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ECPR Joint Session of Workshops 2010, Workshop 26: Comparing Autocracies: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Analyses of Input/Output Dimensions Mnster, 22-27 March 2010

Varieties of Political Regimes and the

Process of Cultural and Socio-economic Modernization

Steffen Kailitz Hannah-Arendt-Institute for the Research on Totalitarianism, Dresden/Ernst-Moritz Arndt-

University Greifswald kailitz@hait.tu-dresden.de

I. Introduction1 In a historical perspective most men lived in some kind of autocratic regime. In addition, even if the number of democracies has seen a dramatic rise between 1990 and 1995, today at least a third of all people still live under autocracies. It seems too pessimistic to speak of a democratic rollback in the last years (like e.g., Diamond 2000, 2008; Puddington 2009)2 but even the most optimistic of us, will agree, that it is still a very long way to the end of history (Fukuyama 1992) where all countries will be liberal democracies. As long as we still find fundamentally different political regime types, it is necessary to classify them properly before we ask what the reasons for the durability of some kind of political regime are or before we study the influence of the regime type on a broad set of outcomes, e.g. international peace or economic development. In this paper, I first introduce a way to identify and classify political regimes. The paper thus addresses a central challenge in comparative politics. The following classification of political regimes is based on the question how the rulers legitimize their rule. The classification lends fundamental importance to the differentiation into non-inclusive, personalist and weakly institutionalized regimes on one side and modern inclusive and institutionalized regimes on the other side. The introduced typology differentiates among the basic types of absolutist monarchy, patrimonialism, military emergency dictatorships, ideocratic and neo-patrimonial one-party autocracies, hybrid and autocratic multiparty regimes and liberal democracies. I interpret this list of regimes as a ranking from the least modern to the most modern political regime. The next step is to locate the regime types into a property space between democracy and autocracy using three dimensions 1. inclusiveness, 2. competitiveness, and 3. civil liberties and executive constraints. I interpret regimes in the property space, which are the most inclusive, competitive, and liberal as the most modern political regimes (which are, in fact, liberal-constitutional democracies). After that, I present the theoretical arguments why two factors - cultural coinage and socio-economic modernization should explain much of the answer to the question what political regime we will find in a country and the empirical evidence that these two factors indeed explain what they should.

1 I thank Tom Mannewitz for research assistance and Uwe Backes for comments on an earlier draft. 2 For a harsh critic on the position that there is authoritarian rollback:Deudney/Ikenberry (2009).

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II. Classifying political regimes There are two ongoing debates the first is on the appropriate way to classify political regimes3 and the second is on the appropriate way to measure democracies.4 More often than not, these two debates are confused. However, to classify political regimes is not the same as to measure democratic quality or the degree of democracy. We should not classify political regimes by measuring democracy. It does not make more sense than to measure to which degree a fish is a mammal (see on that point also Albrecht/Frankenberger 2009). I define a political regime as the set of rules formal and informal that identifies the rulers (who decides what) and regulates the access to power (answer to the questions who selects the rulers who can be selection; questions of inclusiveness and competitiveness) and the limitations to the rule (executive constraints and civil liberties).5 The first step, if we want to classify political regimes, is to define what a political regime is and is not. To identify political regimes we should start from the famous definition of the state by Max Weber as the human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory (Weber 1994: 310). On this solid fundament, I suggest to make a distinction between sovereign states that do qualify as political regimes (states) on the one hand and dependent territories (colonies and occupied countries) as well as territories that lack stateness on the other hand (that do not qualify as political regimes). All territories in which the government does not dispose an actual monopoly on the use of force (e.g., Somalia) are obviously no autocracies. However, at the same time they are also not democracies. That means: No state, no democracy or autocracy, no political regime.6 These territories, which we still generally refer to as states, are actually territories without a common political regime. Thus, there is no central government that rules all of the territory that we find on our map under the name Somalia. One area, Somaliland, already declared itself independent and another declared itself an autonomous state. Two other, Galmadug and Maakhir, also aim at this. In the other parts of the territory warlords, clans or Islamic unions are ruling. In territories in which there is a civil war and none of the war parties controls the whole territory, there is also no government with an actual monopoly on the use of force. The regime in Sudan governs merely the north of the country and is incapable of defeating the southern rebels. Another example is Russia at the time of the civil war between the October Revolution in 1917 and the foundation of the Soviet Union. Besides failed states, there are dependent territories, which either are occupied temporarily or colonized permanently. The occupier usually rules occupied countries autocratically. Nevertheless, this is not always the case, as we can observe in Afghanistan or Iraq today. Up to the beginning of the 20th century, most parts of the world were colonies. There were only about 55 sovereign countries in 1901 in comparison to about 195 in 2010. Having identified political regimes, the next step is to classify them. The following classification of political regimes considers two questions: 1. What is the legitimation of the rulers to rule and how do they rule?7 2. Who rules?. Every political regime tries to cultivate a

3 Cf. Alvarez et al. (1996); Cheibub et al. (2010); Geddes (1999); Hadenius/Teorell (2007); Kailitz (2009c); Linz (2000); Mller/Skaaning (2009); Munck (1996); Munck/Snyder (2004, September 2-5); Perlmutter (1981); Reich (2002); Skaaning (2006)). 4 Cf., Bollen (1980); Bhlmann et al. (2008); Collier/Adcock (1999); Inkeles (1991); Lauth et al. (2000); Lauth (2004); Munck (2009); Munck/Verkuilen (2002); Mller/Pickel (2007)) 5 The definition is inspired by Skaaning (2006): 15. In the following part I extract three dimensions to measure the properties of political regimes from this definition (inclusiveness, competitiveness and executive constraints and civil liberties). 6 This is an extension of the following statement made by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan: No state, no democracy. (Linz/Stepan (2001): 93). 7 The goverments quest for legitimation is already a part of the definition of the state by Weber.

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belief in its legitimacy. The legitimation of a rule should not be confused with legitimacy beliefs of the ruled.8 Legitimacy beliefs [] are convictions held by political members of political systems that political objects are proper or just simply appropriate (Muller 1970).9 Political legitimation is here defined as the explanation of the rulers (that is accepted by the ruled or not) why the rulers have the right to rule and to exert the monopoly coercion of power in a given territory. We can distinguish between a traditional personalist - legitimation of rule and a modern populist legitimation of rule. The decisive difference between traditional and modern political regimes is, that in modern regimes the people participate in politics. Political participation refers to all possibilities for the public to express political opinions regarding political, economic, management or other social decisions. Political participation is understood here in a very narrow way, which does not take into account if the public really influences the decisions of the government. So it is maybe more appropriate to speak only of inclusiveness. Robert Dahl defined inclusiveness as the variation in the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government (Dahl 1971: 4). Modern political regimes legitimate their rule by the inclusion of the people in the political process.10 A difference between modern populist and traditional personalist regimes is also that modern regimes have modern institutions to enable the citizens to participate in the political process (above all through parties and parliaments), while there are no channels for the inclusion of the people in traditional regimes. Classical traditional regimes are absolutist monarchies and patrimonial regimes.11 The ruler in traditional regimes claims to have the right to rule because of his descent or his abilities.12 One of the most spread legitimations in history of a traditional ruler is as simple as that: god (or the gods) want(s) me to rule and you to obey. Traditional societies are non-egalitarian. The ruled are treated by the ruler as political subjects and are not allowed to participate in politics. However, traditional regimes as well as all other political regimes are only stable if at least most people believe that the claim of the ruler to rule is more or less legitimate. Traditional regimes are the weakest when a patrimonial ruler tries to establish a new dynasty. The longer the rule of a dynasty already lasted the more natural it seems to the people that this family has a natural right to rule them, even if the descendant of the founder of the dynasty shows no statesmanship at all. Besides legitimation, traditional rule rests on two additional pillars: the armed forces and the police to secure the monopoly on the use of force (coercion) and a patron-client-system (co-optation). We have to differentiate among modern regimes between those that legitimate by open competition (pluralism theory of democracy) and those in which authority is reasoned through the identity of interests of the ruling and the ruled.

8 See on legitimation and legitimacy: Barker (2001); Beetham (2002); Burnell (2006); Kielmannsegg (1971); Kielmansegg (1976); Westle (1989). 9 See also Lipset (1981): 64. The core of political culture as defined by Almond/Powell is legitimacy. See Almond/Powell (1966): 50f. 10 Of course the oldest, in many ways already modern systems, which were inclusive by my definition, were the city-states in antique Greece, most notably Athens (c.f. Almond/Powell (1966): 217). 11 Since I only study political regimes in the 20th and 21st century and these kind of political regimes died out I do not classify primitive political systems of the Eskimos or of primitive hunting and gathering bands in Africa. Almond/Powell (1966): 43f. Among the traditional political regimes patrimonial regimes are the only ones that have survived, while there are no longer any patriarchal and feudal systems. The reason seems that it is the most stucturally differentiated traditional regime type. See Almond/Powell (1966): 44. For the distinction in primitive, traditional and modern political regimes see Almond/Powell (1966): 217. On the distinction between traditional and modern political systems see also Linz (2000): 143-158. 12 Augustus for example established the Roman Empire by claiming to be a descendant of the Trojan hero Aenas as well as the legal heir of Julius Caesar.

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Table 1: Identity-based and pluralist theory of democracy Identity-based theory of

democracy Pluralist theory of democracy

Principle Identity of the ruling and the ruled

Competing ideas are represented by different parties in the parliament

What follows from the principle?

Political contestation is not necessary and illegitimate. Masses are mobilized to show the identity of interests of the ruling and the ruled.

Political contestation between alternatives is of fundamental meaning.

Societal partial interests Illegitimate Legitimate and desirable Opposition against the ruling

Illegitimate Legitimate and desirable when non-violent

Implementation Ideal type: ideocratic one- party autocracy

Liberal-constitutional democracy

Theoretical founders Rousseau, Marx, Lenin, Schmitt

Locke, Federalist Papers, Dahl

Inspired by (Bhret et al. 1988): 232. The distinction between two visions of modern democracy stems from Talmons classical work. (Talmon 1960). Talmon called the two visons of democracy originally liberal vs. totalitarian. One-party autocracies based on ideology orientate nearly ideal-typical on legitimation through the identity-based theory of democracy. Rule is legitimated through an ideology that is defined as the common interest of the governing and the governed. Therefore, the ideology must be seen as the primary criterion of this regime type (cf. Drath 1958: 9-34; Patzelt 1998: 235-27113). They should consequently be named ideocracies (Cf. Backes 2007; Bernholz 2001; Fritze 2004; Kailitz 2009c; Piekalkiewicz/Penn 199514). Ideocracy is as military autocracy or absolutist monarchy a certain type of autocracy with its own logic of rule (see Bernholz 2001; Wintrobe 2000). A political regime that legitimates itself by an ideology is still an ideocracy even when mass mobilization decreases and the faith in the realization of the utopia declines among the officials and the people and following Linz words the regime can only be labeled post-totalitarian (Linz 2000: 245-261). Non-totalitarian ideocracies should not be classified as diminished subtypes (Collier/Levitsky 1997) of totalitarian ideocracies, for instance, as dysfunctional totalitarian regimes (Brzezinski 1999: 263-276). In fact, ideocracy must be regarded as a superordinate concept and totalitarian ideocracy as the most repressive specification of it. Such a notion of totalitarianism is dissolved from the idea of ideocracy and can be measured similar to the mode of Linz/Stepan (Linz/Stepan 1996) and Mller/Skaaning (Mller/Skaaning 2009) by the degree of civil liberties of the ruled (using the data of Freedom House) and the constraints of the power of the rulers (using Policy IVs executive constraints data). From this perspective totalitarian autocracies are extreme autocracies where the ruled enjoy almost no freedom and the ruling have unlimited freedom (the unchecked right of exerting arbitrary acts).15 Neopatrimonial one-party autocracies like ideocratic one-party regimes are characterized by the existence of modern political institutions a parliament and a ruling party. Their 13 This is originally one of the two basic conceptualizations of the notion of totalitarianism. The other approach sees those autocracies as totalitarian that rest mostly on repression and concentration of power. From this point of view and in contrast to Carl Joachim Friedrichs conception totalitarianism cannot only occur in one-party autocracies. Cf. Shlapentokh (2007). Even if these are entirely different concepts in most of the works on totalitarianism the two conceptions flow into one concept: see e.g. Linz (2000). See for the conceptual problems of this approach Kailitz (2009c): 213-223. 14 The notion of totalitarianism aims to the definition of a system that strives for and achieves unchecked and unlimited powers over a society through repression. This notion should only be used in confine to extreme autocracies ideocracies or not though. 15 Looking at the other side of the political spectrum Bollen defines democracy as the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the non-elite is maximized. Bollen (1980): 372.

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legimation of power consists of an amalgam of personalist legimation and a certain tie to the identity-based theory of democracy. Unlike in pure patrimonial autocracies the people have (confined) participation rights in neopatrimonial one-party autocracies. At the same time, only regimes without an elaborated ideological fundament should be classified as neopatrimonial one-party autocracies, unlike regimes as contemporary North Corea. Furthermore, we have to distinguish neopatrimonial multi-party regimes (see on this regime type Erdmann/Engel 2006) from liberal-constitutional democracies and one-party autocracies. Hybrid and autocratic neopatrimonial multi-party regimes are legitimated by a mix of pluralist and identity-based theory of democracy. Opposing opinions are not prohibited, but seen as not according to the norm. Additionally this regime type carries a strong personalist element of legitimation. Another category in the proposed regime typology is formed by regimes whose autocratic structure is justified by the claim to remedy a state of emergency of political, economic, or social nature. The power holder in such an emergency regime is the military. Moreover, plenty of mixed types may occur in political reality when the rulers combine legitimation strategies. They are stated in the following table and will be characterized at full length in the following part of this paper. The question of the source of legitimation, to which the power holders refer, coincides with the issue of the rules of succession. In traditional regimes this is managed by inheritance, in emergency regimes by cooptation (non-violent succession) or exertion/threat of military force (violent succession), in one-party autocracies by inclusive non-competitive elections, in patrimonial regimes by cooptation by the prior ruler (non-violent succession) or exertion/threat of military force (violent succession).16 Most categories are homogenous regarding the answer to the question who reigns? Traditional regimes are ruled by a civilian (monarch or other personalist ruler), emergency regimes by the military and modern regimes by parties. Table 2: Main regime types in the 20th and 21st century and their legitimation Absolutist monarchies59 (legitimation through personalist, pre-modern traditional legitimation: abilities and/or descent of ruler)

Mixed type between military dictatorships and one-party autocracies (legitimation through an emergency [need of a strong military leader] and identity-based theory of democracy [inclusiveness without competition])

Liberal-constitutional democracy (legitimation through pluralist theory of democracy [inclusiveness of the people in elections and competition between political alternatives before elections, executive constraints and civil liberties])

Semi-inclusive and semi-competitive monarchies (legitimation through personalist, pre-modern traditional legitimation (by abilities and/or descent of ruler) and inclusive and competitive parliamentary elections)

Neopatrimonal one-party autocracies (legitimation through identity-based theory of democracy [inclusiveness without competition] an personalist, pre-modern, non-traditional legitimation of the state leader)

Hybrid and autocratic neopatrimonial multi-party regime (legitimation through a blurred mixture of pluralism and identity-based theory of democracy [in reality: inclusiveness and semi-competitive elections], additionally strong personalist element)

Patrimonialism (legitimation through personalist, pre-modern, non-traditional legitimation by abilities and/or descent of ruler)

Ideocratic one-party autocracy (legitimation through ruling ideology and inclusiveness)

Ideocratic multi-party autocracy (legitimation through ideology, inclusiveness and competitive elections within the scope of the ideocracy)

Military dictatorship (legitmation through state of emergency)

Mixed type between neopatrimonial and ideocratic one-party autocracy (legitimation through inclusiveness, ideology and personalist legitimation

16 On the rules of succession in autocracies see Brownlee (2007b); Kurrild-Klitgaard (2004).

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[personality cult etc.]) The category of ideocratic multi-party autocracies is written italic because it empirically occurred only once in the shape of the contemporary political regime of Iran and played only a little role in reality compared with all the other types.

III. Locating political regimes in a property space To classify political regimes and to locate political regimes in a property space are different things. When we generate a property space to locate political regimes we first have to identify the relevant dimensions to distinguish between political regimes. After that, we have to measure the political regimes on all dimensions to locate it in the property space.17 If we want to generate a property space to locate political regimes it is a necessary first step first to define democracy and autocracy. Starting from Robert Dahls definition of democracy, I argue that competitiveness among political actors and the political inclusion of the people in the political process are the two basic dimensions of democracy.18 A political regime is competitive when all adult citizens irrespective of their political opinions have the right to run for office. Opposition candidates are not excluded from the electoral arena in a competitive political regime. There should be no electoral fraud and vote-buying (on the methods of manipulation see Lehoucq 2003; Magaloni 2007; Schaffer 2007; Schedler 2002). Nevertheless, even if there is electoral fraud and vote-buying elections are not insignificant. Therefore, it seems appropriate to classify regimes with manipulated elections, but without a ban of opposition parties as semi-competitive. A political regime is inclusive if all adult people have the right to vote. To measure competitiveness and inclusiveness in this sense it is appropriate to use the well-known measures by Tatu Vanhanen (Vanhanen 1984, 1990, 1997, 2003). Competition is measured by subtracting the largest parties vote share in parliamentary, or presidential elections, or both (depending on the kind of electoral regime19) from 100. Inclusiveness is calculated as the percentage of voters in relation to the total population (Vanhanen 1984: 28-33Vanhanen 1997: 34-37). One advantage of Vanhanens measures is that he already collected data on both dimension from 1810 to 2008. I argue that competitiveness and inclusiveness are two different dimensions of political regimes that do vary independently.20 Different from Vanhanen himself I do not interpret the measures of competition and inclusiveness as metric variables, but as categorical. Therefore, I do not argue, for example, that if 60 per cent of all citizens voted it is better than if 40 per cent voted. The four corners in the property space are labeled as follows: Table 3: Property space of political regimes with the dimensions participation and competitiveness Competitive oligarchies: competitive, non-inclusive

Electoral regimes: competitive, inclusive (liberal democracies)

Closed autocracies: non-competitive, non-inclusive

Inclusive autocracies: non-competitive, inclusive (ideocratic and neopatrimonial one-party regimes)

17 On the question how to create a property space see Barton (1955) and Lazarsfeld (1937). 18 See Dahl (1971): 6. One difference between Dahls definition of public conestation and participation is that it is much broader than my definition of inclusiveness as the core of participation. 19 Vanhanen classifies government systems into three categories: parliamentary dominance, executive dominance, and concurrent powers. 20 Michael Wigell (Wigell (2008): 242) declared them both to be parts of one dimension (electoralism). I argue that this is not true: My argument is not new since already Dahl argued himself that contestation and inclusiveness vary somewhat independentlyDahl (1971): 4). For an empirical foundation of this claim see Coppedge et al. (2008).

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(absolutist monarchies, patrimonial regimes, military dictatorships)

If one looks at this property space it is important to remind the reader that in the typology I suggest that political regimes should be distinguished by their kind of legitimation. You find the regimes in brackets. The label before the brackets refers to the location of the regime types in a section of the property space. Many historical regimes like Great Britain in the 18th century do not come very close to one of the four poles in the property space. Pragmatically they have to be labeled by the category to which they come closest. I work with the following thresholds:

Table 4: Separation of the sections in the property space based on Vanhanens measures of participation and competitiveness Competitive, inclusive: competitiveness 20 and inclusiveness 15 competitive, non-inclusive: competitiveness 20 and inclusiveness < 5 non-competitive, inclusive: competition < 10 and inclusiveness 15 non-competitive, non-inclusive: competition < 10 and inclusiveness < 5 A regime is classified as semi-inclusive between five an 14 per cent (inclusiveness) and as semi-competitive between 10 and 19 per cent (competitiveness). The thresholds do not differ very much from the suggested thresholds by Tatu Vanhanen. (Vanhanen 1997): 33. Locating political regimes in the two-dimensional property space helps us to distinguish between traditional autocracies, modern one-party regimes and modern multiparty-regimes. This would not be possible with the common one-dimensional democracy measures and regime measures. However, if we only refer to inclusiveness and competitiveness, the antipole of democracy is solely represented by a closed autocracy. Competitive oligarchies and inclusive autocracies share one core attribute (competitiveness or inclusiveness) with democracies, whereas they also share another characteristic with closed autocracies. A mere negative definition of autocracies as non-democracies seems to be insufficient (see Albrecht/Frankenberger 2009; Kailitz 2009b: 456f.).21 In order to complete the regime typology it has to capture the identifying features of autocracies, too. That requires a positive definition of autocracies. According to Karl Loewenstein. in an autocracy the political monopoly of the sole power holder underlies no constitutional restraints (cf. Siaroff 1999, p. 28). Loewenstein opposes the power-concentrating autocracies without control of the autocrat(s) to power dividing constitutional democracies with control of the rulers to (for a regime typology that roots completely in this juxtaposition see Backes 2007).22 Liberal-constitutional democracies in this perspective are defined as non-autocracies. The definition of autocracy in the subsequent typology concentrates on the negation of the question, whether citizens enjoy civil liberties and whether the executive reigns nearly absolutely. In contrast liberal-constitutional (thereby not necessary democratic!) will be the attribute of regimes in which citizens are free and where the executives ruling is constrained and controlled effectively. The classification of constitutional states and autocracies concentrates on the question of the scope of action of the ruling and the ruled. To put it in a nutshell: The less controlled the ruler is (maximation of the freedom of the ruler), the less free are the citizens. 21 Such a negative definition of autocracies is used e.g., by Gandhi/Przeworski (2006): 1, Reich (2002): 7 22 The issue of power sharing belongs to the core issues of comparative political sciences. It was neglected for a longer period anyhow and experiences stronger attention just in recent time: Kropp/Lauth (2007); Mainwaring/Welna (2003).

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Therewith two opposing pairs are introduced with the construction of this regime typology in contrast to the prevalent measures of regimes: 1) Democracies (inclusive, competitive regimes) and non-democracies (ideal-typical: non-inclusive, non-competitive regimes), 2) autocracies and the liberal-constitutional state (non-autocracy). Traditional non-inclusive regimes (non-democracies) should be used as the antonym to modern democracies with regard to the levels of inclusiveness and competitiveness, autocracy and constitutional state in turn as antonyms on the level of power sharing and the guarantee of civil freedom rights. Political regimes can be located in a three-dimensional property space along the dimensions of 1) executive constraints and civil liberties, 2) inclusiveness and 3) competitiveness. The features executive constraints and civil liberties are subsumed under one dimension because unlimited freedom of the ruler(s) can hardly be divided from exiguous civil liberties of the ruled. There are in reality neither regimes that are characterized by controlled exertion of powers and freedom of the citizens nor regimes in which power is exerted without control and where citizens are absolutely free. The dimensions can be operationalized with current indicators: Table 5: Operationalization of four regime indicators Executive Constraints Indicator Executive constraints

Polity IV Source: Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 18002008, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/ polity4.htm (20.10. 2009).

Civil Liberties Measure of civil liberties by Freedom House

Source: Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org (17.10. 2009).

Inclusiveness Indicator of inclusiveness by Tatu Vanhanen

Source: Polyarchy Dataset http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodatagui de/set.html?id=34&sub=1 (19.10. 2009).

Competitiveness Indicator of competitiveness by Tatu Vanhanen

Source: Polyarchy Dataset http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodatagui de/set.html?id=34&sub=1 (19.10. 2009).

Graph 1: Three-dimensional property space of political regimes

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Competitiveness

Pow

er S

harin

g &

Civ

il Li

berti

es

Participation

In the three-dimensional property space the eight corners can be composed as ideal-types. It is depicted below in a reduced two-dimensional form. If it seems necessary, hybrid mixed types can be created. In the following table hybrids describe the mixed types between a constitutional state and an autocracy.23 Table 6: Three-dimensional location of political regimes in the property space

level of inclusiveness and competitiveness Non-democratic constitutional state

Non-inclusive, competitive constitutional state

Inclusive, non-competitive constitutional state

Inclusive, competitive constitutional state (democratic constitutional state)

level of executive constraints and civil liberties

Non-democratic hybrid regime (constitutional monarchy)

Non-inclusive, competitive hybrid regime

Inclusive, non-competitive hybrid regime

Inclusive, semi-competitive, semi-autocratic regime (hybrid multi-party regime)

23 By hybrid we mean the latin foreign word for regimes that arise by the mixture of elements of pure regime types. There is an ongoing discussion on the definition of hybrid regimes. See e.g. Bogaards (2009); Diamond (2002); Karl (1995); Morlino (2009); Wigell (2008).

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Non-inclusive, non-competitive autocracy (absolutist monarchy, patrimonial regimes, military emegency dictatorships)

Non-inclusive, competitive autocracy

Inclusive, non-competitive autocracy (ideocratic and neopatrimonial one-party autocracy)

Inclusive and competitive autocracy (multi-party autocracies)

The categories rarely found in real life are written italic. Looking at the table the following thing is crucial: The presented typology bases upon the regime types in the parentheses (absolutist monarchies etc.) which are defined on the fundament of legitimation of power in turn. The regime types in parentheses are categories of the regime typology. The categorisations before the parentheses identify the section in the property space between democracy and autocracy where the certain regime types can be found. We can identify if a regime is liberal-constitutional, hybrid or autocratic by the aforementioned measurements of executive constraints (Polity IV) and civil liberties (Freedom House). To be precise, the differentiation on the axis of autocracy between constitutional states, hybrid regimes and autocracies can be conducted in the following way: Liberal constitutional regimes: According to Polity IV there are effective constraints of executive power and the citizens enjoy numerous civil liberties (in the words of Freedom House they are free) Hybrid regimes: There are at least a few constraints of executive power and the citizens enjoy at least some civil liberties (in the words of Freedom House they are partly free) Autocracies: According to Polity IV there are (almost) no effective constraints of executive power and/or the citizens enjoy (almost) no civil liberties (in the words of Freedom House they are not free) In addition to that, it is possible to distinguish between common and extreme (totalitarian) autocracies.24 The meaning and the function of elections in autocracies has been more or less ignored for a very long time. However, even non-competitive elections serve as a legitimation of power (Hermet et al. 1978). In modern societies inclusive, non-competitive regimes enjoy at least a higher degree of legitimation than all non-inclusive regime types competitive or not. Non-inclusive regimes in halfway modern societies can only be legitimated through a state of emergency at best. Exclusively the black swan Monaco combines a non-inclusive regime with a high degree of freedom and constitutionality in a modern society. The absolutist monarchies of Arabia go along with quite pre-modern appearing societal structures. Besides the great differences between Monaco and the Arab monarchies, there is one similarity. The people do not have to pay personal taxes. The slogan of the first democratic revolution, the American Revolution, was No taxation without representation. It is rational that if the people pay money to the state that they want to have a say in how the state spends it. However, if the state does not need financial support by its citizens it is much easier to deny them representation. Therefore, we can turn the slogan around and say: No representation without taxation in the modern world. Anyway with its legal-rational bureaucracy and liberalism Monaco the monarchy is only the traditional faade of a modern state building. It is a very small tax oasis25 for the rich which usually anyway do have enough political influence without formal representation in a parliament, while the Gulf monarchies are really traditional leftovers in a world of modern political systems. 24 For a delienation of the extreme autocracies based only on the measures of Freedom House with a normative overloaded label see Freedom House (2009). 25 We can also say: the smaller the state the less important is it if there are elections and parties.

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IV. Characteristics of autocracy types 1. Non-inclusive, non-competitive traditional autocracies: absolutist and constitutional monarchies Non-inclusive and non-competitive monarchies are characterized by a traditional personalist legitimation. They do not exhibit an ideology and require a political culture were people are uninterested in political participation. Mass mobilization or ideologization of the ruled people would be counterproductive for this regime type because this would necessarily challenge the own pre-modern legitimation. Non-inclusive, non-competitive monarchies can be distinguished in absolutist monarchies (autocracies) and constitutional monarchies (hybrid between constitutional state and autocracy). Absolutist monarchies are characterized by an improper distinction between private and national property. This attitude of an absolutist ruler is expressed ideal-typically in Louis XIV. well known, yet not proved citation: I am the state. Traditional monarchies in their pure form do not possess modern political institutions (parliaments and parties). So they lack channels for the citizens feedback or platforms for the solution of conflicts within the elites. This should affect the durability of traditional monarchies in a negative way. Contrary to that the empirical findings of Hadenius/Teorell are that traditional monarchies are among autocracies the most promising regime type to survive (Hadenius/Teorell, p. 13). However, this is maybe just due to their period of examination (1972-2003). As an explanation for monarchic stability in the Arab region the rentier state approach seems to be more plausible (Beck 2007).26 Accordingly, natural resource wealth (gemstones, gas, gold or oil) can foster the survivability of these regimes. The lack of tax burdens may together with the cultural coinage of the Arab region in turn explain the lack of interest in politics among the population (see Gause 1994; Weiffen 2008). The rulers can afford an extended security apparatus to confirm their dominion and the maintenance of a clientelistic network by the affluent gains from the natural resources (Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007). The remaining monarchies concentrate in the Arab region.27 Absolutist monarchies survived in Bahrain, Bhutan, Dubai, Brunei Darussalam, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Beyond this region that regime type can be found only in Swaziland in Africa. In addition on the pacific isle of Tonga a non-inclusive and non-competitive monarchy are to be found. In a historical perspective all absolutist and constitutional monarchies without elections belong in the same category, but the rule of the Saud (as well as the rule of the other oil monarchies) rests on the richness in oil and religious factors and those features fundamental differences in comparison with traditional absolutist monarchies in Europe like in France under Louis XIV (Herb 1999; Lucas 2004). 2. Semi-inclusive, semi-competitive autocratic and constitutional monarchies When monarchies develop from absolutism to semi-inclusiveness and semi-competitiveness we can usually speak of democratization. By and large but not always this goes along with liberalization to the point of a constitutional monarchy.28 When we think of semi-inclusive and semi-competitive monarchies we can virtually speak about a mixed type between

26 I would not argue that oil wealth hinders democracy (resource curse), but that oil wealth does not promote political modernization as wealth by industrialization does. 27 Cf. Albrecht/Schlumberger (2004); Bellin (2004); Fhndrich (2005); Frtig (2007); Lust-Okar (2005), (2006); Posusney/Penner (2005); Richter (2007); Schlumberger (2008). 28 Absolutist and constitutional monarchies are delineated by dint of the rating of freedom rights and power concentration in contrast to inclusive and non-inclusive monarchies.

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monarchies and multi-party regimes. The institutionalization of the regime by the introduction of a parliament and the concession of political parties always marks a modernization of the regime. By the implementation of these institutions, a well-regulated conflict resolution between parts of the elite is made possible and the interests of the citizens find a forum. Moreover, even in a (hybrid and therefore not completely autocratic) constitutional monarchy there can only be parliamentary elections, but no elections of the government. We can classify as semi-inclusive and semi-competitive monarchic autocracies Jordan and Morocco in the present Arabian region. A historical representative of this category is the constitutional monarchy of the German Empire from 1871 to 1918. 3. Non-inclusive, non-competitive (neo-)traditional regimes: patrimonial regimes Patrimonial autocracies resemble absolutist monarchies in their style of logic. The slogan of the rulers in these regimes can be analogue to the above-mentioned motto of absolutist monarchies outlined in the phrase I am the state or at least The state is mine. Non-inclusive and non-competitive regimes where a person tries to subject people to his rule without a credible traditional foundation belong to this category. Very often rulers try to justify their claim to power with exceptional characteristics of their person. In doing so they can give bloomy titles to themselves: Idi Amin, for example, called himself: His Excellency, President for Life, [] Lord of All the Beasts of the Earth and Fishes of the Seas and Conqueror of the British Empire in Africa in General and Uganda in Particular. Some of these rulers and their followers even try to sell the ruler to the people as a prophet or semi-god. In Congo (Zaire) e.g., the Interior Minister claimed in 1974: God has sent a great prophet, the prestigious Guide Mobutu, this prophet is our liberator, our Messiah. Our church is the MPR [Popular Movement of the Revolution]. [] Our gospel is Mobutism.(Engulu cited by Schatzberg 2001: 52). National and private property are not separated properly in patrimonial as well as absolutist regimes. Moreover, unlike monarchs rulers of patrimonial regimes are not bound to tradition. Therefore, in general the scope of arbitrary actions of the ruler is greater than in absolutist monarchies. Patrimonial regimes based on the military are to be integrated in this category as well. Like Idi Amin the rulers come to power by a military coup in this variant of patrimonial regimes. In contrast to military emergency dictatorships, however, no Junta is formed by members of the military in these regimes. There is always one person who claims to be the ruler (see on this regime type Decalo 1989)(Jackson/Rosberg 1982)). Because it is much harder for patrimonial than for absolutist monarchies to invoke tradition the rulers often feel impelled to legitimate their rule by a plebiscite or elections in the phase of establishment. Franois Duvalier, for instance, came into power by presidential elections in Haiti in 1957.29 Not until 1964, he appointed himself president for lifetime and Haiti altered to the category of patrimonialism. After the ruler closes the door to non-violent ways to get rid of him, he rules solely by co-optation (a system of political loyalties) and coercion (Chehabi/Linz 1998). One can assume that purely patrimonial regimes have the least political capability among all autocratic regimes because the citizens demands by and large do not influence policymaking. Like in other types of non-inclusive, non-competitive regimes there are no channels that could identify the will of the people and the rulers are even less interested in what people want than in traditional monarchies. In addition, like other non-inclusive autocratic regimes they lack a forum that enables the elites to agree non-violently on an allocation of power and goods. Because of the widespread affinity of patrimonial rulers to enrich themselves and the 29 By the elections of 1961 Duvalier eliminated all opposing parties and was confirmed in his office without an official dissentient vote. For this reason Haiti changed to the neo-patrimonial one-party regime of a type mentioned below.

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necessity to nourish a clientelistic network to ensure the exertion of dominion a great deal of the revenues flows into the pockets of a chosen circle of recipients. To argue with David Easton patrimonial regimes are supposed to be exceedingly instable because they cannot manage to respond to the claims of the people and cannot count on the support of the citizens therefore (Easton 1965). When the rulers try conserving their power this involves assuring their personally appropriated public money, their lifestyle and their survival ultimately. Indeed patrimonial rulers run a very high risk of being dispossessed violently because they attract a severe degree of anger of the citizens who live beyond the circle of recipients. Indicatives of such patrimonial regimes are the regimes of Samuel Kanyon Doe in Liberia, Muammar al-Quaddafi in Libya, Idi Amin in Uganda, Pahlavi in Iran or Duvalier in Haiti, Mobutu in Congo (Zaire). If the regime is characterized by elections and the dictator relies on a party the regime is not (any longer) a pure patrimonial regime. For instance, Fulgencio Batista converted his military-based patrimonial autocracy to a because of a boycott of the elections by the opposing parties and vote rigging weakly legitimated neopatrimonial multi-party regime. Military-based patrimonial regimes in 2008 can only be found in Libya, Mauretania, and Syria.30 4. Non-inclusive, non-competitive military emergency dictatorships Military emergency dictatorships always legitimate themselves internally and externally by assuming power to overcome an urgent political and/or economic and/or social crisis. Citizens are not involved in the selection of political personnel in military dictatorships and there is no competition among political alternatives. As soon as plebiscites or elections are held in a military dictatorship, it converts from a pure type of a military emergency dictatorship to a one-party autocracy with a military leader (e.g., Spain under Franco, Portugal under Salazar). Patrimonial regimes that are based on the military (e. g. Uganda under Idi Amin) are not counted among military emergency dictatorships. The difference between military dictatorships and patrimonial autocracies based on the military is that in emergency dictatorships the military as an institution seizes power. A group of high-ranking militaries (military junta) then rules the state; in military-based patrimonial regimes the military is in contrast merely an instrument of a personalist ruler. Military emergency dictatorships always claim that they will give back the power to civilians as soon as possible. According to Samuel Finer two factors are decisive whether the military seizes power: an opportunity (a political crisis, for instance) and the affinity of the military to interfere in politics (Finer 1962). Anyway, the military sometimes just topples the government because it acted against high-ranking officers. So the explanation for the coup in Mauritania 2008 is as simple as that: the president fired the high-ranking officers, and then they decided to fire him instead.31 Another meaningful factor that makes military emergency regimes possible is the widespread willingness of elites and the citizens to accept a political intervention by the military in times of crises. That requires a political culture that permits a temporary abandonment of political participation and the takeover of power by the military in times of crises. This willingness is throughout not present in the most developed countries of the world according to the data of the Human Development Index of the UN.32 On the other hand, that means that military emergency dictatorships usually appear in unstable democracies (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Turkey). So even if a military emergency dictatorship is not a modern regime type

30 Turkmenistan converted to the category of neopatrimonial multi-party regimes after the death of Nijasow in 2006. See the subsequent description of this type. Cf. Backes (2009) for the development of Turkmenistan. 31 See eg. 2008 Mauritanian coup detat, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Mauritanian_coup_d'%C3%A9tat. 32 See United Nations (2009).

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we usually find this kind of regime type not in the least developed countries. It is most likely that military emergency dictatorships get to power in medium developed countries (O'Donnell 1979). Military emergency dictatorships are by their core characteristics a fragile type of rule (Nordlinger 1977) and are therefore the least durable type of autocracy (cf. Geddes 2004a, 1999; Hadenius/Teorell, 2007).33 This is above all due to their promise to overcome a deep crisis. There are two options: The first option is that the military can overcome the crisis. By this success the military may count on a future legitimate claim to power. The legitimizing foundations, however, drop out after the crisis. Either they can manage to keep on ruling without any plausible legitimation from then on or they look for an alternative legitimation of a participatory nature or the military gives the power back to civilians. The military then remains a political veto player in the following civilian regime and can seize power in the next deep crisis (e.g., Turkey). Secondly, the military does not succeed in overcoming the crisis. In a little while the legitimizing foundation fades away due to the failure thereupon. The military loses power or it remains in power by coercion and co-optation (but without legitimation). Moreover, in future crises the question will raise, whether the military is presumed to be the most appropriate actor to overcome a crisis at all. Thus the military will ideal-typical lose its power as a political veto player in the subsequent civilian regime. The principal difference between military emergency dictatorships and personalist regimes (absolutist monarchies and patrimonial regimes) is that in personalist regimes the rulers always cling to power, but in military emergency dictatorships the military acts in the interests of preserving the interests of the state and especially the military.34 And, sometimes for military Juntas it seems in the interest of the state and the military to give the power back to civilians. Another central point that conflicts with the durability of this regime type is the problem of unsolved succession. Since pure military dictatorships are emergency dictatorships, they do not even have a chance to establish a legitimate rule of succession. Military coups, therefore, accumulate more in military emergency dictatorships and military-based patrimonial regimes than in democracies. That is to say rivaling groups within the ruling military often decide conflicts about the political course or the succession of the rulers violently. Military dictatorships also have great difficulties to shape political goals that find widespread support among the citizens. This is predominantly due to the lack of channels that could bunch the interests of the citizens. Moreover, militaries are just not trained to solve political problems. The repeated military regimes of Turkey are representatives of military dictatorships. At the present, we can find such military emergency dictatorships on Fiji, in Myanmar and in Mauritania since 2008. Honduras for a brief time in 2009 was also ruled by a military emergency dictatorship. 5. Inclusive, non-competitive dictatorships: Ideocratic and neopatrimonial one-party autocracies One-party autocracies are inclusive autocracies and for this reason modern regimes. Usually non-competitive elections are held. The pure existence of a state party gives the citizens an opportunity to take part in the political process. However, we are talking about directed participation in the framework of a society with almost no civil liberties. One-party autocracies exclude competition of political alternatives. They are inclusive, but never

33 However, there are some long-lived military regimes like Myanmar. 34 Military-based patrimonial regimes are by definition not military emergency dictatorships.

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competitive.35 Participation in one-party autocracies is confined to those who agree with the core of the regime. Furthermore, participation in one-party autocracies is led ad absurdum by the elimination of the citizens chance to vote rulers out of office and thus announce opposition. People are allowed to participate in one-party autocracies, but they are still subjects to the ruler. So according to Almond and Powell ideocracies (labeled as radical totalitarianism = communism and conservative totalitarianism = Nazi Germany) are rooted in a subject-participant culture, while democratic systems are rooted in a participant culture.(Almond/Powell 1966). While liberal-constitutional democracies have to be responsive to the demands of the citizens, because the ruled can vote the rulers out of office, one-party autocracies have a lower pressure to be responsive. One-party autocracies are generally characterized by a ban of all rivaling parties and the prohibition for opposing politicians to take part in elections (non-competitiveness). The monopoly of leadership of the communist parties has in all communist states been anchored in the constitutions. In some communist countries bloc parties were allowed (e.g., GDR), but on no account non-communist, independent parties. A neopatrimonial one-party autocracy is established, when a ruler like Saparmurat Nijasow 1999 in Turkmenistan is appointed to president for lifetime. In contrast to military emergency dictatorships and traditional monarchies we can speak of a modern institutionalized autocracy if there is a parliament and at least one party. Thus institutionalized autocracies offer platforms that enable mediation of conflicts between parts of the elite (Brownlee 2007a; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008; Smith 2005) and perception of the citizens preferences albeit only in a constricted way (see especially on legislatures in communist countries Nelson/White 1982)(Patzelt 2002)). The establishment of a one-party regime is usually but not always (Germany in 1933) a step toward a more modern political regime. The single party represents the efforts of leaders of more modern social forces to suppress more backward social forces on the way to modernity (Stathis 1999). Ideocracies are a subtype of one-party autocracies.36 Legitimation of rule of ideocratic one-party autocracies roots besides in the participation of the citizens in the orientation on an ideologically defined goal of rule. In terms of Max Weber ideocracies as institutionalized regime types with a well-developed bureaucracy and infrastructure constitute like democracies a type of legal-rational rule.37 We have to keep in mind that there is a fundamental difference between mass mobilization from above (directed political participation) and free and voluntary participation. However, even a totalitarian one-party ideocracy in the most radical rebuilding process needs the active support of large numbers of people (Almond/Powell 1966: 116)38, while a traditional political regime is usually satisfied if the people do not rebel against it. Of all regime types ideocratic one-party autocracies feature the strongest propensity to mobilize the masses. For example, a system of communist cells in the workplaces and 35 That does not negate that there can be a certain degree of competition within the institutions of the one-party autocracy like in national socialist Germany. It rather negates that there is competition between alternative political courses. 36 Carl Joachim Friedrichs considerations veered toward the above sketched classification of ideocracies as a type of one-party autocracy at the beginning of the 1970s. See for this: Friedrich (1970). For Friedrich ideocracies have always been thinkable only as modern one-party autocracies (for him totalitarianism was a phenomenon of the 20th century!): [W]hatever might be other characteristic features of a totalitarian dictator ship, a single party claiming a monopoly of party-political activity and committed to a totalist ideology is one of them (ibid., p. 240). 37 As is generally known Max Weber distinguished this modern regime type from traditional and charismatic rule. Contrary to the legal-rational regime type these are shaped by personalism. Weber (1968): 212-301. But it has to be kept in mind that under the label communist one-party autocracies very different kinds of rule existed. Compare, for instance, the Communist rule in Uzbekistan with that in the GDR. See Kitschelt (2005). 38 For an analysis of the need for legitimacy and the strategies of legitimation in communist autocracies see Rigby/Fehr (1982) and Moore (1954).

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neighborhoods organized demonstrations on the Revolution Square in Cuba with more than one million participants. At polls ideocracies, due to the legitimation by the identity-based vision of democracy, aim for a mobilization of 100 percent of all voters, to demonstrate the identity of will of the rulers and the ruled. Not only each dissenting vote, but also the abstention from voting questions the legitimation thereby. Indicatives of ideocracies are the communist and right-wing extremist fascistic and national socialist regimes. Neopatrimonial one-party autocracies can be distinguished from ideocratic one-party autocracies. The focal point of a neopatrimonial one-party autocracy is that it does not rest on a certain ideology, but on nepotism (patron-client-system). Nevertheless, even totalitarian ideocracies have displayed strong personalist elements as well. Especially totalitarian phases of ideocracies show immense pre-modern elements of personalist despotism (e.g., the Soviet Union under Stalin). Some regimes can be placed neither in the category of neopatrimonial one-party autocracies nor in the category of ideocratic one-party ideocracies. For example, the regimes of North Corea under Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il and Romania under Nicolae Ceauescu as well as the regimes of Spain under Franco39 and Portugal under Salazar combine elements of a neopatrimonial and ideocratic one-party ideocracy. These arises the question whether fascist and Nazi regimes (with a vague ideological foundation and glorification of a leader) would be better off in the mixed-type category. Now the only ideocratic one-party autocracies left are China, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. Moreover, only the political regimes in Eritrea and Uzbekistan can be classified as neopatrimonial one-party autocracies. 6. Mixed types between military dictatorships and neopatrimonial one-party autocracies All mixed types between military dictatorships and neopatrimonial one-party autocracies are inclusive and non-competitive. Unlike in pure military emergency dictatorships non-competitive elections are held and one and only one party exists. These pseudo-democratic institutions have the function to provide for enduring legitimation of the ruling militaries. They also differ from pure military dictatorships by the existence of a parliament that in turn constitutes a forum for carrying out conflicts between parts of the elite. Moreover, by carrying out non-competitive elections the crucial problem of a lacking rule of succession in pure military dictatorships is mitigated. As distinguished from pure emergency dictatorships that are ruled by a group of high-ranking militaries the ruling actor of this mixed regime is a president who in turn stems from the military. Examples of this regime type are Chile under Pinochet and Indonesia under Suharto. 7. Inclusive, (semi-)competitive hybrid regimes and autocracies: hybrid and autocratic multi-party regimes As opposed to one-party autocracies hybrid and autocratic multi-party regimes legitimate by inclusiveness and political competition. If there are virtually no opposing parties to be found in the parliament as a result of manipulation and suppression like in contemporary Uzbekistan the regime is classified as a one-party autocracy. Contrary to one-party autocracies there is at least one opposition party in the parliament of hybrid and autocratic multi-party regimes. Non-ruling parties are by no means just instruments of the rulers and therefore decoration, but rather independent actors though constricted in their freedom of action.40

39 On Spain see the classical analysis of Linz (1964). 40 In the last decade the terms electoral authoritarianism (type of autocracy) and competitive authoritarianism (hybrid regime type) for autocratic and hybrid multi-party regimes found general approval in international political science. Cf. Levitsky/Way (2002); Schedler (2002); (2006).

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There is no difference in the kind of legitimation of rule by inclusiveness and competition between hybrid and autocratic multi-party regimes and liberal-constitutional democracies. All hybrid and autocratic multi-party regimes call themselves democracies with a certain degree of entitlement. Transitions between multi-party autocracies, hybrid multi-party regimes and democratic constitutional states can take place by the limitation or expansion of civil liberties and the thresholds can be defined only vaguely. In matters of civil liberties and executive constraints even autocratic multi-party regimes are usually closer to democratic constitutional states than one-party autocracies. Contrariwise, even hybrid multi-party regimes like Singapore differ from democratic constitutional states by their considerably lower degree of implementation of civil liberties and a higher concentration of power. At the same time, this is like in Singapore predominantly not perceived as a democratic shortcoming. In fact, they refer to a concept of democracy that does not provide for a broad implementation of civil liberties and executive constraints. Due to the restrictions of civil liberties and power concentration, these regimes guarantee no real free and fair competition of political forces just by their core characteristics. Even though elections in hybrid and autocratic multi-party regimes are never completely competitive they are not only window dressing, but have relevance for the political process (see Gandhi/Lust-Okar 2009; Lindberg 2006). At the same time, multi-party regimes are more prone to be semi-autocracic (i.e. hybrids between constitutional states and autocracies) than fully autocratic as a rule (cf. Ottaway 2003). Consequently, multi-party autocracies can be distinguished from hybrid multi-party regimes by the degree of power concentration and civil liberties. Hence, restraints of civil liberties and the inclination to concentrate powers imply that competition cannot develop completely in reality. Moreover, this type of rule displays frequent manipulations in the run-up to and at elections what in return involves that the power of the rulers is not put at risk (cf. Magaloni 2007; Schedler 2002; Schaffer 2007). In 2008 the following states where neopatrimonial multi-party regimes: Egypt, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire), Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Yemen, Cambodia, Cameroon, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Russia, Tajikistan, Togo, Chad, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Zimbabwe. A historical representative of a hybrid multi-party regime is Germany in times of the presidential cabinets from 1930 to 1933. In 2008 the following states fell in the category of hybrid multi-party regimes: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Djibouti, Ecuador, Cote dIvoire, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Colombia, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Timor-Leste, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Venezuela, and Zambia. With one exception Iran all autocratic and hybrid multi-party regimes show an element of neopatrimonial legitimation. The exceptional case illustrates a pioneer case of an ideocratic (precisely: theocratic) multi-party regime. Competition is admitted only within ideocratic defined limits in this regime type. It is astonishing that of all regime types it was a theocratic ideocracy to make this clever move firstly whereas even the communist autocracies, which installed bloc parties, did never permit real competition between them.

V. Incidences of regime types in the 20th and 21st century While scholars concentrated on the spread of democracies in the last two decades, shifts from and to other regime types fell into oblivion. The two points in time under consideration here are 1972 and 2005/2008. Military dictatorships and one-party autocracies constituted in 1972 about one quarter of all regimes. Both regime types were hardly to a lesser extent spread than liberal-constitutional democracies. In contrast, the proportion of multi-party dictatorships and

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monarchies turned out to be considerably lower. In 1972 the 15 ideocratic and ideocratic-neopatrimonial one-party autocracies were: Albania, Bulgaria, China, GDR, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Of all these cases Bulgaria, GDR, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as satellite states of the Soviet Union were not fully sovereign, however, but amalgams of sovereign national regimes and externally controlled occupational regimes. At the same time, the one-party autocracies were all communist ideocracies after the defeat of the fascist/Nazi regimes in World War II. In comparison, in 1972 the number of ideocracies was considerably higher than in 2008. Today only China, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam and maybe also North Corea can be classified as ideocratic. It must be pointed out as well that a substantial relativisation of the ideological fundament of the rule has taken place in the remaining ideocracies Thus Chinas CPs policy hardly deserves the label communist in its conventional meaning (Holbig 2008). Whereas the downfall of ideocracies enjoyed great consideration the wipeout of neopatrimonial one-party autocracies, which have been prevalent in the 1970s, has attracted a much lesser public interest. Almost all of the neopatrimonial one-party autocracies merged into neopatrimonial multi-party regimes. To an even higher extent than one-party autocracies depleted the number of pure patrimonial regimes. In 1972 patrimonial regimes were still to be found in the following countries: Haiti, Malawi, Nicaragua, Uganda, Benin, Burkina Faso, Iraq, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Panama, Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, and the Central-African Republic. Meanwhile the names connected to these regimes like Idi Amin (Uganda), Noriega (Panama) or Bokassa (Central-African Republic) stand for the exploitation of the own country and arbitrary actions. Today there only three military-based patrimonial regimes in the world are left (Libya, Mauritania, and Syria). As a result, the time of patrimonialism (without elections) seems to be up. Even the proportion of military emergency dictatorships decreased heavily from 1972 to 2008. It even seemed as if this regime type could die out. Since 2006, however, four coups have taken place: Fiji 2006, Guinea and Mauritania 2008 and Honduras 2009. In contrast to the seizures of power by militaries in Latin America in the 1970s militaries today are unlikely to try to convert military emergency regimes into lasting military-based party dictatorships or even patrimonial regimes just as it happened in Chile under Pinochet or Indonesia under Suharto. The military in Honduras gave way to new elections very fast. The comparatively low portion of traditional monarchies of all regimes in 1972 has declined even more because of the rising number of states in the world notwithstanding even the durability of the most representatives of this regime type. In contrast there was an explosion of the proportion of participatory and (semi-)competitive multi-party regimes of political regime types. Today electoral autocracies are the most frequent type among autocracies. Table 7: Variants of political regimes 1972 and 2008

Regime Number Per cent

Number Per cent

Trend

Traditional Monarchies

15 10,3 10 5,2

Semi- competitive Monarchies 1 ,7 3 1,6

Proportion decreased

Civilian patrimonial regimes 4 2,7 0 0 Military patrimonial regimes 17 11,6 3 1,6

Type has nearly vanished

Ideocratic one-party autocracies

14 9,6 4 2,1 Type has nearly vanished

Neopatrimonial one-party autocracies

17 11,6 2 1,0 Type has nearly vanished

Mixed neopatrimonial and ideocratic- one-party autocracies

3 2,1 1 ,5 Type has nearly vanished

Military dictatorships 12 8,2 2 1,0

19

Type has nearly vanished Neopatrimonial Multi-party regimes

8 5,5 1 ,5 Proportion increased strongly

Ideocratic Multi-party regimes 0 0 30 15,5 Type (yet?) i n s ig n i f i c a n t

Hybrid Multi-party regimes -

7 4,8 26 13,5 Proportion increased strongly

Liberal democracies

44 30,1 105 54,4 Proportion increased strongly

Occupied or civil war

2 1,4 6 3,1 Proportion increased

Transition 1 0,7 0 0 Total 145 99,3 193 100,0 Number of states

increased strongly

VI. Political regimes and the process of cultural and socio-economic modernization The claim to have the right and authority to rule (legitimation of rule) does not guarantee legitimacy. The relationship between the degree of modernization of the orientations of the ruled (form of legitimacy beliefs) and the modernization of the political regime as well as the cultural coinage seems of central importance to the study of the durability of political regimes.41 If the societal structures (culture and degree of socio-economic development) are modern, it should be impossible to legitimate a political regime solely in a traditional way (by descent or abilities of the ruler). From the standpoint of modernization theory it is the structural differentiation of societies that fosters the inclusion of the citizens in the political process (Eisenstadt 1964: 377). The more goods are available the higher becomes the pressure to legitimize decisions on the distribution of these goods. The degree of differentiation refers mainly to the division of labor in any social system (Eisenstadt 1964: 378). The central hypothesis of Tatu Vanhanen is that democratization is expected to take place under conditions in which power resources have become so widely distributed that no group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain hegemony (Vanhanen 1997: 5).42 Out of a rational choice perspective autocracy is prevented and democracy permitted by the accidents of history that leave a balance of power or stalemate a dispersion of force and resources that makes it impossible for any one leader or group to overpower all of the others.43 On the micro-level well-being and education foster the demand of people for freedom and emancipation for themselves ({Inglehart 2005 #2587}{Welzel 2002 #871}{Welzel 2003 #812}).44 The argument is: Education is the most powerful factor in making men modern (Inkeles 1969). Education fosters the ability to think rationally and the 41 The notion that the relationship between political culture and political structure [is] one of the most significant researchable aspects of the problem of political stability and change (Almond/Verba (1963): 33) goes in the same direction. See for the possibility of this interpretation especially Almond/Powell (1966): 215f. 42 This is in line with the following argument of Lipset: A society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy [] or in tyranny (Lipset (1959): 75). The focus of Vanhanens works is the relationship between the degree of democracy and the distribution of power resources. He therefor calls his variant of modernization theory a resource distribution theory of democracy. Vanhanen (1997): 4. According to this theory people and groups struggle for power to obtain scarce resources. The base of his Darwian perspective on politics is that the evolutionary roots of politics lie in the necessity to solve conflicts over scarce resources by some means (Vanhanen (1997): 22). Vanhanens second assumption is that all people have an equal right to those resources. 43 The difference between the approach of Olson on the one hand and my argument is that I do not believe in the accidents of history, but that socio-economic developments foster a greater distribution of the power resources. 44 Vanhanen puts it that way: The level of education represents one aspect of resource distribution, which is the underlying factor of democratization (Vanhanen (1997): 25).

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will to participate politically (Lerner 1958). So Lipset (see e.g., Lipset 1959: 86-98) as more recently Inglehart and Welzel stress the significance of legitimacy for the establishment of democratic regimes. So modernization fosters the will and the ability of the people to participate in politics at the same time. Industrialization seems to be a prerequisite of political modernization since it fosters economic development and social mobilization (e.g., a higher rate of changes in residences and jobs). The increasing number of mobilized people, with the greater scope and urgency of their needs (let alone their demand for redistribution) tend to translate into increased political participation in crowds and riots, in meetings and demonstrations, in strikes and uprisings, or, less dramatically, as members of a growing audience for political communication (Deutsch 1961).45 Social mobilization also means that life becomes more complicated for the individuals and for the government. The government of an industrialized society has to answer a lot more of questions than the government of a traditional society. A traditional personalist regime that is less differentiated is less capable to accommodate demands for new regulations and services and thus satisfy the demands of the people than a modern populist regime with a developed and differentiated bureaucracy (Almond/Powell 1966: 40). So the basic argument for a democratic regime (inclusive and competitive) is that, the larger and more complex a society becomes, the more important is effective political organization [] and [n]o institutional form basically different from the democratic association (Parsons 1964: 355) can handle this. Therefore, the socio-economic developments foster the pressure and the need for a political development that involves the creation of political institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent to absorb and to order the participation of [the new social groups] and to promote social and economic change in the society (Huntington 1968: 264; see also ). (LaPalombora/Weiner 1966): 3). The modern political institutions parties and especially parliaments than serve as the channel[s] through which rents can be distributed, and more importantly, as the forum in which policy compromises can be organized (Gandhi 2008: 100). In a nutshell the interaction between the principal components of socio-economic modernization was perfectly described by Daniel Lerner: The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterize the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. Literacy performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g.,, voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies (Lerner 1958: 60). While from Walt Whitman Rostow (Rostow 1963)46 to Tatu Vanhanen many scholars theorized a linear and inevitable path from socio-economic modernization to democracy47, Barrington Moore (Moore 1966) and others formulated a historical analysis in which socio-

45 See also e.g. Huntington (1968): 266; Olsen (1968). 46 An alternative model of economic development was presented by . However, the model of Gerschenkron does not contradict the model of Rostow. By the arguments of Gerschenkron it can be explained why economic late-developers (China, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia) did establish a one-party autocracy instead of a constitutional-liberal state. Cf. Gerschenkron (1965). 47 However, others explicitly noted that development is not linear and inevitable nor irreversible. See e.g. Almond/Powell (1966): 62.

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economic development, especially industrialization, does not necessarily lead to democracy, but can also end in Communism or Fascism.48 To Moore the concrete form of the modern regime is a consequence of the following factors: 1. the power distribution among the elites and between the classes, 2. the states autonomy from the dominant class.49 However, the two lines of arguments Rostow/Vanhanen vs. Moore do not contradict each other. We can distinguish between various forms of modern regimes and still state one kind of modern regime (e.g., liberal-constitutional democracy in comparison to a one-party autocracy) is more modern than the other. Even if there is no linear path for every country from traditional to modern rule we undeniably can observe a global process of socio-economic, cultural and political modernization.50 Moreover, I will show that there is an indeed a strong relationship between the degree of modernity of a political regime and the degree of modernity of the socio-economic structures and the culture. In this perspective it is not surprising that usually the path from a traditional regime to a modern democracy leads via a one-party autocracy and/or a multi-party autocracy. It is possible to distinguish with Max Weber and Otto Hintze a cultural part of modernization from the socio-economic part. In the original perspective of modernization theory the cultural modernization seemed to be only a consequence of the socio-economic modernization. It was already Max Weber, however, who argued that it is the other way round and the culture of a country decisively influences its socio-economic development.51 Until today it is argued by researchers as Ronald Inglehart that cultural coinages can foster or hamper political modernization (Inglehart 2001). At the very heart of the syndrome of cultural coinage is the question of cultural secularization is. Almond and Powell put it that way: It is through the secularization of political culture that these rigid, ascribed, and diffuse customs of social interaction [in traditional societies] come to be overridden by a set of codified, specifically political and universalistic rule (Almond/Powell 1966). Maybe the most important point about secularization as a prerequisite for democracy is the value placed upon individual personality, or rather the view of the nature of the individual as being end and not means (Griffith et al. 1956: 105, quote stems from Griffith). The religious tradition is of great importance for the regime type, because there is historically a close relationship between the religious tradition and the tradition of the state. Max Weber and in his footsteps Daniel Treisman argued that Protestantism fosters a separation of church and state52 and a less hierarchical society. It those leads to a civic society, that effectively controls office holders

48 It is often forgotten that Moore also discussed the case of India (as an example for a country) which economically remained in the preindustrial age but as a political species belonged to the modern world. See Moore (1966): 314-410. 49 The main obstacle for a democratic development was for Moore the existence of a powerful class of landlords dependent on cheap labor. See Moore (1966) and also Huber et al. (1993); Rueschemeyer et al. (1992). The other well-know claim is: No bourgeois, no democracy. See Moore (1966): 418. For Moore one of the most decisive determinants influencing subsequent political history is, whether or not landed aristocracy has turned to commercial agriculture and if so, the form that this commercialization has taken. Moore (1966): 419. 50 The claim that modernization as a global process is inevitable and irreversible can be described as a feature of modernization theory (see e.g., Huntington (1971): 290). However, no writer on modernization ever claimed that there would be no temporary breakdowns and occasional reversals (ibd.) in this process. The point of view of modernization theory (modernizing optimism) stands in stark contrast to the view represented e.g., by Arendt (1951) and Kornhauser (2008), which can be characterized as modernizing skepticism. 51 See e.g. Eisenstadt (1982); Harrison/Huntington (2001); Huntington (1996); Inglehart/Baker (2000); Lal (1998); Weber (2004 [1920]). I have to emphasize that the argument here is only that there are distinguishable culture zones and a relationship between regime type and culture type, but I do not agree with Huntingtons thesis, that we face a clash of civilizations. 52 The historical background is that the variants of Protestantism usually arose as dissenting sects opposed to a state-religion (catholicism) and the protestant church monitored and anounced abuses by officials of the state and the state religion.

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and fights against corruption.53 Protestantism is indeed the religion that is the least hierarchical among the world religions. It is shaped by egalitarian and individualistic views. Catholicism as the original form of Western Christianity under the influence of the works of Thomas Aquinas comes closest to Protestantism in the appreciation of individualism.54 But even if different from Islam there is a clear-cut division between state and church in Catholicism it also has to be remembered that for Catholics in Thomas Aquinas footsteps the ruler (king) was for centuries like the soul in the body and God in the world (Thomas/Dyson 2002): So Aquinas and the Catholics who followed this path pleaded for a government in the interest of the individual citizens, but against their participation in government. Regarding Islam it is argued, that it hampers the separation of church and state, individualism and therefore the development of a modern civil society. Islam is said to restrict or deny the importance of the individual while highlighting collective over induvidualistic rights (Haynes 2001: 170, see expecially on hierarchical and collectivist aspects of the Arab culture e.g., Elhadj 2006). The religion strongly influenced the structures of the society and the state. So the agrarian economy in the occident was much more individualistic (feudalism) than the collectivist agrarian economy in the orient (Welzel 2002: 237-250). While the Schism between Catholicism and Protestantism was a schism inside Western Christianity, the East-West-Schism deeply divided Eastern and Western countries already in the Middle Ages.55 George Schpflin argued about the different extent of constraints of the executive in Eastern and Western Europe, that the further we go to the east the more prevalent is the idea, that a ruler can do everything, that is not explicitly forbidden (Schpflin 1993: 11f). When the ruler himself makes the laws this leads to an uncontrolled patrimonial rule. If we go even further to the east than Eastern Europe in the Middle East there is no tradition of any constraints to the ruler (Pawelka 2002; Wittfogel 1957). The further we go to the West the stronger is the tradition of executive constraints: Fragmentation of power in the medieval West was crucial to the development of constitutionalism. This fragmentation took two overlapping forms: the differentiation between spiritual and temporal authority; and the distribution of authority between the king and his feudal vassals. These cross-cutting limitations of authority implied their mutual limitation.(Arjomand 1994: 4).56 Different from the Eastern countries in the Western countries already since the Middle Ages also government and jurisdiction were separated. Until today the separation of church and state as well as individualism is least developed in Muslim countries (with the notable exception of Turkey). The argument in democratization studies thus is, that it is much harder for democracy to establish and stabilize in Muslim countries than in Christian countries (Fish 2004; Haynes 2001: 170f., Huntington 1996; Lewis

53 C.f. Treisman (2000): 403. The original argument is presented in Weber (2004 [1920]). 54 It seems that human laws should not be framed for the community, but for the individual. Thomas/Dyson (2002): 137. Therefore law is not directed to the common good only, but also to the private good of an individual.: 79. 55 There are far less statements in political science on the relationship between Judanism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism and the development of the political regime. See e.g. on Confucianism and Democracy: Ackerly (2005); Chae-bong (2004); Chen (2007); Fukuyama (1995). The summary of the debate is that Confucianism is compatible with democracy (inclusiveness and competitiveness), but much less with liberalism (civil liberties and executive constraints). Hundism, Judaism and Buddishm are mostly seen as religions that neither foster nor hamper a democratic development. On Hinduism and democracy see Pratap Bhanu/Mehta (2004). On Judaism and Democracy see Hillel Gideon (3). On Buddhism and democracy there is no elaborated work at all. 56 The original argument is of course from Otto Hintze one of the most significant German Historians: of the German Empire and Weimar Republic Hintze (1970).

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1998: 28f., Ross 2001). Yet in Othodox Christiany secularization is less developed than in Western Christianity.57 To check the relationship between the level of modernization and the form of the political regime I use two widespread measures, the GDP per capita data from Angus Maddison and the Human development Index, which does include indicators on economic development, on education and health. Table 8: GDP and Regime Type

Regime Type GDP (1975) N Standard deviation GDP (2005) N

Standard deviation

Traditional Monarchy 10130,0209 11 11215,98799 7201,0870 10 4443,76858Patrimonial regime 1668,8780 25 1578,25134 2456,1743 7 2431,45428Neopatrimonial one-party autocracy

1923,7913 16 2182,06909 2707,9700 3 1829,84483

Ideocratic one-party autocracy (including mixed types)

2965,0758 19 2284,10348 2707,5740 5 1761,61692

Military regime 2825,7578 9 1404,15819 2408,4600 1 . Hybrid and autocratic multi-party regimes

3700,6583 12 2386,54590 3677,0933 48 4623,99627

Liberal democracies 8943,3915 33 4982,79671 10732,5259 76 8410,70073Average 4841,9274 125 5481,53137 7369,6452 150 7519,29934Source: GDP per capita, (Maddison 2009). Table 9: Human Development Index and Regime Type

Regime type HDI (1975) N Standard deviation HDI (2000) N

Standard deviation

Traditional Monarchy ,55187 8 ,153509 ,72743 7 ,114435Patrimonial regime ,40262 16 ,148610 ,54233 3 ,133628Neopatrimonial one-party autocracy

,41378 9 ,087555 ,53450 2 ,150614

Ideocratic one-party autocracy (including mixed types)

,45440 5 ,209040 ,60850 2 ,122329

Military regime ,57144 9 ,125057 - - -Hybrid and autocratic multi-party regimes

,63433 12 ,117959 ,56192 37 ,154240

Liberal democracies ,74562 37 ,155125 ,81163 63 ,141469Average ,59579 96 ,198445 ,70990 114 ,185300Source: (United Nations 2009) The relationship between regime type and GDP is more or less in line with our argument, even if there is no statistical relevant correlation. There is simply no strong statistical correlation, because there is one major deviation from the prediction. The surviving traditional monarchie