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2008 59: 288 originally published online 7 July 2008Journal of Teacher EducationRichard D. Osguthorpe

On the Reasons We Want Teachers of Good Disposition and Moral Character  

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288

On the Reasons We Want Teachers of Good Disposition and Moral Character

Richard D. OsguthorpeBoise State University

The point of this article is to make a case for teachers of moral disposition without regard for the moral development ofstudents. The article concludes that there are multiple reasons for wanting teachers of good disposition and moral character;that teachers’ dispositions are best conceived as modifiers to the methods that they employ; and that the crux of the dispo-sitions debate is ultimately grounded in avoiding poor moral character. Implications of the article point teacher educatorstoward a conception of teacher education that focuses on preparing teachers of good disposition and moral character simplyfor the sake of teaching that accords with what is good, right, and virtuous. The analysis suggests that the scope of ateacher’s dispositions should be broadened to include all matters of classroom life and teacher effectiveness.

Keywords: teacher dispositions; teacher education; moral character; moral development; moral education

If there is a truism in education, it is that good teachingrequires a teacher to be knowledgeable in content,

skilled in method, and virtuous in disposition and char-acter. The first two stipulations are most often and easilyconnected to student learning; it is readily accepted thata deep understanding of subject matter and an ability toeffectively employ methods to convey that subject mattermight increase a student’s opportunity to learn. Thus, wewant teachers to be experts in their content areas, and wewant them to be able to convey that content in ways thatmake it accessible to students. But why do we wantteachers to be of good disposition and moral character?Presumably, we want teachers to be virtuous for reasonsthat extend beyond reading, writing, and arithmetic—wewant them to be of virtuous disposition because theyinescapably influence the moral development of thechildren in their charge. In other words, a purported rea-son for wanting teachers of good disposition and moralcharacter in the classroom is that teachers act as moralexemplars and models, which in turn is believed to havea direct effect on the moral development of students.

This presumption of a relationship between the moraldispositions of teachers and the moral development ofstudents is one rationale for attending to dispositions inteacher preparation programs, but it does little to quell thedebate swirling around the definition of dispositions, theirpotential for development in teacher preparation, and thebest methods of assessing them in teacher candidates. In

fact, such a rationale has potential to create even morecontroversy by bringing issues of moral education andmoral development to bear on considerations of teachercandidate quality. Furthermore, although it might be thecase that there is a strong relationship between the moraldispositions of a teacher and the moral development of astudent, it might also be the case that the relationship isa weak one or even nonexistent, that the moral qualities ofa teacher do not have quite their assumed impact on thedevelopment of similar qualities in students. Given thepotential for additional controversy and the possible inde-terminacy of such a relationship (see Osguthorpe, 2009),this article builds on the notion that there are reasons forwanting teachers of good disposition and moral characterthat transcend any connection to the moral development ofstudents—all in an effort to clarify the priority placed ondispositions in the preparation of teachers.

Thus, the purpose of this article is to put forward amore robust rationale for wanting teachers of good dispo-sition and moral character, one that is rooted in the claimthat good dispositions are immanent in good teaching—connecting dispositions to the activities of teaching andlearning and moving them away from a narrow focus onmoral development. This rationale is derived from a con-sideration of three provocative questions that bring impor-tant issues to bear on the dispositions debate: (a) Why dowe want teachers of good disposition and moral charac-ter? (b) How morally good does a teacher need to be?

Journal of Teacher EducationVolume 59 Number 4

September/October 2008 288-299© 2008 Sage Publications

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Osguthorpe / Good Disposition and Moral Character 289

and (c) What if a teacher is of poor moral character ordisposition? In the first section of the article, I providesome background for the current inquiry as it pertains tothe controversy surrounding dispositions and teachereducation. The purpose of this section is to show howattention to moral dispositions in teacher education hasoften been closely connected to the moral developmentof students.

In the remaining sections, I examine each of the ques-tions described above with special consideration for thepossibility that the putative relationship between themoral dispositions of teachers and the moral develop-ment of students is nonexistent. The purpose of thesesections is to unearth some of the most commonly heldassumptions regarding the moral character and disposi-tions of teachers and to suggest alternative reasons forplacing an emphasis on dispositions in teacher prepara-tion. The questions I raise have particular relevance tothe preparation of preservice teachers, and in conclusion,I explore the applications of these questions (and subse-quent discussion) for the practice of teacher education.These applications point to different ways that teacherpreparation programs might attend to the moral charac-ter of teacher candidates, and they also suggest differentreasons for wanting teachers of good disposition andmoral character in the first place. The purpose of thisfinal section is to provide possible directions for futurepractice and research.

Conceptual Framework

My point of entry into this article is via the Manner inTeaching Project (MTP), a philosophical and empiricalstudy aimed at understanding how the expression ofmoral character traits and dispositions (manner) is mademanifest in classroom teaching.1 The MTP research teamwas particularly interested in how teacher manner (theexpression of virtuous traits and dispositions) is madevisible in classrooms and what effect manner has onmoral development. As Richardson and Fenstermacher(2001) state, “We wanted to know whether teachers didin fact posses such traits, how they displayed them intheir conduct, and what influence they might have onstudents” (p. 632). It was assumed that if teachers pos-sessed such traits, then the research team stood a goodchance of observing them in teachers’ actions. A partic-ularly Aristotelian perspective on moral developmentprovided the conceptual frame for the MTP inquiry,wherein the young acquire virtue by being around virtu-ous people (see Aristotle, 2000, translation; Dearden,Hirst, & Peters, 1972; Ryle, 1972). That is, virtue is not

“taught”—at least not in the way that mathematics orbiology is taught. Instead, virtue is “caught” or “pickedup” by interacting with those who seemingly possess itthrough habituation.

Thus, MTP researchers entered schools and class-rooms with Aristotelian-colored lenses—expecting tosee virtues expressed by teachers and subsequentlypicked up by students. For example, Richardson andFenstermacher (2001) initially believed that “if teacherswere to contribute to the moral and intellectual develop-ment of their students, the teachers themselves had topossess and exhibit the moral and intellectual traits theysought for their students” (p. 632). The emphasis of thestudy was on detecting the exhibition or display of virtu-ous character traits and understanding how teachersemployed these traits in the course of everyday instruc-tion. It also relied heavily on the assumption that oncedisplayed, these virtues were “caught” by students in theclassroom.

A similar theoretical framework guides the argumentin this article because this same language of virtue andthis conception of moral development often frame dis-cussion of dispositions and the reasons that are put forthin the literature for wanting teachers of good dispositionand moral character. Use of the term moral, then, in thisarticle assumes a normative sense of morality, in that itrefers to what is “morally good” rather than what is,more broadly, morally salient (Sanger, 2003). In addi-tion, the following assumptions are made about disposi-tions and moral development: (a) Moral dispositions area developed feature of what a teacher is and does, whatshe already has, as opposed to what she is coming into,and (b) moral development refers to what happens to astudent, what a student is becoming in a moral sense (seeBurnyeat, 1980). Thus, as it modifies character anddevelopment, the term moral in this article implies char-acter or development over time that is consistent withwhat is morally good or virtuous.

Regarding dispositions, important distinctions can bemade between what is, for example, virtuous or right(see Sockett, 2006), and these differences would cer-tainly prove analytically useful in furthering our under-standing of the questions that guide this inquiry.However, they are not necessarily germane to the pri-mary argument in this article (although certainly perti-nent to outgrowths of the argument) because thesedifferences are related more to what makes actions rightthan to the practical manifestations of each theory:

The two main modern competitors to virtue ethics areutilitarianism and Kantianism. It is important to recog-nize that these three theories may largely converge in

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their practical conclusions [italics added]. They may all,for instance, recommend that one be generous, or just.But the reasons that the theories offer differ greatly.According to utilitarianism, what makes actions right istheir producing the largest amount of well-being overall.According to Kantianism, what makes actions right istheir being in accordance with the law of reason. Wemight understand Aristotle, and a pure virtue ethics, asclaiming that what makes actions right is their beingvirtuous. (Crisp, 2000, p. xvii)

This article is primarily concerned with the “practicalconclusions” of attending to dispositions in teacher prepa-ration. Thus, an attempt is made in this article to employan inclusive and normative sense of “moral,” encompass-ing that which is considered good, virtuous, caring, right,proper, and so on (see Sockett, 2006, p. 20), but it favorsthe Aristotelian conception because the roots of the rela-tionship that guides this inquiry typically lie therein.

As a result, the term moral often designates the use oftrait language in this article, such that moral character ormoral development will connote the possession or devel-opment of certain moral traits or dispositions (e.g., hon-esty, responsibility, fairness, kindness, compassion, etc.).Furthermore, reference is made to good dispositions andbad, or poor, dispositions (see Urmson, 1980, p. 158),where what is “good” represents excellence and what is“bad” or “poor” represents excess or deficiency, follow-ing a conception of dispositions as virtues (see Crisp,2000, p. xiv-xv). That said, following the conclusionsof the MTP regarding teacher manner, an Aristotelianframework likely does not capture all of the complexitiesassociated with dispositions in teacher education (Sanger& Fenstermacher, 2000). However, it is most closelyconnected to the trait language that often frames thedebate, making it a useful theoretical frame for the argu-ment in this article.

The primary data source for this article is the schol-arly literature that assumes a connection between themoral dispositions of a teacher and the moral develop-ment of a student. These assumptions are incrediblycommon in the moral education and moral developmentliterature, ranging from philosophical claims (seeCampbell, 2003; Fenstermacher, 1990, 2001; Hansen,1993, 2001; Noddings, 1984, 2002; Sockett, 1993; Strike& Soltis, 1992; Tom, 1984) to more practice-based or“programmatic” claims (see Benninga, 1993; Lickona,1991; Ryan & Bohlin, 1999). Scholars working from asocial or behavioral science perspective have also madeclaims of a relationship based on quantitative or survey-based research (see Hartshorne & May, 1928-1930; Peck& Havighurst, 1960), whereas more recently, others have

taken a more ethnographic approach (see Jackson,Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993) or have combined philo-sophical and empirical modes of inquiry (see Campbell,2003; Richardson & Fenstermacher, 2001). Althoughthese scholars come to different conclusions (and arriveat these conclusions in different ways), the relationshipbetween the moral character of a teacher and the moraldevelopment of a student is at or near the forefront ofeach study. Most important, they all offer differentinsight and direction for exploring the critical questionsthat frame the query of this article and for analyzing therecent scholarship related to the development andassessment of dispositions and moral character inteacher education programs.2

The correlative (but not often connected) literature ondispositions makes similar arguments for attending todispositions in teacher education and also offers alterna-tive rationales and definitional or conceptual work. In thecontext of teacher preparation, it would likely be difficultto find a teacher education program that did not placegood moral character and dispositions (or some deriva-tive) as a high priority for its teacher candidates. Callsfor such an emphasis have come in a variety of forms, themost influential of which has come from the NationalCouncil for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE)itself. When NCATE revised its standards in 2000, itdetermined that teacher educators ought to more seri-ously undertake the development of moral dispositionsin teacher candidates (despite little consensus about whatit might mean): “NCATE believed that the time hadcome for teacher educators to pay attention not merely toknowledge and skill development and teaching andlearning but also to the moral and ethical development ofteachers” (Wise, 2006, p. 5). But since this relativelybenign acceptance in the NCATE Standards, dispositionshave been the focus of much controversy, resulting invarious revisions of the definition of dispositions. Thecurrent definition reads as follows:

Professional attitudes, values, and beliefs demonstratedthrough both verbal and non-verbal behaviors as educa-tors interact with students, families, colleagues, andcommunities. These positive behaviors support studentlearning and development.

NCATE expects institutions to assess professionaldispositions based on observable behaviors in educa-tional settings. The two professional dispositions thatNCATE expects institutions to assess are fairness andthe belief that all students can learn. Based on their mis-sion and conceptual framework, professional educationunits can identify, define, and operationalize additionalprofessional dispositions. (NCATE, 2008, pp. 89-90)

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This glossary definition differs primarily in its elimi-nation of a prescription of specific traits—such as honesty,caring, and responsibility—for possible use in teachereducation programs. And, although the term social jus-tice was controversially removed from the definition, theexecutive board also issued a call for action that drawsattention to it in the introduction to the current standards(NCATE, 2008, pp. 6-7). In the end, it appears to be muchado about something, but the crux of the issue is stilldifficult to define, as multiple perspectives on the issuecontinue to flourish in the scholarly literature.

For example, prior to this call from NCATE, manyscholars explored the moral dimensions of teaching andlearning and argued for increased attention to disposi-tions and character in teacher education. Goodlad (1994)postulates that “robust” programs of teacher educationshould admit only students who are committed to themoral dimensions of their practice and that these pro-grams should help prepare them for those responsibili-ties. However, even stronger pleas come from teachereducators who argue that teacher preparation programsshould, first and foremost, foster the moral developmentof teacher candidates. These teacher educators contendthat good teacher preparation “must begin with the per-sonal ethical/moral development of the prospectiveteacher” (Weber, 1998, p. 87), primarily because theseprospective teachers “will themselves need to be moral,caring, and socially skilled so that they can demonstrateimportant skills and understandings in word and deed”(Watson, 1998, p. 65).

The strength of such a position relies on the potentialimpact on a teacher’s students. In his argument for placingemphasis on dispositions in teacher education, Wasicsko(2007) points out that the dispositions of teachers are keyto making a meaningful moral impact on students:

It is not so much what the teacher knows or does ratherit is who the person is that makes all the difference. It isparticular human qualities or dispositions in combina-tion with, and shining through, their knowledge and skillsthat allow some teachers to transform many students’lives. (p. 55)

Thus, an additional perspective to consider in the dis-positions debate is that teacher education programsshould attend to the moral dispositions and character ofa teacher because of the possible influence it might haveon the moral development of future students. This pre-sumed relationship is one prominent justification putforth in the teacher education literature.

Similarly, there are recent calls to “reclaim the moral”in the preparation of teachers (Burant, Chubbuck, &

Whipp, 2007) and, more broadly, to move toward amoral or civic professionalism and away from such anarrow conception of method and skill:

The idea of the professional as neutral problem solver,above the fray, which was launched with great expecta-tions a century ago, is now obsolete. A new ideal of amore engaged, civic professionalism must take its place.Such an ideal understands, as a purely technical profes-sionalism does not, that professionals are inescapablymoral agents whose work depends upon public trust forits success. . . .

A new civic awareness within professional prepara-tion could go a long way toward awakening awarenessthat the authentic spirit of each professional domain rep-resents more than a body of knowledge or skills. It is aliving culture, painfully developed over time, which rep-resents at once the individual practitioner’s most prizedpossession and an asset of great social value. (Sullivan,2004, pp. 2-3).

Additional contributions put the concept of disposi-tions in psychological context and offer definitionaland historical perspective (Damon, 2005, 2007; Murray,2007; see also Freeman, 2007; Raths, 2007), create amoral framework for teacher dispositions (Sockett,2006; see also Burant, Chubbuck, & Whipp, 2007; Oja &Reiman, 2007), and provide principles for assessment(Diez, 2006, 2007a; see also Wilkerson, 2006). Many ofthese contributions assume or argue that dispositions arean important component of teacher preparation.

However, even with recent increased attention to dis-positions in the scholarly literature, there is no defini-tive consensus regarding the definition of dispositions orthe role dispositions should play in teacher education(see Borko, Liston, & Whitcomb, 2007). Furthermore,the current direction of the debate appears to be one ofexploring multiple perspectives and entertaining multi-ple definitions (Freeman, 2007). The argument thatfollows in this article assumes that attention to theseissues surrounding dispositions in teacher education is ahealthy development and merits further conceptual work.Thus, it does not seek to offer a definitive response to thequestions surrounding dispositions. Instead, it offers anadditional perspective on the important issue of disposi-tions in teacher education that suggests how dispositionsmight be defined in relation to methods and skills and,subsequently, how they might be assessed in teachercandidates. This perspective builds on similar calls foran integration of knowledge, skills, and dispositions inteacher education (see Diez, 2007b), holding that dispo-sitions are best conceived as modifiers to the methodsthat teachers employ.

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Why Do We Want Teachers of GoodDisposition and Moral Character?

If we make the assumption that there is a relationshipbetween the moral dispositions of a teacher and themoral development of a student, then we want teachersof good disposition and moral character for at least threereasons. The first reason is that we want students of gooddisposition and moral character. This reason for wantingmorally good teachers is the most obvious. The long-held assumption that children “catch” or “pick up” char-acter traits from those with whom they associate dictateswhy we want teachers to possess and exhibit desirabletraits. Not much explanation of this reason is needed.That we want students to develop good moral characteris the primary reason proffered in the moral educationand moral development scholarship for wanting morallygood teachers. It also accords to common sense andappeals to our intuitive sense of how moral developmentoccurs in the young. The typical contention is that ateacher’s example is his or her most powerful tool ofmoral education and that any attempt at moral educationwill be unsuccessful if the teacher is not of good dispo-sition and moral character (see Ryan & Bohlin, 1999).We want our teachers to be good examples of virtue andto display certain character traits and dispositions so thatstudents will, in turn, pick them up and acquire them.

The second reason is that we want teachers to bothconsciously and unconsciously convey good dispositionsand moral character. This reason for wanting teachers ofgood disposition and moral character is grounded on thepremise that what the teacher consciously conveys is an“idealized” expression of morality, and the more theteacher’s idealized expression and “real” expression (thedispositions and character traits a teacher possibly pos-sesses) resemble each other, the more apt it is to havesome influence on the student. In other words, there isless of a chance for misunderstanding (even minor signs)on the part of the student and less of a propensity formisrepresenting on the part of the teacher (see Goffman,1961). And if any relationship is to obtain between themoral character of a teacher and the moral developmentof a student (however indirect that connection might be),then what is conveyed by the teacher must first be con-nected to what is possessed by the teacher, and what isinterpreted by the student must be an accurate construalof both.

The third reason is that we want teachers to teachmorality programmatically. That is, we want teachers ofgood disposition because not only do we want teachers toconsciously and unconsciously express moral charac-ter, but we want them to provide moral instruction via

specific curricula. A common refrain from proponents ofcharacter education is that the programmatic aspects ofcharacter education will not be effective unless theteacher is of good disposition and moral character. Forcharacter educators, direct instruction is the primarymeans of teaching students to be good, but they contendthat this type of instruction is meaningless if a teacherasks students to “do as I say and not as I do.” In otherwords, teachers have to “walk the talk” and “practicewhat they preach”; a teacher’s “actions speak louder thanwords” (see Benninga, 1993; Lickona, 1991; Ryan &Bohlin, 1999). Thus, if a character education program isgoing to have any effect, teachers will need to possess thetraits that they are espousing. This reason for wantingteachers of good disposition and moral character rests onthe assumption that “morals can be taught, not justcaught” and that a teacher’s moral character is integral toboth. Thus, the dispositions possessed by the teacher andthose conveyed by the teacher are just as important to“learning” virtue as they are to “catching” virtue.

However, if we do not assume that such a relationshipobtains, and we consider, instead, the possibility that therelationship is nonexistent—that the moral character ofthe teacher has little or no effect on the moral develop-ment of students—then why do we want teachers ofgood disposition and moral character? We still wantteachers of good disposition and moral character in thiscase for three primary reasons, each of which has nodirect connection to the moral development of thestudent and provides the basis of a more robust rationalefor attending to moral dispositions in teacher education.First, we still want morally good teachers in this viewbecause we want teachers to be what they convey. Justbecause there is no relationship does not relieve teachersof the professional responsibility to be of good disposi-tion and moral character. Teachers simply have a moraland professional obligation to present an accurate pictureof themselves to their students. There is a kind of socialcontract at work here that requires teachers to be whatthey convey—to be who they say they are (Goffman,1959). Teachers then are obligated to be the person theyclaim to be by virtue of a basic societal principle. Wewant teachers of good disposition in this case simplybecause we want teachers to uphold their end of this con-tract—to be what they convey in a moral sense.

The second and more salient reason is that we wantmorally good teaching. Recall that we wanted teachersof good disposition and moral character because wewanted teachers to teach morality. When we considerthat the relationship between the moral dispositions of ateacher and the moral development of a student is nonex-istent, then we do not want teachers of good disposition

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and moral character because we want them to teachmorality but because we want them to teach in moralways. The important distinction here is between teachingmorality and teaching in moral ways. Teaching moralityis grounded in the moral development of students, whereasteaching in moral ways is based on good teaching—being a good teacher. The content of teaching morality ismorality itself, whereas the content of teaching in moralways is whatever content the teacher is teaching—be itsocial studies, math, French, science, and so forth. Theassumption here is that good teaching requires teachersto be morally good—able to teach in ways that accordwith virtue.

Making this assumption, character traits and disposi-tions, or virtues, take on a different grammatical form—they are used to describe the practice of teaching, notwhat is actually taught. As Peters (1981) suggests, theimportance of terms such as character and trait (and theirhyphenated form) is found in their use as adverbs: “Theirsignificance is primarily adverbial. They usually indicatea manner or style of behaving without any definite impli-cation of directedness or aversion—unlike the terms‘motive,’ ‘attitude,’ and ‘sentiment’” (p. 25). Thus, wewant teachers of good disposition and moral characterbecause we want them to exhibit a certain “manner” or“style” of teaching—not because we want them to exhibitcertain traits or dispositions (to be picked up by students).This reason lies in stark contrast to those presented previ-ously, where our reasons for wanting morally goodteachers were grounded in a desire to develop morallygood students. In this view, we want morally goodteachers because we want morally good teaching. Wewant teachers to teach in moral ways, to allow their moralinclinations to inform their practice. The emphasis here ison the activities of teaching and how they are alignedwith virtue; morally good teaching is practice that is mod-ified by what is good, right, and proper.

Finally, the third reason that we want teachers of vir-tuous disposition (in this case, of a nonexistent relation-ship) is that we want teachers to be practically wise, andas Aristotle contends, practical wisdom entails virtue:“For virtue makes the aim right, and practical wisdomthe things towards it” (Aristotle, 2000, VI.12, 1144a).The claim here is that virtues of intellect (e.g., practicalwisdom) require virtues of character (e.g., traits and dis-positions). The example Aristotle offers in support of thiscontention illustrates how moral dispositions and virtueare foundational to the capacity to be practically wise:

There is a capacity that people call cleverness. This issuch as to be able to do the actions that tend towards theaim we have set before ourselves, and to achieve it. If the

aim is noble, then the cleverness is praiseworthy; if it isbad, then it is villainy. This is why both practically wiseand villainous people are called clever.

Practical wisdom is not the same as this capacity,though it does involve it. And, as we have said and is clear,virtue is involved in this eye of the soul’s reaching itsdeveloped state: “Since such-and-such is the end or chiefgood,” whatever it is (let it be anything you like for thesake of argument). And this is evident to the good personalone, since wickedness distorts our vision and thoroughlydeceives us about the first principles of actions.

Manifestly, then, one cannot be practically wise with-out being good. (Aristotle, 2000, VI.12, 1144a)

In this way, there appears to be a direct connectionbetween teachers’ aims and their dispositions (or virtuesof character), resulting in the exercise of practical wis-dom or intellectual virtue in classrooms. Thus, we wantteachers of good disposition and moral character becausewe want these virtues of character to inform the aims thatteachers put forward for the multifarious decisions theymake both in planning and in carrying out those plans inpractice. Importantly, the connection here does not seemto be based on arbitrary virtues or dispositions—it obtainsbetween specific aims and corresponding dispositions(e.g., between aiming for all students to learn and beingdisposed to justice and fairness). Furthermore, this stipu-lation suggests that we want teachers who not only teacheffectively but also know that they are teaching effectivelyand for the right reason—such that their virtues and dis-positions make their aims right.

To summarize the responses to this first question, ifthe relationship obtains, we want teachers of good dispo-sition and moral character because we want students ofgood disposition and moral character; we want teachersto both consciously and unconsciously convey good dispo-sitions and moral character; and we want them to be ableto effectively provide moral instruction via curricula. Ifthe relationship is nonexistent, we still want morallygood teachers because we want teachers to be who theyclaim to be, but primarily because we want morally goodteaching and we want teachers to be practically wise(without any necessary desire to affect the moral devel-opment of students).

How Morally Good Does a Teacher Need to Be?

Wanting teachers of good disposition and moral char-acter for any of the above mentioned reasons raises thequestion of just how good teachers need to be to carry outtheir corresponding aims. If there is a relationship between

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the moral character of a teacher and the moral develop-ment of a student, then the teacher must be a perfectexample of virtue. This claim implies that the moral char-acter and dispositions of the teacher are directly connectedto the moral development of the student and that thestudent acquires the dispositions and moral character pos-sessed by the teacher. This requirement of excellence andperfection is, perhaps, unrealistic. However, it is difficultto suggest a less stringent requirement; we simply do notspeak of varying degrees of good moral character, andwhen we do, we are merely speaking of its opposite. Toargue this point, we need only to consider what it meansfor a person to be “at work” on his or her character. Theexpression is almost euphemistic in its use—a personworking on character is, simply put and by definition, nota person of good character. In other words, if we say thata person is working on being honest or caring, we meanthat she or he is not an honest or caring person. Trait lan-guage, in this way, is all-or-nothing language—traits ofmoral character are either possessed or they are not. Thereis no room for “slips” or lapses in character. As Goffman(1959) suggests, the conscious or unconscious expressionof any undesirable trait or disposition is enough to “disruptthe tone of an entire performance” (p. 52).

Furthermore, the only consideration we might makefor a supposed deficiency in moral character on the partof teachers would be in their conduct outside the class-room and purview of students. That is, teachers needonly convey the moral dispositions that they express andexpect in their classrooms. As Ryle (1972) asserts,

[A person] could not, indeed, be a spokesman for stan-dards if he did not have them. But his having these stan-dards is primarily his being fair-minded, considerate,self-controlled, etc., and only secondarily is it his beinga reliable authority on these standards or an honestconfessor to them. (p. 445)

This type of virtuous expression (disconnected fromthe dispositions and moral character possessed by theteacher) is possible because teachers can convey theirideal selves during their performance as teachers (seeGoffman, 1961). However, in the classroom, the teachermust embody good dispositions and be a model ofperfection in virtue if there is a relationship between themoral dispositions of teachers and the moral develop-ment of students.

Only when we consider the possibility that such a rela-tionship is nonexistent do we relinquish the need for ateacher to be a perfect example of virtue. It might be thecase that we want teachers of good disposition and moralcharacter because we want teachers to teach in ways thatalign with what is good, and right, and virtuous (instead of

teaching morality) or because we want them to be practi-cally wise, but there are no demands here for virtuouscharacter traits to be possessed by or conveyed by ateacher for the purposes of student emulation. In this view,teachers need only to teach honestly, respectfully, respon-sibly, caringly, and so on, or align their aims with virtuousdispositions of character. The argument still holds thatteaching in moral ways and exercising practical wisdom isconnected to who teachers are in a moral sense in theirclassrooms (the dispositions and moral character that arepart of the persona teachers adopt), but the connection isnot one that necessarily holds for who teachers are in amoral sense outside the classroom. Instead, this perspec-tive suggests that demands for teachers’ dispositions aremore defensible in their relation or connection to teachers’methods and in their modification of method, such that ateacher, for example, not just lecture but lecture with com-passion for the uninitiated, with open-mindedness to dif-ferent points of view, and with patience for speakers ofother languages (and correspondingly without arrogance,arbitrariness, and impatience).

The troubling possibility here is that teachers can begood teachers without necessarily being correspondinglygood people outside the classroom—or at least withoutmaking their dispositions and character visible to others;teachers can teach in virtuous ways (fairly, responsibly,etc.) without necessarily revealing their own moral char-acter. This possibility runs contrary to the claim thatstudents can see right through their teachers (Ryan &Bohlin, 1999), and it suggests an undesirable state ofaffairs for teaching and teacher education (see Sockett,2006), but it does not seem unreasonable to suggest thatteachers might adopt a persona in the classroom thatembodies moral dispositions connected specifically tothe activities of teaching—such that teachers’ disposi-tions are made visible only in connection with methodsthat teachers employ.

In summary, if the relationship obtains, then a teachermust be a model of excellence and perfection in relationto what is conveyed to students. We simply have no wayof talking about degrees of good dispositions and moralcharacter—trait language does not allow for it. In answer-ing this question, we would not say that a teacher justneeds to be “kind of good,” “really good,” “very good,” oreven “almost perfect.” There is no scale for dispositionsand moral character—traits are possessed or they are not.Only in the nonexistent form of the relationship do werelieve the teacher of this unrealistic requirement andplace emphasis on the interaction between dispositions,knowledge, and skills—in particular on the ways thatdispositions might be conceived as modifiers of method.Also, it is likely that there is a connection between who a

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teacher is (the dispositions a teacher possesses) and howa teacher teaches (whether in virtuous ways or not), but itseems possible to teach morally and exercise practicalwisdom while not making one’s dispositions and moralcharacter visible.

What If a Teacher Is of Poor MoralCharacter and Disposition?

This final question is at the heart of the debate sur-rounding an emphasis on dispositions in teacher educa-tion. Perhaps the most basic reason for wanting teachersof good disposition is that we do not want the opposite,and likewise, the most basic requirement for how good ateacher needs to be is akin to “do no harm.” So, what if ateacher is of poor moral character and disposition? Andwhat is the nature of the concern that such teachers might“do harm” to students? If there is a relationship betweenthe poor moral character of a teacher and the moral devel-opment of a student—if a teacher’s poor moral characterrubs off on students in the same way that a teacher’s gooddispositions and moral character are caught or picked upby students—then the answer to these questions is clear.We would want to avoid teachers of poor moral characterbecause of the immediate or potential effect they mighthave on the students in their classrooms. For example, wewould not want dishonest teachers if it was a given thatthis trait of dishonesty “rubbed off” on students. Whetherthe effect is direct or indirect is of little consequence inrelation to poor moral character.

However, when we consider the possibility that therelationship between the moral dispositions of a teacherand the moral development of students is nonexistent, webegin to see a contrast in the way that we respond to con-cerns about the poor moral dispositions of teachers. Thiscontrast is likely related to the deep-seated concern wehave for poor moral character, in any of its possibleforms. For example, if the relationship is nonexistent,then our concern about teachers of poor moral characterand disposition should subside in large measure.However, this concern does not seem to abate. Even ifwe assume there is no connection, we would still likelybe wary of putting a teacher of poor moral character in aclassroom because we would simply want to avoid poormoral character. Here, our concern for teachers of defi-cient disposition and poor character seems to far outweighour desire for a teacher of good disposition and moralcharacter. In other words, it might be that in our empha-sis on dispositions, we do not necessarily want morallygood teachers; we might just want to avoid morally poorteachers.

To illustrate, picture a continuum titled Effect on MoralDevelopment, ranging from having no effect on moraldevelopment to having a clear effect on moral develop-ment. We likely would not give much thought or care towhere the morally good teacher comes down. It would beacceptable for the morally good teacher to have a neutraleffect or even no effect at all. However, we would likelynot afford this same luxury to the morally poor or deficientteacher. Whether or not morally poor teachers have animpact on the moral development of students, we are stillunlikely to permit them entrance into classrooms. In thisway, it is apparent that we worry about submittingstudents to a teacher of poor moral disposition. Whether ornot poor or deficient moral character has an effect onmoral development is of lesser consequence than the incli-nation to simply steer clear of poor moral character.

The nature of this inclination is only partly explainedby a desire to avoid teachers with drastic deficiencies incharacter and disposition (e.g., a child abuser, a murderer,a child pornography addict, etc.), and it is not difficult toargue that such teachers do not belong in classrooms. But,again, if we assume that there is no relationship betweenthe moral dispositions of teachers and the moral develop-ment of students, then why are we so readily inclined toavoid teachers of supposed poor moral character (e.g.,teachers who are irresponsible, unjust, and uncaring, etc.,in their practice)? The reason, here, becomes apparent:We worry that teachers of poor moral character will notbe good teachers. We do not necessarily worry thatstudents will “pick up” these less-than-virtuous traits (andbecome irresponsible, unjust, and uncaring). Instead, weworry that their opportunity to learn will be compro-mised, that such teachers will not be prepared for class,will be unfair in their grading procedures, and will disre-gard students’ special needs. In short, our concerns forteachers of supposed poor moral character have a strongconnection to our conception of effective and responsibleteaching (and less regard for the possible effects on themoral development of students).

Discussion

Examination of these three provocative questionsgives rise to various considerations related to the appro-priateness of attending to dispositions in teacher educa-tion. The first question examines reasons for wantingteachers of good disposition and moral character. Thesecond question addresses the moral depth a teachermust possess to bring about the desired outcomes. Andthe third question attends to how a teacher of poor moralcharacter might have an effect on the analysis of this

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relationship and the concomitant emphasis on dispositionsin teacher preparation. In my discussion of responses tothese questions, I suggest that there are multiple reasonsfor wanting teachers of good disposition and moral char-acter (of which the most important are not connected tothe moral development of students); that teachers can begood teachers without necessarily revealing their moralcharacter and dispositions to students; and that the cruxof the dispositions debate is ultimately grounded inavoiding poor moral character.

Considered in terms of educational research and prac-tice, these conclusions have particular relevance to thepreparation of teachers. For example, in the context ofteacher education, the tendency to simply avoid poormoral character is often evident in certain programpolicies and procedures, such as the typical programrequirement that applicants must submit to a criminalbackground check before entering a public school class-room in any capacity (be it observer, participant, tutor, orteacher). This criminal background check is part of ateacher candidate’s record that programs keep on file toassure parents, teachers, administrators, and students (aswell as program officials) that a teacher candidate will dono harm to children. It is, perhaps, initially, the only doc-ument in the file that speaks to the teacher candidate’smoral character and dispositions. However, the pointhere is that the emphasis in such policies and proceduresis not on good dispositions and moral character, per se,but on the avoidance of poor moral character.

This type of program policy or procedure is probablynecessary, but it does not seem sufficient for sustainingany commitment to good moral character and disposi-tions in teacher preparation. What is lacking in the schol-arship of teaching and teacher education is an explorationof additional, more robust, rationales for wanting teachersof good disposition and moral character. The analysis inthis article provides one: Teacher education programswant teacher candidates of good disposition and moralcharacter because they want morally good teaching. Thatis, they want to prepare teachers who educate in ways thatalign with what is virtuous and good (and not necessarilyteachers who teach the virtues).

In other words, we want teachers of good dispositionand moral character not because we want them to teachfairness, respect, magnificence, honesty, compassion, andso on, but because we want them to teach fairly, respect-fully, magnificently, honestly, and compassionately. Thedistinction here is more than semantics—it represents afundamental shift in the moral nature of education and inthe rationale for emphasizing teacher dispositions. Insteadof focusing on the moral development of students, thisreason reflects the importance of the practice of teaching

itself, for its own sake. A teacher who teaches fairlyaddresses multiple learning styles, gives appropriate andrelevant homework, and does not favor one student orgroup over another. Teaching respectfully requires ateacher to give due attention to individual students, showconsideration for different viewpoints and opinions,and refrain from embarrassing or humiliating students.A teacher who teaches magnificently exceeds students’highest expectations and impresses colleagues, adminis-trators, and parents with the greatness of her practice.Honest teaching demands that a teacher present contro-versial issues in an impartial way, be truthful in givingfeedback to students, and refrain from cheating studentsout of worthwhile learning experiences. Finally, ateacher who teaches compassionately shows sympathyfor students’ inability to comprehend difficult problems,exhibits concern for students who fall behind in theirwork, and spends time after school helping students. Thepoint here is that we want teachers to teach compassion-ately or fairly for the sake of good teaching, not becausewe necessarily want them to foster compassion and fair-ness in students.

This rationale for moral character is comparable thento the reason we want teachers to be knowledgeable incontent and skilled in method. We want teacher candi-dates to be knowledgeable in content and skilled in meth-ods of delivering that content because we want effectiveteaching—we want students to learn that content.Successful or effective teaching is primarily the domainof method and content (knowledge of the subject matterand of the corresponding pedagogy), but could it be thatwe want teachers to be morally good in character for thesame reason—because we want effective teaching, andnot for the possible moral effects on students?

An affirmative response has an important applicationto the practice of teacher education, one that places greatemphasis on the moral base (see Sockett, 1993) thatteacher candidates bring to their preparation programs,and on the way such a base is consequently articulatedand developed in ways that emphasize its relationship toeffective and successful (as well as good) teaching.3 Inthis way, the scope of a teacher’s moral character is notlimited to matters of a student’s moral development only;it is broadened to include all matters of classroom life andteacher effectiveness, regardless of any effect or influenceon the moral development of students.

Recent research in this domain has indicated a con-nection between the moral character of a teacher andthe effectiveness of classroom practices. For example,Richardson and Fallona (2001) show that effective class-room management skills and the moral character (ormanner) of a teacher are tightly connected: “Classroom

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management—and particularly effective classroommanagement—is interwoven with the goals and beliefsof the teacher, and with his or her manner” (p. 724).Fenstermacher (2002) argues that exceptional teachingrequires teachers to have a profound conception of moral-ity that is in concert with their methods and styles. Andothers, such as Campbell (2003), describe the importanceof a teacher’s ethical grounding in making pedagogicaldecisions (see also Ball &Wilson, 1996; Hansen, 2001).Although such scholarship often makes a correspondingclaim about the moral development of students, itnonetheless surfaces the often overlooked possibility ofa relationship between the moral character of a teacher,morally good teaching, and effective or successful teach-ing. And it is this possibility that broadens the influenceof a teacher’s moral dispositions in the classroom andpoints to an alternative purpose for preparing teachers ofvirtuous disposition.

Conclusion

The concept of dispositions needs further refinementand analysis if it is to be a core element and standard inthe preparation of teachers. However, the controversysurrounding dispositions is not likely to be settled in itscurrent form if the nature of the recent debate and discus-sion continues its current course. That is, teacher educators(particularly NCATE, their accrediting body) are beingasked the wrong questions and subsequently forced torespond to misguided inquiries or inquisitions. Beforeteacher educators can explore the place or importance ofdispositions relative to knowledge and skills and beforethey can examine accusations of political conformity andthought control related to an emphasis on dispositions, theymust ask a series of prior, more fundamental questions—such as those detailed in this analysis—that address thefundamental purposes of attending to the moral andethical development of teacher candidates. This articleprovides one such account, describing a rationale forwanting teachers of good disposition and moral characterand also pointing teacher educators toward a conceptionof teacher education that focuses on preparing teachersof good disposition and moral character simply for thesake of teaching that accords with what is good, right,and virtuous.

Of course, acknowledging such a rationale necessitatesthe design of a teacher preparation program that attendsto the development of teacher candidates who have theknowledge, skills, and dispositions to teach in virtuousways. What such a program might look like is beyond thescope of this article, but it certainly suggests a need to

move away from the “moral dispositions police”approach to teacher education—the approach that merelyseeks to identify teacher candidates of deficient disposi-tion and poor moral character for the purpose of remov-ing them from the program. The assumption might alsobe made that the primary alternative to avoiding poormoral character in teacher candidates is to simply identifyand seek out teacher candidates of good disposition andmoral character. However, to make such an assumptionwould be to miss an important implication of the preced-ing analysis. That is, preparing moral educators entailsmore than identifying teacher candidates with desiredtraits and dispositions; it suggests that teacher educatorsdesign programs that attend to what it means to teach inmoral ways (and not necessarily the development ofteacher candidates’ moral character).

It might be argued that this type of teaching is closelyrelated to the moral character of a teacher candidate;thus, seeking such candidates is sufficient. However, anapproach to teacher education based on the rationaleprovided in this article recognizes that seeking such can-didates is not sufficient (and, perhaps, not even neces-sary). Put another way, an approach to teacher educationgrounded in the preparation of teachers who teach inmoral ways acknowledges two distinct possibilities: (a)Teacher candidates who display virtuous attributes andtraits both in and outside the classroom might still beunable to translate them into practice and teach in virtu-ous ways (in fact, it is not difficult to imagine an honest,responsible, caring person who fails miserably at the taskof teaching), and (b) teacher candidates might be able toteach or perform morally in the classroom without dis-playing virtuous behaviors, ideas, and beliefs outside theK-12 classroom (or, perhaps, even within the teachereducation classroom).

Acknowledging these possibilities alters the focus thatteacher educators might place on dispositions. If there isa criticism of teacher education in this analysis, it is thatteacher preparation programs focus primarily on theknowledge, skills, and perhaps, even the dispositions ofteacher candidates without attending to the moral mannerwith which a teacher candidate adeptly delivers that con-tent. To teach in moral ways is to connect content knowl-edge and methodological skill with its moral manner ofconveyance—be it the way teachers interact with students,interpret tests, deliver instruction, talk with parents, andso on. In this sense, dispositions are not an entity in andof themselves that are somehow assessed in their ownright. Instead, they become visible via the practice ofteaching as a modifier to method—displayed in a teacher’smanner. Future research, then, is needed to both (a) iden-tify visible and definable ways that dispositions as moral

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manner modify methods of instruction aimed at improv-ing students’ opportunities to learn academic content and(b) study the appropriateness and feasibility of teachereducation practice that emphasizes dispositions for thepurpose of preparing teacher candidates to teach morallyand on developing dispositions related to such virtuousteaching.

Notes

1. The Manner in Teaching Project was conducted from 1997 to2000 under the direction of principal investigators Virginia Richardsonand Gary D Fenstermacher at the University of Michigan.

2. No distinction is made in this article between a person’s char-acter and a person’s disposition. Although definitions of dispositionshave been proffered (see Damon, 2005), it is still difficult to distin-guish something we might call a character trait from a dispositionaltrait: “Dispositions are guided by beliefs and attitudes related to valuessuch as caring, fairness, honesty, responsibility, and social justice”(National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, 2002, p. 53).Furthermore, this article assumes that dispositions, like charactertraits, are moral in nature (Sockett, 2006; Wise, 2006).

3. Making distinctions between good, effective, and successfulteaching also reveals important implications for teacher education,but they lie beyond the scope of this inquiry. Fenstermacher andRichardson (2005) offer a compelling analysis of these distinctions intheir discussion of quality teaching.

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Richard D. Osguthorpe, PhD, is an assistant professor ofcurriculum, instruction, and foundational studies at Boise StateUniversity. His research interests include the moral dimen-sions of teaching, the study of moral education in schools, theuse of practical argument in teacher development, and thepedagogy of educational foundations.

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