those who are implicated directly. Clearly, oneattempt was to redress the problem of poor motivation to boostproductivity and accelerate development that often exists in thepublic sector. Rather than marry these concerns to the profit motivethrough privatisation, the strategy seems to have been to link themto those who are affected by them: the people. Moreover, somekey actors also think that a new politics of development and anew set of political actors, who have grappled with developmentissues at the grass roots, will emerge in the future.

Though the reasons for Kerala’s decentralisation become clearerin the above context, the fact that large amounts of plan fundsdevolved to the LSGIs within the first year surprised evensympathisers. Even Thomas Isaac admits: “There is no doubt thatthe administrative capacity and experience of newly electedmembers of LSGIs did not warrant such a large-scale devolution.Instead of waiting for the gradual building up of administrativecapacity, the government opted to take the plunge and devolvefunds.” One explanation is that decentralisation in Kerala hadreceived many setbacks earlier. Thus the government chose tomove swiftly rather than slowly, as it was perceived that gradualchange could be reversed more easily.

Cynics would have it that strong support to panchayats in WestBengal has coexisted with uninterrupted CPM rule in the state,and the people’s campaign in Kerala was an attempt to ensurea similar situation in Kerala. One fact that gives rise to thiscynicism is the fact that S B Sen, an academic from the IndianStatistical Institute in Kolkata, who headed the committee ondecentralisation of powers, had also played a leading role in thedecentralisation process in West Bengal. Though he passed awaybefore the report of the committee could be made final, an interimreport of the committee was prepared in three weeks under hisguidance [Isaac 2000]. The cynicism gains strength from the factthat as far as human development and expansion of social

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opportunities is concerned, West Bengal has more to learn fromKerala than vice versa, even though West Bengal had empoweredits grama panchayats earlier. Dreze and Sen (1996) note that whilethe government of West Bengal has been successful in landreform and the revitalisation of democratic institutions at thevillage level, its achievements in other types of social opportu-nities, such as, health and education are far below those of Kerala.And if the Kerala government was looking for models of higherproductivity, then too West Bengal had little to offer. It is alsosurprising that a study of decentralisation in other states or adialogue with them does not seem to have been attempted. Infact, Kerala’s own success in literacy and health did not takeplace in the context of decentralisation of power and responsi-bility to local elected bodies. Rather, it was led by the stategovernment, in collaboration with non-government initiativesthat involved committed and concerned persons, as in the KSSP.This strategy worked well for the state in education and health,and it could be argued that the same could be repeated for otherdevelopmental initiatives as well. As the later sections of thispaper will show, the decentralisation process did draw upon suchresource organisations. But the dynamics were different: thesupport that could be provided to a large number of panchayatswas inadequate.

But to view the people’s campaign merely as a bid to holdon to power is indeed cynical. Several situations and eventsappear to have coalesced to result in the people’s campaign. Ashas been illustrated earlier, the 73rd and 74th constitutionalamendments were a turning point. That there was an economiccrisis in the state was beyond doubt, and some major steps toresolve it were essential. The success of small-scale developmen-tal projects had shown the way. The planning process of the stateshows that through the people’s campaign, the state governmentattempted to orient people towards the issues and problems ofdevelopment and seek solutions, as in the past, through publicaction. However, the issues of narrow political gains anddecentralisation in the context of centralised political parties thathave been mentioned above remain. As this paper will show,these concerns are not merely theoretical, but have a deep impacton decentralisation. But first, it is necessary to describe brieflythe major features of the ‘people’s campaign’.

People’s Campaign: Process of PlanningPeople’s Campaign: Process of PlanningPeople’s Campaign: Process of PlanningPeople’s Campaign: Process of PlanningPeople’s Campaign: Process of Planning

The People’s Campaign has been described in detail by Isaac(2000). Here an attempt is made to present the highlights of theprocesses undertaken in 1996-97 in Kerala that resulted in thefirst set of annual plans for 1997-98.

The state government played a key role in initiating the processof participatory planning by LSGIs. The state planning board(SPB) was the implementing agency for the campaign and a highlevel guidance council headed by E M S Namboodiripad andcomposed of MLAs, MPs, senior government officials, leadersof mass organisations, cultural leaders and former chief ministersof Kerala was set up. For the day to day functioning, a coordi-nation committee presided over by the local administration ministermet every week. A special campaign cell was set up at the SPBheadquarters, to which 30 persons were recruited, almost all ofwhom had proven experience of the Total Literacy Campaign(TLC). This cell organised training camps and dealt with day-to-day issues, providing valuable feedback to the SPB [Isaac 2000].

The first phase of the People’s Campaign began with themobilisation of people, as it was thought that two factors

constrained participation in grama sabhas: lack of awarenessamong people and poor preparatory measures. The tone of thecampaign was set by organising ‘Janadhikara Kalajathas’ – scienceand arts theatrical processions – on the theme of power to thepeople all over Kerala. These critiqued the current developmentprocess in Kerala and exhorted people to approach the gramasabha to chalk out a new path. Subsequently grama sabhas2 wereexpected to meet and discuss the local developmental problems,their causes and solutions. To make the grama sabha meetingseffective, these were structured to divide into small groups aftera brief common gathering, so that ordinary people would notbe intimidated in speaking up in large gatherings. Focus wasprovided through a model agenda: the opening sessions were toconsist of inaugural speeches and presentations on the develop-ment crisis in Kerala and the people’s planning campaign.Subsequently, small groups were expected to list the developmentproblems of the ward in each of the 12 sectors, collect statisticsand information on resources and development problems throughmutual consultations, suggest solutions and indicate priorities.Every group was to have one or two trained resource personsto lead the discussion. Guidelines for the discussion were pro-vided in the form of a semi-structured questionnaire to be usedby the resource persons that contained nearly two dozen questionsfor each of the development sectors [Isaac 2000].

At the state level, a three-tier programme was drawn up toprepare resource persons – state-level training for key resourcepersons (KRPs), district level training of district resource persons(DRPs) and panchayat/municipal training for local resourcepersons (LRPs). Among the KRPs, one-third were selected directlyby the SPB, mostly from among former TLC and KSSP activists,and the remaining two-thirds of the slots were nominated by thedistrict planning committees (DPCs). The grama panchayats andmunicipalities selected their own LRPs. Around one lakh resourcepersons were mobilised and trained to act as facilitators in thediscussion groups. A survey of the KRPs showed that electedrepresentatives constituted 27 per cent of the KRPs, while theproportion of elected representatives among DRPs was 36 percent, varying from 17 per cent to 75 per cent among districts.The KRPs were well educated and 64 per cent had postgraduateor professional degrees. However, this did not hold true for DRPs.Only 9 per cent DRPs had postgraduate or professional degrees,while 44 per cent had less than secondary education. At this point,a major criticism voiced by the opposition was that a parallelhierarchical structure to the elected bodies was being createdthrough resource persons, which led the SPB vice chairman toappeal to the LSGIs to avoid political discrimination in the selectionof resource persons [Economic Review 2000; Isaac 2000].

The first grama sabha was organised at the UDF-led Nandiyodepanchayat in Thiruvananthapuram district on September 15, 1996amid much fanfare. In the following months, grama sabhas andthe ward sabhas were the main local events all over Kerala. Itis estimated that more than two million persons participated inthe grama sabhas and the urban ward assemblies. In general, thegrama sabhas were a huge success and generated public debateon development all over Kerala. However, participation in thegrama sabhas varied widely, increasing where commitment andinterest of elected representatives was high, as well as in LDF-led panchayats and declining with greater urbanisation. Partici-pation of women, SCs and STs was not satisfactory. Though theaverage participation on the grama sabhas was 159, much higherthan the legal quorum of 50, a majority of the people did notattend the grama sabhas [Economic Review 2000; Isaac 2000].

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This phase of the campaign is illustrative of the remarkablecapacity in Kerala for intelligent public mobilisation. Also visibleis the critical role of voluntary organisations such as the KSSPthat provided a large number of resource persons and facilitators.A unique process is the structuring of grama sabhas to facilitatea discourse on development and the posing and discussion ofproblems and issues that affect people. This is indeed a far cryfrom both the vote-gathering rhetoric and protest-against-govern-ment around which public mobilisation usually takes place. Interms of its educative value alone, the exercise is remarkable.Its potential to generate a relevant and thoughtful political dis-course is stupendous.

In the second phase of the campaign in October–December1996, development seminars were organised in every grama pan-chayat, and development reports were formulated. These reports(envisaged to have 15 chapters) sought to make an objectiveassessment of the resource potential and problems of the gramapanchayats, on the basis of which a list of recommendations wasto be made. It was thought that LSGIs needed a good databaseto plan and attempts were made to facilitate the use of secondarydata in the preparation of plans, and a format was developed. Butthough all local bodies collected data, only 50 per cent actuallycompleted the forms. An attempt was also made to map the resour-ces of panchayats accurately. Through the method of a ‘transectwalk’, appraisal teams consisting of experts such as an agricul-tural expert, teacher, and civil engineer formulated an eco-zone mapin each panchayat. Again, though the transect walk was carriedout in nearly all the panchayats, compilation of data and identi-fication of eco-zones was achieved in only about 50 per cent. Actualutilisation of findings to guide the plans towards zone-specificinterventions was rare. Later, this walk was dropped [Isaac 2000].

Some reflection is needed at this point on the concept of‘planning’ that appears to have prevailed in the People’s Cam-paign. There seems to have been a fair degree of emphasis ondata collection and resource mapping, with an underlying as-sumption that relevant information needs to be ‘gathered’. Whileit is correct that sound planning needs to be based on an accurateunderstanding of issues, how such understanding can be gainedis a matter that needs to be reviewed. As planning is decentralised,and issues and problems are close to the planners, and oftentangible, the utility of data, formats and the like may decline. Infact, it is centralised agencies and outsiders who seek to under-stand issues through such exercises. The concept of ‘planning’then appears to be influenced strongly by two viewpoints. Firstis the need of centralised agencies for data, formats and reports,and this need appears to have become synonymous with ‘plan-ning’ itself. Second is a certain ‘research project’ approach toplanning. Here, the issue of ‘understanding the problem’ becomeskey. The emphasis shifts to gathering data, defining problemsand writing reports rather than developing strategies and solu-tions. But, as the later developments of the People’s Campaignshow, the key issues for decentralised planning are different.

For the second phase of the campaign, because of the demand-ing nature of the task, the number of KRPs increased from 373to 660 and that of DRPs from 10,497 to 11,808. As a result ofcontroversies regarding the selection of KRPs in the first phase,the selection of additional resource persons was left entirely tothe DPCs and DRPs were selected by local bodies. As theawareness of the skills and time to be invested by the resourcepersons increased, the number of elected representatives amongthe KRPs declined from 27 per cent to 19 per cent. The proportionof women and level of education among the KRPs also declined,

and more government officials were included among DRPs. Asecond round of four days’ training was organised to equip theresource persons to undertake local studies, prepare PDRs andorganise development seminars, and now this was made man-datory for all secretaries of local bodies. The training includeda review of the first phase as well as discussion on secondarydata collection and problems of the various development sectors.At this point, a criticism arose that there was more focus on theform and process of planning than on the content of the plans,as the critics thought that more concrete ideas and policy guide-lines needed to be discussed. After much debate, it was decidedthat as far as possible, training would be woven around certainconcrete development experiences, which the participants wouldbe encouraged to analyse, and the teacher would lead the dis-cussion towards the new policy perspective. Twelve shortmonographs on issues such as drinking water, education andagriculture were brought out [Isaac 2000].

Around five lakh persons, consisting of representatives fromgrama sabhas, elected representatives, local leaders of politicalparties, line department officials and local experts participatedin the development seminars [Economic Review 2000]. Thelargest number of participants was in the subject groups ofhousing and social welfare, and the lowest in the resourcemobilisation group. As our later analysis will show, this was notsurprising. The development seminars were expected to resultin a set of recommendations for each sector, and elect task forcesto turn seminar proposals into projects. The development reportsthat resulted proved to be of varying quality. The best analysistended to be for agriculture, followed by education, for whichmany school teachers provided support. Chapters on industry,energy and resource mobilisation were the weakest. Many gramapanchayats now began to lag behind and the seminars draggedon to March 1997 [Isaac 2000].

The next task, that is, the third phase from December 1996to March 1997 involved preparation of detailed project proposalsto carry out these recommendations. For this a 300-page hand-book was prepared and a project format with eight parts wasdesigned. Sectorwise task forces were constituted at the gramapanchayat level to ‘projectise’ the recommendations and sug-gestions that emerged from the development seminars. Thechairperson of the task force was an elected representative andan officer from the concerned line department was its convenor.It was realised that for project formulation, greater involvementof government officials and experts would be needed than inprevious phases. Consequently, even larger scale training wasorganised, which included officials as well as elected represen-tatives. But the training for this phase was not as successful as theprevious phases and district resource persons did not have theconfidence to organise block-level training programmes [Isaac 2000].

In this phase, as many as 12,000 task forces were organisedat the village level that prepared around one lakh projects forthe consideration of the panchayats. But a review by the SPBshowed that the task forces did not function as effectively asexpected. Isaac (2000) identifies three reasons for the failure:the uncooperative and negative attitude of the officials, theinability of resource persons to deal with issues raised duringtraining, and the fact that some of the southern districts had notyet completed the development seminars. The quality of theprojects too left much to be desired. There was a general tendencyto imitate model projects given in the handbook or adopt ongoingschemes of the departments. Financial analysis was especiallyweak, as was the technical analysis of production-related projects.

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An attempt was then made to revitalise the task forces. A generalmeeting of the grama panchayats was suggested, in which newmembers could be co-opted. Where such revitalisation wasdifficult, a core team of active members could prepare projectsin all sectors. Block-level workshops, known as ‘project clinics’,facilitated by bank employees were organised to examine projectproposals and rectify mistakes. But the preparation of projectsremained problematic. As per the assessment of KRPs, 34 percent of the projects were written by a core group of members.Only in 12 per cent of the grama sabhas were all the task forcesfully active [Economic Review 2000; Isaac 2000].

It is worthwhile to examine here the problems of this phase.While the shortcomings identified by Thomas Isaac are impor-tant, some deeper issues are also implicated. It seems that as thePeople’s Campaign progressed from the initial phases ofmobilisation and identification of issues to the more demandingphase of strategy formulation, success was harder to come by.It may be noted that formulation of strategies and solutions, or‘projectisation’ requires a high degree of technical skill. Projectpreparation at the local level could have been successful had everylocal body been able to tap the required technical expertise. Butin the People’s Campaign no estimates seem to have been madeto match the need for expertise with its availability. ‘Task forces’were formed, but these do not provide clues either about thetechnical expertise needed, or available. The unstated expectationis that public participation would either automatically providesuch expertise (through task forces) or compensate for it. Thisdoes not appear to have happened.

These problems betray the central importance, as well as thecomplexity of the business of ‘projectisation’. And if the conceptof ‘planning’ is scrutinised again, it becomes clear thatprojectisation, or in broader terms, formulating strategies andsolutions, is the essence of decentralised planning. For success,emphasis needs to shift away from detailed identification ofproblems to building expertise in looking for solutions. Forinstance, usually, if there is a drinking water problem in a village,this is well-known to the grama sabha and panchayat members.Collecting statistics or other information about it to define it moreaccurately is often of limited use. What is really needed is a teamof persons, local as well as experts, who are capable of findingsolutions, which can be quite technical. In the People’s Cam-paign, grama sabhas, resource persons and panchayats wereencouraged to collect data, identify issues and make reports. Butthey do not seem to have been provided with adequate oppor-tunities to explore and study possible solutions to problems, manyof which were common to a large number of the grama panchayats.It is not surprising that resource persons faltered in this phase.

Lack of appreciation of the complexity of the task involvedwas also visible from the fact that all the recommendations ofthe development seminars were to be made into projects, thoughonly some would eventually be undertaken, for two reasons. First,the exact amount of the grant-in-aid was not yet known. Second,it was thought that a larger number of projects would bring aboutmore interactions among task force members, technical expertsand public representatives, and the projects could be drawn uponin the future. But this logic betrays poor assessment and planningfor technical expertise needed to prepare such a huge numberof projects at one go. The quality of projects may have been betterif priorities had been identified first, and a smaller number ofprojects prepared subsequently.

In the fourth phase (March-May 1997) of annual plan prepa-ration, every grama sabha was expected to have a shelf of projects

corresponding to the development problems identified by thepeople. But because of the problems that cropped up, this wasnot the case. It was therefore decided that the task of formulatingthe plan would run concurrently with the preparation of projects.The grant-in-aid allocated by the state to each local body hadalso been made known. The projects were now to be prioritisedand incorporated into the five-year plans of the panchayats. Broadsectoral guidelines were issued from the state level: each localbody was to provide 40-50 per cent of the funds for the productivesectors, 30-40 per cent for the service sectors, and 10-30 per centfor the infrastructure sectors. The elected bodies were to formallyadopt a resolution related to the development strategy. Since theelected representatives in the grama panchayats and municipali-ties were to take critical decisions, all panchayat presidents,secretaries and KRPs were brought together to exchange expe-riences and plan future events of the campaign. This interactionwas reported to be highly successful [Isaac 2000].

Since 35-40 per cent of the plan funds were to devolve to thepanchayats, the plan outlay at the state level needed to be farsmaller in 1997-98 than in previous years. This posed consid-erable difficulties because there were many ongoing state-levelschemes that could not be stopped abruptly. One measure wasto increase the total annual plan of the state by 30 per cent fromthe previous year, bringing the amount to Rs 28,550 million. Ofthis, 36 per cent or Rs 10,254 million was earmarked for theLSGIs. Even then cutting down the size of departmental plansproved to be difficult. This issue was resolved by identifyinga set of ‘state-sponsored schemes’ which continued as per theuniform guidelines applicable throughout the state, but wereimplemented by the LSGIs as part of their plans. Another Rs 2,764million was earmarked for these schemes, thus leaving an amountof Rs 7,490 million as grant-in-aid to the local bodies. The grant-in-aid had three components: special component plans (SCP),or funds earmarked for the welfare of scheduled castes, tribalsub-plans (TSP) for scheduled tribes and the general sectorallocation. The general sector allocation was distributed to thegrama panchayats, block panchayats and district panchayats inthe ratio of 70:15:15, for SCP this ratio was 60:20:20 and forTSP, 20:20:60 [Isaac 2000].

However, drawing up the plan documents proved to be moredifficult than anticipated and only a handful of grama panchayatshad finalised their plans by March 1997. The two problems thathad appeared in the earlier stages of the campaign continued todog it. The first was the complex nature of the plan documentenvisaged. The local activists found the statistical statementsrequired in the plan documents difficult, and there were manyconfusions about the concepts and about the amount offunds to be devolved to local bodies. The second set of issuesrelated to the role of the MLAs, some of who demanded thata constituency development fund be used as per their discretion.While this demand was not acceded to, many MLAs, includingthose of the ruling party, remained lukewarm or hostile [Isaac2000]. In other words, Kerala’s decentralisation was attemptedwithin the considerable constraints posed by the existing centralisedpolitical and administrative structures. Here, it could be arguedthat centralised structures are bound to block decentralisation aspower shifts from them to local bodies. If so, no support shouldbe expected from politicians and bureaucracies. Yet in Keralathese agencies, especially the bureaucracy, were expected tocontribute, particularly as problems arose. The other possibilityis that these (centralised) structures, especially the bureaucracies,can be utilised to strengthen and support the LSGIs. If more

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 2003 3839

support from state-level public representatives and officials couldhave been garnered, the planning by LSGIs may have been better.However, it is not clear to what extent this is possible. Simul-taneously, it is also not clear if the state government did plansystematically to generate this support. Certainly one wouldsuspect that it could have roped in its own employees better tosupport the initiative.

In the fifth phase in April-October 1997, the block and districtpanchayats were to start preparation of their annual plans, tocomplement the plans of the grama panchayats. At the state level,a major problem for block-level planning envisaged was the factthat funds from the government of India are received for specificcentrally sponsored schemes as per fixed guidelines and norms.This was seen to be out of consonance with the spirit of thepeople’s campaign, in which LSGIs were to be autonomous insetting norms. If block panchayats continued to implement pre-designed schemes with set norms and procedures, the processof participatory need-based planning would be vitiated. To makethe centrally sponsored schemes flexible as per the priorities ofthe LSGIs, the state government’s matching grant was routedthrough the block offices, and not the district rural developmentagencies, in order to give them autonomy to use the state shareas per LSGI norms. Further, plan funds could be used to supplementthe centrally sponsored schemes where necessary [Isaac 2000].

As in the case of grama panchayats, activities such as training,and preparation of handbooks preceded the planning exercise.But the preparation of block plans was tardy. The block panchayatswere reluctant to integrate centrally sponsored schemes in theirplans. Many blocks even prepared their proposals for centrallysponsored schemes and received their allotments. There wereheated exchanges on this issue among block-level functionariesand campaign organisers at a state-level conference, and theseintensified over time in many blocks. Disciplinary action againstsome block officers only made matters worse. The delay inpreparation of the block panchayat plans made the integrationof block plans into the district plans impossible, and the latterhad to be prepared in parallel. There were instances of duplicationof planning activities, and also critical gaps. As planning movedfrom the grama panchayat level to bigger units, it seemed moredifficult [Economic Review 2000; Isaac 2000].

When the plan campaign was launched, only the above fivephases were visualised. But the experience with project prepa-ration showed that the technical soundness of projects remaineda problem. Consequently, a new, sixth phase for technical andfinancial appraisal of projects was now added, that is, the for-mation of voluntary technical corps (VTCs). To tap all expertiseavailable in the state, retired technical experts and professionalswere encouraged to enrol themselves as volunteers to appraisethe projects of the local bodies and rectify the technical detailsand financial analysis. There was an enthusiastic response andmore than 35,000 VTC members were registered, around two-thirds of whom were retired, especially teachers. Over time, thevision of the VTC evolved into that of a team of officials andnon-officials working together called VTC/PAT (plan appraisalteams). KRPs were brought into these bodies also. The VTC/PATwas to be formed in every block and municipality, with the blockdevelopment officer as convenor and a KRP as joint convenor.At a later date, the VTCs/PATs were the renamed block-levelexpert committee (BLEC), which was empowered to issue technicalsanctions for projects. At the district level, district level expertcommittees (DLECs) were formed to play an advisory role to theDPC, appraise plans of district and block panchayats, and providetechnical sanctions to block and district plans [Isaac 2000].

Despite considerable efforts of the VTCs, technical sanctionfor projects took off slowly. Though the tapping of technicalexpertise through the VTC was a remarkable innovation tostrengthen the panchayats, it seems to have come rather late, thatis, after the projects were already prepared. If technical expertisehad been harnessed when projects were prepared, rather than justto appraise and correct these, it might possibly have been moreeffective. Further, this method, though it mobilised a vast amountof know-how, did not ensure that adequate expertise was avail-able to all panchayats. The number of VTC members in manydistricts was inadequate and even in the best districts somedevelopment sectors had few experts. Moreover, inadequate staffand facilities made the functioning of these committees difficult.But in spite of these constraints, the VTC did provide valuableassistance to the process of appraisal and technical sanction ofprojects [Economic Review 2000; Isaac 2000].

Finally, the first release of funds to a grama panchayat tookplace in June 1997, after a-year-and-a-half of discussion andplanning. A majority of the grama panchayats could finalise theirplans and receive their first installment only by August. Mostmunicipalities, blocks and district panchayats could make it onlyby September-October. The actual release of funds after theintensive planning exercise enthused the activists and arousedpeople’s expectations. Armed with projects, plans and funds, thepanchayats were now free to move forward.

To sum up, the remarkable story of the People’s Campaignshows it to be an effort of unusual motivation and sophisticatedorganisation for participatory planning for development. Its mostimpressive achievements lie in the capacity to mobilise people,to facilitate public discourses on development, and to tap a widerange of resources available within society. Once again, Kerala’sgenius for public action comes to the fore. Yet as the processmoved on from awareness and discussion to more complexphases, certain critical gaps became visible. Inability to provideappropriate technical expertise was a major hurdle, as wasinadequate restructuring of administrative and financial systems.We look now at the outcomes of this process in the next threeyears, noting major issues.

Process of Plan ImplementationProcess of Plan ImplementationProcess of Plan ImplementationProcess of Plan ImplementationProcess of Plan Implementation

A review undertaken soon after the first year’s annual planshad been prepared showed that though the total grant-in-aid tolocal bodies was Rs. 7.5 million, the plan outlay was around Rs17.4 million. Apart from the state plan assistance, resources wereto be raised from institutional finance, state and central schemes,beneficiary contributions and own revenue resources of localbodies. But these estimates were not accurate. Analysis showedthat financial institutions were not forthcoming with credit, andbeneficiary contribution was prone to exaggeration. Further,projects taken up by local bodies showed their priorities to bevery different from those of centralised authorities. The servicesector occupied the most prominent position in the investmentprofile at 38.4 per cent of the plan outlay with the highest priority(14.5 per cent as against 1.6 per cent in the state plan) to thehousing sector, followed by drinking water and sanitation. Thiswas specially marked for the SCP and TSP components: thepanchayats had paid attention to these very basic needs of thepoorest people. In the production sector, the emphasis was onagriculture, animal husbandry and minor irrigation. The localplans provided for almost no investment in large and mediumindustries or large and medium power generation projects. Duringthe first year, there was an overall shift in the investment pattern

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 20033840

of state and local plans taken together from major irrigation, majorindustry and power to small-scale sectors, animal husbandry,health and housing services. The share of roads and bridges alsorose. Moreover, the plans of the three tiers of LSGIs were difficultto integrate, leading to a fair amount of duplication. For instance,all three tiers had substantial outlay for the distribution of milchanimals and poultry and the state government too continued itsanimal distribution scheme. The simultaneous implementationof these projects led to a shortage of livestock, which meant thatsubstandard stock was accepted, and some animals simply changedhands. The various tiers also had different subsidy norms andconditions, which added to the confusion. Similarly, all threetiers tended to take up easy programmes such as those of housingand vegetable production [Isaac 2000].

The early years of plan implementation too threw up severalissues, the first set of which were related to fiscal management.Now it was important to ensure that the large-scale transfer offunds to LSGIs did not disrupt the precarious financial situationof the state. Therefore, a system was introduced to keep day-to-day cash outflows even with revenue inflows. Consequently,funds were dispersed to LSGIs in quarterly installments, on thebasis of actual expenditures [Isaac 2000]. Here, it is importantto note that decentralisation can entail a vastly complicated fiscalmanagement system. In this case, the revenue collection andmanagement of cash flow remained with the state governmenttreasuries, but expenditure shifted to LSGIs. Such a situationdemands enormous coordination compared with the earlier situ-ation where both revenue collection and expenditure were con-centrated at the state level. Moreover, the panchayat office wasnot capable of accounting for the grant given. Most panchayatsecretaries were promoted from the lowest clerical ranks and hadlittle financial know-how or development experience. This prob-lem of lack of fiscal management capacities of the panchayatswas sought to be circumvented by identifying an ‘implementationofficer’ (that is, a departmental officer) for each project, whocould open and operate and a PD account with authorisation fromthe local body. It was however, feared by many elected repre-sentatives that “funds were being returned to the clutches ofdepartment officers” [Isaac 2000].

For the execution of public works, which formed more thanhalf the plan investment, the attempt was to shift the agency awayfrom contractors to beneficiary committees formed by the gramapanchayats. It was hoped that these committees would be ableto break away from the nexus of corruption between governmentfunctionaries and contractors. Thus a government order of 1997stated that LSGIs might utilise the services of contractors onlyas a last resort. But this process too was far from smooth. Nearlyone-fourth of the beneficiary committees were fake, with thecontractor or his nominee as the convenor. A large number startedout as genuine but degenerated over time. Many were unableto maintain the required accounts and some were forced tocompromise with contractors because of their own lack of know-how. Committee members found day-to-day supervision of theworks difficult not only because of lack of time, but also becauseof lack of technical knowledge. Ultimately, only a quarter of thebeneficiary committees functioned as genuine participatoryforums. Considerable problems were also faced in fixingpanchayat-specific labour and material rates for public works.The previous centrally fixed rates were found to be too low, butwhen district specific rates were sought to be fixed, these werenot satisfactory either [Isaac 2000].

Procedures were also evolved to facilitate the selection ofbeneficiaries for programmes for asset distribution and financial

assistance by the grama sabha. Though most local bodies fol-lowed these procedures, there were many complaints fromaggrieved citizens. The problems seemed to appear when thegrama panchayats attempted to subvert the beneficiary listsprepared by the grama sabhas. As per a survey conducted,according to VTC members, 26 per cent and according to KRPmembers, 36 per cent grama panchayats had manipulated thebeneficiary lists approved in the grama sabha [Isaac 2000].

These problems were exacerbated by the fact that nationalelections were held during this period. This diverted the attentionof public representatives, intensified political rivalries and furtherslowed down the process of plan implementation. Some of thepress turned hostile, allegations of financial irregularities in-creased, the opposition demanded an inquiry into the ‘plan scam’.As a result, by the end of March, the plan expenditure of thegrama panchayats was only 30 per cent of the proposed outlay.Consequently, local bodies were allowed to continue planimplementation for another three months. The development worksthen picked up and continued rapidly during summer. Equallyimportant, in spite of the many problems, in every district somepanchayats had begun to innovative and do excellent work [Isaac2000]. If the hurdles of plan implementation in the first year areexamined, a continuity of issues from the planning stage is visible.The issue of lack of technical expertise of the LSGIs is a constantone. Moreover, the issue of administrative restructuring and anew system of fiscal management that decentralisation demandsbecame urgent.

The process of planning continued to evolve over the yearsincorporating many lessons along the way. In 1998-99 the plangrant-in-aid to local bodies was increased by 27 per cent, andthe share of the state-sponsored component decreased. In theallotment of funds to LSGIs, not just the population but also thegeographical area, indices of backwardness and the income ofthe grama panchayat were taken into account. Greater clarityemerged in the types of projects that could be taken up by thevarious tiers of local bodies. LSGIs had to invest a minimumof 40 per cent of their general sector grant-in-aid in the productivesectors and not more than 30 per cent in infrastructure. ‘Frivolous’asset distribution programmes such as distribution of footwear,clothes and financial support for weddings were banned andlimits were imposed on maximum subsidy for a family orindividual. To improve project formulation, task forces at thelocal level were given greater importance, and a semi-structuredprogramme of self-study was designed for the task force mem-bers. Technical and financial appraisal and subsequent technicalsanction for each project was made mandatory. Though thesemeasures streamlined the working of the LSGIs a great deal, theplanning exercise in the second year was also behind schedule.Most task forces remained inactive, though there was a visibleimprovement in the appraisal process. Also, the opposition partiescriticised the expert committees for impinging on the rights ofthe elected bodies [Isaac 2000].

In 1999, the state government sought to involve academicinstitutes and voluntary agencies such as the Kerala AgricultureUniversity, State Institute of Rural Development, Kerala Instituteof Local Administration, Institute of Management in Govern-ment, Centre for Science and Technology for Rural Developmentand Integrated Rural Technology Centre in the training of taskforce members. As part of the institutionalisation process, aproject known as capacity development for decentralisation inKerala was commissioned with financial support of Rs 10.54crore over a period of three years from the Swiss Agency forDevelopment and Cooperation. The Kerala Institute of Local

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 2003 3841

Table 1: Sectorwise Investment Pattern Over Three YearsTable 1: Sectorwise Investment Pattern Over Three YearsTable 1: Sectorwise Investment Pattern Over Three YearsTable 1: Sectorwise Investment Pattern Over Three YearsTable 1: Sectorwise Investment Pattern Over Three Years

1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000Sector Per Cent Grant-in-Aid Maximum Investment Per Cent Grant-in-Aid Maximum Investment Per Cent Grant-in-Aid Maximum Investment

Productive 33.93 Animal husbandry, 40.66 Minor irrigation, 28.31 Minor irrigation,Minor irrigation animal husbandry small-scale industry

Service 41.63 Housing, drinking water 38.06 Housing, drinking water 48.35 Housing, drinking waterInfrastructure 24.44 Roads and bridges 21.28 Roads and bridges 23.33 Roads and bridges

Source: Economic Review 2000.

Table 2: Achievements Before and After DecentralisationTable 2: Achievements Before and After DecentralisationTable 2: Achievements Before and After DecentralisationTable 2: Achievements Before and After DecentralisationTable 2: Achievements Before and After Decentralisation

Achievement in Achievement in thethe Eighty Plan First Three Years of

the Ninth Plan

No of houses built 2.70 lakh 3.06 lakkNo of latrines built 1.25 lakh 4.13 lakhRoads constructed 9,000 km 16,736 km

Source: Economic Review 2000.

Administration (KILA) was identified as the lead organisation,and collaborated closely with the state planning board in organising,coordinating and financing numerous training programmes[Economic Review 2000].

Over the next three years, there was a declining trend incontribution of loans from financial institutions as well as thecooperative sector in total investment. Possibly, financial insti-tutions could not access the grama panchayats, which had becomecritical agencies for project formulation and development. Onthe other hand, the contribution of internal resources was sig-nificant only for grass roots agencies and highest for local bodies.Shifts were also visible in the investment pattern: investment inthe productive sector declined, was constant in the infrastructuresector, and rose in the service sector. A sharp rise came in housingprogrammes, for which the percentage of the grant-in-aid com-ponent rose from 14 per cent to 24 per cent. Drinking watercontinued to be important, while the share on sanitation projectsdeclined. Major gainers were the anganwadis, as a project onsupplementary nutrition was made mandatory. The share of cropand animal husbandry declined, while that for the industrial sectorincreased (Table 1).

In spite of all these problems, there is little doubt that LSGIshave been able to execute developmental works much faster. Thiscan be seen by comparing the achievements of the Eighth Plan,before the People’s Campaign, to the first three years of the NinthPlan, afterwards (Table 2).

Moreover, there has been a visible improvement in the milkand vegetable production in the state [Economic Review 2000].

While these are the general features of the broad picture, thereal understanding of what happened is in the panchayats, andthis is what the next section deals with.

Situation on the GroundSituation on the GroundSituation on the GroundSituation on the GroundSituation on the Ground

This section of the paper deals with the actual situation andevents on the ground in the wake of the People’s Campaign. Itis based primarily on a case study conducted in May-June 2001of 10 grama panchayats in Palakkad district across four blocks,selected to capture maximum possible diversity. Three of thegrama panchayats were located in a tribal block. Data and in-formation was obtained through open-ended discussions withpanchayat functionaries, government officials, employees andthe people. On the basis of the facts and issues thrown up inthis process, an attempt is made below to analyse the situationon the ground against the background of the state’s attempt.Evidence available from other studies and documents is alsoquoted in the discussions.

Palakkad district is predominantly rural and has a lower literacyrate than the southern districts of the state. It has 10 blocks anda population of 18.06 lakh (2001 Census). A brief profile of thesample grama panchayats (Table 3) indicates a population rangeof 15,000 to 32,000 with 10-20 per cent SC population in non-tribal blocks. In two grama panchayats of the tribal block ofAttapady, the ST population was 29 per cent and 46 per cent.

The urban-like settlement pattern was illustrated amply in Palakkad,where there are no long stretches without human habitation anddistances are short. Among the sample grama panchayats, nopanchayat headquarters was more than 16 km away from theblock, though the distances between villages in tribal areas weremuch greater than the rest.

The main occupations of the people are agriculture, construc-tion work, and animal husbandry, with wage labour predominantin tribal areas. The main crops are paddy, coconut and rubber(Table 3). A remarkable feature of the countryside is the hecticbuilding activity that goes on: new houses are under constructioneverywhere, absorbing the money earned in the Gulf and throughcash crops. There are also numerous shops and eating-places inthe countryside, buses ply regularly, and cars and jeep taxis arevisible. High schools, technical schools and colleges are com-mon, and it is difficult to spot any children working. There are,however, poor agricultural labourers visible, especially women,many of whom come from Tamil Nadu for work. There are alsotribal people in the hills, living off forest produce, making honey,working as casual labourers in coconut and cashew plantationsand on their tiny farms, some growing the more lucrative ‘ganja’(marijuana) on hilltops. But even here ‘development’ is clearlyvisible. Most tribal people now live in tiny pucca houses, providedunder the Indira Awas Yojna.

In general, the physical infrastructure available to all govern-ment organisations in Kerala is superior to that in other partsof the country. This was also true of grama panchayat offices,which were housed in buildings of six rooms or so. Most of thebuildings had been built in the early 1960s, but two gramapanchayats had acquired the buildings recently. Three had madeadditions such as computer and meeting rooms and panchayatpresident’s room. Of the nine panchayats from which informationwas available, all had acquired equipment such as jeeps, faxesand telephones after the People’s Campaign was launched. Thedistrict panchayat is housed in a large two-storey building of 30rooms, built in 2000 at the cost of Rs 50 lakh for buildingconstruction and Rs 25 lakh for interior decoration. Up-gradationof panchayat infrastructure has clearly been part of thedecentralisation process.

Politics and PanchayatsPolitics and PanchayatsPolitics and PanchayatsPolitics and PanchayatsPolitics and Panchayats

The elected representatives of the grama panchayats are ex-pected to be the nodal points for reconstructing people’s aspi-rations into plans and projects, and implementing them. A profile

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of 132 representatives, ranging from 10 to 17 in each panchayat(Table 4) shows that 62 per cent of these were men as were nineout of the 10 chairpersons. Two very different dynamics ofreserving seats for women were thrown up in the case study. Inthe one grama panchayat where a woman was the president, thecommunity saw her as inactive and largely a ‘front’ for herhusband. In contrast, in the first panchayat elections in 1995,the seat of the block panchayat president Attapady was reservedfor a tribal woman, and a dedicated and capable tribal womanwas the president of this panchayat for five years.

More than two-thirds of the panchayat functionaries belongedto the general category, 13 per cent to scheduled castes, 11 percent to scheduled tribes, 8 per cent to minorities and seven ofthe 10 chairpersons belonged to the general category: an expectedscenario in the context of reservation of seats. But representationin numbers does not automatically translate into equivalentinfluence. During discussions, the headman in Pudur panchayatsaid that because their ward member belonged to a scheduledtribe, he had little influence and development works in the wardwere not satisfactory. Of the grama panchayat members, 54 percent were aged 40 or less, and 30 per cent were aged 30 yearsor less, including two chairpersons. A mere 14 per cent werepast 50. A surprising 39 per cent reported their occupation as‘nil’ so that it would appear that a fair proportion of youngunemployed persons are panchayat members. Nearly 63 per centhad completed high school, though almost 30 per cent wereeducated up to the upper primary level or less. Less than 8 percent reported having gone to college. Around 64 per cent ownedbetween 0-5 acres of land, though for this information was notforthcoming from nearly half the members. However, ‘landed

interests’ do not seem to play a significant role in the gramapanchayats, at least in terms of representation. The panchayatrepresentatives belong to a fair cross-section of society.

The more important issue was that of political affiliation andits impact. In Palakkad, the district panchayat had 26 electedrepresentatives, including a chairman and a vice-chairman, who,along with 19 of the members, belonged to the LDF. In the 10sample grama panchayats, 58 per cent of the elected panchayatfunctionaries supported the LDF as against 39 per cent supportingthe UDF, with a mere 2.3 per cent in the ‘others’ category. Theintensely political nature of the programme can be gleaned fromthe fact that in the state assembly election held in May 2001,the People’s Campaign was a major focus of debate. While theUDF was threatening to order a comprehensive inquiry into theimplementation of the People’s Campaign (if they won), allegingit to be a decentralisation of corruption, the LDF defended itstaunchly. LDF leaders pointed out that 45 per cent of the Keralapanchayats were ruled by the UDF (were these then also corrupt?);that the People’s Plan had led to unprecedented development,which included the construction of 3,06,288 houses, 4,13,174latrines, 17,188 km of roads and 1,725 bridges; 6.5 crore mandayshad been created that had prevented people from committingsuicides as in nearby Andhra Pradesh; moreover, as the LDF sawit, the People’s Plan was an alternative to the negative effectsof globalisation (The Hindu, May 5, Coimbatore). The highlypoliticised nature of the panchayats means that on the one handthe scrutiny of panchayat activities is very intense. On the otherhand, this scrutiny is often biased and liable to be hijacked forelectoral gains. Here, it needs to be noted that the panchayatsexist in the context of centralised political parties, which may

Table 3: The 10 Sample Grama Panchayats in Palakkad DistrictTable 3: The 10 Sample Grama Panchayats in Palakkad DistrictTable 3: The 10 Sample Grama Panchayats in Palakkad DistrictTable 3: The 10 Sample Grama Panchayats in Palakkad DistrictTable 3: The 10 Sample Grama Panchayats in Palakkad District

Name of Panchayat Block No of Villages Distance from Year of Population – 1991 Census Major Major CropsBlock Establishment Occupation

Headquarters Total Per Cent Per Cent of People(Km) S C ST

Mankara Palakkad 1 18 1961 15,946 20.5 Nil Agriculture, Paddyconstruction work, coconutanimal P ginger andprotection rubber

Mundur Palakkad 2 14 1961 25,996 15.4 Nil Agriculture, Paddy,construction work coconut,

rubberKodumbee Palakkad 2 8 1961 18,034 20.2 Nil Agriculture Paddy,

construction work coconut,Weaving banana

Pudur Attapady 2 15 1968 na na Nil Coolie, Paddy,agriculture cotton,

coconut,ginger

Agali Attapady 2 1 1957 32,738 4.3 29.0 Coolie, Seasonal,agriculture crops,

rubber,vegetables,ragi

Sholayur Attapady 2 10 na 16,491 0.8 45.8 Coolie, Groundnutagricultural labour cotton,

ragi,coconut

Nallepilly Chithur 4 3 1956 30,032 16.5 0.3 Agriculture workers, Paddylabourers sugarcane,business groundnut

Kojhiyampoona Chithur 3 3 1963 28,073 10 2.30 Agriculture workers Sugarcane,labourers,farmers coconut

cotton‘Perumatty Chithur 3 9 1963 27,693 17 6.3 Agricultural labour, na

construction workers

Thirvegapura Pithambi 1 16 1935 26,262 12.6 Nil Agricultural, Paddyconstruction workers coconut,labourers groundnut

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 2003 3843

use the panchayats, their performance and shortcomings for theirown ends. Relevant in this context are the frequent disputes thaterupted over the role of KRPs during the initial years as wellas the fact that grama sabhas were better attended in the LDF-led panchayats. Both in the case of the elected representatives,and in the case of resource persons, panchayats were composedof actors with strong allegiances to centralised political parties.

This politicisation is also illustrated in a case study of two gramapanchayats of Kerala, wherein Nair (2000) finds significantdifferences between the LDF-controlled Vithura and the UDF-controlled Nanniyode panchayats. Political control of plan ac-tivities by installing supporters and members of various func-tional bodies had been attempted by both the panchayats, butwas more conspicuous in Vithura. In fact, in Vithura, within thegrama panchayat even smaller bodies, ‘neighbourhood groups’,‘ayalkkuttams’ (50-80 neighbouring households) and ‘families’clubs’ within ayalkkuttams (about 10 neighbouring families) hadbeen formed to promote mutual help, cooperation and collectiveaction among member families. The ayalkkuttams played a decisiverole in the selection of beneficiaries, and benefits were distributedthrough the ayalkkuttams, a deviation from the standard proce-dure laid down by the SPB, justified by the panchayat committeeon the grounds that the system would prevent misuse of benefits.The grama sabha meetings of the panchayat were dominated bythe most vocal of the ayalkkuttams. Nair finds some truth in thecomplaint of villagers that many members of the ayalkkuttamcommittee had benefited themselves, as in the instance of amember who had been selected for as many as six beneficiaryprogrammes. Equally important, in both panchayats, LDFsympathisers formed the single largest group in the grama sabhas.Nair hypothesises that the political nature of the whole programmecould actually block initiative from competent voluntary workersbecause such people may not want to serve in a panchayatcontrolled by a faction other than their own, or because thePeople’s Campaign is seen as an LDF affair. However, Nair alsoconcludes that the LDF-dominated Vithura panchayat performedbetter and sees the key driving force as the president of thepanchayat, a local labour union activist who was able to buildup a strong cadre of dedicated activists.

The negative impact of intensified political rivalry was broughtout in this case study in Sholayar grama panchayat, where afteran initial argument among the two political groups, no gramasabhas were held or issues discussed. In this context, wherepolitical polarisation was such that the panchayat simply couldnot function, an important issue that arises is that of mediationof conflicts. At the grama panchayat level, many critical demo-cratic institutions such as the legislature, press and judiciary arenon-existent or very weak. Thus the important mediation offractious politics that such institutions can perform remainslimited, and decentralised bodies become more vulnerable. Interms of quality of governance, it could be argued that withdecentralisation, if gains are made by bringing planning anddecision-making closer to the people, losses are also incurredin terms of the diminishing quality of supporting institutions.This algebra is the ‘dilemma’ of decentralisation.

Also to be noted here is the number of political actors thatdemocratic decentralisation creates. There are pre-existing (stateand national) elected representatives and political parties. To thisare added a host of new panchayat representatives and in thiscase, many resource persons with strong political allegiances.As noted earlier, many MLAs remained hostile to the campaignbecause of the increasing importance of resource person, espe-cially KRPs, on the one hand and panchayat members on the

other. At many stages of the campaign, the government wasaccused of developing parallel structures of its own politicalactivists. The large number of actors can increase the pulls andpressures in different directions and make cohesive movementin any one direction even more difficult.

What happens when development administration is so intenselypoliticised? This question has special relevance for a democracy.Notably, in non-democratic regimes, even political administra-tive structures, such as the party cadres in China, are stable overtime, since governments and parties are not voted out of power.Thus policies, good or bad, are followed over a length of time.In a democracy, continuity is sought to be maintained througha bureaucracy that is expected to be relatively neutral or at leastless intensely aligned to shifting political agendas. Thoughincreasing politicisation of the bureaucracy is a fact even in theso-called ‘neutral’ system, whether this politicisation needs tobe muted or heightened is a question that needs careful consid-eration. Democratic decentralisation brings politics and admin-istration closer. On the one hand, this creates synergies. On theother hand, it can create blocks.

Staffing of PanchayatsStaffing of PanchayatsStaffing of PanchayatsStaffing of PanchayatsStaffing of Panchayats

As in the case of infrastructure, in Kerala panchayats of alllevels and especially grama panchayats are better staffed thanin many other states. Each grama panchayat of this case study

Table 4: Profile of Panchayat RepresentativesTable 4: Profile of Panchayat RepresentativesTable 4: Profile of Panchayat RepresentativesTable 4: Profile of Panchayat RepresentativesTable 4: Profile of Panchayat RepresentativesTotal number of members: 132*, Number of chairpersons: 10, Number of

vice-chairpersons for which information was available: 7

Per Cent of No of No of Vice-Total Chairpersons Chairpersons

Gender (132) (10) (7)Male 62.1 9 6Female 37.9 1 1

Caste (132) (10) (7)General 67.4 7 5S C 12.9 1 2ST 11.4 1 0Minority 8.3 1 0

Age (132) (10) (7)20-30 30.3 2 031-40 23.5 1 041-50 31.8 3 551-60 12.9 3 260 and above 1.50 1 0

Level of education (115) (9) (7)Less than upper primary 8.7 2 1Upper primary 20.9 3 2High school 62.6 4 3College 7.8 0 1

Affiliation (132) (10) (6)LDF 58.3 5 3UDF 39.4 5 3Others 2.3 0 0

Occupation (125) (10) (7)None 39.2 5 1Agriculturist 29.6 2 3Labourer 8.0 1 0Retired government servant 1.6 0 1White collar 12.0 0 0Business 9.6 2 2

Land owned (77)None 28.60-5 acres 63.65-20 acres 7.820 acres or more 0

Training received (123)Nil 17.11-5 days 65.0more than 5 days 17.9

Note: * No for which information was available is indicated in brackets.

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 20033844

had a full-time secretary, 4-7 clerks, a peon, part-time employeesand larger panchayats also had junior engineers, a staff strengththat existed before the People’s Campaign was launched, andnot reviewed subsequently. Notably, in spite of the increasedfiscal responsibilities of the panchayats, they did not have ac-countants, and this, as we have seen, had major repercussions.We have already noted that the panchayat secretaries, who couldhave provided much-needed support and coordination, werejunior employees with limited qualifications. Thus thedecentralised bodies of which so much is expected are in factorganisationally very weak.

Moreover, some panchayats faced severe problems with respectto the personnel that they did have. In Sholayar, the presentpanchayat secretary as well as his predecessor were under sus-pension, and the six persons posted in this panchayat werereported to be irregular. Similarly, the staff of the block panchayatAttapady was withdrawn in 2000, and deployed in the perfor-mance audit scheme. The staff provided subsequently is felt tobe woefully inadequate. The district panchayat has a staff of 23,with no accounts officer, and the officers remain departmentalemployees answerable to the hierarchy in the department ratherthan the district panchayat. Even where the officers are transferredto the panchayat, their postings are decided by the departmentconcerned.

Notably, the grama panchayats have no autonomy in hiringor transfer of personnel, so that if the staff is unsatisfactory, theyare unable to take action. Also, government employees are rarelykeen to report to elected functionaries, who may be less qualifiedthan them, may have little working experience and may not sharethe norms of ‘official’ working, which the employees havelearned to expect over the years. This situation can often leadto a reduced capacity to actually execute projects, as the linkbetween intention and planning on the one hand (the domainof the elected representatives) and strategy formulation andexecution (in which experts and employees are key) is weakened.One complaint in the block panchayat Attapady was that gov-ernment officials remained busy in work other than the priorityof the block panchayat, lending credence to observations suchas that of Das (1990) that decentralised governance fragmentsand disperses both political and administrative power. Addition-ally, the nature of the personnel available does not always matchthe tasks thrown up by the planning process. For example, if agrama panchayat takes up a special programme, say lift irrigation,it may not have the necessary expertise available to execute it.While the grama panchayat can fix priorities, it cannot move orhire personnel to fulfil them. In a departmental set-up, it is easierto ensure this match since employees can be transferred and evenhired as per need, for example, if special lift irrigation projectsare to be taken up in a particular area, extra engineers can betransferred accordingly.

As this paper has argued, a valuable aspect of the People’sCampaign in Kerala has been the mobilisation of a truly vastnumber of the community, in grama sabhas, as panchayat andtask force members and as resource persons in planning fordevelopment and welfare. People’s participation in the processesof planning and decision-making marks a radical shift from thebureaucrat-expert mode of functioning. However, the other sideof the coin is that if the state government has sought to do awaywith the old bureaucracy, it has acquired a new one: with theirsalaries, allowances, innumerable committee meetings, a host ofpersons are now paid by the state government. The block panchayatpays an honorarium of Rs 4,000 to the president, Rs 3,500 to

the vice-president and Rs 1,750 to each standing committeechairman and Rs 1,200 to each member per month. Additionally,a sitting allowance of Rs.200 per meeting as well as TA/DA ispaid. The elected grama panchayat members are paid a monthlystipend: Rs 3,500 for the chairperson, Rs 2,500 for the vice-chairperson, Rs 1,500 for two persons chairing important com-mittees and Rs 1,000 to each of the members. Apart from this,travel allowance, daily allowance and a sitting allowance is paidfor each meeting. These new civil servants are different fromthe old ones. They are political, and don’t need to be politicised.Their ‘selection’ depends on their capacity to win elections, noton qualifications and passing of public examinations. Poor tribalsalso see them as having taken on the faults common to bureau-cracies: in Pudur panchayat, the headman of a village complainedthat the elected ward member rarely came to the village, and whenfaced with a demand, said he would ‘look into’ the issue.

Task Forces and Expert CommitteesTask Forces and Expert CommitteesTask Forces and Expert CommitteesTask Forces and Expert CommitteesTask Forces and Expert Committees

But while understanding the panchayats as organisations, itmust be recalled that the panchayats were expected to executeprojects through task forces, to be appraised by the expertcommittees at the block and district level. Table 5 shows thatthe number of task forces in the sample grama panchayats rangedfrom 7 to 13. Each grama panchayat had more than 100 andsometimes up to 200 persons on various task forces. The numberof members in a task force was 6-23. The broad categories ofthese task forces are indicated in Table 7. Though each panchayathad its own set of task forces as per its needs, the variations wereactually very minor: for instance, one panchayat could have atask force on ‘industry and electricity’ and another on ‘energyand electricity’. As indicated in Table 6, nearly all panchayatshad task forces related to agriculture, irrigation and animalhusbandry, drinking water, housing and public works, industry,electricity and transport, committees for scheduled castes, sche-duled tribes and women, and health and education.

In each grama panchayat, more detailed information wascollected about one task force selected at random (Table 7), whichshowed that these task forces had hardly any ‘experts’ to speakof. For instance, the only ‘expertise’ with the drinking water taskforce in panchayat no 2 was two retired persons from the KeralaState Electricity Board, the rest of the task force being composedof agriculturists, coolies and business persons. In the educationtask group in panchayat no 3, expertise consisted of six schoolteachers, and so on. Running down the composition of selectedtask forces in Table 7, it can be seen that the task forces hadbeen able to tap existing expertise within the village in a sporadicway. Members of the task forces included doctors, retired gov-ernment officers, teachers, social workers, farmers and the like.But the task forces were not credible as the kind of group/

Table 5: Structure of Task Forces of Grama SabhaTable 5: Structure of Task Forces of Grama SabhaTable 5: Structure of Task Forces of Grama SabhaTable 5: Structure of Task Forces of Grama SabhaTable 5: Structure of Task Forces of Grama Sabha

Name of Panchayat No of Task No of Members in Task ForcesForces Total Range

Mankara 7 124 11-29Mundur 10 166 7-23Kodumbee 13 106 6-13Pudur 8 Not available Not availableAgali 9 Not available Not availableSholayur Not availableNallepilly 11 158 10-20Kojhiyampoona 13 134 9-14Perumatty 8 102 8-17Thirvegapura 12 200 12-20

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 2003 3845

organisation that can prepare executable projects. The compo-sition was erratic, to say the least. While the task forces had beenable to tap some available expertise, it was not guaranteed thatthey had the capacity to make good projects envisaged by thegrama sabha. This was exacerbated by the sporadic nature oftraining that these task forces received: sometimes no trainingand sometimes as short orientation. Against this background, thecontinuous problems in preparing projects that the gramapanchayats have had are not surprising.

Pointing to the same problem, Nair in his case study commentsthat the panchayats had difficulties in finalising plans and projectreports on time, and shortage of experienced and competentresource persons and task force volunteers was a serious handi-cap. In the UDF-controlled Nanniyode, this problem was moreacute than in the LDF-controlled Vithura. When 26 persons fromamong panchayat committee members, resource persons andactivists were asked why no original or innovative programmewas included in the annual plans, 14 did not give any answer.From among those who did, the majority view was that schemeswere picked up from the planning board’s shelf, as these werelikely to be easily approved by the BLEC and the DPC.

This raises again the whole question of systematically deve-loping expertise at the grass roots for decentralisation. At present,Das’s words, “The kind of support systems and expertise envi-saged at the gram, block and district panchayats under the people’sprogramme could not be provided” seem appropriate. An un-comfortable, but necessary, question that arises is: is there reallyadequate expertise of all kinds available within the panchayats?Obviously, this question cannot be answered without investiga-tion, and such an investigation is an important facet ofdecentralisation. In Kerala, the tacit assumption appears to havebeen that adequate expertise does exist, and the issue is reallyis of organising and tapping it, which the People’s Campaignattempted, and to some extent succeeded in doing. However, themuch more likely possibility, that there may be vacuums in manypanchayats for several kinds of expertise, raises very differentissues. How then is relevant expertise to be provided to thepanchayats? This is a critical question for the process ofdecentralisation in general. As the number of planning andexecuting agencies multiply with decentralisation, and theseagencies want to take on more complex projects, the urgencyof this question will grow. A very vital question is thrown uphere for manpower development.

To turn to the expert committees responsible for appraisal, theblock-level expert committee rejected a few projects last yearon the grounds that more projects than mandated had been

received for general category as against SC/ST. Otherwise, theBLEC approved the grama panchayat schemes. Here, the roleplayed by the BLEC seems to have been more in the nature ofenforcement of rules rather than technical scrutiny and guidance.The district panchayat too is aided by an expert committee, whichin turn has several subcommittees for roads, buildings, education,health, agriculture and animal husbandry and industry. Theconvenor of these subcommittees is usually the district officerin charge, such as the chief medical officer for the subcommitteeon health. Other members included retired officers and localexperts. Importantly, as far as technical expertise is concerned,resources at the district level are the strongest: yet the gramapanchayats access these only for scrutiny and appraisal, not assupport to formulate projects. Though the grama panchayats arethe important agencies for development, preparation and execu-tion of projects, they do so with the help of under-qualified taskforces. Qualified personnel available at the district level merelyappraise these projects. This illustrates that decentralisation cancreate a distance between points in the system where technicalexpertise is available and the points at which projects are con-ceived, framed and executed. This is highlighted in Kerala’s case,where there was swift devolution from the state to the gramapanchayat, with little mediation by the block and district level.This took place in a context where technical expertise wasavailable at central points – the state and the district. It is a matterof concern here that while on the one hand accelerated deve-lopment through decentralisation requires more expertise, on theother, available expertise within government may be utilised less.

All in all, the task forces and expert committees inspire littleconfidence that they will provide innovative solutions to complexproblems. They are ill-equipped to undertake the rigorous workthat is required for accelerated development. Clearly, simplyforming committees and task forces does not in itself createresource support. Developing adequate expertise at the grass rootsis a task that needs to be thought through in much greater detail.

What Do the Panchayats Do?What Do the Panchayats Do?What Do the Panchayats Do?What Do the Panchayats Do?What Do the Panchayats Do?

In 2000-01, in the 10 sample grama panchayats, grama sabhaswere found to have been convened 2-5 times, except for Sholayargrama panchayat. In this panchayat, which simply did not func-tion in the manner envisaged, there appears to have been nomechanism to redress the situation. This raises serious issues ofthe accountability of the grama panchayats. The grama panchayatsare expected to function in the best interests of the people: yetsometimes they do not. Protection against such breakdowns exists

Table 6: Functions Performed by Task ForcesTable 6: Functions Performed by Task ForcesTable 6: Functions Performed by Task ForcesTable 6: Functions Performed by Task ForcesTable 6: Functions Performed by Task Forces

Names of Task Forces Functions No of Panchayatsin which Existing

Agriculture, irrigation and animal husbandry, Irrigation Supply seeds, fertilisers, irrigation facilities, insurance for crops, loans to 9joint sector, animal protection, milk development farmers, storage of water through contours, planting trees.and fisheries, watershedDrinking water, health and social welfare Construction of water tank, taps 8Housing, roads and housing, public works Construction of houses, repair, development of roads, tarring, etc. 9Industry and electricity, energy and electricity, energy Electrification, street light, employment generation 7and transport industryWomen’s development Training for women, micro – entrepreneurship 9SC/ST committee, ST development, social welfare Education of SC people, modern equipment to village craftsmen, electrification

of houses, loans 9Education, education and health, health, education and culture Supply of equipment, tuition to high school students, construction of hospitals 7Culture tourism Give enjoyment to village people, art clubs, training in sports 1Anganwadi Supply nutrition 1Wildlife protection Not available 1

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 20033846

for centralised governments through the institutions of the leg-islature, judiciary and the press. For the grama panchayat, theexpectation is that the grama sabha will build this pressure. Butthe grama sabha lacks the skills and organisation that theseinstitutions possess to perform their specific functions. Thismeans that the processes of the grama panchayats, of deliberation,planning and execution do not enjoy the sort of scrutiny that theprocesses of centralised governments do: a scrutiny that providesan impetus for the evolution and growth of these processes, andthe closeness to the people that decentralised bodies enjoy isoffset by poor institutional mechanisms.

The issues that were discussed in most of the panchayats wererelated to drinking water, housing and electricity, i e, people’sbasic needs. A small number of panchayats also discussed roadsand transport, agriculture, public health, education, SC/ST andwomen’s welfare. This choice of topics has certain implicationsfor the efficacy of grama panchayats as agencies for developmentplanning. Expectedly and logically, the primary concern of thegrama panchayats is people’s basic needs, whether they have aroof over their head, and whether they have water and electricity.Consequently, in their projects and schemes, the grama panchayatsattended to the most immediate needs of the people. Clearly, atthe village level, sensitivity and motivation to deal with basicneeds exists, which is dissipated by centralisation, as people areseen as facts and figures. When the strategies to deal with theseare simple (such as, provision of housing), high motivationmarried to adequate capacity results in effective action. Thepotential of the grama panchayats to deal with issues related tothe basic needs of people seems to be very good indeed.

What is not clear is, are they equally effective for long-termdevelopment planning? The evidence does not seem to indicatethis. It is not clear if the pressures that compel panchayats toaddress people’s basic needs also work for longer term projects.And this is not only an issue of motivation and setting priorities,but also of the capacity of the grama panchayats to deal withproblems. For example, some of the members of the gramapanchayats interviewed during the case study admitted to beingbewildered and puzzled about the possible future measures toreduce unemployment, combat falling agricultural prices andpromote industry, though they did view them as major issues.The falling prices of cash crops was the most burning issue atthe time of the study; yet decentralisation did not appear to bean answer to it. There is a need, therefore, to define moreaccurately the limits of grama panchayats along with their potential.This is important, as the ‘decentralisation’ of problems beyondthe capacities of the panchayats means that these are neveraddressed.

What the panchayats can and can’t do needs to be viewed inthe context of their technical and administrative capacities. Table 8indicates the projects undertaken by the panchayats in five broad

areas: agriculture, drinking water, communication, education andhealth. As may be seen the activities are rather simple: in ag-riculture, seeds, fertilisers and insecticide had been supplied, andloans given; one panchayat had provided a ‘production bonus’;on the positive side, one panchayat had built check dams, onehad undertaken lift irrigation projects and one a biogas project.For drinking water, panchayats had dug wells and tubewells aswell as laid pipelines. Six panchayats had constructed new roadsand six had repaired old ones; one panchayat had attempted toimprove the transportation system. In education, five panchayatshad supplied equipment to schools; five had undertaken one ormore construction and repair projects; one had provided financialassistance for lunch to students below the poverty line and onehad provided fees for tuition to students from underprivilegedbackgrounds. In health also, supply of equipment and construc-tion were the major activities. In the same vein, the most majorscheme of the block panchayat is construction of houses, alongwith centrally sponsored schemes such as the EmploymentGuarantee Scheme. Other activities include supply of milk cansto a local milk society, provision of a refrigerator to the localPHC, as well as provision of seed capital to set up a canteenwhich in turn gives employment to local self-help women’sgroups. The future schemes of the block panchayat include:purchase of land for housing for the rural poor; additionalassistance for housing and establishment of women’s self-helpgroups for cottage industry activities.

Table 7: Details of a Task Force Selected from each Grama SabhaTable 7: Details of a Task Force Selected from each Grama SabhaTable 7: Details of a Task Force Selected from each Grama SabhaTable 7: Details of a Task Force Selected from each Grama SabhaTable 7: Details of a Task Force Selected from each Grama Sabha

Name No of Composition No of Persons WhoMembers Received Training

Drinking water 10 1 doctor, 2 small saving agents, 5 agriculturists, 1 businessman 1 (on people’s planning)Drinking water 9 2 retired persons from KSEB, 2 agriculturists, 3 coolies, 2 business persons Not availableEducation 8 6 teachers, 1 social worker, 9 no profession 2 (1 month training at KILA)Industry and electricity 13 6 coolies, 1 social activist, 1 KSEB worker, 8 agriculturists 13 (1-day training)Housing 13 2 elected members, 1 VEO, 1 farmer, 9 coolies 13 (7 days’ training on housing issues)Agriculture 12 1 business, 8 agriculturists, 3 agricultural labourers, all interested in social work 12 (in SC/ST development)Agriculture 11 All farmers NilAgriculture 13 10 farmers, 1 teacher, 1 social worker, 1 party member Not availableAgriculture 20 1 retired agriculture officer, 1 agriculture officer, 2 anganwadi workers, 15 farmers, 1 teacher Nil

Table 8: Activities of PanchayatsTable 8: Activities of PanchayatsTable 8: Activities of PanchayatsTable 8: Activities of PanchayatsTable 8: Activities of Panchayats

Sector Activity No of Panchayatsthat Took It Up

Agriculture Supply of seeds, fertilisers, insecticide, etc 4Built check dams 1Completed irrigation projects 1Lift irrigation schemes 1Production bonus 1Biogas 1Group farming 1Loan 2

Drinking water Dug wells and tube-wells 4Constructed water tanks 1Provided taps 2Laid pipelines 4Cleaning of well 1

Communication New roads 6Repair of roads 6Improved transportation 3

Education Supply of equipment 5Construction and repair 5Financial assistance for lunch to studentsbelow poverty line 1Special tuition to school students fromdeprived groups 1

Health Supply of equipment 5Construction of building, toilets and water supply 6

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 2003 3847

In his case study of two grama panchayats, Gopinathan Nairinvestigated the development reports formulated by the twopanchayats for the Ninth Plan. He found that the two panchayatshad identified strikingly similar areas of development: increasingagricultural production, protecting the area under paddy culti-vation which has been steadily declining, promoting industrialactivity and improving medical, drinking water, road transportfacilities and preventing the fall in educational standards. The closesimilarity between the development reports of the two panchayatsmakes him question the idea of local specific planning. In the1997-98 annual plans, the panchayats appeared to pick andchoose from the shelves of model schemes given in the numeroushandbooks brought out by the SPB. None of the projects appearedto have been formulated by the grama sabhas, and they appearedto have had little inclination or expertise to evaluate variousprogrammes critically and choose the most suitable ones.

Two themes that run through the projects and activities un-dertaken by the panchayats emerge. First of all, panchayats areconcerned with the basic needs of the people. This is highlydesirable, in itself. But it also means that projects that movebeyond these may remain limited. Second, their projects tendto be simple, and are built around activities such as distributionof assets and construction. This is not a negative per se. A projectdoes not have to be innovative to be useful, and many of theneeded activities are in fact simple: wells need to be dug, schoolsneed repair, hospitals need supplies, and so on. Since the antennaeof the panchayats on such basic issues is sharper and theirmotivation much higher than that of centralised bureaucracies,they undertake these projects with more enthusiasm and vigour.The danger arises in the assumption that the local bodies canalso solve very complex problems such as that of prices ofagricultural produce. As we have seen, they simply do not havethe substantial complex organisational support that such strategicthinking requires.

The district panchayat has aimed for at least some more ambitiousprojects, forming a Palakkad Small Hydro Company, on the basisof an idea mooted by and with technical support from theIntegrated Rural Technology Centre (IRTC), described brieflyin the next section. This company will produce electricity andsell it to the Kerala Electricity Board, which in turn will supplyelectricity in the area. The district panchayat has also got IRTCto study the fish marketing system and assess the possibilitiesfor infrastructure development and hygienic marketing of fish.Additionally, a project to set up a software technology park isin the offing, which will provide service to a number of privateagencies and offer outstation dial-up facility. However, the expertsat IRTC did not think very highly of the project, viewing it moreas an outcome of the current fascination with information tech-nology rather than rigorous research and planning. And this isa danger that the more ambitious local bodies could succumbto. To consider resource support to panchayats, we shall takea look at IRTC, which has supported the more innovative projectsof the district panchayat.

The Integrated Rural Technology Centre, supported by theextensive network of KSSP, is located in Mundur village nearPalakkad. A resource centre for rural development, it has aworkforce of 70 specialists in a wide range of disciplines suchas engineering, agricultural science, microbiology, economicsand sociology among others. On the campus of this institute, onecan glimpse mushroom cultivation, pig breeding, rabbits im-ported from various parts of the world and bred to suit localconditions, a factory to make local sandalwood soap, and many

others. These research and manufacturing units form a constel-lation which is unusual, because it follows the logic of localtechnological needs instead of being a model adopted along thelines of pre-existing academic disciplines and organisations. Yetit takes full advantage of the expertise that exists through itshighly qualified faculty. The institute is funded partly by a grantfrom the state government and partly through consultancies andsponsored projects it conducts.

Many grama panchayats have come to IRTC for advice andassistance in solving their technical problems: solid wastemanagement, resource mapping, watershed development, in-come generating activities for women, coastal zone management,small hydro development, energy conservation, training forwomen’s empowerment. The SPB has entrusted it with varioustraining programmes particularly in education, energy andwatershed development. IRTC continues to develop models forparticipatory planning in five panchayats, with emphasis on microlevel institutes of a participatory nature.

The scope of this case study does not allow an assessment ofthe strengths and weaknesses of an institution such as the IRTCfor supporting panchayats. But some hypothesising is possible. Ashas been noted earlier, IRTC has broken away from the conven-tional academic and research structure that cuts off many tech-nical institutes from the real developmental needs of the people.Simultaneously, recognition is given to the place of knowledge,experimentation and scientific methods for evolving strategies. Itthus attempts to marry expertise with need, an issue that is centralto the functioning of the panchayats. Such institutes as resourcesupport mechanisms may well be a good complement to de-centralisation. However, at present, this or other institutes of asimilar calibre can reach out only to a small number of local bodies.In this case study, except for the district panchayat, no other localbody had systematic contact with a resource centre or a systemto ensure a regular flow of information on developmental issues.For continuous and substantial resource support to panchayats,a much wider network to support their activities will be needed.

During the case study, financial details were sought from thegrama panchayats about revenue, plans and expenditure. To begin

Table 9: Reasons for System to ContinueTable 9: Reasons for System to ContinueTable 9: Reasons for System to ContinueTable 9: Reasons for System to ContinueTable 9: Reasons for System to Continue

Reasons No Percentage of PercentageAnswers of of Total

Those Wanting the AnswersSystem of Continue

General good, works well 22 33.3 24.7Development works undertaken 18 27.3 20.2Good for poor people, SC/STs 6 9.1 6.7Good for local people 7 10.6 7.9Appropriate beneficiary selection 5 7.6 5.6Decentralisation of power,people understand scheme 3 4.5 3.4Reduces exploitation 2 3.0 2.2Reduces corruption 2 3.0 2.2Benefited personally 1 1.5 1.1

Table 10: Reasons for System not to ContinueTable 10: Reasons for System not to ContinueTable 10: Reasons for System not to ContinueTable 10: Reasons for System not to ContinueTable 10: Reasons for System not to Continue

Reasons No Percentage of PercentageAnswers of Those of TotalNot Wanting the Answers

System to Continue

Real benefit 11 47.8 12.4Politically based favouritism 6 26.1 6.7Benefit to self 5 21.7 5.6Schemes failed 1 4.3 1.1Total 23 25.8

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 20033848

with, it was amazingly difficult to get these details. As has alreadybeen pointed out, the panchayats have no accountants and thepanchayat secretaries and presidents often betrayed a great dealof confusion about their own accounts. Consequently, reliabledata on the finances of the panchayats could not be obtained,and a detailed comment on panchayat finances is not attempted.But three general points can be noted. First, in most panchayats,a huge difference exists between planned and actual expenditure.A major reason for this is the paucity of funds actually released,and the fact that these became available only in March. Second,even though the funds available to the panchayats increasedmanifold, the financial and accounting expertise available to themdid not. For any organisation, elected or otherwise, this is anunhappy situation and adversely affects its capacity to manageits own affairs with accountability. The final point concerns theincreased expenditure on panchayat infrastructure as well ashonoraria and allowances of various kinds, a detailed study ofwhich is required to determine its cost effectiveness.

People’s OpinionPeople’s OpinionPeople’s OpinionPeople’s OpinionPeople’s Opinion

An attempt was made in the case study to elicit the opinionof 10 people in each grama panchayat about the process.3 Thenumber of male and female interviewees was even across thepanchayats, 30.9 per cent persons interviewed belonged to thescheduled castes, 11.6 per cent to scheduled tribes and 5.2 percent to minorities. Of the interviewees 45.4 per cent were LDFsympathisers, 23.7 per cent UDF sympathisers and the rest wereeither neutral or sympathisers of some third party. Thus in thesample, 70 per cent persons were either UDF or LDF sympathisers,an indication, once again, of the centrality of these two politicalfactions in the state.

Of the people interviewed 29 per cent had received assistancethrough the agency of the grama panchayat. They had receivedloans, grants for housing, latrines, electrification, seeds, waterand animals. Two persons were found to have received morethan one benefit: one person in Mundur panchayat had receivedfour benefits. When asked if there was bias in the selection ofbeneficiaries, 29 out of 97 interviewees said there was favouritismin beneficiary selection along political or family lines, or both,and four were not willing to comment. It would be fair to concludethat around a third of those interviewed thought that there wasfavouritism in beneficiary selection.

On the whole, the verdict on the panchayats was favourable.When the interviewees were asked whether the system shouldcontinue, an overwhelming majority of 70.1 per cent wanted thesystem to continue, 25.8 per cent did not want it to continue andthe rest did not comment. Each interviewee was also asked why,after he or she had answered. To this, some interviewees gaveno answer while others gave more than one. The reasons givenfor the system to continue are listed in Table 9 and the reasonsfor not continuing in Table 10. Many people gave a somewhatunclear response, such as the system being ‘generally good’ orwith ‘no real benefit’. But when a specific answer was given,a large proportion of the answers were concerned with whetheror not development works such as provision of drinking waterwere taken up. Thus in ‘reasons to continue’, the modal reason(excluding ‘generally good’) was about development works beingundertaken. However, if one clubs together equity-related reasonssuch as “good for poor people/SC/ST/locals, reduces exploita-tion”, 34.8 per cent of the responses fall in this category asagainst 20.2 per cent in the ‘development works undertaken’

category. Among those who did not want the system to continue,the modal reason was that there was ‘no real benefit’. While this isnot very clear, it does lend itself to the interpretation that panchayatswere perceived as being no different from centralised bodies.Where specific reasons for not wanting the system to continuewere given, 26 per cent (but only 6.7 per cent of the total answers)concerned political bias and favouritism of the grama panchayats.And 21.7 per cent were simply that the interviewee had notbenefited himself or herself: not got a house, animal, etc.

The positive and negative aspects of the system as stated bythose interviewed are in Tables 11 and 12. When the intervieweeswere asked to state the positive aspects of the system, 59.5 percent (38.3 per cent of total answers) answers were concernedwith development works done. Another 4.2 per cent (2.7 per centof total) concerned the loans given. Equity-related issues suchas people’s participation, fair beneficiary selection and reductionof exploitation were mentioned less often – they comprised 29.8per cent answers (20.6 per cent of total answers); 6.3 per centanswers concerned the nature of panchayats as administrativeagencies such as panchayats being aware of local needs, reductionof corruption and quick action. In the negative aspects of thesystem, the interviewee’s personal problems not being resolvedtopped the list (42.3 per cent of negative aspects but only 13.7 percent of total) followed by development works not being under-taken (38.5 per cent of negative aspects and 13.7 per cent of total);11.5 per cent of the answers (4.1 per cent of total) concernedpolitical bias and panchayat members looking to their own benefits.

A picture that emerges is that when people assess the panchayats,they do so in terms of whether or not the local bodies improvetheir living conditions. For instance, if one looks at how thepositive and negative aspects of the system have been viewed,54.7 per cent of the answers are concerned with whether develop-ment works were executed or not executed and loans given.Another 15.1 per cent concern personal issues such as applica-tions for loan having been rejected. Thus 69.8 per cent of thepositive and negative aspects of the system stated by the inter-

Table 11: Positive Aspects of the SystemTable 11: Positive Aspects of the SystemTable 11: Positive Aspects of the SystemTable 11: Positive Aspects of the SystemTable 11: Positive Aspects of the System

Reasons No of Percentage PercentageAnswers of Positive of Total

Aspects

Development works done 28 59.5 38.3Loans given 2 4.2 2.7Fair selection of beneficiaries 3 6.4 4.1Reduces exploitation 3 6.4 4.1Poor people benefit 1 2.1 1.4People’s participation 7 14.9 9.6Reduces corruption 1 2.1 1.4Panchayat aware of needs 1 2.1 1.4Quick action 1 2.1 1.4Total 47 64.4

Table 12: Negative Aspects of the SystemTable 12: Negative Aspects of the SystemTable 12: Negative Aspects of the SystemTable 12: Negative Aspects of the SystemTable 12: Negative Aspects of the System

Reasons No of Percentage PercentageAnswers of Negative of Total

Aspects

Development works not done;no benefit to people 10 38.5 13.7Schemes have failed 2 7.7 2.7Political bias 1 3.8 1.4Panchayat members looking toown benefit 2 7.7 2.7Personal issues not sorted out 11 42.3 15.1Total 26 35.6

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 2003 3849

viewee are concerned with whether problems of day-to-day livingare solved, whether development works are taken up etc. Notsurprisingly, in Pudur grama panchayat, people were not satisfied:they wanted a solution to their poverty, which had not beenforthcoming. Equity issues also matter, especially fair beneficiaryselection and benefit to poor people, but take second place tobasic needs issues.

These concerns are reflected amply in the plans and activitiesof the grama panchayats: people are concerned most about theirbasic needs, and grama panchayats have attempted to addressthese, the most notable example being the focus on housing. Thissuggests that panchayats, as they are close the people, are affecteda great deal by what the people think and want. Consequently,grama panchayats perform well as far as social welfare and basicneeds issues go. But a similar public pressure may not build upfor more long-term projects. The capacity of these agencies tomobilise resources, especially through taxes, may also need tobe examined in this light.

What is clear is that public support to panchayats will beforthcoming only if they perform well – if they are able to executedevelopment works and assist people in meeting their basic needs.This brings us back to the issue of the technical and administrativecapacity of the panchayats. If the capacity of the panchayats toformulate and execute projects remains weak, they will ceaseto have public support. An important corollary here is that forthe success of decentralised governance, the technical and ad-ministrative capacity of local bodies is a central issue.

The perceived faults of the panchayats are bias and favouritism.The fluidity of boundaries among applicants, committee mem-bers, elected representatives and sanctioning authorities makethis likely and even inevitable. But these faults are offset by afair number of perceptions of the panchayats being pro-poor andpeople-friendly. Thus the sensitivity of the panchayats to thepeople’s needs plays out both ways: the panchayats are con-cerned, but sometimes biased.

Looking AheadLooking AheadLooking AheadLooking AheadLooking Ahead

As the story of Kerala’s decentralisation develops, in other partsof the country too, after the 73rd and 74th Amendments, the focuson decentralisation sharpens. It is worthwhile to ask, what doesthe experience of the People’s Campaign mean for India?

The public discourse on development that the People’s Cam-paign has fostered in Kerala is relevant for the whole countryand is indeed the essence of decentralisation. The process ofplanning that the state government stimulated in Kerala is a farcry from the mere delegation of powers and responsibilities thathas often gone in the name of ‘decentralisation’. The People’sCampaign has offered a new paradigm for participatory planningby stimulating a public discourse on development, and this givesmeaning to the process of decentralisation. But here it is importantto acknowledge the high literacy and awareness levels in Keralathat provide meaning to this exercise. Noticeable also is thesupport provided by committed voluntary organisations, espe-cially the KSSP. These are ‘contexts’ that all states may haveto create for effective decentralisation.

The urban-like settlement pattern of Kerala and the large sizeof the grama panchayats has to be kept in mind as the Keralaexperience is extrapolated to other states. Caution is needed ininterpreting the learning from Kerala for areas such as MadhyaPradesh, that are poorly connected by road, with grama panchayatsof merely 1000 people or so. We have seen that the negative

aspect of decentralisation is fragmentation: of human and finan-cial resources. The grama panchayats in Kerala correspond tothe size of ‘mandals’ in some states, and around 20 villages orso in others. While the grama panchayat was the key agency inKerala, in other states, the ‘right size’ may be located in otherunits. This remains an area of work: what is the ‘right size’ ina state, looking to the topography and availability of humanresources.

The Kerala experience highlights the critical role of stategovernments in getting the panchayats going. If panchayats areto make plans, then a host of facilitative strategies need to beput in place by state governments: orientation, capacity building,forums for discussion, advisory bodies, financial guidelines andthe like. But as this is done, caution has to be exercised intransplanting the process of planning as centralised governmentsknow it, on to the panchayats. In this paper, the argument hasbeen made that the most critical aspect of planning by local bodiesis the formulation of strategies, solutions and projects, notcollection of data, filling up of formats and report writing.Extreme caution is to be exercised before panchayats are bur-dened with unrewarding paper work, which they may not be goodat, and which may actually shift attention away from the realissues. Thus, what constitutes planning is a question that isimmediately relevant.

We have seen that decentralisation does not automaticallyupgrade technical and other expertise of an area. New energiesare certainly unleashed, but the task of translating these intostrategies is far more complex. In this context, the role of resourceinstitutions to support panchayats for development should notbe under-rated. If one of the expected fruits of decentralisationis accelerated development, then new strategies to address issuesof development have to be developed and evolved continuously.Consequently, decentralisation requires a much wider networkof resource institutions than exists today. Moreover, the natureof the resource institutions has to be deliberated upon carefully.Many resource institutions in the country remain cut off fromthe people and their problems. Research on strategies for develop-ment is scarce and poorly disseminated. It is indeed rare for alocal body to be aware of the pros and cons of the solutions theychoose and the projects they make, and to learn from what hasbeen tried in the past. Here, national and state governments havean important role to play.

The Kerala experience shows very clearly that decentralisationdemands major professional upgradation. Even in a state suchas Kerala, where literacy and government facilities are superiorto those of other states, the lack of technical, administrative andfinancial know-how of the local bodies was a major bottleneck.All over India, village level workers, and the panchayat secre-taries in Kerala are an example, have been recruited on the premisethat they would perform relatively simple tasks in schemes andprogrammes that are pre-designed centrally. But with de-centralisation, the expectations from village-level functionarieschange radically. Consequently, the qualifications required, salarystructure, etc, of the village level functionaries need to shiftaccordingly. As yet, we know little about the best possibleorganisational support for the optimal functioning of local bodies– whether they function best with a small permanent staff or themore fluid task forces, in which areas they require technicalexpertise most, and so on.

Decentralisation makes enormous demands, and administra-tive restructuring is essential to meet this. Here, an importantfeature is that the financial systems may need to be transformed

Economic and Political Weekly September 6, 20033850

radically. The tasks of matching revenue receipts with expen-diture, smooth flow of funds and financial accountability of localbodies acquire new and complex dimensions. For any state, itwould be short-sighted to embark on the process of decentralisationwithout a thorough review of these issues. Moreover, at leastsome of these facilitative changes should be made before signi-ficant funds devolve to local bodies. In fact, as the various crisesthat the People’s Campaign encountered show, to decentralisewithout these changes is to create situations that can makedecentralisation ineffective. Thus ‘sudden’ decentralisationthrough a few government orders is not much of an option: itmerely produces confusion and leads to deterioration in thequality of governance. A time period of one to two years ofplanning and restructuring is unavoidable.

Tied to the issue of technical and managerial expertise of localbodies are the tasks they perform well, and those that they donot. Local bodies show sensitivity to people’s basic needs andwelfare in a manner that centralised bureaucracies do not, andthese issues should certainly be in their domain. But their capacityto take on technically demanding projects will be limited by thetechnical expertise that they can tap. Quite clearly the panchayatscannot access the human resources that state and national govern-ments can. Their very responsiveness to people’s needs may bea handicap here. In the worst case scenario, ‘decentralisation’of problems that local bodies simply do not have the capacityto resolve is not very different from abdication of responsibility.If what the decentralised bodies do well is to be articulated, whatthey do not do well also has to be spelt out.

Decentralisation involves not just the articulation of rights andresponsibilities of local bodies, but also those of state govern-ments. As we have seen, state governments continue to be keyin facilitating decentralisation. How they decentralise, and thesupport and the opportunities they provide, determines the qualityof the process. Moreover, state-level macro policies can becomefar more complex as these are formulated in the context ofnumerous micro initiatives. A continuous dialogue is, of course,key. But it also needs to be recognised that with decentralisationthe role of the state governments does not ‘shrink’, but changes,and sometimes becomes more complex. If governance is toimprove and development accelerate, it is unlikely that lesscapacity will be needed at any level, at least in the short run.As was seen in the case of the financial systems in Kerala, thecapacities at the state level may also need to be upgraded.Moreover, in the context of decentralisation, state governmentsmay need to articulate their own role more clearly.

As the domains of various tiers of panchayats and those ofstate governments are sketched out more clearly, some heartburnis likely. All elected bodies like to implement populist programmes,for obvious reasons. Would the more centralised governmentsbe satisfied confining themselves to capacity-building, coordi-nation, facilitation and projects that require a high degree oftechnical skills and long gestation periods? The frequent reversalsof decentralisation over the past few decades would pointotherwise. As the Indian polity accommodates an ever-increasingnumber of political actors, will a coherence of direction becomeeven more difficult? Will there be antagonism among theseveral layers of government (especially when they supportdifferent political parties), or will these be able to complementeach other?

We have seen that contrary to hopes that decision-making inlocal bodies might be easy, the panchayats are in fact veryvulnerable to fractious politics, to the extent that they can ‘breakdown’ or cease to function at all. One reason why such

fractiousness arises is that panchayats function in political sys-tems that are centralised. To the extent that the larger politicalsystems continue to use, or are seen to use, local bodies for theirown interests, this fractiousness will continue and debilitate thepanchayats. Here it needs to be mentioned that to politicise alongparty lines resource persons and implementation committeesof local bodies is to blunt their instruments for the battle ofdevelopment.

Fractiousness in panchayats also ensues because institutionsat the grass roots to mediate disputes and facilitate a constructivediscourse are often weak. There is no legislature, the press andjudiciary are at a distance. There is only the grama sabha. Doesa grama sabha substitute for these institutions, which have highlyevolved ways of functioning? Or in other words, can de-centralisation substitute for institutions? The Kerala experienceleads us to believe otherwise. How policy is made and imple-mented is not simply a function of where and by whom this isdone. Critical players in this exercise are the institutions thatsupport and scrutinise these activities. For effective de-centralisation, the development of such institutions at the grassroots is indeed a crucial and challenging problem.

Address for correspondence:rashmisb2001@hotmail.com

NotesNotesNotesNotesNotes

[I am grateful to the National Institute of Administrative Research forsupporting this case study.]

1 In this election, the LDF won 585 of 966 grama panchayats while theUDF got 367 [Das 2000].

2 The grama sabha met separately in each ward.3 In grama panchayat Sholayar only seven persons could be interviewed.

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