Election Law Am Jur

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U.S. Supreme Court

Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965)

Harman v. Forssenius

No. 360

Argued March 1-2, 1965

Decided April 27, 1965

380 U.S. 528

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Syllabus

In anticipation of the promulgation of the Twenty-fourth Amendment abolishing the poll tax as arequirement for voting in federal elections, Virginia eliminated the poll tax as an absolute prerequisite tovoting in federal elections and in its stead substituted a provision whereby the federal voter could qualify

either by paying the customary poll tax or by filing a certificate of residence six months before the

election. In suits attacking the constitutionality of the Virginia statutes, the three-judge District Courtrefused to abstain to afford the Virginia courts an opportunity to pass on underlying issues of state law

and to construe the statutes involved. Reaching the merits, the District Court held the certificate ofresidence requirement invalid, as an additional "qualification" imposed solely upon federal voters inviolation of Art. I, 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment.

Held:

1. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to abstain: the state statutes are clearly andunambiguous, the rights allegedly impaired are the fundamental civil rights of a broad class of citizens,and the immediacy of the problem facing the District Court was evident. Pp. 380 U. S. 534-537.

2. The certificate of residence requirement is a material requirement imposed upon those who refuse tosurrender their constitutional right to vote in federal elections without paying a poll tax, and thus

constitutes an abridgment of the right to vote in violation of the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Pp. 380 U. S.538-544.

(a) The poll tax is abolished absolutely as a prerequisite to voting in federal elections, and no equivalentor milder substitute may be imposed. P. 380 U. S. 542.

(b) The statutory scheme may not be saved on the ground that the certificate of residence requirement isa necessary method of proving residence, for constitutional deprivations may not be justified by some

remote administrative benefit to the State. Pp. 380 U. S. 542-544.

235 F.Supp. 66, affirmed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 380 U. S. 529

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are called upon in this case to construe, for the first time, the Twenty-fourth Amendment to theConstitution of the United States:
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"The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or VicePresident, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall

not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax orother tax."

The precise issue is whether 24-17.2 of the Virginia Code -- which provides that, in order to qualify to

vote in federal elections, one must either pay a poll tax or file a witnessed or notarized certificate ofresidence [Footnote 1] -- contravenes this command. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 380 U. S. 530

Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, the Virginia Constitution (Art. II, 18-20) andstatutes (Va.Code Ann. 24-17, 24-67 (1950)) established uniform standards for qualification for voting

in both federal and state elections. The requirements were: (1) United States citizenship; (2) a minimumage of twenty-one; (3) residence in the State for one year, in the city or county for six months, and in thevoting precinct for thirty days; and (4) payment

"at least six months prior to any election . . . to the proper officer all State

Page 380 U. S. 531

poll taxes ($1.50 annually) assessed or assessable against him for three years next preceding . . . suchelection. [Footnote 2]"

The statutes further provided for permanent registration. [Footnote 3] Once registered, the voters could

qualify for elections in subsequent years merely by paying the poll taxes.

In 1963, in anticipation of the promulgation of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, the Governor of Virginia

convened a special session of the Virginia General Assembly. On November 21 of that year, the GeneralAssembly enacted two Acts [Footnote 4] designed

"(1) to enable persons to register and vote in federal elections without the payment of poll tax or othertax, as required by the 24th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, (2) to continue in effect

in all other elections the present registration and voting requirements of the Constitution of Virginia, and(3) to provide methods by which all persons registered to vote in federal or other elections may prove thatthey meet the residence requirements of 18 of the Constitution of Virginia. [Footnote 5]"

"No changes were made with regard to qualification for voting in state elections. With regard to federalelections, however, the payment of a poll tax as an absolute prerequisite to registration and voting waseliminated,

Page 380 U. S. 532

and a provision was added requiring the federal voter to file a certificate of residence in each election yearor, at his option, to pay the customary poll taxes. The statute provides that the certificate of residence

must be filed no earlier than October 1 of the year immediately preceding that in which the voter desiresto vote, and not later than six months prior to the election. The voter must state in the certificate (which

must be notarized or witnessed) his present address, that he is currently a resident of Virginia, that he

has been a resident since the date of his registration, and that he does not presently intend to removefrom the city or county of which he is a resident prior to the next general election. Va.Code Ann. 24-

17.2 (1964 Supp.). Thus, as a result of the 1963 Acts, a citizen, after registration, may vote in bothfederal and state elections upon the payment of all assessable poll taxes. Va.Code Ann. 24-17 (1964

Supp.). If he has not paid such taxes, he cannot vote in state elections, and may vote in federal electionsonly upon filing a certificate of residence in each election year. Va.Code Ann. 24-17.1, 24-17.2 (1964Supp.)."
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The present appeal originated as two separate class actions, brought by appellees in the United StatesDistrict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, attacking the foregoing provisions of the 1963 Virginia

legislation as violative of Art. I, 2, of the Constitution of the United States, and the Fourteenth,Seventeenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments thereto. The complaints, which prayed for declaratory and

injunctive relief, named as defendants (appellants here) the three members of the Virginia State Board ofElections and, in one case, the County Treasurer of Roanoke County, Virginia, and, in the other, the

Director of Finance of Fairfax County. The jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked pursuant to 28U.S.C. 1331, 1343, 2201 (1958 ed.), and chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 380 U. S. 533

a court of three judges was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281, 2284 (1958 ed.).

The District Court denied the State's motion to stay the proceedings in order to give the Virginia courts anopportunity to resolve the issues and interpret the statutes involved. The court further denied the State's

motions to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties, for failure to state a claim on which relief could

be granted, and for want of a justiciable controversy. [Footnote 6] On the merits, the District Court heldthat the certificate of residence requirement was "a distinct qualification," or at least an "increase [in] the

quantum of necessary proof of residence" imposed solely on the federal voter, and that it thereforeviolated Art. I, 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment, which provide that electors choosing a

Representative or Senator in the Congress of the United States "shall have the qualifications requisite for

electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature." The court rejected the argument that theresidency certificate was merely a method, like the poll tax, of proving the residence qualification which is

imposed on both federal and state voters. Accordingly, the District Court entered an order declaringinvalid the portions of the 1963 Virginia legislation which required the filing of a certificate of residence

and enjoining appellants from requiring compliance by a voter with said portions of the 1963 Acts. Wenoted probable jurisdiction. 379 U.S. 810.

We hold that 24-17.2 is repugnant to the Twenty-fourth Amendment, and affirm the decision of theDistrict chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 380 U. S. 534

Court on that basis. We therefore find it unnecessary to determine whether that section violates Art. I, 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment.

I

At the outset, we are faced with the State's contention that the District Court should have stayed theproceedings until the courts of Virginia had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass on underlyingissues of state law and to construe the statutes involved. We hold that the District Court did not abuse itsdiscretion in refusing to postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction.

In applying the doctrine of abstention, a federal district court is vested with discretion to decline to

exercise or to postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction in deference to state court resolution of underlying

issues of state law. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496.[Footnote 7] Where resolution of thefederal constitutional question is dependent upon, or may be materially altered by, the determination of

an uncertain issue of state law, abstention may be proper in order to avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state relations, interference with important state functions, tentative decisions on questions of state law,and premature constitutional adjudication. E.g., Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., supra. The

doctrine, however, contemplates that deference to state court adjudication only be made where the issue

of state law is uncertain. Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678, 377 U. S. 690;McNeese v. Board ofEducation, 373 U. S. 668, 373 U. S. 673-674; City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 357 U. S. 77.[Footnote 8] If the state statute chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 380 U. S. 535
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in question, although never interpreted by a state tribunal, is not fairly subject to an interpretation whichwill render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of the

federal court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction.Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 377 U. S. 375-379. Thus,

"recognition of the role of state courts as the final expositors of state law implies no disregard for theprimacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law."

England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 375 U. S. 415-416.

The state statutes involved here are clear and unambiguous in all material respects. [Footnote 9] Whilethe State suggests that the Virginia tribunals are

"unquestionably far better equipped than the lower [federal] court to unravel the skeins of local law andadministrative practices in which the Appellees' claims are entangled, [Footnote 10] the State

Page 380 U. S. 536

does not point to any provision in the legislation which leaves"

"reasonable room for a construction by the Virginia courts which might avoid in whole or in part the

necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem."

Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 360 U. S. 177.

In spite of the clarity of the 1963 legislation, the State argues that the District Court should have

abstained on the ground that, if the certificate of residence requirement were found to be a qualification

distinct from those specified in the Virginia Constitution, it would be invalid as a matter of Virginia law,and "a crucial federal constitutional issue would accordingly disappear from the case." We find little force

in this argument. The section of the Virginia Constitution (Art. II, 18) on which the State relies expressly

limits the franchise to citizens who have met certain residency requirements. [Footnote 11] The statute inissue, 24-17.2, requires the voter to certify that he meets those residence requirements. It is thusdifficult to envisage how 24-17.2 could be construed as setting forth a qualification not found in the

Virginia Constitution. [Footnote 12] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 380 U. S. 537

In addition to the clarity of the Virginia statutes, support for the District Court's refusal to stay theproceedings is found in the nature of the constitutional deprivation alleged and the probable consequences

of abstaining. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,377 U. S. 218, 377 U. S.229;Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 377 U. S. 375-379. The District Court was faced with two class

actions attacking a statutory scheme allegedly impairing the right to vote in violation of Art. I, 2, andthe Fourteenth, Seventeenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments. As this Court has stressed on numerousoccasions,

"[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, andany restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government."

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 377 U. S. 555. The right is fundamental "because preservative of all

rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 118 U. S. 370. In appraising the motion to stay proceedings,the District Court was thus faced with a claimed impairment of the fundamental civil rights of a broad

class of citizens. The motion was heard about two months prior to the deadline for meeting the statutoryrequirements and just eight months before the 1964 general elections. Given the importance and

immediacy of the problem, and the delay inherent in referring questions of state law to state tribunals,[Footnote 13] it is evident that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to abstain. Griffinv. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 377 U. S. 229;Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 377 U. S. 375-379. [Footnote 14] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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Page 380 U. S. 538

II

Reaching the merits, it is important to emphasize that the question presented is not whether it would be

within a State's power to abolish entirely the poll tax and require all voters -- state and federal -- to fileannually a certificate of residence. Rather, the issue here is whether the State of Virginia may

constitutionally confront the federal voter with a requirement that he either pay the customary poll taxesas required for state elections or file a certificate of residence. We conclude that this requirement

constitutes an abridgment of the right to vote in federal elections in contravention of the Twenty-fourthAmendment.

Prior to the proposal of the Twenty-fourth Amendment in 1962, federal legislation to eliminate poll taxes,

either by constitutional amendment or statute, had been introduced in every Congress since 1939. TheHouse of Representatives passed anti-poll tax bills on five occasions and chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 380 U. S. 539

the Senate twice proposed constitutional amendments. [Footnote 15] Even though, in 1962, only fiveStates retained the poll tax as a voting requirement, Congress reflected widespread national concern with

the characteristics of the tax. Disenchantment with the poll tax was many-faceted. [Footnote 16] One of

the basic objections to the poll tax was that it exacted a price for the privilege of exercising the franchise.Congressional hearings and debates indicate a general repugnance to the disenfranchisement of the pooroccasioned by failure to pay the tax. [Footnote 17]

"While it is true that the amount of poll tax now required to be paid in the several States is small, and

imposes only a slight economical obstacle for any citizen who desires to qualify in order to vote,nevertheless, it is significant that the voting in poll tax States is relatively low as compared to the overallpopulation which would be eligible. . . . [T]he historical analysis . . . indicates that, where the poll tax hasbeen abandoned . . . voter participation increased."

H.R.Rep.No.1821, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3. Another objection to the poll tax raised in the congressional

hearings was that the tax usually had to be paid long before the election -- at a time when political

campaigns were still quiescent -- which tended to eliminate from the franchise a substantial number ofvoters who did chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 380 U. S. 540

not plan so far ahead. [Footnote 18] The poll tax was also attacked as a vehicle for fraud which could bemanipulated by political machines by financing block payments of the tax. [Footnote 19] In addition, and

of primary concern to many, the poll tax was viewed as a requirement adopted with an eye to the

disenfranchisement of Negroes and applied in a discriminatory manner. [Footnote 20] It is against thisbackground that Congress proposed, and three-fourths of the States ratified, the Twenty-fourthAmendment abolishing the poll tax as a requirement for voting in federal elections.

Upon adoption of the Amendment, of course, no State could condition the federal franchise upon paymentof a poll tax. The State of Virginia accordingly removed the poll tax as an absolute prerequisite toqualification for voting in federal elections, but, in its stead substituted a provision whereby the federalvoter could qualify either by paying the customary poll tax or by filing a certificate of residence six monthsbefore the election.

It has long been established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a right

guaranteed by the Constitution.Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 271 U. S. 583

"Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be . . . indirectly denied," Smith v.Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 321 U. S. 664, or "manipulated out of existence." Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.

S. 339,364 U. S. 345. Significantly, the Twenty-fourth Amendment does not merely insure that the

franchise shall not be "denied" by reason of failure to pay the poll tax; it expressly guarantees that the
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right to vote shall not be "denied or abridged" for that reason. Thus, like the Fifteenth Amendment, theTwenty-fourth "nullifies sophisticated, as well as simple-minded modes" ofimpairing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 380 U. S. 541

the right guaranteed. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 307 U. S. 275. "It hits onerous procedural

requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise" by those claiming the constitutionalimmunity. Ibid.; cf. Gray v. Johnson, 234 F.Supp. 743 (D.C.S.D.Miss.).

Thus, in order to demonstrate the invalidity of 24-17.2 of the Virginia Code, it need only be shown that

it imposes a material requirement solely upon those who refuse to surrender their constitutional right tovote in federal elections without paying a poll tax. Section 24-17.2 unquestionably erects a real obstacle

to voting in federal elections for those who assert their constitutional exemption from the poll tax. Aspreviously indicated, the requirement for those who wish to participate in federal elections without paying

the poll tax is that they file in each election year, within a stated interval ending six months before the

election, a notarized or witnessed certificate attesting that they have been continuous residents of theState since the date of registration (which might have been many years before under Virginia's system of

permanent registration), and that they do not presently intend to leave the city or county in which theyreside prior to the forthcoming election. Unlike the poll tax bill which is sent to the voter's residence, it is

not entirely clear how one obtains the necessary certificate. The statutes merely provide for the

distribution of the forms to city and county court clerks, and for further distribution to local registrars andelection officials. Va.Code Ann. 24-28.1 (1964 Supp.). Construing the statutes in the manner least

burdensome to the voter, it would seem that the voter could either obtain the certificate of residence fromlocal election officials or prepare personally "a certificate in form substantially" as set forth in the statute.

The certificate must then be filed "in person, or otherwise" with the city or county treasurer. This is plainlya cumbersome procedure. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 380 U. S. 542

In effect, it amounts to annual re-registration, which Virginia officials have sharply contrasted with the

"simple" poll tax system. [Footnote 21] For many, it would probably seem far preferable to mail in the polltax payment upon receipt of the bill. In addition, the certificate must be filed six months before the

election, thus perpetuating one of the disenfranchising characteristics of the poll tax which the Twenty-fourth Amendment was designed to eliminate. We are thus constrained to hold that the requirement

imposed upon the voter who refuses to pay the poll tax constitutes an abridgment of his right to vote byreason of failure to pay the poll tax.

The requirement imposed upon those who reject the poll tax method of qualifying would not be saved

even if it could be said that it is no more onerous, or even somewhat less onerous, than the poll tax. Forfederal elections, the poll tax is abolished absolutely as a prerequisite to voting, and no equivalent or

milder substitute may be imposed. Any material requirement imposed upon the federal voter solelybecause of his refusal to waive the constitutional immunity subverts the effectiveness of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, and must fall under its ban.

Nor may the statutory scheme be saved, as the State asserts, on the ground that the certificate is a

necessary substitute method of proving residence, serving the same function as the poll tax. As this Courthas held in analogous situations, constitutional deprivations may not be justified by some remoteadministrative benefit to the State. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 96; @ 332 U. S. 646-647. Moreover,

in this case the State has not demonstrated that the alternative requirement is in any sense necessary to

the proper administration of its election laws. The forty-six States which do not require the payment ofpoll taxes have apparently found no great administrative burden in insuring that the electorate is limited

to bona fide residents. The availability of numerous devices to enforce valid residence requirements --such as registration, use of the criminal sanction, purging of registration lists, challenges and oaths, public

scrutiny by candidates and other interested parties -- demonstrates quite clearly the lack of necessity forimposing a requirement whereby persons desiring to vote in federal elections must either pay a poll tax orfile a certificate of residence six months prior to the election.
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The Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro. [Footnote 22] At the VirginiaConstitutional Convention of 1902, the sponsor of the suffrage plan of which the poll tax was an integralpart frankly expressed the purpose of the suffrage proposal:

"Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that, exactly, is what this Convention was

elected for -- to discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under the limitations of the

Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of every negro voter who can be gotten rid of, legally,without materially impairing the numerical strength of the white electorate. [Footnote 23]

Page 380 U. S. 544

The poll tax was later characterized by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as a device limiting 'theright of suffrage to those who took sufficient interest in the affairs of the State to qualify themselves to

vote.' Campbell v. Goode, 172 Va. 463, 466, 2 S.E.2d 456, 457. Whether, as the State contends, thepayment of the poll tax is also a reliable indicium of continuing residence need not be decided, for even if

the poll tax has served such an evidentiary function, the confrontation of the federal voter with a

requirement that he either continue to pay the customary poll tax or file a certificate of residence couldnot be sustained. For federal elections, the poll tax, regardless of the services it performs, was abolished

by the Twenty-fourth Amendment. That Amendment was also designed to absolve all requirementsimpairing the right to vote in federal elections by reason of failure to pay the poll tax. Section 24-17.2 ofthe Virginia Code falls within this proscription."

The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice HARLAN agrees with this opinion insofar as it rests on the proposition that the Twenty-fourthAmendment forbids the use of a state poll tax for any purpose whatever in determining voterqualifications in all elections for federal office. He also agrees that this is not a case for application of theabstention doctrine.

[Footnote 1]

Va.Code Ann. 24-17.2 (1964 Supp.) provides:

"Proof of residence required; how furnished. --"

"(a) No person shall be deemed to have the qualifications of residence required by 18 of the Constitutionof Virginia and 24-17 and 24-17.1 in any calendar year subsequent to that in which he registered

under either 24-67 or 24-67.1, and shall not be entitled to vote in any election held in this State

during any such subsequent calendar year unless he has offered proof of continuing residence by filing inperson, or otherwise, a certificate of residence at the time and in the manner prescribed in paragraph (b)

of this section, or, at his option, by personally paying to the proper officer, at least six months prior to anysuch election in which he offers to vote, all State poll taxes assessed or assessable against him for the

three years next preceding that in which he offers to vote. Proof of continuing residence may only be

established by either of such two methods."

"(b) Any person who shall offer proof of continuing residence by filing a certificate of residence as provided

in paragraph (a) of this section, shall file with the treasurer of his county or city not earlier than the first

of October of the year next preceding that in which he offers to vote and not later than six months prior tothe election, a certificate in form substantially as follows:"

" I do certify that I am now and have been a resident of Virginia since the date of my registration to voteunder the laws of Virginia, that I am now a resident of _______ (city or county), residing at ________

(street and number, or place of residence therein), and that it is my present intention not to remove fromthe city or county stated herein prior to the next general election."
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"______________________"

"Witnessed: ____________________"

"or"

"Subscribed and sworn to before me this ___ day of ______, 19__."

"______________________"

"Notary Public"

[Footnote 2]

Members of the Armed Services are exempt from the poll tax requirement. Va.Code Ann. 24-23.1(1950).

[Footnote 3]

Va.Code Ann. 24-52 to 24-119 (1950). Registration, effected by filing an application showing that the

statutory requirements had been met ( 24-68), was permanent. Thereafter, in order to qualify forsubsequent elections, the voter merely had to pay the assessed poll taxes (unless, of course, his name

had been removed from the registration lists for, inter alia, failure to meet the statutory and constitutionalrequirements ( 24-94 to 24-96)).

[Footnote 4]

Va.Acts, 1963, Extra Sess., cc. 1 and 2. Chapter 2 is now codified in Title 24 of the Virginia Code. Chapter1-applicable to 1964 elections only -- has not been codified.

[Footnote 5]

Va.Acts, 1963, Extra Sess., c. 2, 1(a).

[Footnote 6]

The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted and for failure to setforth a justiciable controversy was directed solely at the complaint of appellee Henderson, who wasregistered and had already paid his poll tax. The District Court was patently correct in rejecting the State's

argument that appellee Henderson lacked standing to maintain this action. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S.368, 372 U. S. 374-376; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 204-208.

[Footnote 7]

See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 377 U. S. 328-329; Baggett v.Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 377 U. S. 375;England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S.411, 375 U. S. 415-416.

[Footnote 8]

To the same effect, see England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 375 U. S.

415-416; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U. S. 134, 369 U. S. 135-136; Spector MotorService, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 323 U. S. 105.

[Footnote 9]
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The only ambiguity discussed in the briefs of the parties or developed during argument concerned thequestion whether 24-17.2 required the voter to secure a prepared certificate of residence from local

election officials or whether he could personally prepare one "in form substantially" as set forth in thestatute. We do not regard this as a material ambiguity having any effect on the constitutional question

and accept, for the purposes of this decision, the State's assertion that the voter may secure such a formfrom local election officials or prepare one according to the statutory description. Infra, p. 380 U. S. 541.

[Footnote 10]

The State also argues that, since the States are empowered by Art. I, 2, Art. II, 1, and theSeventeenth Amendment to create voter qualifications for federal elections, the question whether a statestatutory enactment creates a voter qualification must initially be referred to the state tribunals. True,

"[t]he States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the rightof suffrage may be exercised." Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 360 U. S.

50;Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 193 U. S. 633; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 179 U. S. 335. Theright to vote, however, is constitutionally protected, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 110 U. S. 663-

665; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 321 U. S. 664; and the conditions imposed by the States uponthat right must not contravene any constitutional provision or congressional restriction enacted pursuant

to constitutional power.Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 380 U. S. 91;Lassiter v. Northampton CountyBoard of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 360 U. S. 50-51; United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 313 U. S. 315.The question presented in this case -- whether the Virginia statute imposes a condition upon the franchise

which violates the United States Constitution -- is thus quite clearly a federal question. The precise natureof the condition imposed is, of course, a question of Virginia law. However, the statutory requirement isclear and unambiguous, and the sole question remaining is whether the state requirement is valid underthe Federal Constitution.

[Footnote 11]

Va.Const., Art. II, 18, sets forth as a qualification for voting: residency in the State for one year, in thecity or county six months, and in the voting precinct thirty days.

[Footnote 12]

Moreover, the State cites no Virginia decisions in support of its contention that the requirement mightconstitute an impermissible "qualification" according to Virginia law.

[Footnote 13]

See Baggett v. Builitt, 377 U. S. 360, 377 U. S. 378-379; England v. Louisiana State Board of MedicalExaminers, 375 U. S. 411, 375 U. S. 425-426 (DOUGLAS,J., concurring).

[Footnote 14]

The State also asserts that the District Court erred in denying its motion to dismiss for failure to join

indispensable parties. The argument is that the relief requested in the complaints was an injunction

against the enforcement of all provisions of the 1963 legislation, which included a system for separateregistration of state and federal voters. Va.Code Ann. 24-67, 24-67.1 (1964 Supp.). Since registrationin Virginia is entrusted to local registrars, the State argues, their joinder was essential in order to effectthe relief requested. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U. S. 490, 332 U. S. 493-494.

While the State is correct in asserting that the complaints were phrased broadly enough to encompass allportions of the 1963 Acts, the District Court was certainly warranted in concluding that the basic aim of

the complaints was to secure relief from the certificate of residence requirement. The named defendants

were clearly capable of effecting this relief, and hence the District Court did not err in denying the motionto dismiss. Ceballos v. Shaughnessy, 352 U. S. 599, 352 U. S. 603-604. Moreover, even accepting the

State's broad construction of the complaints, it is apparent that, given the State Board of Elections' power

to supervise and to insure "legality" in the election process (Va.Code Ann. 24-25, 24-26, 24-27
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(1950)), the local registrars were not indispensable parties. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S.145, 380 U. S. 151, n. 10.

[Footnote 15]

H.R.Rep. No. 1821, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.

[Footnote 16]

See generallyOgden, The Poll Tax in the South (1958).

[Footnote 17]

See, e.g., Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Amendmentsto Abolish Tax and Property Qualifications for Electors in Federal Elections, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 14-22,48-58 (hereinafter cited as House Hearings); Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee

on the Judiciary on S.J.Res. 29, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings).

[Footnote 18]

See, e.g., House Hearings 14-15. See generallyOgden, supra, note 16 at 44-52.

[Footnote 19]

See Ogden, supra, note 16 at 59-110.

[Footnote 20]

See House Hearings 14-22, 26-27, 48-58; Senate Hearings 33.

[Footnote 21]

See, e.g., the testimony of Judge William Old before the House Judiciary Committee, defending the polltax as enabling Virginia "to avoid the burdensome necessity for annual registration." House Hearings

81. See also id. at 98-99 (Attorney General Button); 108 Cong.Rec. 4532 (Senator Byrd); 108 Cong.Rec.4641 (Senator Robertson); R. 73, 76 (Governor Harrison).

[Footnote 22]

See 2 Virginia Constitutional Convention (Proceedings and Debates, 1901-1092) 2937-3080.

[Footnote 23]

Statement of the Honorable Carter Glass, id. at 3076-3077. This statement was characteristic of the entire

debate on the suffrage issue; the only real controversy was whether the provisions eventually adoptedwere sufficient to accomplish the disenfranchisement of the Negro. See id. at 2937-3080.
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U.S. Supreme Court

Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)

Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections

No. 584

Argued May 18-19, 1959

Decided June 8, 1959

360 U.S. 45

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

Syllabus

1. A State may, consistently with the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, apply a literacy test to allvoters irrespective of race or color. Gunn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347. Pp. 360 U. S. 50-53.

2. The North Carolina requirement here involved, which is applicable to members of all races and requiresthat the prospective voter "be able to read an write any section of the Constitution of North Carolina in theEnglish language," does not, on its face, violate the Fifteenth Amendment . Pp. 360 U. S. 53-54.

248 N.C. 102,102 S.E.2d 853, affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This controversy started in a Federal District Court. Appellant, a Negro citizen of North Carolina, sued to

have the literacy test for voters prescribed by that State declared unconstitutional and void. A three-judge

court was convened. That court noted that the literacy test was part of a provision of the North Carolina

Constitution that also included a grandfather clause. It said that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 360 U. S. 46

the grandfather clause plainly would be unconstitutional under Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347. Itnoted, however, that the North Carolina statute which enforced the registration requirements contained inthe State Constitution had been superseded by a 1957 Act, and that the 1957 Act does not contain the

grandfather clause or any reference to it. But being uncertain as to the significance of the 1957 Act, and

deeming it wise to have all administrative remedies under that Act exhausted before the federal courtacted, it stayed its action, retaining jurisdiction for a reasonable time to enable appellant to exhaust heradministrative remedies and obtain from the state courts an interpretation of the statute in light of the

State Constitution. Lassiter v. Taylor, 152 F.Supp. 295.

Thereupon, the instant case was commenced. It started as an administrative proceeding. Appellantapplied for registration as a voter. Her registration was denied by the registrar because she refused tosubmit to a literacy test as required by the North Carolina statute. [Footnote 1] She appealed to the

County Board of Elections. On the de novo hearing before that Board, appellant again refused to take the

literacy test, and she was again denied registration for that reason. She appealed to the Superior Court,which sustained the Board against the claim that the requirement of the literacy test violated theFourteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. Preserving her federal

question, she appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court. 248 N.C.102, 102 S.E.2d 853. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 360 U. S. 47
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The case came here by appeal, 28 U.S.C. 1257(2), and we noted probable jurisdiction. 358 U.S. 916.

The literacy test is a part of 4 of Art. VI of the North Carolina Constitution. That test is contained in the

first sentence of 4. The second sentence contains a so-called grandfather clause. The entire 4 reads asfollows:

"Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able to read and write any section of the

Constitution in the English language. But no male person who was, on January 1, 1867, or at any timeprior thereto, entitled to vote under the laws of any state in the United states wherein he then resided,

and no lineal descendant of any such person, shall be denied the right to register and vote at any electionin this State by reason of his failure to possess the educational qualifications herein prescribed: Provided,he shall have registered in accordance with the terms of this section prior to December 1, 1908. The

General Assembly shall provide for the registration of all persons, entitled to vote without the educationalqualifications herein prescribed, and shall, on or before November 1, 1908, provide for the making of a

permanent record of such registration, and all persons so registered shall forever thereafter have the rightto vote in all elections by the people in this State, unless disqualified under section 2 of this article."

Originally, Art. VI contained in 5 the following provision:

"That this amendment to the Constitution is presented and adopted as one indivisible plan for the

regulation of the suffrage, with the intent and purpose to so connect the different parts, and to make

them so dependent upon each other, that the whole shall stand or fall together. "

Page 360 U. S. 48

But the North Carolina Supreme Court in the instant case held that a 1945 amendment to Article VI freed

it of the indivisibility clause. That amendment rephrased 1 of Art. VI to read as follows:

"Every person born in the United States, and every person who has been naturalized, twenty-one years of

age, and possessing the qualifications set out in this Article, shall be entitled to vote."

That court said that "one of those qualifications" was the literacy test contained in 4 of Art. VI; and thatthe 1945 amendment

"had the effect of incorporating and adopting anew the provisions as to the qualifications required of avoter as set out in Article VI, freed of the indivisibility clause of the 1902 amendment. And the way wasmade clear for the General Assembly to act."

248 N.C. at 112, 102 S.E.2d at 860.

In 1957, the Legislature rewrote General Statutes 163-28 as we have noted. [ Footnote 2] Prior to that

1957 amendment, 163-28 perpetuated the grandfather clause contained in 4 of Art. VI of theConstitution, and 163-32 established a procedure for registration to effectuate it. [Footnote 3]But chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 360 U. S. 49

the 1957 amendment contained a provision that "[a]ll laws and clauses of laws in conflict with this Act arehereby repealed." [Footnote 4] The federal three-judge court ruled that this 1957 amendment eliminatedthe grandfather clause from the statute. 152 F.Supp. at 296.

The Attorney General of North Carolina, in an amicus brief, agrees that the grandfather clause containedin Art. VI is in conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment. Appellee maintains that the North Carolina SupremeCourt ruled that the invalidity of that part of Art. VI does not impair the remainder of Art. VI, since the

1945 amendment to Art. VI freed it of its indivisibility clause. Under that view, Art. VI would impose the

same literacy test as that imposed by the 1957 statute, and neither would be linked with the grandfather
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clause, which, though present in print, is separable from the rest, and void. We so read the opinion of theNorth Carolina Supreme Court.

Appellant argues that that is not the end of the problem presented by the grandfather clause. There is aprovision in the General Statutes for permanent registration in some counties. [Footnote 5] Appellantpoints out that, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 360 U. S. 50

although the cut-off date in the grandfather clause was December 1, 1908, those who registered beforethen might still be voting. If they were allowed to vote without taking a literacy test, and if appellant were

denied the right to vote unless she passed it, members of the white race would receive preferentialprivileges of the ballot contrary to the command of the Fifteenth Amendment. That would be analogous to

the problem posed in the classic case ofYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, where an ordinanceunimpeachable on its face was applied in such a way as to violate the guarantee of equal protection

contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. But this issue of discrimination in the actual operation of the

ballot laws of North Carolina has not been framed in the issues presented for the state court litigation. Cf.

Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 170 U. S. 225. So we do not reach it. But we mention it in passing

so that it may be clear that nothing we say or do here will prejudice appellant in tendering that issue inthe federal proceedings which await the termination of this state court litigation.

We come then to the question whether a State may, consistently with the Fourteenth and SeventeenthAmendments, apply a literacy test to all voters irrespective of race or color. The Court in Guinn v. UnitedStates, supra, at 238 U. S. 366, disposed of the question in a few words:

"No time need be spent on the question of the validity of the literacy test, considered alone, since, as wehave seen, its establishment was but the exercise by the state of a lawful power vested in it not subject toour supervision, and, indeed, its validity is admitted."

The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of

suffrage may be exercised,Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 193 U. S. 633; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S.328, 179 U. S. 335, absent, of course, the discrimination which the Constitutioncondemns. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 360 U. S. 51

Article I, 2 of the Constitution in its provision for the election of members of the House ofRepresentatives and the Seventeenth Amendment in its provision for the election of Senators provide that

officials will be chosen "by the People." Each provision goes on to state that "the Electors in each Stateshall the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." So,while the right of suffrage is established and guaranteed by the Constitution (Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.

S. 651, 110 U. S. 663-665; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 321 U. S. 661-662), it is subject to the

imposition of state standards which are not discriminatory, and which do not contravene any restrictionthat Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed.See United States v. Classic, 313

U. S. 299, 313 U. S. 315. While 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides for apportionment of

Representatives among the States according to their respective numbers counting the whole number ofpersons in each State (except Indians not taxed), speaks of "the right to vote," the right protected "refersto the right to vote as established by the laws and constitution of the state." McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 146 U. S. 39.

We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires to adopt may be required of voters. But there

is wide scope for exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record (Davisv. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 133 U. S. 345-347) are obvious examples indicating factors which a State maytake into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters. The ability to read and write likewise

has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot. Literacy and illiteracy are

neutral on race, creed, color, and sex, as reports around the world show. [ Footnote 6]Literacy chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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Page 360 U. S. 52

and intelligence are obviously not synonymous. Illiterate people may be intelligent voters. Yet, in our

society, where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter canvass and debate campaignissues, a State might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise the franchise. Cf. Franklin

v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221, appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 946. It was said last century in

Massachusetts that a literacy test was designed to insure an "independent and intelligent" exercise of theright of suffrage. [Footnote 7]Stone v. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 360 U. S. 53

Smith, 159 Mass. 413-414, 34 N.E. 521. North Carolina agrees. We do not sit in judgment on the wisdomof that policy. We cannot say, however, that it is not an allowable one measured by constitutionalstandards.

Of course, a literacy test, fair on its face, may be employed to perpetuate that discrimination which theFifteenth Amendment was designed to uproot. No such influence is charged here. On the other hand, a

literacy test may be unconstitutional on its face. In Davis v. Schnell, 81 F.Supp. 872, 873, affirmed, 336

U.S. 933, the test was the citizen's ability to "understand and explain" an article of the FederalConstitution. The legislative setting of that provision and the great discretion it vested in the registrar

made clear that a literacy requirement was merely a device to make racial discrimination easy. We cannot

make the same inference here. The present requirement, applicable to members of all races, is that theprospective voter "be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of North Carolina in theEnglish chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 360 U. S. 54

language." That seems to us to be one fair way of determining whether a person is literate, not acalculated scheme to lay springes for the citizen. Certainly we cannot condemn it on its face as a deviceunrelated to the desire of North Carolina to raise the standards for people of all races who cast the ballot.

Affirmed.

[Footnote 1]

This Act, passed in 1957, provides in 163-28 as follows:

"Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able to read and write any section of theConstitution of North Carolina in the English language. It shall be the duty of each registrar to administerthe provisions of this section."

Sections 163-28.1, 163-28.2, and 163-28.3 provide the administrative remedies pursued in this case.

[Footnote 2]

Note 1 supra.

[Footnote 3]

Section 163-32 provided:

"Every person claiming the benefit of section four of article six of the Constitution of North Carolina, as

ratified at the general election on the second day of August, one thousand nine hundred, and who shall beentitled to register upon the permanent record for registration provided for under said section four, shall,prior to December first, one thousand nine hundred and eight, apply or registration to the officer chargedwith the registration of voters as prescribed by law in each regular election to be held in the State for
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members of the General Assembly, and such persons shall take and subscribe before such officer an oathin the following form, viz.:"

" I am a citizen of the United States and of the State of North Carolina; I am __ years of age. I was, onthe first day of January, A.D. one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven, or prior to said date, entitled

to vote under the constitution and laws of the state of _______, in which I then resided (or, I am a lineal

descendant of ___________, who was, on January one, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven, orprior to that date, entitled to vote under the constitution and laws of the state of _________, wherein hethen resided)."

[Footnote 4]

N.C.Laws 1957, c. 287, pp. 277, 278.

[Footnote 5]

Section 163-31.2 provides:

"In counties having one or more municipalities with a population in excess of 10,000 and in which a

modern loose-leaf and visible registration system has been established as permitted by G.S. 163-43, witha full time registration as authorized by G.S. 163-31, such registration shall be a permanent public record

of registration and qualification to vote, and the same shall not thereafter be cancelled and a newregistration ordered, either by precinct or countywide, unless such registration has been lost or destroyedby theft, fire or other hazard."

[Footnote 6]

World Illiteracy at Mid-Century, Unesco (1957).

[Footnote 7]

Nineteen States, including North Carolina, have some sort of literacy requirement as a prerequisite to

eligibility for voting. Five require that the voter be able to read a section of the State or Federal

Constitution and write his own name. Arizona Rev.Stat. 16-101; Cal.Election Code 220; Del.CodeAnn., Tit. 15, 1701; Me.Rev.Stat., c. 3, 2; Mass.Gen.L.Ann., c. 51, 1. Five require that the elector be

able to read and write a section of the Federal or State Constitution. Ala.Code, 1940, Tit. 17, 32;

N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. 55:10-55:12; N.C.Gen.Stat. 163-28; Okla.Stat.Ann., Tit. 26, 61; S.C.Code 23-62. Alabama also requires that the voter be of "good character" and "embrace the duties and obligationsof citizenship" under the Federal and State Constitutions. Ala.Code, Tit. 17, 32 (1955 Supp.).

Two States require that the voter be able to read and write English. N.Y. Election Law 150;

Ore.Rev.Stat. 247.131. Wyoming (Wyo.Comp.Stat.Ann. 31-113) and Connecticut (Conn.Gen.Stat. 9-12) require that the voter read a constitutional provision in English, while Virginia (Va.Code 24-68)

requires that the voting application be written in the applicant's hand before the registrar and without aid,suggestion or memoranda. Washington (Wash.Rev.Code 29.07.070) has the requirement that the voter

be able to read and speak the English language.

Georgia requires that the voter read intelligibly and write legibly a section of the State or Federal

Constitution. If he is physically unable to do so, he may qualify if he can give a reasonable interpretationof a section read to him. An alternative means of qualifying is provided: if one has good character and

understands the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican government, and he can answercorrectly 20 of 30 questions listed in the statute (e.g., How does the Constitution of Georgia provide that a

county site may be changed?, what is treason against the State of Georgia?, who are the solicitor generaland the judge of the State Judicial Circuit in which you live?), he is eligible to vote. Ga.Code Ann. 34-117, 34-120.
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In Louisiana, one qualifies if he can read and write English or his mother tongue, is of good character, andunderstands the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government. If he cannot

read and write, he can qualify if he can give a reasonable interpretation of a section of the State orFederal Constitution when read to him, and if he is attached to the principles of the Federal and StateConstitutions. La.Rev.Stat., Tit. 18, 31.

In Mississippi, the applicant must be able to read and write a section of the State Constitution and give areasonable interpretation of it. He must also demonstrate to the registrar a reasonable understanding of

the duties and obligations of citizenship under a constitutional form of government. Miss.Code Ann.

3213.


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U.S. Supreme Court

Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915)

Myers v. Anderson

Nos. 8, 9, 10

Argued November 11, 1913

Decided June 21, 1915

238 U.S. 368

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Syllabus

Guinn v. United States, ante, p. 238 U. S. 347, followed as to the effect and operation of the FifteenthAmendment and that a state may not establish as a standard for exercising suffrage a standard existingprior to the adoption of that Amendment and which was rendered illegal thereby. While the Fifteenth

Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage on any class, it does prohibit the states from depriving

any person of the right of suffrage whether for federal, state, or municipalelections. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 238 U. S. 369

Election officers who refuse to allow person to exercise their suffrage because of a state law disqualifyingthem according to a standard made unconstitutional by the Fifteenth Amendment are liable for damagesin a civil action under 1979, Rev.Stat.

Where the standards fixed for voters are several in number, but are all so interrelated that one cannot beheld invalid without affecting the others, the entire provision must fail.

Where a statute establishing qualifications for exercising suffrage is unconstitutional, it does not deprive

the citizens of the right to vote, as the previously existing statute is unaffected by the attempted adoptionof one that is void for unconstitutionality.

The so-called Grandfather Clause in the statute of Maryland of 1908 fixing the qualifications of voters atmunicipal elections in the City of Annapolis based on the right of the citizen or his ancestor to vote at adate prior to the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment is unconstitutional because the standards then

existing have been made illegal by the self-operating force of the Fifteenth Amendment.

182 F.2d 3 affirmed.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States, of the statute of Maryland fixing qualification of voters and containing what has been knownas the Grandfather's Clause, and the construction and application of 1979, Rev.Stat., are stated in theopinion. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 238 U. S. 375

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
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These cases involve some questions which were not in the Guinn case, ante, p. 238 U. S. 347.The chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 238 U. S. 376

foundation question, however, is the same -- that is, the operation and effect of the Fifteenth Amendment

Prior to the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, the privilege of suffrage was conferred by the

Constitution of Maryland of 1867 upon "every white male citizen," but the Fifteenth Amendment, by its

self-operative force, obliterated the word "white," and caused the qualification therefore to be "every malecitizen," and this came to be recognized by the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland. Without

recurring to the establishment of the City of Annapolis as a municipality in earlier days, or following thedevelopment of its government, it suffices to say that, before 1877, the right to vote for the governing

municipal body was vested in persons entitled to vote for members of the General Assembly of Maryland,which standard, by the elimination of the word "white" from the Constitution by the Fifteenth Amendment

embraced "every male citizen." In 1896, a general election law comprising many sections was enacted in

Maryland. Laws of 1896, c. 202, p. 327. It is sufficient to say that it provided for a board of supervisors ofelections in each county to be appointed by the governor, and that this board was given the power to

appoint two persons as registering officers and two as judges of election for each election precinct or wardin the county. Under this law, each ward or voting precinct in Annapolis became entitled to two registering

officers. While the law made these changes in the election machinery, it did not change the qualification of

voters.

In 1908, an act was passed "to fix the qualifications of voters at municipal elections in the City of

Annapolis and to provide for the registration of said voters." Laws of 1908, c. 525, p. 347. This lawauthorized the appointment of three persons as registers, instead of two, in each election ward or precinct

in Annapolis, and provided for the mode in which they should perform their duties, and conferred the rightof registration, and consequently the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 238 U. S. 377

right to vote, on all male citizens above the age of twenty-one years who had resided one year in the

municipality and had not been convicted of crime, and who came within any one of the three following

classes:

"1. All taxpayers of the City of Annapolis assessed on the city books for at least $500. 2. And duly

naturalized citizens. 2 1/2. And male children of naturalized citizens who have reached the age of twenty-one years. 3. All citizens who, prior to January 1, 1868, were entitled to vote in the State of Maryland orany other state of the United States at a state election, and the lawful male descendants of any person

who prior to January 1, 1868, was entitled to vote in this state or in any other state of the United Statesat a state election, and no person not coming within one of the three enumerated classes shall beregistered as a legal voter of the City of Annapolis or qualified to vote at the municipal elections held

therein, and any person so duly registered shall, while so registered, be qualified to vote at any municipal

election held in said city; said registration shall in all other respects conform to the laws of the State ofMaryland relating to and providing for registration in the State of Maryland."

The three persons who are defendants in error in these cases applied in Annapolis to the board ofregistration to be registered as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of their right to vote at an election to be

held in July, 1909, and they were denied the right by a vote of two out of the three members of the board.

They consequently were unable to vote. Anderson, the defendant in error in No. 8, was a negro citizenwho possessed all the qualifications required to vote exacted by the law in existence prior to the one we

have just quoted, and who on January 1, 1868, the date fixed in the third class in the act in question,

would have been entitled to vote in Maryland but for the fact that he was a negro, albeit he possessednone of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 238 U. S. 378
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particular qualifications enumerated by the statute in question. Howard, the defendant in error in No. 9,was a negro citizen possessing all the qualifications to vote required before the passage of the act in

question, whose grandfather resided in Maryland and would have been entitled to vote on January 1,1868, but for the fact that he was a negro. Brown, the defendant in error in No. 10, also had all the

qualifications to vote under the law previously existing, and his father was a negro residing in Marylandwho would have been able to vote on the date named but for the fact that he was a negro. The three

parties thereupon began these separate suits to recover damages against the two registering officers who

had refused to register them on the ground that thereby they had been deprived of a right to vote securedby the Fifteenth Amendment, and that there was liability for damages under 1979, Rev.Stat., which is as

follows:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any state or

territory subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitutionand Laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedingfor redress."

The complaints were demurred to, and it would seem that every conceivable question of law susceptible of

being raised was presented and considered, and the demurrers were overruled, the grounds for so doing

being stated in one opinion common to the three cases (182 F.2d 3). The cases were then tried to thecourt without a jury, and to the judgments in favor of the plaintiffs which resulted these three separate

writs of error were prosecuted.

The nonliability, in any event, of the election officers for their official conduct is seriously pressed inargument, and chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Page 238 U. S. 379

it is also urged that, in any event, there could not be liability under the Fifteenth Amendment for havingdeprived of the right to vote at a municipal election. But we do not undertake to review the considerations

pressed on these subjects, because we think they are fully disposed of by the ruling this day made in

the Guinn case and by the very terms of 2004, Rev.Stat., when considered in the light of the inherentlyoperative force of the Fifteenth Amendment as stated in the case referred to.

This brings us to consider the statute in order to determine whether its standards for registering andvoting are repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendment. There are three general criteria. We test them by

beginning at the third, as it is obviously the most comprehensive, and, as we shall ultimately see, the

keystone of the arch upon which all the others rest. In coming to do so it is at once manifest that, barringsome negligible changes in phraseology, that standard is in all respects identical with the one just decided

in the Guinn case to be repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendment, and we pass from its consideration andapproach the first and a subdivision numbered 2 1/2. The first confers the rights to register and vote free

from any distinction on account of race or color upon all taxpayers assessed for at least $500. We put allquestion of the constitutionality of this standard out of view, as it contains no express discrimination

repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendment, and it is not susceptible of being assailed on account of an alleged

wrongful motive on the part of the lawmaker or the mere possibilities of its future operation in practice,and because, as there is a reason other than discriminati

Election Law Am Jur

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