13694cv Keelingv.Hars

In the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

AUGUSTTERM2014

No.13694cv

JAIMEKEELING,PlaintiffCounterDefendantAppellee,

v.

EVEHARS,

DefendantAppellant,

NEWROCKTHEATERPRODUCTIONS,LLC,ANEWYORKLIMITEDLIABILITYCOMPANY,

DefendantCounterClaimant,

ETHANGARBER,Defendant.*

AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork

No.1:10cv9345ThomasP.Griesa,Judge

*TheClerkofCourtisdirectedtoamendtheofficialcaptioninthiscase

toconformwiththeabove.

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SUBMITTED:JUNE26,2015DECIDED:OCTOBER30,2015

Before:CABRANES,LIVINGSTON,andDRONEY,CircuitJudges.

Theprimaryquestionpresented iswhetheranunauthorizedwork that makes fair use of its source material may itself beprotectedbycopyright.

We hold, for substantially the reasons stated by theUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(ThomasP.Griesa, Judge), that, if thecreatorofanunauthorizedworkstayswithin the bounds of fair use and adds sufficient originality, shemayclaimprotectionunder theCopyrightAct,17U.S.C.103, forheroriginalcontributions. Wealsorejectdefendantschallengestothe District Courts jury charge. The District CourtsJanuary11,2013judgmentisthereforeAFFIRMED.

STEVENPARADISE,Vinson&ElkinsLLP,NewYork,NY,forPlaintiffCounterDefendantAppellee.EVEHARS,prose,LosAngeles,CA,forDefendantAppellant.

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JOSA.CABRANES,CircuitJudge:

Theprimaryquestionpresented iswhetheranunauthorizedwork that makes fair use of its source material may itself beprotectedbycopyright.

We hold, for substantially the reasons stated by theUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(ThomasP.Griesa, Judge), that, if thecreatorofanunauthorizedworkstayswithin the bounds of fair use and adds sufficient originality, shemayclaimprotectionunder theCopyrightAct,17U.S.C.103, forheroriginalcontributions. Wealsorejectdefendantschallengestothe District Courts jury charge. The District CourtsJanuary11,2013judgmentisthereforeAFFIRMED.

BACKGROUND

PlaintiffAppellee JaimeKeeling is the author ofPointBreakLive! (PBL), a parody stage adaptation of the 1991 HollywoodactionmoviePointBreak,starringKeanuReevesandPatrickSwayze.Inthefilm,ReevesplaysarookieFBIagentwhogoesundercovertoinfiltrateagangofbankrobbingsurfers ledbySwayzescharacter.TheKeelingauthoredPBLparodyparallels thecharactersandplotelements fromPointBreakandreliesalmostexclusivelyonselecteddialoguefromthescreenplay. Tothisrawmaterial,Keelingaddedjokes,props,exaggeratedstaging,andhumorous theatricaldevicesto transform the dramatic plot and dialogue of the film into an

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irreverent, interactive theatrical experience. For example, inKeelings PBL parody, Point Breaks deathdefying scene in whichReevesscharactermustpickupbricks,blindfolded,inaswimmingpool takesplace, instead, in a kiddiepool. Massivewaves in thefilm are replaced by squirt guns in the PBL parody. A centralconceit of the PBL parody is that the Keanu Reeves character isselectedatrandom from theaudienceandreadshis lines fromcuecards, thereby lampooningReevess reputedly stiltedperformancein the movie. Keeling added to the effect that the audience waswatchingthemakingofthefilmbycreatingasetoffilmproductioncharactersinthePBLparody,includingadirector,cinematographer,andproductionassistants.KeelingpossessesnocopyrightorlicensewithregardtothePointBreakmotionpicture.

DefendantAppellantEveHars,proceedingpro seonappeal,owns production company New Rock Theater Productions, LLC(NewRock). In2007,Keeling executedaproductionagreementwithHars,pursuanttowhichNewRockwouldstageatwomonthproduction run of PBL from October through December 2007.During that time period, Hars conferred with an entertainmentattorney and the holder of the copyright to the HollywoodscreenplayforPointBreak,andeventuallyHarscametobelievethatKeelingdid not lawfully own any rights to thePBL parody play.Accordingly, after its initial twomonth run, Hars sought torenegotiate the terms of the contract upon its expiration and, ineffect,continuetoproducePBLwithoutfurtherpaymenttoKeeling.Keeling refused renegotiation, threatened suit, and registered a

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copyright in PBL, without first obtaining permission from thecopyright holders of the original Point Break. Keelings assertedcopyright in PBL became effective on January 4, 2008. Hars andNewRock continued to stageperformances ofPBL for four yearsthereafterwithoutpaymenttoorauthorizationfromKeeling.

In December 2010, Keeling brought suit against Hars, NewRock, and New Rock investor Ethan Garber, asserting claims forcopyrightinfringement,breachofcontract,andtortiousinterferencewith contract. In the District Court proceedings, all parties wererepresentedbycounsel.AftertheDistrictCourtdenieddefendantsmotiontodismiss,seeKeelingv.NewRockTheaterProds.,LLC,No.10Civ. 9345 (TPG), 2011WL 1899762, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.May 17, 2011),defendants asserted counterclaims seeking, inter alia, adeclarationthat Keelings PBL copyright registration was invalid. Uponcompletionofdiscovery,defendantsmovedforsummaryjudgment,arguingprimarily thatPBL,anunauthorizedderivativework,wasnotentitledtocopyrightprotectionasamatteroflaw.TheDistrictCourt denied defendants successive motions for summaryjudgment, ruling that a parody that makes fair use of anothercopyrighted work may contain sufficient originality to meritcopyright protection itself. See Keeling v. New Rock Theater Prods.,LLC,No. 10Civ. 9345 (TPG), 2011WL 6202796 (S.D.N.Y.Dec. 13,2011); Keeling v. New Rock Theater Prods., LLC, No. 10 Civ. 9345(TPG),2012WL5974009(S.D.N.Y.Nov.29,2012).TheDistrictCourtalso rejecteddefendants argument that a scriptheavily reliant ontheatrical devices, as was PBLs, could not lawfully constitute

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originalcreativeexpressiondeservingofcopyrightprotection.2011WL 6202796 at *1. Finally, the Court found that multipleoutstanding issues of material fact remainedincluding whetherPBLconstitutedafairuseparodyofPointBreakandwhetherPBLcontainedsufficientoriginalitytomeritcopyrightprotection.Id.

InDecember 2012, the caseproceeded to a fiveday trialbyjury.Atthecloseoftheevidence,thepartiesdeliveredsummationsfocused largely on whether PBL was a parody at all, and if so,whether thatparodyconstitutednoninfringingfairuse. RecordonAppeal(ROA),Keelingv.NewRockTheaterProds.,LLC,No.10Civ. 9345 (TPG) (GWG),Dkt.No. 98, at 567648 (S.D.N.Y.Dec. 7,2012).TheDistrictCourtthenchargedthejury,beginningwiththefirstquestion the jurywouldbeasked toanswer: whether [PBL]was a fair use by way of a parody of the original movie PointBreak.Id.at652.TheDistrictCourtdeclinedtoenumerateeachofthe fourstatutory factorspertainingtofairuse,opting insteadtoattempt toputa littlemorecontenton thediscussion,which theDistrictCourtbelievedthatthelistoffactorsalone lacked. Id.at655.Thepertinentinstructionsonfairusewereasfollows:

Now, the person who creates the derivativeworkhasacopyrightinthatderivativework.Now,if the derivative work is simply somehow really acopyoftheoriginalthenitmaybesomehowcalledaderivativeworkbut it infringesontheowneroftheoriginal.Butifitiswhatwecallfairusethenitisnotan infringementon theoriginaland it isanewworkandithasitsowncopyrightandtheauthoror

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thecreatorof thenewworkowns thatcopyrightaswellasownsthenewwork....

Theplaintiffcontendsthat[PBL]isafairuseofsections of the script of the original movie. Theplaintiffcontendsthatthisisfairuseasaparodyandaparody,certainly,canbefairuse....

Aproperparodyissomethingwhichgenerallyridiculestosomeextent,makesfunof,makeslightoftheoriginal.Supposetheoriginalistheveryseriousdrama of some kind and if someone comes alongandmakes a parody, it is generally turning it intosomethingdifferent, humorous, ridiculous. And ifthat is done it is fair use to use even substantialamountsofthescriptoftheoriginalmovie.Itisfairusetoevenusethehighpointsorthehighpointaslongasitisnotsimplyconveyingagaintheoriginalmovie.Ifittakesthescriptoftheoriginalmovieandcreates somethingwhichuses that script to ridiculetomake funof, tomake lightof toproducehumorinstead of the original seriousness, then that is alegitimateparody.

Now, the amount of script taken from theoriginal cannot completelygo beyond theneeds oftheparody. Inotherwords, if theparody is for, ifwecouldimagine,athirditisnotlegitimatetocopytheothertwothirdsandputthemoutagain. Butiftheamountofscriptusedisreasonablyrelatedtotheproduction of the humor, the ridicule, thelightheartedness and so forth that is a legitimateparodyandthatisfairuse.

Now, it is sometimes said that the judge ininstructingajuryonfairuseissupposedtorefertoa

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listof factors. The listof factors is a listof factorswithoutmuchcontentormeaning. Andwhat Iamtryingdowithyounow is to refer to thenecessaryfactors but I hope put a littlemore content on thediscussion. And really thats all I have to say todefinefairusebywayofparody.

Id. at 65355. No party objected to the District Courts juryinstructions.Id.at668.

ThejuryreturnedaverdictinKeelingsfavorintheamountof$250,000, finding (a) that Keelings use of material from the filmPointBreakwasfairuse in thewayofaparody, (b) thatKeelingwasthesoleownerofthecopyrighttoPBL,and(c)thatdefendantsinfringed Keelings copyright. Id. at 67577. The District CourtenteredjudgmentonJanuary11,2013.

Defendant Hars, now proceeding pro se, appealed. Shechallenges the District Courts denial of her pretrial motion forsummaryjudgmentaswellasthesubsequentjuryverdictinfavorofKeeling.1

1 Although Hars suggests in her reply brief that she does not in fact

challenge the District Courts denial of her pretrial motion for summaryjudgment and instead appeals only the pure legal issues raised therein, seeDef.sReplyBr.9,we treatherappeal, takenasawhole,asachallenge to theDistrict Courts denial of summary judgment as well as the subsequent juryverdict.

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DISCUSSION

Though not a model of clarity,2 Harss appellate briefingprimarilyraisesthreeissues:first,whetherPBL,asanunauthorizedfairuse, isentitled tocopyrightprotectioncapableofsupportingKeelings claim of infringement by a third party; second, whetherKeelingscontributionstotheworkconsistingofindividuallynoncopyrightableelementscouldbesufficient tosupportacopyrightinPBL;andthird,whethertheDistrictCourtsjuryinstructionswereerroneous.Thefirsttwoissuesrelatetothesamequestion:whetherKeelingsworkwascopyrightable.Weconsidereachissueinturn.

I.ChallengestoCopyrightLaw

In general, where summary judgment is denied and themovantsubsequentlylosesafterafulltrialonthemerits,thedenialof summary judgmentmaynotbe appealed.Schaefer v.State Ins.Fund, 207 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marksomitted). However, this rule does not apply where, as here, thedistrictcourtspurportederrorwaspurelyoneoflaw.Id.Insuchcircumstances, we review de novo the legal issues underlying thedistrictcourtsdenialofsummaryjudgment.Id.

2Weconstrue thesubmissionsofapro se litigant liberallyand interpret

them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. Triestman v. Fed.BureauofPrisons,470F.3d471,474(2dCir.2006)(emphasisinoriginal)(internalquotationmarksomitted).

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TheCopyrightActprincipallyofferscopyrightprotection fororiginalworksofauthorship.17U.S.C.102(a).Pursuanttothestatutes terms, authors may control the copying of their originalworksandalsoretaintheexclusiverights topreparederivativeworksbaseduponthecopyrightedwork.3 17U.S.C.106. Thus,unauthorized derivative works are typically afforded no copyrightprotectionbecause theyunlawfully infringe theexclusive rightsoftheoriginalauthor. Id.; see also id. 103 ([P]rotection for aworkemployingpreexistingmaterialinwhichcopyrightsubsistsdoesnotextendtoanypartoftheworkinwhichsuchmaterialhasbeenusedunlawfully.).

The doctrine of fair use constitutes a critical and longstanding limitationontheexclusiverightsoftheoriginalcopyrightowner.4 Though only made a part of statutory copyright law in1976,[f]romtheinfancyofcopyrightprotection,someopportunity

3Section101oftheCopyrightActdefinesaderivativeworkasaworkbased upon one or more preexisting works such as a translation,fictionalization,oranyotherforminwhichaworkmayberecast,transformed,oradapted.17U.S.C.101.Thedefinitionfurthernotesthatsuchaworkcanconsistofeditorial revisions,annotations,elaborations,orothermodificationswhich,asawhole,representanoriginalworkofauthorship.Id.

4SeegenerallyAuthorsGuildv.Google,Inc.,No.134829cv,F.3d,2015WL6079426,at*5(2dCir.Oct.16,2015)(Fornearlythreehundredyears,sinceshortlyafter thebirthof copyright inEngland in1710, courtshave recognizedthat, in certain circumstances, giving authors absolute control over all copyingfromtheirworkswouldtendinsomecircumstancestolimit,ratherthanexpand,public knowledge. (footnote omitted)); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair UseStandard,103HARV.L.REV.1105(1990)(discussingthedoctrineoffairusewithinthecontextofthehistoryandobjectivesofcopyrightlaw).

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for fairuseofcopyrightedmaterialshasbeen thoughtnecessary tofulfillcopyrightsverypurpose,topromotetheProgressofScienceandusefulArts. Campbell v.AcuffRoseMusic, Inc., 510U.S. 569,575 (1994) (alterationsomitted) (quotingU.S.CONST.,Art. I,8,cl.8). Under Section 107 of theCopyrightAct, certainunauthorizedfair use of a copyrighted work, for purposes such as criticism,comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research, isnotan infringementofcopyrightand thus is lawful.5 17U.S.C.107. While parody is not expresslymentioned in the statute, theSupremeCourthas instructed thatparody, likeothercommentorcriticism,mayclaimfairuseunder107.Campbell,510U.S.at579.

In this case, Hars does not dispute the jurys factualdetermination that Keelings use of Point Break material in hercreationofPBLwasfairuse in thewayofaparody. ROA,Dkt.No. 98, at 675. Indeed, she repeatedly disclaims any fair usechallenge, explaining that she is not concerned about whetherKeelingsscript isafairuseofPointBreakbecause it iscompletelyirrelevanttoanyandallofHarsarguments.Def.sReplyBr.20;seealsoid.at2021([T]heissueofwhetherKeelingsscriptqualifiesasfairusewasastutelyandconsciouslyavoidedbyHars inherbrief.

5 The Copyright Act lists four nonexhaustive factors for courts toconsiderindeterminingwhetherauseisfair: (1)thepurposeandcharacterof the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is fornonprofiteducationalpurposes; (2) thenatureof thecopyrightedwork; (3) theamount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrightedworkasawhole;and (4) theeffectof theuseupon thepotentialmarket fororvalueofthecopyrightedwork.17U.S.C.107.

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... Hars is not asking the Court to spend even one second ofvaluabletimetryingtodeterminewhetherKeelingsscriptqualifiesforfairuse.).

Instead,HarspresentstwolegalargumentsforwhycopyrightprotectionshouldnotextendtoKeelingswork,bothofwhichwerefirst raised indefendants summary judgmentbriefinganddeniedbytheDistrictCourt.

A.CopyrightProtection:FairUse

First,Harsargues thatanunauthorizedderivativework likePBLcategoricallymaynotreceiveindependentcopyrightprotection,regardlessofwhetheritmakesfairuseofitssourcematerial.6 Thisargumentflowsfromtheadmittedlyunusualposture inwhichthiscasearises.Typically,fairuseisinvokedasadefenseagainstaclaimof copyright infringement brought by the sourcematerial

6BothpartiescharacterizePBLasaderivativework.SeeDef.sBr.13,918, 2740, 4551; Pl.s Br. 1, 9, 2132. We note that, as a general matter,derivative works and fair use are discrete legal categories. Under theCopyright Act, a derivative work involves a transformation to the worksform,17U.S.C.101,while fairuse involvesa transformationof theworkspurpose and character, 17 U.S.C. 107. PBL is bothit involves thedramatizationofamotionpicture,makingitaderivativework,anditinvolvesatransformationofthemotionpicturescharacterfromserioustoparody,makingit noninfringing fair use. The parties here seem to confuse the distinctionbetweenderivativeworksandfairuse. Nonetheless,becauseneitherpartyhasraised this issue on appeal, and because our analysis applies equally toderivativeandnonderivativeworksso longastheworkconstitutes lawfulfairuse, we need not further address questions raised by the partiescharacterization.

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rightsholder.Here,however,KeelinginvokedthefairuseprincipletoestablishanaffirmativeclaimagainstdefendantsforunauthorizeduseofherPBLparody. Hars concedes thatKeeling coulduse thefair use doctrine as a shield against a claim of copyrightinfringement, but argues that she may not use the doctrine as asword to vest a work with independent copyright protectionagainstthirdpartyinfringement.Def.sBr.1314.

This argument is inconsistent with the operative statutorylanguage. The CopyrightAct provides that derivative works areentitled to independent copyrightprotection, separate from anycopyright in thepreexistingmaterial. 17U.S.C.103(b). Thoughcopyright protection expressly may extend to derivative worksemploying preexistingmaterial inwhich copyright subsists, thestatutecautions thatprotectiondoesnotextend toanypartof thework inwhichsuchmaterialhasbeenusedunlawfully. 17U.S.C.103(a) (emphases supplied). If, however, a work employspreexisting copyrightedmaterial lawfullyas in the caseof a fairusenothing in the statute prohibits the extension of theindependent copyrightprotectionpromisedby Section 103.7 Id.103(b).Aclosereadingofthestatutethereforemakesplainthatanunauthorizedbutlawfulfairuseemployingpreexistingcopyrighted

7To be sure, the independent copyrightprotection in thenewwork islimited to that works original content: [C]opyright in a compilation orderivativeworkextendsonly to thematerialcontributedby theauthorofsuchwork,asdistinguishedfromthepreexistingmaterialemployedinthework.17U.S.C.103(b).

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material may itself merit copyright protection. It is not theinvocationof fairuse thatprovides theworkcopyrightprotection,andperhapsthinkingsohascreatedsomeconfusiononthepartofthedefendant.Itistheoriginalityofthederivativeworkthatmakesit protectable, and fair use serves only to render lawful thederivativework, such that itmay acquireaswould other lawfulderivativeworkssuchprotection.

Resisting this statutory principle, Hars argues that the caselaw does not permit the extension of independent copyrightprotection toanunauthorized fairuse,and contends that theonlycourt to have dealt with the issue found that Congress did notcontemplate such a result. Def.s Br. 14 (quoting Sobhani v.@Radical.Media,Inc.,257F.Supp.2d1234,1239(C.D.Cal.2003)).Butin fact, Congress did expressly contemplate the extension ofcopyright protection where, as here, a work constituted noninfringingfairuse.Therelevantlegislativereportstatedthat,

[u]nder this provision [(i.e., Section 103(a) of theCopyrightAct)],copyrightcouldbeobtainedaslongas the use of the preexisting work was notunlawful, even though the consent of thecopyright owner had not been obtained. Forinstance,theunauthorizedreproductionofaworkmightbe lawful under the doctrine of fair use or anapplicableforeignlaw,andifsotheworkincorporatingitcouldbecopyrighted.

H.R. Rep. No. 941476, at 58 (1976) (emphases supplied). Thislanguageaddressesprecisely the issueraised in the instantappeal.

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Although the consent of the copyright ownerhere, therightsholder in the Hollywood screenplay Point Breakhad notbeenobtainedbyKeeling,herresultingparodyPBLwaslawfulunder the doctrine of fair use, and accordingly, it could becopyrighted.

We have previously confirmed that, because [d]erivativeworksare explicitly included in the subjectmatterof copyrightasdefined by the Copyright Act, the mere fact that a litigantsunauthorizedcreationsarederivativeworks is in itself,ofcourse,nobar tocopyrightability. Durham Indus., Inc.v.TomyCorp.,630F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing 17 U.S.C. 103). And thisstatutory interpretation is consistent with the animating policybehind the fairusedoctrineto fulfill copyrights corepurposeofpromotingdevelopmentinartsandscience.SeeCampbell,510U.S.at575. Without any possibility of copyright protection againstinfringement for her original fairuse parody, playwrights likeKeelingmightbedissuadedfromcreatingatall.

Accordingly,weagreewith theDistrictCourtsholding that,whenaderivativeworksunauthorizeduseofpreexistingmaterialis fair use and the work contains sufficient originality, its authormayclaimcopyrightprotectionunder103forheroriginalcreativecontributions.SeeKeeling,2011WL1899762,at*1.

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B.CopyrightProtection:Selection,Coordination,andArrangementofUnProtectableElements

Harsssecond legalargumentfaresnobetter. Harscontendsthatifanauthorsoriginalcontributionstoaderivativeworkconsistsolelyofnoncopyrightableindividualelements,thosecontributionscannot supporta copyright. Specifically, she claims thatKeelingsoriginal contributions to thePBL script are insufficient towarrantcopyright protection because they consist entirely of noncopyrightablestagedirectionsand theatricaldevices. See17U.S.C.102(b) (providing that copyright protection does not extend toany idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,concept,principle,ordiscovery,regardlessoftheforminwhichitisdescribed,explained,illustrated,orembodiedinsuchwork).

Wedisagree.AstheDistrictCourtproperlyfound,copyrightlawprotects not only the individual elements themselves, but thecreative choices made in selecting and arranging even uncopyrightableelements. Indeed, theCopyrightAct itselfexplicitlyprotectscompilations,17U.S.C.103,andalonglineofcaselawconfirms that copyright covers compilations of raw data or facts,elements which are not themselves protectable, so long as thecompilation itself (including the arrangement of those elements)possesses some minimal degree of creativity, no matter howcrude,humbleorobvious.FeistPublns,Inc.v.RuralTel.Serv.Co.,499U.S.340,345 (1991) (internalquotationmarksomitted);seealsoHarper&Rowv.NationEnters.,471U.S.539,547(1985)(Creationofa nonfiction work, even a compilation of pure fact, entails

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originality.);Silversteinv.PenguinPutnam, Inc.,368F.3d77,80 (2dCir. 2004) (It is well settled that compilations of fact may becopyrightableeventhoughfactsthemselvesarenotprotected).TheSupremeCourthasmadeclearthatevenatelephonedirectorymaybecopyrighted if itsnoncopyrightable factual elements are arrangedwiththerequisiteminimaldegreeoforiginality.SeeFeist,499U.S.340. Keelings original contributions to PBL clearly exceed thiscreativitythreshold.8

Tobe sure,Hars is correct thatKeeling couldnot copyrightthe commonly used individual stage directions and theatricaldevicese.g., the conceptofdrafting an audiencemember toplaythelead,therelianceoncuecards,ortheuseofsquirtgunswhichtogethercomprisePBLs jokes. ButKeelinghasneversoughttodoso. Rather,as theDistrictCourtcorrectlyheld,Keelingscreative

8 We similarly reject Harss related argument that Point Breakmaterialimproperly pervade[s] the PBL script in contravention of Eden Toys, Inc. v.FloreleeUndergarmentCo.,697F.2d27 (2dCir.1982), superseded by rule on othergroundsasrecognizedinFed.TreasuryEnter.Sojuzplodoimportv.SPISpiritsLtd.,726F.3d62,84(2dCir.2013).SeeDef.sBr.3537.Totheextentitevenappliesinthiscase,whichisuncertain,EdenToysrequiresmerelysomesubstantial,notmerelytrivial,originalitytomeetthestandardforsufficientoriginality.697F.2dat34(internal quotation marks omitted). PBLs transformative parody fulfills thisstandard,anditsuseofasubstantialportionoftheunderlyingworkpresentsnohindrancetofindingsofeitherfairuseororiginality.Cf.Campbell,510U.S.at588(Whenparodytakesaimataparticularoriginalwork,theparodymustbeabletoconjureupatleastenoughofthatoriginaltomaketheobjectofitscriticalwitrecognizable. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bill Graham Archives v.DorlingKindersleyLtd.,448F.3d605,613(2dCir.2006)(holdingthateventheuseof an entire original work may be permissible fair use, so long as the use istailoredtofurther[thenewworks]transformativepurpose).

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contribution,andthushercopyright,isintheoriginalwayinwhich[she]hasselected,coordinated,andarrangedtheelementsof...herwork tocreatenewparodicmeaning. Keelingv.NewRockTheaterProds.,LLC,No.10Civ.9345(TPG),2013WL918553,at*2(S.D.N.Y.Mar. 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingKnitwaves,Inc.v.LollytogsLtd.,71F.3d996,1004(2dCir.1995)).

Harsslegalchallengestothejurysinfringementverdictthusfail.

II.ChallengestoJuryInstructions

WenowturntoHarsschallengestotheDistrictCourts juryinstructions. BecauseHarsfailedtoobjecttothechargeattrial,wereview these claims for plain error, andwill only grant relief ifthere was (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantialrights, and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, orpublic reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v.Weintraub,273F.3d139,145 (2dCir.2001) (alterationsand internalquotationmarksomitted);seealsoFed.R.Civ.P.51(d)(2)(Acourtmay consider a plain error in the instructions that has not beenpreservedasrequiredbyRule51(d)(1)iftheerroraffectssubstantialrights.).Ajurychargeiserroneousifitmisleadsthejuryastothecorrectlegalstandard,orifitdoesnotadequatelyinformthejuryofthe law. Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 552 (2d Cir. 1996).Conversely, a jury instruction will be deemed adequate if thecharge, takenasawhole, iscorrectandsufficientlycovers thecasesothatajurycanintelligentlydeterminethequestionspresentedto

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it.Id.at553(internalquotationmarksomitted). We havepreviously observed that the plainerror exception to Rule 51sobjection requirement should only be invoked with extremecaution in thecivilcontext. Rasanenv.Doe,723F.3d325,333 (2dCir. 2013) (internal quotationmarks omitted) (quoting Pescatore v.Pan Am.World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 18 (2d Cir. 1996)). Toconstitute plain error, a courts action must contravene anestablishedruleoflaw,andgototheveryessenceofthecase. Id.(alterations,citation,andinternalquotationmarksomitted)(quotingLavinMcEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 483 (2d Cir. 2001);Andersonv.Branen,17F.3d552,556(2dCir.1994)).

Hars contends that the jury instructions were erroneous intwo respects: first, she argues that the District Court improperlyexcusedKeelingfromprovingthatheroriginalcontributionstothePBLscriptweresufficienttomeritcopyrightprotection;andsecond,she argues that the District Court failed to enumerate the fourstatutory fairuse factors in its instructions to the jury. Neitherconstitutesplainerror.

A.OriginalityInstruction

Inher firstchallenge to the jurycharge,Harsargues that theDistrict Court failed to charge the jury that [o]riginality is aconstitutional requirementand is thesine quanonof copyright.Feist,499U.S.at34546; seeDef.sBr.27. Harspointsout that theDistrictCourtneverprovidedaseparateinstructiononoriginalitytothe jury. HarsalsocontendsthattheDistrictCourtmisrepresented

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the governing law by suggesting that a finding of fairusewouldautomatically entitle PBL to copyright protection. Harscharacterizesthispositionasthefairuse=copyrightequation,andattacks the equation for implicitly excusingKeeling from offeringthenecessaryproofofheroriginal,protectablecontributions.Def.sBr.915.

Admittedly,theDistrictCourtdidnotofferadiscrete,explicitinstructionon the requirementoforiginality. Instead, it collapsedaspects of both fair use and originality into a single set ofinstructions. Thechargedid,however,sufficientlyinstructthe juryon theoriginalityrequirement tosurviveplainerrorreview. In itsexplanationoffairuse,theDistrictCourtdistinguishedbetweenaninfringingcopyoftheoriginalandanoninfringingnewwork.ROA,Dkt.No.98,at653.TheCourtwentontoexplainthekindoforiginality required for a fair use parody to merit its owncopyrightprotection:

Aproperparodyissomethingwhichgenerallyridiculestosomeextent,makesfunof,makeslightoftheoriginal.Supposetheoriginalistheveryseriousdrama of some kind and if someone comes alongandmakes a parody, it is generally turning it intosomethingdifferent, humorous, ridiculous. And ifthat is done it is fair use to use even substantialamountsofthescriptoftheoriginalmovie.Itisfairusetoevenusethehighpointsorthehighpointaslongasitisnotsimplyconveyingagaintheoriginalmovie.Ifittakesthescriptoftheoriginalmovieandcreates somethingwhichuses that script to ridicule

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tomake funof, tomake lightof toproducehumorinstead of the original seriousness, then that is alegitimateparody.

Id. at 65455. Without using the word originality, the DistrictCourtthusindicatedthataprotectablefairusemustbenew,mustturn[ ] [theoriginalmaterial] intosomethingdifferent,andmustavoidsimplyconveyingagaintheoriginalmaterial.Id.

These jury instructions adequately trace the law of fair useand, more specifically, the underlying concepts of transformativepurposeandcharacter,whichareacknowledgedtobe[t]heheartofthefairuse inquiry ingeneral,OnDavisv.Gap,Inc.,246F.3d152,174 (2d Cir. 2001), and the heart of any parodists claim inparticular,Campbell,510U.S.at580.SeealsoBlanchv.Koons,467F.3d244, 25152 (2d Cir. 2006) (a new work is transformative when ittransforms the raw material of the underlying work in thecreation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights andunderstandings(quotingCastleRockEntmt,Inc.v.CarolPublgGrp.,Inc.,150F.3d132,142(2dCir.1998))).

ItwouldarguablyhavebeenpreferablefortheDistrictCourtto deliver separate instructions on fair use and originality.Nevertheless,itscombinationoftheseelementsintooneinstructiondoesnotcontraveneanestablishedruleoflaw.Rasanen,723F.3dat 333. Even if this combination was error, we would still notconclude that it affected Harss substantial rights. [T]aken as awhole,thechargewaslegallycorrect,alertedthejurytotheissueof originality, and sufficiently cover[ed] the case so that a jury

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[could] intelligently determine the questions presented to it.Hathaway, 99 F.3d at 553 (internal quotation marks omitted).Proceedingwiththerequisiteextremecautioninthecivilcontext,Rasanen, 723 F.3d at 333, we hold that the District Court did notplainlyerrindeliveringitsoriginalityinstruction.

B.StatutoryFactorsInstruction

We likewise reject Harss challenge to the District Courtsfailuretoexplicitlyenumerateinitsinstructionsallfourofthefairusefactorslistedin17U.S.C.107.

As a legal matter, the four factors do not each carry equalweightinanevaluationofparodyasfairuse;indeed,somemaynotbe relevant at all. As noted, the first factorthe purpose andcharacter of the use, 17 U.S.C. 107lies at the heart of theinquiry for parody, while the other three factors are much lessimportant.9Indeed,astheSupremeCourthasinstructed,themore

9 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (the second factorthe nature of the

originalcopyrightedworkisnot...everlikelytohelpmuchinseparatingthefairusesheepfromtheinfringinggoatsinaparodycase,sinceparodiesalmostinvariablycopypubliclyknown,expressiveworks);id.at588(thethirdfactortheamountandsubstantialityof theportionof theoriginalworkusedis lessimportant, as parody must be able to conjure up at least enough of thatoriginal tomake theobjectof itscriticalwitrecognizable); id.at591 (as to thefourth factortheeffecton themarket fororvalueof theoriginalcopyrightedworkitismorelikelythat[aparody]willnotaffectthemarketfortheoriginalinawaycognizableunderthisfactor,thatis,byactingasasubstituteforit...[,]because theparodyand theoriginalusuallyservedifferentmarket functions).See also Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 1998)

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transformativethenewwork[underfactorone],thelesswillbethesignificanceofotherfactors ...thatmayweighagainstafindingoffairuse.Campbell,510U.S.at579.

Inlinewiththishierarchyofsignificance,theDistrictCourtsfairusechargeemphasizedthequestionoftransformativeuseunderthefirststatutoryfactor.TheCourtmentionedthethirdfactoronlybriefly (the amount of script taken from the original cannotcompletelygobeyondtheneedsoftheparody,ROA,Dkt.No.98,at655),anddidnotrefertothesecondandfourthfactorsatall.Wefind itsstatedrationalethedesire toputa littlemorecontentonthediscussion,which thelistof factorsalone lacked, id.tobeunderstandable, if not advisable. The safer course is for the trialjudgetoexplaintheapplicationofallfourfactors,howeverbriefly,basedonthecircumstancespresented.

Nonetheless,even ifweassumed that the failure todescribeallfourfactorswaserror,thiserrordidnotaffectHarsssubstantialrights.Inordertoshowplainerroraffectingsubstantialrights,alitigantmusttypicallyshowthattheerrorwasprejudicial:Itmusthaveaffectedtheoutcomeofthedistrictcourtproceedings.Bennettv.UnitedStates,663F.3d71,88(2dCir.2011)(emphasisandinternalquotationmarks omitted) (quotingUnitedStates v.Olano, 507U.S.725, 734 (1993)). Hars presented no evidence thatwould tend tosupportadifferentverdictonfairuse,even if theDistrictCourt ([T]hethirdfactor[has]little,ifany,weightagainstfairusesolongasthefirstandfourthfactorsfavortheparodist.).

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hadcoveredthefourfactorsindetail.Onthecontrary,Harsherselfeffectively concedes this point by disclaiming any challenge to afindingof fairuse. SeeDef.sReplyBr.20 ([A]tno timedidHarsevenimply,nevermindargue,thatKeelingsscriptwasnotfairuseof Point Break. (emphasis in original)). Without a showing ofprejudice to Harss substantial rights, her challenge to the juryinstructionsonfairusenecessarilyfails.

CONCLUSION

Tosummarize,weholdthat:

(1)theauthorofanunauthorizedfairuseexhibitingsufficientoriginalitymay claim independent copyrightprotectionunder theCopyrightAct,17U.S.C.103,againstinfringementfortheoriginalcreativecontributionstherein;

(2) copyrightprotectionmay extend to awork that exhibitsthe sufficient minimal degree of originality in selecting,coordinating, and arranging otherwise unprotectable underlyingelements;and

(3) the District Court did not err in delivering its juryinstructionsonoriginalityandfairuse.

Having rejected each of defendant Harss arguments, weAFFIRM the District Courts January 11, 2013 judgment in itsentirety.