JUR Terrorism Final

SUICIDE TERRORISM IN PALESTINE:TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARTYRDOM NORM

STEVEN ALAGNA

STEVEN ALAGNA is from Kansas City, Missouri where he attended St. Pius X High School.

Graduating from Notre Dame in 2011 with a B.A. in Political Science and a focus on

International Relations, he also majored in Spanish and minored in Japanese. Steve is currently

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teaching middle school social studies in Jacksonville, Florida through the Alliance for Catholic

Education.

Introduction

A “norm” is a standard of appropriate behavior for an actor with a given identity.1 In a

burgeoning body of International Relations (IR) literature concerning norms and their

importance, those norms that do not prohibit a type of warfare, promote the environment, or

protect the equality of underrepresented groups seem to have been left out of the discussion.

Norms are not inherently peace-promoting or forward-thinking; rather, norms can also promote

conflict and violence. They are socially constructed regulators of behavior that only contain as

much meaning or power as is ascribed to them by the identity that they govern. Unfortunately,

the discipline of IR has focused almost exclusively on norms that promote peace and cooperation

while ignoring norms that promote conflict.

In what has proven to be an indispensable contribution to the discussion on norms,

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have developed a model to describe the development

and trajectory of norms. The Norm Life Cycle,2 which traces the lifespan of the norm from

emergence to internalization, has become the baseline for the study of a number of different

norms. However, this model has not been applied to norms that promote conflict, leaving the

development of these norms unknown. Do they follow the same trajectory as the more peaceful

norms? In other words, would they fit into the model of the Norm Life Cycle?

To answer this question, I examine the “martyrdom norm” in Palestine as a case study.

The martyrdom norm gives legitimacy to the tactic of suicide terrorism in the eyes of the

Palestinian people. Rather than lamenting the lives of those who have killed themselves in a

1 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics, and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no.4 (1998): 891. This definition is credited to Peter Katzenstein, 1996. 2 Finnemore,and Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics.”

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terrorist attack, cultural norms call for celebrations with wedding-like parties, congratulations to

the family of the attacker, and posters, graffiti,, websites, and songs played in honor of the

“martyr.” Palestinian streets are full of posters and graffiti that glorify the martyr as executors of

suicide attacks. The norm has such strong influences on the tragic use of suicide bombing as a

tactic, which makes the issue of such a norm’s emergence and development especially pertinent.

I argue that this martyrdom norm follows the trajectory described by the Norm Life

Cycle, and that this might provide some preliminary evidence that conflict-promoting norms

follow the same trajectory as the more heavily studied norms that promote cooperation.

This thesis is organized into four parts. First, I review the literature on the cause of

terrorism and suicide terrorism. In this section I highlight the limitations of a material-based

explanation of suicide terrorism and I argue that there is a normative basis for this behavior.

Moreover, I identify the culture of martyrdom, or the martyrdom norm, as this normative basis.

After the literature review, I move to a theoretical discussion of norms that will provide a

conceptual toolbox for my analysis. Here I define norms and discuss how they are related to

identities. I also discuss in detail Finnemore and Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle, incorporating

Koh’s Transnational Legal Process Theory and its contributions in explaining certain

mechanisms of the life cycle.

In the following section, I discuss the methodology of my thesis. Since I will use process

tracing to show that the martyrdom norm in Palestine follows the same track as peace-promoting

norms, in the methodology section I elaborate on the nature and advantages of the case study

method and the process tracing technique. Finally, I anticipate the kind of analysis I will do in

the next section.

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The fourth section is devoted to testing the historical evidence on the emergence and

consolidation of martyrdom in light of the Norm Life Cycle. I detail each mechanism of the

model, showing how the martyrdom norm first emerges because of Hamas’ role as “norm

entrepreneur.” Next, the norm reaches a popular tipping point and cascades to enjoy broad

acceptance. Although the norm is currently not internalized at the final stage of the cycle, this is

no reason to reject the hypothesis that the martyrdom norm follows the Norm Life Cycle.

Indeed, few norms become fully internalized, but we do not say that only internalized norms

follow the Cycle. In this section, I confirm the hypothesis that the culture of martyrdom norm

follows the Norm Life Cycle, but in the process of my analysis, I add new mechanisms of

persuasion to the model: financial incentives and familial support.

Finally, in the concluding section, I explore the wider implications of my findings,

considering their place in the larger discussion of norms and how they can help bring an end to

suicide terrorism in Palestine.

Causes of Terrorism and Suicide Terrorism

Before discussing the underlying norms behind suicide attacks, a review of the literature

concerning the causes of terrorism and suicide terrorism is in order. Defining "terrorism" has

proven to be a struggle worthy of a literature review in itself,3 but for the purposes of this paper,

"terrorism" will be understood according to the U.S. Code’s definition: "premeditated,

politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or

clandestine agents."4 This definition is best because it highlights the political nature of terrorist

attacks and the idea that, conventionally, terrorism is a means for a political end. Suicide

3 See first chapter of Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

4 22 USC Sec. 2656f. 2010.

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terrorism, a form of terrorism, includes a terrorist attack that necessitates the willful termination

of the attacker's life in the execution of the attack.

The tactic of suicide bombing has been used in a wide variety of contexts and settings

(ranging from Asia to Europe to Africa), but it has especially transformed the nature of one of

the world's most enduring conflicts--that between Israel and Palestine.5 In the context of this

conflict, Hezbollah conducted the first suicide bombings in 1983 and a series of attacks

continued for the next few years.6 However, it was not until 1993 and 1994 that suicide attacks

were perpetrated in Israel proper7 by Palestinian Hamas.8 Since then, Palestinian suicide

terrorism has become a constant threat for Israelis, and between 2000 and 2005, 515 people were

killed and 3,500 were injured by Palestinian suicide attacks.9

In response, IR and sociological theory have produced ample research in an attempt to

ascertain the foundational causes of terrorism and suicide terrorism. Tannewald describes

“cause” as “something that brings about a particular event,”10such as terrorism. Some of the

causes of terrorism most applicable to the case of Palestinian suicide terrorism include

conventional terror as (1) a last recourse and (2) a means to promote self-determination and

nationalism. I will explore these ideas, along with their counter-arguments.

5 David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How suicide bombing became not just a means but an end," The Atlantic, June 2002. 6 David Cook and Olivia Allison, Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations, (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2007):. 23.7 Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008): 182.

8 Cook and Allison, Understanding, 29.

9 Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi, “Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no.3 (2007): 223.10 Nina Tannenwald. “Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no.2 (2005): 29.

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Causes of Terrorism

Last Recourse

One foundational cause of terrorism is its perception as a kind of last recourse for

disenfranchised people with no other options.11 According to Ward Thomas, terrorism is chosen

by people who cannot play by the conventional rules of politics or war because they do not have

other means or channels of influence, such as communication channels or adequate military

capabilities.12 Indeed, in the case of Israel and Palestine, Palestinians may very well feel as

though their peaceful legal and political recourses are unavailable or dysfunctional.13

Furthermore, Palestine could hardly pose a conventional military threat to Israel's top-notch

armed forces and so many Palestinians believe that Hamas must resort to terrorism and other

unconventional methods in order to channel their influence.

Self-Determination

Another frequently mentioned cause of terrorism is self-determination and nationalism.14

This theory claims that those who commit terrorist acts often do so with a territorial goal in mind

that cannot be met with the extant means of the disenfranchised group. Kydd and Walter argue

that "territorial change," that is, "taking territory away from a state either to establish a new

state...or to join another state," is one of the top objectives of many terrorist attacks.15 Of course,

the struggle over territory is central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.16 Dowty recreates the logic

11 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 76, 115; Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001): 80.12 Thomas, Ward, Ethics of Destruction, 80.

13 For instances of Palestinians feeling left out of the peace process, see Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 76, 115. For their lack of general legal recourse see Eric Hazan, Notes on the Occupation, (New York: The New Press, 2007): 67-68.14 Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism." International Security 31, no.1 (2006): 52.15 Kydd and Walter, “Strategies,” 52.

16 See also Cook and Allison, Understanding, 28, and David Newman, "The Formation of National Identity in Israel/Palestine: Construction of Spatial Knowledge and Contested Territorial Narratives," in Promotinv Conflict or Peace Through Identity. ed. Nikki Slocum-Bradley. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing

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behind Palestinian self-determination in the following way: "Were they not Arabs, sharing a

common language, common culture, and common history as heirs to a great world civilization,

from Morocco to Iraq? Were they less entitled than Europeans...to national self-determination as

a nation-state based upon this ethnic identity?"17 This logic, he would argue, would be

transformed into an ethic of exile and resentment, ultimately leading to violence and the

development of the “thrown stone” as a symbol for the intifada and Palestinian unity.18

It is important to note that the First Intifada, a large-scale popular uprising against the

Israeli occupation, was a catalyzing force in establishing a base of support for the creation of an

important political actor in Palestine – Hamas. Hamas would prove to be a fundamentalist

organization that is the primary user of terrorist tactics for political ends.19 All in all, territorial

questions and self-determination are oft-cited root causes of terrorism within Israel and Palestine.

These two underlying causes of terrorism overlap and interact in different ways. There is

probably no single cause that uniquely and inevitably leads to terrorism; rather, complex

combinations of variables can considerably widen the realms of possibility to include terrorism.20

Logic of Consequences and Logic of Appropriateness

As it is, these initial causes may help, in part, to explain the phenomenon of terrorism in

general, but they have little explanatory power when dealing with suicide terrorism. What

would make an individual agree to a martyrdom operation as opposed to other forms of

Company, 2008): 61-80.17 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 57.

18 Dowty Israel/Palestine, 92, 132. During the intifada, children would commonly throw stones at Israeli forces. The stone became a symbol of Palestinian resolve and determination in the face of poverty imposed by the occupation.19 Dowty, Israel/ Palestine, 132.

20 Louise Richardson, "The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview." in The Roots of Terrorism. ed. Louise Richardson. (New York: Routeledge, 2006).

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terrorism? It does not follow from the last recourse or the self-determination arguments that an

individual should select the tactic of suicide terror over other means.

The decision to commit suicide in the process of an attack is not one that seems to fit

within conventional definitions of rationality. A “rational” action is one that maximizes

perceived utility and minimizes costs; “rationality” refers to adherence to benefit-maximizing

behavior.

In IR theory, there is an important distinction between the "logic of consequences" and

the "logic of appropriateness."21 A decision is made through the logic of consequences when

only material benefits are taken into account. This is limited to what would normally be

considered strategically rational, utility-maximizing decisions. The logic of appropriateness, on

the other hand, is operating when decisions are made based on normative, social, ideational, or

non-material reasons. One easy way to identify the operation of the logic of appropriateness is

when an agent undertakes an action that does not maximize utility in an attempt to conform to

social standards or ideas of normative correctness. However, norm- and interest-based behavior

are not always mutually exclusive and oftentimes it is impossible to cleanly ascribe a behavior to

only one logic.22

As Brooks points out, "suicide bombing has become the tactic of choice, even in

circumstances where a terrorist could have planted a bomb and then escaped injury. Martyrdom

became not just a means but an end."23 It was mentioned earlier that terrorism is widely

considered to be a means to a political end, rather than an end in itself. The irrational use of

21 James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," International Organization 52 no.4 (1998): 949.22 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 888; Thomas, Ward, Ethics of Destruction, 33.

23 Brooks, “Culture of Martyrdom.”

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suicide terrorism, even when other options are available, implies that the decision to undertake a

martyrdom operation can be explained by looking at norms.

When IR’s two logics are applied to suicide bombing, it would seem that even if suicide

bombing has some strategic value, it would defy the logic of consequences for two reasons: first,

because it is not rational, and second, because it is chosen even when other rational means are

available. Since the tactic necessitates the willful extermination of one's own life, it subverts

traditional rationality. As Brooks notes, the tactic "creates its own logic and transforms the

culture of those who employ it."24 With this in mind, the underlying "logics" behind the common

explanations for suicide terrorism can be distinguished.

Causes of Suicide Terrorism

Organizational vs. Individual Motivations

With the two “logics” in mind, we turn to how motivations differ between actors. In

identifying the root causes pertaining to suicide terrorism, a distinction is made between

organizational and individual motives,. A motivational hierarchy ranges from the attack

organizers who are driven by ideological and strategic goals, to the individual bombers, who are

motivated by more personal reasons.25 Organizations' motives are typically centered on the

overall success of the organization on a more panoramic level. Examples of organizations'

motives include the planning and execution of asymmetric warfare, intergroup competition

between radical groups, and the value of suicide attacks as a strategic means to political ends.26

Thus, organizational causes seem to operate more closely according to the logic of

24 Brooks, “The Culture of Martyrdom.”

25 Cook and Allison, Understanding, 138-139.

26 See Cook and Allison, Understanding, 133.

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consequences. The organization is most concerned with the material and strategic success of

each attack.27

The individual motives are what distinguish suicide bombing from

other forms of terrorism. While the organizational motives of two groups –

one engaging in more conventional terrorism and the other in suicide

terrorism – might be identical, individual motives differ because these are

the causes that would compel an individual to volunteer for an operation at

the cost of his or her own life. In other words, it is at the individual level that

suicide bombing defies rationality, and therefore the individual motives

provide a better normative explanation for suicide bombing attacks.

Because individual motives must incorporate some kind of logic that defies

an individual's rational choice to live, they will provide more insight into the

underlying norms that promote the behavior of the executors of suicide

terrorism. These more normative individual explanations include religion

and the martyrdom norm. Table 1 describes the difference between

organizational and individual motives.

Type of Motivation

Examples Logic

Organizational material success, military strategy, intergroup competition

logic of consequences, utilitarian

Individual desperation*, religion, culture of martyrdomlogic of appropriateness,normative *except for desperation

Table 1

Desperation

27 For more information on the strategic value of suicide terrorism as a tactic, see Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random House, 2005).

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Although it is not a normative cause, the first explanation that is commonly cited is

individual desperation. Essentially, individuals without means will turn to suicide terrorism as a

last resort. Cook and Allison argue that poverty is a root cause of suicide terrorism, and that

impoverished people would be more likely to turn to suicide operations over other forms of

terrorism as a reflection of their desperation.28 In other words, if an individual perceives that he

or she has nothing worth living for, then that person might be more likely to enlist in a

martyrdom operation, especially if the blame can be placed on Israeli action. As Hisham H.

Ahmed notes, "Most experts feel that there is a common denominator among 'suicide bombers',

that is the lack of a horizon, a lack of hope, that they are people who had lost faith in life."29

These arguments, however, are empirically denied by the finding that most Palestinian

suicide bombers have not been members of the lower economic classes. Nasra Hassan, a

journalist, interviewed nearly 250 Palestinians involved in martyrdom operations, including

soon-to-be attackers, attackers who survived their operation, those involved with the planning

and organizing of operations, and the families of attackers.30 Out of all of the people she

interviewed, she writes that not one "conformed to the typical profile of the suicidal personality.

None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed."31 Indeed, many

were well-educated, well-off people.32 Desperation is not, then, a convincing cause of suicide

terrorism. If, on the other hand, it were empirically found that most suicide terrorists are indeed

poor and desperate, then it would be more likely that the logic of consequences supports


29 Hisham H. Ahmed, "Palestinian Resistance and 'Suicide Bombing," in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. Ed. Tore Bjorgo (New York: Routledge, 2005): 96.30 While citing statistics dealing with the socio-economic background of known attackers could potentially strengthen my argument, it would appear that this data set does not exist. Inherently, the clandestine nature of suicide operations makes such data difficult to collect, and so Hassan’s survey, which is commonly cited in the literature concering suicide terrorism, might be as close to a statistical study as is currently available.31 Nasra Hassan, "Letter from Gaza, 'An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the 'human bombs.'" The New Yorker. November 19, 2001, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/11/19/011119fa_FACT1.32 Hassan, “Letter”; Cook and Allison, Understanding, 127.

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reasoning for suicide bombing. A more material explanation, such as one related to poverty,

might lend credence to the argument that the decision to volunteer for a suicide bombing

operation is closer to rationality. However, since this is not the case, we can reasonably infer

that this more material or consequential explanation can be rejected.

Religion

While the argument that suicide bombers are usually desperate and poor is a

misconception, the idea that most bombers are deeply religious seems to be well grounded.33

Perhaps the most convincing basis of suicide terrorism is religion, and all that it entails,

including influential religious leaders, manipulation of scripture, and its role in enabling a

"culture of martyrdom," which will be discussed more in-depth below. Cook and Allison argue

that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is becoming increasingly Islamized.34 Similarly, Ahmed

writes that Islam is "a mobilizing ideology to indoctrinate believers into not accepting oppression

and subjugation."35 Islam may not be a direct cause or an isolated independent variable for

suicide terrorism, but it certainly seems to play an influential role. As Mark Juergensmeyer puts

it, “real grievances,” such as economic or social hardships, are often framed and articulated in

religious discourses and decried by influential religious leaders within the context of a religious

framework. He argues that religion might not be the "initial problem," but rather "the medium

through which these issues are expressed."36

33 Cook and Allison, Understanding, 126.


35 Ahmed, “Resistance,” 100.

36 Mark Juergensmeyer, "Religion as a Cause of Terrorism," in The Roots of Terrorism, Ed. Louise Richardson. (New York: Routledge, 2006): 141.

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Indeed, for example, the will of Hanadi Jaradat, a female suicide attacker37, was rife with

religious language that expressed real grievances:

I know that I shall not bring back Palestine. I fully know this. However, I know that this is my duty for Allah. Believing in the principles of my faith, I respond to the call. I now inform you that, Allah willing, I shall find what Allah has promised to me and to all of those who take this path--gardens which Allah has promised us, in which we will live forever...it is my duty to the religion of Allah--and my own obligation to Him--to defend it [Palestine]. I have nothing before me other than this body, which I am going to turn into slivers that will tear out the heart of everyone who has tried to uproot us from our country.38

In this will, the previously cited causes of terrorism can be identified. Jaradat seems to say, in

spite of her statelessness or self-determination (“I know that I shall not bring back Palestine”)

and despite the fact that she has “nothing before me” (last recourse), she still decides to become a

martyr (“my duty for Allah”). She has no expectations for herself other than to “respond to the

call.” The "social hardships" that Juergensmeyer cites might have included witnessing her

younger brother being killed by Israeli forces on the night before her brother's wedding.39 It is

also interesting to note that Jaradat was a law student who was weeks away from graduating.40

Hassan mentions that most individuals that volunteer for martyrdom operations have lost a close

friend or relative in the Israeli conflict.41 Jaradat had real grievances that influenced her decision,

but she does not make a rational calculation to recover Palestine or her lost family. Rather, she

decides to become a suicide bomber out of a religious conviction. In this way, religion can

become a kind of intervening variable that mediates between "real grievances" and the end result

of suicide bombing. Religion itself is perhaps not a primary cause, but it is a key ingredient of

37 Jaradt's attack was a famous attack in 2003 on the Maxim Restaurant in Haifa 2003. It sparked negative reactions and public comments from President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin. Twenty-one people were killed. "Suicide bombing of Maxim restaurant in Haifa: October 4, 2003." Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21 January 2004. 38Will of Hanadi Jaradat qtd. in Cook and Allison, Understanding, 39.

39 Arnon Regular, "Profile of the Haifa Suicide Bomber," Ha'aretz. 5 October 2003.

40 David Blair, "Revenge Sparked Suicide Bombing," The Daily Telegraph 6 October 2003.

41 Hassan, "Letter."

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the larger culture of martyrdom, and it can heighten and catalyze other causes in order to prompt

an individual to become a suicide bomber.

The picture becomes more complex, however, as we begin to see what catalyzes the

catalyst – namely, influential religious leaders. At this point, the distinction between

organizational and individual motivations becomes less clear. While individuals might be

influenced by these leaders, the leaders themselves might be a mechanism or cog of the

organization planning the attack. In the introductory chapter of World Religions and

Norms of War, Vesselin Popovski argues that an individual's belief that a suicidal action will

serve some higher purpose, will destroy enemies, and is mandated by God, is the result of

somebody's external manipulation.42 That "somebody" is often the critical nexus to suicide

terrorism.

Nasra Hassan says, "A charismatic figure is a key ingredient in inspiring martyrdom."43

Influential Islamic leaders publish fatwas, or Islamic scholarly legal documents. Cook and

Allison express surprise at the sheer amount of fatwas supporting suicide attacks in comparison

with the scarcity of those fatwas that condemn suicide attacks.44 Religious leaders who often

interpret certain Qur’anic verses to promote deontological violent attacks write these fatwas.45 In

other words, without these influential leaders, much would be lost in the ways of religious

justifications for suicide terrorism. Influential leaders can be an important step along the causal

chain leading to suicide attacks.

42 Vesselin Popovski, "Religion and War," In World Religions and Norms of War. ed. Vesselin Popovski, et al. (New York: United Nations University Press, 2009): 16.43 Hassan, Nasra. "Suicide Terrorism," In The Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise Richardson (New York: Routledge, 2006): 31.44 Cook and Allison, Understanding, 12-13.

45 Amira Sonbol, “Norms of War in Sunni Islam,” in World Religions and Norms of War, ed. Vesselin Popovski, et al (New York: United Nations University Press, 2009): 289, 295.

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This phenomenon also overlaps with the desperation and self-determination causes: as

the appeal of extreme Islam with young Muslims represents a kind of reclamation of their lost

heritage, it also serves as a way to fight back against past injustices. Thus, influential leaders

need not only be religious; they can be attack organizers who may or may not cite religion to

recruit more suicide bombers. Extremism (especially religious extremism) combined with an

identity that demands retaliation against the "West" or an occupier, provides for a space

conducive to suicide terrorism.

Influential leaders operate by providing signals of extremism for the sake of extremism.46

In other words, organizations try to "outbid" each other, attempting to prove that they are the

most fervent believers of the Palestinian cause.47 Dowty defines extremism as "the belief that

one's own cause is so righteous that it justifies, or even demands, the use of any means, no matter

how violent or immoral they be according to ordinary standards."48 He goes on to explain that

extremists on each side can "count on each other" to perpetuate a cycle or dialogue of violence

that perpetuates negative perceptions of the enemy and refuels people's motivation to take

revenge.49 Extremism can be a kind of cycle that propels itself, and in the process it breeds

terrorism. Of course, religious extremism in particular plays a special role in the commission of

terrorist attacks.

The Culture of Martyrdom

The influential leader's quasi-institutionalized endorsement of suicide attacks based on

Qur’anic verses adds to what Jerrold Post calls a "culture of martyrdom."50 He explains that this

46 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 225, Sonbol, “Norms of War,” 301. Kydd and Walter note a similar phenomenon they call "outbidding" and disucss it from 76-78.47 The term "outbidding" can be attributed to Kydd and Walter, “Strategies,” 76-78.

48 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 225

49 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 225..

50 Jerrold M. Post, "The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism." In The Roots of Terrorism. Ed. Louise Richardson. (New York: Routledge, 2006): 22.

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culture is the result of entrenched religious rhetoric, groupthink, and social values. In other

words, suicide operations are discussed in highly religious discourse in the larger community.

I define the culture of martyrdom as the ideological and social structure that underlies the

legitimization of suicide bombing. It includes all of the signs that show that martyrdom has a

positive social value. The culture of martyrdom is not a behavior in itself (although suicide

bombing is), but rather a norm that proscribes or endorses a specific behavior and gives meaning

to it. Recall that a norm was defined as “a standard for appropriate behavior for an actor with a

given identity.” Following the definition of a norm, the culture of martyrdom prescribes suicide

bombing as a morally correct, religiously justified behavior for a Palestinian. To be a good

Palestinian means to be willing to become a martyr, or in the very least to support martyrdom

and to participate in a culture that supports suicide terrorism. Thus, the culture of martyrdom is

the norm, and in this thesis, I will use “the culture of martyrdom” and “the martyrdom norm”

interchangeably.

Experts recognize group loyalty as a critical factor in an individual's execution of a

martyrdom operation, highlighting the importance of the social dimension of these missions,51

and social pressure is placed on people to congratulate the families of recent suicide attackers.52

For example, after a suicide attack takes place in Palestine, organizers will traditionally put on a

kind of religious wedding ceremony for the family of the attackers, which actually does "not

receive condolences but congratulations,"53 thereby perpetuating the image of the heroic martyr

and creating and ethic of martyrdom.54


52 Hassan, “Letter.”

53 Ahmed, “Resistance,” 100.


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After an attack, the attacker is celebrated as a hero. In his or her hometown, posters and

graffiti featuring green birds, the symbol of suicide bombers, are proudly displayed and press

releases go out.55 Brooks argues that martyrdom has become the primary focal point of the Arab

media, which covers not only the details of the attack, but also images of proud parents at

celebration ceremonies held for the families of the newest martyrs.56 The culture then becomes so

entrenched with heroic images of the martyrs that children are formally socialized to admire the

attackers, and they see suicide bombers as "rock stars, sports heroes, and religious idols rolled

into one."57

This same culture of martyrdom which incentivizes suicide bombing also discourages

backing out of an agreed-to suicide operation, as such an act brings much shame both to the

potential attacker and to his or her family.58 Thus, not only is there social praise, but also social

shame. Such social pressure is a strong indicator of norms underlying the behavior of suicide

bombing, specifically the culture of martyrdom.59 Indeed, the normative culture of martyrdom is

perhaps the most important cause of suicide terrorism in Palestine.

David Brooks cites a national Palestinian poll that shows a 70 to 80% approval rating of

the practice of suicide bombing. This is a higher approval rate than any of the political

organizations of Palestine, including Fatah and Hamas, the latter of which employs the tactic.60

Indeed, suicide bombers are so highly revered in Palestinian culture that attack organizers are

solicited by more volunteers than they can handle. One Hamas leader told Hassan: "It is difficult

55 Hassan. “Letter.”



58 Post, “Psychological Dynamics,” 22.

59 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 892.


to select only a few. Those whom we turn away return again and again, pestering us, pleading to

be accepted."61

The cultural affinity for suicide bombing becomes very apparent in the particular names

for the same phenomenon: what Israelis call "suicide bombing," Palestinians refer to as

"martyrdom."6263 Hassan noted that one precondition for her interviews was that she was not

allowed to use the term "suicide," because it is strictly forbidden in Islam. According to her, the

preferred term is "sacred explosion."64

In sum, two causal chains or two logics can be traced as common explanations for suicide

terror. The first is a “logic of consequences” explanation (Figure 1); the other is the normative

“logic of appropriateness” (Figure 2). In the utilitarian logic, individual poverty and desperation

magnify or precipitate a lack of hope, which in turn spurs an individual to volunteer his or her

own life. In the normative explanation, the culture of martyrdom is what directly leads a person

to agree to a martyrdom operation, but "real grievances," such as the loss of a loved one, are

sometimes the initial catalyst that impels the person to subscribe to such a culture. The

grievances are interpreted and contextualized within Islam, which is in turn manipulated through

influential leaders to magnify the normative culture of martyrdom.


62 Ahmed, “Resistance,” 90-91.

63 The two sides refer to the same objective phenomenon in different ways, which is indicative of the different discourses surrounding suicide terrorism or martyrdom operations. Discourses are a kind of contextual, linguistic practice with a purpose. For instance, referring to the phenomenon as "suicide terrorism" or "suicide bombing" serves to delegitimize the practice at a linguistic level, while calling it a "martyrdom operation" confers legitimacy. Postmodern constructivist scholars of IR seek to uncover and problematize power structures within dominant discourses. Indeed, postmodernists might see the predominant use of the phrase "suicide terrorism" in this paper as an acknowledgement of the dominance of the Israeli discourse, or a reflection of the power difference between Israel and Palestine. For more on strategic discourse, see Michael J. Shapiro, "Strategic Discourse/Discurisve Strategy: The Representation of 'Security Policy' in the Video Age," International Studies Quarterly 34 no.3 (1990): 327-340. My definition of "discourse" is an adaptation from this article. For more on legitimacy and discourse, see Harmonie Toros, "'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts." Security Dialogue 39, no.4 (2008): 407-426. 64 Hassan, “Letter."

To better understand the causal chains of suicide terrorism, it is helpful to view them in

terms of variables. An independent variable is the concept that is the causal phenomenon of a

theory. In the consequential logic, one could say that an individual’s lack of hope is what spurs

him or her to commit suicide terrorism. Because of this, “lack of hope” is the independent

variable. Similarly, in the normative logic, the culture of martyrdom is the cause of individual

consent to suicide terrorism, so it is the independent variable. Independent variables can also be

modified or magnified by condition variables, which influence the magnitude of the effect that

the independent variable has on other variables.65 In the logic of consequences causal chain,

poverty can act as an augmenting force, or even a prerequisite to a lack of hope. Similarly, Islam

and influential leaders are both variables that magnify, interact with and make possible the

culture of martyrdom. Therefore, these are condition variables. In addition to condition

variables, I list “real grievances” as a cause that is more remote to the process.66 These

grievances do not necessarily result in suicide terrorism, and therefore it

would be misleading to label them as an independent or even a condition

variable. In both logics, the dependent variable is suicide terrorism. This is

the phenomenon we hope to explain.

Logic of Consequences:lack of hope →suicide terrorismIndependent VariableDependent Variable

×povertyCondition Variable

Figure 1: The Logic of Consequences

65 Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 11.

66 Van Evera mentions remote causes on p13-14.

Logic of Appropriateness:real grievances→culture of martyrdom → suicide terrorism Remote Cause Independent VariableDependent Variable

×IslamConditionVariable

×influential leaders ConditionVariable

Figure 2: The Logic of Appropriateness

Both chains seem complex, but due to the empirical argument that suicide bombers are

not poor, uneducated, or without hope, the normative chain seems most plausible. Poverty, last

recourse, and territorial issues might be common explanations of conventional terrorism or

terrorism in general: they might even be at work in instances of suicide terrorism. By

themselves, however, they do little to help explain the suicide terrorism phenomenon. Individual

desperation is similarly less convincing as a more material explanation, although sometimes

“real grievances” can be made normative by Islam and influential leaders. Thus, a normative

explanation must be at work. Arguably the most plausible explanation is the larger culture

behind the martyrdom norm that is so heavily entrenched in the daily lives of Palestinians.

Because of its causal foundations for suicide terrorism, the martyrdom norm’s trajectory is

important to ascertain.

Norms, Norm Processes, and The Model

Since it has been established that the martyrdom norm is the main basis for suicide

terrorism in Palestine, it is important to learn more about norms and how they operate. This

section will deal with what norms are, how they function, and their importance in the discipline

of IR, drawing on the extensive literature on norms. It will also review the literature concerning

the processes of norm emergence and consolidation, including Finnemore and Sikkink's Norm

Life Cycle and Koh's "transnational legal process,"67 as well as modifications to these models

made by other authors. Finally, improving these models, I will present a modified version for

the expected trajectory of the martyrdom norm.

Norms

In order to review the literature on norms, we first need to define the concept. "Norm" is

generally agreed to mean "a standard of appropriate behavior for actors within a given identity."

Richard Herrmann adds that "most norms take the form: moral people do X, in situations A, B or

C unless Q and/or R prevail." Thus, norms are not only dependent on identity but also on

situation, and situations can be perceived differently.68 Furthermore, norms have both

"prescription," or a built-in mechanism that denotes appropriate behavior, and "description,"

because the norm is founded on collective understandings of observable, repeated interactions.69

Because of these multiple meanings, and because appropriateness comes to be defined by the

norm, some argue that norms have built-in punishments for behaviors that violate the norm.70

However, norms are not only limiting factors on power and behavior, but they can also become a

source of power for the influential "wielders" of the norm, and they can also constitute new

patterns of behavior.71

67Harold Hongju Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?" The Yale Law Journal 106, no. 8 (1997): 2599-2659.68 Richard K. Herrmann, "Linking Theory to Evidence in International Relations," Handbook of International Relations. ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage Publications, 2002): 130.69 Thomas, Ward, Ethics of Destruction, 7.

70 Gary Guertz, International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003): 33.71 Thomas, Ward, Ethics of Destruction. 11, 30; and Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 891.

Norms are extremely dynamic and not inherently peace-promoting; indeed, norms can

promote both justice and injustice,72 peace and war,73 or have no ethical content at all.74 But,

Finnemore and Sikkink carefully point out that, as a logical corollary to Katzenstein's definition,

there can be no "bad" norms, because each norm must be seen as appropriate by the group or

individual that operates under it.75 However, these norms can still lead to undesirable outcomes.

Additionally, since norms are based on collective understandings, they can vary in

strength and agreement.76 In other words, weaker norms have less widespread agreement, while

there is more universal agreement on stronger norms. Norms are identifiable based on their

followers – individuals, organizations, and states that give the norm "material expression."77

Herrmann provides three more ways to test the existence of the norm.78 The first is presence of

the norm in codified laws, or institutionalization. If a norm is widely accepted enough to prompt

a law codifying the norm, then a norm is in play. The second method is observing a norm in

repeated behavioral patterns. For instance, it can be determined whether or not a norm exists

based on reactions to its violation, because it will lead to disapproval.79 Perhaps counter-

intuitively, norm-violating behavior might be more indicative of a norm than norm-abiding

72 Guertz, International Norms, 21.

73 Herrmann “Linking Theory to Evidence,”130.

74 Thomas, Ward, Ethics of Destruction, 27. Thomas writes that some norms are "instrumental or perhaps ritualistic," or even logistical. Not all norms deal with ethical content.75 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 892. I think this argument is somewhat misleading. Perhaps it is improper to label a norm as "bad," but certainly norms can be seen as conflict-promoting rather than peace-promoting, as Guertz and Herrmann point out. Norms can also be seen as inappropriate by outsiders or non-subscribers to the norm in question. 76 Finnemore and Sikkink “International Norm Dynamics,” 892.

77 Karen Brown Thompson, "Women's Rights are Human Rights," in Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, ed. Sanjeev Khagram, James v. Riker, Kathryn Sikkink (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002): 110.78 All three are in Herrmann, “Linking Theory to Evidence,” 129.

79 Denise Garcia, "Warming to a Redefinition of International Security: The Consolidation of a Norm Concerning Climate Change," International Relations 24, no.3 (2010): 272. Garcia calls this the best test for a norm's existence. Also, Finnermore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 892; Guertz, International Norms, 33.

behavior because, while norm-abiding behavior might generate praise, the norm could be so

deeply internalized that norm-abiding behavior is simply expected, and it will generate no

reaction at all.80 The third method identified by Herrmann is uncovering the norm in dominant

discourses. Similarly, Richard Price notes that when a normative change has occurred, there is a

shift in the dominant discourse to move the burden of proof onto opponents of the norm.81

Norms are becoming increasingly crucial in International Relations theory.82 It has

already been discussed how norms can explain the underlying forces behind seemingly irrational

behavior.83 Additionally, norms can empower non-state actors without, and even against, state

action by helping civil society mobilize and form networks.84 Furthermore, scholars recognize

the role of norms as a key structuring power: even in an anarchic system, many regard norms to

be as important or more important than structures of material power in effecting regime change.85

In other words, norms and normative changes can act as countervailing forces to anarchy, the

fundamental problem of IR. Just as realism looks to state power as the structuring force,

constructivists and critical theorists look to norms as having, at least, equal weight. Thus, in an

IR discourse in which mainstream scholars focus on material concerns, state-centeredness, and

anarchy, norms can add a new dimension to these fundamental IR topics.

One key distinction to make is the difference between norms and behavior. The

difficulty in differentiating behavior and norms, in particular when conducting empirical work,

80 Finnemore and Sikkink, “Internaitonal Norm Dynamics,” 892.

81 Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," International Organization 52, no.3 (1998): 631. 82 Kathryn Sikkink, "Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymetries of Soft Power." Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, ed. Sanjeev Khagram, James v. Riker, Kathryn Sikkink (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002): 301.83 See discussion on Logic of Consequences and Logic of Appropriateness

84 Daniel C. Thomas, “Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, ed. Sanjeev Khagram, James v. Riker, Kathryn Sikkink (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002): 71, 73, 93.85 Sikkink, “Restructuring World Politics,”302-303, 306.

necessitates a cautious approach to studying the norm independently from the behavior it

generates. A norm is a standard of behavior, not the behavior itself.

Identities

At the most basic level, an identity is a perception of the self or of one's own group as

opposed to an "other."86 Identities can be formed through socialization and discourse and they

are reflexive and relational, meaning that they reflect perceptions of the self but have their

meaning in relation or comparison to another actor.87 Of course, since “actors with a given

identity” 88 determine social norms, norms and identities are intimately related. In fact, norms and

identities are so interrelated that their connection makes both more difficult to isolate and study.89

Norms are defined by identity, and a person will not act based on a norm that does not

pertain to her or his personal identity. For example, Slocum-Bradley discusses how group

identities and perceptions of self as belonging to a certain group and having a certain identity can

drive norms to be conflict-promoting as well as peace-promoting, noting that even violence can

become "appropriate."90 Slocum-Bradley cites authors who have given examples of how group

identities and key figures come to form cultures in which genocide and terrorism are seen as

legitimate.91 This is of particular interest to this study, as it shows how identities have

legitimized violent norms like the culture of martyrdom. Of course, the culture of martyrdom is

86 Nikki Slocum-Bradley, "Introduction: Borders of the Mind," in Promoting Conflict or Peace through Identity, ed. Nikki Slocum-Bradley (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008): 1.87 Slocum-Bradley, “Introduction,” p.3 and Nikki Slocum-Bradley, "Crossing Mental Borders: Constructing a Laissez-Passer for Peace," in Promoting Conflict or Peace through Identity, ed. Nikki Slocum-Bradley (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008): 209.88 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 891.

89 Thomas, Ward. Ethics of Destruction, 44-45.

90 Slocum-Bradley "Introduction" p12.

91 She cites Fujii (2002) and Moghaddam (2006).

tightly bound to its related identities and the larger identity felt by the Palestinian people due to

the common experience of the Israeli occupation.

Norm Process Models

IR literature has produced various models examining the development and internalization

of norms. This section will describe Finnemore and Sikkink's "Norm Life Cycle" model of how

a norm becomes internalized followed by a description of "Transnational Legal Process Theory,"

which is more concerned with the intersection of norms and law, but can still shed helpful

insights into intervening steps on the way to internalization.

The Norm Life Cycle

Finnemore and Sikkink present an important contribution to the discussion of norm

development with their Norm Life Cycle. Many scholars have used the life cycle as a model to

trace the development of a number of different norms, including anti-landmine norms, anti-

chemical and nuclear weapons norms, anti-child soldier norms, and even anti-plastic shopping

bag norms. This list may illustrate what I recognize as a fundamental problem with this body of

literature: nearly all attention is paid to norms that promote peace, especially if they limit the

legitimate use of a certain type of war tactic. Recall that norms are not inherently positive or

peace-promoting. However, nearly all of the literature that concerns norms, including that which

concerns norm processes, focuses on these peace-promoting and warfare-limiting norms. In the

analysis section, I will use the model of the life cycle to trace the trajectory of the martyrdom

norm, which does not promote peace, but rather encourages a type of warfare.

Essentially, the life cycle is composed of three stages with a critical "tipping point"

separating the first two stages: norm emergence, a tipping point, norm cascade, and norm

internalization.92 In my discussion, I will draw from Richard Price’s case of the anti-landmine

norm to illustrate each step.

Norm emergence, the first stage, deals with the early stages of norm development. In this

stage, "norm entrepreneurs" are attempting to persuade a critical mass of actors to subscribe to

the norm.93 The actors that constitute norm entrepreneurs can be individuals or organizations.94

Finnemore and Sikkink say that these norm entrepreneurs can be motivated by “altruism,

empathy,” ideational concerns, and commitment.95 Some of these motivations, however, seem to

be more relevant for peace-promoting norms, as it would seem unlikely that someone advocating

for suicide terrorism would do so in the name of empathy. Nevertheless, in the process of

persuasion, these entrepreneurs are, through discourses and actions, strategically framing and

building the norms themselves, since a norm is a collective intentionality.96

In order to persuade a critical mass of actors, norm entrepreneurs might engage in various

strategies. Price names four: (1) disseminating information, (2) forming issue networks, (3)

grafting, and (4) shifting the burden of proof onto those who do not follow the norm being

promoted.97 First, in issue dissemination, entrepreneurs can highlight certain information and

play it up in the media or to a strategic audience. Price calls this “agenda setting,” and in his

discussion of the norm against landmines, he gives the example of an information campaign that



94 Finnemore and SIkkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 899.95 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 898.

96 Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink, "From Santaigo to Seattle: Trnasnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics," in Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, ed. Sanjeev Khagram, James v. Riker, Kathryn Sikkink (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002): 12-13; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 897 97 Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights,” 617.

included shocking statistics and images highlighting the atrocity of landmines and the

devastating effect on their victims.98 Secondly, norm entrepreneurs can also form networks to

further their cause. The formation of issue networks means galvanizing support for the norm

across a broad range of different organizations. In Price’s case, issue networks were formed

between the UN, NGOs, and influential individuals.99 The third technique, "grafting," is defined

as "the combination of active, manipulative persuasion and the contingency of genealogical

heritage in norm germination."100 In other words, grafting has to do with strategically framing

the new norm so that it fits in well and complements norms that are already more deeply rooted.

For example, Price describes how norm entrepreneurs framed AP landmines as a weapon of

mass destruction in order to benefit from the already-existent strong norm in play against

WMD.101 However, apart from grafting, norm entrepreneurs can also promote their norm via

deliberately inappropriate acts, such as civil disobedience, as a demonstration.102 As Finnemore

and Sikkink point out, "invoking a logic of appropriateness to explain behavior is complicated by

the fact that standards of appropriateness are precisely what is being contested."103 The fourth

technique is shifting the burden of proof, which often means “shaming” those who do not follow

the new norm and “emulating” those that do.104 Again, those states that had enacted a landmine

ban used these mechanisms in order to persuade other states to subscribe to the anti-landmine

norm.105

98 Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights,” 619-623.


100 Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights,” 617.

101 Price , “Reversing the Gun Sights,” 628.





By whatever means, norm entrepreneurs in the first stage are attempting to persuade a

critical mass of actors to follow the norm. Once this occurs, the process passes through a

theoretical threshold: the "tipping point."106 But, what constitutes a critical mass? Finnemore

and Sikkink admit that they are unsure, but that it could possibly be around one-third of actors.107

However, some actors are more important than others, depending on the norm itself. Again, in

the case of the landmine ban norm, a large state that has traditionally and widely used landmines

is a more critical state than a more isolated, smaller state that has less to do with landmines. So,

some theoretical threshold or "tipping point" exists that marks the achievement of a critical mass

of actors.

After this critical mass is achieved, the norm enters the second stage, which is "norm

cascade." In this stage, persuasion by the entrepreneur and domestic interests become less

important.108 Rather, peer pressure-like imitation becomes the primary dynamic, as actors

socialize and conform to the norm out of a desire for legitimacy.109 In this stage, the norm begins

to "cascade" throughout the aggregate of actors, as an increasing number of actors attempt to

emulate each other and shame those that have not yet joined the norm bandwagon.110 Price

argues that when Britain, France, and South Africa (critical, mine-using states) enacted landmine

bans, the tipping point was achieved and the norm began to cascade throughout the system.111

Finnemore and Sikkink describe the cascade as a kind of "contagion," in which there is outside



108 Finnemore and Sikkink “International Norm Dynamics,” 902. For a counter-argument that argues that domestic influences might be more important than socialization, see Leisbet Hooghe, "Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Union," International Organization 594 (2005): 861-898.109 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 895, 902.



social pressure for each actor to behave according to its own identity. In this stage, the authors

argue, appropriateness comes to be redefined and the norm enjoys broad acceptance.112

At the far end of the cascade is stage three: internalization. Across the IR literature of

norm processes, this term is perhaps the most misrepresented.113 Finnemore and Sikkink

intended internalization to mean that the norm has achieved "taken-for-granted" status.114 At this

stage, the norm is so widely accepted that obedience to it might be merely out of habit or via

obedience to the law, an institutionalized form of the norm.115 At this point, the norm is no

longer up for debate and has been fully integrated into decision-making, probably even at an

unconscious level. A norm might be so powerful and deeply internalized that it becomes

unconscious and violating it would be "unthinkable."116 Examples of norms that have become

internalized include anti-incest and anti-slavery norms. Both incest and slavery were common

social practices, and because the norms that prohibited them have become internalized, both are

considered to be unthinkable now.

However, norms do not always reach internalization.117 Indeed, even a norm that passes

through the norm cascade can "ossify," or become less pertinent.118 Also, some norms are more

effective at achieving internalization than others. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the actual

content of the norm can be important; perhaps norms that prevent bodily harm and promote

112 Finnemore and Sikkink “International Norm Dynamics,” 902. For a criticism of this view, see Michael J. Gilligan and Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, "Do Norms Reduce Torture?" The Journal of Legal Studies. 38, no.445. (2009). Here, the authors argue that the socialization process does not actually change state interests.113 Many authors, including those dealing with Transnational Legal Process Theory, use the term "internalization" to mean what Finnemore and Sikkink would call "institutionalization," or codification of the norm into laws. More on this will be discussed in the section on the next norm process.114 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 895.

115 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904-905.

116 Thomas, Ward, Ethics of Destruction, 38.


118 Garcia, "Warming,” 275, 290.

equality are more likely to complete the cycle than other norms.119 Indeed, the cycle is flexible

and not path-dependent, and norms do not always move through the cycle in the same way.120

However, it is important to note that a norm need not be internalized in order to influence

behavior. Recall that a norm enjoys “broad acceptance” and shifts the definition of

appropriateness in the norm cascade stage. Internalization is merely the extreme end or

completion of the norm cascade.121

Transnational Legal Process Theory

One critique of the Norm Life Cycle is that it is often too linear, and that it does not

account for the development of norms at the intersection of law and politics.122 The

Transnational Legal Process is similar to the Norm Life Cycle, but it is more focused on

international law and it answers the question as to why states would obey an international law

when there is no higher order that enforces such a law.123 The process explains how norms

become internalized at the domestic level and how occasional obedience becomes habitual. The

process has three steps: interaction, interpretation and internalization.124 As Koh states, "one or

more transnational actors provokes an interaction with another, which forces an

interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the

moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to internalize the new

interpretation of the international norm into the other party's normative system."125 Thus, this

119 Finemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 907-908. Similarly, Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights,” 622-23 argues that images of human carnage are particularly effective means of expediting the process of broad norm acceptance.120 Rumbidzai Mufuka, "Understanding an Abnormal Norm: The Life Cycle of the Cuban Embargo," International Affairs Journal 3, no.1 (2009): 38. In this article, the author describes a norm that moves back and forth between stages and actors.121 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904.

122 Garcia, “Warming,” 274.

123 Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey,” 2645-6, 2649

124 Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey,” 2646.

125 Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey,” 2646.

process describes how the norms embodied in international laws become internalized on the

domestic level.

For the purposes of this thesis, the transnational legal process theory is introduced for two

reasons: (1) for its description of internalization, and (2) for the level of analysis where

internalization takes place. First, Koh distinguishes a number of types of internalization:126

political internalization takes place when policy makers adopt an international norm into policy,

legal internalization is when international norms are incorporated into domestic laws, judicial

internalization happens when domestic litigation spurs judicial constructions to be consistent

with the international law, and legislative internalization occurs when laws are passed that

uphold the international norm. Finally, social internalization occurs when public legitimacy and

widespread obedience are conferred upon the norm. Social internalization also implies a kind of

incorporation of the norm into the identity of the actor, itself.127

It is important to note that what Koh calls "internalization" does not line up with

Finnemore and Sikkink's concept of "internalization." Rather, Finnemore and Sikkink might call

this phenomenon "institutionalization," or the codification of the norm into laws. On the

domestic level, this often takes place in the authors' "norm cascade" stage as more states adopt

the norm. However, Koh’s idea of “social internalization,” when taken to the highest degree, can

line up with Finnemore and Sikkink’s idea of internalization.

Second, the transnational legal process theory is useful because of its level of analysis.

While the Norm Life Cycle is concerned explicitly with international norm development, the

Transnational Legal Process Theory is about explaining domestic obedience of international

laws. Thus, the two models operate on different levels of analysis. The life cycle traces norms

126 Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey,” 2656-7.

127 Galit A. Sarfaty, “The World Bank and the Internalization of Indigenous Rights Norms,” The Yale Law Journal 114, no.7 (2005): 1810.

from the first image to the systemic level, looking at how international norms become

internalized internationally. In contrast, the legal process traces a norm from the third image to

the second, looking at how international law leads to domestic obedience and interpretation,

influenced by key individuals. If the martyrdom norm were to achieve internalization, it would

probably look like a mix between Finnemore and Sikkink’s and Koh’s idea. Perhaps more

accurately, it would look like Koh’s social internalization to the extreme: located at a more local

level of analysis, the norm would achieve widespread communal incorporation.

My Model

At least one author has attempted to adapt the Norm Life Cycle to the domestic level. As

Rumbidzai Mufuka traces the development of the Cuban embargo norm, she argues that as the

international norm collapsed, Congress and US actors attempted to "reinvigorate the cascade

domestically," and the critical actors shifted from nation-states to Congress.128 While Mufuka's

arguments might not persuade everyone, at the very least they demonstrate that it might be

possible to adapt the Norm Life Cycle to other levels of analysis.

Much like Mufuka, my norm process model will change the level of analysis of

Finnemore and Sikkink's Norm Life Cycle. My model uses the life cycle as a skeleton with

some changes to incorporate the changes in levels of analysis. Essentially, in tracing the

development of the martyrdom norm, I will see if the norm follows this sequence of steps: (1)

norm emergence: norm entrepreneurs persuade a critical mass of individuals; (2) a tipping point

is reached after a critical mass of individuals subscribe to the norm and it cascades as individuals

interact and socialize with other members of the community; and (3) internalization: the

128 Mufuka, “Understanding an Abnormal Norm,” 37-38.

community adopts the norm and it gains a kind of "taken-for-granted" status, or is adopted into a

law.

I largely replace "state" actors with individuals in Finnemore and Sikkink's cascade stage,

and I replace the international system of their final stage with a kind of communal

internalization, not unlike Koh's idea of social internalization. I will look for historical evidence

and explore specific mechanisms to trace the martyrdom norm through this chain of steps. My

methodology will be discussed in the next section.

Methodology

With the above information about norms in mind, I argue that the martyrdom norm

follows the trajectory of the Norm Life Cycle. The method of investigation will be a case study,

and in order to conduct this within-case study, I will use process tracing to associate the

historical evidence with the life cycle along with finding more mechanisms to improve the

model. This section will explain what is meant by “case study” and “process tracing,” and the

advantages that both hold in creating and improving theory.

Large-N Stuies and Case Studies

Scholars distinguish between large-N and small-n studies, and the difference between the

two lies in the number of cases studied.129 While large-N studies work with a large pool of data

or samples, sometimes attempting to derive theory from as many different data points or cases as

possible, case studies (small-n studies) use a small number of cases and look more in depth into a

particular case, or "an instance of a class of events," where "class of events" refers to some kind


of interesting phenomenon or object worth studying.130 Indeed, a case study is often an attempt

to build or test a theory based on an investigation into an interesting occurrence.

Moreover, case studies have some key advantages over large-N studies. One such

advantage is conceptual validity, or the ability to see the variables in question in their given

context. This is especially beneficial when the variables or objects of study are difficult to

quantifiably measure, such as "freedom" or norms.131 Case studies can also prove to be more

promising than large-N studies in developing new hypotheses, especially when dealing with

deviant cases, or cases that appear to be abnormal.132 Finally, case studies are superior in

exploring the causal mechanisms between independent and dependent variables, especially if

those mechanisms are complex, such as instances of equifinality or path dependency.133

130 Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 17-18.

131 George and Bennett, Case Studies, 19.


133 George and Bennett, Case Studies, 21-22.

Case Selection

The Palestinian martyrdom norm is an important case because it provides a tangible

example of a strong, conflict-promoting norm at work. The case is one of the few instances of

suicide terrorism about which plenty has been written, allowing me to explore the applicability

of the Norm Life Cycle model. Since cultural support for suicide terrorism is so strong in

Palestine, as will be shown in the following section, the Palestinian martyrdom case provides a

good object of study to better understand a larger class of under-studied norms. By adding a

conflict-promoting norm to the body of literature concerning norm trajectories, the Palestine case

will improve and expand the life cycle model.

Process Tracing

One very important strategy for investigating a case is process tracing. In process

tracing, an "investigator explores the chain of events [...] by which initial case conditions are

translated into case outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects independent variable and

outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable

evidence of each step."134 Thus, process tracing explores the links between possible causes and

outcomes.135 In so doing, intervening causal processes and variables are identified that serve as

the mechanisms between the independent and dependent variables,136 and process tracing

explores the "footprints" left by these antecedent conditions.137

Process tracing can both test theory and develop theory.138 In this investigation, process

tracing will be developing a new theory by applying an existing theory (Finnemore and Sikkink's






Norm Life Cycle) to a new situation and a new level of analysis. Indeed, Van Evera believes

that "we can fashion theories by importing existing theories from one domain and adapting them

to explain phenomena in another,"139 and that is exactly what this investigation will do. The

process of deriving a theory from process tracing will necessarily be inductive,140 which is fitting

because Finnemore and Sikkink recognize the inductive nature of normative theories.141

Similarly, it has been said that process tracing provides a good middle ground between history

and political theory.142 Again, since norms are so deeply rooted in historical context, and since

the goal of this paper is to explore the development of a particular norm in time, process tracing

is a natural methodological choice.

This study’s primary method will be a linear process tracing because the Norm Life

Cycle seems to follow a cause-effect path. Norm entrepreneurs promote the norm until it reaches

a tipping point. Then, other actors socialize and spread the norm further until it cascades and is

eventually internalized. Stage one causes stage two, which causes stage three if the norm fully

completes the cycle.

One helpful illustration is the domino example.143 In this illustration, there is a row of

dominos ready to cascade, where only the first and the last domino are visible. A screen

separates the middle (intervening) dominos. Without having seen the act of pushing the

dominos, the two end dominos have fallen over, but it is unclear whether or not the cascade

began from one particular side (linear causality), or from both simultaneously (convergence). In

order to determine a theory, the screen must be removed and the observer must study the middle





143 See George and Bennett, Case Studies, 206-207.

dominos. Based on this observation, a step-by-step theory can be developed that will explain

how the cascade progressed.

Testing Hypotheses and Proving Causation

In process tracing, there are four types of tests that determine causation. The first is the

weakest—the “straw in the wind” test. It is not necessary or sufficient to establish causation, but

it can raise doubts or increase the probability of a hypothesis.144 The second test is the “hoop”

test, which is more demanding in that it sets up a kind of hurdle or a criterion that the evidence

must meet. In this sense, it is a necessary but not sufficient test to prove causation.145 The third

kind of test is a “smoking gun” test, which is when the tester sees a kind of “smoking gun” or

exact proof that there is causation. It is not necessary, but it is sufficient.146 These first tests have

no implications for rival hypotheses: even the smoking gun does not make it impossible for

another cause to also have a smoking gun.147 However, the last test, the “doubly-decisive” test, is

both necessary and sufficient to prove causation, and it confirms one hypothesis while disproving

all rival hypotheses.148 This can occur with a combination of a smoking gun and a series of hoop

tests that reject all other possible hypotheses, and it is the most difficult test to meet.

Using these tests, I will show that the historical evidence confirms my theoretical

hypotheses, and that the causal chains of the historical events fit within the framework of the

mechanisms of the Norm Life Cycle.

Evidence

144 David Collier, “Process Tracing: Introduction and Exercises,” University of California, Berkeley Department of Political Science, 2010: 5.145 Collier, “Process Tracing,” 5.

146 Collier, “Process Tracing,” 6.

147 Collier, “Process Tracing,” 5-6.


As an example of process tracing in a case study, I will again turn to Richard Price’s

discussion of the spread of the anti-landmine norm. In this study, Price selects the landmine ban

case to demonstrate the ways in which transnational civil society operates in achieving political

goals. He presented historical evidence for each of his theoretical “pedagogical methods” that

civil society can use to promote a norm. He also showed historical proof of the norm reaching a

critical mass and a tipping point, leading to cascade. Additionally, by process tracing, he was

able to test the theory that civil society’s actions constrained state sovereignty, arguing that this

conclusion is too simplistic.149

Process tracing is a method that combines history and theory. Similar to Price, I will

present historical evidence for each causal step or mechanism in the life cycle model. My

evidence will therefore be mostly secondary sources. The clandestine nature of Hamas and other

pertinent actors makes it more difficult to attain primary sources, and the language and

geographical barriers make interviews and other types of evidence unfeasible. However, the

secondary sources will provide ample evidence for each mechanism or step. In some parts of the

argument, I also cite public opinion polls that I have aggregated across time. This will show the

historical trends in public approval of attacks against Israel.

In the "Analysis" section that follows, each step of the martyrdom norm's development

will be explained and compared to an adapted model of the Norm Life Cycle. In order to prove

that the martyrdom norm, a conflict-promoting norm, follows the same trajectory as a peace-

promoting norm, all of the intervening variables and antecedent conditions must be accounted for

and explainable by the theory, and the actual events must unfold according to the hypothesized

causal chain. Consequently, my principal hypothesis is that the martyrdom norm follows the

norm life cycle. The norm fits into the template of each stage, and I explore the mechanisms of


each one with historical evidence. Over the course of the process tracing, the method will unveil

improvements and new mechanisms that can improve the initial model.

Analysis: Process-Tracing the Norm Life Cycle

Although the Norm Life Cycle was developed to explain norm processes within and

among states in the international system, for this study, my context will be Palestine, and my

actors will be individuals. My central hypothesis is that the martyrdom norm follows the Norm

Life Cycle model. In addition to this, I will have sub-hypotheses regarding each step of the

process. First, I expect to see that there is an emergence stage for the martyrdom norm in which

norm entrepreneurs are promoting the norm through persuasion, which includes Price’s four

pedagogical techniques. Second, the norm should reach a critical mass of individuals, shifting the

burden of proof onto those opposed to martyrdom, and the norm will enjoy wide acceptance.

Finally, if the norm is to be internalized, then it will show signs of having a kind of “naturalized”

status in which life without the norm becomes difficult to imagine. However, I do not suspect

that the martyrdom norm has achieved internalization in Palestine at this point.

Hypothesis 1

Norm Emergence: Acting as norm entrepreneurs, Hamas promotes the martyrdom norm via

issue dissemination, framing, issue networks, grafting, shifting the burden of proof, and

“financial incentives and familial support.”

In this stage, we should expect to see norm entrepreneurs, acting as individuals or as

organizations, working to persuade a critical mass of actors to subscribe to the culture of

martyrdom. The primary persuasive mechanisms of these entrepreneurs include information

dissemination, framing, forming issue networks, grafting, and shifting the burden of proof onto

opponents of the norm. These correspond to Price’s “pedagogical techniques” of persuasion.150

These mechanisms are the intervening variables that connect the very initial stages of the norm’s

emergence to the norm cascade, or broad acceptance. I propose that Hamas fulfills the role of

the norm entrepreneur and employs all of Price’s pedagogical techniques, in addition to new

kinds of mechanisms that I will call “financial incentives and familial support.” Therefore, to test

the hypothesis, I will present evidence that Hamas strategically crafts the culture of martyrdom

for its own aims using at least some of the mechanisms listed above.

Background

Hamas executed the first suicide bombing in Palestine in April of 1993, leading up to the

Oslo peace talks.151 In 1993, in the Declaration of Principles, often called the Oslo peace talks,

Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) mutually recognized each other and set

out the framework for Israeli withdrawal.152 It became clear that the PLO was seen as the

legitimate negotiating partner for Israel, and that the two sides would work towards a two-state


151 Brooks, “Culture of Martyrdom,”; Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 182-183.

152 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 142-143.

solution.153 However, Hamas and other hawkish organizations rejected Oslo, arguing that the

PLO was too weak to advocate the Palestinian right of return.154 In other words, in the eyes of

Hamas, Oslo had the effect of disproportionately legitimizing Israel, which it explicitly

condemns in its 1988 charter,155 and it also gave political power to its rival Fatah party, which

comprised the PLO.156 As a result, Hamas felt extremely threatened by the Oslo accords.157

Since the talks had effectively ended the Palestinian intifada, or the popular uprising of the

Palestinian people, Hamas changed its strategy and escalated a campaign of violence to spoil the

peace talks.158 This campaign included the first modern Palestinian suicide attack on Israel.159

At the time of this attack, which was a suicide car bomb in the parking lot of a restaurant

where Israeli soldiers were eating, Israelis were especially surprised because the suicide bombing

tactic was more associated with Lebanon and Hezbollah.160 Hamas probably saw the success

Hezbollah’s suicide attack campaign had enjoyed in prior years, causing Israeli forces to

withdraw from southern Lebanon in the 1980s.161 Hezbollah had crafted a culture of martyrdom

by glorifying the martyr as a heroic figure, and in its 1993 attack, Hamas followed this model.162

Hamas even used Hezbollah’s strategic template of finding and training an attacker, having him

or her write a letter and put out a video of testimony.163 However, since Palestinian culture was

not yet accustomed to martyrdom, Hamas had to work harder to justify the tactic of suicide

153 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 144.

154 Sean F. McMahon, The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations: Persistent Analytics and Practices (New York: Routledge, 2010): 27; Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 144.155 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 181.

156 Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005): 58.

157 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, 2006 ed (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 72.158 Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 66-67.


160 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 55.


162 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 160, 162.

163 Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 66.

bombing, especially amidst the perception that it might spoil the peace talks that enjoyed high

levels of public support.164 According to a poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey

Research, (CPRS) some 65% supported the main issues of the talks and only 13.5% believed that

the opposition must utilize violence to express their views while 80.3% believed that the

“opposition must utilize democratic dialogue.”165 Thus, at this juncture, the Palestinian public

was opposed to using violence as a means to send a political message.

In response to this, Hamas took on a “quasi-apologetic” approach, and attempted to

justify the attacks in pragmatic terms: Hamas’ political chief, Musa Abu Marquz, was quoted in

Filastin al-Muslima, a Hamas publication based in London, saying “the military activity is a

permanent strategy that will not change. The modus operandi, tactics, means, and timing are

based on their benefit. They will change from time to time in order to cause the heaviest damage

to the occupation.”166 Although suicide bombing is not explicitly referenced, it is to be

understood as a military strategy that might be employed if it is determined that it can be most

effective.167

Slowly and strategically, Hamas began to craft the culture of martyrdom to create a

society more amenable to the suicide bombing tactic. Hamas was able to take advantage of its

“communal infrastructure” of its involvement in mosques, schools, and welfare programs to

recruit attackers and also garner public support.168 Its campaign included publishing posters of


165 CPRS Poll #1 (September 10-11, 1993). All CPRS polls can be found at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/index.html. 166 Filastin al-Muslima (June 1994) quoted in Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 66-67.

167 Hamas organizers were acting out of the logic of consequences to increase the legitimacy of the norm when it was not yet legitimate.168 Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 82.

martyrs, broadcasting songs honoring the martyr on the radio, holding rallies and setting up

internet sites to promote martyrdom as a societal virtue.169

Martyrdom posters170 typically showed the martyrs in front of an image of the Al-Aqsa

Mosque at the Dome of the Rock and were posted in the streets, in mosques, and even in

schools.171 Sometimes they include captions such as “Glad tidings from a heroic suicide

bomber.”172 Similarly, along with posters, graffiti is often used by Hamas to take credit for

attacks and glorify the martyr. One example of this read: “The Islamic Resistance Movement

[Hamas] and Ez Ed Din Al Qassam Brigades announce to our Palestinian people the martyrdom

of the hero Ismail Ashur Brais, who carried out the Rafiah Yam martyrdom mission on 6

November 2002. May God grant him forgiveness and bestow upon you long life.”173 Both

graffiti and posters are commonly used to provide public praise for the martyr.

Songs, which were often performed at student militant rallies put on by Hamas, contained

lyrics that glorified martyrdom. For instance, these lyrics were sung at a rally in 2005: “Write

your life in blood/Be silent/Do not speak/Silence speaks louder than the ring tones”174 The entire

rally was a marketing campaign.175 Eventually, after the efforts of Hamas, public support for the

tactic increased and children even began playing a playground gamed called “the shahid

[martyr] game” in which they would act out a suicide operation.176

169 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 162-163.

170 For images of examples of martyrdom posters, see Appendix I.


172 Justus Reid Weiner and Noam Weissman, “Hamas’ Determination to Perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Critical Role of Hate Indoctrination,” Jerusalem Viewpoints no. 545 (2006): http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp545.htm.173 Zaki Chehab, Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement (New York: Nation Books, 2007): 97.174 Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006): 131.175 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism,162.

176 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism,163.

Indeed, Ami Pedahzur writes that organizations promote a “culture of death” to gain

popularity for their missions and to use suicide bombing for strategic purposes.177 He says that

social support for the operations is constructed and mobilized in a calculated, top-down way, and

that cultural affinity or acceptance of suicide bombing does not occur as a function of religious

or Arab culture, but rather that this acceptance is solicited by the political organizations planning

attacks.178 Rather, religion and culture are rhetorical tools that can aid in the training and

recruitment of suicide bombers.179 As proof of this, Pedahzur argues that Palestinian culture,

which has always been Islamic and Arabic, has not shown continuous use of suicide terrorism.

Rather, he sees attacks organized into campaigns that last around three years and are centered on

political goals of the organizations that execute them.180 Because of this, it can be inferred that

suicide terrorism is used strategically by Hamas, which provides its motivation for the formation

of the culture of martyrdom. In the same way that the chief of Hamas’ military stated that the

organization would take a pragmatic approach, using whatever tactic is most effective, Hamas’

desire to use suicide terrorism provides the motivation to craft the culture of martyrdom.

This points to the discussion of the two “logics” in the literature review, which stated that

organizers operated within the logic of consequences while the individuals acted through the

logic of appropriateness. Even though the martyrdom norm will provide the normative basis for

the logic of appropriateness that leads to suicide bombing, the norm was still constructed and

promoted with utilitarian motivations. Finnemore and Sikkink, however, do not make room for

this in their model of the Norm Life Cycle. They write that norm entrepreneurs act out of

177 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 28-29, 44. That being said, while arguing that no particular culture will give rise to the culture of martyrdom on its own, Pedahzur recognizes that certain cultures might be more easily persuaded by organizations than others. He cites an antecedent condition for this: a long sense of repression by a disproportionately strong oppressor (p159).178 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism,158, 164.



altruism, empathy, and ideational commitment.181 I think that this might be limited to the

cooperation-promoting norms; At least, I do not see any inherent reason as to why norm

entrepreneurs must act out of a logic of appropriateness. Perhaps this is one of the differences

between the development of conflict-promoting norms and peace-promoting norms, and

“utilitarian motives” can constitute an addition or improvement to the model.

Issue Dissemination

Although Hamas’ clandestine nature and prolificacy in internal leaflets and

correspondence complicate the systematic study of its information distribution, it has made

public statements and given press releases.182 For instance, Hamas has strategically persuaded

the Palestinian public of the importance of armed attacks against Israel, especially in the context

of peace talks that disproportionately benefit its rival, the Fatah party, which controlled the

Palestinian Authority (PA). Indeed, suicide bombing campaigns seem to be correlated with

important peace talks between Israel and the PA, which would serve to legitimize the PA in the

minds of the public and pose a threat Hamas.183 One important instance of this is during the Oslo

peace talks of the early 1990s. Since the talks would legitimize the importance of the PA as a

critical player in the negotiations, Hamas launched a propaganda campaign against the

Declaration of Principles, while simultaneously ramping up its military attacks.184 It is not

difficult to see the connection between this kind of persuasion and Hamas’ military initiatives:

during the intifada preceding the Oslo talks, Hamas’ military apparatus and security department


182 Mishal and Sela cite a number of internal correspondences, which are in Arabic. Thus, I am limited to their translated citations and partial summaries. Additionally, many of Hamas’ press releases from before 1999 appear to be untranslated.183 Hassan, “Letter.”


distributed leaflets to the Palestinian public, signifying that Hamas viewed such an information

campaign as a military, rather than a political, issue.185

One publication was an apologetics book that sought to reconcile the tactic of suicide

terrorism with Islamic moral values, arguing that suicide bombers are Islamic “martyrs.”186

Although it was published in Damascus and it remains unclear as to whether or not Hamas

actually published the book, it is widely believed that the organization strategically promoted

such a publication.187 It is noteworthy that even in this publication, limitations are placed onto

the scope of suicide operations, stating that martyrdom operations should not occur without

public consent,188 highlighting the importance of Hamas’ need to foster a culture that will

legitimize such operations. This publication will be discussed again under “grafting.”

Apart from the posters, songs and graffiti mentioned above, another way in which Hamas

disseminates information to the Palestinian public is through demonstrations. Indeed, in the time

of the intifada, Hamas established an entire “political activity unit” charged with the

responsibility of conducting public demonstrations, including “stoning, building barricades,

burning tires…writing slogans, enforcing strikes,” etc.189 While these actions might seem less

connected to suicide bombing, they are still promoting a culture of martyrdom by increasing

Hamas’ legitimacy and by promoting a collective, unitary quality to the community. The chief

of this political division, Musa Abu Marzuq, argued that “military activity is a permanent

strategy that will not change. The modus operandi, tactics, means, and timing are based on their


186 Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 77. The apologetics book is: Khalid al-Kharub, “Harakat Hamas Bayn al-Sulta al-Filastiniyya wa-Isra’il: Min Muthallah al-Qiwa Ila al-Mitraqa wal-Sandan” [Hamas movement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel: From the triangle fo forces to the hammer and anvil], Majallat al-Disarat al-Filastiniyya, no. 18 (1994). Because this book is very difficult to find and is in Arabic, I am limited to the translations and citations offered in the Mishal and Sela book.187 Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 76.



benefit. They will change from time to time in order to cause the heaviest damage to the

occupation.”190 Since this political branch is conducting demonstrations against the occupation,

and since the main strategy against the occupation is Hamas’ military attacks, these kinds of

demonstrations share an important link with suicide bombing and contribute to an overall culture

of martyrdom.

Framing

One important way a norm entrepreneur can promote the norm is with strategic language.

In its promotion of the suicide bombing tactic, Hamas frames the issue in terms of pragmatic

retaliation in order to further promote public support of martyrdom.191 For instance, in February

1994, after the massacre of the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, perpetrated by an Israeli,

Hamas took advantage of the situation by using it as the reason for escalating its suicide car

bombing campaign.192 After two suicide attacks on April 6 and 13th in 1994, Hamas publically

announced that they were retaliatory operations in response to the Cave of the Patriarchs

massacre. Incidentally, these attacks also coincided with the Cairo agreement negotiations.193

Similarly, the 1995 murder of “The Engineer,” or Tahya ‘Ayyash, led to a new suicide

campaign in February and March 1996.194 Tahya ‘Ayyash is credited with being the first to

propose the idea of human bombs to Hamas195 and he was considered an icon by Hamas

sympathizers. His assassination at the hands of Israeli forces set off a campaign so violent and

brutal that Mishal and Sela consider it the “worst terrorist assault ever unleashed against

Israel.”196 It was instrumental in creating a newly heightened sense of insecurity and unrest in

190Filastin al-Muslima, June 1994 [an Arabic London newspaper]quoted in Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 67.







Israel.197 This campaign was framed as a just response to Israeli actions and most of the attacks

were performed by Hamas followers that called themselves “disciples of the martyr Tahya

‘Ayyash.”198

Incidentally, McMahon argues that Israeli forces strategically provoke many Hamas

attacks so that it can justify tightening its siege of Palestine.199 The example he gives was the

assassination of Hamas’ military leader, Salah Shihada in June of 2002. After the intensification

of suicide attacks (In 2002 alone, 211 were killed and 1448 injured by suicide attacks),200 Israel

was able to justify taking a harder line with Palestine. Indeed, the assassination lines up with

Israel’s launching of Operation Defensive Shield, which led to the reoccupation of West Bank

Palestinian municipalities.201 All in all, whether or not Hamas plans and executes the attacks in

direct retaliation, it is undeniable that the framing and justification of the attacks in terms of

pragmatic retaliation make the operations more palatable to the public.

Issue Networks

Another of Price’s pedagogical techniques for norm entrepreneurs, issue networks are

also complicated by Hamas’ clandestine nature. However, Hamas is known to have a

“communal infrastructure” that transcends churches, schools, and welfare programs.202 Hamas’

overlaps with church and educational organizations might be a special case of issue networking,

but it also makes it more difficult to demark the borders of the organization.

Outside of Hamas’ interactions and affiliations with these communal networks, there is

an empirical example of various groups coming together to promote an instance of martyrdom.

197 McMahon, Discourse, 141; Brooks, “Culture of Martyrdom.”


199 McMahon, Discourse, 143-44.

200 Martin Gilbert, The Routledge Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 9th ed (New York: Routledge, 2002): 162.201 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 237.

202 Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 9, 82.

In one set of suicide attacks in August and September 1997, Hamas had attempted to dissociate

itself with these attacks, stating that the attackers were from abroad. However, it was discovered

that the perpetrators were affiliated with Hamas’ military wing and a complex network of Hamas

connections ranging from Palestine to Jordan to Lebanon, and they were assisted and mobilized

by the clergy from mosques from these areas.203 So, the overlap between Hamas and Islamic

churches seems to be an important way in which Hamas organizers as norm entrepreneurs

promote martyrdom operations.

Grafting

Recall that grafting occurs when the norm entrepreneur attempts to frame the norm in

terms that agree with preexisting, well-established norms.204 It is a specific framing technique.

By grafting the martyrdom norm to widely accepted Islamic ideas, this practice proves to be

another example of the overlap between norm entrepreneurs and Islam. Hamas organizers, in

framing armed attacks as the most pragmatic way to end to the occupation,205 associate

martyrdom as the means to the achievement of the Palestinian state. Therefore, martyrdom is

grafted into the framework of the strong norm for Palestinian self-determination.

Perhaps a better example of grafting, however, is the Hamas publication that reconciles

the use of martyrdom operations with Islamic teachings.206 Since Islam explicitly forbids

suicide,207 suicide bombing does not cleanly fit in with Islamic war ethics.208This publication

reconciles the two and frames suicide operations in terms of Islamic martyrdom or jihad. Since


204 See Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights,” 617, 627-631.


206 Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 76-77.

207 Sonbol, “Norms of War,” 283.

208 Sonbol, “Norms of War,” 301.

this publication, martyrdom has almost always been discussed in religious language, and this

provides an excellent example of strategic grafting.

Similarly, attack organizers can strategically interpret verses of the Qur’an to promote a

culture of suicide bombing. Even though Islam stresses the importance of life and the

immorality of suicide, influential leaders are able to interpret some lines in the Qur’an to support

the idea of martyrdom.209 Sonbol writes that Qur’anic verses, such as “And be not weak hearted

in pursuit of the enemy; if you suffer pain, then surely they (too) suffer pain as you suffer pain,

and you hope from Allah what they do not hope; and Allah is Knowing, Wise,”210 can be

interpreted by a religious leader to promote martyrdom. Similarly, other verses discuss the

importance of war against invaders who threaten Islamic identity. Cook and Allison note that

pro-martyrdom ideas might not be especially difficult to graft with Islamic teaching for radical

Muslims,211 and influential individuals and charismatic figures are known to be important

ingredients in inspiring suicide bombers.212

The fatwa is one mechanism that fuses Islamic teaching with the idea of martyrdom,

often citing Quran verses. A fatwa is an Islamic legal document published by a religious leader,

and any fatwa that discusses martyrdom does so in religious terms. Hassan writes that fatwas

can confer legitimacy on suicide bombing, and although there are fatwas supporting and

condemning the tactic, the “okay to do” edicts are taken more seriously and are more

prevalent.213 One example of a pro-martyrdom fatwa is by Dr. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi:

The martyr operation is the greatest of all sorts of jihad in the cause of Allah. A martyr operation is carried out by a person who sacrifices himself, deeming his life [of] less value than striving in the cause of Allah, in the cause of restoring the land

209 Sonbol, “Norms of War,” 288-289.

210 Qur’an 4:104 quoted in Soonbol, “Norms of War,” 288.


212 Richardson, “Overview,” 31.

213 Hassan, “Suicide Terrorism,” 31.

and preserving the dignity. To such a valorous attitude applies the following Qur’anic verse: “And of mankind is he who would sell himself, seeking the pleasure of Allah; and Allah hath compassion on (His) bondmen.” (Qur’an, 2:207)214

In this last sentence, Qaradawi explicitly synthesizes the idea of martyrdom with a Qur’an verse

— a clear instance of grafting. Dr. Qaradawi might not be directly affiliated with Hamas

(although Hamas’ elusive and indefinable boundaries complicate even the idea of

“membership”), but he is nevertheless closely connected. Qaradawi is an important and

prominent theological leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.215 The Muslim Brotherhood was the

basis for Hamas’ establishment, and Hamas is one of the main political parties that support the

Brotherhood.216 Thus, Dr. Qaradawi and other Islamic scholars that publish pro-martyrdom

fatwas do have important links to Hamas, and the fatwa proves to be another important

mechanism in which Hamas can entrench societal values in order to promote a culture amenable

to martyrdom.

Shifting the Burden of Proof

It is difficult to describe the early phases of a shift in the burden of proof and the

discussion of this technique will perhaps become clearer under the heading of norm cascade, in

which the burden has already been shifted. Consequently, showing evidence of such a shift will

further demonstrate the work that has been done by Hamas to promote the martyrdom norm.

However, one mechanism that Price describes in the shifting of the burden of proof is

emulation.217 Hamas promotes emulation of the culture of martyrdom in its strategic creation of

214 “The Qaradawi Fatwas,” Middle East Quarterly 11, no.3 (2004): 78-80. http://www.meforum.org/646/the-qaradawi-fatwas#_ftn3. The full fatwa, dated March 22 2004 can be found online at http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID =68511215 Oliver Guitta, “The Cartoon Jihad,” The Weekly Standard 11 no.22 (2006). http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/704xewyj.asp216 Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 16.


the martyr’s heroic image. In its early stages of using suicide terrorism, Hamas sought to

influence the public by putting up posters, playing songs on the radio, holding rallies, and

establishing internet sites — all of which sung the praises of the martyr.218 Martyrdom is made

into a virtue. Hassan even describes a “martyr of the month” calendar, in addition to the

prevalence of graffiti and poster images of green birds, the symbol of the martyr.219 Similarly,

Hamas strategically films a video testimony of the martyr before the operation, and then

publishes this video to media services.220 Brooks describes the importance of loyalty to the

group, a kind of emulation, as a mechanism to promote a culture of martyrdom.221

New Mechanisms: Financial Incentives and Familial Support

Although these mechanisms are not discussed in Price’s techniques or in Finnemore and

Sikkink’s life cycle, providing financial incentives for subscribers to the norm and familial

support for the norm are two additional techniques that Hamas uses to promote the martyr

culture. Perhaps these mechanisms are related to “emulation,” but it would be misleading to say

that they constitute shifting the burden of proof. Apart from forms of ideational persuasion,

Hamas even employs a material tactic to increase support of martyrdom: cash rewards. Hamas

puts a substantial amount of its resources into providing money for the families of martyrs.222

Hassan writes that although the average logistical cost of a suicide operation is around $150,

Hamas pays from $3000 to $5000 to the family of the martyr.223 Additionally, Hamas’ charity

organizations often pay rent for the families of martyrs whose houses were destroyed by Israeli

retaliation in an effort to disincentivize familial support for martyrdom.224 In 2003, three Hamas

218 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 162-163.


220 Brooks, “Culture of Martyrdom,”; Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 179; Hassan “Letter.”


222 Mishal and Sela, Hamas, 156; Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 38.


224 Levitt, Hamas, 123.

charity organizations came together to provide $18,000 per month to a family whose home was

destroyed by Israeli forces. In instances such as this, the family becomes an important channel

of Hamas’ influence and Hamas benefits from public endearment as neighbors see Israelis

destroying houses and Hamas providing humanitarian relief by rebuilding them.225Again, it is

important to stress that material and normative factors are interconnected in complex ways and

that it is not surprising that material incentives are used to further legitimize a particular norm.

This does not preclude the possibility that once the norm is sufficiently legitimate, it can lead to a

certain behavior even without material incentives.

In addition to financial support, the family also receives the video testimony of the

attacker226 and they are thrown a kind of wedding ceremony where they receive congratulations

from neighbors.227 Thus, emulation of the martyrdom cultural norm is facilitated by Hamas’

financial and emotional support of the attacker’s family and these kinds of ceremonies promote

the creation of a heroic martyr image.228

In sum, through posters, religious rhetoric, the creation of the heroic martyr image, public

video testimonies, and financial rewards for bombers’ families, organizations like Hamas

strategically construct a culture amenable to suicide bombing.229 This is consistent with the role

norm entrepreneurs play in promoting a norm through persuasion, information dissemination,

grafting, etc.

To confirm the hypothesis that we can see norm entrepreneurs promoting the martyrdom

norm, there must be evidence of individuals or organizations persuading, disseminating

information, changing the burden of proof, grafting and/or forming issue networks to promote

225 Levitt, Hamas, 123.





the culture of martyrdom. We have seen evidence showing that Hamas, in a strategic ploy to

spoil the Oslo talks and undermine Israeli and PLO power, sculpted a culture more supportive of

suicide terrorism through persuading (leaflets and demonstrations), framing (as justified

retaliation), disseminating information (posters, music, media), use of issue networks (churches,

schools, etc), grafting (associating Martyrdom with Islamic principles), and shifting the burden

of proof (emulation of the heroic martyr image). This passes a smoking gun test and proves the

hypothesis.230 Thus, the martyrdom norm, like any other norm, was promoted by Hamas acting

as norm entrepreneurs in the norm emergence stage.

Hypothesis 2

Norm Cascade: The martyrdom norm reached a critical tipping point and cascades to wide

support. This is made apparent by some kind of spike in public opinion, as well as socialization

that is guided by non-Hamas actors

Finnemore and Sikkink estimate that a tipping point might exist around the one-third

mark of actors (in this case, individuals).231 Wherever the critical mass tipping point may be,

once norm entrepreneurs have successfully promoted the norm to the point of crossing the

threshold of the tipping point, it should enjoy broad acceptance and quickly spread throughout

the rest of the community. Here, appropriateness is redefined as actors are socialized to adopt

the new norm and the norm entrepreneur’s efforts become less important as society seems to take

up and promote the norm on its own. For this to occur with the martyrdom norm, we should

observe evidence of public support for martyrdom operations hit a kind of exponential influx

point and we should see other individual actors besides Hamas promoting the norm through

230 Collier, “Process Tracing,” 6. A smoking gun test is a sufficient, but not necessary, test to prove a hypothesis.


socialization. We might also see evidence of individuals pressuring non-norm followers in a way

that shows that the burden of proof now lies on the non-subscriber to the martyrdom norm. In

sum, evidence of the norm cascade of the martyrdom norm would comprise (1) public opinion

polls demonstrating a broad support for martyrdom and (2) socialization of the norm by actors

other than Hamas.

Public Opinion

Observing Palestinian public opinion provides an important benchmark for the public’s

support of suicide operations, and therefore, for the martyrdom norm. This will indicate whether

or not a “tipping point” has been reached, and a kind of drastic increase would provide good

evidence of a norm cascade, in which the norm is being spread quickly through socialization.

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) has conducted public

opinion polls of Palestinians from September 1993 to the present.232 By going through these

polls, it is possible to see the trajectory of public support for martyrdom operations and armed

attacks against Israel across time. While inconsistencies in wording and frequency of the

questions do pose some problems (questions did not appear in all polls, and were sometimes

worded differently), by looking at a number of trends and questions holistically, a broad picture

can be painted to better understand Palestinian public support for suicide operations.

For instance, Figure 3.1 shows Palestinian public support for “armed attacks against

Israeli targets,” although after May 2002, the question was changed to “armed attacks against

Israeli civilians inside Israel.” Because of this, it would appear that public support for attacks

greatly diminished after December 2001. However, this is probably more of a function of the

wording of the question and not of actual public support changes. In July 2001, both forms of

232 All polls up until April 2000 can be found online at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/ and polls after 2000 at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/index.html.

the question appeared, and 85.9% of respondents supported armed attacks against Israeli targets,

while 58.1% approved of attacks against “Israeli civilians inside Israel.” This latter figure is the

benchmark that should be compared to the approval ratings after December 2001, when only the

“Israeli civilians” question appeared in surveys. Thus, when this adjustment is made, it becomes

apparent that after the spike in 2001, support of martyrdom does not decline so rapidly.

Adjusting for this: the chart might look more like Figure 3.2. Here, the stickiness of public

support becomes more apparent.

Figure 3.1: Public Support for Armed Attacks Against Israeli

Targets/Civilians233

233 See data for all charts in Appendix II.

Figure 3.2: Adjusted Public Support for Armed Attacks Against Israeli

Targets/Civilians234

Nevertheless, these charts give only a partial indication of Palestinian support for

martyrdom operations, because the questions referred to “armed attacks” rather than suicide

attacks. Still, as the introductions to the poll results indicate, many of the polls took place in the

context of highly publicized suicide attacks, and this is probably what came to mind when the

respondents took the survey. The PCPSR also used suicide-bombing instances as examples of

“armed attacks,” demonstrating that the organization did not consider suicide terrorism to be a

separate phenomenon, and that suicide terrorism was to be included in “armed attacks.”

234 This adjusted chart is by no means scientific; it is merely a visual aid. I adjusted for the change in question wording by roughly adding 23 to each percentage, because that was the rough difference between the “civilian” question and the “Israeli target” question in the June 2001 poll.

Figure 4: Palestinian Public Support for Armed Attacks Against Israeli Settlers

In August/September 1995, PCPSR introduced the issue of “armed attacks against Israeli

settlers [in Palestinian territories].” The question did not appear again until December 2001, and

it was present in the poll until the end of 2004. After an initial low point in 1995 (69.2%),

approval for these attacks hovered 75%. Figure 4 makes it quite clear that Palestinians felt

animosity towards the Israeli settlers, and armed attacks against them, including suicide

bombings, were more than acceptable — they were popular. Although this poll begins after

Hamas’ information campaign to legitimize suicide terrorism, it demonstrates overwhelming

public support for attacks (including suicide attacks) against the settlers in the West Bank and

Gaza.

Figure 5: Palestinian Public Support for Specific Instances of Suicide Attacks

One good indicator that isolates suicide operations, as opposed to other armed attacks,

comes from looking at specific instances of attacks asked about in a few polls. In this graph

(Figure 5), although it has fewer data points, the spike between July 1996 and October 2003

becomes apparent, which lines up with the spikes in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 that take place in 2001.

This series of correlated spikes seems to fulfill the hypothesis that there would be a kind of

exponential jump in public approval ratings to indicate that the norm has reached a tipping point.

The spike itself represents the cascade, and evidence of passing at least a hoop test that the

martyrdom norm has cascaded.235

Socialization

In this stage of the norm life cycle, the influence of the norm entrepreneur becomes less

important because the norm enjoys wide acceptance and takes on its own momentum. Thus,

acceptance of the norm is more related to a dynamic of contagion than one of persuasion.

Therefore, we should be able to see evidence of actors other than Hamas promoting the culture

of martyrdom. One way in which we can see that this is true is through the media. Brooks

argues that martyrdom operations have become the central focus of Arab media, and he writes

that “reporters who speak with Palestinians about the bombers notice the fire and pride in their

eyes.”236

After attacks, Palestinians see news stories with TV interviews with the attacker’s happy,

proud parents.237 Indeed, rather than feeling grief at the loss of their child, parents often

demonstrate a sense of pride and satisfaction.238 This is evidence that there has been a shift in

norms. By observing the reactions of others, and noting that norm-promoting behavior generates



237 Brooks says this is indicative of a “culture of revenge.”


praise, it would seem clear that this reaction is evidence that the martyrdom norm is widely

accepted.

Similarly, in addition to parents becoming new actors that promote the idea of

martyrdom, Hassan writes that there is social pressure to congratulate the families of suicide

attackers.239 However, parents become spreaders of the martyrdom norm, as well. One poignant

example is of Miriam Farhat, the mother of three suicide bombers. She talks about crying in

2002 as her son, who was about to carry out a suicide mission, read his will. She said: “I am

your mother! It is not easy for me to ask you to leave, I cry for you day and night. Don’t

misinterpret my tears. They are the tears of a mother who is about to give her son in marriage to

the beautiful houris in Paradise. You must obey your orders, and maintain your fight until the

moment you meet God.”240 She goes on to say that she was relieved when she heard the news of

her son’s successful mission a few hours later. Thus, this mother, who at the time of this send-

off was not a Hamas official, became a promoter of the norm, although she is not a norm

entrepreneur. This corresponds to the cascade stage of the cycle and the idea of a larger

socialization of the norm.

Public support of the martyr is high, and Asad writes that the suicide bomber is often

seen as a strong moral leader.241 This is important because it implies that the suicide bomber did

the appropriate action prescribed by the norm. This is in accordance with the model, which says

that by norm cascade, standards of appropriateness are being redefined.

Eric Hazan discusses his experience of seeing city walls with pictures of the martyrs after

an attack and the phenomenon of local people taking pride in an attacker from their area.242 In


240 Chehab, Inside Hamas, 86.

241 Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007): 63.

242 Hazan, Notes, 3.

addition, he writes that children in schools tell stories of their favorite martyrs.243 Similarly,

Brooks describes fifth and sixth graders studying poetry about suicide operations and university

students using fake blood and body parts strewn about the room to recreate and celebrate a

suicide attack on a Sbarro’s pizzeria.244 Some Palestinian classrooms are even decorated with

posters of martyrs.245 Brooks writes, “Palestinian children grow up in a culture in which suicide

bombers are rock stars, sports heroes, and religious idols rolled into one.”246

Additionally, in 2002, which would be after the tipping point, Fatah (Hamas’ rival

political party) begins to adopt the suicide bombing method. Pedahzur writes that Fatah’s

decision to begin using suicide terrorism was less a strategic decision and more that they were

“drawn into it.”247 This is consistent with the hypothesis because it occurs after the cascade,

meaning that Hamas’ influence is less important because other actors begin to promote the norm,

even inadvertently. The fact that Fatah was more “drawn into” employment of the tactic

highlights the “contagion” aspect of socialization in the cascade stage.

At this point, it would seem that through the media, interactions between families, and

even children, the norm is being promoted by actors other than Hamas. The burden of proof has

shifted off of justifying attacks and onto those who would be reluctant to congratulate an

attacker’s family. This provides strong evidence of a norm cascade, and the second hypothesis is

met.

Hypothesis 3

Norm Internalization: I do not think the martyrdom norm has been internalized.

243 Hazan, Notes, 29.


245 See Appendix I.



For a norm to be internalized, it must achieve a kind of “taken-for-granted” status,248 to

the point where violating it might seem “unthinkable.” In the same way that incest and slavery

are both unthinkable in our society today, yet they both were socially acceptable in past times, an

internalized norm might not even be thought of as a norm anymore. Public opinion polls about

incest and slavery would surely be nearly unanimous, although we would not even consider

conducting such a poll, because the norms have been so internalized and these issues have

become taboo. And while we might still consider the level of support for armed attacks against

Israel civilians to be too high (around 50%), martyrdom is nowhere near the level of an

internalized norm.

This does not mean, however, that the norm cannot still influence people’s behavior and

decisions. In intermediary stage two, norm cascade, appropriateness is redefined. Norms can

redefine appropriateness without being internalized in the same way that we can still see general

trends of appropriateness in issues that are not taken for granted. Tannenwald writes that an

idea’s acceptance or reception does not necessarily mean an internalization of that idea.249 For

example, we might say that most people are generally anti-war, but it would be going too far to

say that an anti-war norm has been internalized and that we consider war to be unthinkable.

Another disambiguation that might be necessary is the distinction between Finnemore

and Sikkink’s understanding of “internalization” and the “internalization” of the Transnational

Legal Process Theory, which was mentioned in an earlier section. The culture of martyrdom

might have indeed reached this latter version of interpretation. Koh writes about a kind of

“social internalization” in which the norm achieves widespread public legitimacy and obedience.

This has happened in the norm cascade stage, but a more extreme version of Koh’s “social


249 Tannenwald, “Ideas and Explanation,” 32.

internalization” would look similar to Finnemore and Sikkink’s idea of “internalization.” It

would simply occur on a different level of analysis.

Nevertheless, just because the martyrdom norm has not completed the Norm Life

Cycle, this does not mean that the norm does not follow the cycle. In fact, many norms do not

reach Finnemore and Sikkink’s high standard for internalization. Overall, from norm emergence

to norm cascade, the martyrdom norm follows the same mechanisms as other norms that go

through the cycle, and my hypothesis is confirmed.

Conclusion

Summary

This thesis sought to answer whether the martyrdom norm followed the Norm Life Cycle

model. After a review of the literature concerning the causes of terrorism and suicide terrorism,

it was determined that the decision to volunteer for a suicide operation must have a normative

basis, the martyrdom norm. Then the discussion moved to a larger explanation of norms and

their importance in IR, and Finnemore and Sikkink’s three-staged Norm Life Cycle model was

introduced. The following section discussed the case study and process tracing methodologies,

and types of evidence. Finally, the analysis section was the actual process tracing of the

martyrdom norm through the stages of the Norm Life Cycle.

From the analysis, we can conclude that the martyrdom norm follows the same trajectory

as the “good” norms that have been studied through the Norm Life Cycle. Still, slight additions

to the model were necessary to fully incorporate this case into the model. In the first stage, norm

emergence, we saw evidence of Hamas acting as norm entrepreneur, persuading the Palestinian

public through issue dissemination, framing, forming issue networks, grafting, and shifting the

burden of proof. This is in line with the traditional model. We also saw evidence of new

mechanisms, namely financial incentives and familial support. These mechanisms might prove

to be important additions to the Norm Life Cycle model and should be considered in future

applications of the model.

Additionally, we saw evidence that norm entrepreneurs do not have to act within a logic

of appropriateness in their promotion of the norm. Although Finnemore and Sikkink imply that

norm entrepreneurs act out of appropriateness in their discussion of altruism, empathy, and

ideological commitment, appropriateness is not always the most accurate portrayal of

entrepreneurial motivations. It might be accurate to say that Hamas acted out of ideological

commitment to a Palestinian state, so in this sense, the martyrdom norm’s promotion could

possibly be seen as altruistic, but I think this might be stretching the concept too far. Of course,

it is nearly impossible to determine whether or not Hamas was acting out of a logic that was

purely utilitarian or purely altruistic. There are complex interactions between the two logics, and

because of this, I think the model should be expanded to include logic of consequences

explanations for norm entrepreneur motivation, rather than limiting the discussion to altruistic

and normative reasons. Indeed, we saw evidence that Hamas promoted the norm to strategically

improve its own legitimacy in Palestine.

The martyrdom norm seemed to conform to the traditional model more in the

intermediary second stage, norm cascade. Here, we saw evidence from public opinion polls of a

tipping point and an ensuing cascade around 2001. We also saw historical evidence of

socialization of the norm, in which Hamas’ efforts became less important because the norm took

on momentum of its own. Consequently, we saw actors other than Hamas promoting the norm.

Although the norm is not internalized, this is no reason to reject the hypothesis that the

martyrdom norm follows the Norm Life Cycle. Many norms are never internalized, but they can

still have an impact on actors’ behavior. Palestine may become a country in which the

martyrdom norm will become totally internalized. .

Norms

Case studies and process tracing often aim to develop or improve theory. Through a

process tracing of the martyrdom norm, we have seen new mechanisms that can improve the

Norm Life Cycle model. In this sense, this thesis can contribute to the dialogue on norms by

making small expansions on one of the discipline’s most important tools in norm discussions.

Additionally, the dynamics of conflict-promoting norms can be added to the discussion.

We know that, for the most part, we can say that these kinds of norms follow the same life cycle

as the more studied, peaceful norms. Hopefully, conflict-promoting norms will receive more

attention from IR scholars in the future.

Improvements

In the future, this study could be improved by more first-hand evidence of the martyrdom

norm at work. Conducting interviews with Hamas organizers, attack planners, would-be

attackers, or families of attackers could help give personal meaning to the theory, in addition to

uncovering prime examples of the theory at work. If Hamas’ materials (posters, propaganda,

leaflets, publications, statements, etc.) were more attainable, this could also contribute to the

study. In addition, complete public opinion polling with consistent questions could provide more

insights into the widespread approval enjoyed by the tactic of suicide bombing.

One question that is not answered is whether the departures from the Norm Life Cycle

model can be attributed to the fact that I was studying a conflict-promoting norm. In other

words, are conflict-promoting norms more likely to have a logic of consequences-motivated

norm entrepreneur than a peace-promoting norm? Can we find other new mechanisms (such as

my financial incentive and familial support argument) by studying other conflict-promoting

norms? Are conflict-promoting norms less likely to be internalized? These are all important

questions that could be explored by other studies and by a greater understanding of the dynamics

of conflict-promoting norms.

Malleability and Conflict Resolution

What are the implications of this study on the real world? In other words, how can the

findings of this study be translated into concrete actions or policies? We know that the

martyrdom norm has profound effects on the public legitimacy of suicide terrorism. To curb this

behavior, a number of steps can be taken.

First, fight fire with fire. Hamas as norm entrepreneurs had to persuade the public in

order to promote the martyrdom norm. In the early stages of norm development, entrepreneurs

compete against one another in promoting their norms. Thus, to undercut the martyrdom norm,

we could have taken steps to delegitimize Hamas as an organization and made them less credible

in the eyes of Palestinians by empowering the competing entrepreneurs who were trying to

persuade a critical mass of the public of Hamas’ illegitimacy. However, now that the norm

emergence stage has passed, Hamas’ actions are less important, and they do not have to compete

against opposing norm entrepreneurs because the norm has achieved wide acceptance.

Therefore, rather than stopping the development of the martyrdom norm via competition, it

might be wiser to undertake a new norm at the beginning of the cycle. Again, this would require

new norm entrepreneurs who would disseminate information, form issue networks, graft, etc.

The ultimate goal would be to achieve normative change and redefine martyrdom as

inappropriate.

Other techniques might be not to delegitimize Hamas (and other organizations that now

use suicide terrorism), but to highlight the legitimacy of their non-violent operations. Perhaps

this could be the content of the new norm that is promoted through persuasion and then

socialized through a larger audience. Rami Khouri writes that Hezbollah and Hamas both use

non-violent strategies and attacks to achieve political ends.250 By legitimizing and strengthening

these tactics, perhaps we could lessen the strategic need or desire for suicide operations from the

organizational standpoint. Non-military solutions could be much more effective in achieving

Palestinian’s goals because they would not be posing themselves against the much stronger

Israeli army, and they would also garner more international support.251 There have been

250 Rami G. Khouri, “Free at Last! Free at Last! Allahu Akbar, We Are Free at Last! Parallels between Modern Arab and Islamic Activism and the U.S. Civil Rights Movement,” in Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East, ed. Maria J. Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 80.251 Mary Elizabeth King, “Palestinian Civil Resistance against Israeli Military Occupation,” in Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East, ed. Maria J. Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 139.

successful instances of Palestinian non-violent struggle and civil disobedience to attain political

ends. If these tactics can be seen as more legitimate, then suicide terror can end and we can

move closer to a two-state solution or a final solution to the ongoing conflict.

Overall, the tactic must involve changing the public perception of martyrdom. Suicide

terrorism is what Palestinians make of it, and now the tactic is being made legitimate. Even

Hamas organizers recognize the importance of public consent for these types of operations. If

public opinion on the tactic can be changed, then the culture of martyrdom will dissolve and

suicide terror will be less prevalent in Palestine. In addition, Palestinian organizations will be

seen as more legitimate authorities, which will open the door for more successful peace talks. In

the end, Palestine’s very future might lie in the hands of the people that confer legitimacy upon

the martyrdom norm.

Appendix I: Examples Martyrdom Posters

These posters depict two Hamas suicide bombers, Osama Ayed Bahar and Nabil Habiyeh. They are hanging outside of Bahar’s house, which was to be demolished by Israeli Defense Forces.

The Dome of the Rock can be seen behind the two men.252

This poster shows Hamas suicide bomber Isa Budier and was found outside his family’s demolished home.253

252 Quique Kierszenbaum, photographer, “IDF Demolishes Suicide Bomber’s Homes,” September 19, 2002. Photograph. From Life. http://www.life.com/image/1394417 (accessed March 22, 2011).253 Paula Bronstein, “Suicide Bomber home Dis,” August 13, 2002. Photograph. From Life. http://www.life.com/image/1333497 (accessed March 30, 2011).

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This poster depicts two Hamas martyrs responsible for 2003 suicide attacks. The poster also shows Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Hamas’ leader, in the center, along with the Al-Aqsa mosque in

the bottom corner. The inscription atop the poster is a verse from the Qur’an translated as “Among the [religious Moslem] believers there are men who have been true to their covenant with Allah: some of them [have already fulfilled their vows and] found their death [in battle]; and some still wait [their turn]. However, they have not in any way broken [their vows].”254

This photo shows Hamas’ martyr posters displayed in a Palestinian elementary school.255

254 “Mosques in the Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories Are Used as Platforms for Provoking Anti-Israeli and Anti-American Hatred, and a [sic] Hothouses for Training Terrorists: Al-‘Ein Mosqu in al Bireh as a Case Study,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, November 2003. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/html/final/eng/sib/mpa_11_03/alein_1203_a.htm (accessed March 30, 2011).255 “The exploitation of Palestinian youth by Palestinian terrorist organizations,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, March 2004. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/html/final/eng/sib/4_04/y_apc.htm (accessed March 30, 2011).

71

This poster, which depicts a Hamas suicide bomber student, was found posed in a mosque. The caption reads “The Islamic Bloc at the Open University of Jerusalem escorts, with gladness and rejoicing [as for a bridegroom; and at the same time announces with sorrow the death of] its hero, who died a shaheed [martyr]for the sake of Allah while carrying out a suicide bombing attack,” and above the depiction of al-Aqsa mosque, the caption reads “When al-Aqsa mosque cries out: I beg you, come to my aid—all the blood in my veins answers the call.”256

The poster at left depicts a Hamas female suicide bomber holding a child. Both are wearing Hamas headbands. This image appeared in Filastin al-Muslima, a Hamas publication based out of London.257258

256 “Mosques in the Palestinian Authority.”

257 “The exploitation of Palestinian youth.”

258 For more examples of Hamas’ martyr posters, see Anzalone, Christopher, July 29, 2009, “Cyber Shrines & Cyber Martyrs: HAMAS Commemorates the ‘Martyrdom’ of Senior Military Commander Salah Shehadah,” Views from the Occident, http://occident.blogspot.com/2009/07/cyber-shrines-hamas-commemorates.html.

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Appendix II: Poll DataData from Polls on Public Support for Armed Attacks “against Israeli

targets”/”Israeli civilians”/”Civilians inside Israel”

Poll # DATE % TOTAL % strongly support % support

12 Sep-94 32.7 32.713 Nov-94 33.4 33.4

14 Dec-9415 Feb-95 46 4616 Mar-95 32.5 32.5

17 May-95

18 Jul-95

19Aug/Sep-

95 18.3 18.320 Oct-95 21.1 21.1

21 Dec-95

22 Mar-96

23 Jun-96

24 Sep-9625 Dec-96 39.1 39.126 Mar-97 38.1 38.1

27 Apr-97

28 May-9729 Jul-97 35.5 35.5

30 Nov-97

31 Dec-97

32 Mar-98

33 Jun-9834 Mar-98 49.7 49.735 Aug-98 43.6 43.636 Oct-98 50.8 50.837 Nov-98 41.2 41.2

38 Jan-9939 Jan-99 40.8 40.840 Apr-99 44.6 44.641 Jun-99 44.7 44.742 Jul-99 38.5 38.543 Sep-99 35.7 35.744 Oct-99 39.5 39.545 Dec-99 35.6 35.646 Jan-00 43.3 43.347 Feb-00 39.4 39.4

48 Apr-00 44 441 Jul-00 51.6 51.62 1-Jul 85.9 48.2 37.73 1-Dec 81.8 30.8 514 2-May 52 20.6 31.45 2-Aug 52.3 23.1 29.26 2-Nov 53.2 25.2 287 3-Apr 57.3 32.2 25.1

8 3-Jun9 3-Oct 54.4 26.9 27.5

10 3-Dec 47.5 25.1 22.411 4-Mar 53.1 26.9 26.212 4-Jun 50.1 23.1 2713 4-Sep 46.1 27.4 18.714 4-Dec 40.1 22.5 17.615 5-Mar 37.5 9.7 27.816 5-Jun 46.3 11.3 3517 5-Sep 37.8 10.3 27.518 5-Dec 39.7 9.4 30.319 6-Mar 52.4 14.2 38.220 6-Jun 56.1 24.7 31.421 6-Sep 57.4 16.6 40.8

22 6-Dec

23 7-Mar

24 7-Jun

25 7-Sep

26 7-Dec27 8-Mar 66.5 27.9 38.628 8-Jun 54.8 15.9 38.9

29 8-Aug30 8-Dec 48.1 13.9 34.231 9-Mar 54.2 16.4 37.8

32 9-May

33 9-Aug34 9-Dec 43 12.5 30.535 10-Mar 47.2 17.9 29.336 10-Jun 43.8 10.5 33.337 10-Oct 49 14.4 34.638 10-Dec 48.2 13.8 34.4

73

Data from Polls on Public Support for Armed Attacks against “Israeli settlers”/ “settlers in the West Bank and Gaza”

Poll # DATE % TOTAL% strongly support % support

12 Sep-94

13 Nov-94

14 Dec-94

15 Feb-95

16 Mar-95

17 May-95

18 Jul-9519 Aug/Sep-95 69.2 69.2

20 Oct-95

21 Dec-95

22 Mar-96

23 Jun-96

24 Sep-96

25 Dec-96

26 Mar-97

27 Apr-97

28 May-97

29 Jul-97

30 Nov-97

31 Dec-97

32 Mar-98

33 Jun-98

34 Mar-98

35 Aug-98

36 Oct-98

37 Nov-98

38 Jan-99

39 Jan-99

40 Apr-99

41 Jun-99

42 Jul-99

43 Sep-99

44 Oct-99

45 Dec-99

46 Jan-00

47 Feb-00

48 Apr-00

1 Jul-00

2 1-Jul3 1-Dec 92.1 50.8 41.34 2-May 89.3 45.9 43.45 2-Aug 91.8 53.2 386 2-Nov 93.9 50.8 43.17 3-Apr 91.2 55.3 35.9

8 3-Jun9 3-Oct 89.3 51.9 37.4

10 3-Dec 86.2 52 34.211 4-Mar 90.9 50.8 40.112 4-Jun 75.2 42.3 32.913 4-Sep 92.2 50.5 41.714 4-Dec 83.1 44.5 38.6

15 5-Mar

16 5-Jun

17 5-Sep

18 5-Dec

19 6-Mar

20 6-Jun

21 6-Sep

22 6-Dec

23 7-Mar

24 7-Jun

25 7-Sep

26 7-Dec

27 8-Mar

28 8-Jun

29 8-Aug

30 8-Dec

31 9-Mar

32 9-May

33 9-Aug

34 9-Dec

35 10-Mar

36 10-Jun

37 10-Oct

38 10-Dec

Data from Polls on Specific Instances of Suicide Terror

Poll # Date % TOTAL

% strongly support

% support Description

221996 Mar 21.1

"Armed attacks… against Israelis in Jerusale, Tel Aviv and Ashkelon

271996 Apr 40.3

"armed attack against the Israeli Café in Tel-Aviv last month" 47.9% oppose

291996 Jul 35.5

"Several suicide attacks against Israelis…the past few weeks." 55.5% oppose

92003 Oct 75 40.4 34.1Maxim Restaurant: Jaradat!

272008 Mar 83.5 41.9 41.6

"bombing attack in the religious school in Jerusalem inside Israel… eight Israeli students were killed in addition to the Palestinian attacker, do you support or oppose this attack?"

272008 Mar 77.4 34.8 42.6

"bombing attack in Dimona in Israel…one Israeli woman was killed in addition to the two bombers, do you support or oppose this attack?"

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Public Support of Hamas

Data from Polls on % of People that Would Vote for Hamas in an Election

Poll # DATE % support6 Feb-94 13.97 Mar-94 15.68 Apr-94 15.99 May-94 12.3

10 Jun-94 13.711 Aug-94 13.912 Sep-94 10.113 Nov-94 17.414 Dec-94 16.615 Feb-95 14.416 Mar-95 12.417 May-95 12.318 Jul-95 13.119 Aug/Sep-95 16.620 Oct-95 1321 Dec-95 9.722 Mar-96 5.823 Jun-96 7.824 Sep-96 8.125 Dec-96 9.726 Mar-97 8.627 Apr-97 10.328 May-97 829 Jul-97 9.330 Nov-97 11.931 Dec-97 11.632 Mar-98 9.133 Jun-98 12.134 Mar-98 13.435 Aug-98 1236 Oct-98 12.237 Nov-98 10.938 Jan-99 11.239 Jan-99 12.340 Apr-99 12.241 Jun-99 10.442 Jul-99 11.243 Sep-99 10.444 Oct-99 9.745 Dec-99 946 Jan-00 10.3

47 Feb-00 10.248 Apr-00 12.9

1 Jul-00 10.32 1-Jul 16.73 1-Dec 164 2-May 15.55 2-Aug 19.86 2-Nov 16.67 3-Apr 17.48 3-Jun 22.29 3-Oct 20.9

10 3-Dec 20.111 4-Mar 20.312 4-Jun 2413 4-Sep 2214 4-Dec 17.615 5-Mar 25.116 5-Jun 30.117 5-Sep 27.318 5-Dec 27.719 6-Mar 36.720 6-Jun 32.921 6-Sep 2922 6-Dec 29.323 7-Mar 26.724 7-Jun 21.925 7-Sep 20.726 7-Dec 20.527 8-Mar 24.728 8-Jun 21.729 8-Aug 20.430 8-Dec 20.431 9-Mar 2332 9-May 23.933 9-Aug 18.934 9-Dec 20.835 10-Mar 21.736 10-Jun 18.937 10-Oct 18.138 10-Dec 18.8

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JUR Terrorism Final

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