Jihad and the rifle alone

8/11/2019 Jihad and the rifle alone

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Jihad and the Rifle Alone: Framing Abdullah Azzam

1.3. Abdullah Azzam

Azzam was born in Palestine in 1941. He conducted sharia studies at the prestigious al-Azhar

university in Cairo and after earning his PhD in 1973 he taught amongst other places at the

university of Amman in Jordan and at Abd al-Aziz in Jeddah where one of his students was a

young Usama bin Ladin.

Azzam is central for the understanding of today’s militant Islamism for two reasons. First he

functioned as an important administrator and leading figure for the so-called Afghan Arabs:

the Arabian men who came to Afghanistan during the 80s to fight against the Soviet Union.Azzam came to work as a link between Wahhabite interests in Saudi Arabia and these Afghan

Arabs that later came to form the seed of al-Qaida and the global jihadist movement. Second

Azzam came to function as a link in the chain of thinkers that comprises the history of

militant Islamism. In Azzam’s texts ideas that were developed by other thinkers such as Qutb,

Mawdudi, Faraj and Shariati came together and were developed. Azzam is in this way

standing on a point between the old militant Islamism and the new both historically and

ideologically. His message is not new. Other modern Islamist thinkers have propagated for

jihad . What differs him from these earlier thinkers is that he spoke directly to an existing

movement. Where the call for jihad earlier had been mostly rhetoric or only followed by a

very miniscule group Azzam wrote to an audience that actually followed his advice.1

The purpose of the paper is as we have stated to understand the global jihadist movement

through a reading of its own texts. Its object of study is the idea world of global jihadism as it

is manifested in selected written texts. These selected texts are two of Azzam’s central texts:

Join the Caravan ( Ilhaq bil-Qaafilah, 1987) and Defence of the Muslim Lands ( Ad-Difaa’ An-

Araadil-Muslimeen, 1984). We read these texts as part of a process whose purpose is to

propagate for a certain way to perceive the world and thereby call for action. In short: as

frames. The works of Azzam is a fixed moment in a process that started before him and has

continued after. The object of the paper is this specific moment but to be able to understand it

we must place it within a greater historical context. Azzam’s texts must be thought of as an

answer to and as a development of this history. Though it is not any kind of history we are

1 Kepel, 2002, p. 144ff .

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interested in but the history of ideas: how the ideas of militant Islamism has developed and

changed. Neither is it Islam we are interested in but Islamism as a modern political

movement. In some cases though, e.g. when it comes to the history of certain central

concepts, the line between Islam and Islamism gets blurred since even contemporary Islamistideologues such as Azzam refers to classical Islamic history.

Both Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands are texts well suited for frame

analysis. The stated purpose of both texts is to incite to social action: to join the jihad . In the

second preface to Join the Caravan Azzam writes: ”(…) there are two duties which we are

trying to establish: the duty of Jihad (fighting), and the duty of arousing the believers.”2 It is

not only participation in jihad but also the arousing of the Muslims to fight that he considers a

duty. The title itself – Join the Caravan – is an urge towards the reader to join the jihad in

Afghanistan.

Defence of the Muslim Lands is the more extensive of the two texts. It is also a fatwa, an

answer to a religious legal question given by a religious authority. Fatawas usually deals with

subjects that are not touched upon or not answered sufficiently in the Quran or sunnah. A

fatwa is not binding but is rather to be thought of as guidance and its weight depends on the

status of its author. Fatawas does not however have to be answers to direct questions but can

also – like in Azzam’s case – be written against the background of a specific event or a

specific problem as an urge for Muslims to act in a certain way. To give Defence of the

Muslim Lands more religious weight Azzam had it signed and commented by other prominent

Muslim scholars. 3

2. The modern history of Islamism

The purpose of this chapter is to paint the historical background of Azzam’s work. The

chapter is chronologically structured and divided into three parts. The first starts with the birth

of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 and stretches to Nasser’s rise to power in Egypt 1954.

The second part deals with the age of Arabic nationalism from 1955 to the six-day war in

1967. The third and last part starts with the rise of Islamism after the six-day war to the

2 Abdullah Azzam, Join the Caravan, Azzam Publications, London, 2001, p. 18.3 Abdullah Azzam, Defence of the Muslim Lands, Azzam Publications, London, 2002, p. xxii-xxiii.

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murder of president Sadat in 1981. A period that saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the

Islamic revolution in Iran and the establishment of the world Azzam worked in.

2.1. 1928-1952

The history of modern militant Islamism can be traced to two main sources: Abu’l A’la

Mawdudi in Pakistan and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.4

The second half of the 19th century saw the beginning of an upswing for Egypt nationalism.

The building of the Suez Canal resulted in a large influx of European citizens and ideas to

Egypt at the same time as the dependence on British economical aid deepened. This

dependency on British investors together with a rising identification with European culture

led to an increase of discontent in the lower classes. In the 1880s Egyptian officers that saw

Turkish and Cirsassian officers being promoted before them formed a secret society that

would become the core of the nationalistic movement.

At the same time a movement whose ambitions was religio-political rather than nationalistic

started to make itself heard. At the centre of this movement that reacted against the

modernization and secularisation of Egyptian society was two persons: Jamal al-Din al-

Afghani – a teacher at prestigious al-Azhar university in Cairo – and Muhammad ‘Abduh.

This movement argued for a return to the way of life of the Prophet Muhammed and the first

generation of Muslim’s way of life. The purpose was to cleanse Islam from the inventions and

additions that has been added later and corrupted the religion. The movement took its name –

salafiyya – from the collective name of the first three generations of Muslims after

Muhammed. Even though the salafi movement was quite daring in its rhetoric’s it never

succeeded in becoming a vital political power. Instead, the first serious attempt to change the

political situation came from the Egyptian officers that in 1881 forced through a nationalistic

war minister and later a more liberal constitution. The British used the civil unrest that

followed as an excuse for a military intervention and in 1882 Egypt were occupied by British

forces. It was meant to be a short occupation but in reality it put Egypt under British rule until

the free officers military coup in 1952. The time until that was dominated by political unrest.

The most important political actors during this time were the British – who in reality ran the

4 See e.g. Mattias Gardell, Bin Ladin i våra hjärtan: Globaliseringen och Framvä xten av

Politisk Islam, Leopard Förlag, Stockholm, 2005; or Kepel, &&&&&&&

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country – the nationalistic waft party that was the most popular party in the country and king

Fuad. Out of this situation a forth actor merged that would come to play an important role in

Egypt’s domestic politics and in the development of militant Islamism: the Muslim

Brotherhood.The Muslim Brotherhood emerged in a society that was deeply influenced by a newly

awakened nationalism in opposition to an occupational force and a growing discontent with a

parliamentary system that neither succeeded in freeing the country from occupation nor

creating a better life for its citizens. In their motto the brotherhood offered a third way: “ The

Quran is our constitution”.5 Their emergence in the end of the 1920s marked the birth of the

modern Islamist movement. Needless to say they were not the first Muslim movement in 20 th

century Egypt. We have already mentioned the salafi movement. What separated the

Brotherhood from earlier religious movements was their political activism. Their founder –

Hassan al-Banna – saw politics as a part of Islam and refused to acknowledge a difference

between the both.6 The salafi movement was criticised for spending too much energy on

minor problems rather than focusing on Islam’s main enemies: imperialism and Zionism.7

When the salafi movement criticised the ordinary Egyptian for not being religious enough, al-

Banna and the Brotherhood put great trust in the piousness of the masses. This open attitude

towards and trust in individual religiosity was within the Brotherhood pared with an interest

in the realities of the lower classes and a belief in their potential as a political power. The

basis of the Brotherhood’s ideology was that Islam should be the foundation of society. In its

criticism of the salafi movement and of the traditional religious institutions there was an

ambition to make Islam a part of all aspects of daily life. Where nationalism, parlamentarism

and imperialism – all considered to be western and for Egypt foreign ideas – had failed, Islam

would succeed in guiding the country.

”Our mission is one described most comprehensively by the term ”Islamic, though this word

has a meaning broader than the narrow definition understood by people generally. We belive

that Islam is an all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life, adjucating on

every one of its concerns and prescribing for it a solid and rigorous order.”8

5 &&&&&&6 Lia, p. 58.7 Lia, p. 59.8 Lia, p. 75

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The Islamism of the Brotherhood was not reactionary in the sense of striving for a return to

the past as the salafis did. Rather, Islam was viewed as guidance through modernity, not as an

alternative to it.9

During the second half of the 1930s the Muslim Brotherhood grew to a mass movement and apolitical force to be reckoned with. Its political program was clearly class based. Their

audience was first and foremost the educated lower middle class whose prospects of climbing

the social ladder was grim and they criticised the political and economic elite for corruption

and for being bearers of western, un-Islamic values.

The Brotherhood’s swelling ranks and rising political power made them increasingly

inconvenient for the political elite and in 1948 the sitting Prime Minister Nokrashi ordered

their dissolution. At the end of he same year Nokrashi was murdered by a member of the

Brotherhood and a month later, its founder Hasan al-Banna was also murdered. The final

blow did not come until the free officers military coup and Nasser coming to power though.

The Brotherhood was accused of planning an attempt on Nasser’s life in 1954 and a large part

of their members were tortured and thrown in jail. This experience became a steel bath for the

Egyptian Islamist movement and came to influence its relationship with the regime for

decades to come.

If the relationship between Islamists and the sitting regime in Egypt during this time was

riddled with conflict things were of a different nature on the Indian subcontinent. The 1920s

and 30s saw serious conflict between the Muslim and the Hindu population. A large part of

the Muslims experienced a declining political influence, which resulted in demands for a

separate Muslim state. As in Egypt hence there existed a nationalistic movement but its main

enemy was not the British but the Hindus.10

In the light of this conflict between Muslims and Hindus Abu’l A’la Mawdudi argued for a

return to original Islam, untainted by influences by Hinduism and western values. From the

beginning he was opposed to a separate Muslim state since he felt it would abandon the

Muslims left in India but he later changed his mind and started to argue for not only a Muslim

state but an Islamic state, governed by Islamic law.

Mawdudi emphasized Islam’s political character. He saw political power as a measurement of

and a guarantee for the vitality of Islam. Just like the Muslim Brotherhood he criticized the

9 Lia, p. 76.10 &&&&&

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religious establishment for not being enough involved in political and social issues but in

contrast to the Brotherhood he did not put his trust in the masses but in a political elite. The

creation of an Islamic state must start with the creation of a political Islamic elite – a vanguard

– that can initiate a peaceful revolution top down. To create such an elite Mawdudi forms aparty - Jamaat-e-Islam – in 1941. Its purpose was to function as a vanguard for an Islamic

revolution. The historical background of this idea can be found both in Lenin’s theory of a

communist vanguard but also in the Quranic story of Muhammed’s move from Mecca to

Medina – the hegira. Muhammed and his followers emigrated from Mecca to Medina to

freely be able to exercise their religion. Mawdudi interprets this as a break with an

unbelieving environment with the purpose of creating a hard core – a vanguard – that can lead

the revolution as a blueprint for political action.11

Mawdudi lays out the foundation for his view on the relation between Islam and politics in the

small pamphlet Jihad in Islam. Islam is according to Mawdudi not a religion in the ordinary

sense.

” In common terminology ‘religion’ means nothing more than a hotch potch of some beliefs,

prayers and rituals. If this is what ‘religion’ means, then, it should, indeed, be a private

affair. (…)There is no reason why you should take up a sword? Do you wish to convert

people to your faith by killing them? We are forced to admit the point that if you regard Islam

as a religion in the conventional meaning of the term and if, indeed, Islam be a conventional

type of religion, the necessity for ‘Jihad’ cannot be justified.”12

If Islam had been a religion in the ordinary sense of the word there would have been no

reason to connect it to political struggle, armed or peaceful. But Islam is for Mawdudi not

only a religion but also a revolutionary ideology whose purpose is to change the present social

order. Islam is hence fundamentally political in character. Neither are the Muslims a nation.

To be a Muslim is for Mawdudi the same thing as belonging to a revolutionary party with

Islam as its ideology. To be a Muslim is to be an activist and jihad is the means through

which the struggle is conducted.13

2.2. 1953-1966

11 Gilles Kepel, Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam, p. 34f.12 Mawdudi, Jihad in Islam, p. 3f.13 Ibid. p. 5.

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The period between Nasser’s rise to power and the six-day war was in Egypt a time of

nationalism. Nasser’s projects were to free Egypt from the shackles of its colonial past and

transform it to a modern independent nation.14 The relationship between the Muslim

Brotherhood and Nasser’s regime was from the outset fairly good but broke down totally afteran attempt on Nasser’s life from one of the brothers. The regime answered with a liquidation

of the brotherhood and the execution or imprisonment of its leaders and activists. This

experience was to have a profound impact on future Islamist thinkers. The one whose voice

would be heard the loudest was Sayyid Qutb.

Qutb had worked as a teacher, journalist, author and as a literary critic. During the 1940s he

was one of Egypt’s leading voices of nationalism and provoked king Farouk enough to be

sent to the USA in exile for a few years to elude prison. It was during this period that he

discovered Islam and he joined the Muslim Brotherhood when he returned in 1951. After the

attempt on Nasser life he was sentenced in a summary trial to 25 years in prison. It was during

his time in jail that he wrote his most famous tract: Milestones.15

The tone in Milestones differs radically from both that of al-Banna and Mawdudi. Where they

both believed in the possibility of changing society from participating in it – in the case of the

Brotherhood through education of and preaching to the people and in Mawdudi’s case

through the creation of an Islamic elite – Qutb had lost all faith in change from the inside.

Milestones opens with a description of humanity as standing on the brink of extinction. The

ideologies of the day – democracy, Marxism, socialism, capitalism and nationalism – have all

failed. The only thing that can lead humanity back on the right track is Islam.16 For Islam to be

able to do that it must be cleansed from the corrupting effects of history.

” If Islam is again to play the role of the leader of mankind, then it is necessary that the

Muslim community be restored to its original form. It is necessary to revive that muslim

community which is buried under the debris of the man-made traditions of several

generations, and which is crushed under the weight of those false laws and customs which

are not even remotely related to the Islamic teachings, and which, in spite of all this, calls

itself the ’world of Islam’.”17

14 Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, p. 23.15 Ma’alim fi al-tariq. Has also been translated as signposts or signs along the path.16 Seyyid Qutb, Milestones, Dar al-Ilm, Damascus, p. 7ff.17 Ibid., p. 9.

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Qutb shares with Mawdudi this longing for a return to a more original version of Islam, divine

and untainted by human history and modernity. But Qutb pushes this longing further than

Mawdudi. The world of today is according to Qutb steeped in barbarism and ignorance. To

describe this condition Qutb borrows a concept from the Quran that describes the time beforeMuhammed: jahiliyya.

” If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the

whole world is steeped in Jahiliyya , and all the marvellous material comforts and high-level

inventions do not diminish this ignorance. This Jahiliyya is based on rebellion against God’s

sovereignty on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely

sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive

form of the ancient Jahiliyya , but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to

legislate rules of collective behavior, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without

regard to what God has prescribed .”18

Qutb shares the Muslim Brotherhood’s view of western culture as morally bankrupt and

corrupting. Western ideologies such as democracy and nationalism are for Qutb a form of

paganism where the party, the people or the leader takes God’s place as the only entity worthy

of worship. With Mawdudi he shares the belief in a vanguard that leads the Muslim world

back on track. Since today’s society is a copy of the barbarian pre-Muhammed age this

vanguard should be modelled after those who brought the world out of Jahiliyya for the first

time i.e. Muhammed and his followers. But as opposed to Mawdudi Qutb does not see this

vanguard as participating in the existing political system. This system is for Qutb rotten to the

core and must be avoided and opposed at every cost.

”We must also free ourselves from the clutches of jahili society, jahili concepts, jahili

traditions and jahili leadership. Our mission is not to compromise with the practices of jahili

society, nor can we be loyal to it. Jahili society, because of its jahili characteristics, is not

worthy to be compromised with. Our aim is first to change ourself so that we may later

change the society.”19

Qutb hence argues for a withdrawal from society modelled on Muhammed’s move to Medina

but in a more radical fashion that Mawdudi did. For Qutb the whole of society is jahiliyya.

18 Qutb, Milestones, p. 11.19 Ibid., p. 21.

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Therefore the vanguard must first withdraw from society and purify itself to be able to return

and change it from its foundations.

Milestones was smuggled out from prison, published in 1964 and became a bestseller. The

same year Qutb was released. However the revolutionary character of his works was tooobvious and when Nasser in 1965 announced that a new Muslim conspiracy had been

uncovered Qutb was accused of being its leader. He was hanged a few months later. The

seeds of nationalism’s death and the rise of Islamism was however already sown and would

start to grow just a year later in 1967 with the humiliating defeat against Israel in the six-day

war.

2.3. 1967-1981

To consolidate his own power and reduce the ulemas – the religious authority – Nasser put al-

Azhar under state control in 1961. The university turned into a propaganda machine with the

purpose of showing the compatibility between Islam and Nasser’s socialism. 20 One of the

traditional roles of the ulema had been to function as intermediary between the people and the

state. As separate from the state the ulema had been able preach obedience to the sitting

regime at the same time as it could criticize it. In this way the ulema could function as a

neutral stabilizing force in society. In making the ulema into a tool for the state Nasser

deprived it its status as a trustworthy third part. The role as critic of the state in Islam’s name

was left vacant for other forces to fill. A vacuum had been created.

The Arab world had in large part after being decolonialized turned to the idea of Arab

nationalism whose goal was to unite its divided classes and peoples under a pan-Arabic unity.

In reality no such unity ever came to exist and the beginning of the end for Arab nationalism

came with the defeat against Israel in the war of 1967. Apart from being a crushing military

defeat it also hurt the nationalist idea. Nationalism had not been able to create the modern

ideal society that many had hoped for and now its flaws had been put out in the daylight with

the defeat against an inferior opponent. Nationalism no longer appeared to be the answer to

Egypt’s and the Arab world’s problem. Another vacuum had been created.

In Egypt this vacuum appeared to be filled by a leftist movement. As in large parts of the rest

of the world a leftist wave swept through the Egyptian universities during the last years of the

sixties. This leftist wave coincided with the creation of PLO as an autonomous Palestinian

20 Gilles Kepel, Jihad , p. 53.

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organization. The leftist wave posed a threat to Nasser’s progressive image at the same time

as the creation of PLO made it harder for other Arab leaders to use the Palestinian cause as a

propaganda tool. The Palestinians now hade a voice of their own and fought for their own

sake. To stop the leftist forces, consolidate his own power and make them into acounterweight to the lefts rising power at the campuses the newly assigned Anwar Sadat

started to free the imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood. A similar development

gave the Islamists a strong foothold at universities not only in Egypt but also in Tunisia,

Algeria, Pakistan, Malaysia and Morocco.21

The early 70s saw the birth of Jama’at Islamyia – Islamic groups – on Egypt’s universities.

With silent support from the state these groups offered students solutions of many of the

social problems that the Egyptian university system couldn’t handle. In a short time the

number of students at Egyptian universities had more than doubled but the system had not

been able to follow this development. In addition the explosive rise in access to educated

young men flooded the market. Out of these a class of well educated young men with great

expectations but without the possibility of social advancement or professional career emerged,

a class that questioned the path Egypt had chosen. It was within this class that Islamism

started to take roots as an alternative to western values.

The quiet agreement between Sadat and the Islamists held up until 1977 and the Camp David

agreement between Egypt and Israel. The agreement was percieved by the Islamist movement

as a compromise towards the sworn enemies of Islam and as a treachery. The first

confrontation between the regime and the Islamist movement was initiated by a group that

media named Al Takfir w-al Hijra.

The real name of Al Takfir w-al Hijra was in translation The Society of Muslims. The group

formed around Shukri Mustafa, a Muslim Brother from Egypt’s countryside who during

Nasser’s cleansings had been put to jail between 1965 and 1971. It was there he first came in

contact with the writings of Qutb and Mawdudi.

There existed amongst the imprisoned Brothers different schools concerning how Milestones

should be understood. The main source of the disagreement was how to understand Qutb’s

use of the terms mufasala and ‘uzla, separation and withdrawal. Qutb uses these terms in his

discussion about jahiliyya. As we have seen earlier Qutb argues in favour for the creation of

an Islamic vanguard. This vanguard must separate itself and cleanse itself from jahili society.

21 Ibid., p. 64f.

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The question was how to understand this separation. Both groups agreed that the Egyptian

society was jahili and therefore must be pronounced takfir , be excommunicated. The idea of

takfir stretches back to the 13th century and Ibn Taymiyya – the Muslim theologian probably

most quoted by the jihadist movement. Facing the problem how the invading Mongols thathad converted to Islam should be dealt with Taymiyya meant that it is not enough to confess

one’s self to Islam to be a Muslim. One must also fight to uphold Islamic law. 22 Doing this

Taymiyya opens up the possibility of excommunicating other Muslims as being false Muslims

or infidels on the basis of their actions.

One of the interpretations of Qutb said that mufasala and ‘uzla meant separation and

withdrawal in a spiritual way. The movement was perceived as being in a phase of weakness

– istid’af . To openly declare the surrounding society as takfir would have devastating

consequences for the movement. Instead one argued for an inner withdrawal where you in

secret considered the surrounding as jahiliyya but never expressed it.23

The other interpretation argued for a total withdrawal from society. Shukri Mustafa shared

this interpretation. Al-Takfir w-al Hijra means excommunication and emigration, or to be

more precise: Muhammed’s emigration from Mecca to Medina. This is as we have seen not a

new idea but what separated Shukri Mustafa from Mawdudi or Qutb was that he actually did

withdraw from society. Al Takfir w-al Hijra came to function as a sect that totally separated

itself from the rest of society. The members of the group lived together in apartments that

were paid for by mutual funds. They married partners that were assigned by Mustafa and

severed all unnecessary contact with society. Since Egyptian society according to Mustafa

was jahili he did not see a fundamental difference between it and e.g. its nemesis Israel.

Neither of the countries were in Mustfa’s eyes Muslim, i.e. belonged to Dar al-Islam – the

House of Islam. Both were therefore a part of Dar al-Harb – the House of War. When

questioned what he would do if Egypt were invaded by Israel he answered that he would flee,

just as he fled Egypt society.

” If the Jews or anyone else came, our movement ought not to fight in the ranks of the

Egyptian army, but on the contrary ought to flee to a secure position. In general, our line is to

flee before the external and the internal enemy alike, and not to resist him.”24

22 David Cook, Understanding Jihad , p. 63ff.23 Kepel, 2005, p. 74f.24 Shukri Mustafa quoted in Ibid., p. 85.

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Hijra became in Mustafa’s hands a political strategy for dealing with jahiliyya under istid’a –

the phase of weakness.25

Just as Qutb had done before him Mustfa argued that the ulema had been corrupted to work as

a tool for unrighteous rulers. Instead of listening to the ulema and the whole Islamic scholarlytradition Mustafa argued for a more personal relation to God directly based on the Quran.

Mustafa hence share Qutb’s and Mawdudi’s longing for a purer Islam, free from religious

authority, an Islam that builds a direct, unmediated link between God and man. This

dismantling of the legitimacy of the traditional religious institutions and demands of

individual religiousness creates a situation where it is not longer enough to confess one’s self

to Islam to be a Muslim. One must also live and act according to the rules of Islam. This

insistence on action is implicit in Qutb’s writings but is made explicit only with Mustafa.

There is hence a tension within Mustaf’s thought. On the one hand the concepts of istid’a and

hijra and on the other hand the insistence on action. This tension surfaced in 1977 when

members of the group kidnapped an ex-minister as a response to the arrest of 14 of its

members. When they were not released he was executed. After that a military court sentenced

Mustafa to death.26

During the period from the student rises in 1968 to the Al-Takfir w-al Hijra affair in 1977 the

Islamist student movement – Jama’at islamiyya – had grown into a considerable political

force. After eradicating the political influence of the student left with the silent support of

Sadat Jama’at islamiyya islamized the universities. As opposed to Al Takfir w-al Hijra

Jama’at islamiyya was not a small sect but a mass movement. Where Al Takfir w-al Hijra had

great demands on the religiousness of the individual members Jama’at islamiyya was more

allowing. The movement was in this way similar to the Muslim Brotherhood in that they had

great faith in the individual piousness of the students and did not have detailed programs for

their behaviour. In doing this they were able to create a mass movement and influence society

from the bottom and from within. In an article written by one of its members to celebrate the

beginning of the 15th Islamic century four signs that indicates the existence of an Islamic

movement is mentioned: veiled women, men with untrimmed beards, early marriage and

attendance at public prayers on the Greater and Lesser Holidays.27 Compare this with

Mustafa’s demands for a total withdrawal from society.

25 Ibid., p.26 Ibid., p.27 Ibid., p. 156f.

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The good relations between Sadat and Jama’at islamiyya would not come to last though. With

the Al Takfir w-al Hijra affair the relationship between Sadat’s regime and the Islamists

became strained but the real breakdown came when Sadat in 1977 initiated the peace

negotiations with Israel that two years later would result in the Camp David agreement. TheIslamist movement saw Israel and the Jews as Egypt’s and the Muslim’s sworn enemies. A

peace with them was not considered acceptable. The tone between the regime and the

movement hardened between 1977-79. The regime shut down local offices and meeting

places and stopped its payments to the movement. This led to a rise in the support of the

movement. After the Camp David agreement in 1979 Sadat openly criticized the Islamist

movement for hiding its political ambitions under a religious robe. The final show off

between Sadat and Jama’at islamiyya came in 1981 when the movement was accused of

inciting and participating in riots and massacres of Christian copts in Cairo. After this the

movement lost a lot of its support from within the Egyptian society and Sadat could liquidate

the movement and arrest its members without any resistance. As for the Muslim Brotherhood

this did not mean the end of the movement. Parts of Jama’at islamiyya went underground

where it was extremized and came to fight a low intensive war against the Egyptian state well

into the 1990s.28

The most formidable combination of Islam and politics during the 20th century is not however

to be found in Egypt but in Saudi Arabia. Its historical foundation is an alliance between

politics – the house of Saud – and religion – the preacher ‘Abd Al-Wahhab and his followers.

During the mid-18th century the Arabian Peninsula was divided between different tribes

fighting amongst themselves over scarce resources. An alliance between Wahhab and the

house of Saud gave the Sauds the upper hand in this Hobbesian war through providing their

conquest with the religious justification of being jihad at the same time as Wahhab’s own

interpretation of Islam was spread over the whole Arabian Peninsula. This alliance between

the house of Saud and Wahhab and his followers is still a dominant factor in Saudi Arabic

politics. The Saud/Wahhab conquest of the Arabian Peninsula has come to be seen as a re-

enactment of Muhammed’s conquest of the same area through the pairing of religion and

politics, of the book and the sword, in an undividable unity that is the model for the Muslim

vanguard.29

28 See e.g. Montasser al-Zayyat, The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden’s Right-Hand Man, Pluto Press,

London, 2004.

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Wahhab’s interpretation of Islam – Wahhabism – can be described with three concepts: tawid ,

takfir and jihad . Tawid is the Islamic version of monotheism. Within Sunni Islam it can be

described in three points: unity in the supremacy of God, unity in the worship of God and

unity in God’s name and properties. Unity in the supremacy of God means that there is onlyone God and that he is the origin of everything. Unity in the worship of God means that

nothing besides God is worthy of worship and unity in God’s name and properties means that

only the representations and descriptions of God that are given by God are correct and

acceptable. 30 Out of these three points it is number two, unity in the worship of God – Tawid

al’ibada – that is given most weight in wahhabism. The other two points are according to

wahhabism not enough to distinguish a Muslim from an infidel. It is only tawid al-‘ibada that

can be the difference between monotheism and polytheism, between tawid and shirk .. In

reality this means a prohibition against all worship that is not directed directly against God

e.g. the naming of the Prophet Muhammed or another religious figure in prayer, to view as

another person as a link to God, to praise the dead or praying at their graves or building

monuments over them. 31 Those who do not share this interpretation of tawid or live up to it

can according to wahhabism not be considered as Muslims but are infidels and must be

fought.32 Wahhabism hence uses the takfir concept in the same way as other theorists such as

Qutb. The difference between wahhabism on the one hand and Qutb on the other is that while

Qutb wrote in a weak position, Saud and the wahhabis used takfir as an excuse for jihad

and an actual conquest of the Arabian Peninsula.

Wahhabism cannot be viewed as an Islamic school in the traditional sense. Al-Wahhab only

wrote a few texts and they are mostly compilations of un-commented hadith. 33 It is rather an

attitude and a way of life that gets its expression in an intolerant attitude towards other forms

of Islam such as Shi’ism and Sufism that springs from a strife to purify the religion from

bida’ – innovation – and return to an original, true form of Islam as it is written in the Quran

and hadith. Because of its extreme intolerance against other forms of Islam and its close

relationship with the specific political environment of Saudi Arabia it is doubtful that

29 Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West , The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

Cambridge & London, 2004, p. ?????30 Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, Islamic Publications International, Oneota, 2002, p. 31.31 Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, Islamic Publications International, Oneota, 2002, p. 32f.32 Ibid., p. 34.33 Ibid., p. ?????

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wahhabism would ever had spread from the Arabian Peninsula if it had not been for two

reasons: oil and emigrating members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Beginning with Nasser’s persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood during the mid 1950s many

of its members started to leave Egypt for Saudi Arabia. They were generally well-educated,deeply religious, multi-lingual and therefore welcomed to the new country.34 These political

refugees soon came to be an important part of Saudi Arabia’s intellectual life. They were

forbidden to proselytise but they used their newly won freedom to spread their teachings and

their texts internationally, which also spilled over inside the county. During the 1960s they

offered the younger Saudi generation a more active alternative to the conservative

wahhabism, though in a down toned version not to anger their host. In Saudi Arabia the

Brotherhood had a possibility to undisturbed unite their forces. They were given time and

means to create an international network for cooperation, education and distribution of their

doctrine mixed with Saudi Arabia’s wahhabism.

During the 1950s and 60s educated Egyptians started to find their way to Saudi Arabia in

search for a better life. These young men could often after a few years of work return to their

home country considerably richer then when they left. They brought with them the version of

Islam that they experienced had made this possible. A large group who had left their country

well educated but poor and without a future came back just a few years later as a new

prosperous upper middle class. This group was not as their parents inspired by a European

culture but of the Saudi version of a traditional Islamic culture with veiled women and strictly

religious men with beards and traditional clothes. Wahhabism came to be a symbol of social

success.35 These were the intellectual prerequisites for the spread of international wahhabism.

The economic prerequisite came with oil.

In October 1973 Syria and Egypt attacked Israel with the purpose of restoring their lost

honour after the embarrassing defeat in 1967. The real winner of this war was not however to

become any of the combatants but rather Saudi Arabia who with its embargo on oil flexed its

muscles, raised the price of oil and its own revenues many times over. The war of October

1973 made Saudi Arabia into one of the riches countries of the world and gave it the

opportunity to spread wahhabism over the whole Muslim world. Prior to 1973 the Muslim

world had been a quilt of different schools and versions of Islam where religion usually had a

34 Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, p. 172f.35 Kepel, 2002, p. 71.

15



minor influence on politics. Saudi Arabia changed this through the internationalisation of

wahhabism. Imams educated in Saudi Arabia spread over the Muslim world together with

generous donations, cassette tapes, pamphlets and books in order to purify it from “false

Islam”. This way a void was filled that Arabic nationalism never succeeded in filling. SaudiArabia took the role of the protector of Islam and a pan-Islamic thought started to supersede

pan-Arabism.36

The spread of wahhabism can be described as a silent revolution. In 1979 the Shi’ite imam

Ruholla Khomeini succeeded with something that neither Mawdudi, Qutb or any of their

followers had succeeded with: a real Islamic revolution.

Khomeini was, as opposed to Mawdudi and Qutb, an educated and recognized religious

authority and it was as such that he succeeded in uniting the religious class, the poor and the

middle class in a revolution against the existing order. The ideas that Khomeini based the

revolution was however not throughoutly his own. A large part was copied from or inspired

by Ali Shariati. Shariati was educated in Paris and well read in the revolutionary leftist writers

of the 50s and 60s such as Fanon, Guevara and Sartre. His own liberation theology was a

unification of this revolutionary leftism and Shi’ism.

Shariati was as we have seen not the first to combine Islam with the ideas of the revolutionary

left. Both Mawdudi’s and Qutb’s notions of a revolutionary Muslim vanguard are clearly

indebted to Lenin’s writings.37 Shariati shares their understanding of Islam as a revolutionary

religion and their critique of the religious authority as reactionary. The theme from Shariati’s

thought that is the most important for this paper is however his conception of martyrdom.

Shi’ism has since the birth of Islam been a movement in headwind. Sunni Islam has from the

outset established itself as the dominant movement and the history of Shi’ism is therefore to a

large content characterized by stories of adversary, oppression and martyrdom. One of the

central stories of Shia Islam is the one about al-Husayn, the fourth calif and the grand child of

the Prophet. Al-Husayn was killed together with his family and his followers by the

competing and dominant Muslim power, the Umayyad. His martyrdom has since become a

symbol for the Shia view on martyrdom and participation in politics. As opposed to Sunni

Islam where the martyr generally is viewed as victorious and where martyrdom is a source of

happiness it is in Shi’ism a source of sorrow. Every year in the memory of Al-Husayn’s death

36 Ibid., p. 69ff.37 For a diskussion on the relationship between jihadism and the revolutionary left see Roy, 2004, p. 41-57.

16



ashura is celebrated where Shi’ites whip themselves for not having been able to help him.

The political consequence of this view of martyrdom is withdrawal. Instead of actively

engaging in politics the Shi’ite way has traditionally been passively waiting for the return of

al-Mahdi - the twelfth imam. The return of the Mahdi signals the end of history when justiceis brought to the world. Until this return the Muslims must endure oppression. The traditional

Shi’ite attitude towards politics has therefore been not to participate it, endure oppression and

wait for the Mahdi. Shariti opposes this defeatist and passive interpretation of Islam in his

discussions about martyrdom.

The Arabic and Persian word for martyr is shahid . The word has a double meaning in that it

also means “witness”. Shariati puts great weight on this double meaning and argues that

Shi’ism is the only religion where the word predominantly means “witness” rather than

“dead”.38 ”So instead of martyrdom, i.e. death, it essentially means ’life’, ’evidence’, ’testify’,

’certify’. These words: martyrdom and bearing witness show the differences which exist

between the vision of Shi’ite Islamic culture and the other cultures of the world.”39

A martyr is for Shariati someone who negates his whole existence for an ideal. He thus

becomes a part of this ideal. He uses his death to bare witness for the sake of a cause. 40

Martyrdom is hence for Shariati an active action where a human chooses to use his death for

the sake of a cause, not through putting his life at risk in combat but by actively seeking

death. This is Shariati’s interpretation of Al-Husayns martyrdom.

2.4. Epilogue

On the sixth of October 1981 the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was murdered by some of

his own soldiers during a military parade. The soldiers belonged to a group that called itself

al-Jihad . The group’s ideological leader was a man called Salam Faraj. He had prior to the

assassination summarized the group’s ideology in a short book called Al jihad al farida al

gha’iba – Jihad - the Absent Obligation.

The Absent Obligation settles the scores with the whole modern history of the Egyptian

Islamic movement that in Faraj’s eyes has failed with its goal of establishing an Islamic state.

38 Ali Shariati, Arise and Bear Witness, http://www.shariati.com/arise.html 39 Ibid.40 Ali Shariati, Jihad & Shahadat , http://www.shariati.com

17

http://www.shariati.com/arise.html



http://www.shariati.com/






”So if a part of religion is for Allaah and another is for other than him, fighting is obligatory

until the religion is for Allaah (alone).”47 Faraj hence takes the combination of takfir and

jihad further than anyone before him through arguing that not only can Muslims be false

Muslims because they don’t live according to Islamic law but it is also the duty of “true”Muslims to fight them. He quotes Taymiyya:

” Every group which rebels against mutawaatir (clear-cut), law of the Islamic Shari’ah must

be fought by the consensus of all the Imaams (leaders) of Muslim, even if they pronounce the

Shahaadah (declaration of faith).”48

Traditionally jihad is not considered to be an individual duty – fard ‘ayn – but a collective

duty – fard kifaya – except during a crises.49 This means that jihad is usually not a personal

duty like fast, hajj, prayer, zakat or belief but a collective issue. If a sufficient number of

Muslims chose to fight there is no reason for the rest to also do it. Faraj, on the other hand,

means that jihad in today’s situation is fard ‘ayn for all Muslims, an obligatory duty: ”(…) it

becomes like praying and fasting.”50

AZZAM

47 Ibid., p. 25.48 Ibid., p. 24.49

Reuven Firestone, Jihad: the Origin of Holy War in Islam, Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford, 1999,p. 60f.50 Faraj, 2000, p. 59.

19



In chapter 3 – Fard Ain and Fard Kifayah – Afghanistan is again mentioned several times.

The expulsion of ”the Russians and the Communists from Afghanistan” is described as a duty

– fard ayn – for all Muslims.55

Also inn chapter 4 – Important Questions – it is clear that the problem that Azzam addressesis the war in Afghanistan. The chapter answers questions such as if not a general Muslim

rallying to Afghanistan or Palestine would leave a political vacuum to be filled by

communists, baathists, nationalists and secularists in the other Muslim homelands, if one can

fight in Afghanistan despite that the afghan leadership is divided, if one can fight alongside

afghans who does not display an acceptable level of piety, if it is acceptable to accept help

from non-Muslims to wage jihad in Afghanistan or Palestine and under what conditions a

peace with the Russians in Afghanistan or the Jews in Palestine is acceptable.56

The book ends

with a conclusion where Afghanistan is not mentioned.

Join the Caravan is divided into four parts and opens with two forewords. In the first

foreword the book is described as an answer to the many letters the writer receives with

questions for advice about how to come to Afghanistan.57 Afghanistan is also mentioned in

the second foreword as a school and as the Land of Jihad ”.58 Part 1 – Reasons for Jihad –

consists of sixteen points where Azzam states the reasons for why Muslims should join the

jihad . Out of these sixteen points four mentions Afghanistan: ” Due to the scarcity of men”,

” Responding to the Call of the Lord ”, ”Following the Pious predesessors” and ”Protecting

the oppressed in the land ”.59 Out of these four it is only the first – ” Due to the scarcity of men

– that deals specifically with the conditions in Afghanistan. In the other points Afghanistan is

used as an example to illustrate more general principal questions.

Part 2 – O’ Islam! – begins with a description of the sacrifices that the afghan Muslims has

been forced to make after the Russian invasion, the expectations they have for other Muslims

to come to their aid and the lack of religious education that characterize the new generation of

domestic afghan fighters.60 Afghanistan is mentioned one more time and the chapter conclude

with a list of other places where Muslims has been oppressed and murdered.61 Part 2 conclude

55 Ibid., p. 19.56 Ibid., p. 31ff.57 Azzam, 2001, p. 15.58 Ibid., p.16f.59 Ibid., p. 19-40.60 Ibid., p. 41.61 Ibid., p. 49.

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Later he quotes Ibn Taymiyya: ” If the enemy enters a Muslim land, then there is no doubt that

it is obligatory for the closest and the next closest to repel him, because the Muslim lands are

like one land.”67

Even if Afghanistan is the more specific problem Azzam addresses, his argumentation startsfrom a more general problem: aggression against Muslim lands. To justify his ideas about

how Muslims should act when a Muslim country is attacked by the disbelievers Azzam both

quotes scholars from all the four major schools of Sunni Islamic thought, refers to Islamic

history through the sunnah and quotes the Quran. By doing this Azzam places the war in

Afghanistan within a larger context. He puts it in the context of Muslim history and in the

context of religion, of Islam. The enemy then becomes not a specific one but the disbelievers,

i.e. all non-Muslims, in general.

In Join the Caravan Azzam is more vague about who constitutes the enemy. There are again

references to the disbelievers such as: “(…) the tyrants have gained dominance over the

Muslims in every aspect and in every land. The reason for this is that the disbelievers only

stand in awe of fighting”68, and “So, if the fighting stops, the disbelievers will dominate, and

fitnah, which is Shirk (polytheism), will spread.”69. So, as in Defence of the Muslim Lands the

main enemy of Join the Caravan are the disbelievers.

Azzam puts the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan into a wider context, which is the historical

conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Soviets must be fought in Afghanistan

because they represent a threat from the disbelievers in general to the Muslims in general.

Azzam does however write about the enemy in an even more general fashion calling it only

“the enemy” 70 or “the aggressor”71. This indicates a widened applicability of his reasoning.

Even if both texts are written within the context of the war in Afghanistan they address larger

issues than only that conflict. Since they describe the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a case

of disbeliever aggression against Muslims they are valid in all cases were Muslim lands are

under attack by non-Muslims. Azzam however does not stop there. In an extensive quote of

Qutb he takes the war in Afghanistan out of the historical context and puts it into a

metaphysical one.

66 Ibid., p. 4.67 Ibid., p. 8.68 Azzam, 2001, p. 19.69 Ibid., p. 20.70 Ibid., p. 27. Also see p. 50, point 1.71 Azzam, 2002, p. 11.

23



“ Nor will it (Evil) allow Good to rise in whatever safe, well-established ways that the latter

follows, because the very growth of Good is a risk to Evil. The very existence of Truth is a

danger to Falsehood. And, no doubt, Evil will turn to hostility; and certainly, Falsehood will

defend itself by attempting to kill the Truth and suppress it by force. This is a naturaldisposition, not a temporal matter! It is nature, and not a transient condition. ”72

This conflict, which Azzam describes through Qutbs words, is not a specific historical

conflict but a universal conflict between good and evil, between truth and falsehood. Azzam

uses this metaphysical conflict between good and evil as a tool to discuss historical conflicts

as the invasion of or aggression against Muslim lands in general or more specific the war in

Afghanistan. He posits those conflicts as an example of the eternal struggle between good and

evil. Supporting his call for jihad in Defence of the Muslim Lands Azzam quotes the Quran:

“ And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and polytheism: i.e. worshipping

others besides Allah) and the religion (worship) will be for Allah alone (in the whole of the

world).”.73 In Join the Caravan he writes: “(…) if the fighting stops, the disbelievers will

dominate, and fitnah , which is Shirk (polytheism), will spread.74 Jihad , thus can not only be

fought for the sake of a specific historic problem. The problem addressed by jihad is a-

historic. It is the eternal battle between good and evil where good means Muslim or Islamic

and evil everything else. This makes Azzam’s writings applicable not only to the specific

cases that he discusses but to any case were Muslim interests are perceived as being under

attack. His rulings thus become abstract and flexible. It has become possible to use his

reasoning as a tool to justify jihad in almost any situation or context. What constitutes

aggression against Muslims and therefore functions as a justification for jihad is so loosely

defined that there almost always are an excuse for jihad . Not even other Muslims are safe

from harm. Renegade Muslim groups has to be fought to “(…) unify the Muslims and protect

their religion, honour and wealth, (…).75 This can be interpreted as that the line between good

and evil is not identical to the line between Muslim and non-Muslim. Therefore other

Muslims are also to be considered legitimate targets. As we have seen earlier jihadists such as

Shukri Mustafa and his Al Takfir w-al Hijra or Salam Faraj do, Azzam also quotes Ibn

Taymiyya to justify this: “(…) if the aggression of a Muslim aggressor cannot be stopped

72 Azzam, 2001, p. 26.73 Azzam, 2002, p. 10.74 Azzam, 2001, p. 20.75 Azzam, 2002, p. 12.

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except by killing him, then he must be killed, (…).76 Azzam’s use of takfir however is far less

radical than Mustafa’s or Faraj’s. Even if he legitimizes the possibility of fighting other

Muslims he puts far more weight on arguing for cooperation over sectarian borders since

fighting the disbelievers is of greater importance than anything else.“(…) (H)ow can we fight with people like Afghans, amongst them truthful, amongst them

dishonest, where smoking and Niswar (a type of tobacco) is widespread, for which he would

even sell his gun?”

“We must fight, because fighting is based on confronting the greater harm. (---) We must

choose the lesser of two evils; which is the greater evil: that Russia takes Afghanistan, turns it

into a disbelieving country and forbids the Quran and Islam from it? Or Jihad with a nation

that has sins and errors?77

So even if Azzam acknowledges the possibility of other Muslims being the enemy, fighting

the greater enemy, i.e. the disbelievers takes precedence. As we have seen in our historical

chapter, the early Muslim brothers also used a similar line of reasoning in trusting the piety of

the people to be able to focus on the main enemy. They also share with Azzam the idea of this

enemy being foreign. For the early Muslim brothers it was the British as well as ideas foreign

to Egypt and Islam such as nationalism, parliamentarianism and imperialism. For Mawdudi,

who shares the idea of the foreign enemy, it was the Hindus. Since then, however, Islamists

have generally turned towards the enemy within. Qutb and Mustafa following him, declared

the whole Egyptian society jahiliyya. Faraj saw the Egyptian regime as the root of evil. In The

Absent Obligation he writes: “Fighting the enemy that is near to us comes before that which

is far.”78

“Verily the main reason behind the existence of Imperialism in the Muslim lands is these

rulers (i.e. the local rulers). Therefore to begin with destroying the Imperialists is not a useful

action and is a waste of time.79

Even if Faraj acknowledges that there is a foreign enemy – the imperialists – he finds fighting

this far enemy to be a waste of time. It is the local rulers – the near enemy – that are

responsible for the far enemy’s influence over Muslims lands.

76 Ibid., p. 12.77 Ibid., p. 37.78 Faraj, 2000, p. 48.79 Ibid., p. 49.

25



of all Muslims. Hence the greatest problem facing the Muslims is not a foreign aggressor but

themselves.

As we have seen earlier Azzam describes the war in Afghanistan not as contingent but as a

natural condition.

83

It is the way of the world. Since this conflict is a natural condition itcannot in itself be considered a problem. “ I blame not the invader when he uses force or

prepares, For his way is to seize, and our concern must be to prepare.”84 Rather, the main

problem that Azzam addresses is the Muslim reaction to this conflict. For Azzam the jihad in

Afghanistan is not just a war between good and evil, between Muslims and disbelievers. It is

also an opportunity.

There is for Azzam an intrinsic value in jihad .85 The problem is that Muslims in general does

not understand this. The enemy that the Muslims are facing in Afghanistan is just a contingent

manifestation of an eternal enemy. The war in Afghanistan is just a part of a conflict that has

been going on for a long time and will continue for a long time after that specific war has

ended. Therefore the real problem is within the Muslim community itself. It is the

unwillingness to actively partake in this conflict. The true enemy is not the disbelievers since

they are part of the natural order. The true enemy is rather within each individual Muslim. It

is the love of life: “ Anybody who looks into the state of the Muslims today will find that their

greatest misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad due to their “…love of this World and

hatred of death…””86 It is also the love of this world, of worldly possessions and power:

“Those who serve their lusts and their desires will not be satisfied except by contradicting the

Truth or rejecting a great part of it. If the scholars and those who govern, love power and

pursuit their desires, they will not find fulfillment (sic.) unless they oppose the Truth,

especially when the doubtful coincides with their lusts, thus tempting their lower nature. (---)

To follow vain desires blinds the eye of the heart until it can no longer differentiate between

Sunnah and Bidah , or inevitably reverses them such that it perceives the Bidah as Sunnah.

This is the plague that the scholars suffer when they prefer the life of this world, pursue lusts

and follow after rulers.”87

83 Azzam, 2001, p. 26.84 Ibid.85 This will be discussed at greater depth in the next chapter.86 Azzam, 2001, p. 19.87 Azzam, 2002, p. 48.

27



The battle between good and evil, between truth and falsehood is thus not only, or even

mainly, the battle between the Muslims and the disbelievers but a battle in the hearts of all

Muslims.

“(…) (T)he perception of the truth relies on the enlightenment of the heart. When the heart has a strong attachment to the life of this world and the bearer of this heart is immersed in

sin, ran (black covering) overcomes the heart, because every sin is a black stain on the

heart.”88

We can hence see that there are three levels in Azzam’s diagnostic framing These three levels

corresponds well with aspects of traditional jihad theory. The word jihad stems from the

Arabic word jahada. This is classically defined as “exerting one’s utmost power, efforts,

endeavours, or ability in contending with an object of disapprobation.” 89

This object of

disapprobation is traditionally seen as being in one of three different forms: “(…) a visible

enemy, the devil, and aspects of one’s own self.”90 As we see these three different forms

corresponds with Azzam’s three levels of diagnosis. The visible enemy is the physical enemy

of the Russians or the disbelievers. The devil is the incarnation of evil and falsehood and

aspects of one’s own self is the battle in the hearts of all Muslims. In the next chapter we will

examine if these three levels not only are a part of Azzams diagnosis, but also of his

prognosis.

3.1.1. Conclusion

We can now answer the two questions that this chapter set out with. First: which problem

does Azzam address with Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim lands? As we have

seen there are not one but three answers to this question. Azzam moves among three different

levels of diagnosis. On the first level, and perhaps the most obvious one, Azzam writes to

bring attention to the war in Afghanistan. On the second level he posits this war in a

metaphysical context. On this level the problem is not so much specifically the war in

Afghanistan but rather it being a manifestation of the universal conflict between good and

evil, between truth and falsehood. Being a universal conflict it is not confined to the

battlefield of Afghanistan, to our time or even to geographical space. It is also a conflict

88 Azzam, 2002, p. 49.89 Muslim b. al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, quoted from Firestone, 1999, p. 16.90 Firestone, 1999, p. 16f.

28



within each Muslim. This conflict in the hearts of all Muslims constitutes Azzams third level

of diagnosis.

These three levels of diagnosis also correspond to our second question: who is responsible?

On the first level it is specifically the Russians and more generally the disbelievers that arehold responsible and are seen as the enemy of the Muslims. On the second level it becomes

more complicated. Since the war in Afghanistan is seen as a part of a greater conflict between

good and evil the one to blame is evil or falsehood itself. But since the conflict between good

and evil is a universal one it is not really possible to put blame on anyone. Both good and evil

are universal parts of Gods creation. Both of them are just playing their part. It is not possible

to blame evil for being evil. This leads us to the third level. Since it is not possible to blame

evil for being evil the blame falls on those who fail to oppose evil: the Muslims. The only one

that can be hold responsible is the one who does not fight, neither the aggressor nor his own

weaknesses and shortcomings.

3.2.1. Jihad of the Sword

Azzam’s answer to the question of what that should be done is fairly straightforward. The

answer is jihad .

To repel the aggressor, the Muslims must turn to jihad . “ According to our modest experience

and knowledge, we believe that Jihad in the present situation in Afghanistan is individually

obligatory (Fard Ain), with one’s self and wealth (…)”91

Jihad is usually translated to “holy war”. This translation, although not totally wrong, does

not capture the whole width of the word. The word’s literal meaning in Arabic is “striving” or

91 Azzam, 2001, p. 41.

29



“exerting oneself”.92 Since it is used in the Quran it also implicates striving with regard to

religion.93 There is nothing in the word itself that has to do with warfare. Traditionally there

are three types of jihad : jihad of the heart – such as the struggle against one’s own

weaknesses and sinfulness -, jihad of the tongue – such as speaking on behalf of good andforbidding evil – and jihad of the sword. When it is used by itself however the last meaning is

usually implicated.94 Understood as jihad of the sword it has traditionally been defined by

classical Muslim jurists and legal scholars as “warfare with a spiritual significance”.95 In

Encyclopedia of Islam it is defined as “(i)n law, according to general doctrine and in

historical tradition, the jihad consists of military action with the object of the expansion of

Islam and, if need be, of its defense.”96 These are the classical definitions of jihad . But as

Cook writes, “(t)he differences between what is written in theological and legal treatises and

what a believer may practice in any religion, moreover, are often substantial. Therefore, the

definition of jihad must be based both on what Muslims have written concerning the subject

and on the historical record of how they have practiced it.”97 On the basis of this Cook

suggests the definition “(…)warfare authorized by a legitimate representative of the Muslim

community for the sake of an issue that is universally, or near universally, acknowledged to

be of critical importance for the entire community against an admitted enemy of Islam. ”98

Firestone gives a similar definition of jihad of the sword as “(…) any act of warring

authorized by legitimate Muslim authorities on behalf of the religious community and

determined to contribute to the greater good of Islam or the community of Muslims, either in

part or as a whole.”99

There is no question that Azzam’s definition of jihad is jihad of the sword. “The word Jihad ,

when mentioned on its own, only means combat with weapons.”100 Both books are filled with

92 Firestone, 1999, p. 16; Cook, 2005, p. 1.93 Cook, 2005, p. 1.94 Firestone, p. 17.95 Cook, 2005, p. 2.96 Encyclopedia of Islam, quoted in Cook, 2005, p. 2.97 Cook, 2005, p. 2.98 Ibid., p. 3.99 Firestone, 1999, p. 18.100 Azzam, 2001, p. 51.

30



stories101 and metaphors102 of war and references to famous battles in Muslim history103.

Azzam also straight out rejects the distinction between the “greater jihad ” and the “lesser

jihad ” made by some scholars as stemming from a false hadith.104 Differentiating between the

greater jihad and the lesser jihad belongs to a mystical tradition of Islam, giving jihad a non-violent meaning. According to this interpretation the lesser jihad refers to war and the greater

jihad to an inner battle.105 Azzam is quite clear in his refutation of this interpretation. “(It) is

in fact a false fabricated hadith which has no basis.”106 Jihad for Azzam means actually

participating in armed combat. It is not enough to only support the jihad through words or

with money. “(…) I have found that the Afghans are in severe need of money. But their need

for men is more severe (…)107

“ Donating money does not exempt a person from bodily Jihad, no matter how great the

amount of money given.”108

“(…)(T)his is a place not for words but for action.”109

This demand of actual participation in armed combat turns Jihad into a social revolutionary

force.

At the same time that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and devote Arab Muslims started

to arrive there to fight the disbelievers, Ruhhulla Khomeini succeeded with something that no

other modern Islamic movement had succeeded with: to create a revolution. This success was

due to Khomeini’s ability to unite Iran’s student radicals, pious middle class and urban poor

under one banner.110 Other Islamists such as Mawdudi, al-Banna or Qutb had only been able

to appeal to one or another of these classes, making an all out revolution impossible.

Khomeini however fused the student radical’s Marxism together with the middle class – the

bazaar owner’s – frustration over their loss of market to an elite around the imperial court,

and the economic uncertainty and dreadful living conditions of the urban poor. 111 As a cleric

101 Azzam, 2001, p. 33, 36.102

Azzam, 2002, p. 45 ”We don’t give you anything but the sword”, p. 1 ” I have been raised between the hand

of the Hour with the sword (…). He has provided sustenance from beneath the shadow of my spear (…).”103 Such as The Battle of Badr, The Trench, Tabuk and Khaibar. Azzam, 2001, p. 52.104 Azzam, 2001, p. 51.105 Cook, 2005, p. 35ff. See also Firestone, 1999, p. 16ff.106 Azzam, 2001, p. 51.107 Azzam, 2001, p. 21.108 Ibid., p. 51.109 Ibid., p. 22.110 Kepel, 2002, p. 107.111 Kepel, 2002, p.108.

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he attracted the support of the pious middle class and as an opponent to the Shah and U.S.

influence he attracted the support of the students. Khomeini succeeded in making Islam into a

revolutionary force and a promise of a better future through making it into an alternative to an

almost universally hated regime.Azzam’s social revolution is of a different kind. It is not a national revolution as that in Iran

but an attempt to unite the whole Muslim world as one nation. It is a cry to the Muslims to

rally around a common cause and against a common enemy. Like Khomeini in his unification

of the different classes of Iranian society, Azzam proposes a “democratization” of jihad .

In the battle between Athens and the Persians at Salamis the Athenians had to abandon their

usual way of warfare to meets the Persians and the Phoenicians in their own element: water.

This required the Athenian aristocrats to leave their horsebacks and to fight among the poor

on the ships. Thus in battle making them all equal.112

For Azzam through not allowing for the wealthy or for the scholars to escape from

participating in actual combat he turns jihad into an equalizing force where neither wealth nor

statue matters.113 Again: on the battlefield are men are equal.114 There are throughout both

Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands both an implicit and an explicit critique of

the upper classes for not sufficiently engaging in jihad . In the preface to the second edition of

Join the Caravan Azzam writes: “We found most of these people (that come to Afghanistan to

participate in jihad ) to be from among those of modest upbringing, good-heart and healthy

character. We have seen that much education, with the accompanying suppression of good

deeds, brings about a cold heart, a slackened determination and a greed for life which

argues, unfeelingly and feebly, against evidence by way of barren disputation.”115

Azzam’s “democratization” of war becomes even more apparent in his discussion of the

obligatory character of jihad . In the Quran sura 2:216 says: “Fighting is commanded upon

you even though it is disagreeable to you. But it is possible that you dislike something which

is good for you and that you love something which is bad for you. God knows, but you know

not.” This sura is the starting point of a classic scholarly discussion about whether jihad is

prescribed for every Muslim male or if it might be ignored if enough others are willing to

112 Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors: The Changing Culture of Military Conflict , Lynne

Rienner Publishers, London, 2002, p. 34f.113

This does not apply to women though whom Azzam does not allow on the battlefield. Azzam, 2001, p. 60.114

Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors: The Changing Culture of Military Conflict , LynneRienner Publishers, London, 2002, p. 34f.115 Azzam, 2001, p. 16.

32



fight.116 If jihad is obligatory for everyone, then it is fard ayn. If not, it is fard kifaya. Azzam

distinguishes between two different types of jihad . First there is offensive jihad . This is jihad

when the enemy is attacked in his own territory.117 The purpose of offensive jihad is to expand

the Muslim territory. This kind of jihad is for Azzam not obligatory. It is fard kifaya. Thismeans that as long as someone does it the rest can stay behind.

“The meaning of Fard Kifayah is that if there are not enough people that respond to it, then

all the people are sinful. If a sufficient amount of people respond, the obligation falls from the

rest.”118

Second there is defensive jihad . Defensive jihad means expelling the disbelievers from

Muslim lands.119 This kind of jihad is obligatory on all Muslim males. It is fard ayn.

“(…) Jihad under this condition (when the disbelievers enter a Muslim land) becomes Fard

Ain upon the Muslims of the land which the disbelievers have attacked and upon the Muslims

close by, where the children can march forth without the permission of the parents, the wife

without the permission of her husband and the debtor without the permission of the creditor.

If the Muslims of this land cannot expel the disbelievers because of a lack of forces, because

they are lazy, indolent or simply do not act, then the Fard Ain obligation spreads in the shape

of a circle from the nearest to the next nearest. If they to slacken or there is again a shortage

of manpower, then it is upon the people behind them, and on the people behind them, to

march forward. This process continues until it becomes Fard Ain upon the whole world.120

Islam is traditionally considered as resting upon five pillars: Witness (shahadah), Worship

(salat ), Fasting (sawm), Alms giving ( zakat ) and Pilgrimage (hajj).121 These pillars are duties

that are obligatory for every Muslim to perform. For Azzam jihad is a duty on the same level

or above these.122 He quotes Taymiyya: “The first obligation after Imam (faith, belief) is the

repulsion of the enemy aggressor who assaults the religion and the worldly affairs.”123 When

jihad becomes fard ayn, i.e. when a Muslim land is under attack, it takes precedence over

116 Firestone, 1999, p. 60.117

Azzam, 2002, p. 4.118 Ibid., p. 19.119

Ibid., p. 4.120 Azzam, 2002, p. 5.121 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East , Westview Press, Boulder/San

Fransisco/Oxford, 1991, p. 42ff.122 For example jihad has priority over hajj. See Azzam, 2002, p. 5f.123 Azzam, 2002, p. 5.

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(SAWS) was asked: “Is a martyr put to trial in his grave?” He (SAWS) replied, “The flashing

of swords above his head is sufficient trial for him.””129

Azzam takes revolutionary Islamism one-step further. Where earlier thinkers have seen Islam

as the only way and jihad as a means to establish an Islamic state, Azzam sees jihad as theonly way. He can therefore be described not only an Islamist but also a jihadist.

3.2.2. Jihad of the Tongue

As we saw in the previous chapter there are more aspects to Azzam’s jihad than only jihad

against a physical enemy: against evil and against one’s self. Jihad against evil is traditionally

called jiahd of the tongue and means speaking out, forbidding evil and promoting good.130

The battle between good and evil is by Azzam also described as a battle between truth and

falsehood.131 This suggests a communicative aspect of battle and of jihad . The concepts of

truth and falsehood are only meaningful in speech, writing or any other form of

communication. It is only in the context of communication that one can conceive of things

being truth or false. Jihad then, is for Azzam apart from being armed combat also a form of

communication. There are two aspects of this communicative jihad . The first one is calling

for jihad and educating the mujahedeen. “(…)(T)here are two duties which we are trying to

establish: the duty of Jihad (fighting), and the duty of arousing the believers. ”132 To call for

jihad is hence a duty on the same level as fighting. There is throughout both Join the Caravan

and Defence of the Muslim Lands a harsh criticism against the Islamic scholars who does not

use their knowledge and influence to call for jihad . “What is the matter with the scholars, that

they do not arouse the youths for Jihad, especially since arousal is compulsory? (---) What is

the matter with the Imams, that they do not sincerely advice those who seek counsel from the

regarding going out with blood and soul in the Path of Allah? ”133 Azzam’s criticism is not

limited to the scholars. It also goes out to all parents. “What is the matter with the mothers,

that one of them does not send forward one of her sons in the Path of Allah, (…). (---) (…)

(W)hat is the matter with the fathers that they do not urge one of their sons, so that he can

grow up in the rearing-ground of heroes, the lands of men and the grounds of battle?”134 But

129 Azzam, 2002, p. 25.130 Firestone, 1999, p. 17.131 Azzam, 2002, p. 1.132 Azzam, 2001, p. 18.133 Ibid., p. 46f.134 Ibid., p. 47.

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the duty of arousing the believers does not only mean calling them to fight. It also means

providing education to the ones already on the battlefield. Azzam considers the low

educational level of the mujahideen to be a great problem and calls for he scholars to join the

jihad and teach the mujahideen.

135

Fighting is hence not totally sufficient. One must also fightfor the right reason and in the right way. Defence of the Muslim Lands in itself testifies to this.

It is as a fatwa i.e. a religious justification of jihad . It is a way to show for an audience that the

cause is just. In justifying an act one acknowledges that it is a form of communication. One

tries fix it’s meaning for an audience. This is the second aspect of the jihad of the tongue. One

has to keep in mind that jihad for Azzam essentially means armed combat. In writing about

jihad of the tongue Azzam does not necessarily mean preaching or any other verbal act the

way they are usually perceived. He is still writing about armed combat but about different

aspects of that armed combat. It is important for Azzam that the jihad is done in a correct way

because it has meaning not only in the moment and at the place were it happens. Jihad in

itself is a form of communication, of proselytising.136 “ Jihad is Dawah with a force (…)”137

Through both Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands Azzam uses examples from

Islamic history to illustrate his reasoning. He puts the Afghan jihad into a greater historical

context. In doing this he acknowledges that the actions of the mujahideen in Afghanistan also

might be used as examples in the same way in the future. The actions in themselves are

communicative. They have a meaning in the same way as the actions of Muhammed and his

followers have. This communicative aspect of action in general and violent action in

particular is not unique for Azzam’s thought. It can be found throughout the whole Islamic

history of martyrdom. In Martyrdom in Islam David Cook describes martyrdom as a narrative

and the martyr as a communicative agent.

“ Martyrdom means witness. Witness is the most powerful form of advertisement, because it

communicates personal credibility and experience to an audience.”138

As we have seen this communicative aspect of martyrdom is also emphasized by Shariati

within the context of Shi’ism. Martyrdom is not a central theme in neither Join the Caravan

135 Ibid., p. 17, 21.136

Faisal Devji discusses this communicative aspect of jihad . After 9/11 Osama bin Ladin described the attacks

as a speech and a call to Islam understood by everyone. It was for bin Ladin a form of proselytization much more

effective and universal than the traditional form of indoctrination and recruitment. Devji, 2005, p. 14f.137 Azzam, 2002, p. 4.138 David Cook, 2007, p. 1.

36



nor Defence of the Muslim Lands. However in another statement called Martyrs: The

Building Blocks of Nations Azzam is more outspoken on the subject.

“The life of the Muslim Ummah is solely dependent upon the ink of its scholars and the blood

of its martyrs. What is more beautiful than the writing of the Ummah’s history with both theink of a scholar and his blood, such that the map of Islamic history becomes colored with two

lines: one of them black…and the other one red… History does not write its line except with

blood.”139

Notice the connection between writing and sacrifice. The sacrifice of the martyr is as much a

communicative event as the writing of the scholar. Through killing and dying for Islam the

mujahideen writes its history, a history that will be read and retold to make others follow in its

footsteps. This is what Azzam means with “dawah with a force”. Jihad with its sacrifice and

fighting is not only a way to protect the Muslims or expand their territory. It is not only a way

to conquer land or wealth but also a way to conquer hearts and minds. It is a call for others to

follow its example. The mujahideen in Afghanistan is for Azzam a vanguard not only because

it fights on the frontline but also because it leads with its example. With its actions the

vanguard turns the Muslims to the right path.

“ It will be like the small spark which ignites a large keg of explosives, for the Islamic

movement brings about an eruption of the hidden capabilities of the Ummah, and a gushing

forth of the springs of Good stored up in its depth.”140

As we have seen earlier this idea of a vanguard is a reoccurring theme in 20 th century Islamic

thought. The vanguard is seen as an elite that in some way will lead the Muslims right. For

Azzam this means leading them to jihad .

As we saw in the first part of this chapter Azzam sees jihad as the most central part of Islam

after faith. As we have seen in this part Azzam’s jihad is quite a complex concept. For Azzam

jihad means armed combat but this armed combat has a wider meaning than just defending or

expanding the Muslim lands. It is also a form of communication whose purpose is to call for

others to follow. There is hence circularity in Azzam’s argumentation: jihad is fought for the

sake of bringing more people to fight it. It seems like jihad is fought for its own sake. This

brings us to the third aspect of jihad : the jihad of the heart.

139

Abdullah Azzam, Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations, athttp://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_martyrs.htm 140 Azzam, 2001, p. 34.

37

http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_martyrs.htm





3.2.3. Jihad of the heart

As we have seen earlier Azzam outright rejects the distinction between “the lesser” and “the

greater” jihad as stemming from a false hadith. This could be interpreted as a rejection of the

spiritual side of jihad. That is however not the case.Both jihad by the sword and jihad by the tongue are means to an end. Jihad by the sword is a

means to protect or expand the Muslim lands and jihad by the tongue a means to call for

others to join the jihad . In this call for jihad Azzam displays circularity in his argumentation.

Why do something with the purpose of making others do the same thing? The answer can

only be that this something has a value in itself. That it is not a means to an end but an end in

itself.

As we have seen earlier Christopher Coker distinguishes between instrumental and non-

instrumental, or existential ways of warfare.

“The problem is that we so want to understand violence primarily in utilitarian, rational

terms, in terms of means and ends, that the question of what violence “signifies,” “says,” or

“express” seems, at best, to be of secondary importance.”141

Coker describes instrumental warfare as being created by the Greeks in starting to treat war as

a technical problem that could be solved by human reason.142 It is in other words the

continuation of politics by other means.

Existential war however is not about reason but about identity. The existential warrior fights

not for a cause but for himself.

“Violence is not only instrumental; it is also the moral essence of the warrior. For true

warriors, war-making is not so much what they do but what they are.”143

For the existential warrior violence has an existential meaning. It is life affirming and self-

affirming. It is the way through which he comes to know and create himself.

Both jihad by the sword and jihad by the tongue can be understood in utilitarian, rational

terms, in terms of means and ends. Jihad by the heart however cannot.

For Azzam jihad is a way to school the heart and the soul. In the second preface to Join the

Caravan he describes the Afghan jihad as a school that Islam may obtain many benefits

from.144 It is not a school that in the first place teaches warfare or other worldly matters but

141 Coker, 2002, p. 6.142 Ibid., p. 28.143 Ibid., p. 6.144 Azzam, 2001, p. 17.

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rather a school of spirituality. Jihad is for Azzam a way for the Muslims to become better

men and to come nearer to God. It is in fighting and only fighting that man gets closer to the

divine.

“(…) (T)he purification of the soul and the evolution of the spirit is lifted to great heights inthe midst of the battle.”145

“The popular Jihad movement with its long part of effort, great sacrifice and serious losses,

purifies souls so that they tower above the lower material world. Important matters rise

above petty disputes about money, short-term desires and inferior provisions. Malice

disappears and souls are sharpened; and the caravan moves on from the foot of the mountain

up to the lofty summit, far away from the stench of clay and the struggles of the low

ground.”146

This symbolic language reappears in Defence of the Muslim Lands. “(…) (T)he Prophet

(SAWS) warned about being preoccupied with the world, away from Jihad. He once pointed

to a plough and said: “ It does not enter a people’s homestead except that Allah enters

humiliation with it.””147

Worldly matters and engagement in it is for Azzam a distraction from divinity. The plough

signifies an attachment to the world and what’s in it. It means turning your head from the

heavens to the earth. It turns people from the path of God. In contrast jihad is the way to leave

these worldly matters behind and purify one’s self.

In On War Clausewitz describes a young man’s first experience on the battlefield.

“The novice cannot pass through these layers of increasing intensity of danger without

sensing that here ideas are governed by other factors, that the light of reason is refracted in a

manner quite different from that which is normal in academic speculation.”148

The battlefield presents the young man with an experience like none other, an experience that

is unique and cannot be prepared for or recreated except on the battlefield. It shows him the

limits of reason. For Azzam Clausewitz’s refracted light of reason is something good. Reason

is a human property. Battle shows the limits of reason and thus the limits of man and the

world. It puts man on the border between the world and God.

145 Azzam, 2002, p. 25.146

Azzam, 2001, p. 34.147

Azzam, 2002, p. 25.148 Carl von Clausewitz, On War , ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Everyman, London, 1993, p. 132. Quoted

from Coker, 2002, p. 30

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“ Ask the people of the battle fronts because they are the nearest to Allah.”149

It does so not only because it refracts the light of reason but also because it frees the fighter

from his “(…) love of this World and hatred of death (…)”150 Again it turns him from the

world towards the divine, from the contingent to the eternal. Through jihad man turns hisback to the world and everything that is in it. “They (the companions of the Prophet) had been

bathed in jihad and cleansed of engrossment in the world, just as a wound is bathed in

water.”151

So even if Azzam rejects the distinction between “the lesser” and “the greater” jihad there are

clearly spiritual aspects of his thinking. His version of jihad by the heart, of struggling against

one’s own sinful inclinations, does mean a withdrawal from the world but through engaging

in battle. War thus changes from being an instrumental continuation of politics to be an act of

personal salvation for the individual warrior.

3.2.4. Conclusion

Prognostic framing is about proposing solutions for diagnosed problems. As we have seen

earlier Azzam addresses three connected problems: the situation in Afghanistan and the battle

between good and evil, both in the world and in the hearts of all Muslims. Azzam’s solution

for these problems is simple. It is jihad understood as armed combat. At a closer look

however we have seen that there are many aspects of Azzam’s jihad , each which corresponds

with different aspects of the problem itself and with the classical categorization of jihad in

three different types: of the sword, of the tongue and of the heart.

The solution for the situation in Afghanistan is armed combat: jihad by the sword. It is the

duty of all believers to participate in this jihad with their selves. It is not sufficient to only

support the jihad through money or words. Neither is only fighting in sufficient. It has to be

done in the correct way for the correct cause. This is where the jihad by the tongue becomes

important. The war in Afghanistan is seen not only as a war between two countries but a war

between good and evil. As such it is a part of a metaphysical conflict that has been going on

since the beginning of time. In this conflict actions does not only have direct repercussions

but becomes also a part of the history of the conflict. They become communicative. Jihad by

149 Azzam, 2002, p. 49.150 Azzam, 2001, p. 19.151 Azzam, 2001, p. 30.

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the sword becomes jihad by the tongue in that Azzam acknowledges its actions as acts off

communication with present or future generations of Muslims.

Finally Azzam sees jihad not only as a means to an end. He sees it as an end in itself. Jihad is

for Azzam a form of salvation. It is a spiritual act that brings man closer to God.

3.3. Motivational framing

Motivational framing is about making an audience take the step from talk to action. It is a call

to arms, a way to motivate participation in activism. As we have seen in earlier chapters both

Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands are in themselves calls to action. They are

a call to the Muslims to actively participate in jihad . The purpose of this chapter is to study

how Azzam argues to make this happen.

To make this move from talk to action Azzam uses both the carrot and the stick. The carrot is

showing the benefits of the jihad . The stick on the other hand is showing the consequences of

ignoring the jihad . Both the carrot and the stick are used on two different levels: the personal

and the collective. The personal level concerns the consequences for the individual Muslim

and the collective the consequences for the whole ummah.

3.3.1. The Carrot and the Stick

As we have seen in the previous chapter jihad for the individual is end in itself because it

brings man closer to God. While still alive however, man is still a part of the world and not

the divine. One of the great promises of jihad is therefore martyrdom. “ Hoping for

Martyrdom and a High Station in Paradise” is Azzam’s 8th reason for jihad . He quotes a long

list of rewards for the martyr in paradise.

“The martyr has seven special favours from Allah:

He is forgiven his sins with the first spurt of his blood,

He sees his place in Paradise (before his soul leaves his body),

He is clothed with the garment of Faith,

He is wed with seventy-two wives from the beautiful maidens of Paradise,

He is saved from the Punishment of the Grave,

He is protected from the Great Terror (of the Day of Judgement),

On his head is placed a Crown of Dignity, a jewel of which is better than the

World and all it contains, and he is granted intercession for seventy people of

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his household.”152

The reward for giving one’s live in jihad is paradise but not only that. It is a higher station in

paradise than for others. Azzam describes paradise as having a hundred levels and the highest

levels are reserved for those who fight.

153

“ Allah has preferred in grades those who fight with their possessions and their lives, over

those who sit back. And to all of them has Allah promised good (Paradise). But Allah has

favoured the Mujahideen over those who sit at home by a tremendous reward, by higher

grades from him, and with Forgiveness and Mercy.”154

These versions of paradise places Azzam within a classical hadith tradition. David Cook

groups the special qualities of the martyr in this tradition into different categories: “(…)

personal forgiveness as well as the ability to obtain forgiveness for his loved ones, the

certainty of paradise and protection from the torments of hell, honor and distinction, and

exaggerated sexual powers (in other traditions said to be either the power of 70 or 100

men.”155

We have already seen references to the two first categories: forgiveness and a place in

paradise.156 Apart from the reference to the 72 houris in the quote above there are no other

references to sexual rewards in Join the Caravan or Defence of the Muslim Lands. References

to honour however, reoccurs throughout both books. These references do not state honour as a

reward of jihad though but rather as something that must be protected through jihad . Jihad is

in many places described as a shield or a protection for the honour of the ummah.157 It is also

described as a protection for the honour of the Muslim women.158 Nowhere is jihad or

martyrdom described as a means to achieve honour. It is rather a means to protect the

Muslims from attacks on their already existing honour.

This logic is apparent throughout both books. Rather than emphasizing the rewards of jihad

Azzam describes it as a duty, which therefore is followed by punishment if ignored rather

than reward if executed. There are of course rewards for participating in jihad . These are both

of a divine character such as a guaranteed place in paradise or of a worldly character such as

152 Azzam, 2001, p. 37.153 Azzam, 2001, p. 18.154 Azzam, 2001, p. 17.155 David Cook, 2007, p. 37f.156 See also Azzam, 2002, p. 49.157 Azzam, 2001, p. 37; Azzam, 2002, p. 11, 13.158 Azzam, 2001, p. 43ff.

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the establishment of an Islamic state159 but the focus of the books are not on these rewards. It

is rather the intrinsic good of jihad that is emphasized. That jihad in itself is a reward.

If there are few rewards for participating in jihad besides participation itself there are more

punishments for not doing so. Azzam’s third reason for jihad in join the Caravan is “Fear of Hell-Fire”.160 Since jihad is an obligation like fasting or praying, ignoring it is a sin and the

punishment is hell. Being weak and oppressed is not an excuse for not participating.

“Weakness is not an excuse before the Lord of the Worlds. In fact, it is a crime making the

one committing it deserving of Hell.”161

One can here see a direct criticism against the theory of istid’a - “the phase of weakness” –

reminiscent of Faraj’s. Being oppressed and in a weakened state is not an excuse for

postponing jihad or making it into a purely inner struggle. Jihad is clearly a duty for all

Muslims and neglecting it will lead to punishment in the life hereafter. “ Whoever did not go

out for Jihad, nor helped equip a fighter, nor treated a Mujahid’s family well in his absence,

Allah will afflict him with a calamity before the Day of Judgement.”162

There are no references to hell in Defence of the Muslim Lands. Instead there are punishments

of a more collective character. Early on Azzam paints a picture of the world divided into good

and evil that we have discussed in an earlier chapter. This battle between good and evil,

between truth and falsehood is a metaphysical conflict. It is the way the world is. The duty of

jihad means fighting for good and truth. Neglecting this duty does not cause evil to win over

good but Allah to replace the Muslims as the champions of good and truth. “ If you march not

forth, He will punish you with a painful torment and will replace you with another people,

(…)”163 So in neglecting the duty of jihad Muslims do not only risk hellfire but also that the

Muslims as a people will be deprived of their status as God’s chosen ones because of not

doing what God has asked of them. Because the Muslim people have been ordered as a whole

when jihad is Fard Ain they can also be judged as a whole. Neglecting the duty of jihad thus,

does not only have consequences for the individual but also for the Muslims as a people.

Azzam draws a picture of the contemporary Muslims as a people that has lost their touch with

God. He tells stories of Muslims not guarding the honour of their women, not protecting their

159 Azzam, 2002, p. 46; Azzam, 2001, p. 33ff.160 Azzam, 2001, p. 23.161 Ibid., p. 25.162 Azzam, 2001, p. 49.163 Azzam, 2002, p. 2.

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children, of not allowing their sons to fight for Allah, who prefers life and worldly matters

before martyrdom and paradise. He tells of a people defeated and humiliated in Palestine,

Spain, Sudan, Lebanon, Somalia, Burma, Caucasia, Uganda, Zanzibar, Indonesia and Nigeria.

“Will we take admonishment from the past before we lose the present? Or will history repeat itself over us while we swallow degradation, fall into oblivion as those before us did, and lose

just as they lost?”164

The Muslims are for Azzam a people chosen by God to spread His word. Their present state

as oppressed and misfortunate is a result of them abandoning fighting in God’s name. Only

fighting can give the Muslims their prominence back.165 Otherwise they will be replaced as

God’s people and fall into oblivion.

3.3.2. Conclusion

To urge the Muslims to fight Azzam uses both the carrot – promises of rewards – and the

stick – threats of punishments. The promises of rewards are however more scarce than the

threats of punishment. For the individual Muslim the greatest reward for participating in jihad

is a guaranteed place and a high station in paradise with all its benefits. This promise of

paradise is however much less emphasized in Azzam’s writings than the intrinsic value of

jihad . The collective benefits of jihad are hardly mentioned except for the establishment of an

Islamic state.

Since Azzam sees jihad as an obligation there are more emphasize on the punishments that

ignoring that obligation results in. For the individual Muslim the most obvious punishment is

going to hell. The collective on the other hand is punished both by loosing its status as God’s

chosen people and by suffering humiliation and defeat.

We can se that Azzam’s motivational framing roughly follows the pattern of jihad by the

sword, tongue and heart that we have discussed in the previous chapters. The rewards and

punishments of the individual concerns his soul and therefore the jihad of the heart. The

collective being punished with defeat and humiliation refers to the jihad by the sword and the

metaphysical aspect of no longer being the champions of good refers to the jihad by the

tongue.

164 Azzam, 2001, p. 49.165 Azzam, 2001, p. 19.

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4. Concluding Description and Discussion

The purpose of this paper has been to facilitate an understanding of today’s global jihadist

movement through a structured reading of two of it’s central texts: Abdullah Azzam’s Join

the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands. This reading has been structured through

Benford’s & Snow’s collective action frame typology. Azzam’s text has in the preceding

chapter been analysed as diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames. These three

dimensions of analysis have together provided a complex picture of Azzam’s thinking, a

picture that enable us to answer the research question of the paper: 1. What separates Azzam’s

though from and what connects it with that of earlier 20 th century Islamists? This chapter will

first conclude what we in the earlier chapters have said about Azzam’s worldview as analysed

through Benford’s & Snows’s collective action frame typology and second answer the

research question.

4.1. Azzam Framed

At a first glance it is easy to read both Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands

simply as Azzam’s exhortation to join the Afghans in their battle against the Russians. This is

partly a correct interpretation but it is not the whole truth. The fight against the Soviet Union

is but one dimension of Azzam’s thought. Azzam’s argumentation in the two texts are

basically structured along three dimensions of classical jihadist theory: jihad of the Sword,

jihad of the Tongue and jihad of the Heart. These three different aspects of jihad are all

directed towards different enemies: a visible enemy, the devil and one’s own self. To read

Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands only as a call to arms against the Russians

is to only consider the first one of these three enemies. Azzam is however quite clear on that

the other two aspects of jihad are equally – if not more – important. He describes the war in

Afghanistan not as a unique event but as a part in a larger conflict: that between Muslims and

disbelievers and in extension between Good and Evil, i.e. a battle against the devil. Evil is

however not just present as an external enemy but also something that might exist in the heart

of every Muslim. Therefore jihad must also be considered as an inner struggle against one’s

own weaknesses. This does not mean that Azzam subscribes to the view of jihad as being

primarily an inner struggle. He outright rejects the concept of the smaller and the greater

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jihad . Jihad is for Azzam jihad by the Sword, i.e. armed combat. There is however a deeper

meaning to this armed combat than only fighting an external enemy. It has not only an

instrumental value, but also a value in itself. It is not primarily a means to an end, but an end

in itself. It is the most central aspect of Islam. This description of jihad as a pillar of Islam isrevolutionary not only in that it rejects the traditional view of what constitutes the base of

Islam but also in that it proposes a social revolution and a democratisation of the ummah

where one’s standing does not depend on wealth or education but rather on participation in

combat, on one’s willingness to die and kill for Islam.

These worldly aspects of jihad are though secondary for Azzam. Jihad is not described as a

means to an end but as an end within itself. It is the one thing that bring man the closest to the

divine. It is also an act of communication: calling for others to do the same.

Since Azzam considers jihad to be one of the pillars of Islam and as an obligation he

emphasizes the dire consequences of not participating in jihad rather than its rewards. As

motivation he uses the stick rather than the carrot. Since jihad is an end in itself it is also a

reward in itself. The punishments of not actively engaging in jihad are of both an earthly and

a divine character though.

Throughout both Defence of the Muslim Lands and Join the Caravan Azzam uses all the three

dimensions of classical jihad theory to diagnose, prognose and motivate. He therefore covers

a wide array of different aspects of the jihad : from the worldly to the divine, from the

personal to the collective. He makes jihad into an all encompassing principle of human

behaviour.

4.2. Azzam and his predecessors

Azzam’s call for jihad is a part of a great Islamic tradition. Calls and justifications for jihad

has been a part of Muslim history since the days of Muhammad in the same way that war has

been a part of the history of every society. For Azzam and other 20th century jihadists this

history is in itself a central aspect of the justification of violence. It is only by referring to

Islamic history that violence can be shown to be just. The question this paper set out to

answer is if Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands can be described as being

solely contained by this tradition or if it contains some innovations. It is not the tradition as a

whole we are interested in though but its 20th century manifestations.

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One important aspect of jihad that has been discussed since the first generations after

Muhammad is how other Muslims should be treated. Early Muslim history is not only the

history of conquest but also of internecine fighting within the Muslim community. The

greatest example of this being the rift between Sunni and Shi’a Islam. Azzam allows for thepossibility of fighting other Muslims but it is not a central tenet of his writings. He is far less

willing or interested in pronouncing other Muslims as takfir than e.g. Salam Faraj. Though

writing at almost the time as Faraj Azzam faced a very different reality. While Faraj was a

part of a very small group within Egypt society Azzam was in the middle of an international

movement. The only enemy within reach for Faraj was the local, hence the need for

justification of violence against other Muslims. For Azzam the enemy was foreign and his

fellow combatants came from different parts of the Muslim world, hence the need for unity.

This difference in who that is considered the main enemy however turns out to be the greatest

difference between Azzam and his predecessors. Azzam was the first truly anti-nationalistic

jihadist thinker of the 20th century. Both Mawdudi and al-Banna had foreign enemies but they

were not interested in fighting them outside their home countries. Qutb, Mustafa and Faraj all

confined themselves to Egypt, Khomeini to Iran and the wahhabites to the Arabian peninsula.

Azzam however was as a cosmopolite Palestinian already in the outskirts of nationalism and

the state system. It is therefore not surprising that he became the first to take the step from

fighting the near enemy to fighting the far enemy. Even though he did not take it all the way

and considered attacking the disbelievers on their home soil this might be considered one of

Azzam’s greatest contributions to jihadist ideology. The idea of the far enemy presupposes

the unification of Muslims and the abolishment of nationalism. It suggests that the state

system is a product of the oppressing disbelievers and that it therefore should be ignored and

fought. Though Azzam never pushed it that far it contains the seed of a truly global jihad

fought without consideration of borders or nationalities.

If turning from the near to the far enemy is Azzam’s first truly radical idea his view on jihad

as a pillar of Islam is the second. To see jihad as a pillar of Islam is however in itself not

unique for Azzam. Both Faraj and more importantly Taymiyya before him has described

jihad as being as or more important than everything but faith in itself. What makes Azzam

unique however is that he combines this view with an emphasis on the spiritual aspects of

jihad . For both Taymiyya and Faraj jihad was primarily a means to en end. For Azzam it is an

end in itself that contains the essence of Islam. For Azzam the true Muslim is first and

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Jihad and the rifle alone

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