Kailitz, Sailing the Ship.pdf

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Sailing the Ship through the Storm. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Breakdown

and Survival of Electoral Regimes in the Interwar Years

Steffen Kailitz1

Draft paper prepared for presentation at the IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference: Whatever Happened to North-South?, Sao Paulo, February 19th, 20112

Abstract

Based on a configurational analysis this paper identifies, which conditions are necessary and

which are sufficient for the breakdown and survival of non-autocratic electoral regimes in the

interwar period. It turns out that economic, political and social stress might well be the main

reason why there was an authoritarian reverse wave in the interwar period, but this factor

does not help us to explain why some democracies in this period survived while others failed.

The results are as complex as historic reality. Structural factors do matter as well as

institutions and actors. It turns out that under the preconditions that an electoral regime had astrong labor-repressive agrarian elite, was not highly developed and had no electoral and

constitutional tradition before the First World War and no leading politician acted in favor of

democracy during a times of crisis, and, the regime broke down if there was either no

Charlemagne heritage or a leading politician acted in favor of autocracy in a time of crisis or

there was a strong president. Conversely, a non-autocratic electoral regime survived the

interwar years under the preconditions that it had a tradition of a strong and effective state

apparatus (Charlemagne heritage) and no territorial loss and there was no pro-autocratic

action of a leading politician in a economic and/or political crisis, if it either established a

constitutional democracy pre World War I or there was a pro-democratic action of a leading

politician in a time of crisis or the democratic regime was parliamentarian.

1 University of Erfurt (Visiting Professor) and Hannah-Arendt-Institute for Research on Totalitarianism at theUniversity of Dresden E-mail: [email protected] and [email protected] I thank Robin Dyck, Erik Fritzsche, Tanja Havlin, and Katrin Strehle for research assistance. I also thank DirkBerg-Schlosser and the participants of the the Symposium on Conditions of Democracy in Inter-War Europe C.C.C. Revisited, Marburg, July 3, 2009 for helpful comments.


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1. Introduction

Around 1918 political observers (e.g. Bryce 1921) thought they were experiencing a

worldwide victory of democracy pretty much like at the beginning of the 1990s (e.g.

Fukuyama 1992): It was assumed that with the spread of popular elections the principles and

methods of democracy would eventually prevail among all enlighted people (Dean et al.

1934, 1). But during the interwar period an authoritarian reverse wave followed. When Lenin

took over in Russia in 1917 the era of Communism and, only a few years later, in Italy in

1923 the era of fascism began. Until 1939 all the states of Central- and Eastern Europe, with

the exceptions of Czechoslovakia, Finland and Switzerland had fallen to various forms of

autocratic rule. The reasons for survival and breakdown of electoral regimes in the interwar

years appear to be, especially after the Interwar project of Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy

Mitchell (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000, 44-70; 2002; Berg-Schlosser and Meur 1994;

Berg-Schlosser 1998), the most studied issues in the subfield of democratization studies

focusing on the persistence of democracies (see also Aarebrot and Berglund 1995; Ertman

1998; Linz and Stepan 1978; Skaaning 2008). So why does it make sense to review this issue?

First, different from previous studies I include in my analysis all countries in the world, not

only the European countries. Second, I apply a different method on the topic. I argue that an

explanation for the outcome that does not includeall necessary conditions is never able toexplain the outcome, since the outcome would by definition not take place without the

necessary conditions. So this paper identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for 1. the

breakdown and 2. the survival of electoral regimes in the interwar period.3 Only recently,

researchers (Goertz 2006; Braumoeller and Goertz 2000; Goertz and Starr 2003; Ragin 2006)

have emphasized the importance of necessary conditions. Since classical statistical

approaches are not able to identity necessary conditions, other tools namely the different

forms of a configurational analysis4, have been developed for this kind of research. Booleanalgebra isthe perfect tool to check the necessity of conditions (Caramani 2009, 58-61; Ragin

2006, 2008). When Charles Ragin (1987) first introduced crisp set qualitative comparative

analysis (csqca), the main advantage he emphasized was that this method it is able to identify

more than one path leading to the same outcome, even if it was noted from the beginning that

3 The most similar analysis on this topic is (Skaaning 2008). However, Skaaning focuses geographically on theEuropean cases and on structural explanations of the breakdown and survival of the electoral regimes and heincludes all European countries, even the USSR.4 Configurational analysis is used as a generic term for crisp set qualitative comparative analysis, fuzzyset/qualitative comparative analysis and multi-value qualitative comparative analysis. See Ragin (2008); Rihouxand Ragin (2008).


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Boolean algebra is a tool to test the necessity and sufficiency of conditions (Ragin 1987, 99-

101). Until today most researchers using configurational analysis be it, csqca, fuzzy set

QCA (fsqca) or multi-value QCA (mvQCA) still work only top-down and search for

sufficient conditions of the outcome. Necessary conditions, however, have to be checked

bottom-up (Ragin 2000, 218; see e.g. also Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 57-62).5 A

bottom-up analysis has further advantages. It is more case-orientated than the top-down

analysis. Condition by condition the researcher deals with the truth tables and it is easy to

address which cases have led to a result.

2. Selection of cases

To identify non-autocratic electoral regimes I use three indicators on two dimensions. On the

first dimension I distinguish electoral regimes from non-electoral regimes by the dimensions

public competitiveness and participation (Dahl 1971, 6). To measure competitiveness and

participation I use the well-known measures by Tatu Vanhanen (1984, 1990, 1997, 2003).

Competition is measured by subtracting the largest parties vote share in parliamentary, or

presidential elections, or both (depending on the kind of electoral regime) from 100.

Participation is calculated as the percentage of voters in relation to the total population

(Vanhanen 1984, 28-33; 1997, 34-37). On this dimension I classify political regimes asfollows:

Electoral democracy competitiveness 20 and participation 15Electoral oligarchy and/or semi-competitivesystem

competition 10 and < 20 and participation 5and < 15

Non-participative and/or non-competitiveregime

competition < 10 or participation < 5

The thresholds do differ only slightly from the suggested thresholds by Tatu Vanhanen (1997, 33).

Too much of the previous literature placed an overwhelming emphasis on the electoral

process and thus overlooked other fundamental dimensions that are criteria for analyzing

regimes (Snyder 2006, 220). There are, however, regimes with elections that are still

autocracies (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010). An autocracy

is defined as a political regime in which the executive is almost unrestricted (see e.g.

Loewenstein 1957, 28). Mexico until the end of the 1980s is a classic example of an electoral

5 A problem of only using the classical top-down analysis of sufficient conditions via Tosmana or fs/QCA is alsothat the algorithm sometimes identifies a condition as necessary, because it is included in all paths to theoutcome. But sometimes this condition does not pass a bottom-up test of necessary conditions.


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autocracy (Magaloni 2008). On the non-autocratic dimension I measure the executive

constraints by Polity IV (Polity IV Project 2009). Thus, I distinguish between three regime

types on this dimension:

Constitutional regime The executive is effectively constrained(Polity IV, executive constraints = 7)

Hybrid regime The executive is subject to some constraintsat any rate (Polity IV, executive constraints =5 or 6)

Autocracy The executive is not constrained (Polity IV,executive constraints = 4 to 1)

I consider all constitutional and hybrid electoral regimes in the period from 1919 to 1938 with

a population of more than 200.000 inhabitants all over the world. So Liechtenstein,

Luxembourg, Monaco and San Marino are excluded because of their small size. I further

exclude regimes which are either completely non-democratic or completely not constitutional.

Namely, I exclude Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and the Soviet Union which were

included in one or the other previous analysis of democracies in the interwar period (Berg-

Schlosser and Mitchell 2000, 2002; Skaaning 2008). In Hungary, for intance, in 1926 the

white regime led by Istvn Bethlen, a Transylvanian aristocrat, and Mikls Horthy, the

former commander in chief of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, took over. This can be seen as areaction to the red revolution, led by Bla Kun. Red terror was followed by white

terror. Many Communists and other leftists were tortured and executed without trial. From

1932 on the regime showed strong fascist elements. In any case, at no point in the interwar

years had Hungary been non-autocratic. There is only one ambiguous case, Honduras.

Although Polity IV data measures a hybrid regime in the interwar years I classify this regime

as an electoral autocracy because it had only presidential elections and in addition to that

these elections were subject to massive electoral fraud (Bendel 1995, 150).In the following inquiry I include electoral oligarchies (Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay,

and Yugoslavia) with an electoral participation of more than 5 and less than 15 per cent of the

total population in national elections I consider 16 non-autocratic electoral regimes that

survived the interwar years Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia,

Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,

Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA and 14 electoral regimes that broke down.


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Table 1: Breakdowns of Electoral Regimes in the Interwar Years in Chronological OrderCountry Date of breakdown Before change of regime Change of regimeItaly 29-Oct-1922 Hybrid electoral

democracyto electoral autocracy (3/1); on03-Jan-1925 from electoralautocracy to non-electoralautocracy (3/3)

Poland 12-May-1926 Constitutionaldemocracy to hybrid non-electoral system(2/3)Portugal 28-May-1926 Hybrid electoral

oligarchyto non-electoral autocracy (3/3)

Lithuania 17-Dec-1926 Hybrid electoraldemocracy

to non-electoral autocracy (3/3)

Cuba 01-Jan-1928 Hybrid electoraloligarchy


Yugoslavia 06-Jan-1929 Hybrid electoraloligarchy


Argentina 06-Nov-1930 Hybrid electoraloligarchy


Germany 30-Jan-1933 Hybrid electoraldemocracy


Uruguay 31-Mar-1933 Hybrid electoraloligarchy

to non-electoral hybrid regime(2/3)

Austria 25-Jul-1934 Hybrid electoraldemocracy

to electoral autocracy (3/1)

Estonia 12-Mar-1934 Constitutionaldemocracy


Latvia 15-May-1934 Constitutionaldemocracy


Greece 04-Aug-1936 Constitutionaldemocracy


Spain 01-Apr-1939 Constitutionaldemocracy to non-electoral autocracy (3/3)

3. Method: The Analysis of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

First, I will test the necessity (and sufficiency) of the different explanations for democratic

breakdown and survival of electoral regimes bottom-up one by one. After that I provide a top-

down analysis of the sufficient paths to the outcome (the classical configurational analysis).

Finally, I will merge the solution formulas for necessary and sufficient conditions. Data

management and analysis was performed using fs/QCA 2.5 and Tosmana.

As a reminder: A necessary condition has to be fulfilled whenever the outcome is present. The

cases with the outcome are a subset of the cases with the condition. But there can be cases

where the condition is present but not the outcome.


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Condition is completely necessaryCondition absent Condition present

Outcome present 1. no cases here 2. cases hereOutcome absent 3. not relevant 4. not relevant

When a condition is completely sufficient, the outcome always takes place when the condition

is present. Therefore, cases with this condition are a subset of the cases with the outcome.

This does not, however, mean that the outcome cannot take place when the condition is not

present, because there can be other conditions or combinations of conditions leading to the

same outcome.

Condition is completely sufficientCondition absent Condition present

Outcome present 1. not relevant 2. cases hereOutcome absent 3. not relevant 4. no cases here

When it comes to necessary conditions, we always have to check if a condition is only of

trivial necessity. All necessary conditions are regarded as trivial in which the cause is present

in all cases, irrespective of outcome (Caramani 2009, 62; Braumoeller and Goertz 2000, 854).

For obvious reasons, for instance, no war can be fought and peace achieved without air and

gravity.

To analyze the necessity (and sufficiency) of a condition bottom-up I use also Ragins

measures of consistency and coverage of necessary and sufficient conditions (see the table in

the appendix). The measure of consistency tells us to which degree a subset relation has been

approximated. The coverage assesses the relevance of a consistent subset (Ragin 2006,

2008). With these measures of consistency and coverage it is possible to identify whether a

condition is almost necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome. The measures are calculated

by the following formulas:

consistency necessity (and at the same time coverage sufficiency) =

number of cases with condition and outcome/number of cases with outcome

consistency sufficiency (and at the same time coverage necessity) =

number of cases with condition and outcome/number of cases with condition


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Consistency is always the crucial measure. It is pointless to regard coverage if a condition is

not close to being necessary (or sufficient). In order to measure consistency a minimum

requirement has to be chosen, while this is not necessary for coverage. Ragin (2008) suggests

that the level of consistency should be above 0.8. To be on the safe side I set a threshold of

0.85. Nevertheless, if we speak of necessity and sufficiency in the context of a configurational

analysis, only a possible necessity or a possible sufficiency is meant by these expressions. The

fewer cases one analyzes, the likelier are errors concerning one`s claims on necessity and

sufficiency.

What is the surplus value by measuring consistency and coverage of sufficient and necessary

conditions compared to the classical quantitative toolkit? A correlation matrix reveals the

relationship between certain conditions and the outcome if there is a relationship. Only if we

are very lucky and social scientists are never that lucky we measure a perfect relationship,

which means that our condition is necessary and sufficient. All values in between one and

zero do not tell us if a condition is either (close to being) sufficient or (close to being)

necessary. So we get a lot more information if we check necessity and sufficiency separately.

Different from a regression analysis a top-down analysis of sufficient conditions is able to

identify INUS-conditions (insufficient but non-redundant elements of a complex which is

itself unnecessary but sufficient for the outcome).

4. Theoretical Explanations and Operationalization

4.1 Structural Approaches

4.1.1 Modernization Theory: Socioeconomic conditions

Since Seymour Martin Lipset published his seminal article Economic Development andDemocracy (1959) the following thesis is one of the best known in social sciences: the more

well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy (31). The argument

is, in a nutshell, that wealth can cause higher education to spread, can strengthen the middle

class and create a democratic civil society and thus make democracy sustainable. For Lipset,

modernization is the prerequisite of the development of a democratic political culture. On the

micro-level well-being and education foster the demand of people for freedom and

emancipation for themselves (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2002; Welzel et al. 2003).Especially education fosters the ability to think rationally and the will to participate politically


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(Inkeles 1969; Lerner 1958).6 I focus on wealth, namely GNP, and education, namely literacy.

For the purpose of this paper I have constructed an index of the degree of modernization of a

country as follows:

Highly developed country: High GDP (> 3750$) and High Literacy (> 90%)

Medium developed country: Medium GDP (3749-2000$) and High Literacy (> 90%) or High

GDP (> 3750$) and Low Literacy (< 90%)

Low developed country: Low or Medium GDP (< 3749$) and Low Literacy (< 90%)

Literacy is measured by data from Vanhanen (2009) and gross domestic product (GDP) at

purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita by data from Maddison (2009).

4.1.2 Historical Structures

4.1.2.1 Strong labor-repressive agrarian elite

Barrington Moore claimed in his seminal work Social Origins of Dictatorship and

Democracy (1993) that the two undemocratic routes to modernity, the authoritarian-

reactionary route and later fascist route followed by Germany and Japan and the communist

route followed by China and the Soviet Union are linked to the occurrence of strong labor-

repressive agrarian elites. In Moores footsteps Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992)

and Stephens (1989) pointed out that a strong labor-repressive agrarian elite also undermines

democratic stability. The argument in a nutshell is that the existence of a large labor-

repressive landed class in the nineteenth and early twentieth century changed the alliance

options for the other classes and as a consequence the political outcome (Stephens 1989,

1070). The method of labor control leads the landlords to seek an alliance with those incontrol of the means of coercion, the state, and it accounts for the strong anti-democratic

impulse of the aristocracy (Stephens and Kmmel 2002, 41). By using data of scholars such

as Ersson (1995) and Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 159-199) I distinguish

between the presence and absence of a significant landed upper class engaged in labor

repressive agriculture. If there is either no strong agrarian elite or the agriculture is not labor-

repressive cases are coded as 0.

6 For a more thorough argument with regard to why literacy is important for the democratization process seeHadenius (1992).


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4.2. Stress Approaches

Based on David Eastons system theory (1965; 1973), it seems likely that political systems

under extraordinary stress experience a breakdown, because the citizens are not willing to

support a regime that does not satisfy their demands. If the will of the people to support the

political system decreases, the stress on the regime increases further. Especially the

correlation between the absence of economic stress (that means economic growth, absence of

an economic crisis and low inflation) and the stability of democracy is well established

(Przeworski 1996; Przeworski et al. 2000). Stress for a political system, however, can have

very different causes.

4.2.1 Economic Decline

Postwar Crisis

It seems to make sense to argue that a sudden drop in economic wealth endangers the

persistence of an electoral regime. A time-specific factor of stress for some electoral regimes

in the interwar periods was a strong economic and social crisis after World War I. World War

I was a traumatic experience for all countries taking part in that war, especially for theEuropean countries which lost the war. A typical example of a postwar crisis is Germany. In

1919 Free Corps took Berlin and the Spartakus leaders Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg

were murdered; soon afterwards the German Revolution was crushed. I followed the coding

rule by Berg-Schlosser/de Meur (1994) to distinguish between countries that experienced a

post-war crisis and those that did not.

Great Depression

It is often said that the strong effect of the world economic crisis is indeed one of the major

reasons why so many democracies failed in the interwar years (referred to Weimar Germany

see Lepsius 1978, 50). Using the data of Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2002 (2002) and Angus

Maddison (2009), I test if there was a strong effect of the Great depression after 1929.

However, all electoral regimes that broke down before 1929 are coded with 0, because the

condition did not precede the outcome and therefore the economic crisis could not haveplayed a role in these breakdowns.


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Double Crisis

The last step is to clarify whether a combined strong effect of a postwar crisis and the Great

Depression helps to explain the breakdown of non-autocratic electoral regimes. Only cases

which experienced both forms of crisis are coded with 1.

4.2.2. Territorial Loss

After World War I huge territorial shifts occurred in Europe. It can be argued that every

nation experiences great stress when it is confronted with substantial loss of territory and/or

many of its native people. People of a former greater empire might think it is necessary to

support a strong autocrat, that is aiming and able to retake territory and free the own

people abroad (on the effects of postimperial stress on Weimar Germany and Post-Soviet

Russia see Kailitz and Umland 2009).

4.3. Institutional Approaches: Democratic Regime Type and Electoral System

Institutional variables have a special appeal for researchers, because politicians can changethem without great effort via constitutional engineering (Sartori 1997). It is relatively easy

to modify the electoral system, whereas it is often a long lasting and complicated process to

improve socio-economic conditions. I examine the effect of two institutional variables: 1. a

strong president and 2. a proportional electoral system. I have chosen these factors according

to the following arguments in the literature: Juan Linz (1994) and many others argued that

presidential democracies are more prone to democratic breakdown (see e.g. also Kailitz

2004a; Valenzuela 2004). The point is that the president and the majority of parliament areindependent of each other and there is no constitutional resolution for a deadlock between

these two institutions.7 Regarding electoral systems Ferdinand Hermens (1941) claimed that

proportional electoral systems not only lead to high level of fragmentation of party systems

and low levels of government stability, but also in the end to the breakdown of democracy.

7 In the discussion on the constitution of the Weimar Republic most prominently Karl Dietrich Bracher pointedout that the dual legitimacy of two popularly elected bodies independent of each other the president of the stateand the parliament undermined the stability of the governments and led to a presidential dictatorship (Bracher1962). Until today many political scientists stress that semi-presidentialism was a main problem of the WeimarRepublic (Rb 1994; Skach 2005).


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5. Results

5.1 Structural Approaches

5.1.1 Socioeconomic conditions

The absence of a high level of development is a necessary condition for the breakdown of

electoral regimes. In other words, an electoral regime does not break down when it has

reached a certain level of economic development. This result is in line with (Przeworski et al.

2000). All electoral regimes that broke down were solely countries with low or medium levels

of development. All electoral regimes with a high level of development surived the interwar

years. However, a high level of development is not a necessary condition for the survival of

electoral regimes since Czechoslovakia, Costa Rica, Finland, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden

survived without being highly developed. Nevertheless, the absence of a low level of

development is almost a necessary condition (consistency 0.88). Only the electoral regimes in

Costa Rica and Ireland survived the interwar years despite a low degree of modernization.

Nevertheless, Costa Rica is not a strong contradiction to the claim that electoral regimes with

low levels of development broke down in the Interwar years.8 The electoral regime in Costa

Rica broke down shortly before the start of the interwar years in 1917 as well as shortly afterthe end of the interwar years in 1947. However, it is obvious that the electoral regimes in

Argentina, Austria, and Germany broke down despite exhibiting at least medium levels of

development. And if I were to only slightly reduce the threshold for a high GDP, Austria

(GDP 1913: 3465$ per capita) and Germany (GDP 3523$ per capita) would even count as

highly developed countries. That is why one could argue that the Austrian and German

development somehow contradicts the modernization theory (see e.g. Lipset 1960, 28).

Table 2: Modernity (high) and BreakdownModernity(high)

Outcome Countries

0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand,Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA

0 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Greece, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia

1 0 Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden1 1

8 However, presently we can observe the pattern of a surviving democracy despite a low level of modernization,for example in India.


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Table 3: Modernity (low) and BreakdownModernity(low)

Outcome Countries

0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA

0 1 Austria, Germany, Argentina

1 0 Costa Rica, Ireland1 1 Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Greece,Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay,Yugoslavia

5.1.2 Historical Structures

5.1.2.1 Strong labor-repressive agrarian elite

A strong agrarian elite combined with a labor-repressive agriculture was a necessary

condition for the breakdown of an electoral regime in the interwar period. In we turn the

tables the absence of a strong labor-repressive agrarian elite was not a necessary condition for

the survival of an electoral regime. That means electoral regimes can survive very well with a

strong agrarian labor-repressive elite. Anyhow: no breakdown of an electoral regime without

a labor-repressive agrarian elite.

Table 4: Strong labor-repressive Agrarian Elite

Strong labor-repressiveagrarian elite

Outcome

Countries

0 0 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand,Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

0 11 0 Australia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Ireland, USA1 1 Austria, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,

Spain, Greece, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia

5.1.2.2 Secularism and State-Building

Secularized Protestantism was an almost necessary condition for an electoral regime tosurvive in the interwar years (consistency of 0.88). Nevertheless, the electoral regimes in

Costa Rica and Ireland survived with a Catholic culture. Moreover, three electoral regimes in

countries with secularized Protestant majorities broke down. If we turn the tables, the absence

of secularized Protestantism as the dominant culture did not fulfill the criterion of quasi-

necessity for the breakdown of the electoral regime (consistency of 0.79)


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Table 5: Secularized ProtestantismSecularizedProtestantism

Outcome Countries

0 0 Costa Rica, Ireland0 1 Austria, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Greece, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal,

Uruguay, Yugoslavia

1 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,USA

1 1 Estonia, Germany, Latvia

A Charlemagne heritage was a necessary condition for the survival of an electoral regime in

the interwar years. Not a single electoral regime with Byzantine heritage survived the interwar

years. Nevertheless, Byzantine heritage was not at all a necessary condition for the breakdown

of an electoral regime in the interwar years. The electoral regime broke down in eight

countries with a Charlemagne heritage.

Table 6: Charlemagne HeritageCharlemagneHeritage

Outcome Countries

0 0 -0 1 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,Greece, Yugoslavia 1 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,

France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,United Kingdom, USA

1 1 Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay

5.1.3. Legacy: Electoral and Liberal-Constitutional Tradition

The absence of an electoral and constitutional tradition before World War I is a necessary

condition for the breakdown of an electoral regime. Conversely, the presence of an electoral

and constitutional tradition is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the survival of a

democracy.

Table 7: Electoral and Constitutional Tradition pre World War IElectoral andConstitutional Tradition

Outcome Countries

0 0 Czechoslovakia, Finland, Ireland0 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain,

Argentina, Cuba, Greece, Uruguay, Portugal, Yugoslavia 1 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France,

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,United Kingdom, USA

1 1 -


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5.2. Stress Approaches

5.2.1 Economic Decline

Postwar crisis

The presence of a postwar crisis is not a necessary condition for the breakdown of an electoral

regime. However, the absence of a postwar crisis is almost a necessary condition for the

survival of electoral regimes. Of 16 surviving electoral regimes only two had to struggle with

a postwar crisis. In these two countries, Czechoslovakia and Finland, the electoral regimes

stood at the age of a precipice.

Table 8: Postwar Crisis and BreakdownPostwarcrisis

Outcome Countries

0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA

0 1 Spain, Greece, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia 1 0 Czechoslovakia, Finland1 1 Austria, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland

Great Depression

Nearly all electoral regimes of the late 1920s were strongly affected by the world economic

crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s (for details see Saalfeld 2002; Zimmermann and

Saalfeld 1988).9 Due to the fact that the fascists already came to power in Italy in 1923 and

seven more electoral regimes broke down before the Great Depression, a strong impact of the

world economic crisis is no necessary condition for the breakdown of electoral regime.

However, this does not imply that the impact of the Great Depression was not a reason why

electoral regimes that survived until 1929 broke down.

Table 9: Great DepressionStrong impact of Great depression

Outcome Countries

0 0 -0 1 Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Yugoslavia 1 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,

France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,United Kingdom, USA

1 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Latvia,Uruguay

9 The data even give us the peculiar answer that a strong effect of the World economic crisis is a necessaryreason for the survival of an electoral regime.


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Double Crisis

Maybe the impact of double crisis (Arends and Kmmel 2000) does not help to explain as

much as one might think when we only take a look at the German case. Of the 14 failed

electoral regimes, only four suffered a double crisis. So, a double crisis was not at allnecessary for an electoral regime to break down. It is also not very probable that the failures

of the electoral regimes in Austria, Estonia, Germany, and Latvia are directly related to the

fact that the impact of the world economic crisis (1929-33) was the second profound crisis in

less than ten years. For example, in Germany the economy recovered rather quickly after the

disastrous inflation of 1923 and it could therefore not have had any direct impact on the

democratic breakdown in Germany. During the golden years of the Weimar Republic

between 1924 and 1929 the GNP per capita increased at an average rate of four per cent.Argentina, Cuba, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia neither experienced a crisis after World War I

nor were they strongly affected by the world economic crisisbefore the electoral regime

broke down However, since only two of 16 of the surviving electoral regimes experienced a

double crisis the absence of a double crisis is almost a necessary condition for survival. In

addition to that we should also consider again that the electoral regimes in Czechoslovakia

and Finland were very close to a breakdown of the electoral regime.

Table 10: Double CrisisDoublecrisis

Outcome Countries

0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA

0 1 Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Uruguay, Portugal,Yugoslavia

1 0 Czechoslovakia, Finland,1 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Latvia

5.2.2 Territorial Loss

Three Empires the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the German Empire, and the Ottoman

Empire perished after World War I. Only two of our observed electoral regimes Austria

and Germany suffered huge territorial losses. Germany lost 13 per cent of its previous

territory and with it 15 per cent of the cultivated rural land (Arends and Kmmel 2000, 199).

In Austria as well as Germany fascists gained ground and the electoral regime broke down.

Huge territorial losses are not at all necessary for an electoral regime to break down. No

electoral regime that had to cope with huge territorial loss survived. So the absence of

territorial loss is a necessary condition for the survival of electoral regimes. Huge territorial


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losses might well be the missing explanation for why two relatively well-developed countries

turned into autocracies in the interwar years. It might especially explain the strengthening of

fascist parties in these countries. In Germany the Nazis took over power and in Austria the

fascists were at least part of a coalition government.

Table 11: Territorial LossTerritorialloss

Outcome Countries

0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,USA

0 1 Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal,Uruguay, Yugoslavia

1 0 -1 1 Austria, Germany

5.3. Institutional Approaches: Democratic regime type and Electoral System

The presence or absence of a proportional electoral system is neither a necessary (or

sufficient) condition for the survival or breakdown of an electoral regime.

Table 12: Proportional Electoral SystemProportionalsystem

Outcome Countries

0 0 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, USA,0 1 Spain,Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay 1 0 Belgium, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland,

Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,1 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Argentina,

Yugoslavia

The presence or absence of a strong president is also neither a necessary (nor a sufficient)

condition for the breakdown or survival of an electoral regime in the interwar years. Costa

Rica, Finland, USA survived with a strong president and five electoral regimes survived witha parliamentarian regime. However, the absence of a strong president (= parliamentarianism)

only scarcely misses the threshold of quasi-necessary condition (consistency: 0.81).

Table 13: Strong PresidentStrongPresident

Outcome Countries

0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Ireland,Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

0 1 Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania1 0 Costa Rica, Finland, USA1 1 Austria, Germany, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia


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5.4. Actor-centered Approaches

Popular Support of anti-democratic Parties

Strong anti-system parties are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the breakdown

of electoral regimes. In seven electoral regimes broke down without strong anti-democratic

parties and in four countries democracy survived despite strong anti-system parties.

Table 14: Popular Support of Anti-Democratic PartiesAnti-system-parties

Outcome Countries

0 0 Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway,Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA

0 1 Greece, Poland, Argentina, Cuba, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Portugal 1 0 Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Netherlands1 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain

Autocratic Behavior of Leading Politicians

The absence of action on the part of leading politicians to save democracy is a necessary

condition for the breakdown of an electoral regime. Every time leading politicians acted in

favor of autocracy, democracy broke down. Autocratic behavior of leading politicians is asufficient condition for the breakdown of electoral regimes. The same can be said for regimes

in which leading politicians acted in favor of democracy in times of crisis, as in Belgium,

Czechoslovakia, and Finland (for the datails see Capoccia 2005). Under unfavorable

conditions it seems to have a fundamental impact if leading politicians support democracy, as

in Finland and Czechoslovakia, or whether they are not willing to defend it, for example

Hindenburg in Weimar Germany or King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy. If we turn the tables,

it was a necessary condition for an electoral regime to survive the interwar years that no

leading politician acted in favor of autocracy. Moreover, it was a sufficient condition for the

survival if a leading politician acted in order to save democracy. In Germany and Italy the

power was handed over voluntarily to the fascists by a non-democratic president (Germany)

or king (Italy). In Austria the King shifted the power to anti-democratic, non-fascist actors,

which included fascist groups in the government, partly to prevent a fascist autocracy.10

10 In Germany we can actually observe both patterns. First, in 1930 Hindenburg handed the power over to anti-democratic, non-fascist forces. When the constitutional dictatorships of Schleicher and Papen did not work outwell, however, he finally empowered Hitler in 1933 (Bracher 1955).


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Table 15: Pro-Autocratic Behavior of a Leading Politician in a Time of CrisisPro-AutocraticBehavior

Outcome Countries

0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,United Kingdom, USA

0 1 Lithuania, Poland, Spain,Argentina, Portugal, Uruguay 1 0 -1 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Greece,Cuba,

Yugoslavia

Table 16: Pro-Democratic Behavior of a Leading Politician in a Time of CrisisPro-DemocraticBehavior

Outcome Countries

0 0 Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA

0 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia

1 0 Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland1 1

6. An Explanation for the Failure and Success of Electoral Regimes in the Interwar Years

In the bottom-up analysis the absence of a high level of modernization and the absence of a

liberal and electoral tradition pre World War I and a strong agrarian labor-repressive elite and

the lack of a pro-democratic action of a leading politician in a (economic and/or political)crisis appeared to be necessary conditions for the breakdown of an electoral regime. Hence,

only if all four conditions (prerequisites) had been fulfilled in the interwar years, did an

electoral regime break down.11

The bottom-up analysis also shows that a Charlemagne heritage and the absence of a huge

territorial loss and an autocratic action of leading politicians are necessary factors for the

survival of electoral regimes in the interwar years.12 In addition to that the absence of a low

level of modernity (presence of at least a medium development; exceptions: Costa Rica and

11 High levels of economic development (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand,Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA), the absence of a strong labor-repressive agrarian elite(Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) anda traditionof liberal constitutionalism dating back to the time before World War I (Australia, United Kingdom, Belgium,Canada, New Zealand, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, USA) and apro-democratic action of leading politician in a (economic and/or political) crisis (Belgium, Czechoslovakia,Finland) are sufficient conditions to explain the survival of electoral regimes (in combination with the necessaryconditions).12 If we go the way bottom-up, conversely, the absence of a Charlemagne heritage (Estonia, Latvia, Greece,Lithuania, Poland, Yugoslavia) and a huge territorial loss (Austria and Germany), and the occurrence of a pro-autocratic autocratic action of a leading politician in a (economic and/or political) crisis (Austria, Cuba, Estonia,Italy, Latvia, Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia) are sufficient conditions to explain the breakdown of electoralregimes (in combination with the necessary conditions). Nevertheless, not all cases are explained by these threepaths.


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Ireland), a dominant culture of secularized Protestantism (exceptions: Costa Rica and Ireland)

and a double crisis (exceptions: Czechoslovakia and Finland)13 are quasi-necessary

conditions for the breakdown of electoral regimes in the interwar years. In two of the four

deviant cases, Czechoslovakia and Finland, the electoral regime almost broke down and it

seems almost only due to pro-democratic actions of leading politicians that democracy

survived (Braghiroli 2007; Karvonen 2000; Bradley 2000). In Costa Rica the electoral regime

broke down shortly after and before our time of consideration. Ireland became independent in

1921 after centuries of British rule. The argument those would be that Ireland in fact had a

liberal and constitutional tradition pre World War I. This means consequently: Having had

no immediate experience of anything but the Westminster system, most Irish citizens [and so

also the main political actors, S.K.] perceived the idea of an alternative regime type as beyond

the limits of realistic consideration (Zink 2000, 292).

To present the results of our top-down analysis of sufficient conditions, the reader needs to

know the complete truth table:

Table 17: Truth Table of all Conditions for the Survival and Breakdown of Electoral Regimes v1 v2 v3 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15 v16 v17 O Country1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Australia,

UnitedKingdom

0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 Austria1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 Belgium1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Canada, New

Zealand0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 Costa Rica1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 Czechoslovakia1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Denmark1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 Estonia, Latvia1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 Finland1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 France,

Netherlands1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 Germany0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Ireland0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 Italy0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Lithuania1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Norway0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Poland1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Sweden1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Switzerland1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 USA0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Spain0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 Greece0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Portugal0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Argentina0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 Cuba

0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 Uruguay0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 Yugoslavia

13 A postwar crisis is also a quasi-necessary condition, but this factor is already implied in the double crisis.


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v1: Protestant-secular tradition; v2: Charlemagne heritage; v3: strong labor-repressive agrarian elite; v4:huge territorial loss; v5: postwar crisis; v6: strong anti-democratic parties in parliament; v7: proportionalelectoral system; v8: strong president; v9: high modernity; v10: low modernity; v11: strong effect of Greatdepression; v12: pro-autocratic action of a leading politician in a time of crisis; v13: pro-democratic action of aleading politician in a time of crisis; v14: double crisis; v17: electoral and constitutional tradition pre WorldWar I; O: breakdown of non-autocratic electoral regime.

If all necessary conditions were fulfilled, according to the top-down analysis of sufficient

conditions, three paths led to an electoral breakdown in the interwar years:

Result for sufficient conditions of breakdown:

no Charlemagne heritage orpro-autocratic action of aleading politician in a time of crisis or

strong president (and no pro-democratic action of a leadingpolitician)

Estonia, Greece, Latvia,Lithuania, Poland,Yugoslavia

Austria, Cuba, Estonia,Germany, Greece, Latvia,Italy , Yugoslavia

Argentina, Austria, Cuba,Germany, Poland, Spain,Portugal , Uruguay,Yugoslavia

Remainders included, choice of prime implicants by the author based on theoreticassumptions. In italics cases which are solely covered by this path.

The other way round, if all necessary conditions were fulfilled, there are three paths that led to

the survival of an electoral regime in the interwar years:

Results for sufficient conditions of survival:

electoral and constitutionaldemocracy pre World War I or

no pro-democraticbehavior of a leadingpolitician in a time of crisis or

Parliamentarianism (andCharlemagne heritage and nopro-autocratic behavior of aleading politician in a time of crisis)

Australia, Belgium, Canada,Costa Rica, Denmark, France,New Zealand, Netherlands,Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,United Kingdom,USA

Belgium, Czechoslovakia,Finland

Australia, Belgium, Canada,Czechoslovakia, Denmark,Ireland , France, Netherlands,New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,Switzerland, United Kingdom

Remainders included, choice of prime implicants by the author based on theoreticassumptions. In italics cases which are solely covered by this path.

If I recode Ireland, which seems very plausible, as being a country with an electoral and

constitutional tradition pre World War I due to the British rule only two paths would be left.


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7. Conclusions

If we merge our solution formulas for necessary and sufficient conditions our result is. A non-

autocratic electoral regime broke down in the interwar years under the preconditions that the

country had a strong labor-repressive agrarian elite and was not highly developed and had no

electoral and constitutional tradition pre World War I and no leading politician acted in favor

of democracy during a times of crisis, if there was either no Charlemagne heritage or a

leading politician acted in favor of autocracy in a time of crisis or there was a strong

president.

A non-autocratic electoral regime survived in the interwar years under the precondition that it

had a Charlemagne heritage and no territorial loss and there was no pro-autocratic action of a

leading politician in an economic and/or political crisis, if it either established a constitutional

democracy already before World War I or there was no pro-democratic behavior of a leading

politician in a time of crisis or the democratic regime was parliamentarian.

The lack of a modernization seems to be the single most important structural factor that

contributes to the breakdown of electoral regimes. If we turn the table, the single most

important factor that contributed to the survival of an electoral regime in the interwar period is

a Charlemagne heritage. That means the most important structural prerequisite for a stable

electoral regime is a developed and stable state apparatus. That goes in line with Huntington(1968). However, actors do matter, too. According to the formula for the surviving electoral

regimes it is a sufficient condition for an electoral regime to survive, that a leading politician

acted in favor of democracy in a time of crisis in the interwar years. In the case of Finland the

behavior of the president seems the most probable explanation why democracy survived,

whereas it failed in a country with an otherwise similar configuration like Estonia (for a

detailed comparison of Finland and Estonia see Siaroff 1999). Another important result is that

in the interwar period regimes with an electoral and constitutional tradition (= consolidateddemocracies) did not break down. That means consolidated democracies can survive any

crisis.

The stress factors, with the exception of a huge territorial loss, are neither completely

necessary nor sufficient conditions for the survival or breakdown of electoral regimes.

However, one should still be very wary of saying that stress does not matter for the survival of

electoral regimes. It can be shown easily that all democracies at the point of breakdown had

experienced some kind of crisis (Linz 1978). A double crisis is almost a necessary conditionfor the breakdown of an electoral regime and so it is still very plausible that the combination


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of the influences of the Postwar Crisis and the Great Depression are main factors that

contributed to the first and only reverse wave in history.14 However, as already mentioned,

only non-consolidated democracies break down when they face a crisis. The explanation is

that if an electoral and constitutional regime has endured over time people have seen

competent and imcompetent governments. This means the people do not blame the

democratic system for the crisis as might well be the case in electoral regimes without an

electoral and constitutional tradition. The result is in line with the argument of Svolik

(2008) that consolidated democracies survive because they are consolidated and those

democracies that are not consolidated do only survive because of

some favorable circumstances (e.g. pro-democratic action of a leading politician).

The most surprising result to emerge from the data is that in our combined formulas for

necessary and sufficient formulas the presence of strong presidents constitutes one of three

sufficient paths to the breakdown of electoral regimes if the necessary conditions are fulfilled,

and parliamentarianism constitutes one of three sufficient ways to survival. Among the three

paths to breakdown the strong president-path is the one which covers most cases (nine out

of 14) and is the only path to explain the breakdowns in Argentina, Portugal, Spain, and

Uruguay sufficiently. This result could not have come to light with the classical tools of

statistical analysis. Moreover, even a bottom-up analysis of sufficient conditions is not able to

identify clearly the important role of strong presidents. So, if we want to clarify whichconditions are sufficient or necessary for an outcome, we need to conduct a bottom-up

analysis of the necessary (and sufficient) conditions first and follow that up with a top-down

analysis of sufficient conditions. Both steps are indispensable for a configurational analysis of

necessary and sufficient conditions of an outcome.

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Appendix

Table 18: Consistency and Coverage of Necessity (and Sufficiency) for the Breakdown of a non-autocraticElectoral Regimecondition Liberal-constitutional democracies

and hybrid electoral regimes(electoral oligarchies included)

Liberal-constitutional democraciesand hybrid electoral regimes(electoral oligarchies excluded)

Outcome

Consistencynecessity

(coveragesufficiency)

Consistencysufficiency

(coveragenecessity)

Consistencynecessity

(coveragesufficiency)

Consistencysufficiency

(coveragenecessity)High modernity =0

1 0,7 1 0,6 Breakdown of Electoral


28/29

28

Low modernity =1

0,78 0,85 0,78 0,78 Regime

Literacy = 0 0,86 0,86 0,78 0,78SecularizedProtestantism = 0

0,79 0,85 0,67 0,75

Early state = 0 0,43 1 0,56 1

Strong agrarianelite = 1 1 0,67 1 0,56

Electoral andconstitutionaltradition pre WWI= 0

1 0,82 1 0,75

Postwar Crisis = 1 0,5 0,78 0,78 0,78Economic Crisis= 1

0,43 0,27 0,56 0,24

Double Crisis = 1 0,29 0,67 0,44 0,67Territorial loss =1

0,14 1 0,22 1

Anti-systemparties = 1

0,5 0,64 0,78 0,64

Strong president =1

0,64 0,75 0,44 0,57

Proportionalelections = 1

0,71 0,48 0,89 0,42

Autocraticbehaviour = 1

0,57 1 0,67 1

Democraticbehaviour = 0

1 0,52 1 0,41

Table 19: Consistency and Coverage of Necessity (and Sufficiency) for of a non-autocratic Electoral Regimecondition Liberal-constitutional democracies and

hybrid electoral regimes (electoraloligarchies included)

Liberal-constitutional

democracies and hybridelectoral regimes (electoraloligarchies excluded)

Outcome

consistencynecessity(coveragesufficiency)

Consistencysufficiency(coveragenecessity)

High modernity = 1 0,63 1 0,63 1 Survival of ElectoralRegime

Low modernity = 0 0,88 0,82 0,88 0,88Literacy = 1 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,88SecularizedProtestantism = 1

0,88 0,82 0,88 0,82

Early state = 1 1 0,67 1 0,8Strong agrarian elite= 0 0,56 1 0,56 1

Tradition of electoral democracypre WWI = 1

0,69 0,79 0,69 1

Electoral andconstitutionaltradition pre WWI =1

0,81 1 0,81 1

Economic Crisis = 1 1 0,73 1 0,76Postwar Crisis = 0 0,88 0,67 0,88 0,88Double Crisis = 0 0,88 0,58 0,88 0,74Territorial loss = 0 1 0,57 1 0,7Anti-system parties= 0

0,75 0,63 0,75 0,86

Strong president = 0 0,81 0,72 0,81 0,72


29/29

29

Proportional election= 0

0,31 0,56 0,31 0,83

Autocraticbehaviour = 0

1 0,73 1 0,84

Democratic behavior= 1

0,19 1 0,19 1

Table 20: Raw Data on Literacy (Vanhanen 2009) and GDP (Maddison 2009)Country Year Literacy GDPArgentina 1913 51 3797,24Australia 1913 90 5156,81Austria 1913 76 3465,49Belgium 1913 81 4219,54Canada 1913 87 4446,77Chile 1913 44 2988,35Colombia 1913 15 1235,85Costa Rica 1913 37 1623,81 (1920)Cuba 1913 44 N/ACzechoslovakia 1913 93 (1920) 2095,54Denmark 1913 95 3912,17Estonia 1913 N/A N/AFinland 1913 80 2111,67France 1913 83 5753,52Germany 1913 95 3523,69Greece 1913 34 1591,70Iran 1913 3 1000Ireland 1913 ? 2736,08Italy 1913 51 2464,97Latvia N/A N/A

Lithuania N/A N/ANetherlands 1913 89 3954,85New Zealand 1913 91 5209,25Norway 1913 95 2344,46Poland 1913 60 1739,01Portugal 1913 27 1250,33Spain 1913 41 2055,62Sweden 1913 96 3064,15Switzerland 1913 95 4373,13United Kingdom 1913 90 4761,75Uruguay 1913 58 3310,11USA 1913 89 5200,70Yugoslavia 1913 N/A 1056,95

N/A = Not available. In the cases were data was not available from Maddison and Vanhanen I used countrystudies to make an informed guess about the category they fall in. For Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania thefollowing references were used to code the cases: Parming (1975), Rogainis (1971), Vardys (1978).

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