JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats

19 October 1999

Joint Doctrinefor Countering

Air and Missile Threats

Joint Publication 3-01

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides the guidancenecessary to conceptualize, plan, coordinate,and conduct successful joint operations tocounter air and missile threats throughout therange of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

C. W. FULFORD, JR.Lieutenant General, US Marine CorpsDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

• General..................................................................................................................... I-1• Joint Counterair......................................................................................................... I-2• Changing Threats...................................................................................................... I-4• Defense of North America......................................................................................... I-4

CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND CONTROL

• General.................................................................................................................... II-1• Command Relationships.......................................................................................... II-1• Multinational Considerations................................................................................... II-7• C4I Resources and Requirements............................................................................. II-7• C4I Infrastructure..................................................................................................... II-7• Intelligence Requirements........................................................................................ II-8

CHAPTER IIIAIRSPACE CONTROL

• General.................................................................................................................. III-1• Airspace Control and Coordination Procedures...................................................... III-1

CHAPTER IVOFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

• General.................................................................................................................. IV-1• OCA Targets.......................................................................................................... IV-1• OCA Operations.................................................................................................... IV-2• OCA Resources..................................................................................................... IV-5• OCA Planning Considerations............................................................................... IV-6• Execution of OCA Operations................................................................................ IV-7

CHAPTER VDEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

• General................................................................................................................... V-1• Passive Air Defense................................................................................................ V-2• Active Air Defense.................................................................................................. V-3

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• DCA Planning Considerations................................................................................ V-4• Execution of DCA Operations................................................................................. V-4

APPENDICES

A References........................................................................................................ A-1B Administrative Instructions................................................................................ B-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-3

FIGURES

I-1 Joint Counterair Operations............................................................................ I-3II-1 Primary Joint Force Commander Staff Divisions and Responsibilities........... II-3IV-1 Primary Offensive Counterair Missions....................................................... IV-3IV-2 Primary Offensive Counterair Systems........................................................ IV-6V-1 Defensive Counterair Operations.................................................................. V-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Discusses Background and Fundamentals of JointCounterair Operations

Provides Command and Control Relationships and KeyConsiderations and Requirements for Joint CounterairOperations

Discusses Fundamentals for Planning and ExecutingOffensive Counterair Operations

Discusses Fundamentals for Planning and ExecutingDefensive Counterair Operations

Overview of Joint Counterair Operations

Joint counterairoperations are executedby all components, usinga variety of integratedweapons systems andsensors to counterthreats, both before andafter launch.

The degree of airsuperiority may vary.

The purpose of the joint counterair mission is to attain adesired degree of air superiority to allow freedom of actionand protect the joint force. To execute this mission, jointforce commanders (JFCs) integrate the capabilities of eachcomponent to conduct offensive and defensive operations.Offensive counterair (OCA) operations seek to dominate theenemy’s airspace and prevent the launch of threats, whiledefensive counterair (DCA) operations defeat enemy airthreats after launch. Joint counterair missions may employaircraft, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles,artillery, special operations forces, or information operationsagainst a variety of threats. These threats include enemyaircraft (manned or unmanned), ballistic missiles, and cruisemissiles (air, land, or sea launched).

Counterair operations usually begin early in the conductof joint operations, and their effects produce a desireddegree of air superiority at the time and place of the JFC’schoosing. Air superiority may not totally eliminate airand missile opposition. However, it limits the enemy’sability to conduct air and missile attacks while providinga more favorable environment for joint forces to performtheir tasks without prohibitive interference from enemyattacks. Air superiority may vary over time and geography.The degree of air superiority required depends on theoverall situation and the JFC’s concept of operations.

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OCA consists of offensive measures to destroy, disrupt,or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms,and their supporting structures and systems. Ideally, mostjoint OCA operations will prevent the launch of aircraftand missiles by destroying them and their supportinginfrastructure prior to launch. OCA includes attackoperations, fighter sweep and escort missions, suppressionof enemy air defenses, and electronic warfare.

DCA is all defensive measures designed to detect, identify,intercept, and destroy or negate enemy air and missileforces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly airenvironment. DCA employs both active and passivemeasures to protect US or multinational forces, assets,population centers, and interests.

Counterair operationsare both offensive

and defensive.

THE COUNTERAIR FRAMEWORK

OFFENSIVECOUNTERAIR

DEFENSIVECOUNTERAIR

COUNTERAIR

DEFENSIVECOUNTERAIR

OFFENSIVECOUNTERAIR

Attack Operations

Fighter SweepFighter EscortSuppression of EnemyAir DefensesElectronic Warfare

Attacks on missile sites,airfields, command andcontrol, infrastructure

Active Defense

Passive Defense

Interception of ballisticmissiles, cruise missiles,aircraft

Camouflage and DeceptionHardeningReconstitutionNBC FacilitiesDetection and WarningDispersal

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Executive Summary

Changes in the lethalityand advancement of airand missile threats havemade the counterairmission more vital.

Theater plans to counterthe air and missile threatmust be integrated withnational plans to defendNorth America.

Unity of effort,centralized planning, anddecentralized executionare key considerations.

Designation of the jointforce air componentcommander (JFACC).

The area air defensecommander (AADC)develops and implementsthe joint area air defenseplan.

The rapid and continuing proliferation of advancedweapons and technology expands the scope andcomplexity of attaining air superiority and protectingfriendly forces and vital interests. As demonstrated duringthe 1991 Persian Gulf War, US forces were not immune toa missile threat. The detection capabilities, engagementranges, mobility, and lethality of air and missile threatshave significantly increased.

Adversaries are rapidly gaining access to advanced aircraftand missiles that can directly threaten the United States aswell as US forces and interests abroad. Theater plans andoperations should be coordinated and integrated withbinational and strategic plans for the defense of NorthAmerica. Regardless of where US interests are threatened,US forces must maintain continuous global surveillance,intelligence, and the ability to engage the threat.

The growing diversity of air and missile threats requiresjoint forces to be more responsive, flexible, and integratedin order to effectively counter them. The manner in whichJFCs organize their forces directly affects the responsivenessand versatility of joint force operations. Unity of effort,centralized planning, and decentralized execution arekey considerations.

The JFC normally designates the joint force air componentcommander (JFACC) as the supported commander fortheater- and/or joint operations area (JOA)-wide counterair.Normally, the JFACC is the Service component commanderhaving the preponderance of air assets and the capability toplan, task, and control joint air operations. The JFACC willgenerally use centralized control and decentralized executionas the optimum arrangement to respond to air and missilethreats.

The JFC establishes and the area air defense commander(AADC) implements theater- and/or JOA-wide defensepriorities through promulgation of a joint area airdefense plan. Normally, the AADC is the componentcommander with the preponderance of air defense capabilityand the command, control, communications, computers, andintelligence capability to plan, coordinate, and executeintegrated air defense operations. The AADC establishesweapons control procedures and measures for all DCAweapons systems and forces.

Command and Control of Joint Counterair Operations

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Right of self-defense.

The airspace controlauthority develops theairspace control plan.

The joint forcecommander apportionscomponent capabilities tothe JFACC and/orAADC.

Intelligence preparationof the battlespace (IPB)begins in peacetime. Ithelps commandersunderstand the enemyand select appropriatecourses of action.

Airspace control forcounterair operations.

Total protection may be impossible. All commanders havethe authority to use all necessary means and take allappropriate action to protect forces from a hostile act ordemonstrated hostile intent.

The JFC normally designates an airspace controlauthority (ACA), who has overall responsibility forestablishing and operating the airspace control system.The ACA develops policies and procedures for airspacecontrol that are incorporated into an airspace control plan(ACP) and promulgated throughout the area ofresponsibility or JOA. The ACP is implemented throughthe airspace control order (ACO). All counterair forces aresubject to the ACO of the ACA. However, this centralizeddirection by the ACA does not imply operational controlor tactical control (TACON) over any air asset.

The JFC may apportion component capabilities to theJFACC and/or AADC for counterair missions. The JFCalso determines the most appropriate command authorityover forces made available. Typically for OCA, air andnaval forces provide air sorties TACON, and land forcesprovide fire support and attack helicopters in direct support.Normally for DCA, air sorties are provided TACON, whilesurface-based active defense forces are provided in directsupport.

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) playsa critical role in planning, deploying, employing, andsustaining joint counterair operations. Intelligenceprovides information on target employment, deployment,enemy intentions, likely avenues of movement, and otherkey factors. Anticipation of enemy actions and real-timeintelligence dissemination are vital to countering enemyair and missile threats.

The primary goal of airspace control is to enhance theeffectiveness of air, land, maritime, and specialoperations forces in accomplishing the JFC’s objectives.Airspace control should maximize the effectiveness ofcombat operations without adding undue restrictions andwith minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of anyService or functional component.

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OCA operations destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemyaircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supportingstructures and systems. OCA targets should be attackedor neutralized on the surface or as close to their sourceas possible, and these operations are normally conductedover enemy territory.

Preplanned OCA missions rely on continuous andaccurate intelligence for targets expected at particularlocations and times. The air tasking order (ATO) matchestargets with capabilities and forces made available to theJFACC on a given day.

Immediate missions are conducted against unexpectedmobile and time-sensitive targets and require rapid action.Minutes often define the timeline when these targets arevulnerable to attack.

Offensive operations within a land area of operations (AO)short of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) arecontrolled by the supported land force commander. Beyondthe FSCL, coordination and restrictive measures are usedto avoid conflicting or redundant operations. Forcesattacking targets beyond the FSCL must coordinate withall affected commanders to allow necessary reaction toavoid fratricide. Generally the joint targeting and ATOprocesses provide sufficient coordination for preplannedtargets beyond the FSCL. However, certain time-sensitivetargets and other targets of opportunity may be acquiredand must be attacked quickly. Although land forcecommanders establish an FSCL as a permissive fire supportcoordination measure, the coordination of actual attackswith all affected commanders is important to preventfratricide. Under exceptional circumstances, the inabilityto perform such coordination will not preclude attackingthe target, with the commander of the attacking forceassuming the increased risk of fratricide.

The JFACC is normally responsible for the theater- and/or JOA-wide OCA planning process. Land, naval, andamphibious force commanders are responsible for

Offensive counterair(OCA) missions arenormally preplanned

but may be immediate.

OCA planning beginswith the IPB.

Offensive Counterair Operations

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synchronizing the timing and effects of attack operationswith surface maneuver within their designated AOs.Commanders should use the IPB to find appropriate targets,match those targets with JFC and/or JFACC counterairobjectives, task assets to attack the targets, and assess theeffectiveness of the attacks. The IPB operates continuouslyto keep all commanders updated with the most accurateand reliable data. Three important aspects of the OCAplanning process should be setting clearly definedobjectives, determining targets and/or effects to fulfill thoseobjectives, and maintaining unity of effort.

The preferred method of countering air and missile threatsis to use OCA operations to destroy or disrupt them priorto launch. Attack operations may be performed by fixed-or rotary-wing aircraft, surface-to-surface fires, specialoperations forces, or ground forces. Centralized OCAplanning is fundamental to achieving objectives, but doesnot preclude individual components and units fromtaking actions to accomplish their missions and protecttheir forces.

DCA operations employ a mix of weapon and sensorsystems from all components. The goal of DCAoperations, in concert with offensive operations, is toprovide a secure area from which joint forces canoperate. The JFC establishes and the AADC implementsair and missile defense priorities through promulgation ofan area air defense plan.

Passive air defense provides individual and collectiveprotection of friendly forces and critical assets. Passiveair defense is the responsibility of commanders at all levelsof the joint force. The AADC should provide timely attackwarning, which initiates many of the passive defensemeasures. General warnings indicate that attacks areimminent or have occurred. Specific warnings signify thatspecific units or areas are in danger of attack. Passivedefense measures include camouflage, concealment,deception, hardening, reconstruction, nuclear, biological,and chemical defensive equipment and facilities,redundancy, detection and warning systems, mobility, anddispersal.

Centralized planningdoes not preclude self-protect measures.

Defensive counterair(DCA) operations consistof

passive air defense

Defensive Counterair Operations

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Executive Summary

Active air defense is direct defensive action taken todestroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostileair and missile attacks. These actions protect assets andforces by negating the threat while in flight and are subjectto the weapons control procedures established by theAADC. Active air defense measures include layereddefense-in-depth against air and missile threats throughmultiple engagement opportunities. Integrated detection,identification, assessment, interception, and engagement ofair and missile threats is necessary to protect friendly forcesand vital interests.

Active air defense measures include area defense, whichuses a combination of weapon systems to defend broadareas; point defense to protect limited areas (normally vitalelements or installations); and self-defense, where friendlyforces use organic weapons and systems. Active measuresmay also include high value airborne asset (HVAA)protection. HVAA protection uses fighter aircraft to protectcritical airborne platforms, such as the Airborne Warningand Control System.

DCA planning begins during peacetime with the IPBand the development of an area air defense plan.Continuous surveillance is required for early detection,identification, and prediction of attack areas of air andmissile threats. The integration of active air defensesystems provides efficient control and exchange of essentialnear real time information to all defensive forces andresources. The development of plans and communicationsarchitecture to warn forces and cue appropriate systems tothreats is critical.

The employment of defensive weapon systems requiresearly identification of friendly, neutral, or hostileaircraft and missiles to maximize beyond-visual-rangeengagement and avoid fratricide. This requires clearlyunderstood rules of engagement (ROE). The problem ofdistinguishing friendly, neutral, and enemy assets whileemploying various weapon systems against the latter is ahighly complex task for some threats. However sinceballistic missiles have a distinct flight profile, ROE forthis threat should allow immediate engagement. TheAADC and ACA establish procedures within the airspacecontrol system to positively identify all airborne assets,

and active air defense.

Active air defensemeasures.

DCA planningconsiderations.

Rules of engagementand identificationrequirements.

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reduce delays in operations, and prevent fratricide. Positiveidentification (ID) of tracks is normally the preferredmethod of operation. In the absence of positive ID,procedural ID is used, which employs previouslyestablished and promulgated airspace control measures.Generally, some combination of positive and proceduralID will be used.

Early warning of hostile air and missile attacks is vitalfor a layered defense. DCA operations attempt interceptionof intruding enemy aircraft and missiles as early as possible.Although DCA operations are reactive in nature, they shouldbe conducted as far from the friendly operational area asfeasible. To maximize destruction of enemy air and missilethreats, the engagement process must continue throughoutthe threat’s approach to, entry into, and departure fromthe friendly operational area.

Interceptor missions are tasked by appropriate commandand control agencies in response to the detection andassessment of a hostile, potentially hostile, or unknowntarget. Aircraft may remain under the control of theinitiating control agency; however, this control can betransferred to a control agency in an adjacent sector or tothe interceptor when conditions permit.

Surface-to-air weapons offer high firepower and rapidresponsiveness. Their effectiveness requires a reliable,interoperable interface with aircraft operations. Integrationof these capabilities strengthens mutual support andprovides the best overall defensive coverage.

Weapons control of surface-to-air units is expressed asa status declared for a particular area and time. The“weapons free” order permits weapons systems to fire atany target not positively recognized as friendly. The“weapons tight” order allows weapons systems to fire onlyat targets recognized as hostile. Finally, the “weapons hold”order allows weapons systems to fire only in self-defenseor in response to a formal order.

Fire control orders are given to direct or to inhibit firingby surface-to-air weapons units based on rapidlychanging battle situations. The “engage” order directs orauthorizes units and weapon systems to fire on a designatedtarget. The “cease engagement” order directs units to stopthe firing sequence against a designated target. Finally,

Defense in depth forDCA operations.

Command and control ofinterceptors.

Surface-to-air-weapons.

Weapons control statusfor surface-to-air units.

Fire control orders forsurface-to-air units.

.

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“hold fire” is an emergency order used to stop firing.Missiles already in flight should be prevented fromintercepting, if technically possible.

The purpose of the counterair mission is to attain a desireddegree of air superiority to allow freedom of action andprotect the force. The JFC should integrate the capabilitiesand forces from all components to achieve this goal. Airsuperiority enables and enhances joint operations in alldimensions by limiting the enemy’s ability to threaten theUnited States, its forces, or its national interests.

CONCLUSION

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CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

I-1

1. General

To protect the United States, its forces, andits vital interests from air and missile threats,combatant commanders, Commander ofUS Element North American AerospaceDefense Command (NORAD), andsubordinate joint force commanders(JFCs) integrate the capabilities of eachcomponent to gain and maintain airsuperiority. Air superiority delivers afundamental benefit to the joint force. Itprevents adversaries from interfering withoperations of air, space, or surface forces andassures freedom of action and movement.Control of the air is a critical enabler for thejoint force because it allows US forces bothfreedom from attack and freedom to attack.Using both defensive and offensiveoperations, the JFC employs complementaryweapon systems and sensors to achieveprotection of the force. These operations notonly protect against attack, but also ensurethat US forces can strike potential threats prior

“If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose it quickly.”

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery

to launch. Unity of effort is vital forcountering threats with an engagementwindow of perhaps a matter of minutes. Inthis time-sensitive environment, the JFCmust ensure that component systems areintegrated and interoperable to achieve airsuperiority.

The degree of control may vary from airsupremacy to local air superiority, dependingon the overall situation and the JFC’s conceptof operations. It may be needed for differentlengths of time, ranging from a few minutesto the duration of the conflict, and also varywith geographic areas. The JFC normallyseeks to gain and maintain control of the airenvironment as quickly as possible to allowfriendly forces to operate without prohibitiveinterference from enemy air threats. USmilitary forces must be capable of counteringthe air and missile threat from initial forceprojection through redeployment of friendlyforces. These threats include enemy aircraft(manned or unmanned), ballistic missiles, and

Air superiority is essential for the success of most military operations.

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cruise missiles (air, land, or sea launched).The proliferation of theater missiles andadvances in missile technologies, coupledwith weapons of mass destruction (WMD),make theater missiles a particularly difficultand dangerous threat. Joint theater missiledefense is an integral part of counterairoperations.

2. Joint Counterair

Air superiority is achieved through thecounterair mission, which integrates bothoffensive and defensive operations from allcomponents to counter the air and missilethreat (see Figure I-1). These operations mayuse aircraft, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), air-to-surface missiles,special operations forces (SOF), and elements

of information operations to counter the threat.Joint forces must be integrated to exploit themutually beneficial effects of offensive anddefensive operations to destroy, neutralize, orminimize air and missile threats, both beforeand after launch.

a. Offensive Counterair (OCA). OCAis offensive operations to destroy, disrupt,or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles,launch platforms, and their supporting

structures and systems as close to theirsource as possible. This enables friendly useof otherwise contested airspace, enhancesfreedom of action, and reduces the enemy’sair and missile threat to friendly forces. Thegoal of OCA operations is to prevent thelaunch of aircraft and missiles by destroyingthem and their overall supporting infrastructureprior to employment. These operations rangethroughout enemy territory and are generallyconducted at the initiative of friendly forces.OCA consists of attack operations, fighter sweep,escort, suppression of enemy air defenses, andelectronic warfare (EW).

b. Defensive Counterair (DCA). DCAis all defensive measures designed to detect,identify, intercept, and destroy or negateenemy forces attempting to attack or

penetrate the friendly air environment.These operations include both active andpassive air defense measures. The basicdefense criteria is normally to detect, identify,intercept, and destroy the threat. Since DCAoperations employ weapon and sensorsystems within the same airspace, theseoperations are subject to the weapons controlprocedures and measures of the area airdefense commander (AADC) and integratedwith the joint force air component

Joint counterair integrates capabilities from all components.

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Introduction

commander’s (JFACC’s) overall plan for theconduct of air operations.

• Active Air Defense. Active air defenseis direct defensive action taken todestroy, nullify, or reduce theeffectiveness of hostile air and missilethreats against friendly forces andassets. It includes the use of aircraft, airdefense weapons, EW, and otheravailable weapons. Integration of theseweapon systems will allow for a defensein depth, using multiple engagements.

• Passive Air Defense. Passive airdefense consists of all measures, otherthan active air defense, taken tominimize the effectiveness of hostileair and missile threats against friendlyforces and assets. These measuresinclude camouflage, deception,dispersion, and the use of protectiveconstruction. Passive air defenseimproves survivability by reducing thelikelihood of detection and targeting andalso minimizing the potential effects ofsurveillance and attack.

Figure I-1. Joint Counterair Operations

JOINT COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

Joint CounterairOperations

Special OperationsForces

DefensiveCounterair

OffensiveCounterair

Air-to-SurfaceMissiles

AircraftSurface-to-Air

Missiles

Surface-to-SurfaceMissiles

InformationOperations

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Rapid proliferation of theater missiles expands the scope and complexity ofprotecting friendly forces and vital interests.

3. Changing Threats

Enemy air and missile threats continueto grow in numbers and capabilities. Therapid proliferation of theater missiles (TMs),including cruise missiles, theater ballisticmissiles, and air-to-surface missiles, expandsthe scope and complexity of protectingfriendly forces and vital interests. Asdemonstrated during the 1991 Persian GulfWar, US forces were not immune to a missilethreat.

Other trends also complicate the counterairmission. The detection capabilities,engagement ranges, mobility, and lethalityof enemy SAM systems and fighter aircrafthave significantly increased. Cruise missilesand unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) presentelusive targets and will remain difficult todetect, identify, and engage. Finally, thewidespread proliferation of WMD (pairedwith aircraft, cruise missiles, or theaterballistic missiles) greatly increases theimportance of employing a robust defensefor US forces and assets which impact USnational security interests.

4. Defense of North America

Adversaries are rapidly gaining access toadvanced aircraft and missiles that can directlythreaten the United States as well as US forcesand interests abroad. Although thispublication focuses on countering air andmissile threats in an area of responsibility(AOR) and/or joint operations area (JOA),some of the concepts, activities, andcapabilities discussed also apply to the defenseof North America. Theater plans andoperations should be coordinated withbinational and strategic plans for NorthAmerican defense. Regardless of where USinterests are threatened, US forces mustmaintain continuous global surveillance,intelligence, and the ability to engage thethreat. The Commander in Chief, NORAD(CINCNORAD) is tasked to provideaerospace warning for North America.Aerospace warning consists of the detection,validation, and warning of an attack againstNorth America whether by aircraft, missilesor space vehicles. The Commander in Chief,US Space Command (USCINCSPACE)supports NORAD by providing the missile

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Introduction

warning and space surveillance necessary tofulfill the US commitment to the NORADagreement, and provides integrated tacticalwarning and/or attack assessment of space,missile, and aircraft attacks on the continentalUnited States and Alaska should NORAD beunable to accomplish the assessment mission.If offensive operations are necessary,

USCINCSPACE will provide surveillanceand warning to the appropriate combatantcommanders, CINCNORAD, or theCommander, US Element NORAD, whoseforces will conduct offensive operations.

Refer to JP 3-01.1, “Aerospace Defense ofNorth America,” for further discussion.

OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR IN THE DESERT

Each of the pilots of four F-15Cs from the 58 th Tactical Fighter Squadron wasflying his first combat mission on 17 January [1991], sweeping for Iraqi fighters.Around Baghdad, “The whole ground was red with Triple-A fire as far as youcould see,” recalled one pilot. The four F-15s were inbound toward Mudaysisairfield when two Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighters took off and headed for them at lowlevel. Using the look down, shoot down radar capability, one F-15 fired anAIM-7 radar-guided missile and saw the F-1 explode. The Iraqi wingman,evidently startled by this disaster, created an even greater one for himselfwhen he turned right and dove straight into the desert floor.

SOURCE: 58th TFS Unit Historycited in DOD Final Report to Congress,

Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

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CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND CONTROL

II-1

1. General

The growing capabilities of air and missilethreats (speed, range, accuracy, stealth,lethality) requires joint forces to be moreresponsive, flexible, and integrated in orderto effectively counter them. The manner inwhich JFCs organize their forces directlyaffects the responsiveness and versatility ofjoint force operations. The first principle injoint force organization is that the JFCsorganize forces to accomplish the missionbased on the JFC’s vision and concept ofoperations. Unity of effort, centralizedplanning, and decentralized execution arekey considerations. Unity of effort isnecessary for effectiveness and efficiency.Centralized planning is essential forcontrolling and coordinating the efforts of allavailable forces. Decentralized execution isessential to generate the tempo of operationsrequired and to cope with the uncertainty,disorder, and fluidity of combat. Taskingforces is situationally dependent andnormally tailored by the JFC to enableeffective spans of control, responsiveness,tactical flexibility, and protection.

2. Command Relationships

The JFC organizes forces to bestaccomplish t h e m i s s i o n , a s s i g n sresponsibilities, and establishes supportedand supporting relationships and anynecessary coordinating instructions. The JFCestablishes guidance and target prioritiesbased on the concept of the operation and afterconsidering theater- and/or JOA-wide

“Our superiority in precision munitions, stealth, mobility and command, control,communications, and computers proved to be decisive force multipliers.”

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USCINCCENT1991

priorities along with priorities within land andnaval areas of operations (AOs). The JFC’sguidance and target priorities will be executedthroughout the theater and/or JOA and be fullyimplemented by all subordinate commanders.

The JFACC is normally the supportedcommander for counterair. As such, theJFACC plans, organizes, and executescounterair operations theater- and/or JOA-wide. In accordance with JFC guidance andpriorities, the JFACC should determine thepriority, timing, and effects of counterair firesthroughout the theater and/or JOA. Once theJFC designates a land or naval AO, the landand naval force commanders are the supportedcommanders within these AOs. Within theirdesignated AOs, land and naval forcecommanders synchronize maneuver, fires, andinterdiction. To facilitate this synchronization,such commanders have the authority todesignate the target priority, effects, andtiming of fires within their AOs. Within thejoint force theater and/or JOA, all missionsmust contribute to the accomplishment of theoverall objective. Synchronization of effortswithin land or naval AOs with theater- and/or JOA-wide operations is of particularimportance. To facilitate synchronization, theJFC establishes priorities that will be executedthroughout the theater and/or JOA, includingwithin the land and naval force commanders’AOs. In coordination with land or naval forcecommanders, the JFACC has the latitude toplan and execute JFC-prioritized counterairoperations and attack targets within land andnaval AOs. The JFACC must coordinatecounterair operations in order to avoid adverse

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effects and fratricide. If counterair operationswould have adverse effects within a land ornaval AO, then the JFACC must eitherreadjust the plan, resolve the issue with theappropriate component commander, orconsult with the JFC for resolution.

a. Joint Force Commander. The JFCexercises combatant command (commandauthority) or operational control (OPCON)over assigned or attached forces to ensureunity of effort to counterair and missile threats.The JFC provides authoritative direction tosubordinate commanders on objectives,priorities, missions, and apportionment ofjoint capabilities and forces. Primaryresponsibilities of the JFC as they apply tojoint counterair include the following.

• Develop and maintain a system to unifythe employment of subordinate forces incarrying out assigned counterairmissions.

• Develop and produce joint operationplans for joint counterair and airspacecontrol or delegate authority tosubordinate commanders.

• Establish appropriate commandrelationships for the componentcommanders.

• Define and assign both operational areas(to include JOAs) within which a jointtask force will operate and AOs for landand naval force commanders.

• Establish plans, policies, programs,priorities, and overall requirements forintelligence activities.

• Assign tasks, functions, and responsibilitiesto, and direct coordination among, thesubordinate commands to ensure unityof effort in accomplishing joint counterairmissions.

• Establish, coordinate, and disseminaterules of engagement (ROE) to allsubordinate commanders.

b. JFC’s Staff. The JFC’s staff assists theJFC in the decision making and executionprocess. The staff ’s sole function iscommand support, and its only authorityis delegated to it by the JFC. The staff plans,monitors, advises, and coordinates theresponsibilities of the JFC listed above. TheJFC has the authority and latitude to organizethe staff and assign responsibilities to ensureunity of effort and accomplishment ofassigned missions (to include joint counterairoperations). The composition of the staffnormally reflects the composition of the jointforce to ensure those responsible foremploying joint forces have thoroughknowledge of total force capabilities, needs,and limitations. Normally, each staff divisionis responsible for a specific area and isrequired to coordinate its actions, planning,and progress with other concerneddivisions and agencies within thecommand. The primary staff divisions andsome of their main responsibilities are shownin Figure II-1 and included below.

• Intelligence Directorate (J-2). J-2focuses on identifying enemy centers ofgravity and provides timely, accurateintelligence needed for planning andexecuting joint operations. J-2 ensuresthe availability of reliable intelligenceand timely indications and warnings,AOR- and/or JOA-wide, for allcomponents and allies. J-2 participatesin planning and directing, collecting,processing and exploiting, analyzingand producing, and disseminating andintegrating intelligence on theadversary’s air and missile threats. Itcoordinates intelligence collection andreporting from all sources to disclose theadversary’s air and missile locations,activities, capabilities, and intentions as

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quickly as possible. J-2 will operate thejoint intelligence center or jointintelligence support element, asappropriate, for the JFC. J-2 ensures thatthe intelligence needs of the commandand subordinate commands are met.

• Operations Directorate (J-3). J-3assists the JFC in coordinating anddeconflicting the execution of jointcounterair operations. Its work beginswith initial planning and continuesthrough the integration and coordination

of counterair operations with allcomponents. J-3 may also assist incoordinating long-range or futureplanning responsibilities. J-3 will operatethe Joint Operations Center for the JFC.

• Logistics Directorate (J-4). J-4formulates logistics plans for the JFC.It coordinates and supervises supply,maintenance, repair, evacuation,transportation, construction, and otherrelated logistic activities. J-4 advises theJFC on logistic support required for

PRIMARY JOINT FORCE COMMANDER STAFFDIVISIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Operations Directorate(J-3)

Intelligence Directorate(J-2)

PlansDirectorate (J-5)

Logistics Directorate(J-4)

Joint TargetingCoordination Board

Command, Control,Communications, and

Computer (C4) SystemsDirectorate (J-6)

Assists in planning,coordinating, and deconflicting

joint counterair operations

Provides intelligence needed forplanning and executing joint

operations

Assists in long-rangeplanning

Formulates logistics plans

Accomplishes broadtargeting oversight functions

Responsible forcommunications, spectrum

management, andinformation systems

Figure II-1. Primary Joint Force Commander Staff Divisions and Responsibilities

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countering the air and missile threat. Itformulates policies to ensure effectivelogistic support for all forces in thecommand.

• Plans Directorate (J-5). J-5 assists theJFC in long-range planning. Long-range planning includes theformulation of plans and planningconsiderations required to counter airand missile threats. J-5 planningencompasses campaign, specialweapons, and joint operation plans. J-5may also conduct simulations andanalyses of the air and missile threat (inconcert with J-2 and J-3) to assist the JFCin plans preparation.

• Command, Control, Communications,and Computer Systems Directorate(J-6). J-6 develops, coordinates, anddisseminates the JFC’s theater- and/orJOA-wide communications, spectrummanagement, tactical communications,and management of information systemsplans and procedures. In concert withJ-3, J-6 implements measures to protectand ensure timely information anddecision support services for the JFC andstaff.

• Joint Targeting Coordination Board(JTCB). The JFC may establish anddefine the role of a JTCB to accomplishbroad targeting oversight functions.Functions of the JTCB may include,but are not limited to, coordinatingtargeting information and providinggeneral targeting guidance andpriorities. To avoid conflictingoperations, the JTCB may also maintaina complete list of restricted targets andareas where SOF operate. If established,the JTCB is normally comprised ofrepresentatives from the joint force staff,all components and, if required,component subordinate units.

Refer to JP 3-0, “Doctrine for JointOperations,” for more informationconcerning the functions of the JTCB.

c. Joint Force Air ComponentCommander. The JFC will normallydesignate a JFACC to integrate thecapabilities and command and control (C2)of joint air assets. Normally, the JFACC isthe Service component commander having thepreponderance of air assets and the capabilityto plan, task, and control joint air operations.The need for a JFACC is based on the JFC’soverall mission, concept of operations,missions and tasks assigned to subordinatecommanders, forces available, duration andnature of joint air operations desired, and thedegree of unity of C2 of joint air operationsrequired. The functions and responsibilitiesof the JFACC, AADC, and airspace controlauthority (ACA) must be integrated toensure that OCA and DCA operations andairspace control are synchronized. Theresponsibilities of the JFACC, AADC, andACA are interrelated and are normallyassigned to one individual, but they maybe assigned to two or more individualswhen the situation dictates. Based on thesituation, if the JFC decides not to assignthe JFACC, AADC, or ACA as oneindividual, then close coordination betweenall three positions is essential.

Since the attainment of air superiority isnormally an AOR- and/or JOA-wide priority,the JFC normally designates the JFACCas the supported commander for theater-and/or JOA-wide counterair operations.The JFACC will generally use centralizedcontrol and decentralized execution as theoptimum arrangement to respond to air andmissile threats.

The JFC assigns the JFACC’s authority andresponsibilities. They normally include, butare not limited to, joint counterair planning,coordinating, allocating, and tasking

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Command and Control

based on the JFC’s concept of operationsand air apportionment decision. Otherresponsibilities of the JFACC relating to jointcounterair operations include the following.

• Develop, coordinate, and integrate thejoint counterair plan with operations ofother components for JFC approval.

• M a k e a n a i r a p p o r t i o n m e n trecommendation to the JFC, afterconsulting with other componentcommanders, which includes counterair

(OCA and DCA), strategic attack,interdiction, and close air support.

• Provide centralized direction forallocating and tasking joint counteraircapabilities and forces made available bythe JFC.

• Provide information operations (IO)strategies to neutralize enemy air andmissile threats while preserving friendlyoffensive and defensive capability.

• Perform the duties of the AADC whendirected by the JFC.

• Perform the duties of the ACA whendirected by the JFC.

A joint air operations center (JAOC)normally functions as the JFACC’sprincipal operations center. It links withnational and theater sensors, intelligence,communications, and component operationscenters. The success of the JAOC rests onthe expertise of component liaisons such asthe battlefield coordination detachment, navaland amphibious liaison element, MarineLiaison Officer, and the special operations

liaison element (SOLE). These liaisonelements enhance coordination betweenthe JFACC and other componentcommanders. They represent their respectivecomponent commander on time-sensitive andcritical issues. The component operationscenters and liaison elements facilitate theplanning, coordination, integration, anddeconfliction of all joint counterair operationswith other component operations.

Refer to JP 3-56.1, “Command and Controlfor Joint Air Operations,” for more detailsconcerning the employment of liaisonelements.

Successful counterair operations require coordination, integration, anddeconfliction with other component operations.

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d. Area Air Defense Commander. TheJFC normally designates an AADC with theauthority to plan, coordinate, and integrateoverall joint force DCA operations. Normally,the AADC is the component commander withthe preponderance of air defense capabilityand the command, control, communications,computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilityto plan, coordinate, and execute integrated airdefense operations. When a JFACC isdesignated, the JFACC will normally beassigned to function as AADC since these twofunctions are interrelated. The JFC will alsodefine the support relationship between theAADC and supporting commanders.Components will provide representatives, asappropriate, to the AADC’s headquarters toprovide specific weapon systems expertise aswell as broader mission expertise. With thesupport of Service or functional componentcommanders, the AADC develops,integrates, and distributes a JFC-approvedjoint area air defense plan. A critical featureof a joint, integrated plan is a reliable,consistent, and common operational picture(i.e., a fused and correlated air, ground, andmaritime picture) available in all supportingC2 facilities. This plan should include IOstrategies for counterair. The plan should alsocontain detailed weapons control andengagement procedures that are integral to alljoint counterair operations. The plan shouldbe closely integrated with the airspace controlplan (ACP), and the AADC establishesweapons control procedures and measures forall DCA weapons systems and forces.However, this does not restrict commanders’authority to use all necessary means and takeall appropriate actions to protect their forcesfrom a hostile act or demonstrated hostileintent. Primary responsibilities of the AADCinclude the following.

• Develop, integrate, and distribute a JFC-approved joint area air defense plan.

• Develop and execute, in coordinationwith the joint force J-2, J-3, and J-6, a

detailed plan to disseminate timely airand missile warning and cueinginformation to components, forces, allies,coalition partners, and civil authorities,as appropriate.

• Develop and implement identificationand engagement procedures that areappropriate to the air and missile threats.

• Ensure timely and accurate trackreporting among participating units toprovide a consistent common operationalpicture.

• Perform the duties of the ACA whendirected by the JFC.

• Establish sectors or regions, asappropriate, to enhance decentralizedexecution of DCA operations.

e. Airspace Control Authority. The JFCnormally designates an ACA who has overallresponsibility for establishing andoperating the airspace control system. TheACA also develops policies and proceduresfor airspace control that are incorporated intoan ACP and promulgated throughout thetheater. A key responsibility of the ACA is toprovide the flexibility needed within theairspace control system to meet contingencysituations that necessitate rapid employmentof forces. The ACA coordinates through theACP the use of airspace, includingintegration with the host nation anddeconfliction of user requirements. TheACA must be able to rapidly implementairspace control measures in the dynamiccounterair environment to enhancefreedom of action of components whilepreventing fratricide. The ACP isimplemented through the airspace controlorder (ACO). All forces affecting jointair operations are subject to the ACO.However, this centralized direction by theACA does not imply OPCON or tacticalcontrol (TACON) over any air asset.

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Refer to JP 3-52, “Doctrine for JointAirspace Control in the Combat Zone,” andJP 3-56.1, “Command and Control for JointAir Operations,” for more details concerningthe ACA, JFACC, and AADC.

f. Component Commanders. The JFCmay apportion component capabilities and/or forces to the JFACC or AADC to supporttheater- and/or JOA-wide counterair missions.The JFC determines the most appropriatecommand authority over forces madeavailable to conduct OCA and DCA.Typically for OCA, air and naval forcesprovide air sorties TACON, and land forcesprovide fire support and attack helicopters indirect support. For forces made available forDCA, air sorties are normally providedTACON, while surface-based active defenseforces are provided in direct support.Regardless of the command relationship, allactive defense forces are subject to the ROE,airspace, weapons control measures, and firecontrol orders established by the JFACC,AADC, and/or ACA and approved by theJFC. Additionally, the AADC will be grantedthe necessary command authority to deconflictand control engagements and to exercise real-time battle management.

3. Multinational Considerations

Most joint operations are conducted withinthe context of an alliance or coalition. Eachmultinational operation is unique. Theinternational situation, along with theperspectives, motives, and values of each allyor coalition member, may vary. The JFCshould evaluate key considerations anddifferences involved in planning,coordinating, and conducting counterairoperations in a multinational environment.Agreement on objectives, threats, and a clearlydefined, responsive, and interoperable C2structure are crucial to effective multinationaloperations. The JFC must be prepared tonegotiate with allies and coalition partnerswhen planning and developing ROE,

airspace control measures, weapon controlmeasures, and other appropriate areas. Allcritical forces and geopolitical areas shouldreceive adequate protection from air andmissile threats. Sharing intelligence andwarning information is also vital to ensuringunity of effort.

Refer to JP 3-0, “Doctrine for JointOperations,” and JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrinefor Multinational Operations,” for furtherdetail concerning multinational operations.

4. C4I Resources andRequirements

Effective joint counterair operations requirea reliable C4I capability that integrates air-,surface-, subsurface-, and space-based assets.C4I resources detect, identify, and trackthreats to warn and cue defensive assets aswell as provide accurate launch and impactpoints. These resources should be capableof rapidly exchanging information, interfacingwith components, and displaying a commonoperational picture to all components ofconcern. The information flow should supportthe chain of command and be as complete,secure, and as near real time as possible. Thesesystems should be flexible enough to allowredirection of available forces. C4Iarchitecture among Service and functionalcomponents, and among all levels ofcommand, should also be survivable,interoperable, flexible, and redundant to themaximum extent possible.

5. C4I Infrastructure

The C4I infrastructure should consist ofinteroperable systems that provide completecoverage against a diverse threat array. Thesesystems should be connected to commandersat appropriate decision and execution levelsto integrate forces and missions. The systemsexpedite C2 functions through rapid, reliable,flexible, and secure exchange of informationthroughout the chain of command. The C4I

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architecture provides the timely intelligenceand operational information needed to plan,employ, coordinate, deconflict, execute, andsustain joint counterair operations. EffectiveC4I systems help commanders fusegeographically separated offensive anddefensive operations into a focused effort.These systems also facilitate the integrationof counterair with other joint operations viarapid communications among commanders,staffs, sensors, weapon systems, andsupporting agencies.

“When we started our deployment, wehad only the most rudimentarycommunications infrastructure inSouthwest Asia and the challenge ofdistance was daunting. Thanks to goodplanning and our understanding of theimportance of satellites, we quickly andsmoothly transitioned to a maturetactical theater network.”

General Colin L. Powell, CJCSDecember 1990

6. Intelligence Requirements

Target development and analysis of air andmissile threats normally begins during

peacetime. Intelligence plays a critical rolein planning, deploying, employing, andsustaining joint counterair operations.Time-phased intelligence, collected on areasover periods of time, also provides valuableinformation on target employment,deployment, potential intentions, likelyavenues of movement, and other key factors.The effectiveness of counterair operationsrequires the timely collection, analysis,production, and dissemination of reliableand accurate intelligence. Intelligencepreparation of the battlespace (IPB) is ananalytic methodology which helps thecommander understand the enemy andselect an appropriate course of action. IPBbegins in peacetime but is a continuing processthat is conducted and updated throughout thecourse of operations. It drives collection plandevelopment and identifies sensor types,collection windows, and areas of coverage.IPB aids the target development process byidentifying how and where counterairoperations can affect the enemy’s capabilitiesand operations. It can also reduceuncertainties concerning the enemy,environment, and terrain, and presentsinformation via data bases and in graphicform. The development and refinement of a

Reliable C4I capability is required to detect, identify, and trackthreats to warn and cue defensive assets.

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data base on threat capabilities and enemyoperational employment proficiency must bea continuous process. This data base supportsidentification of enemy centers of gravity,capabilities, and vulnerabilities. It also helpsto formulate objectives, avenues of approachand attack, and courses of action by aidingthe process of locating and identifying air andmissile threats and their associated C4Isystems.

a. Intelligence should be tailored tosupport real-time operations as well asdeliberate planning. Target development,weapon selection, execution, and combatassessment depend on well-integratedcollection and analysis processes. Collectionsystems must be capable of being rapidlyredirected to support the targeting of time-sensitive targets. Anticipation of enemyactions gained through intelligence and real-time dissemination is key to countering enemyair and missile threats. Integrating weatherobservations and forecasts with intelligencemay affect estimates of friendly and enemycourses of action (i.e., their ability or inabilityto employ in certain weather conditions).

b. The joint force will have a number ofintelligence analysis centers involved inproviding all-source intelligence in supportof counterair operations. These include thejoint intelligence center or joint intelligencesupport element supporting the joint force J-2.Individual components also have supportingintelligence elements. The JAOC’s combatintelligence division provides threatassessment and status as well as targetingsupport for planning and executing airoperations at the JFACC level. Theintelligence division supports the execution ofcounterair operations by monitoring ongoingmissions, responding to the fluid battlespacesituation, and providing near real timeintelligence from all sources. It providesindications, warning, and situation intelligenceto designated users throughout the theater and/or JOA. It also ensures that preplanned joint airtasking order (ATO) targets are valid.

Refer to JP 2-0, “Doctrine for IntelligenceSupport to Joint Operations,” and JP 2-01,“Joint Intelligence Support to MilitaryOperations,” for an overview of intelligencefunctions and requirements.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIAIRSPACE CONTROL

III-1

1. General

The primary goal of airspace control is toenhance the effectiveness of air, land,maritime, and special operations forces inaccomplishing the JFC’s objectives. Airspacecontrol should maximize the effectivenessof combat operations without addingundue restrictions and with minimaladverse impact on the capabilities of anyService or functional component. Allcomponents of the joint force share the AORand/or JOA airspace for offensive anddefensive operations. Because of this,airspace control can become very complex.The timely exchange of information overreliable, secure, interoperable means ofcommunication is needed to coordinate anddeconflict joint counterair operations.

“In order to assure an adequate national defense, it is necessary — andsufficient — to be in a position in case of war to conquer the command of theair.”

GEN Giulio DouhetThe Command of the Air , 1924

Execution of the ACP is accomplishedthrough ACOs that provide specific airspacecontrol procedures applicable for definedperiods of time. ACOs are designed todeconflict and identify all airspace users aswell as eliminate fratricide.

2. Airspace Control andCoordination Procedures

Standardized airspace control proceduresand close coordination reduce confusion andcontribute to the overall effectiveness of thecounterair mission. The ACA recommendsand JFC approves the boundaries withinwhich airspace control is exercised andprovides priorities and restrictionsregarding its use. Coordination with hostnation active DCA systems is essential.

Airspace control integrates different airspace users and provides themwith responsive and timely support.

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a. Airspace control may require acombination of positive and proceduralidentification (ID) procedures. Positive IDis a high-confidence ID derived from visualobservation, radar observation of point oforigin, and/or electronic ID systems. Whenavailable, positive ID is used because itprovides the most rapid, reliable, andtransferable means of identification.Procedural ID is another identification methodthat relies on a combination of previouslyagreed upon airspace control measures. Itseparates airspace users by geography,altitude, and time. Procedural ID can beadvantageous for some missions andscenarios, normally in limited airspace areas.For most scenarios a combination of positiveand procedural ID techniques would be usedto identify friends and foes.

b. Air traffic control facilities and radarcontrol units (Marine tactical air operationscenter and so forth) will provide flightfollowing and monitoring throughout theairspace control area. The urgent exchange

of information between the air traffic controlfacilities, radar control units, and airspaceusers requires reliable voice and data nets,radars, identification friend or foe, andselective ID features. Accurate and timelyID enhances engagement of enemy aircraftand missiles, conserves friendly resources,and reduces risk to friendly forces.

See JP 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint AirspaceControl in the Combat Zone,” and JP 3-56.1,“Command and Control for Joint AirOperations,” for further detail on airspacecontrol methods.

c. Airspace control functions must beclosely coordinated with joint counterairoperations. The ACP facilitates joint counterairoperations as well as all other AOR and/or JOAoperations which might otherwise conflict.Prioritization and integration of these operationsare essential. The ACP is designed to identifyall airspace users, facilitate the engagement ofhostile air and missile threats, and expedite thesafe passage of friendly and neutral forces.

CHAPTER IVOFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

IV-1

1. General

Executing and sustaining OCA operationsare high-priority goals as long as the enemyhas the capability to threaten friendly forces.The success of these operations will benefitall forces across the entire range of militaryoperations. These operations reduce the riskof air and missile attacks, allowing friendlyforces to focus on their mission objectives.

2. OCA Targets

OCA targets should be attacked on thesurface or as close to their source aspossible; however, targets may be sought andattacked wherever found. The JFC’s guidanceand objectives, coupled with a theater-levelIPB, determine target selection and priority.Target identification and planning should startprior to hostilities. The target data should be

“After all, the great defense against aerial menace is to attack the enemy’saircraft as near as possible to their point of departure.”

Winston ChurchillMemo of 5 Sept 1914

as current as possible based on the latestintelligence information. Target defenses, toinclude active and passive systems, shouldalso be evaluated to determine vulnerability.Connectivity among collection sensors, C2platforms, and offensive assets is critical forresponding to these targets. Commandersshould consider the following target sets forOCA operations.

a. Airfields and Operating Bases.Destruction of hangars, shelters, maintenancefacilities, and other storage areas as well aspetroleum, oils, and lubricants will reduce theenemy’s capability to generate aircraft sorties.Runway or taxiway closures often preventuse of the airfield for short periods, thuspreventing subsequent takeoffs and forcingreturning aircraft to more vulnerable or distantlocations. Direct attacks on crews andmaintenance personnel facilities may reduce

Attacking OCA targets as close to their source as possiblereduces the risk of air and missile attacks.

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sortie generation rates longer than attacks onthe infrastructure of airfields and operatingbases.

b. Aircraft. Target aircraft include enemyfixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft (manned orunmanned), whether in flight or on the ground.Destruction of these targets will limit enemyattacks, observation, and defensive capability.

c. Missiles and Support Infrastructure.OCA operations are most effective whenconducted against theater missiles beforelaunch. The preemptive destruction ofmissiles, launch facilities, storage facilities,and other support infrastructure greatly limitssubsequent TM attacks. OCA assets may alsobe rapidly retasked to destroy time-sensitivetargets such as mobile launchers.

d. C4I Systems. C4I systems are criticalto the employment of forces and should begiven a high priority during OCAoperations. Intelligence gathering, warning,and control systems include ground-controlledintercept, early warning and acquisitionradars, space-based systems, and other sensorsas well as their supporting facilities. Althoughsurface-based radars and sensors are movable,the time required to redeploy them is normallylengthy compared with the systems theycontrol. Destruction of such sites couldsubstantially reduce the enemy’s capability todetect, react, and attack friendly forces. Thesetargets may have hardened facilities, butcertain components may be exposed duringoperation. Fixed site, hardened facilities areusually easier to locate than mobilesystems. Attacks against fixed sites can alsobe preplanned with appropriate weapons toincrease the probability of kill. Attacks shouldalso be considered against airborne, maritime,and ground-based C4I platforms, as well asagainst systems supporting space-basedplatforms.

e. Naval Platforms. Enemy navalplatforms capable of employing aircraft or

theater missiles are also important OCAtargets. Destruction of these platforms limitsthe enemy’s ability to conduct air and missileattacks in the littoral or possibly influence vitalsea lines of communications.

f. Air Defense Systems and EnemyForces. Disruption or destruction of enemyair defense systems and the personnel whocontrol, maintain, and operate them mayrender these systems ineffective.

3. OCA Operations

OCA operations normally occur overenemy territory to achieve counterairobjectives. Accurate and timely intelligenceis needed to locate and attack OCA targets aswell as their supporting elements. Attemptswill be made to destroy selected targets onthe ground; however, targets may be destroyedbefore, during, and after launch or takeoff.Tasked units should have the latitude to plan,coordinate, and execute their operations.OCA may include operations involvingaircraft, missiles, SOF, surface fires, or groundforces from the joint force components.

OCA missions may be preplanned orimmediate. Preplanned missions rely oncontinuous and accurate intelligence toidentify targets at particular locations andtimes. Normally, the ATO tasks apportionedforces to execute these preplanned missions.Immediate missions are conducted againstunexpected, mobile, or time-sensitive targetsthat fall outside the ATO cycle and requirerapid action. Minutes often define the timelinewhen these targets are vulnerable to attack.Unexpected, mobile, or time-sensitive targetscannot be effectively attacked unlessresponsiveness and flexibility is built into theATO. The ATO should make provisions forairborne alert, designated divert aircraft, andon-call surface fire support.

Attacks within a surface AO short of thefire support coordination line (FSCL) are

IV-3


controlled by the supported land forcecommander. Beyond the FSCL, coordinationand restrictive measures are used to avoidconflicting or redundant operations. Forcesattacking targets beyond the FSCL mustcoordinate with all affected commanders toallow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide,both in the air and on the ground. Generallythe ATO process provides sufficientcoordination for preplanned targets beyondthe FSCL. However, certain time-sensitivetargets and other targets of opportunity maybe acquired and must be attacked quicklyusing information provided through thebattlefield coordination detachment or otherliaison element as practical. Although landforce commanders establish an FSCL as apermissive fire support coordination measure,the coordination of actual attacks with allaffected commanders is important to preventfratricide. Under exceptional circumstances,the inability to perform such coordination willnot preclude attacking the target, with thecommander of the attacking force assumingthe increased risk of fratricide.

Primary OCA missions are shown inFigure IV-1 and listed below.

a. OCA Attack Operations. These attackoperations are offensive actions againstsurface targets which contribute to theenemy’s air power capabilities. The objectiveof attack operations is to prevent the hostile

DESERT STORM OCA

The Iraqi Air Force posed both a defensive threat to Coalition air operationsand an offensive threat to Coalition forces in the region. In addition to adefensive capability, the Iraqi Air Force had a chemical weapons deliverycapability and had used precision-guided missiles.

Initial targeting of the Iraqi Air Force during Operation DESERT STORMemphasized the suppression of air operations at airfields by cratering andmining runways, bombing aircraft, maintenance and storage facilities, andattacking [command, control, and communications] facilities. Coalitionplanners anticipated the Iraqis initially would attempt to fly large numbers ofdefensive sorties, requiring an extensive counterair effort. Air commandersalso expected the Iraqis to house and protect aircraft in hardened shelters.An attempt to fly some aircraft to sanctuary in a neighboring country also wasexpected, although the safe haven was thought to be Jordan, rather than Iran.

SOURCE: Final Report to CongressConduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

Figure IV-1. Primary OffensiveCounterair Missions

PRIMARY OFFENSIVECOUNTERAIR

MISSIONS

Offensive CounterairAttack Operations

FighterSweep

Escort

Suppression of EnemyAir Defenses

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use of aircraft and missile forces by attackingtargets such as missile launch sites, airfields,naval vessels, C2 nodes, munitions stockpiles,and supporting infrastructure. Attackoperations may be performed by fixed- orrotary-wing aircraft, surface-to-surface fires,SOF, or ground forces.

b. Fighter Sweep. The fighter sweep isan offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seekout and destroy enemy aircraft, cruise missiles,or targets of opportunity in an allotted sector.

c. Escort. Escorts are protection sortiesflown against enemy aircraft and air defensesystems in support of air operations overenemy territory. Escort aircraft are normallyassigned to protect specific groups of friendlyaircraft while en route to or from a target area(for example, for air interdiction or strategicattack). Escort aircraft may also protect airlift,air-to-air refueling, EW, C2, search andrescue, and SOF infiltration/exfiltrationaircraft. Escort may also be used as a DCAmission, as in the case of high value airborneasset protection. See Chapter V, “DefensiveCounterair Operations,” for further detail.

d. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses(SEAD). SEAD operations destroy,

neutralize, or temporarily degrade enemysurface-based air defenses in a specific areaby destructive or disruptive means. SEADrequirements vary according to missionobjectives, system capabilities, and threatcomplexity.

• SEAD Resources. SEAD resources mayinclude specialized aircraft, multiroleaircraft, helicopters, air-to-surface andsurface-to-surface missiles, artillery,SOF, and UAVs. Specialized aircrafthave the ability to destroy, neutralize, ordegrade enemy air defense assets usingweapon systems such as precision-guidedmunitions, antiradiation missiles, and on-board jammers.

• SEAD Operations. SEAD operationsfall into three categories: AOR and/orJOA air defense system suppression,localized suppression, and opportunesuppression. AOR and/or JOA airdefense system suppression contributesto air superiority by disabling enemy airdefense systems or major capabilities ofthose systems. Localized suppressionoperations normally have specified timeand space limitations because theysupport specific operations or missions.

Fighter aircraft may perform a fighter sweep to seek out and destroyenemy aircraft or targets of opportunity.

IV-5


Opportune suppression includes self-defense and offensive attacks againstenemy air defense targets of opportunity.SEAD should be a part of all planning ofair and missile operations.

For more detailed information on SEADcategories, refer to JP 3-01.4, “JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forJoint Suppression of Enemy AirDefenses (J-SEAD).”

4. OCA Resources

The effectiveness of OCA operationsdepends on the availability and capabilities

of friendly resources and systems. The choiceof a particular weapon system may dependupon the situation, target characteristics,threats, weather, and available intelligence.Whenever possible, commanders shouldemploy weapon systems that minimize the riskto friendly forces. The primary offensivesystems are shown in Figure IV-2 and includethe following.

a. Aircraft. Using aircraft for OCAprovides the advantages of long-range, highpayload, ability to deliver precision weapons,night and all-weather capability, self-defensecapability, air-refueling capability, andflexibility of a manned system.

SEAD IN “THE STORM”

On the morning of 17 January [1991], an EA-6B from Marine Tactical ElectronicWarfare Squadron Two provided electronic warfare support for Marine, Navyand Royal Air Force strike packages attacking strategic targets at the Al-‘Amarah and Az-Zubayr command and control sites, as well as the Az-Zubayrrailroad yards and the Al-Basrah bridges across the Tigris River. These targetswere heavily defended by interlocking belts of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). Iraqi fighters also were a potential threat. Thiswas a dangerous mission — among the first daylight strikes of the war. Longbefore they approached the targets, the EA-6B crew started to work. The firstenemy radar that came up was quickly jammed. Shortly after, however,additional radars were noted searching for the strike groups. Jamming ofIraqi long-range early warning radars allowed the strikers to approachundetected. However, Iraqi ground control intercept radars as well as targettracking radars simultaneously began probing the Coalition strike package.The EA-6B crew quickly introduced intense electronic jamming into all modesof the Iraqi air defense system, which prevented the vectoring of enemy fighters.They also forced SAM and AAA systems into autonomous operation,uncoordinated by the command and control system which greatly reducedtheir ability to locate and track Coalition aircraft. To accomplish this, the EA-6B crew did not attempt evasive action but placed themselves into a predictable,wings-level orbit which highlighted their position amidst the beaconing (sic)and jamming strobes of the enemy radars. The severe degradation to radiotransmissions caused by jamming interference limited the EA-6Bs ability toreceive threat calls, making them vulnerable to enemy aircraft. Nonetheless,the crew remained on station, enabling all Coalition aircraft to strike the targets,accomplish the missions, and return home without loss or damage.

SOURCE: 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing Award Citationcited in DOD Final Report to Congress,

Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

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b. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. UAVs areused in OCA operations to perform suchfunctions as surveillance, reconnaissance,deception, jamming, and decoy of enemyforces and air defense systems. UAVs arepreprogrammed or remotely piloted and oftenprovide intelligence to friendly forces whileproviding confusing and erroneousinformation to the enemy. Furthermore,UAVs may cause the enemy to expendweapons and other resources to evaluate orattack them.

c. Missiles. Missiles which may be usedfor OCA include surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, and air-to-air guided missiles aswell as air-, land-, and sea-launched cruisemissiles.

d. Special Operations Forces. SOF havethe capability to conduct direct action,provide terminal guidance, observeattacks, and collect intelligence. SOF maystrike enemy targets that are normally beyondthe capability of other munitions. Examplesinclude targets concealed by difficult terrain,underground facilities, or “safe haven” targets.SOF may also be used to locate, positivelyidentify, and designate targets for other forces.Coordination with the SOLE is critical todeconflict operations, protect forces, andavoid fratricide.

e. Surface Fire Support. Artillery andnaval surface fire support may be used duringOCA operations if enemy targets are withinrange. Surface fire may provide the safestand fastest method of attacking targets.

f. Armed Helicopters. These assetsmay be placed in direct support of theJFACC. The JFACC will normally taskattack helicopters made available by theJFC as a maneuver unit, with mission typeorders, when employing them to supportOCA attack operations.

g. C4I Systems. C4I support for OCAincludes early warning and surveillancesystems, satellites, radars, identificationsystems, communications systems, andsurface-, air-, and space-based sensors. Thesesystems provide warning, intelligence,targeting data, and C2.

5. OCA Planning Considerations

Planning should begin with the IPB andthe development of an OCA plan. The planis based on the JFC’s assessment of the overallair and missile threat, target data base, ROE,objectives, priorities, missions, and availablefriendly forces. The JFACC is responsiblefor the planning and execution of OCAoperations.

Figure IV-2. Primary OffensiveCounterair Systems

PRIMARY OFFENSIVECOUNTERAIR

SYSTEMS

C4I systems

Aircraft

Unmanned aerialvehicles

Missiles

Special operationsforces

Surface fire support

Armed helicopters

IV-7


a. IPB enhances the commanders’ abilityto find targets, task attack forces, and assesstheir effectiveness. Considerations includethe enemy’s air and missile operating areas,signatures, capabilities, and deployment andemployment procedures. IPB attempts toprovide a comprehensive picture of the enemyactivity, terrain, and weather within thetheater and/or JOA. This effort requirescontinuous surveillance.

b. There are three important aspects ofthe planning process: setting clearlydefined objectives, determining targetsand effects that support the objectives, andunity of effort. All planning levels mustunderstand the JFC’s objectives to ensure acoordinated effort. Proper sequencing andprioritizing of the objectives should provideeconomy of force and maximize synergy.Targeting is the process of selecting targetsand matching the appropriate response tothem, taking account of operationalrequirements and capabilities. The followingseven criteria are normally used to establishtarget priorities.

• Objective. The degree to which targetssatisfy the OCA objectives.

• Threat. The threat posed by the enemytarget, determining the urgency or theneed to counter it.

• Expected Effect. The degree ofdegradation to enemy capability whichcan be reasonably expected to result froma successful attack.

• Delay in Effect. The time between theinitial engagement and the desired effect.

• Risk Calculation. The probable riskinvolved for the attacking forces.

• Forces Available. The number and typeof forces which must be provided toachieve the desired result.

• Assessment. The ability to determinethe effect of an attack on enemycapability.

6. Execution of OCA Operations

The preferred method of countering airand missile threats is to use OCAoperations to destroy or disrupt them priorto launch. These operations are preferablyconducted over enemy territory. The JFCassigns missions and directs coordination andsupport relationships among subordinatecommanders. The JFC will normally assignthe responsibility for planning and executingtheater- and/or JOA-wide OCA operations tothe JFACC. The JFACC normally exercisesOPCON over assigned and attached forces.The JFC may apportion additional componentcapabilities and/or forces to the JFACC tosupport theater- and/or JOA-wide OCAoperations. The JFC determines the mostappropriate command authority, but typicallyair and naval forces provide air sortiesTACON and land forces provide fire supportand attack helicopters in direct support.

a. OCA operations rely on C4I systems fordeconfliction with other operations.Operations against fixed targets shouldemphasize preplanning, accurate and timelyintelligence, target selection, time over target,and published ROE. This emphasis enhancesmission effectiveness while minimizingfratricide and interference with otheroperations. OCA operations against mobileor time-sensitive targets (SAMs, ballistic andcruise missile launchers) require integratedC4I systems to assign the optimum weaponsystem.

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JP 3-01

b. Centralized OCA planning isfundamental to achieving objectives, butdoes not preclude individual componentsand units from taking actions to counterair and missile threats for theaccomplishment of their missions orprotection of their forces. Reliable and

secure C4I systems are needed to ensuretimely and accurate planning, response,close coordination, and integration. Thesesystems represent the common threads thattie all AOR and/or JOA operations togetherand they must be aggressively protectedfrom enemy interference.

CHAPTER VDEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

V-1

1. General

DCA operations (Figure V-1) employ a mixof weapon and sensor systems from allcomponents to protect US or multinationalforces, assets, population centers, and interestsfrom enemy air and missile threats. The JFC

“Find the enemy and shoot him down, anything else is nonsense.”

Manfred Baron von Richtofen1917

establishes and the AADC implementstheater- and/or JOA-wide defensepriorities through promulgation of a jointarea air defense plan.

a. The AADC develops the area air defenseplan in coordination with the joint force and

Figure V-1. Defensive Counterair Operations

Passive Air Defense

DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

Active Air Defense

- Camouflage, concealment,and deception

- Hardening

- Reconstitution

- Nuclear, biological, andchemical defensiveequipment and facilities

- Redundancy

- Detection and warningsystems

- Dispersal

- Mobility

- Active Air Defense Targets

-- Fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft

--Missiles

- Active Air DefenseOperations

-- Area defense

-- Point defense

-- Self-defense

-- High value airborneasset protection

V-2

Chapter V

JP 3-01

component staffs. The plan integrates DCAcapabilities throughout the theater and/orJOA.

b. The area air defense plan reflects thepriorities established by the JFC. Appropriatecomponent commanders provide surface-,air-, and sea-based active defense capabilitiesand forces.

DCA operations consist of active andpassive air defense measures linkedtogether with a joint C4I infrastructure.The AADC is responsible for integrating thecapabilities of different components toconstruct a C4I architecture which will negatethe air and missile threat. Because of theirtime-sensitive nature, DCA operations requirea streamlined decision and coordinationprocess.

“All warfare is based on deception.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of W arc. 500 BC

2. Passive Air Defense

Passive air defense provides individualand collective protection for friendly forcesand critical assets and is the responsibilityof every commander in the joint force. Itincludes measures, other than active airdefense, taken to minimize the effectivenessof attacking aircraft and missiles. The AADCis responsible for timely warning of attack,which initiates some of the passive defensemeasures. Warnings may be either general orspecific. General warnings indicate thatattacks are imminent or have occurred, whilespecific warnings signify that only certainunits or areas are in danger of attack. Passivemeasures do not involve the employment oflethal weapons, but they do improvesurvivability. Depending on the situation andtime available, a variety of measures may betaken to improve the defensive posture offriendly forces and assets. Some measures

should be planned for and practiced duringpeacetime. Passive measures include thefollowing.

a. Camouflage, Concealment, andDeception (CCD). CCD deny accuratelocation and targeting of friendly assets bymisleading and presenting falseinformation to the enemy. These measuresreduce vulnerability of friendly assets bylimiting their exposure to targeting. They maybe conducted continuously or in response towarning. Timely intelligence concerning theoverflight of enemy satellite and aircraftcollection systems is important to the effort.CCD may cause the enemy to abort, delay, ormodify an attack, or deplete resources byattacking false targets.

b. Hardening. Valuable assets and theirshelters are hardened to protect againstphysical attack, electromagnetic pulse, andtransient radiation. Hardening measuresshould be accomplished during peacetimewhenever possible.

c. Reconstitution. Reconstitution is thecapability for rapid repair of damageresulting from enemy attacks and the returnof damaged units to combat readiness.Examples of reconstitution include the repairof airfield operating surfaces and aircraft, theremoval of mines and unexploded ordnance,and restoring essential services such as C4Isystems, power, and fuel.

d. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical(NBC) Defensive Equipment and Facilities.NBC defensive equipment and facilitiesprotect against the effects of WMD byproviding contamination detection, shelter,and decontamination. Individual protectiveequipment allows vital functions to continuein the NBC environment.

e. Redundancy. Duplication of criticalcapabilities enables vital systems to continueoperating when critical nodes have been

V-3


destroyed or damaged. Redundancy includesdual, contingency, or backup capabilities thatcan assume primary mission functions, inwhole or in part, upon failure or degradationof the primary system.

f. Detection and Warning Systems.Timely detection and warning of air andmissile threats provide maximum reactiontime for friendly forces to seek shelter or takeappropriate action. Connectivity forcommunications and sensor systems is vitalfor accurate and timely warning. Acombination of air-, space-, and surface-baseddetection and communication assets shouldbe established to maximize detection andwarning. “All clear” procedures should alsobe established to notify forces when a warningis false or the threat no longer exists.

g. Dispersal. Dispersal complicates theenemy’s ability to locate, target, and attackfriendly assets.

h. Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerabilityand increases survivability by complicatingenemy surveillance, reconnaissance, andtargeting.

3. Active Air Defense

Active air defense is direct defensiveaction taken to destroy, nullify, or reducethe effectiveness of hostile air and missilethreats against friendly forces and assets.Integrated employment of air-to-air andsurface-to-air weapon systems throughcoordinated detection, identification,assessment, interception, and engagement ofair and missile threats is necessary to counterenemy attacks. Rapid, reliable, and securemeans of identification within the airspacecontrol area are critical to the survival offriendly forces.

a. Active Air Defense Targets. Theprimary active air defense targets are fixed-

and rotary-wing aircraft (manned andunmanned) and missiles. Missiles pose asignificant challenge since they are oftendifficult to detect and destroy after launch.They can be employed from long ranges, inall types of weather, and without the supportand manpower required for aircraft. Ballisticmissiles, whether employed in high or lowaltitude trajectories, also present uniqueproblems, including high velocities and shortreaction time.

b. Active Air Defense Operations.Successful active air defense requires theintegration of all appropriate defensive forcesand weapon systems within a theater or JOA.Active air defense operations are designedto protect selected assets and forces fromattack by destroying enemy aircraft andmissiles while in flight. These operations aresubject to the weapons control proceduresestablished by the AADC. When possible,the AADC should arrange a layered defenseplan to allow multiple engagementopportunities for friendly forces. EW mayalso be employed to disrupt or destroyguidance systems. Active air defenseoperations include the following.

• Area Defense. Area defense uses acombination of weapon systems (e.g.,aircraft and SAMs) to defend broad areas.

• Point Defense. Point defense protectslimited areas, normally in defense of vitalelements of forces or installations. Forexample, a SAM unit positioned toprotect an airfield is considered pointdefense.

• Self-Defense. Self-defense operationsallow friendly units to defend themselvesagainst direct attacks or threats of attackthrough the use of organic weapons andsystems. The right of self-defense isinherent to all ROE and weapons controlprocedures.

V-4

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JP 3-01

• High Value Airborne Asset (HVAA)Protection. HVAA protection defendsairborne national assets, which are soimportant that the loss of even one couldseriously impact US warfightingcapabilities. Furthermore, the politicalramifications of destroying one of theseassets could provide the enemy with atremendous propaganda victory. HVAAaircraft include Airborne Warning andControl System, Rivet Joint, JointSurveillance Target Attack RadarSystem, and Compass Call. HVAAprotection is performed by fighter aircraftusing various combat air patrol or escorttechniques.

c. Active Air Defense Systems. Theintegration of active air defense systemsprovides efficient control and exchange ofreal-time information to all defensive forcesand resources. Components must work inunison and provide a mix of dedicatedweapon systems to maximize theeffectiveness of air defense operations. Whencomponents work in unison, the limitationsof some surveillance, control, and weaponsystems may be balanced by the advantagesof other systems. Assets used in conductingactive air defense may include fixed- and

rotary-wing aircraft, surface-to-air weapons,and C4I systems.

4. DCA Planning Considerations

DCA planning may be conducted atmultiple levels. It begins during peacetimewith the IPB and the development of an areaair defense plan. The JFC will provide theguidance, priorities, taskings, and concept ofoperations for component commanders andthe staff. All components and the joint forcestaff will participate in the planning processrequired to develop the area air defense plan.

Continuous surveillance is crucial for earlydetection, identification, and prediction ofareas of attack from air and missile threats.The AADC, in coordination with the jointforce J-2, J-3, and J-6, will develop the plansand communications architecture for warningaffected forces and cueing appropriate systemsto the threat.

5. Execution of DCA Operations

The overall DCA effort should be centrallyplanned and should integrate forces andcapabilities from all components. The JFCdefines missions and may apportion

Active air defense assets include fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.

V-5


component capabilities and/or forces to theAADC to support theater- and/or JOA-wideDCA operations. The JFC determines themost appropriate command authority overforces made available, but normally air sortiesare provided TACON, while surface-basedactive defense forces are provided in directsupport. Regardless of the commandrelationship, all active defense forces madeavailable are subject to ROE, airspace,weapons control measures, and fire controlorders established by the AADC and approvedby the JFC. As the supported commander fortheater- and/or JOA-wide DCA, the AADCwill be granted the necessary commandauthority to deconflict and controlengagements and to exercise real-time battlemanagement.

The JFC normally authorizes the AADCto integrate DCA efforts of the joint force andto develop engagement procedures for allactive air and missile defense forces andcapabilities assigned, attached, and supportingthe joint force. However, this does not restrictcommanders’ authority to take thoseimmediate actions required to defend theirforces. Since defensive systems and assetsare limited, total protection for all friendlyforces and interests may not be available. In

some cases, units may need to provide self-defense by using organic weapons and passivemeasures when possible.

Execution of air defense operationsrequires continuous surveillance of thetheater and/or JOA. Integration of sensorsprovides a complete, timely, and commonoperational picture. Tactical warning initiatessome passive measures and provides initialcueing for defense forces. The AADC shouldestablish a reporting system capable of nearreal time production and dissemination oftracking data. Track production is a sequentialprocess which begins with the surveillancefunction. After detection, tracks are identified,labeled, and disseminated as rapidly aspossible. Detailed and timely track datapermits C2 systems to evaluate the track anddetermine its significance. Defense forcesthen engage hostile tracks or allow the passageof friendly tracks.

a. ROE. For DCA to be effective, ROEmust be established, disseminated, andunderstood. The components and supportingcommanders are responsible for ensuringcompliance. Unless ROE are alreadyestablished by higher authority or an existingplan, the JFC is responsible for establishing

Successful active air defense requires the integration of all appropriatedefensive forces and weapon systems within an AOR and/or JOA.

V-6

Chapter V

JP 3-01

and implementing the ROE. The JFCshould request inputs and recommendationsfrom the JFACC, AADC, and othersubordinate commanders. Centrally plannedidentification and engagement procedures arevital for avoiding duplication of effort andfratricide. However, since ballistic missileshave a distinct flight profile, ROE for thisthreat should allow for immediateengagement.

b. Airspace Control for DCAOperations. The problem of distinguishingfriendly, neutral, and enemy assets whileemploying various weapon systems is acomplex task. The AADC and ACAestablish procedures within the airspacecontrol system to positively identify allairborne assets, reduce delays inoperations, and prevent fratricide. PositiveID is a method of employing electronic andvisual means to positively identify trackswithin an airspace. Positive ID of tracks isnormally the preferred method of operation.In the absence of positive ID, procedural IDmeans are used. Procedural ID permits thesafe passage of non-hostile aircraft andenables the employment of defensive systems.Integration, coordination, and airspace controlprocedures enhance the synergisticcapabilities of various weapon systems.Airspace control measures normallyinclude fighter engagement zones, missileengagement zones, and joint engagementzones (JEZs). These zones are portions ofairspace in which the responsibility forengagement rests with commanders of aparticular weapon system or systems undertheir control. When airspace control measuresinclude a JEZ, the commander uses aircraftand SAM systems concurrently to engagepositively identified threats with the optimumsystem available.

c. Weapon Systems Employment forDCA Operations. Early warning of hostileair and missile actions is vital for a layereddefense. DCA operations should attempt

to intercept intruding enemy aircraft andmissiles as early as possible. Although DCAoperations are reactive in nature, they shouldbe conducted as far from the friendlyoperational area as feasible. To ensure attritionof enemy air and missile threats, theengagement process must continuethroughout the approach to, entry into, anddeparture from the friendly operationalarea.

• Surface-to-Air Weapon Systems.Surface-to-air weapons are employedeither in area, point, or self-defenseoperations. These weapons offersignif icant f irepower and rapidresponse. Their effectiveness requiresa reliable, interoperable interface withaircraft operations. Identification andcommunication processes that precludeengagement of friendly aircraft andreduce unnecessary expenditure ofweapons are also required. Integrationof these capabilities strengthens mutualsupport and provides the best overalldefensive coverage. The optimalcapabilities of each weapon system occurat different ranges and altitudes. Formaximum effectiveness, all surface-to-air capabilities and forces assigned,attached, and supporting the jointforce are included in the area airdefense plan and are subject to theprocedures established by the AADC.Although these systems are subject to theAADC’s procedures and weaponscontrol measures, they maintain the rightof self-defense.

•• Weapons Control Status. Weaponscontrol of surface-to-air units isexpressed as a status declared for aparticular area and time. There arethree types of weapons control status.“Weapons free” is a control orderwhereby weapons systems may be firedat any target not positively recognizedas friendly. “Weapons tight” is a control

V-7


order whereby weapons systems may befired only at targets recognized as hostile.Finally, “weapons hold” is a control orderwhereby weapons systems may only befired in self-defense or in response to aformal order.

•• Fire Control Orders. Fire controlorders are given to direct or to inhibitfiring by surface-to-air weapons unitsbased on rapidly changing battlesituations. There are three primary firecontrol orders. The “engage” orderdirects or authorizes units and weaponsystems to fire on a designated target.The “cease engagement” order directsunits to stop the firing sequence againsta designated target. “Hold fire” is anemergency order used to stop firing.Missiles already in flight must beprevented from intercepting, iftechnically possible.

• Air-to-Air Fighter Interception.Fighter aircraft performing DCA or OCAmissions may be tasked to respond to thedetection of hostile, potentially hostile,or unknown airborne targets. Aircraftnormally operate under positivecontrol of a controlling agency, butmay initiate and conduct interceptsautonomously when authorized orwhen the environment or depth of theoperation precludes positive control.In this instance, the controlling agencymay provide broadcast information ontarget information to all affected fighters.Air-to-air fighters operate with enhancedfire control radar and beyond visual rangeweapons that allow multiple targets to beengaged at once. The use of permissiveROE allows maximum use of beyondvisual range weapons while engaginghostile targets well before reachingthreatening ranges.

V-8

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JP 3-01

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX AREFERENCES

A-1

The development of JP 3-01 is based upon the following primary references.

1. JP 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.”

2. JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

3. JP 1-01, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures Development Program.”

4. JP 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

5. JP 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

6. JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”

7. JP 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support toTargeting.”

8. JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

9. JP 3-01.1, “Aerospace Defense of North America.”

10. JP 3-01.2, “Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations.”

11. JP 3-01.3, “Doctrine for Air Defense From Overseas Land Areas.”

12. JP 3-01.4, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression of EnemyAir Defenses (J-SEAD).”

13. JP 3-01.5, “Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense.”

14. JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

15. JP 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.”

16. JP 3-14, “Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations” (indevelopment).

17. JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”

18. JP 3-51, “Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations” (in revision).

19. JP 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.”

A-2

Appendix A

JP 3-01

20. JP 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.”

21. JP 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”

22. Air Force Manual 1-1, Volumes I and II, “Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United StatesAir Force.”

23. Air Force Doctrine Document, 2-1.1, “Counterair Operations,” 1 September 1996 (finaldraft).

24. Air Force Doctrine Document, 2-5.4, “Intelligence.”

25. Allied Tactical Publication 42, “Counter Air Operations.”

26. Field Manual 100-5, “Operations.”

27. Field Manual 44-100, “US Army Air Defense Operations” (final draft).

28. Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-50, “Antiair Warfare.”

29. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, “Naval Warfare.”

30. Naval Warfare Publication 3-01.1, “Antiair Warfare.”

APPENDIX BADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

B-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theUnited States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division,Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsorfor this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-01.2, 1 April 1986, “Joint Doctrine for TheaterCounterair Operations,” and JP 3-01.3, 23 May 1964, “Doctrine for Air Defense fromOverseas Land Areas,” with Interim Change 1.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: HQ AFDC DET 1 LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

B-2

Appendix B

JP 3-01

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AADC area air defense commanderACA airspace control authorityACO airspace control orderACP airspace control planAO area of operationsAOR area of responsibilityATO air tasking order

C2 command and controlC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCCD camouflage, concealment, and deceptionCINCNORAD Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense

Command

DCA defensive counterair

EW electronic warfare

FSCL fire support coordination line

HVAA high value airborne asset

ID identificationIO information operationsIPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffJ-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staffJ-4 Logistics Directorate of a joint staffJ-5 Plans Directorate of a joint staffJ-6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

Directorate of a joint staffJAOC joint air operations centerJEZ joint engagement zoneJFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJOA joint operations areaJTCB joint targeting coordination board

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

OCA offensive counterairOPCON operational control

ROE rules of engagement

SAM surface-to-air missileSEAD suppression of enemy air defensesSOF special operations forcesSOLE special operations liaison element

TACON tactical controlTM theater missile

UAV unmanned aerial vehicleUSCINCSPACE Commander in Chief, US Space Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-01

active air defense. Direct defensive actiontaken to destroy, nullify, or reduce theeffectiveness of hostile air and missilethreats against friendly forces and assets.It includes the use of aircraft, air defenseweapons, electronic warfare, and otheravailable weapons. (Upon approval of thispublication, this term and its definition willmodify the existing term and its definitionand will be included in JP 1-02.)

air defense. All defensive measures designedto destroy attacking enemy aircraft ormissiles in the Earth’s envelope ofatmosphere, or to nullify or reduce theeffectiveness of such attack. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority. The commanderdesignated to assume overall responsibilityfor the operation of the airspace controlsystem in the airspace control area. Alsocalled ACA. (JP 1-02)

airspace control order. An orderimplementing the airspace control plan thatprovides the details of the approved requestsfor airspace control measures. It ispublished either as part of the air taskingorder or as a separate document. Also calledACO. (JP 1-02)

airspace control plan. The documentapproved by the joint force commander thatprovides specific planning guidance andprocedures for the airspace control systemfor the joint force area of responsibility/jointoperations area. Also called ACP. (JP 1-02)

air superiority. That degree of dominancein the air battle of one force over anotherwhich permits the conduct of operations bythe former and its related land, sea and airforces at a given time and place withoutprohibitive interference by the opposingforce. (JP 1-02)

air supremacy. That degree of air superioritywherein the opposing air force is incapableof effective interference. (JP 1-02)

area air defense commander. Within aunified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force, thecommander will assign overallresponsibility for air defense to a singlecommander. Normally, this will be thecomponent commander with thepreponderance of air defense capability andthe command, control, and communicationscapability to plan and execute integrated airdefense operations. Representation fromthe other components involved will beprovided, as appropriate, to the area airdefense commander’s headquarters. Alsocalled AADC. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (commandauthority). Nontransferable commandauthority established by title 10 (“ArmedForces”), United States Code, Section 164,exercised only by commanders of unifiedor specified combatant commands unlessotherwise directed by the President or theSecretary of Defense. Combatantcommand (command authority) cannot bedelegated and is the authority of acombatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assigned forcesinvolving organizing and employingcommands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction over all aspects ofmilitary operations, joint training, andlogistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command.Combatant command (command authority)should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally, this authority is exercisedthrough subordinate joint forcecommanders and Service and/or functional

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-3

GL-4

Glossary

JP 3-01

component commanders. Combatantcommand (command authority) providesfull authority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatantcommander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Also calledCOCOM. (JP 1-02)

counterair. A mission which integratesoffensive and defensive operations to attainand maintain a desired degree of airsuperiority. Counterair missions aredesigned to destroy or negate enemy aircraftand missiles, both before and after launch.(Upon approval of this publication, thisterm and its definition will modify theexisting term “counter air” and its definitionand will be included in JP 1-02.)

defense in depth. The siting of mutuallysupporting defense positions designed toabsorb and progressively weaken attack,prevent initial observations of the wholeposition by the enemy, and to allow thecommander to maneuver his reserve. (JP1-02)

defensive counterair. All defensive measuresdesigned to detect, identify, intercept, anddestroy or negate enemy forces attemptingto attack or penetrate the friendly airenvironment. Also called DCA. (Uponapproval of this publication, this term andits definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

direct support. A mission requiring a forceto support another specific force andauthorizing it to answer directly thesupported force’s request for assistance.Also called DS. (JP 1-02)

electronic warfare. Any military actioninvolving the use of electromagnetic anddirected energy to control theelectromagnetic spectrum or to attack theenemy. Also called EW. The three major

subdivisions within electronic warfare are:electronic attack, electronic protection, andelectronic warfare support. a. electronicattack. That division of electronic warfareinvolving the use of electromagnetic,directed energy, or antiradiation weaponsto attack personnel, facilities, or equipmentwith the intent of degrading, neutralizing,or destroying enemy combat capability.Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actionstaken to prevent or reduce an enemy’seffective use of the electromagneticspectrum, such as jamming andelectromagnetic deception, and 2)employment of weapons that use eitherelectromagnetic or directed energy as theirprimary destructive mechanism (lasers,radio frequency weapons, particle beams)or anti-radiation weapons. b. electronicprotection. That division of electronicwarfare involving actions taken to protectpersonnel, facilities, and equipment fromany effects of friendly or enemyemployment of electronic warfare thatdegrade, neutralize, or destroy friendlycombat capability. Also called EP. c.electronic warfare support. That divisionof electronic warfare involving actionstasked by, or under direct control of, anoperational commander to search for,intercept, identify, and locate sources ofintentional and unintentional radiatedelectromagnetic energy for the purpose ofimmediate threat recognition. Thus,electronic warfare support providesinformation required for immediatedecisions involving electronic warfareoperations and other tactical actions suchas threat avoidance, targeting, and homing.Also called ES. Electronic warfare supportdata can be used to produce signalsintelligence, both communicationsintelligence, and electronics intelligence.(JP 1-02)

fires. The effects of lethal or nonlethalweapons. (JP 1-02)

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Glossary

high value airborne asset protection. Adefensive counterair mission which defendsairborne national assets which are soimportant that the loss of even one couldseriously impact US warfightingcapabilities or provide the enemy withsignificant propaganda value. Examples ofhigh value airborne assets are AirborneWarning and Control System, Rivet Joint,Joint Surveillance and Target Attack RadarSystem, and Compass Call. Also calledHVAA protection. (Upon approval of thispublication, this term and its definition willbe included in JP 1-02.)

information operations. Actions taken toaffect adversary information andinformation systems while defending one’sown information and information systems.Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace.An analytical methodology employed toreduce uncertainties concerning the enemy,environment, and terrain for all types ofoperations. Intelligence preparation of thebattlespace builds an extensive data basefor each potential area in which a unit maybe required to operate. The data base isthen analyzed in detail to determine theimpact of the enemy, environment, andterrain on operations and presents it ingraphic form. Intelligence preparation ofthe battlespace is a continuing process. Alsocalled IPB. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. Thejoint force air component commanderderives authority from the joint forcecommander who has the authority toexercise operational control, assignmissions, direct coordination amongsubordinate commanders, redirect andorganize forces to ensure unity of effort inthe accomplishment of the overall mission.The joint force commander will normallydesignate a joint force air componentcommander. The joint force air component

commander’s responsibilities will beassigned by the joint force commander(normally these would include, but not belimited to, planning, coordination,allocation, and tasking based on the jointforce commander’s apportionmentdecision). Using the joint forcecommander’s guidance and authority, andin coordination with other Servicecomponent commanders and other assignedor supporting commanders, the joint forceair component commander will recommendto the joint force commander apportionmentof air sorties to various missions orgeographic areas. Also called JFACC. (JP1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint suppression of enemy air defenses. Abroad term that includes all suppression ofenemy air defense activities provided byone component of the joint force in supportof another. Also called J-SEAD. (JP 1-02)

joint targeting coordination board. A groupformed by the joint force commander toaccomplish broad targeting oversightfunctions that may include but are notlimited to coordinating targetinginformation, providing targeting guidanceand priorities, and preparing and/or refiningjoint target lists. The board is normallycomprised of representatives from the jointforce staff, all components, and if required,component subordinate units. Also calledJTCB. (JP 1-02)

joint theater missile defense. Theintegration of joint force capabilities todestroy enemy theater missiles in flight orprior to launch or to otherwise disrupt the

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JP 3-01

enemy’s theater missile operations throughan appropriate mix of mutually supportivepassive missile defense; active missiledefense; attack operations; and supportingcommand, control, communications,computers, and intelligence measures.Enemy theater missiles are those that areaimed at targets outside the continentalUnited States. Also called JTMD. (JP 1-02)

offensive counterair. Offensive operationsto destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemyaircraft, missiles, launch platforms, andtheir supporting structures and systems bothbefore and after launch, but as close to theirsource as possible. Offensive counterairoperations range throughout enemyterritory and are generally conducted at theinitiative of friendly forces. Theseoperations include attack operations, fightersweep, escort, and suppression of enemyair defenses. Also called OCA. (Uponapproval of this publication, this term andits definition will modify the existing term“offensive counter air operation” and itsdefinition and will be approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

offensive counterair attack operations.Offensive action in support of the offensivecounterair mission against surface targetswhich contribute to the enemy’s air powercapabilities. The objective of attackoperations is to prevent the hostile use ofaircraft and missile forces by attackingtargets such as missile launch sites, airfields,naval vessels, command and control nodes,munitions stockpiles, and supportinginfrastructure. Attack operations may beperformed by fixed or rotary wing aircraft,surface-to-surface weapons, specialoperations forces, or ground forces. Alsocalled OCA attack ops. (Upon approval ofthis publication, this term and its definitionwill be included in JP 1-02.)

operational control. Transferable commandauthority that may be exercised by

commanders at any echelon at or below thelevel of combatant command. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Operational controlmay be delegated and is the authority toperform those functions of command oversubordinate forces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces, assigningtasks, designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operationalcontrol includes authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations and jointtraining necessary to accomplish missionsassigned to the command. Operationalcontrol should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Operational control normallyprovides full authority to organizecommands and forces and to employ thoseforces as the commander in operationalcontrol considers necessary to accomplishassigned missions. Operational controldoes not, in and of itself, includeauthoritative direction for logistics ormatters of administration, discipline,internal organization, or unit training. Alsocalled OPCON. (JP 1-02)

passive air defense. All measures, other thanactive air defense, taken to minimize theeffectiveness of hostile air and missilethreats against friendly forces and assets.These measures include camouflage,concealment, deception, dispersion,reconstitution, redundancy, detection andwarning systems, and the use of protectiveconstruction. (Upon approval of thispublication, this term and its definition willmodify the existing term and its definitionand will be included in JP 1-02.)

positive control. A method of airspacecontrol which relies on positiveidentification, tracking, and direction of

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Glossary

aircraft within an airspace, conducted withelectronic means by an agency having theauthority and responsibility therein. (JP1-02)

procedural control. A method of airspacecontrol which relies on a combination ofpreviously agreed and promulgated ordersand procedures. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued bycompetent military authority whichdelineate the circumstances and limitationsunder which United States forces willinitiate and/or continue combat engagementwith other forces encountered. Also calledROE. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. The commanderhaving primary responsibility for all aspectsof a task assigned by the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan or other joint operationplanning authority. In the context of jointoperation planning, this term refers to thecommander who prepares operation plans,or operation orders in response torequirements of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander whoprovides augmentation forces or othersupport to a supported commander or whodevelops a supporting plan. Includes the

designated combatant commands andDefense agencies as appropriate. (JP 1-02)

suppression of enemy air defenses. Thatactivity which neutralizes, destroys, ortemporarily degrades surface-based enemyair defenses by destructive and/or disruptivemeans. Also called SEAD. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces madeavailable for tasking, that is limited to thedetailed and, usually, local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuversnecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical control maybe delegated to, and exercised at any levelat or below the level of combatantcommand. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

theater missile. A missile, which may be aballistic missile, a cruise missile, or an air-to-surface missile (not including short-range, non-nuclear, direct fire missiles,bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or wire-guided missiles), whose target is within agiven theater of operation. Also called TM.(Upon approval, this term and its definitionwill modify the existing term and itsdefinition and will be included in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

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JP 3-01

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or JointStaff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-01 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub,makes required changes and prepares pubfor coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats

Documents

Transcript of JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats