THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

A. K. Narain

University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

Heinz Bechert

Universitiit Gottingen, FRG

Lewis Lancaster

EDITORS

Leon Hurvitz University of British Columbia

Vancouver, Canada

j1Jiversity of California, Berkeley, USA A. W. MacDonala

Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France

B . .J. Stavisky

WCNILKR, Moscow, USSR

Alex Wayman

Columbia University, New York, USA

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Stephen Beyer

University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

Volume 1 Number 2 1979

c/o Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison,

Wisconsin 53706

THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.

This Journal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Inc., and will be governed by the objectives of the Association and will accep~ scholarly contributions· pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various dis­ciplines such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, art, archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The JIABS will be published twice yearly in the Spring and Fall.

The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views ex­pressed by the authors in the Association's .Journal and other related pub­lications.

Manuscripts for publication and correspondence concerning articles should be submitted to A. K. Narain, Editor-in-Chief, JIABS, Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A. The Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the final content of the .Journal and reserves the right to reject any material deemed inappropriate for publication and is not obliged to give reasons therefor.

Books for review should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. The Editors cannot guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to the senders.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Andre Bareau (France) Joseph M. Kitagawa (USA)

John Brough (U.K.) Jacques May (Switzerland)

M.N. Deshpande (India) Hajime Nakamura (Japan)

R. Gard (USA) John Rosenfield (USA)

B. G. Gokhale (USA) Bardwell L. Smith (USA)

P. S. Jaini (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.)

J. W. de Jong (Australia) E. Zurcher (Netherlands)

Copyright © The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1979

Sponsored by South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wiscon­sin, and by Professor Bardwell Smith, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota.

CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

1. Is the Buddhist Notion of "Cause Necessitates Effect" (Paticcasamuppiida) Scientific? by A.D.P. Kalansuriya 7

2. Chou Yung vs. Chang Jung (on Sunyatii): the Pen-mo Yu-wu Controversy in Fifth-Century China, by Whalen Lai 23

II. SHORT PAPERS

1. GUI;.aprabha's Vinaya-sutra and his Own Commentary on the Same, by P. V. Bapat 47

2. Ked, "Some," in a Pali Commentary, by 1. B. Horner 52 3. Comments on Zen, by M. Kiyota 57 4. The Freudian Unconscious and BhavaJiga, by O. H. de A.

Wijesekera 63

III. BOOK REVIEWS

1. Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective: Collected Ar-ticles, by H. V. Guenther 67

2. Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, by Geske Lhundup Sopa and J. Hopkins 69

3. Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice, by~. Kiyota 72 4. Choix de Documents tibetains conserves it la Bibliotheque

Nationale, complete par quelques manuscrits de l'India Office et du British Museum; presentes par Ariane Macdonald et Yoskiro Imaeda 76

IV. NOTES AND NEWS

1. Presidential Address by Professor Gadjin M. Nagao 79 2. Report on the Proceedings of the First Conference of the

LA.B.S., Columbia University, New York, September 15-17, 1978 85

3. List of Members of LA.B.S. 92

V. OBITUARY

Yamaguchi Susumu, by Sakurabe Haj£me 104

Is the Buddhist Notion of "Cause Necessitates Effect (Paticcasamuppiida) Scientific?

by A. D. P. Kalansuriya

Causality in Buddhism: an introductz"on

The notion of causality (P3:li: paticcasamuppada; Sanskrit: pratztya­samutpada) is central to Buddhism. The Buddha testifies to its key role in the Buddhist religion thus: "He who sees causality sees the Dhamma" (yo paticcasamuppiidarJ'! passati so dhammarJ'! passati).l In their own way, the Pilii Nikiiyas, employing the conceptual tools available in the wider Indian thought, deal elaborately with this notion. But then, does the notion of causality (paticcasamuppada) express a universally valid truth? Does the causal argument here render its conclusion certain or only highly probable? We shall at· tempt to answer these questions in this paper.

In the Sa'f!!yutta Nikiiya, the notion of causality is explained in this way: "Causation has the characteristics of objectivity, ne-cessity, invariability and conditionality" ( ... tathatii avitathatii an-annathata idappaccayata ayurJ'! vuccati ... paticcasamuppada).2 Paticcasamuppiida is a combination of the two words paticca "de­pendent" and samuppada "arising." Accordingly, paticca-samup­pada denotes "dependent arising" or "conditioned origination" or "conditioned genesis." The MaJihima Nikiiya explicates this caus­ation by the following general formula: imasmi'f!! sati idarJ'! hoti, imassa uppada idarJ'! uppaJihiiti; imasmirJ'! asati idaf!1. na hoti; imassa nirodha idarJ'! niruJjhati. 3 A literal rendering of this reads as follows: "When this is, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. When th.is is not, that does not come to be; upon the cessation of this, that ceases also."

7

Philosophical analysis

At this juncture, philosophically speaking, an analysis would make explicit the nature of the notion of causality in Buddhism. But, then, which analysis? Thinkers may disagree. To put it dif­ferently, would it be·valid to explain the central notions of Buddh­ism by way of another religion? Or should they be explained by way of modem science? Or should they be explained within their own context (the natural context to which they conceptually be­long).? Admittedly, we face a significant issue here, and it relates to the nature of the function of philosophy. For, throughout its long and varied history, 'philosophy' has meant many different things. This is a complex issue which we cannot dwell on here. But we shall clarify our position, very briefly, in this way. Along with the later Wittgenstein, we say that "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."4 The reference here is to a thorough misunderstanding of our language. But how has this misunderstanding of our language arisen? It is due not to simple error, but to a bewitchment whose source lies partly in the human propensity for seeking an essence, a unity or a simplicity which is non-existent. And, therefore, a misunderstand­ing of our language gives rise to a misuse of language which, in tum, gives rise to perplexities. They baffle and confuse us. Wittgen­stein himself saw a way through all this perplexity: "What is your aim in philosophy?-To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle."5 Accordingly, philosophy does not involve itself in the primary sense of imparting straightforward factual information, but simply in de­scription of the hidden and nebulous sources of our confusion and bafflement; of showing how we are misled and how we can re­orientate ourselves. The consequence is clarity, which means that philosophical problems should completely disappear. To put the point yet more explicitly, the conceptual tool which is emphasized here is as follows: not to use words out of context and not to iso­late a word from the life to which it belongs, in which it is used, in which it has meaning. We wish to examine and analyse the· truly Buddhistic notion of causality by way of the above-mentioned conceptual tool.

If we determine "not to use words out of their natural con­text" as a central conceptual tool in our present analysis of the notion of causality (paticcasamuppada), it is of prime significance

8

to note the nature of the conceptual structure of Buddhism. 6 The · Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, says the following about his thought-process: "I am one of those who profess the basis of a

· religion ... "7 In the same context, the Buddha clearly emphasizes his ideology as religious. This is evident from the following: " ... it was not useful, not related to the fundamentals of religion, and not conducive to revulsion, dispassion, cessation, peace, higher knowledge, realization and nibbiina."8 The logical nature of the Buddhist religion is evidently hinted at,as will be clear from a care­ful understanding of the above-mentioned contentions of the Buddha himself. The religious nature of Buddhism is further made explicit by the moral code and the procedural guide emphasized by the Buddha with reference to the summum bonum-nibbana­the transcendent. The moral code is embodied in the majjhz"ma patipada, the middle mode of conduct by which the sage crosses to the safety of nibbana-the final liberation of mind which is like the extinction of a lamp. What gradually unfolds seems to be the c:thico-religious nature of Buddhism as against its scientific or empirico-epistemological or any other kind of nature. To make the point clearer still, what is made explicit is that the central doctrine of Buddhism remains an ethical one and never an empirical hypo­thesis or theory or doctrine which is either 'true' or 'not-true' ('false') empirically. And this way of treating Buddhism-limiting Buddhism to its natural context, namely, a religious one, may elicit a combative counterblast from the Buddhist modernists. We hope to argue against them in the sequel.

Ethics and causal formula

The main argument in our paper notes initially that the back­ground of the notion of causality is ethico-religious. It should be kept in mind, at the outset, that if the notion is applied without re­ference to the other notions that form its normal background, nonsense is produced, for the notion remains empty. This is what the later Wittgenstein describes as "when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work" (wenn die Sprache leerlauft, nicht wenn sie arbeitet).9 We propose that the Buddhistic notion of causality needs to be employed within the conceptual structure · of Buddhism to avoid it being made meaningless. Quoting from the

9

Nikiiyas themselves, we showed that the notion of causality (patic­casamuppiida) is embedded not in a made-up scientific causal formula but in an ethico-religious groundwork, essentially woven into ancient Indian thinking. '

However, it appears that the Buddhist modernists are at variance with our above contention. K. N. J ayatilleke and D.]. Kalupahana are the prominent Buddhist modernists who have for­warded an argument basically different from ours. For instance J ayatilleke contends, "Those occurrences which are causally con: nected are considered to have the following relation, namely, that (1) 'Whenever A is present, B is present' (imasmirrt sati idarrt hoti) and (2) 'whenever A is absent, B is absent' (imasmirrt asati idarn. na hot£). This means that B does not occur unless A is present and B occurs only when A is present. Thus a one-one correlation is estab­lished between the conditions constituting the cause and their ef­fect. This is a scientific view of causation as opposed to the practi­cal common-sense view."lO Elsewhere Jayatilleke says that Buddh­ism is concerned primarily with the sense of the notion of causality which denotes the causal laws that operate in bringing about the continued genesis of the individual. ll With reference to the notion of causality, Kalupahana says, "Thus the causal principle as stated in the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas seems to include all the features of a scientific theory of causation-objectivity, unique­ness, ,necessity, conditionality, constant conjunction, productivity, relativity-as well as one-one correlation. "12

Although both these Buddhist modernists discuss at length the notion of causality (paticcasamuppiida), it is difficult to take seriously their assurances that it is similar to the scientific notion of causality. For in this connection what they do is to follow the 'so-called' Mill's methods of induction. Even as Mill did, the Buddhist modernists have to face the logical consequences of the conception of a cause as a sufficient and necessary condition. To put it differently, the occurrence of A necessitates the occurrence of B; and B does not come to be without A occurring. Serious dif­ficulties lie in determining whether, in fact, these relations hold. Similar difficulties appear as regards the notion of causality in Buddhism, if its difficulties are similar to those in Mill's methods of induction. It is unnecessary to add that both J ayatilleke and Kalupahana equate the nature and function of causality in Buddh­Ism with those in Mill's method of induction by way of their 50-

10

called 'scientific view of causation.' Both Jayatilleke and Kalupahana are true to the contentions

in the Nz"kiiyas when they emphasize and re-emphasize that the order or the fixed nature of phenomena-the regular pattern of phenomena or conditionality-exists, irrespective of the arrival of the Buddhas. But this emphasis is not the end but the beginning of the inquiry, namely, the serious need to note the logical nature of the notion of causality. A paraphrasing of the significant words that are made explicit with reference to Buddhistic causation such as 'necessity,' 'objectivity,' 'invariability' and 'conditionality' will not help at all to work out a good basis or a rationale. The point we labour all along can be elucidated thus. What does the word avz"­tathatii ("necessity") denote? J ayatilleke says that" ... since there is no failure even for a moment to produce the events which arise when the conditions come together, there is said to be 'necess­ity.' "13 Kalupahana in his own way elaborates the denotation of the word avitathata ("necessity") thus: "The traditional anthropo­morphic meanings attached to the word 'necessity' have been re­jected, and the empiricist view that it denotes a lack of exception or the existence of regularity has been accepted."14 Ironically, though, this way of treating the word 'necessity' can have an ad­verse effect on the understanding of the true Buddhistic notion of causality. To elucidate this point we shall take the first sentence of the causal formula describing the nature of the conditioning of the individual, namely, 'ignorance conditions the volitional activi­ties' (avzJja paccaya sarrtkhara). But, then, what is the nature of the causal relation between aviJja ("ignorance") and sarrtkhara ("voli­tional activities")? J ayatilleke does not make any attempt to note and specify the logical nature of this relation. Kalupahana's argu­ments run a similar course. It is not very clear why the words 'necessity' and 'empiricality' are brought together in Kalupahana's thesis. The problem seems not so much to be what is being affirm­ed, as what is denied. To put it even more explicitly, it appears as if there is a synthetic relation of necessitation, or alternatively, 'an empirical necessity.' On the one hand, it is not at all clear what is being denied and on the other, it is not clear what those who be­lieve in synthetic relations of necessity take them to be. Therefore, it is difficult to take seriously Kalupahana's assurance to the effect that "necessity," when divorced of "anthropomorphic meanings," is equivalent to "a lack of exception or the existence of regularity."

11

For clarity's sake, can Kalupahana answer the following question: How does one come across 'a lack of exception or the existence of regularity'? By experience or by reasoning a priori? To hammer the way out of the impasse of this causal hotch-potch is, of course, possible, but very difficult and a shift of emphasis in the right direction is called for. Apparently, such a shift of emphasis may not be based on the attempts ·of either Kalupahana or J ayatilleke. The reason relates to a misunderstanding of the limitations on the subject matter at hand.

The implication here is the acceptance of the serious philo­sophical technique of humbly trying to explore Buddhism from within its own context. This philosophical technique is made ex­plicit by Wittgenstein by his notion-"avoiding engine idling"-not to use the central notions of an argument outside their territory. And what Buddhist modernists have done is to wrongly read hardened meanings of modern generations into Buddhist termino­logy which, conceptually, belongs to the thought-structure of ancient Indian philosophy. Admittedly, it would certainly be a mistake to suppose that an introduction of Graeco-Roman philo­sophical concepts is unwarranted. But our emphasis relates to an exercise in which the effort should have been to reveal the limita­tions of the subject matter at hand-Buddhism, in the first instance.

The Buddhistic 'causal relation ': Its nature

As a precursor to Kalupahana's likely answer, let us turn to the question raised previously, namely, "How does one come across a lack of exception or the existence of regularity"? In an empiri­cist web of understanding, which incidentally is his approach, the answer should simply be, "experience." But this is no more than mere generalization of the data-of the observed (perceived) instan­ces on which it is based. However, the propositions expressing Buddhist causal laws or 'about' causal law-like instances such" as avzJJii paccayii sankhiira ("ignorance conditions (= causes) volition­al acts"), jiitz"paccaya jariimarar;a'Y{L ("birth conditions (= causes) death"), etc., are no mere summaries of what has happened in the past, of the states of affairs that might for instance be offered as evidence in favour of such laws. If they are laws, the proper logical form of such laws is best expressed through the hypothetico-con-

12

ditional 'if-then' rather than the categorical 'all. " . are.' To put the matter thus would be worth the effort, since it would help avoid all 'ontological commitments.'15 Therefore, what should be. done in this connection is merely to investigate the applications of the causal law. In itself, therefore, a causal law is a rule or a pre­scription to which a truth-value cannot be assigned. The most we could do is to apply it to various contexts, scientific, ethico­religious, poetic, political and so on.

What emerges explicitly from this analysis, for the moment, is that the Buddhist causal laws just noted are neither empirical generalizations nor mere summaries of what has happened. They simply are morality-oriented rules or prescriptions.16 Admittedly, the primitive causal formula in Buddhism which runs thus: z'mass'

,uppada z'da'YJ1, uppaJihiitz' ... imassa nz'rodha z'da'YJ1, nz'ruJihati ("from the arising of this, that arises: upon the cessation of this, that ceases also") testifies to this. Stated in an abstract form it reads as follows: "From the arising of A, B arises; from the cessation of A, B ceases also." When it is applied to "the continued genesis of the individual" in the proper Buddhist context, philosophically speaking, the central concern centers upon the need to note the logz'cal nature of the relation between A and B. That is to say, to note the logical nature of the relation-empirical (probable) or ethical or necessary or a prz'orz' or empirico-necessary17 or any other. But, then, what is the log£cal nature of the relation between cause and effect (abstract formula) or birth and decay-death or ignorance and volitional acts (concrete formula)?

Buddh£sm and Scz'ence

Let us turn, first, to Kalupahana. He says: "Without being a partisan of anyone of these metaphysical views, the Buddha ad­duced empirical causal explanations."18 We contend that what Kalupahana's contentions amount to is, simply, a misusing of con­texts-empirical and ethico-religious-from which the logical nature of the causal relation in Buddhism is not made explicit. Admittedly, the relation not only remains nebulous but is also attended by very significant difficulties. We shall see one difficulty in what follows. Does "decay-death" (the effect) follow by necessity from "birth" (the cause)? The ethico-religious character of Buddhism is destroy-

13

ed if the answer to it is supplied in the negative. To put it different_ ly, one has to give an affirmative answer to the question just men­tioned. And, therefore, empirical relations in the sense of "high degree of probability" or "low degree of probability" are logically not possible here. To Kalupahana, the case seems to be both ethico_ religious and scientific at the same time. That is to say, the relation between "cause and effect" is both necessary and empirical. Ac­cording to Kalupahana, the relation appears necessary, because "decay-death must arise from birth" in order to retain the central ground-work in Buddhism. To drive home the point, according to the primitives in Buddhism, decay-death by necessity cannot arise if birth is non-existent. The Sa1]'!yutta Nikaya testifies to this con: elusion in this way: katamo ca paticcasamuppado? jiitipaccaya ... jaramara1J,a1]'!19 ("What is causation? Upon birth, decay-death arises"). Alternatively, within the conceptual structure of Buddh­ism, it is theoretically impossible to entertain a view which em­bodies the position that the effect (= decay-death) arises from cause other than birth. However, if Buddhist modernists wish to argue against this view (which in itself is a very difficult thesis), they should incorporate two things:

(i) that the formula which involves "birth conditions ( = necessitates) decay-death" needs radical revision,

and

(ii) that a basically different alternative doctrine of salvation originating from the very conceptual structure of Buddh­ism is logically possible.

Needless to say, both (i) and (ii) cannot be accommodated within the conceptual structure of Buddhism which is a religion with a set moral code according to the Buddha himself.20 Why? Because (i) and (ii) above adversely affect the very groundwork of Buddhism. The reason relates to the logical impossibility of enter­taining an alternative means other than the ariyatthangikamagga with reference to the summum bonum (nibbana), within the con­text of Buddhism. Logically speaking, the Buddhist conceptual structure can accommodate only one means and only one goal. Non-buddhist religious tenets or scientific tenets or poetic tenets

14

or any other tenets cannot be accommodated in it at all. It is evi­dent, therefore, that to read empi~icism into the truly Buddhist causal formula is, first, a central philosophical error. Second, it gives rise to considerable theoretical difficulties.

It is logical to entertain the following: The claim that "the Buddha adduced empirical causal explanations," impressive though this claim may be, remains unsupported. Again, J ayatilleke's claim too, namely, "This is a scientific view of causation as opposed to the practical common-sense view, "21 remains unsupported. Ad­mittedly, as made explicit, causal explanations in Buddhism are not empirical (i.e. scientific) but ethical. The central notions that arise from its conceptual structure are ethical. To put the matter thus would be worth the effort, since it would help avoid philosophical errors, pseudo-problems and bewitchments. For instance, the rela­tion between

(i) "Upon birth, decay-death is conditioned ( = necessitated)" (jiitipacca"yii jariimarar;,ar(l,) ,

(ii) "Upon ignorance, volitional acts are conditioned ( = neces­sitated)" (avzJj'ii paccayii sankhiira) ,

(iii) "Cause conditions ( = necessitates) effect," etc.,

are necessary ones. It is because birth necessarily conditions ( =

necessitates) decay-death, according to Buddhism. Alternatively, the one and only way or patz"padii also has been designed on a moral code by the Buddha to uproot the cause (birth), so that the effect (decay-death) can be uprooted at the same time. And, there­fore, what is implied is a necessary, sacrosanct and ethical relation between cause and effect in Buddhism. We emphasize the ethical ( = sacrosanct) nature as the central characteristic of the notion of causality in this ethico-religious ideology. Buddhist modernists have made it a fashion to read hardened meanings of modern generations such as empiricism, positivism, science, parapsychology, psycho­logy, psycho-analysis, etc., into Buddhism, which is primarily built on the constraints of agriculture, pastoralism and the environment affecting it. These in turn are embedded in ancient Indian civiliza­tion. This fashion almost amounts to a philosophical error, namely, confusion of contexts-to expect an empirical (probable) relation

15

from an ethico-religious ideology where such a relation is lOgically impossible. If Buddhist religious notions were to be carefully ana­lyzed, for clarity's sake, within their own context, then the follow_ ing will be revealed:

(i) the ethico-causal formula

and

(ii) its application to phenomena.

The Sarrzyutta Nz'kaya testifies to this end thus: ... thz'ta va sa dhatu dhammatthz'tata dhammaniyamata z'dappaccayata: (" ... this order exists-the fixed nature of phenomena-the regular pat­tern of phenomena").22 The exact meanings of the key notions in this passage, such as order, fz'xed nature of phenomena, and regular pattern, are not that clear. However, the same Nikaya note~: jati­paccaya jaramara1J,ar[! ("Upon birth, decay-death is conditioned"). Apparently, the case appears to be as follows: The abstract causal formula makes explicit a necessary relatz'on between birth and decay-death; and this is projected onto the external world of our experience in concreto. The subconcept of compulsion or of efficiency is implicitly contained in the Buddhist notion of caus­ality. If so, it is not possible to take seriously the assurances of Buddhist modernists-] ayatilleke, Kalupahana, and others-that Buddhist causality is scz'entific.

In scientific practice, causality is dissociated from any notion of efficiency or compulsion. That is to say, in the scientific con­text, causal connection is replaced by a functional relationship of a mathematical sort. Admittedly, once the mathematical function is established, the agency of causal compulsion ceases to be a problem for science. But such a complex theoretical exercise is not undertaken in Buddhism. Again, the claim that Buddhist causality is also scientific is further weakened, when Buddhist modernists read the scientific notion of 'one-one correlation' into the wider notion of pat£ccasamuppada. What is a 'one-one correlation'? What impact does it have on the truly Buddhist notion of causality (pa#ccasamuppada)? The scientific investigator attempts to find a relation that is equally determinate in either direction, that is, he seeks a one-one relation: 'whenever X occurs, E occurs, and E does

16

not occur unless X has occurred':23 but this formula does not mean "X will be followed by E" or "X will bring about E" or "X gives rise to E" or "X necessitates E," put simply what accelera­tiona particle will have under given circumstances, i.e., it tells us how the particle's motion is changing each moment, and not wh"ere the particle will be at some future moment. Therefore, the formula which embodies 'one-one correlation' can absorb the idea that it is not rendered necessary that causes should precede their effects. Bertrand Russell has formulated this idea in this way: "The law makes no difference between past and future: the future 'deter­mines' the past in exactly the same sense in which the past 'deter­mines' the future."24 But the Buddhist causal formula, even if it implicitly contains a primitive one-one correlation, by necessity cannot absorb this Russellean idea which is scientific, simply be­cause its scope is thoroughly limited. For instance, the reversibility of the temporal order of cause-effect direction cannot be accom­modated in the Buddhist model; but the reverslbility--Of the tem­poral order of events can be accommodated in the scientific causal model without damaging it. In this sense, it is hardly possible to accept the Buddhist causal formula as scientific. The truly scientif~ ic notion of causality, therefore, not only entertains probability but is also capable of accommodating the notion of the reversibility of the temporal order of events. What emerges explicitly from this is that both the notions of "probability" and of "the reversibil£ty of the temporal order" have no place in truly Buddhist causality. This may be restated as follows: these notions are not ingredients of truly Buddhist causality. Buddhist causality, therefore, is not only primitive, but is also not scientific.

The logical nature of the Buddhist causal formula becomes even clearer once the notions of order and of the fixed nature of phenomena, as understood within the Buddhistic context, are further elaborated. How are we made aware of the so-called fixed nature of phenomena and the order in the cosmos? Is the order in the cosmos universally valid? Clear answers to both these questions are found in Buddhism. For instance, the fixed nature of pheno­mena and the order in the cosmos were discovered by the Buddha and revealed to us. Kalupahana puts the idea in this way: "Thus, having experienced particular instances of causation through sen­sory as well as extrasensory perception, the Buddha arrived at a general theory of 'causality' or 'causal uniformity,' which could be

17

considered a universally valid principle."25 But, if the order and uniformity in the cosmos are universally valid, the causal relation which is said to exist between cause and effect-birth and decay_ death, ignorance and volitional acts-is also universally valid. To clarify it further, the relation between cause and effect in primitive Buddhism is certairi (or necessary). It is not possible, therefore, to take seriously the assurance of either J ayatilleke or Kalupahana that Buddhist causality is scientific and empirical (probable).

The necessary character or the universally-valz"d character of Buddhist causality (paticcasamuppiida) makes the Buddha's 80-

called generalization unassailable and sacrosanct. And this position is consistent with Buddhism, the religion of the Buddha: but it must also be emphasized that the sacrosanct Buddhist position is basically different from that of science. In Buddhism:

(i) "birth (jiiti) necessitates or produces decay-death (jarii­mararJ,af!1, )," which expresses a necessary connection.

But in science the scientist looks for a general law of the following form:

(iia) "whenever an event of type X occurs, an event of type Y occurs."

An example will make explicit the scientific causal formula:

(iib) "whenever a gas is heated, its volume remaining constant, its pressure rises."

This proposition expresses the connection between the two events "a gas being heated" and "the pressure rising." But it does not express a necessary connection; it expresses a probable connection of a high degree of probability only. Therefore, the notion of "one event necessitating this or that event" is not implicitly contained in the scientific concept of causality, whereas this notion is implicit­ly contained in Buddhist causality (paticcasamuppiida). To repeat, first, Buddhist causality not only expresses a necessity, a produc­tion, but also emphasizes a necessary connection; and, second, Buddhist causality is unassailable. Truly scientific causality denies

18

both necessity (necessary connection) and unassailability. The idea is better expressed by D.M. Taylor and A.J. Ayer. With reference to the notion of necessity, Taylor says: " ... the notion of one event necessitating another is senseless."26 And as regards the notion of unassailability, Ayer says, " ... no laws are sacrosanct, none is safe from rejection in the light of further experience, because, while we have to rely on some laws in building up our picture of the world, they do not always have to be the same ones ... so there is no scientific hypothesis, no factual generalization of any kind and no presupposition, of which we can say that it is unassailable."27 And as Buddhism accepts necessity, unassailabili­ty and sacrosancticity, what emerges into explicitness is the basic distinction between science and Buddhism. It is the case that both science and Buddhism use the word 'causality' in their respective argumentations, deliberations, presuppositions, etc. However, this is not going to make Buddhism scientific.

Religious systems, inclusive of the Buddhist one, originating in the desire for practical rules of good conduct are basically primitive. The central attempt in religions is to solve certain prob­lems that are not yet treated as coming within the scope of science. Alternatively, the meaning of a word in a religious ideology, which emphasizes rules of good conduct, is not identical with a technical word in a scientific language. What we mean here is that the meaning of a technical term in a scientific language cannot be derived from the meaning of the same word in ordinary language. The way in which the concept of causality in Buddhism is given application by Buddhist modernists is unintelligible. It involves the conflation of a concept from one category with another taken from another category. This gives rise to meaninglessness of one kind or another. Admittedly, therefore, one has to be extra careful when borrowing scientific terms and using them elsewhere-in religion, politics, poetics, aesthetics, ethics and so on.

Again, in certain areas of science, the scientists go one step further towards a special technical langauge. Here one is involv­ed, not only with a special terminology of words with very differ­ent meanings, but with the fundamentals of a specific linguistic structure. All these lend weight to the thesis that Buddhism and science are basically different in nature, scope and goals. Any attempt to explain Buddhism thro·ugh science, therefore, leads to emptiness alone.

19

Conclusion

The notion of necessary connection made explicit in Buddhist causality (pa#ccasamuppiida), conceptually speaking, is consistent with that of nibbiina-the summum bonum. It is this consistency that elicits the ethical nature of Buddhist causality as against the so-called empirical (scientific) one. For instance, the notion of paticcasamuppada ("causality") not only emphasizes jati ("birth") necessitating jariimara1J,am ("decay-death"), but is also included in the uprooting of jiiti ("birth") which is nibbiina ("emancipation ==

freedom"). To put it differently, if jiiti ("birth") is not uprooted, the person is reborn in an unending manner (it necessitates jarii­mara1Jarrt and punabbhavo). It must now be very clear that the only salvation is the attainment of nibbiina and that the only means is the ariyaHhangikamagga. The implication, soteriologically, is the logical impossibility of an alternative doctrine of salvation in Buddhism. Logically it suggests the necessary (certain) character of the relation between jiiti ("birth") and jariimara1Jarrt and punab­bhavo ("decay-death" and "rebirth"). Cannot one attain nibbiina by following a means other than the ariyaHhangikamagga? The only possible answer is in the negative. For, within the strictly limited religious model in Buddhism, it is not possible to entertain any alternative doctrine of salvation. Emancipation ( = nibbiina) is the only salvation meaningful and the ariyatthangikamagga the only means by which it can be attained. Therefore, an alternative doc­trine of salvation in Buddhism is simply self-contradictory. If so, this doctrine must have a central impact on notions such as jiiti ("birth"), jaramara1J,ar(! ("decay-death"), punabbhavo ("rebirth"), avzJj"ii ("ignorance"), sankhiira ("volitional acts"), etc. This is be­cause these ideas have no meaning outside the context of Buddhism.

To put the point differently, they have meaning only within the limited boundary of the Buddhist religion. The notion of pro­bab£lity is foreign to the ethico-religious conceptual structure of Buddhism which is embedded in ancient Indian (aryan) thinking. To elaborate: If Buddhism were to be meaningful, avzjjii ("igno­rance") must necessitate smikhiira ("volitional acts") and jiiti ("birth") must necessitate jariimara1J,a'Y[! ("decay-death"). The words used in this type of discourse have emotive meaning only. By emotive meaning, we mean a disposition to produce emotion­al and attitudinal effects on the hearer, the follower, the disciple

20

or anyone else. Therefore, from a logical point of view, there exist no probable (empirical) relations. The only relation that exists between cause and effect or avijja and sankhara or jiiti and jarii­mararJ,af!'l or any other in Buddhism is a morality-oriented necessary one. If so, it is needless to add that an alternative doctrine of salva­tion in Buddhism is theoretically non-present, because there is no space for doubt-denial conditions or probability-conditions or In­

ductive generalizations or mathematical deductions.

NOTES

Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Sri Lanka, Peradenia, Sri Lanka.

1. Ed. V. Trenkner and R. Chalmers, Majjhima Nikaya, Tr. I. B. Horner, Middle Length Sayings, Vol. I, London, PTS, 1954-9, 190-l.

2. Ed. L. Feer, Sarrr-yutta Nikiiya, Tr. C.A.F. Rhys Davids and F.L. Woodward, Vol. II, London, PTS, The Book of the Kindred Sayings, 1917-30, 26.

3. Majjhima Nikiiya (op. cit.,) Vol. I. 262-4. 4. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,

1953, p. 47e. 5. Ibid., p. 103e. 6. I have dealt with this notion, elaborately, elsewhere: see A.D.P.

Kalansuriya, "The Ethico-religious Nature of the Conceptual Framework of Buddhism, Dialogue,Vol. IV, Nos. 1 & 2, August, 1977, pp. 51-60.

7. MaJi"himii Nikaya, Vol. II, 21l. 8. Ibid., 431. 9. Philosophical Investigations, p. 51.

10. K.N. ]ayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, London, Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963, p. 449.

11. K.N: ]ayatilleke, The Message of the Buddha, Ed. Ninian Smart, London, Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1975, p. 197.

12. D.]. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Honolulu, The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, p. 98 ..

13. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 447. 14. Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 93. 15. A.D.P. Kalansuriya, "Wittgenstein, Meaning Model and Buddhism,"

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. IV, No.3, April 1977, pp. 381-91. 16. See, "The Ethico-religious Nature of the Conceptual Framework of

Buddhism," Dialogue, Vol. IV, Nos. 1-2, August 1977. 17. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 453: "It closely resembles

the Regularity Theory except for the fact that it speaks of the empirical necessity (avitathata)."

21

18. Causality, p. 143. 19. Sarr;yutta Nikiiya, Vol. II. 25. 20. MaJi"himii Nikiiya, Vol. II. 21l. 21. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 449, 22. Sarr:tyutta Nikiiya, Vol. II. 25. 23. L.S. Stebbing, Modern Introduction to Logic, London, 1945, p. 264. 24. Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic, Longmans, 1919, p. 195. 25. Causality, p. 107. 26. D.M. Taylor, Explanation and Meaning, Cambridge University Press

1970, p. 5. ' 27. A.J. Ayer, Probability and Evidence, London, Macmillan, 1972, p. 25.

22

,

Chou Yunga vs. Chang J ungb (on Sunyatii); The Pen-rna Yu-wu c Controversy in Fifth­Century China!

by W haZen Lai

Since the Wei-Chin period, the goal of learning has been that of embodying the Tao and penetrating the Hsiian d (Dark Mystery). Both Tao and Hsiian pertain to the origin, pen­yuan. e The Three Hsiian-Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu and the I Ching-and the Buddha-Dharma were teachings investigating the origin and reverting to the basi~. Controversies over the similarity and difference between Sakyamuni and Lao-tzu were all centered upon ~he concept of pen-mo (origin and end). Those siding with Sakyamuni would deride Lao-tzu for abiding ~th the end aspect. Those honoring Lao-tzu would say that Sakyamuni failed to attain the origin.2

The above observation of T'ang Yung-t'ung in his magnum opus brings out one of the key concerns in the early encounter between the Buddha-Dharma ("Buddhism") and the native traditions of China. The paradigm of pen-mo (origin and end) was drawn from the Chinese native outlook more than from Buddhist thought pro­per. The implied cosmo gonic sequence in pen-mo is that pen sig­nifies the essential fountainhead while mo denotes the less essen­tial subsequents that draw their life from the one origin. Applied to the evaluations of different ideologies, spokesmen naturally saw their own ideology as grounded in the origin and relegated their opponents' position to the lesser subsequents. Although the pen-mo paradigm existed in Han thought, the. organic ties between the two were such that whatever has an origin naturally has an end. Much of Han cosmo gonic speculations were based on the assumption of pen-wu mo-yu: in the origin, there was wu (pre-being), but in the end, yu (the many existents) evolved.

23

Whether the origin was called the Tao, the One, Ultimate Unity, Ultimate Simplicity, Spirit, or the Original Ether, the general consensus was that it brought forth the myriad things of this "below-form" (hsing-hsia f ) or material world.' Instead of endless_ ly speculating on the mysterious origin, Han Confucianism con­fidently analyzed the specifics of present on tic realities; the latter held the key to the universe just as much as the former. It was only with the Neo-Taoists that disenchantment with the existents occurred, and a trend styled "repressing the mo in reverence for the pen" began.3 Since Wang Pig the .word wu took on the new meaning of absolute "nonbeing," a mathematical zero. The line in Lao-tzu (interestingly absent in the Ma-wang-tui Lao-tzu): " ... and being comes from nonbeing," became the basis for Wang Pi's nihilism. Confucian ming-ch£aoh , because it was a teaching fixated on names (ming, i.e. the subsequents, mo, of things), was looked upon as missing the origin. Confucius the Sage himself, however, was elevated above Lao-tzu precisely because, in know­ing the Tao, he was silent about it. He who knows does not speak.

When the Buddhist tradition found a foothold among Chin­ese intellectuals, the pen-mo value scheme was applied to it.-Aside from the partisan position already cited, there were those who argued that the Tao and the Dharma were essentially one pen and that the two teachings of the Buddha and Lao-tzu were historical mo-manifestations. The sentiment that stressed one origin for all three teachings, each penetrating the ultimate in its way, was fairly strong; and this metaphysical "One and Only" even became the basis of the doctrine of "sudden enlightenment."4 The basic para­digm of pen-mo, or its variant, pen-chii (origin and trace), was to be the framework for analysis from the Six Dynasties period down to the Ming-Ching syncretism. Pen-chi became the logic of the honj£ suz)'akuj doctrine in Japan.5 Its cousin, t'i-yungk (substance and function), evolved into a philosophical category for all schools in China.6 A full treatment of these issues would not be possible in this limited space; moreover, aspects of the Buddho-Taoist en­counter have already been introduced by other scholars .. Many of the pen-mo controversialists were crudely partisan and too predict­able; on the other hand, many of the syncretists were well-meaning and pious but lacked a discerning eye for the real issues. The exceptions are Chang Jung and Chou Yung, whose exchange of VIews IS partially preserved by Seng Yul in the Hung-ming-chz'.m

24

Two famous gentry Buddhists of their day, they argued for and against the basic equivalence of the Tao and the Dharma with a rare ability to anticipate each other. Unlike other debates, this one progresses internally, and some of the ideas evolved were incorpor­ated into subsequent thinkers' reflections on this issueJ Much has been written on the initial Neo-Taoist appropriation of the empti­ness (sunyata) idea by way of Wang Pi's wu (nonbeing). The dif­ferences between these two concepts are demonstrated here at length in the exchange between Chang Jung and Chou Yung. Both the substance and the impact of this exchange went beyond those of Seng Chao'sf earlier critique. The "pairing of concepts" (ko-io ), that is, mistaking wu for sunyata, did not end with Seng Chao but with Chou Yung's attack on both Taoism and the Ch'eng-shihP (Sa ty asiddh i) theory of "being and nonbeing" (yu­wu). For these reasons, the present article will take, to my know­ledge, the first comprehensive look at the letters of these two fifth-century figures.

The Parties

Chang Jung (444-497) was a scion of a noted Southern fami­ly which descended from a high official of the Chin dynasty. For generations the Changs had mingled well within gentry-Buddhist circles, and were on familiar terms with monks of ming (renown). They wrote treatises on matters of faith, patronized the Sangha, and wrote laudatory pieces for Buddhist masters upon their pass­ing away. In his youth, Chang Jung received a gift from the Tao­ist master Lu Ching-hsiu.q Known as the best of the Four Changs (the other three were his cousins), he was especially famous for· his understanding and argumentation: "an artist without a master." At his death he held in his left hand the Classic of Filz"al Piety and the Lao-tzu and in his right the shorter Prajiia-paramita Sutra and the Lotus Sutra, symbolizing his being at peace with the norms of the Confucian tradition, the Tao, the idea of emptiness or wisdom, and his devotion to the Buddha Sakyamuni.8 It was during an ill­ness sometime between 463 and 493 that he authored his "Family Instructions" (Men-luT )9 and sent it out to Ho Tien, Ho Yin, Kung Chih-kuei, Kung Chung-chih, and Chou Yung for their edification. The Hos and the Kungs were eminent families.

25

Chou Yung (Shan-tz'uP ) was of a family of similar eminence , though one of his arlcestors had been outspoken against the Bud-dhists. Yung himself went to the capital from Shu (Szechuan) and was renowned enough to be invited by Emperor Ming of the Sung dynasty to be his "intellectural" companion. A devoted Buddhist layman and gentry hermit, Chou Yung prided himself on his vege­tarianism and lamented still having a wife. He was knoWn especially for a now-lost treatise, "On the Three Schools," in which he dealt with three then-current typical Buddhist positions on the Two Truths-on the relationship between phenomenal reality (yu) and ultimate emptiness (wu). He received Chang Jung's "Family In­structions" some time after, and felt obliged to disagree with its equating of Buddhism and Taoism. Several scrolls of letters were exchanged between the two mz"ng-shz"ht (men of fame), but Seng Yu saw fit to excerpt only the first four letters, permitting Chou Yung to have the last word. The Hung-mz"ng-chz" has recently been critically edited with detailed notes and a Japanese translation by the Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyusho of Kyoto University. Without the Japanese effort in tracing the allusions and references the pre­sent Jask would have been much more difficult. This more inter­pretative approach, however, may be my contribution as well as my responsibility.l0

The Issues

Two basic issues may be drawn from the Chang-Chou corre­spondence. The first is the pen-mo paradigm, to which we have previously referred. Chou Yung questioned the assumption of equivalence in the "perennial philosophy" of Chang Jung. He therefore represented the "purist" Buddhist defending the faith. Our sympathy will probably vary according to where we ourselves stand on such matters: Chou Yung will be either "refreshingly clear-headed" or "unnecessarily tendentious."

. The second, pen-wu (original nonbeing), figures as a more substantive ideological issue. When the doctrine of emptiness was introduced to China, it was often understood a la Wang Pi: Things are empty (sunya) because they are "originally nothing" (pen-wu). "Being comes from nonbeing," says Wang Pi: "Nonbeing is the substance (the t'z", substratum) of being." The Chinese should not

26

be blamed too much for this misappropriation of the sunyata doctrine, because Chih-chien in his translation of the Prajiiii­param£ta Sutra chose pen-wu for sunyatii or tathata (suchness). "The Tathagata is pen-wu; the various dharmas too are pen-wu." It took Kumarajlva to settle on the term k 'ungU for sunya and sunyata, and Seng Chao to undermine the pen-wu interpretation. ll That interpretation says: .

Wu predates the myriad transformations and k 'ung is the beginning of the various forms. The people are entangled in the subsequent existents (mo-yu). By abiding psychically with pen-wu, the deviant ideas will cease.12

This interpretation translated the original Buddhist insight of the emptiness of the self-nature (svab-hava-sunya), of any given entity as £s, into the Han cosmogonic concern. It made sunyata into an a prz"ori source for all realities and missed the point of seeing what-is as such as empty. Seng Chao criticized the pen-wu school in his Chao-Iun,v stressing its unwarranted bias for the nihilistic:

They ... inclined towards nihilism, holding wu in high re­gard in their interpretation. Thus they identify the being of not~being (je£-yu-yu W ) as wu, and likewise the nonbeing of not-nonbeing (je£-wu-wu x ) also as wu. However, upon in­vestigation, the original text says that the not-being (je£-yu) is not truly being (wu-yu); and the not-nonbeing (je£-wu) is not truly nonbeing (wu-wu). Why do they misread it and insist on negating the being of not-being and the nonbeing of not-nonbeing? Theirs is nothing but a desire to hold onto nonbeing.13

The one-sided view of the pen-wu school ran indeed counter to the middle-path philosophy of the Buddhists (Madhyam£ka). Despite Seng Chao's alleged victory, the old mentality found a devious way to reassert itself, this time by relying on the Two-Truths dis­tinction. The Ch'eng-shih masters misappropriated this doctrine and relegated, in various fashions, the basic pen-wu mo-yu (origin­al nonbeing, subsequent being) structure into the two-tiered Realities (s£c).14 Realities are ultimately empty but in appearance seemingly real. As I have shown elsewhere, Chou Yung criticized this sophistry of compartmentalizing yu and wu in his San-tsung­lun.Y This treatise was known to Chang Jung. Aware ofthe nihil-

27

--------- ----

ist charge, Chang argued that Lao-tzu intuitively knew of the iden_ tity of yu and wu (being z"s nonbeing, or, form z"s emptiness) but that circumstances forced him to preach a state 6f wu outside the parameters of yu (existents). As we will see, this drew another volley of fire from the tireless dialectician Chou Yung.

The wu issue aside, we should not overlook the living person_ alities. Their dilemmas, their faith, their informed· outlook and ideas, their ability to articulate alien or new ideas in a native lan­guage, their humaneness and, I sense, that irrepressible "quarrel­someness" of mz"ng-shz"h salonists are transparent in the letters. Chang Jung's "Family Instructions,"15 incidentally, would predate the Fam£ly Instructz"ons for the Yen Clan of the same genre. The Yen compilation is usually regarded as the earliest surviving work of its kind, and in its comprehensiveness it still is.

My translation of the letters below is fairly complete as far as the major issues are concerned. The mutual point-by-point citations by the parties are left out, as are greetings etc.l6 I have tried to be both faithful and readable in the translation, as well as to elucidate the issues. Matters pertaining to religion and politics in the South will be appended towards the end.

Chang Jung's Men-Lu

28

For generations, our family has been devoted to the Buddha. On my mother's side, there has long been a reverence for the Tao. The Taoist and Buddhist traditions are not two in their attainment of the Ultimate. "Cultivating passivity without any stirring," the pen is reached-this is where they are the same. "Responding (to external stimuli) and thereby pene­trating all,"17 (the pen) accommodates itself to the (differ­ent) trace-subsequents, and differences arise. The situation is comp;trable to the fact that aithough the same music was not kept up (by different dynasties), the wisdQm of the Five Em­perors was not departed from. Or, although the same rites were not inherited, the sageness of the Three Kings was not unrevered as a model. How can it be said that their ways. are different just because of variance in time, or that their in­tentions are not one just because of divergences in dynastic practices?18 How can one follow the follies of the common people and question the (one common) spiritual Absolute? Now I see the man of Tao and the follower of the marga competing.19 Like the Confucians and the Mohists, they la-

bor on nghts and wrongs. Once upon a time a wild goose flew across the horizon, but at such a distance that it was difficult to tell what it was. The people of Yiieh thought it was a wild duck and the people of Ch'u thought it was a

. swallow. Among men there are differences (of opinion) like those of Ch'u and Yiieh, but the wild goose is nevertheless just one wild goose. This is because although the lucid pen is one, (each) man tends to regard his own view (alone) as faithful to it. The pen flows out into the traces and is dif­ferentiated, and we tend to gather around where it might happen to befall. You may all choose to be singlemindedly devoted to the Buddha's trace but let us not speak ill of the origin of the Tao.20

. Chang Jung circulated this men-lu, "penetrating to the origin of

. the two paths," among the two Hos and Kungs and Chou Ylmg, soliciting their reactions. "The song of the bird near its death is sad, as man too speaks well at his own twilight," Chang confessed dur­ing his illness. Fearful of the "frailness of the breath," astonished by the "unpredictability of life," and alert to the "seamless flow of time," he desired to leave behind a guide for his descendants.21

Chou Yung's Reply and Counter Questions

Chou Yung humbly thanked his friend but subtly stated his preference immediately. Next to the Buddha, he treasured Con­fucian norms. On a par with the Sage were the Yellow Emperor and Lao-tzu, whose profundity, despite the corruptions of their later spokesmen,22 was to be honored. He states, however,

I have abandoned previous opinions and insist upon differen~ tiating the pure from the less pure. Thus too, in my discern­ment I have separated out the red from the purple .... Where traditions agree or disagree cannot be glossed over. How they are the same or different should be proven with due refer­ences. What you said in your treatise-that they are one on account of the attained pen-seems to differ from my idea of similarity. How they differ on account of the times is also not what I mean by their difference.23

Having drawn the battle line, Chou Yung countered Chang'S thesis

29

paragraph by paragraph. He began with the issue of pen-i chi-iz (one origin, different traces).

You said that in their origin they are on~. What do you mean by this "origin"? In the Taoist tradition, this would mean es. sentially the Tao and Te chapters of the Lao-tzu, would it not? In the Buddhist tradition, this ought to refer in essence to prajna (wisdom). What the Tao-Te chapters value as the highest is the hsu-wu,aa the vacuousnonbeing. What prajiiii meditates upon is the thorough (psychic) reflection of the nature of reality, dharmata. Hsu-wu and dharmata may be similar in their passivity, but their ways of abiding in this (psychic) passivity are different. When you say, "In the at­tainment of the Ultimate, there is not-two," do you mean the attainment of the Ultimate within the hsu-wu, and do you mean that this is not-two vis-a-vis dharmata? Or do you mean that there is, beyond the two items here, a higher pen beyond? Or do you mean that there is no difference in the meaning of hsu-wu and of dharmata themselves? If there is aseparatepen, I would like to know what it is. If the two (pens) are not dif­ferent, I would like to know how they are not.24

Chou Yung raised the basic question against all who pose a theory of the unity of all philosophies or religions. Is the unity, the pen, drawn from one of the traditions, or beyond all known precedents in the traditions? If the former, then it would be biased; if the lat­ter, it would mean founding a new pan-tradition with no basis in any! If the pen is that of the two original traditions, how to recon­cile the two pens of hsu-wu and dharmata? Purists can always plague the compromiser25 chasing his "wild goose."

30

What you said-how the ways differ with changing times­is precisely where the teachings of the Buddha differ from the Tao. That the meaning cannot be one due to different periods is precisely how the teachings of the Tao depart from the Buddha's. The Tao and the Buddha are two, a matter of "either the duck or the swallow." However, what you honor as the pen is the one thing called the "wild goose." The way you straddle the Tao and the Buddha cannot but lose both in the end. I wonder on what basis you come to know of this (higher) pen, and by what principle you may so lightly regard it. If you would still consider the two teachings simultaneous­ly as pen, I am afraid that you can never resolve the emerging controversies from both sides. Even if you follow both teach-

ings and intuit their origin, the origin is glimpsed through the teachings themselves. If so, then you should, as it were, wear a deerskin loincloth and go about with the hermit's rod, watch­ing with disinterest the blind debates between the Confucians and the Mohists. What cause is there for you to be involved in the debate itself? However, as you have affirmed the mutual origins as true and suggested that the division in "the traces are both untrue, then you should abandon equally the "function of the two traces. How is it that, as "men gather where it might befall," you would diligently serve the Buddha alone and, in your cultivation of the breath and the embrace of the One, pay little homage to the Tao?26

The mystic-hermit who knows the union of teachings has always been allotted his niche in Chinese society, somewhat comparable to that of the Hindu sannyiisz"n, but left intentionally unstructured. Chou Yung would rather the loinclothed eremite stay outside the endless zsms of mundane men, but if Chang Jung so involved him­self with another theory, he should live by its implications. Even the mystic intuits the union through the medium of the teachings. To relegate the teachings to mere accidents, i.e. not essentz"al to the pen (in the manner of the antinomian Neo-Taoists), is to overlook the organic nature of pen-mo (in the original Han Confucian sys­tem). Means are no accidents. As Chou Yung himself was second­arily devoted to the words of Confucius for a different end, he concluded his letter with a further question to Chang J ung on the status of Confucius. Are there one pen and three mo? Or are not both pen and mo different in the three major teachings?27

Chang lung's Reply

In a common search for truth and unders~anding, Chang J ung thanked Chou Yung for his wise words, and perhaps reminded his critic that the treatise was written for a purpose. "I have yet to forget my body (or self), and therefore I still preserve feelings and sentiments. When the body disintegrates (or the self is emptied), it will metamorphize into the Ultimate. "28 There is even the sugges­tion that he delayed his departure in order to leave the Men-lu to his family. The above lines are, however, an apology for not having kept silent and not having remained aloof from all tendentious con-

31

troversies, because Chang Jung then explained, psychologically, what he meant by "attaining the ultimate," in a language shared by Buddhists and Taoists of the time.

The essence of the spirit is its ability to know. The Tao of Tao-Te is that it can be known. That which can know and yet does not know what can be known does not qualify to be "that which can know." That which can be known and yet is not known to that which can know is not truly "that which can be known." Therefore we know that "that which can know" must progress toward the Tao (the "known"), and "that which is to be known" (the Tao) must cognize the pro­gressing knower. [That is, spiritual wisdom in man and the Tao are ontologically one. 29 ] However inferior people stir up their feelings and ruffle up (waves upon the passive psyche's) re­flection,30 arousing desires and disrupting the spirit.31 Once the spirit is so activated, then the functions of the conscious­ness (shih-yung,ab derivative of the shen-t'iac )32 will rise and fall (fluctuate). Thereby the mind is turned upside down and directed toward the inferior, and the (original passive) reflec­tion is alienated from the Tao (its natural object). Now since Lao-tzu could concentrate his spirit ether (consciousness) until it attained a passive state and abode with the vacuous (hsu), in full control of the body, he could be a vessel of the luminous and embrace the One, residing in the unmoving and penetrating the passive. What is passive by nature can pene­trate,33 and therefore the reflecting can never cease. When the body abides in the vacuous, everything is harmonious and in tune with the Tao. If you want to deny Lao-tzu this passivity, how can that be? If you want to deny the equivalence be­tween passivity and the Tao, what basis is there? Now to posit one passivity with two different spirits, or to posit one passive spirit but two paths (i.e. Buddhist and Taoist), that I have never heard of. Therefore the attainment of the Ultimate must have the One as its nature ... The Emperors are five but the spirit is one; the Kings are three but the Tao is invariable. Can the squabble between the duck and the swallow settle the matter of the wild goose?34

Like most perennial philosophers, Chang Jung based his theory of the i-penad (one origin) on the mystical unity of the passive subject and the Absolute. Psychology acts as the proof of his metaphysics of the One. However, alert to current Buddho-Taoist debate, Chang Jung anticipated the distinction between Lao-Tzu's wu and the Buddha's k 'ung that he felt Chou Yung was going to raise. The

32

Buddhists had argued that they alone knew that "form is empti­ness" (a seemingly inclusive middle) while Taoists knew only their apparent opposition.

33

Although the doctrine of dharmata (as sunyata) intuits k'ung in the midst of matter, and the doctrine of hsu-wu indeed sets up a reality beyond yu (being), yet the two circle back and meet at one point. This you should consider somewhat. It is because the (Taoist) roving in emptiness banishes all (deviant) thought, and the mind brushes off the dust (or kle§a, defile­ments) by itself. And as the (Buddhist) mind does not waver, its union reaches to the (Taoist) above-form. Therefore in wang-yuae (forgetfulness of being), Lao-tzu is comparable to the Buddha, and in yu-wangaf (the cessation of being, i.e. emptiness)35 Sakyamuni does not displace Lao-tzu. As the spirit is free, the essence will be harmonious, the self forgot­ten, and a passive purity attained. The spirit then penetrates all, fulfilling its functions (in t,he world). At this level, I do not see any difference between Sakyamuni and Lao-tzu. With­in this framework, I can only endorse their similarity. Their attainment of the Ultimate is not two; those who empathize with this will envision the One. However, ever since things have been divided as stimuli, the psychic responses to them have been hard to reintegrate. The myriad forms and the sen­ses of sight and sound have interacted, and now subject and object are aligned on opposite sides.36 As the people's fix­ation is deep, the cure must be gradual. Therefore Lao-tzu hid the doctrine of "form as such (is empty)." He went along with what-is (yu, what the people had) without upsettin~ their feelings. ·He prized what-is-not (wu, what they had not), 7 try­iny to steer them to the right way. This is because things have their latent aspects and men their moments of aspiration for nonbeing. If one can wake to the Western Wind (Buddha) in the morning, dream of the Southern Genius (Lao-tzu) at night, can one not rest with the Han Spirit (Confucius) in the day? Now you may say that Lao-tzu failed to exhaust the meaning of wu (nonbeing); then you have not gotten my meaning. If you say he had penetrated wu (as sunya) but failed to pene­trate yu (being, also assunya), you have a point but it is still not what I meant. If you say that there is doubt whether he had so elucidated it in his teaching, then why would the Bud­dhist teaching, having itself penetrated being, still rely so heavily on the (yu-) traces? If at that point you would like to say that the Buddha relied on these in consideration of sit­uations (as upaya), it would then not be diffferent from Lao-tzu's practice of the same.38 .

Chang lung thus well defended his thesis of the union of the teach­ings at the ultimate level; for him, the Three Teachings were One in essence and different only in manifestation (end, trace, func­tion). To the other queries raised, Chang lung would not budge from his position (a) that the differences were accident<J.l, not es­sential; (b) that the "wild goose" transcended the either/or, and those who knew this would not be bothered with futile debates; (c) that he involved himself in the controversy only because he could not ignore such one-sided debates; (d) that he, from his standpoint, was no partisan 'as regards truth, as was charged; and (e) that he would rather Chou Yung not rally Confucius in order to "surround and stealthily attack" the Taoist. 'For him, the Three, nay, the Hundred Sages of various traditions only expressed One Truth.39

Chou Yung's Final Exercise of Dialectics

Chang lung'S qualifications of Lao-tzu's "nihilism," as well as his apology for his seeming silence on the greater "form is empti­ness" paradox, would have been sufficient safeguards against a les­ser critic in the days of Seng Chao. After Seng Chao, the' Ch'eng­shih masters-scholars of Harivarman's Ch 'eng-shih-lun (Satya­siddhisastra)-unknowingly deviated from the orthodox Sunyavada position of Nagarjuna. In their Buddho-Taoist synthesis, they too tried to perfect a philosophical position in support of "apparent being but ultimate emptiness." Often they relied precisely on the pen-mo paradigm., suggesting that reality is essentially empty but functionally real, i.e. t'i-wu yung-yuag (empty in substance but real in function). Chou Yung had already criticized this in his San-tsung­lun, and the best way to introduce this treatise without going into the whole question of its original form is to cite the Nan-Ch 'i-shuah account. After T'ang Yung-t'ung's emended version of this text, it should read:

Chou Yung authored the San-tsung-lun, establishing the Real­ist school (that would not deny provisional reality). Then he established the Nihilist school (that negates provisional real­ity) to undercut the Realist. Then he established the "Real-is-Empty" school to undercut both.40 .

Seng Chiianai supplied two ingenious metaphors to describe and to deride the imperfections of the first two schools. The Realist

34

"gnaws a chestnut empty," that is, he sees the substance of the meatless chestnut to be empty without questioning the reality of the untouched shell. The Nihilist "floats a melon in water," that

. is, negates its reality by pushing it momentarily into the water, but, in the next minute, permits the same to appear as rea1.41

The one compartmentalized yu and wu, being and nonbeing, into the "inner" (meat) and "outer" (shell); the other cleverly juxta­posed two opposites in one space (melon) in two different time brackets (in and out of water). Only the third school, seeing that "reality as such is empty," is qualified to have the highest insight. Most interpreters would place Chou Yung himself in the third school,42 but I think that in the exchanges with Chang Jung we can see that he was better than that. His position is typically Madhyam­ika, namely, not to have a position; his method is prasaJigika, the ability to "take and break" any position, master of all but mastered by none. Here we see the basic difference between Taoist hsu-wu and Buddhist sunyata (k 'ung). The Taoist is ultimately committed to an ontology ofthe hsu, the vacuously real, or to an antiontology of the wu, still the source of all beings.43 The Buddhist point is ul­timately more than just identifying opposites-one can find paral­lels to that in Chuang-tzu. It is to be free from all positions by re­alizing the antinomies in every position. It is the exercise of a philo­sophical dialectic-not an ontological assertion-in order to cease all mental games and cut through the web of our thought. Only with this in mind can we understand and properly translate Chou Yung's reply to Chang Jung's qualifi.cations.

35

Indeed, it is true that Lao-tzu hid the doctrine of "Matter as such (is empty)"-just as you say. However, I am afraid that is not yet the true "Matter as such." If that which can be hid­den is hidden, then that which hides it would be expansive.44

This doctrine (of an ontological Void) may not be limited to Lao-tzu himself. This is because being is being by virtue of its being known to things as being. Nonbeing is nonbeing by vir­tue of the fact that it is known to men as nonbeing.45 The manner in which Lao-tzu, abiding with being, pointed ahead to nonbeing is such that his (outlook) does not lie outside the above-described [subject-object, ontological] framework. This is the point in my humble treatise On the Three Schools: there I can take up or let go, bridle and let run [in a truly critical philosophy] in such a way that no one can transcend its dialectics. This is why the Buddha's teaching can exercise

its (subtle) meaning and snatch away common sentiments and ideas, and can apply words that go against the rules of lan­guage. The doctrine that "As it is form, therefore it is empty" therefore deserves to excel over all schools. Not having under_ stood this, how could Lao-tzu be counted within its rank?46

As the Neo-Confucians realized in the Sung period, it :was best not to argue with the Buddhists "lest one fall prey to their arguments." Whether Chou Yung was correct or not in his judgment, the record -ending with this letter-is in his favor. He was not totally negative toward the Taoists. The Taoist delight in hsu-wu was a needed cor­rective to the confused world's fixation with the teeming realm of yu (being). However, if Wang Pi and Ho Yenaj already conceded that Lao-tzu was inferior to Confucius, how could Lao-tzu have anticipated the wisdom of the still superior Buddha? Like other Buddhist spokesmen of this period, Chou Yung could cite the many manifestations of the Buddha and the doctrine of his final or re­sidueless teaching to prove the brilliance of the "Sun and Moon" (enlightened one). In the presence of this light, the lesser. torches of human opinion and the lesser expediencies should be abandon­ed.47 Chou Yung would not agree to the psychological reductionism of Chang Jung: that in passivity there is oneness irrespective of the traditions. The ways of abiding in passivity can apparently differ.

The freedom of the spirit of Lao-tzu is the freedom beyond the realm of being. The practice of harmonizing the essence and self-forgetfulness in the Buddhist tradition is aimed, how­ever, at abolishing both riipa and sunyata (form and empti­ness) ... The spirit can be passive and not be the same; the passivity varies and so do the two paths. What you have not heard, I have heard already.48

Denying the equivalence of the psychic states,. Chou Yung refus­ed to acknowledge the Taoist Tao as the Buddhist Tao. He de­fended it as follows.

36

What is gained (in the Taoist path) is the passivity of the spirit. What is lost, however, pertains to the emptiness of matter (wu-hsu). If it is the passivity gained through passivi­ty, it is not the ultimate passivity (or, it has not penetrated to the true nature of what constitutes passivity). If the (physical po) spirit is only spiritual within its own limits, it

is not the ultimate spirit (or,it has not thoroughly understood the nature of spirit).49

As long as the Taoists cultivated only the passive side of their being 'or the vacuo,us nature of things, they would be biased and not at­tain that Buddhist freedom from both extremes. Perhaps indirect­ly aware of the fact that Chuang-tzu also spoke of the freedom from oppositions, and consciously countering Chang Jung's claim that the Taoist knew thoroughly the nature of being and nonbeing (chin-yu, chin-wuak ),50 Chou Yung added the crowning touch:

The ability to exhaust both being and nonbeing (that is, to see into their individual, opposite natures) is reserved only for the most Ultimate of all men. The thorough knowledge of being and of nonbeing, I can grant the Taoist to have. But that state of mind known as "neither being nor nonbeing" the Taoist tradition has yet to reach. "Neither being nor non­being" is a doctrine about which even the Three Schools (in the San-tsung-lun) were obscured in their understanding.51

The original San-tsung-lun being lost, I have a suspicion that the "Neither being nor nonbeing" option lay beyond the original tri­partite division into the Realism of Being, the Nihilism of Non­being, and the positive identity of Provisional Reality is Empty. Pushed possibly by Chang Jung's defense of Lao-tzu, Chou Yung came up with a higher negation-neither provisional reality nor Emptiness-in the typical pyramidal negation of the Madhyamika tradition in China. I suggest this reading of the last line instead of the traditional one-that the fei-yu fei-wual. doctrine was to be in­cluded within the third school-because I feel Chou Yung was pres­sured by Chang Jung. In the next section, he was compelled again to dispute the orthodoxy of the latter's interpretation of Lao-tzu. If indeed Lao-tzu anticipated the Higher Truth, paramartha, in Buddhist Madhyamika, it would be found in the text.

37

Is it to be found in the Tao chapters? Is it to be found in the Te chapters? If you have gained this without reliance upon the two divisions, then (this theory of a union of the Buddhist and the Taoist tradi!ion) qualifies to be a third school by the side of Lao-tzu and Sakyamuni. Then you may establish your own school. It cannot be said to be established on Lao-tzu (or, it is not something that I dare to propose).52

There are some more passages to follow. Although I regret that the whole set ofle:ters has not bee~ pres~r:ed, I would agr~e with Seng Yu, the complIer, that the basIc posItIOns were stated III the initial exchange and that53 for all practical purposes we can consider them to have remained unchanged later. Chou Yung remained a Buddhist dialectician to the end, and Chang Jung passed away at peace with the Three Teachings in their Unity.

Historical SignzJicance

The debate between Chou Yung and ChangJung was not the first <;r the last of its kind in the Six Dynasties period (420-589). The Siinyavadins of China had prided themselves on intuiting the identity of opposites (form and emptiness) before, but, as I men­tioned earlier, Chou Yung was the most articulate and the most progressive in this period (Sung, 420-479). He was so pivotal that Chi-tsang,am the San-Iunan master in Sui (589-612), recruited him into the orthodox Madhyamika lineage.54 The honeymoon of Neo­Taoism and Prajiiaparamita Buddhism was breaking up.55 In the Sui-T'ang period, the so-called Sinicization notwithstanding, the major Buddhist patriarchs continued Chou Yung's critical stance against Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. One of the common charges a­gainst Taoism was its "otherworldliness." For those of us who un­critically associate Taoism with a celebration oflife and nature, and Buddhism with a cultivation of nirvii1Ja beyond this life, the charge appears rather peculiar. However, in their contemporary terms, Chou Yung and others indeed had a case. The Taoists were looking for nonbeing beyond the realm of things; the Buddhists could find the absolute where things simply were. The Bodhisattva's reaffir­mation of the world ("sarr-siira is nirviir].a") was better than the vain, selfish search for personal immortality. 56 The Buddha was a powerful savior, more universalistic and compassionate than the traditional Taoist sages. Chou Yung could say,

38

The Buddha responded to the world in manifestations that are endless. (He) appeared as the leader of the scholars (Confu­cius), as the Taoist national preceptor (Lao-tzu) ... as prime minister and the elder of communities. How is it that Lao-tzu had only one trace (manifestation)?57

The Taoists countered, of course, with their ovvn version-how Lao­tzu appeared in the West (India) as the Buddha-in another and cruder round of the pen-ma debates.57

The disenchantment between Taoism and Buddhism was in­evitable, for although Taoism helped to introduce the Buddhist faith due to their natural affinity, the same familiarity bred in time mutual contempt. The Buddho-Confucian controversies were more related to matters of civic and familial duties, matters that Buddhist apologists could accomodate with greater ease.59 The Buddho-Taoist controversies touched upon finer theoretical issues like sunyatii and WU, dharmata and hsil. For some, like Chou Yung, it became a matter of either/or. However, Chou Yung himself could feel at home with Confucius, as Confucianism was a less direct threat. It is perhaps significant that the Neo-Taoist style slowly waned as the Six Dynasties drew to a close·, and Sinitic Mahayana, confident in its autonomy, arose in Sui.60 An example of this is the following criticism directed against the Taoist tradition by Chi-tsang, continuing Chou Yung's enterprise. The Buddha is for­eign ("outer") and the Taoist is native ("inner").61 However, in terms of their worth, the former is deeper ("inner") and the latter is superficial ("outer"):

39

The outer teaching recognizes the one essence to all things; the inner teaching can clearly perceive the Three Times (past, present, future through which the Buddha lives).

The outer has yet to understand the workings of the five senses; the inner develops the six supernatural powers that penetrate to the most subtle.

The outer fails as yet to identify the myriad beings with the great vacuity; the inner is able to discourse on the real nature of all things (shih-hsiang,ao dharmata) without dis­rupting the provisional realities (chia-ming,ap prajiiapti).

The outer fails to abide in wu-weiaq and roves simultaneously among the myriad things; the inner establishes the real­ity of the various dharmas without removal of suchness as it is.

The outer still keeps to the gates of gain and loss; the inner is able to eliminate both extremes within the one principle (middle path) that is beyond all discursive words.

The outer has yet to permit the subject consciousness and the

object realm to cease; the inner perfects the mutual ex­tinction of the means (subject) and the focus of contem_ plation (object).62

Again, this might not be the fairest of indictments against ideolo­gical opponents, but the point is that the M-adhyamika has reached beyond naive ontology, realist or nihilist, has penetrated epistem­ology, and-in its critical philosophy or dialectics-has done away with the subject-object distinction as well as all conceptual dualities. Indeed, philosophical Taoism remained faithful to a simple na­turalism, and even present-day religious Taoism maintains, much to its credit, a concrete realism without all the secondary and ter­tiary reflections of the Buddhists.

It is always tempting to look for the sociopolitical correlates to ideologies. Much solid scholarship has demonstrated the social and political factors in the rise of Neo-Taoism, and how both the membership and the philosophy of the Neo-Taoists themselves changed in time. The Neo-Taoist movement signalled an intellec­tual dissatisfaction with Han Confucianism, especially when the Han state faltered. The Neo-Taoists were patronized by Ts'ao Ts'ao,ar a Realpolz"tiker who endorsed the old Taoist-Legalist tie and the commitment to naturalism. The movement was curtailed by the rise of the conservative Confucian Chin rulers, the Ssu-ma3S

family. The Neo-Taoists became less political, sometimes even fa­talistic (Hsi K'ang,at from a lower background). The collapse of the North made the Buddhist option even more attractive ... and so on. However, by the fifth century, so-called elite philosophizing had been demonopolized. The Buddhist Sangha enfranchised many brilliant minds from lesser backgrounds, with no direct political position or clan ties; the Mou Shan tradition of religious Taoism also championed the cause of the earlier Southern shamanistic tradition, supported by earlier settlers. Both power bases grew and flowered in the Liang period later on. The ideological com­petition between the two camps was natural.

However, all these sub currents had almost nothing to do with Chou Yung and Chang Jung, at least not in any direct or traceable way. The debate they had was not a debate between a Buddhist and a Taoist, but one between two gentry Buddhists with different views on Lao-tzu's philosophy. Chang Jung was a Buddhist layman from a Buddhist family who happened to ask his relatives not to

40

deride "the pen of the Taoists" "because he felt the pen was One. lIe was? when compared with Chou Yung, from a more established family, whose members had held a greater number of political .offices. Chou Yung, on the other hand, was more eminent as an individual, and in spite of his ties with the court and his official posts, seems to have been a hermit. His more purist understanding of the Dharma created in him a sharper tongue as a spokesman for the superiority of the Dharma. He seems to have compartmental­ized his life in such a way that Confucian duties were actively em­braced without overlap. For Chang Jung, the synthesis of pen was the only proper solution. Their disagreement led to no political reprisal-that was the style of the North, not that of the gentry Buddhists of the South. As belles lettres, their views made nice conversation in the circuit of the salons, with minimal impact on the Sangha itself.

CHINESE GLOSSARY

a~iM s rlI~ al {i~

bJiliJ~ t i5± aj filJ~ c ;1fs:*1f~ u~ ak m1fm~ dj( v aIDfff al ~f1f~f~ e ;1fs:~ w ~f1f1f am*_ f M""F x ~f~~ an =~11€ g.:E5B5 -.-=,.=,t,. ao ~*§ y =-mEHU h i5Mt z *-Ji!iJji~ ap ~i5 i;1fs:Ji!iJji aq 4ft1i~

.. j ;1fs:~H~Ji!iJji ar lft#k k 1*Jfl aa 1!&~ as I§j,~

1 {iiffi ab ~Jfl at $~ m~l3f:!~ ac jjJ${;$: au :Ril'~jt n {ia ad -* av r~IDfff otlrit ae ;g1f aw ~* p nlG~ af 1f;g ax '/llf q~~W¥ ag 1*~Jfl1f ya ~ r r~7$ ah mJfifW: az jjJ$~

41

NOTES

University of California at Davis. 1. The present essay is related to two others, Whalen Lai, "Sinitic

Understanding of the Two Truths Theory in the Liang Dynasty: Ontological Gnosticism in the Thoughts of Prince Chao-ming," and "Further Develop_ ments on the Two Truths Theory in China: Toward a Reconstruction of Chou Yung's San-tsung-lun," both forthcoming in Philosophy East and West.

2. T'ang Yung-t'ung, Han Wei liang-Chin Nan-pei-chao Fo-chao-shih (reissue; Peking: Chung-hua, 1955), pp. 465-66.

3. Ibid., p. 469. 4. Ibid., p. 467. 5. The tendency among Japanese scholars is to trace this theory back

to Chih-i the T'ien-T'aiau master instead of earlier; see Alicia Matsunaga, The Buddhis~ Philosophy of Assimilation: The Historical Development of the Honju-Suijaku Theory (Rutland, Vermont: Charles .E. Tuttle, 1969).

6. Down to Chang Chi-t'ung's ill-fated and much-maligned theory of "E.astern Learning as t'i; Science of the West as yung."

7. Primarily the San-Iun adoption of Chou Yung's critique by Chi-tsang. 8. T'ang, Fo-chiao-shih, pp. 428-29. 9. Ming Confucians probably saw it as their task to change the Buddhist­

sounding lu (also used for vinaya) into li.mav (treatise). 10. Gumyoshu Kenkyu (Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1975), III, pp. 358-

75. Space dictates that allusions go without notation here, and my diverg­ence from their translation be on record instead of justified at every point.

11. T'ang, Fo-chiao-shih, pp. 238-242. Most detailed is the appendix II, "Honwugi no genryu," in Imai Usaburo, Sodai Ekigaku no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Meiji tsusho, 1958), pp. 478-84.

12. This is Chi-tsang's reconstruction attributed to Tao-anaw (sic); see Tazsho Daizokyo (henceforth T.) 42, p. 29a.

13. T. 44, p. 152a. 14. The Two Truths were mistaken as realities instead of ways of know­

ledge; see Whalen Lai, "Sinitic Understanding of the Two Truths Theory ... " 15. It is not clear if Chang Jung had not excerpted this piece from a

larger work. 16. Full exchange in T. 52, pp. 38c-41b. Henceforth, I will cite

Gumyoshu's translation. 17. See Gumyoshu Kenkyu, p. 359, note 4; from the I Ching, Appended

Remark A: "I, Change, is without thought, wu-wei; passive, not moving, (the milfoil sticks) responding will penetrate (to the structure of reality)."

18. The argument that philosophy should change according to the times was one endorsed by many in this period to account for the advent of new faiths.

19. In the pen-mo debate, sometimes the Buddhist and the Taoist were aligned in the camp of Tao-chia in opposition to the ming-chiao of the Confucians; see T'ang, Fo-chiao-shih, p. 466. The word tao is used twice here.

20. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, pp. 358-59.

42

21. Loc. cit. 22. Ibid., p. 361, referring probably to "religious Taoism." 23. Loc. cit. 24. Loc. cit. 25. In reverse, the "universalist" will charge the "purist" for his partic-

ularism. 26. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, p. 362. 27. Ibid., p. 363. 28. Loc. cit.; my interpretation differs. Feelings, ching,ax are natural to

life. 29. This subject-object analysis was both Buddhist and Taoist. 30. Chao,ay illuminate, reflect, is an attribute associated with the passive

mind. It is endorsed by both Taoists and Buddhists; the mirror analogy is also shared.

32. Shih is considered to be mo, yung just as spirit; shen or hsin is re­garded as pen, t'i; the practice was current already in Han yin-yang classifi­cation.

33. The spirit is passive and it can penetrate, d. shen-t'ung. az 34. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, pp. 364-65. 35. A play on the order of words, wang-yu and yu-wang; a more subtle

play is found in the last line also, but it is less obvious in English. 36. Basic assumptions are k 'an-yin, stimulus and response, and the dif­

ferentiation of subject from object after sense-contact takes place; this is in Han thought though shared by the Buddhists in a different vocabulary.

37. Ambiguity here is due to the term yu (being, have) and wu (non-being, have-not).

38. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, pp. 365-66. 39. Ibid., pp. 366-68. 40. Cited in T'ang, Fo-chiao-shih, p. 741; translation here rearranged. 41. Ibid., pp. 742-47. 42. Ibid., pp. 750-753. 43. See the view of Taoist scholar, Michael Saso, stating the issue from

the Taoist side in an article to appear in a new series, Michael Saso, ed., Buddhist and Taoist Studies I (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1978): volume in print but nbt available to the writer at the moment.

44. Meaning unclear; it seems to suggest an ontological void or womb. 45. That is, this is direct affirmation and not yet dialectical introspection. 46. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, p. 370. 47. Ibid., p. 371. 48. Ibid., p. 372. 49. Ibid., p. 373. 50. This charge however was still used later by Buddhists against the

Taoists. 51. Gp. cit., p. 373. 52. Ibid., p. 374. 53. Ibid., p. 375. 54. See note 1 above for essays related to this larger issue.

43

55. See Tokiwa Daijo, Bukkyo to ]ukyo, Dokyo (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko 1930) that surveys the exchange between the Three Teachings, esp. pp. 598-605~

56. The greatest conflict came between early Pure Land masters and the religious Taoists, with T'an-luan's stand far from being re~olved.

57. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, p. 371. The Japanese honji-suijaku logic is fully evident here.

58. T'ang, Fo-chiao"shih, p. 466. Taoists proposed their counter-theory of Lao-tzu civilizing the barbarians, Lao-tzu hua-hu.

59. Often resolved on the Buddhist side by (a) apologetics proving the ethical committments of the Buddhists, up to pairing the paiicasz1a with the five Confucian virtues, or (b) Hui-yuan's stand against the king, based, none­theless, on the positive function of such hermits and monks who t 'i-tao , embody the Tao, or are in communion with the pen, for the spiritual welfare of the state.

60. The critical stance against Lao-Chuang of the early masters in Sui­T'ang Buddhism tended to wane after 700 A.D.; Kamata Shigeo in his various works touches on this.

61. T. 45, p. lc lists the geography, but 2a reverts back to the traditional inner/outer distinction used already by Taoists who regard themselves to be "inner" (also, pen). .

62. T. 45, p. 2a.

44

GU:Q.aprabha's Vinaya-sutra and his Own Commentary on the Same

by P. V. Bapat

I have written a paper on GUl}aprabha's V£naya-siitra 2 and have given an idea of the general contents of the same by giving the names of its various chapters and indicating their correspondence with the V£naya-vastu of the Mula-Sarvastivadins and with the Pali Vinaya.

Gur;taprabha (5th c. A.D.?) has written his own commentary (Sva-vyiikhyiina) on the V£naya-sutra and he reveals several pecu­liarities of the Buddhists, which are quite novel to orthodox schol­ars. Elsewhere3 , I have drawn attention to the use of the word krt by the Buddhists to indicate the abbreviation of a passage, almost similar to the use of pe (peyyiilam) in Pali texts.

In this paper I want to draw attention to some other peculiar­ities of the Buddhists.

(i) iidau Kriyiipadasya prayogal}. (The use of an act£on­word at the beginning.)

GUI,laprabha, while commenting on the Vinaya-sutra No.267 Kiirayeranpiidadhiivanikiim, says (Plate Ill-A, Lines 2-3): -

kiimakiiro'tra, na niyama iti sandarsaniirtham iidau kriyii­padasya prayogal}.

To show that there is an action of the will, an option, and not an inexorable rule, there is the use of the action-word at the begin­ning [of the siitra] , which says: "They may cause to be built a place where [monks] can get their feet washed". In the Sanskrit text of the siitra, the action-word karayeran is used at the beginning of the siitra. This suggests that the managers of a vihiira may, if they like, construct a place where monks could wash their feet. There is no rule binding upon them to construct such a place. This seems to be a very novel usage and Pfu:tinian scholars assure me that

47

such a usage is not met with in orthodox grammatical systems. . In another place of th~ s~me commenta~y (Plate IVB, Page 1,

Lme 7) Gur;taprabha has a sImIlar remark, whIle commenting upon sutra No. 561:· ,

kathanarrr- bhik~u1'}ya'ntaritam antarayiko syiid vii "Declaring· by the Bhik~u~ the impedimentary obstacles"

This is a matter to be done in both the Sanghas. This is ~ matter that involves a sense of shamefulness on the part of the Bhik~u:r;Ii (lajjii-nimittam etat). The commentary adds:

uk'tarrr- tasmiit kiimaciira-vijiianartham iidau kriyapada_ prayogal;-.

"Therefore, it is said: the action-word (kathana) is used at the beginning [of the sutra] to indicate the voluntary nature of action". The declaration depends upon her will.

This additional example confirms the intention of Guna­prabha in attributing a peculiar interpretation to the use of acti~n­word at the beginning of a sutra.

(ii) Woman's age at the time of her ordination into the Buddhist Order. GUJ).aprabha, while commenting upon sutra 566

dviidasatva'Y[L var~aniirrr- upasampad vyu¢hatiiyiirrr-"In the case of a married woman, the ordination requires

twelve years", says: kumdrikdyii~ virrzsati-var~atvarrz, g!ho~itiiyii~ dviidasa-var~a­tvam "In the case of an un-married [woman] the requirement is

of twenty years, and in the case of one who is married into [ another] household, the requirement is of twelve years". In the case of a S£k~ama1'}ii (trainee), the ages prescribed by him are respectively eighteen and ten.

This seems to be strange. Why is this distinction made between a married and unmarried woman? The age-limit of twelve years in the case of a married woman is also mentioned in Pali Bhikkhuni Piit£mokkha, Paci. 65-67; that of twenty years in the case of an unmarried girl also in the same work, Paci. 71-73. In Pali Sutta­vibhanga, there is no indication as to how this period is to be counted, beyond that she has not reached the. age of twelve or twenty (Vin. iv. 322, 327). In Sanskrit Bhiksu1'}z Vinaya also there is the mention of the limit of twelve (Paci. 100, Page 245). E. Waldschmidt and Gustav Roth explain that this period of twelve is to be counted from marriage.4

48

In Pali Vz"n i. 66, and Bhikkhuni Piitz"mokkha, Paei. 75, we have the expressions, Bh£kkhu dasavasso and Bhikkhunzparipur:trta-

. dvadasa-vassa, in respect of a Bhikkhu or Bhikkhuni, who is quali­fied to give ordination (upasampadii) to another. It is the belief of the Buddhists that with ordiation a new regenerated life begins and so their age is understood in Buddhist eircles to begin with or­dination. So in their cases their age is counted from their ordina­tion. So a Bhikkhu of ten years standing and a Bhikkhuni of twelve years standing from ordination is qualified to give ordination to

. others. In. Bhikkhuni Piicittiya 65, there is the expression gihigata'f!/­

(corresponding to which in the Bh£k~urti Vinaya, Paei. 100, we have grhi-caritaf!L) and so there is no justification to believe that the age is not to be counted from birth. There are passages in the Sutta-vibhanga which may throw light on the problem of twelve years. dvadasa-vassa ca kho bhikkhave gihigatii khama hotz" sitassa, urthassa, etc.: "A married woman, 0 Bhikkhus, is able to endure cold, heat, etc ... " On the contrary) about an unmarried girl below twenty, it is said that she is unable to endure cold, heat (akkhamii hoti sitassa, u1J-hassa, etc. Vin. iv. 322, 327). So here we get the explanation of the distinction deliberately made between a married woman and an unmarried girl.

Bhadanta Maramba Ratanasara of Vidyalmkiir campus of the University of Sri Lanka in reply to my query writes that the Sin­halese Sanna (Comment) on the relevant word "twelve" explains that the period of twelve years is to be counted from the time of conception (patisandh£to patthaya). This is a clear gloss preserved in the Sinhalese tradition, though in Buddhist Theravada countries the tradition of a Bhikkhun'i Sangha is lost. Professor A. Hirakawa of Tokyo also writes to me that in China, Korea and Japan there are really no Bhikkhunis. There are only sriimanerzs. He says that in the Patimokkhas of di~ferent schools preserved in Chinese, the word twelve is to be interpreted as twelve from birth.5 There is no justification for interpreting it as twelve from marriage.

And this very interpretation is further strengthened by GUJ?a­prabha.

(iii) Dharmas and anudharmas of a woman-trainee Gu~aprabha's dharmas in which a woman is to be trained

before ordination are different from those in Pali. He mentions six dharmas and six anudharmas (virtues and minor virtues) (Plate

49

IVA, Page 1, Lines 5-7). The six dharmas are: she should not (1) go alone on a road, (2) cross a river, (3) touch a man, (4) sleep with another in a lonely house, (5) go on an errand as a messenger_ woman, and (6) conceal the moral lapses of others.

Bhikkhunz Vibhanga (Vin. iv. 319), however, while comment_ ing upon Piicz"ttiya 63 mentions as six dhammas, the five rules of a layman's good conduct (pancaszla) , namely, abstaining from murder, falsehood, stealing, intoxicating drinks and violation of celibacy, along with the sixth, abstaining from food at an impro­per time (that is, after mid-day).

The six anudharmas, which are not found in relation to a woman under training in Pali Vinaya, are given by GU1!-aprabha as follows:

(1) Not to accept gold or silver, (2) not to shave off hair on private parts, (3) not to dig earth, (4) not to cut green grass, (5) not to relish what is not given, and (6) not to relish any kind of storage.

Most of these rules of dharmas and anudharmas are covered in the rules of Patimokkha for Bhikkhunis, but they are not pre­scribed for women-trainees in Pali. Mahiivyutpatti (9320-21) also mentions these words but does not specifically enumerate them.

NOTES

1. "Discovery of a Sanskrit Text: Vinaya-sutra", Proceedings of the 26th Session of the International Congress of Orientalists (held in New Delhi in 1964), 3, Part 1 (1969),343-4.

2. Dr. V. V. Gokhale and myself have been working for some years upon GUI).aprabha's Vinaya-sutra and his own commentary and we soon hope to prepare a critical edition of the first chapter of these texts for the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna. We must make it clear that this sutra text on which we are working is not the one given in the Microfiche plates MBB-1971·54, which were supplied to us by Dr. Christopher S. George of the Insti­tute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York. That sutra is some ordinary text extracted from Sarva-Thathagata Dvadaiasahasra-Parajika text related to Vinaya, for the Buddhist laymen of Nepal. The manuscript of that text is dated 1793.

3. Journal of the Departme~t of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, 1 (Dec. 1971),58-62.

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4. E. Waldschmidt and Gustav Roth, Bruchstuche des Bhiksunr-Prati-mok~a der Sarvastivadins, p. 245, notes 3-4. . .

5. For another additional evidence, see Vin.-sutra, Bhiksuni-Vibhanga, Prayascittika 49:

Piir7;iztliylim dviidasa-var~atvasya upasampad var~li1J.iim: when the twelfth year is completed, there is the time of ordination;

and Sutras 54-55:

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Upasamplidane dvlidasa-var~atvlid arvlik pari1J-rtayal;; virrtsater anyasyiil;: In the case of a married woman, there is ordination when twelve years are completed; before that (there is the time of training); in the case of another, the period is of twenty.

---- ---~~ -----------------

Keci, "Some," in a Pali Commentary

by 1. B. Horner

When I Was translating the Buddhava:rp.sa Commentary (BvA), called Madhuratthavilasini, under the title of Clarifier of the Sweet Meaning!, I became interested in the references to ked, "some", . that occur there. These amount to seventeen. Here I propose to put forward, without criticism, merely a selection of these after making a few introductory remarks.

It would seem that even as the compilers of the Pali Canon and commentaries knew of the PoraI).a or Ancients who were their predecessors and could cite their sayings, so too the commentaries knew what can only be presumed to be some of their contemporar­ies who, like the compilers, devoted time and thought to the right commentarial explanations of canonical words and phrases. These commentaries, as we now have them, called these contemporaries of theirs by such terms as eke, or more frequently ked, both mean­ing "some"; they also knew "others" (as unspecified as are ked) as anne and as apare. The indexes to some Pali Text Society pub­lications, but by no means all, list references to the POraI).a. None, I think, lists the references to keci, eke, anne, or apare, with the outstanding exception of the Vocabulary to the Suttanipata Com­mentary which also includes that on the Khuddakapatha Com­mentary. Here therefore a good lead is given into one of the "un­discovered corners of Pali literature" as Dr Lily de Silva calls it in her pioneer, but short discussion of attempts made in the Suman­galavilasini-tika(DAT) to identify the upholders of a view intro­duced now and again by the Sumangalavilasini (DA) with the words keci vadanti, some say2. She cites DA passages where the phrases keci vadanti and eke vadanti occur. She also gives DAr's inter­pretations of DA conceptions of the views held by eke and ked and of who these eke and ked were supposed to be.

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Dealing solely here with the Buddhavarpsa Commentary (BvA), I will also deal solely with the views and readings it attributes to keci, one reason for this being that I find no references to eke there at all. To speak of anne and apare as well would lead me too far afield,. though the BvA references to them are very sparse.

It seem·s that the Pali Commentaries, as finally formulated, might agree with, disagree with, or make no comment on, thus ap­parently accepting what they record keci to say, vadantz", or to read, pathanti, presumably in the ancient commentarial manu­scripts, potthake. This suggests that at least some of their views were considered sufficiently important or interesting for notice in the Commentaries, though of course we have no means of know­ing how many were ignored or, supposing some were in fact ig­nored, what were the reasons for doing so. We can, however, say that such of their views as are recorded are not necessarily re­garded with disfavour. They were not quoted for the sake of showing them to be incorrect or holding them up to ridicule. Rather, it might be that their views were quoted in order to support, even perhaps to justify or lend weight to the commen­taries' own interpretations.

For example, of the views ascribed to keci fourteen times in the Suttanipata Commentary, there appear to be twelve times when they are accepted and accepted almost as if they add to knowledge. Similarly in BvA fourteen of the sixteen or seventeen occurrences of what keci are recorded there to say or to read are apparently concurred with since no adverse criticism is made. This leaves only two out of the total number that incur definite dis­approval.

This brings us to the question of the identity of keci. Who were they? Can we know for certain? One supposes that they were knowledgeable men, devoting time and thought to the Buddha's teaching and the manner in which it should be understood and perpetuated. Further to that, I can only say at present that DAr is of the opinion they were residents, not of the Mahavihara at Anur­adhapura, but of the Uttaravihara (DAr I 160 164 289, II 155) or of the Abhayagiri (DAr I 207 316)3 both also at Anuradhapura and assuming these two names do not refer to one and the same Vihara, though it is more likely that they do.4

Unfortunately BvA throws no light at all on the identity of keci. That is one matter. How little these Theras of old realized

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they were compiling for a posterity that after 2,500 years would still be enormously interested and curious! But there is nothing to be done at this distance of time. The other matter is the impor­tance of collecting all the views that all the -Pali commentaries ascribe to keci and so forth. There is much work still to be done on the commentaries', and many aspects remain to be explored for a fuller understanding of their structure, methods and function. Though keci may not be of prime significance in themselves, it is obvious they commanded a degree of interest and respect and should not be lightly brushed aside. My attempts to begin to collect the views attributed to them in BvA, and in BvA only, now follow. Only a selection is given here, however, but enough I hope to convey some idea of the treatment accorded to them. Whether other commentaries show similar or different attitudes to ked is a matter wide open to investigation.

(1) BvA, p. 13: "But some read: The Lord, chief in the world, supreme of men, was asked by a host of Brahmas, their hands clasped", ked pana: Bhagava ti Zokiidhipati naruttamo katanjaZi brahmagar;,ehi yiidto ti pathantz~ instead of, as at BvA 5: Brahmii ca lokiidhipatz" Sahampati katanjali anadhivararrt ayiicatha.

No comment made.

(2) BvA, p. 28: "Some read: in the zenith adorned with jewels", nabhe ratanama'Y!¢itan ti pa~hanti ked, as does Bv I 5.1t would seem BvA might prefer to read sabbaratanama'Y!q,itan, adorned with all the jewels, and saying nothing about the zenith.

No comment. .

(3) BvA, p. 65 on Bv IIA 1: "A city named Amara means that the city was named both Amara and Amaravati. But some ex­plain it even here in another way. How can they when this was the name of the city?"-keci pan 'ettha annena pi pakiirena var;,fLayanti; kif!L tehi riama'f!1- pan' eta'f!1- tassa nagarassa?

We are not told what is ked's explanation. Here there is a reprimand.

(4) BvA p. 76 on Bv IIA 30: "Possessed of eight special qual­ItIes means: possessed of eight special qualities spoken of thus: with the mind composed, quite purified, quite clarified, without

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blemish, without defilement, grown soft and workable, fixed, im­movable, I gained, I procured power in the superknowings (a.t.tha­gur:tasamupetan ti evar[L samahite citte ... evarp, vuttehi a.tthagury,ehi samannagatam abhinnabalam aharim anesin ti attho). But some say: Endowed with the eight happinesses of recluses, and that these are: not appropriating wealth and grain '" ( the eight are now specified, and may be compared with Jataka \7, p.252-3). These (i.e. "some", just above) say: Endowed with the eight hap­pinesses of recluses, I created a hermitage - thus making a con­nexion with the hermitage. This does not agree with the text": keci pana: atthahi samar;asukhehz" upetar[L; atth' imani samary,a­sukhani nama dhanadhaiiitapariggahabhavo ... imehz" atthahi sama­r:tasukhehi upetar[L samupeta1?l assama1?l mapesin ti, assamena sam­bandha1?l katva vadanti. Tarrt pa.liya na sameti.

Thus the interpretations postulated by "some" could hardly be more clearly repudiated. According to the BvA compiler the interpretation is connected with a material thing, namely a her­mitage, rather than with the mind or mental activities, citta, as is intended by the text, pa.H. Not to agree with or tally with the text is quite a bad error on the part of any commentarial compiler.

Reprimand.

(5) BvA p. 152 on Bv IV 29: "samkilesamarary,a-p tadii ti .. , keci: sammohamarattarrt tada ti pa.thanti: dying then with defile­ments (present) ... some read: dying then with confusion (present)". Confusion is one of the defilements.

No comment.

(6) BvA p. 201 on Bv XII 26 explains cando taragar:te yatha (as the moon in a host of stars) by saying: yatha gagane paripur;­r:tacando taragarJe obhaseti pakasati evam eva sabbii pi disa obha­seti ti attho,"as a full moon in the heavens ma!<-es effulgent and illumines in a host of stars even so did he make effulgent all the, quarters". To this it adds: keci cando pa"!-r:taraso yathii ti pathanti: "some read: as the moon on the fifteenth (day)", and comments that "the meaning is quite clear", so uttanattho va. This is because the full-moon day and the fifteenth day (of the month) are reck­oned to be one and the same. Thus it is apparent that for keci's wording here there is

Acceptance.

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(7) EvA p. 230 on Bv XVIII 12 which reads c'atuva'fl:1Japari_ vuta1fL where va1J1Ja appears to mean something like "kinds", for BvA explains the compound as clltuparisaparivuta1fL, "surrounded by the four companies" which, as it says, comprise warrior-nobles brahmans, householders and recluses. It then adds catuva'fl:1Jeh£ parivutan ti pathanti ked, " some read: surrounded by the four va'Y!1Jas". But whether keci's understanding of va1J1Ja differed from the commentarial one and for ked meant, for example, caste, the four castes, or whether there was merely a difference in grammat­ical construction is not easy to know.

No comment.

I hope I have put forward enough examples to indicate that on this one subject alone the Commentaries, albeit one Comment­ary only, contain a wealth of interest. I believe ked and their in­terpretations are recorded with more or less frequency in probably all the Commentaries. These also, on occasion and frequently in Samantapasadika, the commentary on the Vinaya, name their sources, the ancient commentaries such as tha Maha-atthakatha, the Kurundi and the Mahapaccari.5 To collect their opinions ex­pressed and preserved in the commentaries as we have them today would be to render a good service to Pali commentarialliterature, and should provide a valuable study.

NOTES

1. To be published by the Pali Text Society as Sacred Books of the Buddhists No. 33.

2. Lily de Silva, ed., Dtghanikayatphakatha(ikii L"inatthapa'l!fwnii. [DAr] (London: PaIi Text Society). Vol I lix f.

3. See DAr I p. LX. 4. See Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, s.v. both Uttaravihara and

Abhayagiri where it is said, "In the Chronicles Abhayagiri is referred to under several names", one of which is Uttaravihara.

5. Mrs C.A.F. Rhys Davids in Buddhist Psychological Ethics, p. xxviii gives a list of six ancient commentaries, known in particular to Buddhaghosa.

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Comments on Zen

by M. Kiyota

This short paper is a review of Zenkei Shibayama, Zen Comments on the Mumonkan (tr. into English by Sumiko Kudo). New York and Scarborough, Ontario: A Mentor Book, New American Library, 1974.366 pp. Glossary and Index. Paperback.

This book consists of Shibayama's te£sh8 on the popular Mumonkan (Wu-men kiian) , composed by Wu-men in China in early 13th century. Te£sho are instructions on the goroku, a col­lection of essential sayings of past Zen masters. Mumonkan con­sists of 48 such sayings, each commented upon by Wu-men. Zen Comments on the Mumonkan consists of Shibayama's tez"sho on the Mumonkan. Shibayama was the roshi of Nanzenji Monastery (representing the Rinzai tradition of Zen), Kyoto, from 1948 to 1967. He is a qualified tez'sho master. In this work, the Mumonkan is translated in its entirety with Shibayama's own tez"sh8 added. Both are rendered into English by Sumiko Kudo, a long-time personal (and faithful) secretary to the roshi, and edited by John Moffit. Kudo, I feel, deserves the highest praises for interpreting ideas conceived and composed in a language (frequently expressed in terse classical Zen vernacular) rooted in a tradition other than the language into which she translates them. For this type of work requires not only familiarity with the languages (classical Zen vernacular, modem Zen Japanese, and English) but also consider­able insights into the culture that those languages represent. This work was occasioned by an invitation to the r8sh£ by Colgate Uni­versity to deliver a series of lectures on Zen, an enterprise ap­parently realized through the good offices of Professor Kenneth Morgan.

This work provides many of us-absorbed in the painstaking work of textual exegesis, thematic contextualization, and philo-

57

sophical interpretation of Buddhist texts and systems of thought_ a "refreshing breeze," for it communicates the Dharma through direct discourse and simple metaphors without the contrivance of logical structure and intellectual manipulation 'of ideas. This is im­portant, for Zen ultimately consists of an experiential process, not a noetic philosophy to be apprehended simply by the intellect, as Shibayama rightly points out. To this end, Professor Morgan de­serves credit. For, after the death of Charles Moore, a platform to enable native Asian philosophers and religious practitioners to speak their minds freely-from the perspectives of their own philo­sophical tradition and religious training and without the imposi­tion of Western concepts and bias-has not been adequately pro­vided. In passing, it might be pointed out that Professor Morgan has been involved in this type of what we might call a reverse "out-reach" program, without the strain of 'cultural imperialism,' since the fifties. The Path of Buddha, which he compiled and edited in the late fifties, represents the culmination of such ef­forts. Such a breed of man is in short supply nowadays.

In reviewing a book of this type-a translation of teisho plus a teisho on tez"sho by a teisho master-it is meaningless to cite one's own preference of terms, or, for that matter, to criticize the contents of the teisho per se, because teisho consists of an intui­tive insight (prajiiii) which is beyond the realm of conceptual thought. We should, as Professor Morgan has seemingly done, en­courage the practitioner to speak his own mind in a manner he de­sires. Nevertheless, we must make clear that there is a distinction between religious instructions designed to 'enlighten' people (keimo, as the Japanese would gently put it) and scholarship. It is this difference which I wish to point out. Furthermore, the fact that this work represents a product of a reverse "out-reach" pro­gram does not, by any means, mean that it cannot be criticized (no matter how useful it may be in terms of keimo). But my cri­ticism is not directed to the specific contents of the teisho, the manner in which they are presented and translated, nor the intent with which Professor Morgan encouraged the publication of .this work. It is directed to issues to which, I feel, this work has not ad­dressed itself squarely: the content of the experiential, the specific meaning of the term "no reliance on letters," and the very nature of teisho itself. This book is reviewed from the perspective of modem Buddhology.

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Throughout the work, the roshz" insists on the priority of Zen experience-echoing one of D.T. Suzuki's major themes-and he plays down the role of "letters/scripture" (the terms "letters" and "scripture" are used interchangeably in this work). The fact remains that there is no school of Mahayana developed in East Asia which does not emphasize the experiential (my work, Sh£n­gon Buddhism: Theory and Practice, 1978, for example, empha­sizes the same), and there is no school of Buddhism which con­ceives the "letters" as truth per se. In other words, emphasis on the experiential and "no reliance on letters" -odd though it may seem to a Zen practitioner-are not features unique to Zen (or the Rinzai tradition of Zen which the roshz" represents). They are com­mon Mahayana properties. But what is lacking in this work-like many other works authored by Zen practitioners-is a structured approach to describe the contents of the experiential~

We must remind outs elves that satori-the Zen equivalent for enlightenment-as such is not the goal of Zen, as the roshi rightly points out on many occasions. In fact, the very notion of en­lightenment should be abandoned in Zen (datsuraku shin-shin, as Dagen puts it) because the goal of Mahayana, of which Zen con­stitutes an integral entity, is practice. Practice means the external demonstration of prajiia (sunyatayam prayojanam), that is, the creation of a new socio-religious human configuration through the practice of emptiness. It is within the context of sunyatayam pray ojanam , for example, that we can speak rationally of Buddh­ism as an experiential philosophy. The roshi's statement, "Zen is Zen experience," actually refers to this kind of practice and ex­perience. Furthermore, what is important to note here is that this kind of experience is communicated through "skill-in-means," as it always has been throughout the history of Buddhism. In Mahaya­na, "skill-in-means" refers to the ultimate (paryavasiina) of wisdom.

"Letters" and language, sounds and mantra, metaphors and similes, ma1}(1ala and mudra, etc. are symbolic representation of truth. They constitute the Buddhist "skill-in-means" through which truth is communicated, and have always been the accepted, effective, and only available instrument to communicate truth. If this were not so, it would be strange that a great number of Buddhist literary expositions-such as the Prajnaparamitii, Vajra­cchedika, Vimalakirtinirdesa, La1ikiivatara, Awakening of Maha­yana Faith, etc.-have been made available through many Zen

59

writers, such as, for example, D.T. Suzuki, Sh6san Yanagida, etc. Both Y6sai of Rinzai and Dogen of Sot6 relied on "letters" to compose the Kozengokoku-ron and Shobogenzo, respectively. And Zen Comments on Mumonkan, itself, employs "letters" to convey its tez"sho messages, though, in all fairness to the roshi, he does point out the limitations of his own teisho writings. But this is precisely the reason why a work of this sort should, I repeat, take a structured approach to describe the experiential and pro­vide a clear definition of what the term "no reliance on letters" actually means within the context of the Zen tradition (which does in fact employ "letters").

Now then, Zen apologists would stoutly maintain that Bodhi­dharma came to China to spread the True Dharma from "mind­to-mind" and did not rely upon the words of scripture. First, whether Bodhidharma was a historical figure is highly question­able, but we shall not get involved in a subject of this sort now, for it has already been thoroughly discussed, by, for example, Shindai Sekiguchi (Daruma daishi no kenkyu, Tokyo: Taisei in­satsu, 1957). Second, a statement of this sort-"no reliance on letters"-can be found in Tsu~g-mi's Ch 'an-yuan-chu-ch 'uan chi (9th century), Tao-yuan's Chz"ng-te fu-teng lu (11th century), Y6sai's Kozengokoku-ron (12th century), etc. But interestingly, this type of a statement, though found in even earlier Zen texts, was most strongly articulated in late T'ang, when Buddhist scholar­ship began to wane, and particularly in Sung, when Zen began to be absorbed by Confucianism (prompting Wing-Tsit Chan, for example, to remark that neo-Confucianism is Zen plus Confucian­sim. In his Shina bukkyo no kenkyu (Vol. III, Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1943), Daij6 Tokowa claims that "no reliance on letters," advoca­ted strongly by Sung Zen practitioners, contributed to the decline of Zen in China, for, in their insistence on "no reliance on letters," they ignored the classics. Within the context of the history of Chinese Buddhism, a school of thought which failed to honor the classics failed to renew itself, for textual studies not only involves an exegetical exercise but the constant re-interpretation of systems of thought from new perspectives in order to respond effectively· to actual historical situations.

More interesting to note is that, historically, the notion of "no reliance on letters" was not at all times observed without criticism, even within the Zen tradition. For example, the Tsu-

60

ting shih-yuan (Section 5), a catalogue of Zen works (compiled ca. 1098-1100), says,

The patriarchs who transmitted the Dharma observed the teachings of the Trip£.taka together with practice. But after Bodhidharma, mental marks (hsin-yin) were emphasized to 'see' one's own Buddha-nature. As a result, many practition­ers lost sight of what we actually mean by "no reliance on letters" and they conceived Zen as just sitting in silence. These people are like a deaf-mute lamb!

As this statement clearly indicates, the ultimate purpose of Zen is neither "no reliance on letters" nor just "sitting in silence." It consists, most fundamentally of all, in arousing one's own bodhi~ citta-chien-hsing as the Chinese would call it, or kensho as the Japanese call it, with the vigor of a koan. Kensho literally means "seeing one's own nature." It corresponds to what the existential­ists refer to as the "authentic self." Like the existentialists, a Zen practitioner may be able to realize kensho through the means of "letters. "

Teisho, like "letters," is a means to "see" the "authentic self," which Mahayana maintains is based upon an insight into non-duality. Teisho is designed to penetrate the realm of non­duality, the realm beyond conceptual thought. It mayor may not enable one to realize kensho. Granting that "letters" in themselves offer no assurance of realizing kensho either, they nevertheless have an equal-if not a better-chance to develop a rational under­standing of what kensho is. But what is important to note here is, as historians of religions constantly remind us, that any type of religion is subject to the historical cycle of fossilization and re­newal. To accept teisho without criticism is to fossilize Zen; to critically examine teisho is to revitalize the 'spirit' of Zen. Critical examination means to understand the doctrinal basis of Zen thought through the means of "letters" and to interpret those "letters" with prajiia insights. Tez"sho, observed in a didactic man­ner as does this work, deprives one of the freedom to think criti­cally and to digest ideas through the process of reasoning. Not­withstanding the roshi's claim that tez"sho is free of dogma, the manner of its presentation smells of dogma, because the roshi simply offers flashes of insight without interpreting the doctrinal basis of those insights and without contextualizing those insights. Te£sho in general tends to become sterile, ritualized and dogmatic,

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as many-who have frequently participated in a private tet'sho session (with a cool head) or have read an extensive range of teisho literature in the original-can attest. Fully aware of this kind of danger inherent in teisho, Seizan Yanagida approaches Zen histori_ cally and doctrinally (Mu no tankyii, Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten . , 1969), Shigeo Kamata investigates Kegon as the basis of Zen thought (Chugoku kegon shzso no kenkyu, Tokyo: Tokyo Univer­sity Press, 1975), Shun'ei Hirai examines the Chinese development of prajna as the basis for the development of Chinese Buddhist experiential philosophy (Chugoku hannya shiso-shi no kenkyu, Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1976), etc. These are all faithful Zen practi­tioners and eminent Buddhologists. Zen studies in Japan among Zen scholars take a philological, philosophical and historical approach to investigate the contents of the experiential. They avoid offering flashing insights but present their views rationally, based upon textual, doctrinal and historical investigation.

As a matter of summary, let me repeat that to understand the contents of teisho rationally requires the contextualization of those contents within the framework of basic Mahayana prinCiples -such as prajnii, madhyama pratipiid, cz"tta-miitra, etc. This is quite important because, as I see it, Zen has come a long way since it was introduced to the West by D.T. Suzuki (also in a keimo manner, though his studies on the Lmikavatara and his translation of the Awakening of Mahayana Faith, accomplished during his younger years, still warrant respectability), and, subsequently, in the more flamboyant manner of Alan Watts and others. It is this manner of spreading Zen in the West that prompted Edward Conze, the eminent British Buddhologist, to caustically remark, "Zen is nothing but prajnaparamita with jokes." If Zen is to be taken seriously, as it should be, more serious work-which not only moves the 'spirit' of man but which stimulates the reasoning power of man-is certainly in need. This review, it must be made clear, is not intended to criticize Zen nor the roshi simply for the sake of criticism. It is intended to encourage Zen practition­ers to examine Zen as an integral entity of the Mahayana tradition, doctrinally and historically, so that they would be able to present the experiential in a structured and rational manner.

The roshi and Miss Kudo-respectable practitioners and faith­ful missionaries of Rinzai Zen-died in 1974, leaving behind them this excellent piece of keimo literary work. Gassho.

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The Freudian Unconscious and Bhavanga

by O. H.' de A. Wz"jesekera

Although several thinkers before him had observed the existence of unconscious processes in the workings of the mind, the 'scien­tific' concept of the Unconscious must be attributed to the un­doubted genius of Sigmund Freud. According to him mental life is the function of an apparatus made up of several portions, which he compared to a telescope or microscope. To the oldest of these he gave the name of id, which he believed contains everything that is inherited, above all, the biological instincts which according to him originate in the somatic organization. For the purpose of this paper, it is necessary to lay stress on Freud's concept of the id as a reservoir of the psychical forces which maintain the dynamism of all the conscious and the unconscious factors of the human psyche. Next he posited a later-developed region of mental life, giving it the name of ego. This according to Freud is a part of the id which has undergone a special development under the influence of the external world. This is the agency which is in control of vol­untary activity arising in consequence of the relation between sen­sory perception and muscular action. Such, practically in Freud's own phraseology,l is a description of the most important aspect of the human psyche. What is important to note is that theid, as Freud himself points out, is intimately connected to the Uncon­sious, with the implication that the ego is closely associated with the (waking) consciousness.

Several writers on Buddhist psychology who have discussed the Therevada concept of bhavanga have taken it as referring to some sort of subconsciousness or subliminal consciousness or un­consciousness. Mrs Rhys Davids, who was the first to point it out in her very first work2 on Buddhism, published soon after 1911, made this observation: "The Pall word bhavanga expresses both (a) the objective aspect of vital functioning and (b) the subjective

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aspect of our sub-consciousness, or mental state, when we are not attending to anything ... " In her last work3 on the subject she had this to say of bhava?iga: "It was wanted for vital continuance when the act of waking advertence, which we' now call attention, is absent. The vital continuum with its potentiality of attention-in_ perception was ever proceeding (becoming) . . ." In the same work she understood by bhavmiga "the stream of unconscious life" (p. 407), which she also called "the flow of organic life" (p. 398). Mrs Rhys Davids did not clearly identify bhavanga with the Un­conscious of Freud, but generally took it as some sort of subcon­sciousness as was posited by philosophical writers of the period. In his work Buddhist Psychology o/Perception Saratchandra translated the term bhavanga as the unconscious (p. 75), but no­where discussed the relevant theory of Freud in relation to it, al­though he attempted a comparison of Freud's theory of dreams with that of later Buddhist works. My intention in this paper is to attempt a little more detailed comparison of the Buddhist no­tion of bhavanga with the Freudian concept of the Unconscious.

In a previous paper4 I have made an attempt to define the provenance and the original significance of the term bhavanga. The conclusion I arrived at was that the concept was not a later product of Abhidhamma thought as believed by the above-men­tioned wirters, but was already found in the early Canonical per­iod, occurring as it does in the Anguttara Nikaya in a passage which refers to rupanga, veda?iga, saiirLanga, bhavanga (II. 79). In agree­ment with Keith's interpretation5 of this passage I pointed out that bhavanga here obviously stood for the two last factors, namely sarr-khiirii and viiiiiana, in the well-known list of five skandhas. I cited evidence from the Pali canon to justify such an interpreta­tion. Students of Buddhism cannot miss the fact as found in the formula of Dependent Origination (paticcasamuppiida) that san­khara and viiiiiana are the conditons par excellence for samsaric becoming (bhava). They are indeed, with antecedent avijjii, the conditions for the arising of indivuduality (nama-rupa). It is there­fore no cause for surprise if sankhiira and viiiiiana came to be re­garded as the factors of existence (bhava-anga). This interpreta­tion is supported indirectly by the usage of Sarvastivada Abhi­dharma which applied the term bhavangani to all the twelve fac­tors of becoming in the pratitya-samutpiida. As La Vallee Poussin pointed out,6 in the Sarvastivada tradition vzjiiiina came to be con-

64

sidered the bhavanga par excellence, but a closer study of the links (nidiinas) of the paticcasamuppiida series as preserved in the Pali Canon indicates that sankhiira which are the immediate conditions for viftftana are even more impo~tant as a factor in the develop­ment of individuality. In fact in the Theravada Canon sankhiirii are regarded as the most characteristic condition for becoming (bhava). Hence it is that the samsaric being (satto) is characterized in the Sarrtyutta Nikiiya (1. 135) as purely a complex of sankhiira (suddha-sankhara-punja). Thus it would appear that the Pali Canon­ical tradition which considers sankhara and viftftiina as equally im­portant factors in samsaric becoming, that is to say as the two most important constituents of bhavanga, is more legitimate than the later developed doctrine of Sarvastivada which takes only vi­jftana as the bhavanga par excellence. A study of the meaning of sankhara in the Pali Canon clearly supports such an interpretation.

It is necessary at this stage to inquire into the meaning of the terms sankhara and viftniina as they occur at the beginning of the patz"ccasamuppiida series. A careful study of the relevant contexts will indicate beyond doubt that sa'likhara signify the predisposi­tions or tendencies resulting from previous voluntary action (ceta­nii/kamma). This may be understood as the momentum resulting from previous kamma. It finds a parallel usage in the physical sphere when the term (abhi)sankhara is used to describe the con­tinuing momentum of a wheel set rolling (Anguttara Nz'kiiya, 1. 112). Hence we may understand sankhiira in this context as psychical dispositions or tendencies, or generally as psychical forces. Similar­ly, the term vinftana in the same context, althought generally translated as consciousness, has a special meaning when it appears as the precondition of niima-rupa. Now, students of Buddhism are aware that by niima Canonical doctrine refers to vedanii, saftftii, sankharii and viftftiina which are the constituents of empiric indi­viduality. In this latter occurrence there is no doubt that viftftana means consciousness. Thus the term viftftana as a prior link in the paticcasamuppiida series must be understood as viftnana in a po­tential form. In Western terminology this may be described as noetic potential. Such a significance of the term may be understood in the light of the concept of viftiiiina-sot~ which is said to continue from the past into the present life, and if samsara is not ended, in­to the future also (see Digha Nikaya, III. 105). It is obvious that at the non-empirical state viftniina is unconscious and becomes con-

65

scious only when confronted by the objective world in the percep_ tual process, etc. As we showed at the beginning of this paper, Freud's concept of the human psyche consisting of id-forces and· the Unconsicous may therefore be considered to a large extent parallel to the Buddhist notion of bhavanga which too, according to our interpretation; is constituted by the sankharas or psychical forces combined with viiiiiiina which in the empirical state appears as consciousness which Freud attributed to the ego or the empiri­cal agent.

NOTES

1. An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, London, Hogarth Press, 1949. See especially Chps. I, IV and VIII.

2. Buddhism, Williams and Norgate (Home University Library). 3. The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism,

London, Luzac & Co., 1936. 4. 'Canonical References to Bhavanga', Malalasekera Commemoration

Volume, ed. Wijesekera, Colombo, 1976, pp. 348 ff. 5. See his Buddhist Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923, p. 194

f.n.1. 6. Douze Causes, 40.

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III. BOOK REVIEWS

Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective, collected articles by Herbert V. Guenther. Emeryville, California: Dharma Publishing, 1977.261 pp.

The publication of a scholar's "collected articles" invites us to view his development in a broad perspective and to consider on this basis his overall strengths and weaknesses. The eleven essays gathered here span a quarter-century, from 1950 through 1975, and cover topics ranging from the Gar;4avyiiha Sutra to the philosophical background of Tantrism' and the role of the spiritual teacher. It is clear from reading them that Herbert Guenther's aims and methods have been unusually consistent over a long span of time.

Prof. Guenther's professed aim, as expressed in the Introduction, always has been to offer "a key to the understanding of Buddhism as a living force of 'extensive becoming' that seems to constitute the nature of human thought and spiritual growth." Western scholars-even sympathetic ones-all too often have patronized Buddhist philosophy by regarding it 1) as hopelessly subordinated to mysticism and there­fore not to be considered in the same light as our "more rigorous" Western systems, or 2) as hopelessly involuted and scholastic and there­fore irrelevant to modern philosophical concerns. In the face of this, it has been the singular contribution of Prof. Guenther to have at­tempted to explain Buddhism in a manner consonant with recent de­velopments in analytic and phenomenological philosophy: so certain is he of Buddhism's significance for modern thought that his attempt at elucidation has become nearly his exclusive preoccupation, to the point, it must be said, where the lines between scholarship and apologetics at times are blurred.

Those who are familiar with Prof. Guenther's work are aware that he has fashioned a theory of translation that evolves from the attempt to take absolutely seriously Buddhism's status as a "process" philosophy. He believes, in effect, that a world-view that admits of no static entities will be utterly misrepresented if its terms are translated "statically," i.e., on the basis of one foreign word's supposed equivalency to one English word. He passionately affirms (on page x) that "I never could

67

(nor will I ever) subscribe to a mood of 'definiteness' because this mood is soporific and geared to a static conception of man and the universe and to a mechanical mode of dealing with them. Although a definiteness with the deterministic interpretation displays a C"ertain attractiveness which seems to be natural and more easy, this attractiveness is but the pervasive fallacy of assuming that everything is reducible to quantifiable platitudes. "

Prof. Guenther, in short, is not going to apologize for what others regard as the turgidity or inconsistency of his translations: he regards it as his duty to remain true to the difficulty and elusiveness of the Bud­dhist concepts, and superficial readability be damned. Prof. Guenther cannot be accused of incoherence, but his essays do raise a number of disturbing problems.

The first, most eloquently posed by R.A. Stein in his Preface to the Vie et Chants de 'Brug pa Kun legs Ie Yogin, is that ofthe degree to which the implications of a word should be brought to bear on the word's translation. For example, should the Tibetan rig-pa, generally rendered as "knowledge," be translated as "Being qua being" and glossed as a "value-sustained cognition having a strongly aesthetic character," or again as a "peak experience," simply because these Western terms match Prof. Guenther's notion of their interpretation by certain schools? Prof. Guenther, needless to say, would maintain that it should, for the reasons outlined above, but it is clear that such non-literal translations and glosses leave us rather at the mercy of the translator's vision, for we have no way of separating the original statements from their overtones, since the rendering has combined the usually separate functions of translation and commentary.

The problems inherent in such an approach are particularly evi­dent in Prof. Guenther because he has chosen so frequently to translate Buddhist vocabulary into the terms of such divergent Western disciplines as biology, systems analysis, astrophysics and Heideggerian philosophy. One is sorely tempted to ask, "Come on now, do the Buddhists really mean all those things?" It is by no means self-evident that they do, but in the absence of historical or contextual qualifications, there is no way of telling from Prof. Guenther's work that there can be any doubt.

Prof. Guenther has worked closely throughout his career with teachers from the 'Brug-pa bKa'-brGyud and rNying-ma schools of Tibetan Buddhism, and he has made a real contribution by his exposure through those schools of uniquely Tibetan contributions to Buddhist philosophy. Nevertheless, one feels uneasy reading the essays in this book, because one does not feel utterly confident that Prof. Guenther's translations are capturing the spirit (let alone the letter) of the bKa'­brGyud and rNying-ma thought that he discusses so extensively.

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Even more disquieting is his tendency to homologize bKa'-brGyud and rNying-ma thought with Buddhism (or even "Eastern thought") in general. Running through most of these essays (and most of Prof. Guenther's work) is a vital concern with the distinction between Mind with a capital M (rig-pa, sems-nyid) and mind with a small m (sems).

The former is a pure, spontaneous, aesthetic, intuitive awareness, onto­logically expressible as "Being-in-itself," while the latter is everyday mental functioning: conceptual, rigid and very much "fallen" from the pure state to which, nevertheless, it can return. The parallels between such a view of man and that of Christianity (not to mention Bergson or Heidegger) are startling indeed, but we may at least concede that such a myth os is implied by many bKa'-brGyud and rNying-ma works. The suggestion, however, that such a scheme somehow is the heart and soul of Buddhism is, at the very best, arguable, and needs to be demonstrated rather than simply asserted or assumed.

In short, then, Prof. Guenther's greatest strength turns out to be his weakness as well: admirably, he seeks to demonstrate the relevance of Buddhist philosophy to the contemporary crisis of the soul, but in so doing he tends to substitute commentary for translation and philo­sophical generalization for contextual analysis. In doing that, he draws us far enough away from the work he is discussing that we no longer are certain where we stand, and can, in the end, but report that this does indeed seem to be "Tibetan Buddhism in Western perspective." In that, there may be great psychological value, but the scholarly and historical value often is problematic.

Regardless of the problems endemic to it, Prof. Guenther's is a provocative and sometimes insightful corpus, and his ideas deserve serious discussion. Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective will pro­vide ammunition for both his supporters and his opponents and for that, in addition to its numerous interesting essays (especially the seminal "The Concept of Mind in Buddhist Tantrism," "The Levels of Under­standing in Buddhism," and "The Philosophical Background of Bud­dhist Tantrism"), it bears reading.

Roger Jackson

Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, by Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, with a foreword by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. New York: Grove Press, 1976. 164 pages.

Seven years ago, Herbert Guenther published the first substantial English translation of Tibetan grub-mtha' (siddhanta) literature, includ-

69

ing in his Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice major portions of dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's Grub-pa'i rnam-bzhag rin-po-che'i phreng-ba and Mi-pham's Yid-bzhin-rndzod-kyi grub-mtha' bsdus-pa. Now, Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins ,have brought out a book that is in many ways an obverse, a mirror image of Prof. Guenther's. Not only is their title very nearly the opposite of his, but the ordering of material is reversed, too: Prof. Guenther devotes the first portion of his book to "theory," i.e., to the four traditional schools of Indian Bud­dhism, and the latter part to "practice," a discussion of the different levels of Tantra; Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins, on the other hand, give the first half of their work over to translation of the Fourth Panchen Lama's practice-oriented commentary on Tsong-kha-pa's Three Principal Aspects of the Path to Highest Enlightenment, while the second half is devoted to a complete translation of dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's Grub-pa'i mtha'i rnam-bzhag rin-po-che'i phreng-ba ("Precious Garland of Tenets"). (I am not certain what prompted this latter ordering, as the traditional emphasis-certainly in the dGe-Iugs-pa school, in 'Yhich Geshe Sop a was trained-is on the mastery of theory prior to an under­taking of serious meditative (particularly Tantric) practice.)

Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins most markedly differ from Guenther in a more essential way, i.e., in the theory of translation that they bring to bear on the -Precious Garland. Prof. Guenther, of course, shapes his translations with a complex, frequently-shifting vocabulary drawn largely from recent analytic and phenomenological philosophy. He always has disdained "literal-mindedness" and the one-English-word-for-one-foreign­word equivalency employed by "philologists" who fail to understand that a non-static philosophical system must be translated by "non-static" means. I'm not sure that Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins can be classified as "philologists," but they have opted for a very literal rendering of dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's text.

The two different approaches are typified by the following ex­ample. Prof. Guenther (Penguin edition, p. 109) translates a portion of the yul-can ("The Owner of the ObjectIve Situation';) section of the chapter on Cittamiitra as follows: "The substratum awareness is as regards its internal experientially initiated potentialities of experience (existentially and ethically) neutral, but is disturbed and divided by the 'constant' which as a primary factor [in cognitive life] is accompanied by five ever-present function patterns as its assistants." Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins (p. 115) translate the same passage from the same "object­possessor" (;;luI-can) section of the Cittamatra chapter rather differently: "The followers of scripture assert that a: mind basis of all apprehends [the five senses, the five objects, and] the internallatencies ... A mind basis of all has the aspect of not discriminating its objects [it does not id~ntify, 'This is such and such'] and its entity is undefiled and neutral.

70

It is· a constant main mind, associated only with the five omnipresent mental factors."

Prof. Guenther's rendering of bag-chags (vQsana) as "the experien­tially initiated potentialities of experience" is a typical instance of com­mentary-as~translation, but a literalism that translates kun-gzhi (which denotes but does not translate the Sanskrit alaya-vijiiana) as "mind basis of all" is not entirely helpful, either. Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins have insisted on translating virtually every Tibetan word as literally as possible into an English equivalent, with occasionally unfortunate re­sults. A minor, if egregious, example is the consistent use of "Foe Destroyer" when referring to those who have reached the highest Hinayana attainment: "Foe Destroyer" is a literal translation of the Tibetan dgra-bcom-pa, but the Tibetan term was chosen on the basis of a false Sanskrit etymology; the term arhat actually refers to "one who is worthy." Other instances of excessive literalism include the trans­lation of yongs-grub (parini!ipanna) as "thoroughly-established phe­nomena," of kun-rdzob bden-pa (sa1flvrti-satya) as "truth for a con­cealer," and of 'gro (gati) as "migration."

Though the translation of the Precious Garland does not read at all smoothly, it should be pointed out in Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins' defense that if they have erred, it is to the preferable side: too much literalism, in my opinion, runs far less risk of significantly distorting a text than does too little. Furthemore, one begins to suspect after two difficult renditions of the Precious Garland that it is not a work that lends itself easily to translation. Grub-mtha' literature in general is highly structured and condensed. Even the longer examples of the genre, such as that of 'J am-dbyangs bzhad-pa, are nearly incomprehensible for one without a considerable background in Buddhist philosophy and/or a native informant. dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's grub-mtha' is a short one, concise to the point where it is barely more than an outline. Because of this, nearly every sentence requires a page of historical and scholastic elucidation. Geshe Sop a and 'Prof. Hopkins have interspersed the text with a number of helpful clarifications, but one wishes that there were far more of them, and in a somewhat less technical vocab­ulary. One wishes, too, that the glossary at the back could have been somewhat more complete and that the Tibetan and Sanskrit originals of some of the more unusual translations could have been indicated parenthetically in the text.

The text that comprises the first, "practice" portion of the book, the Fourth Panchen Lama's commentary of Tsong-kha-pa's Three Prin­cipal Aspects of the Path to Highest Enlightenment, had been previous­ly translated in Geshe Wangyal's The Door of Liberation. Its retrans­lation is justified by the relative unobtainablility of Geshe Wangyal's book! as well as by the addition to the text of a number of visualization

71

details that, had been omitted from the earlier translation. The text is an important and interesting one, giving detailed instructions on the pro­cedure to be followed in a meditative sitting. The session described in­volves visualization, prayer, mantra and a meditation that touches on most of the major points of the lam-rim (a particular arrangement of the "stages of the path" that is, in one form or another, central to the practices of all Tibetan schools): the rarity and importance of human birth, impermanence and the imminence of death, the ~ufferings of salflsara, the cultivation of bodhicitta, and the meditation on emptiness. Geshe Sopa's and Prof. Hopkins' translation is a clear and readable one, prefaced by a detailed background discussion of lam-rim, and one wishes that such detail could equally have been provided for the Precious Garland translation. The difficulties with that translation notwithstand­ing, though, the Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism provides a tantalizing taste of the vast range of thought a~d practice encompassed by Tibetan Buddhism, and should-if used in concert with other texts­prove useful to specialist and interested layman alike.

V. Olivetti

Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice, by Minoru Kiyota. Los Angeles and Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1978. viii, 178 pp. Anno­tated bibliography and glossary of technical terms. $7.95 (cloth); $5.95 (paper).

Shingon Buddhism is a tightly structured and specialized treat­ment of Shingon thought in relation to Mahayana philosophy. Shingon, or specifically, "Shingon mikkyo," is the Japanese version of Tantric Buddhism. Although Shingon had its roots in Indian Tantrism and was colored by the Chinese Buddhist tradition, this brand of Buddhist thought was syst~matized as a distinct school of the Mahayana and as an integral part of the' Japanese Buddhist tradition by Kiikai (A.D. 774-835) in the ninth century. In terms of its canonical sources, Shingon owes its basic insights to two Indian texts, the Mahavairocana-sutra, which transmits the Madhyamika system of thought, and the Tattva­samgraha-sutra, which transmits the Yogacara-vijiianavada system of thought. In essence, Shingon consists of a systematization of these two doctrinal foundations of Mahayana. However, it differs from other Mahayana traditions to the extent that it describes its doctrine through symbolic representation, identifies Dharmakaya Mahavairocana, the cosmic Buddha, as the embodiment of truth, and develops a new di­mension of world order, the dharmadhatu, which in turn is also iden­tified as Dharmakaya Mahavairocana.

72

Minoru Kiyota's monograph is a product, over the course of many years, of serious Buddhological research into primary Shingon sourses and is a substantial contribution to the development of Buddhist Studies in the West. In its organization, the work consists of five sec­tions: a historical introduction to Tantric Buddhism in the first chapter, followed by separate chapters on Shingon doctrine and practice (chap­ters II-V), and a concluding essay on the relation between Shingon thought and Yogacara-vijiiiinavada Buddhism ("Epilogue"). In addition, Kiyota has included at the end of the volume a selected bibliography of books and articles in Japanese and English and a glossary of technical terms. The bibliography is annotated and is a carefully chosen list of secondary sources. Consisting largely of Japanese studies of the first magnitude, it is extremely useful for those capable of employing con­temporary Japanese Buddhological works on Shingon for further in­vestigation. Readers unacquainted with Shingon jargon will also appre~ ciate the glossary attached at the end of the volume where Kiyota has coined expressions for some 185 Shingon-related terms.

In reviewing a work of this sort, at least three strong points can be discerned:

1. Kiyota has relied heavily on primary sources; portions of the work contain canonical documents in excerpts translated by the author. While it is regrettable that the author did not offer more lengthy trans­lations, the present work is, of course, preceded by Yoshito Hakeda's scholarly introduction to the life and thought of Kukai with a trans­lation of his major works (Cf. Kiikai: Major Works, Columbia, 1972). However, while this earlier study does give the English reader the first coherent account of this school, the translations should be viewed as background-not as an end in itself-for with Kiyota's doctrinal expo­sition of the same primary sources, the translations become increasingly useful and valuable. Given the current situation of a grossly inadequate amount of intelligibly translated documents, this is not to imply that translations of Buddhist texts are unimportant. Indeed, both works complement each other and should be read together to gain a fuller appreciation of Shingon thought. In light of this earlier study, Kiyota has wisely chosen to focus in on the major aspects of Shingon theory and practice.

2. The author has critically used secondary sources to present the historical and religious background to Tantric Buddhism. Though he does not go out of his way to find fault with the Japanese studies, his treatment of their research is objective and his judgments are fair. As evidenced by the manner in which he handles the materials, he also shows an obvious sensitivity to historical data. The first chapter, which examines the Indian doctrinal foundations of Tantric Buddhism, pro­vides us with a concise treatment of the emergence of Tantric Buddhist

73

ideas during the mid-seventh century in India and a real attempt to eval­uate the overall influence of Tantra on Buddhist thought. There is also a valuable discussion of the organization of the two primary Shingon siitras and an analysis of the geographical orgins .and transmission of these siitras.

Chapter II ("The Shingon System of Doctrinal Classification and Evaluation") involves a lengthy discussion of the p 'an-chiao exercise within the context of Kiikai's thought. My only criticism of this section is the author's discussion of the Chinese Tantric tradition, for there is only a passing attempt to evaluate the influence of the Chinese mate­rials on Kiikai's thought. Kiyota, however, is careful to remind us that, while Tantric Buddhism established deep roots in Japan, it essentially failed to sustain the interests of the Chinese. If there is any evidence of Chinese influence, it is to be found in Kiyota's analysis ofthe p 'an-chiao exercise which Kukai adopted from the Chinese textual tradition. In other words, we must remind ourselves that Tantric Buddhism was un­organized when Kukai began his investigation of the sutras and that, while the Mahavairocana-sutra was known during the Nara period, Kiikai's reason for going to China was to look for a commentary on that sutra and to seek out a master of Tantric thought unavailable to him in Japan. Thus, as Kiyota explains, "granting the fact that Shingon is largely based upon texts of Indian composition and that its tradition was transmitted to Japan from China, the formation of Shingon doctrine, the systematization of Shingon as a distinct religious order, and the iden­tification of Shingon as a distinct entity of Mahayana are attributed to the creative efforts of KUkai." Nonetheless, one still is lead to the hope that he will give us a study of the Chinese religious background at a future date.

3. The most original and valuable part of the work is Kiyota's analysis of Shingon doctrine and practice concentrated in chapters IlI­V ("Shingon Doctrinal Concepts," "The Two Ma~~alas," and "The Path to Buddhahood," respectively). In reviewing these key chapters, it is perhaps best to summarize their major theme as I see it. The in­terpretative principle of Kiyota is that Shingon is an existential phil­osophy and that the crux of this system lies in an understanding of what faith means within the Shingon context in particular and within the Mahayana in general. Working from the perspective of the Mahayana, his exposition of Shingon doctrine largely deals with soteriological issues. The strength of Xiyota's research is seen in its theoretical for­mulations and in the author's attempt to describe the Shingon view of Mahavairocana both doctrinally and iconographically. As a school of Mahayana, Kiyota claims that Shingon begins with the a priori view of universal enlightement (e.g., the concept of non-duality, shinzoku [uri, and its corollary doctrine of sokushin jobutsu) and that it emphasizes

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wisdom as the sole vehicle to realize enlightenment. Focusing in on th practice of compassion as the means to cultivate wisdom, Kiyota at tempts to describe compassion as the act of implementing wisdom, or in more practical terms, the application of religious insight on the phe nomenal level. Thus, he claims that, in Shingon, enlightenment is nOl the goal. Practice is. Practice, as he conceives of it, is enlightenment, or. in more religious terms, a practice designed to realize one's inherent Buddha-nature. In other words, Kiyota sees Shingon enlightenment as the individual's intense awareness of his contingency to others and con­ceives of the ultimate form of human liberation to consist of the prac­tice of liberation. It is in this context that he identifies Shingon as an existential philosophy. However, he goes on to say that, because Shingon takes an a priori view of enlightenment, faith constitutes the basic ingredient of theory and practice. Thus, he sees faith as the "un­conditional acceptance of the proposition that the seeds of enlighten­ment are inherent in all sentient beings," and claims that it is this kind of faith that contributes to the Buddhist view of the awakening of man.

In these sections it is clear that the book is not written for the novice, but for the advanced student and specialist of Sino-Japanese Buddhism. The Western reader who has not already studied Japanese Buddhism through either primary sources or secondary scholarly works in Japanese is often likely to find Kiyota's discussion somewhat techni­cal. Nevertheless, it does offer the student of Buddhism a detailed picture of how Shingon thought can be analyzed within the broader context of Mahayana Buddhism. In particular, the "Epilogue," which summarizes the major doctrinal themes of the work, provides penetrat­ing insights into Shingon from the perspective of the Y ogacara "three svabbava theory".

In summary, by facilitating a better understanding of the religious background and the dynamics of Shingon thought, Kiyota's work pre­sents depth to the appreciation of Mahayana Buddhism. Although the author touches only lightly on the religious and historical background of Chinese Buddhism, he does show sensitivity to the many facets of Sino-J apanese Buddhism which had created a new vision of things and an ideal Buddhist image of man. The value of this work for the scholar­ly study of Buddhism is seen in the fact that, behind the intricate ex­pressions of Shingon doctrine, Kiyota shows that there isa humane ideal that belongs to the empirical world. My only reservation about the book is that, because the subtlety of thought involved is so focused and expressed in an extremely terse manner, the work might be difficult for the novice unacquainted with Buddhist terminology to follow the finer points of his doctrinal exposition. A general introduction to the fun­damentals of Mahayana thought coupled with an index might be ir order. This does not detract from the value of the work as a whole, fo:

75

I feel that, to date, this small volume is the most comprehensive treat­ment of Shingon theory and practice available in any Western language. It is a welcome addition to the literature on Buddhism and is likely to

be the standard work on Shingon doctrine for some time. Its many­sided information is certain to help formulate some tentative judgments about the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition.

AaronK. Koseki

Mission Paul Pelliot: Choix de Documents tibetains conserves a la Bib­liotheque Nationale, complete par quelques manuscrits de l'India Office et du British Museum; Presentes par Ariane Macdonald et Yoshiro Imaeda; Tome ler; Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale; 1978.

A stiff, pretective box contains photographic reproductions of the documents chosen and a brief introductory and explanatory fasi­cule. The documents are reproduced on the recto only of separate sheets, numbered successively from 1-304. The choice of documents was operated by Madame D.A. Macdonald, Madame A.-M. Blondeau and Professor R.A. Stein. In the first instance the choice was guided by the desire to make available for study those texts concerned with un­known or little known aspects of Tibetan civilisation. However the im­portance of the Chinese Ch'an dossier was also taken into account; and Buddhologists will be grateful for the entries under Buddhism in the brief summary of the contents of the manuscripts on p. 17-18 of the fasicule.

In a short preface, Professor Stein situates the general importance of these manuscripts and stresses the light they cast on the dim begin­nings of Tibetan history and society. He sketches out the story of their dispersion and their conservation; he renders homage to the previous labours of Louis de La Vallee Poussin, J. Bacot, F.W. Thomas and Mar­celle Lalou; he also tells us of his hope that the vocabulary of rare words constituted by Marcelle Lalou will one day be published, com­pleted by more recent research.

A list of the inventory numbers of the manuscripts reproduced in this first volume is to be found on p. 16. Mademoiselle Marie-Rose Seguy, ConServateur en chef it la Bibliotheque Nationale, Departement des manuscrits, Section orientale, gives a general description of the Tibetan collection from Tun-huang in Paris which includes over 2500 manuscripts of which 254 are bilingual or trilingual. She provides a table of the Tibetan manuscripts containing texts, fragments or notes in Chiense characters as catalogued in the Inventaire of Marcelle Lalou: some of these were previously inventoried under two numbers, one Pelliot Tibetan, one Pelliot Chinese, so this table will be of service to

76

those who wish to refer to these ·manuscripts. She further provides a provisional list of the Chinese manuscripts containing texts, fragments, or notes in Tibetan which did not find place in the same Inventaire. She gives the inventory numbers of trilingual manuscripts containing texts, fragments· or annotations in Tibetan, Chinese and Khotanese. She lists the bilingual or trilingual manuscripts containing texts, fragments or annotations in Tibetan, Chinese and Yugur; and she draws attention to 55 manuscripts of the Tibetan collection which include paintings, drawings or sketches.

Y. Imaeda and A. Macdonald explain (p. 15) how the documents have been classified in the numerical order of M. Lalou's Inventaire and make explicit their system of numbering folios, pages, note-books, scrolls, etc. These two researchers have added brief but extremely use­ful notes (p. 19-27), written in 1972, relative to fifty manuscripts of the Pelliot Tibetan collection in Paris and two manuscripts of the India Office, London, and providing references to pUblications and research in progress.

As one would expect from the Imprimerie Nationale, the general get-up of this very important publication is impeccable. There can be no question of criticism in this short notice. We must express our gratitude for the enormous, sustained effort to which this pUblication bears testimony and congratulate all concerned in making more easily accessible this priceless 'collection of materials. A difficult road for future research has been opened. Surely some of the readers of this Journal will negotiate it. Let us hope that Tibetans will be among them.

Alexander W. Macdonald

77

IV. NOTES AND NEWS

Presidential Address by Professor Gadjin M.Nagao

In his presidential address delivered at the American Oriental Society's annual meeting in 1951, Walter E. Clark of Harvard Uni­versity discussed the prospective development of Indian Studies in four major fields. They were:

1. The comparative study of Pali, Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese Buddhist Texts in the effort to reconstruct the history of Buddhist thought,

2. A more detailed study of Hinduism, 3. The study of Indian history through archeology, and 4. The systematic collection of material dealing with the

practical affairs of life in medieval India.

These four areas of study anticipated by our very learned scholar have in the succeeding years been developed even more extensively than he might have anticipated.

Confining ourselves today to the first of the four topics, we find that during the one generation since the time Professor Clark made his observation, many Buddhist scholars have achieved scho­lastic proficiency that is very impressive, to say the least. Let me cite a few examples. There are:

1. John Brough's GiindhiiridharmapadaJ-2. Sanskrittexte aus den Turfan{unden, published under the

supervision of E. Waldschmidt,

79

3. Franklin Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrz"d Sanskrit Grammar and Dz"ctz'onary,

4. Copious text-editions and translations of Mahayanistic and Abhidharmic texts by such scholars as E. Lamotte,G. Tucci, V.V. Gokhale, and many others,

5. The rise o'f the study of Buddhist epistemological and logical texts, led by E. Frauwallner, and

6. The recent interest in the study of Buddhist Tantric texts pursued by many scholars, both on this continent and in Europe and other countries.

The work accomplished by such scholars has been a landmark, but their effort has not exhausted the field. There are still more texts to be studied and still more difficulties to be overcome by our­selves and the younger generation to follow us. In what direction has the research done by former scholars been converging or diverging? What are the desiderata of Buddhist studies today? The present seems to be an opportune time to review the developments in Buddhist studies and to prepare the way for the generation to come.

In view of. the fact that Buddhist studies have now gained recognition as an independent field in the humanities, this session of the International Association for Buddhist Studies is a very significant historical event. The independent status that Buddhist studies have gained requires that the manner in which we continue our research include at least the following two complementary methods:

1. Analysz"s, which is utilized in the comparative study of Pili, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese Buddhist texts, and

2. Synthesis, which is utilized in the effort to reconstruct the history of Buddhist thought.

By means of analysis, we will be able to establish as facts the information gleaned from the data-be they textual, archeo­logical, or in any other form-transmitted to us by our forerun­ners. The Buddhist texts, which have come down to us through various traditions and which have been found in various areas, must be ever more critically and thoroughly analyzed, so that we can gain the information hidden deep therein. I would even go

80

so far as to say that the best-known and best-studied texts still await further investigation. I shall now give three examples to illustrate this.

First, the Suttan£pata, which contains perhaps the oldest suttas of Buddhism, deserves to be re-examined in order to clarify the earliest stages of Buddhism in relationship to the common as­cetic background that may have been present before J ainism and Buddhism developed their respective systems. Such an examina­tion will shed light on the Buddhist scriptural developments that followed as well. I believe that the outcome of such an analytical study will take the form of fresh translations with extensive and detailed philological commentaries in the manner in which Pro­fessor K. R. Norman presented the Thera- and Therigatha.

Second, you may be aware that in Japan, the gigantic pro­ject of publishing the "Sanskrit manuscripts of the Saddharma­pw:uJarika, collected in Nepal, Kashmir and Central Asia," is being undertaken by a team of scholars. This project is attempting to present, for the first time, almost all of the available manu­scripts (33 in number) of this most widely disseminated Maha­yana siltra. The fruit of this project will not be a single critical edition of the sutra, but will probably be a series of editions based upon an investigation of a variety of recensions in accord­ance with the lineage of each manuscript's tradition. The project will probably extend itself into a comparative study between those recensions and the Chinese and Tibetan translations. These scho­lars are attempting to answer with the philological thoroughness that H. Luders exemplified in his analysis of a few Central Asian fragments of the Saddharmapundarika manuscripts fundamental questions such as: In what languages and under what circumstan­ces were the Mahayana sutras composed? and How did their Sans­kritization take place?

Third, in my opinion, Asanga's Mahayanasan;graha is one of the highest achievements attained by the Y ogacaras. In this text, Asanga has attempted ~o systematize all of the elements of Bud­dhist philosophY'_~_1:>hidharmic\ as well as Mahayanistic. His text is the text that expounds Buddhist philosophy, if ever there is to be such a text. Professor E. Lamotte's research on this text is so well known that there is no need for me to go into the details of his work. In spite of the fact that Professor Lamotte's research has shown signs of thoroughness and completeness, that should

81

not discourage us from re-examining the text. On the contrary, Professor Lamotte's work should encourage us to look deeper into the text so that we will gain a deeper understanding of the Bud­dhist philosophy systematized therein. A close ,examination of all the Chinese and Tibetan translations of this text and a comparison of them with the Chinese and Tibetan commentaries, whose Sans­krit originals have not yet been uncovered, disclose many discre­pancies among the various renditions. These discrepancies may be overcome by reconstructing a hypothetical Sanskrit text. We are still in the dark as far as the historical development of the Yoga­cara-vijnanavada texts are concerned, and therefore we must con­tinue our study, by producing new translations of the text from the hypothetical Sanskrit recension, if we are to come to an under­standing of how Yogacara trends developed around the 4th to 5th centuries.,

The three examples that I have cited above will suffice to remind us that Buddhist studies in the future will have to be based upon a more critical and thorough-going philological analy­sis of the Buddhist texts that have been transmitted to us through several different traditions. In the present state of Buddhist stud­ies, I feel that philology must precede philosophy or history, but what is even more important is the fact that the former must not nullify the latter.

This, then, brings us to the second method of research. Th.e method of synthesis is necessary to bring together the facts that we have accumulated through analysis and to reconstruct, as far as possible, the history of Buddhist thought. This second method of research must be emphasized because it seems to be unduly neg­lected and almost disregarded at present. Some of you may take exception to what I have just stated, and may argue that since we have not yet progressed far enough in our analytical studies of Buddhist texts, it is much too early to proceed to this second synthetic method. That is, some of you may think that it is still too early to attempt to reconstruct the history of Buddhist thought. I must admit that I do not share such a view. Those who use analytical tools without synthetic visions are just as blind as those who possess synthetic visions but lack analytical tools.

How, then, should the history of Buddhist thought be re­constructed in the present state of Buddhist studies? I do not think that it will be a simple task, nor do I think that a mere ap-

82

plication of analysis will solye the problem. I will suggest six areas, the study of which can give us some insight into how one might re­construct the history of Buddhist thought. The six areas represent six gaps. The process of bridging the gaps will result in combining analytical tools with synthetic visions.

1. The gap between the Jain and the Buddhist traditions must be bridged, because towards the end of the Vedic period, there arose ascetic movements that intensified the meditative tendencies found in the older Upanisads and that became the common back­ground for the J ains and the Buddhists in developing their respec­tive doctrinal systems. The common elements, not only of verses and phrases, but also of vocab1.llary (e.g. asrava, bhava, karman, etc.) found in the oldest strata of the two traditions must be col­lected and studied anew. This, I believe, will elucidate the earlier stages of both religions and define what those fundamental con­cepts meant originally, as the late Professor L. Alsdorf proposed in his Etudes jaina, etat present et taches futures.

2. The gap between the Theravada tradition and the Sarvasti­vada and other traditions must be bridged, because as F. Weller ob­served long ago and Professor J. Brough has reiterated, "Arbeiten mit dem Palikanon allein sind unfriichtbar und zwecklos (studies with the Pali canon alone are fruitless and purposeless)." We now have important publications such as the Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden in addition to the Chinese and Tibetan translations at our disposal. The philological comparisons between the corre­sponding texts of different traditions as well as within a respective tradition will undoubtedly unravel the formative process of pre­sectarian Buddhist doctrines such as the dvadaiangapratityasamut­pada, the paiicaskandha, the caturdhyana, the caturarupyasama­patti, etc. By filling in this gap, the precise meanings of those al­most impossible philosophical terms will become clearer.

3. The gap between the Madhyamika and the Vijnanavada traditions must be bridged, because the Madhyamikas and the Vijnanavadins were not, from the beginning, two antithetical schools, as is usually assumed. They seem to have belonged to the same Y ogacara movement that endeavored to incorporate into its yogic system the Mahayanistic bodhisattvacaryas praised in such sutras as the Prajiiiipiiramitas and others like the Dasabhiimika. In this way, the Yogacara movement established the practical system of the bodhisattvamarga. It is quite possible that the form of

83

Indian Buddhism that was imported into China through Chinese translations that were done contemporaneously to the Buddhist developments in India reflected the transitional development from the earlier Madhyamikas to the later Vijii.anavadins. At any rate, those contemporaneous Chinese translations must be exploited with a critical eye, as they reflect the historical situation of Indian Buddhism, which tended to be silent concerning anything concrete.

4. The gap between the Buddhist logical tradition and the later Mahayanistic and Tantric traditions must be bridged, because the great masters of Buddhist logic are often exponents of Some form of later Mahayanistic or Tantric philosophy. The continued efforts of scholars, based on the unified image of Buddhist activi­ties as a whole, are now beginning to disclose the general climate of Buddhist thought after the Gupta period.

S. The gap between Indian Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism must be bridged, because the contemporaneous Chinese transla­tions can assist in documenting the historical developments of Indian Buddhism. Also, the developments that took place in China must be understood in relationship to what was taking place in India at that time. The importance of understanding the function that Chinese records can play in determining the developmental conditions in both India and China cannot be overly emphasized.

6. The gap between Indian Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism must be bridged because it is now impossible to make a thorough study of Indian Buddhism without consulting the Tibetan trans­lations, whether or not the Sanskrit originals are extant. We must now study the enormous amount of Indian Buddhist texts that the Tibetans have preserved in translations and also investigate the manner in which the Tibetan translators understood these texts. Moreover, an investigation into how the Tibetans developed their own indigenous Tibetan Lamaism through fusion with their native religious tradition must be made. The flood of Tibetan religious texts, both canonical and extra-canonical, published in India and other countries, will facilitate in clarifying the basic historical events that took place in the development of Tibetan Buddhism and in distinguishing Indian elements from those Tibetan elements that constitute Tibetan Lamaism.

In conclusion, one of the directions that Buddhist studies as an independent area of the humanities might take in the future is to bridge the gaps that I have outlined above. Those topics

84

were selected because we scholars should not uncritI'call """ 'ent . .. y aCC'r _ VIews of BuddhIst hIstory that are based on misconceptions, sheb. as the view that the Hinayana and Mahayana are two antagonistic movements, the former being inferior to the latter, and that the Madhyamikas and Vijnanavadins are two antithetical schools, the one propounding "non-being" and the other "being." By empha­sizing the importance of philological studies, I am not deploring the scarcity of philologically reliable works being done in our dis­ciplIne. On the contrary, I welcome the recent trends that show an increasing number of Buddhist scholars publishing very reliable philological works, both in the West and in the East.

Report on the Proceedings of the First Con­ference of the LA.B.S., Columbia University, New York, September 15-17,1978

1. The International Association of Buddhist Studies, founded in August, 1976 at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and duly incor­porated in 1977, met for its First Conference at the Columbia Universi­ty in New York from September 15th to the 17th, 1978. The organiz­ing committee consisted of Professor Alex Wayman (Coordinator), Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Buddhist Studies, Colum­bia University; Professor Theodore Riccardi, Jr., Director, NDEA Cen­ter for South Asia Studies, Columbia University; and Professor A.K. Na­

rain, Professor of History and South Asian Studies, University of Wis­consin-Madison and the General Secretary of the LA.RS .. The con­ference was held on the 15th floor in the School of International Af­fairs Building, at the Columbia University. Attendance at the panels varied between 70 and 125 persons. The business meeting on the 16th of September was attended by 48 members. Many of the participants were housed in the New York Student Center of the Hotel Empire (across from the Lincoln Center), and some made private arrangements elsewhere and with friends. Necessary local expenses for the organiza-

85

tion of the Conference were met by funds of the NDEA Center for South Asia Studies, Columbia University. II. Professor Gadjin M. Nagao was the General President of the Con­ference. Professor Theodore deBary, Vice-President and ProY-ost, Col­umbia University, delivered the welcoming address at the opening session on September 15th at 9.:00 A.M .. Papers were grouped in eight panels as listed below:

1. Buddhism in Contemporary Context (Chairperson: Professor Fredric Underwood)

2. Buddhism in General India Context (Chairperson: Professor Theodore Riccardi, Jr.)

3. Pali Buddhism (Chairperson: Professor M.W. Padmasiri de Silva)

4. History of Mahayana (Chairperson: Professor Philip Yampol-ski)

5. Buddhist Tantras (Chairperson: Professor Alex Wayman) 6. Buddhist Art and Archaeology (Chairperson: Professor A.K.

Narain) 7. Buddhist Logic (Chairperson: Professor Alex Wayman) 8. Mahayana Doctrine (Chairperson: Professor Yoshito Hakeda)

_ The following persons, whose names are given below in alphabetical order, read papers:

J.G. Arapura: "Reason and Transcendance in Mlidhyamika and Vedlinta"

Harvey B. Aronson: "Immeasurable (appamaiiiia)" A.L. Basham: "On SaIp.bodhi" Daniel Bassuk: "Aldous Huxley's Understanding of Buddhism" Raoul Birnbaum: "Some Underlying Principles of Early Bud-

dhist Wall-Painting in China" George D. Bond: "The Paradox of Death in Theravada Buddhism" Martha L. Carter: "Problems of Cosmological Buddha Iniages in

Central Asia and China" Douglas D. Daye: "Falsifiability and Darsana Relevance in 6th

Century Buddhist Logic"

tion"

Thomas Dowling: "Indra Among the Buddhists" George Elder: "Body in Tantric Buddhism" Walter A. Frank: "Buddhism: Ethics for a Modern World?" Ashok K. Gangadean: "The Nature of Nliglirjuna's Dialectic" B.G. Gokhale: "Similes in the Plili Nikayas" Luis o. Gomez: "Tun Huang Fragments on Amanasiklira" Yoshito Hakeda: "Subhakarasimha's Esoteric Buddhist Medita-

*Helmut Hoffmann: "The First Section of the Buddhist Pilgrim's Itinerary to Shambhala fl'Om the Indus Valley to the Crossings of the Oxus"

86

87

Sechin Jagchid: "The Mongol Khans, Chinese Buddhism, and Taoism"

Yun-hua Jan: "Confrontation between Ch'an Monks and Tibetan Priests in Yuan China"

T. James Kodera: "Nichiren (1222-1282) and his Nationalistic Eschatology"

* Aaron Koseke: "Chi-Tsang's Sheng-man pao-ku: Buddha-nature and non-duality"

Lewis Lancaster: "Some Principles of Text Editing" Jacques Maquet: "Contemporary Theravada Meditation - Ongoing

Research" Esho Mikogami: "Some Remarks on the Concepts of arthakriyii" Gadjin M. Nagao: "From the Madhyamika to the Yogadira Philo­

sophy" Sung-bae Park: "Wonhyo's Contribution to Buddhist Thought in

Korea" Howard Parsons: "Buddhism and Marxism: Compatabilities and

Divergences" Julia Meech Pekarik: "The Flying White Horse" D. Prithipaul: "Buddhist Themes in the Art of Richard Wagner" Mokusen Miyuki: "A Jungian Approach to the Ideational Con-

tent of the Buddha's Enlightenment" Ismael Quiles: "Nirvana and Metaphysical Experience" James B. Robinson: "The Concept of Divinity in the Indian

Mahayana" *D. Seyford Ruegg: "The Theory of Buddha-nature in Buddhist

Thought" N.H. Samtani: "Mahayanic Elements in Thai Buddhism" *Jagdish Sharma: "Buddhist and Jaina Yaksas" Chang Sheng-yen: "The Layman Buddhism of Late Ming Dynasty" *Upasak Chandrika Singh: "Buddhist Symbols on Indo-Greek

Coins" *William Stablein: "A Bibliography of the Mahakalatantra" Robert Thurman: "Buddhism and Individualism in Indian Art

and Society" Taitetsu Unno: "Dependent Origination in Hua-yen Thought" *Whalen Wai-Lai: "History and Prophecy in Mahayana: Sena

Giro (1889-1961)" Ven Shig Hui Wan: "Prajnaparamita Thought and Chinese Ch'an Leonard Zwilling: "The Tibetan Translation of Pramiinaviirttika

III, 3"

About another half a dozen papers received could not be read in the

absence of their authors. Seven listed above marked * could not be:;

present to read their papers.

III. The Business meeting of the general body of the LA.B.S. was held on the 16th of September a~ 1:00 P.M .. Professor G. Nagao, the Gener­al President of the First Conference, and Professor A.L. Basham, who succeeded Professor Nagao as the Chairperson of the Board ,of Direc­tors and the Executive Committee, presided over the meeting. Professor A.K. Narain, the General Secretary, first reported that he had received messages of greetings and good wishes for the success of the Conference from Professors Tucci, Bapat, Conze, Kenneth C. Chen, Waldschmidt,' Demieville, Nakamura, Wijesekera, and others including H.E. the Am­bassador of Sri Lanka in the U.S.A., Prosessor Karunaratne. He then read a report on the activities of the I.A.B.S. and made a plea for in­creasing membership. In the absence of the Treasurer, Dr. Beatrice Miller, he read as below the consolidated statement of accounts of the LA.B.S. up to September 11, 1978:

I. Membership

Membership Receipts: 1976177 1978

Full ($15.00) 68 90

Associate ($10.00) 06 05

Student ($5.00) 19 15

93 110

The number of members given above includes:

Founder Members

Life Members

Institutional

Total:

88

20

04

06

II. Income (dues)

1976 $2735.00

1977 $1705.00

1978 $2826.67

$7266.67

1979

04

01

05

III. Income (other)

Interest $50.50 (Bus Acct.)

1977 $68.41

1977 $24.92

9/11/78 $66.10

9/11178 $24.18

;T.,::.ot==al=..z,....<:9.!.../:..;11::..:./-'-7.=.8 _____ $2 34. U. Total Income, 9/11/78 $7500.78 Note: This statement also includes two uncollected items:

J oumal Advertisements $200.00 (unpaid)

Balance 2 Found. Mem. $240.00

IV. Expenditures

Incorporation $570.10

V.LE.O.A. $50.00

Office supplies $89.75

Postage, telephone $458.49

Printing (brochures, stationary, etc.) $172.20

Exchange $14.77

Total $1355.31

BALANCE AS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 1978: $6145.47

89

Following are the decisions ofthe Business Meeting: 1. The General Secretary informed the members that since the

fiscal year of the LA.B.S. is the calendar year, a duly audited statement of the LA.B.S. accounts would be made by the Treasurer afte.r the end of the year 1978. But since this was the first formal Conference of the LA. B.S., she had prepared a consolidated statement for the information of the members. The statement as given above was approved at the Business Meeting. .

2. The Meeting was also informed of the various actions taken by the General Secretary after the foundation of the LA.B.S. and before the First Conference meeting at Columbia University, and they were approved.

3. Professor AL. Basham was elected Chairperson of the Execu­tive Committee in the vacancy caused by Professor G. Nagao, for the residue of the latter's term.

4. Professors A. Bareau (France), and H. Nakamura (Japan), were elected as Vice-Chairpersons in place of Professors A.L. Basham and L. Ligeti.

5. The following were elected Honorary Felfowsof the LAB.S.: Sir Harold W. Bailey (U.K.), Professor Louis Ligeti (Hungary), Professor N. Poppe (U.S.A.), Dr. Sh5son Miyamoto (Japan), V.V. Gokhale (India), Professor O.H. de Wijesekera (Sri Lanka).

6. The Meeting put on record their satisfaction at the publication of the First issue of the Journal of the LA.B.S., and the Editorial team was congratulated for their work.

7. Some names for Editorial Advisory Board were suggested. The Editor-in-Chief was authorized to add some of the names if he thought necessary.

8. The General Secretary informed the Meeting that some of the members of the Executive had declined to continue for various reasons and he was authorized to nominate replacements. Nominations already made were approved.

9. The problem of membership from some of the Asian countries on account of their economy and foreign exchange difficulties was dis­cussed and it was decided to have a special rate of $5.00 for all mem­bers from India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and from such other countries- having similar problems, and to make at­tempts to subsidize the balance of $10.00 for each such member by raising it from other sources, private and public.

10. The General Secretary reported that the LA.B.S. has been affitiated with the International Union for Oriental and Asian Studies (U.l.E.O.A) and had thus made an application to the U.N.E.S.C.O.

90

through the LC.P.H.S. for financial support" for the 2nd Conference to be held in Asia. This was approved.

11. The General Secretary then reported the communication from the Secretary of the International Association of History of Religions (LA.H.R.)" for the affiliation of the LA.B.S. with the LA.H.R .. The matter was discussed and it was approved, subject to the condition that it did not affect the LA.B.S. finances adversely.

12. Requests from Institutions to establish exchange relations between periodicals issued by them and the LA.B.S. were discussed, and it was resolved not to enter into such relationships for the time being, as the LA.B.S. had no library and storage facilities of its own.

13. The General Secretary and Editor-in-Chief was authorized to use 50 copies of the Journal as complimentary copies for individual scholars, libraries, and Institutions. In addition, he was also authorized to use whatever number of sample and review copies he thought neces­sary for publicity and for raising funds and Institutional and Library subscriptions.

14. It was resolved that the LA.B.S. take steps to investigate all possibilities of support for the continuation of the Bibliograpbique Bouddbique.

15. The General Secretary reported his negotiations for holding the 2nd Conference of the LA.B.S. in Asia and mentioned the progress he had made, and the possibilities. He was authorized to pursue the matter and decide on the venue.

16. It was also decided that if the 2nd Conference would be held in India or Sri Lanka the General President for the Conference should be from the host country, and some names were suggested. The General Secretary was authorized to consult with them and request their acceptance.

17. The Meeting expressed thanks to the Columbia University and particularly to Professors Alex Wayman and Theodore Riccardi of the South Asia Center for theirinvitation to hold the 1st Conference of the LA.B.S., and for their hospitality and nice arrangements. A vote of thanks to them and their team was put on record.

18. The Meeting ended after a vote of thanks to the, President, the Chairperson, the General Secretary and the Treasurer for their work.

91

List of Members of I.A.B.S.

Abbreviations: (F)- Founder; (L)- Life; (1)- Institutional; (S)­Student; (H)- Honorary Fellow; unmarked- Regular Full Member

Arapura, Prof. J. G., Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster Uni­versity, Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4Kl, CANADA

Aronson, Prof. Harvey B., Dept. of Religious Studies, Cocke Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903

Bahm, Prof. Em. Archie J., Dept. of Philosophy, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131

Bailey, Sir Harold, (H) Queens College, Cambridge CB3 9ET, ENGLAND

Bajpai, Prof. Shiva G., Dept. of History, California State Univ., Northridge, CA

Baker, Richard D., 300 Page Street, San Francisco, CA 94102 Bapat, Prof. P.B. (H), Svlidhyliya, 772 Shivajinagar, Poona 4,

INDIA Bardisban," John F. (A), 23447 Riverside Drive, Southfield, MI

48034 Bareau, Prof. Andre (F), College de France, 15 bd. Colbert,

92330 Sceaux, FRANCE Basham, Prof. A.L. (F), Prof. & Head ofthe dept. of Asian Civiliza­

tions, Australian National University, Box 4, P.O., Can­berra, A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA

Bassuk, A. Prof. Daniel E. (A), Dept. of Religion, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620

Beane, Prof. Wendell C., 337 Graham St., Highland Park, NJ 08904 Bechert, Dr. Heinz, Seminar Fuer Indologie Und Buddhismus­

kunde, Der Universitaet Goettingen, Hainbundstrasse 21, D-34 Goettingen, F.O.G.

"Bement, Michale B (S), 643 E.Johnson St., Apt. No. 12,Madison, WI53703

Berry, Stephen Gerard (S), 474 West 238th St. Apt. 2F, Bronx, NY 10463

Berry, Thomas 5801 Palisade Ave., Riverdale, NY 10471 Beyer, Prof. Stephan, 1230 Van Hise Hall, University of Wiscon­

sin, Madison, WI 53706

92

Bielefeldt, Carl, Dept. of Religious Studies, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903

Birnbaum, Prof. Raoul, 10 Park Ave., New York, NY 10016 Blackwell, Prof. Fritz, Dept. of Foreign Languages & Literatures,

Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164 Bloom, Prof. Alfred, Dept. of Religion, 2560 Campus, University

of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96882 Bond, Prof. George D., Dept. of Religions, Northwestern Univer­

sity, 1940 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60201 Bongard-Levin, Prof. G. M., Armyanskiy Per 2, Instut Vosdoko­

ved, AN SSSR, Moscow, USSR Boyd, A. Prof. James W. (A), Department of Philosophy, Colora­

do State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523 Braue, Prof. Donald Allen, 2564 Boyd Avenue, Fort Worth, TX

76109 Brown, William 1. (S), 1012 E. Dayton St. Apt. 4, Madison, WI

53703 Bruce, Prof. Robert, 510 Hillside Avenue, Prescott, AZ 86301 Buck, Harry M., Coordinator, Humanities, Wilson College, 1053

Wilson Ave., Chambersburg, PA 17201 Bull, Joanna (S), 20285 Croyden Lane, Topanga, CA 90290 Busick, Bonnie S., 223 W. Dutton, Kalamazoo, MI 49006 Cairns, Grace E., 2940 Tipperary Drive, Tallahassee, FL 32308 Carter, Prof. John Ross, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion,

Chapel House, Colgate Universtiy, Hamilton, NY 13346 Carter, Martha Limbach, 325 Lakewood Blvd., Madison, WI

53704 Chan-ngarm, Saeng, Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai Uni­

versity, Chiang Mai, THAILAND . Chandra, Dr. Lokesh, Intl. Acac. of Indian Cul., J22 Hauzkhas

Enclave, New Delhi 16, INDIA Chang, Prof. Chi-chlin, 3, Lane 5, Ching-Tien St., Taipei, Taiwan,

REPUBLIC OF CHINA Chang, Prof. Rev. Sheng-yen (F), The Buddhist Association of the

U.S., 3070 Albany Crescent, W. 231st St., Bronx, NY 10463 Chang, Shong Te, No.8 4F Bldg. 65, Sheeng Hi Dist., Wai Shung

Hi, Taipei, TAIWAN Chappell, Prof. David W., Dept. of Religion, University of Hawaii,

344 George Hall, Honolulu, HI 06822 Ch'en, Prof. Kenneth (H), Dept. of Oriental Languages, UCLA,

Los Angeles, CA 90024 Coburn, A. Prof. Thomas B.(A), Dept. of Religious Studies, St

Lawrence University, Canton, NY 13617

93

Colucci, Donald John (S), 316 H.B. Crouse Hall, Syracuse Univer­sity, Syarcuse,NY 13210

Conze, Prof. Edward (H), Foxwell, Marston Road, Sherbourne, Dorset, DT9 4BN ENGLAND

Corbin, Prof. Harry F. Box 73, Wichita State University, Wichita, KS 67208

Corless, Prof. Roger, 2466 Hilgard Ave., Apt. 201, Berkeley, CA 94709

Crispin, Rena (S), 100 Craig Ave., Madison, WI 53705 Dani, Prof. A.H., Dean, School of Social Science, Post Box No.

1090, University of Islamabad, Islamabad, PAKISTAN Dargyay, Dr. Eva K., Karl-Witthalm-Str. 11, D-8000 Munich 70,

F.R.G. Day, Prof. Terence P., Department of Religion, University of

Manitoba, Winnipeg R3T 2N2, Manitoba, CANADA Daye, Prof. Douglas, Dept. of Philosophy, Bowling Green Univ.,

Bowling Green, OH 43403 DeBary, Prof. William Theodore, 205 Low Library, Columbia

University, New York, NY 10027 . Dell, David J., South Asia Institute, Columbia Univ., New York,

NY 10024 Demieville, Prof. Paul (H), 234 Boulevard Raspail, 75014 Paris,

FRANCE Diskul, Prof. M.C. Subhadradis (F), Faculty of Archaeology, Sil­

pakorn University, Bangkok, THAILAND Dills, Barbara P. (S), 1337 Jenifer St., Madison, WI 53703 Dornish, Margaret Hammond, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Religion,

Pomona College, Claremont, CA 91711 Dowling, Prof. Thomas L., 140 Cadman Plaza West ll-K, Brook­

lyn, NY 11201 Dragonetti, Prof. Carmen, Centro de Investi~aciones Filosoficas,

C.I.F., Minones :w73, 1428 Buenos AIres, ARGENTINA Dresden, Prof. Em. Mark J., 380 E. Rose Tree Road, Media, PA

19063 Dumoulin, Prof. Em. Heinrich, Sophia University, 7 Kioicho,

Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, JAPAN Elder, A. Prof. George R., 828 West End Ave., 11-F, New York,

NY 10025 Fenner, Edward Todd (S), Dept. of South Asian Studies, Univ. of

Wisc., Madison, WI 53706 Ferro, Nancy (S), Route 2, Box 51, Muscoda, WI 53573 Florida, A. Prof. Robert Edwin, Dept. of Religion, Brandon Univ.,

Brandon, Manitoba, CANADA R7A 6A9

94

Frank, Dr., Walter A., Universtiy of Bonn, SeIPinar for Central Asia, Mavia Paci's Weg T, D 5300 Bonn, F.R.G.

Gangadean, Asttok K., Gest Center, Haverford College, Haver­ford, PA 19041

Gard, Dr. Richard A., Director of Institute Services The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, Mel~ille Memorial Library, S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794

Gelfman, Wayne (S), 15-8 Inamuragasaki, I-Chome, Apt. 2B, Kanakura-shi, 248TE, JAPAN

Gimello, Prof. Robert M., Dept. of Religious Studies, Univ. of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106

Gokhale, B.G. (F), Asian Studies Program, Wake Forest Univer­sity, Box 7547, Winston-Salem, NC 27109

Gokhale, Prof. V. V. (H), 39/1415 Prabhat Rd., Poona 5 Maha- . rashtra, INDIA

Gombrich, Prof. Richard (F&L), The Oriential Institute, The Uni­versity of Oxford, Pusey Lane, Oxford OX1 2LE, ENGLAND

Gomez, Prof. Luis, Dept. of Far Eastern Languages and Litera­tures, Frieze Bldg., The Universtiy of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI48104

Graham, Prof. Thomas, Dept. of Religious Studies, University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3B ZE9, CANADA

Granoff, A. Prof. Phyllis E., Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster University, Hamilton, OntariCjl,.L8S 4K1, CANADA

Grosjean, Mia Emlen, 123 East 75th St. New York, NY 10021 Haines, Ms. Judy F., 290 Potter Place, Weehawken, NJ 07087 Hakeda, Dr. Yoshito, 408 Kent, Columbia University, New York,

NY 10027 Hamilton, James Patrick (S), 5800-10 Bjelde, Monona, WI 53716 Han, Prof. Ki Doo, Won Kwang University, Iri City, Chollapuk-do

510-11, REPUBLIC OF KOREA Hanson, Mervin V. (S), Dept. of Religious Studies, University of

British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, CANADA Hanson-Barber, A.W., 544 W. Wilson St.,Madison, WI 53703 Harris, Collett C., c/o Benjamin G. Cox, 914 South Center St.,

Terre Haute, IN 47807 Harrison, Paul Maxwell (S), Dept. of South Asian and Buddhist

Studies, Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National Uni­versity, P.O. Box 4, Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRA­LIA

Heine, Steven (S), 335 S. 18th St., Philadelphia, PA 19103 Hejib, Alaka Vasant, Faculty of Religious Studies, MCGlli Univer­

sity, 3520 University St., Montreal, Quebec, H2X 1W4, CANADA

95

Hoffmann, Prof. Helmut, Dept. of Uralic and Altaic Studies, Goodbody Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN

47401 Hopkins, Prof. Jeffrey, Dept. of Religious Studies, Cocke Hall,

Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903 Horner, LB. (H), 62 South Lodge, Circus Road, London NW8

9ET, ENGLAND Hurvitz, Prof. Leon (F), The Univ. of British Columbia, 2075

Wesbrook PI., Vancouver, British Columbia, V6T 1 W5, CANADA

Inagaki, Hisao, 83 Leeside Crescent, London, NWll OJL, ENGLAND

Inokuchi, Taijun, Shinfuyacho-Sanjo, Kyoto, 606, JAPAN Ishii, Prof. Yoneo, The Center for Southeast Asian Studies,

Kyoto University, 46, Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku,

Kyoto 606, JAPAN Jackson, Prof. Herbert C., Dept. of Religious Studies, Michigan

State Univ., East Lansing, Michigan, 48842 Jacobson, Prof. Em. Nolan P., 1612 Clarendon PI., Rock Hill, SC

29730 Jagchid, Prof. Sechin, Dept. of History, 230MRSB, Brigham

Young University, Provo, Utah 84602 Jaini, Prof. Padmanabh S., Dept. of S & SE Asian Studies, U. of

Cal., Berkeley, CA 94720 Jamspal, Lozang (A), Lamaist Buddhist Monastery of America,

Box 306 A RD 1, Washington, NJ 07882 Jan, Prof. Yun-hua (F), Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster

University, 1280 Main St. West, Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4K1, CANADA

Kajiyama, Prof. Yuichi (F), Dept. of Buddhist Studies, Kyoto Univ., Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606, JAPAN

Kanda, A. Prof. Shigeo H., Dept. of Religious Studies, California State University, Chico, CA 95926

Kang, Kun Ki (S), 340 E. 34th St. No. 9H, New York, NY 10016

Katz, Nathan, Dept. of Religion, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122

Kawamura, Leslie S., Religious Studies, The University of Calgary, 2920-24th Ave. N.W., Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, CANADA

Keel, Dr. Hee-sung, Dept. of Religion, St. Olaf College, Northfield, MN 55057

Keyes, Prof. Charles F., Dept. of Anthropology, Univ. of Wash­ington, Seattle, WA 98195

Keyt, Christine Mullikin, 12032 36th Ave. N.E., Seattle, WA 98125

96

Ki Doo, Prof. Han, Won-Kwang University, Iry City, Cholla Pukdo 510-11, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Kim, Hee-Jin, Dept. of Religious Studies, Univ. of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403

King, Sallie Behn (S), 2818 Sommers Ave., Madison, Wi 53704 King, Prof. Winston L., 518 Caldy Place, Madison, WI 53711 Kirk, Prof. James A., Dept. of Religious Studies, The Univ. of

Denver, Denver, CO 80208 Kirtz, William D. (S), 104F Eagle Heights, Madison, WI 53705 Kitagawa, Dean Joseph M., Office of the Dean, The Divinity

School, The Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 Kiyota, Prof. Minoru (F), Dept. of South Asian Studies, 1242

Van Hise Hall, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 Kodera, A. Prof. Takashi J., Dept. of Religion, Wellesley College,

Wellesley, MA 02181

Kohn, Richard Jay (S), 916 E. Gorham St., Madison, WI 53703 Krishan, Y.C., 11/55 Dr. Zakir Hussain Marg, Bapa Nagar, New

Delhi 110003, INDIA

Ku, Cheng-mei (Kathy) (S), 505-D Eagle Hts., Madison, WI 53705

Kiiloy, Hallvard, K. (F), UNICEF, Box No. 1187, Kathmandu, NEPAL

Kurtze, Susan S. (S), Box 610, 3600 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104

Kvaerne, Prof. Per, Religionshistorisk Institutt, Postboks 1010, Blindern, Oslo 3, NORWAY

Lamotte, Prof. Etienne (H), Place du Roi Vainquer 15-Bte. 10, B- 1040 Bruxelles, BELGIUM

Lancaster, Prof. Lewis, Dept. of Oriental Lang., The U. of Calif., Berkeley, CA 94720

Lang, Karen Christina (S), 4059 8th Ave. NE No. B, Seattle, WA 98105

Langbauer, Prof. Delmar, Dept. of Religion, University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, WA 98416

Lange, Prof. Emil F., Dept. of Religion & Culture, Wilfrid Laurier Univ., Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5, CANADA

Lee, Dr. Cyrus, Dept. of Philosophy, Chinese Culture College, Yang Ming Shan, Taipei, TAIWAN

Lethcoe, Nancy R., 4952 Morland, R.R. No.1, Victoria, B.C V8X 3X2, CANADA

Lewis, Todd (S), Box 88 Hollow Rd., Skillman, N.J. 08558 Ligeti, Prof. Louis (H), V. Belgrad rakp. 26, 1056 Budapest,

HUNGARY Likhitanontl, Dr. Likhit, Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai

Univ., Chiang Mai, THAILAND 97

Ling, Prof. Trevor O. (F), Dept. of Comparative Religion, The University, Manchester.M13 9PL, ENGLAND

Locke, John K., St Xavier's School, G.P.O. Box 50, Kathmandu, NEPAL

Macy, Joanna Rogers (A), 3508 Lowell St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016

Macdonald, Prof. A.W. (F), L.A No. 140 du C.N.R.S., Faculte des Lettres Universite de Paris X, 92001 Nanterre, FRANCE

Maquet, Prof. Jacques (F), Dept. of Anthropology, Univ. of Cali­fornia, Los An&.eles, Los An~eles, CA 90024

Marchand, Deborah Lynn (S), 5210 Hedden Circle, Middleton, WI 53562

Martin, Prof. Richard B., Area Collections Dept., Univ. of Virgin­ia Library, Charlottesville, VA 22901

Martinson, Paul V., 2303 Doswell Ave. St. Paul, MN55108 Matsumura, Hisashi (S), Dept. of South Asian & Buddhist Studies,

Faculty of Asian Studies, The Australian National Univ., P.O. Box 4, Canberra, AC.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA

Maxwell, Dr. Natalie, Box 125, Rte~ 1, Port Murray, NJ 07865 May, Prof. Jaques, 68 Ave. de Rumine, Ch. 1005 Lausanne,

SWITZF:R:r,,~D

Mayer, Prof. John R.A, Dept. of Philosophy, Brock Univ., St. Catharines, Ontario, CANADA

McClung, Prof. Larry, Dept. of Religion, Moravian College, Beth­lehem, PA 18018

McGinty, Prof. Park, Dept. of Religious Studies, 324A Maginnes Hall No.9, Lehigh Univ. Bethlehem, PA 18015

McMullin Neil F., 157 Shelbourrte Rd., Rochester, NY 14620 Meadows, Carol Jean, 276 Riverside Dr. New York, NY 10025 Melzer, Philip, 4000 Thornapple St., Chevy Chase, MD 20015 Mendelson, Dr. Edward Michael, 96A New St., New Hope, PA

18958 Mikogami, Esho, c/o Dept. of Buddhist Studies, Ryukou Univ.,

Shichijo Omiya, Kyoto 600, JAPAN Miller, Dr. Robert J. and Dr. Beatrice, 1227 Sweet Briar Rd.,

Madison, WI 53705 Miller, Stephen, 145 E. 15th St., Apt. No.4-V, New York, NY

10003 Miyuki, A. Prof. Mokusen, 1508 Westmoreland Dr., Montebello,

CA 90640 Morgalla, Janina W. (S), 906 S. Brooks St., Madison, WI 537 5 Morgan, Prof. Kenneth W., 52 Henry Ave., Princeton, NJ 08540 Muck, Terry C., Dept. of Religions, Northwestern Univ., 1940

Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60201 98

NiJ.gao, Prof. Gadjin M.(L & F), 1 Sennyuji-sannai, Higashiyama, Kyoto 605, JAPAN

Nakamura, Prof. Hajime, The Eastern Institute, Meiko Building, Soto-kanda 2-12-4, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, JAPAN

Narain, Prof. A. K. "(F&L), 1242 Van Hise Hall, Univ. ofWiscon­sin, Madison, WI 53706

Nattier, Janice J. (S), 15 Pleasant Ave., Somerville, MA 02143 Nielsen, Prof. Niels C. Jr.! Rice Univ., Dept. of Religious Studies,

Houston, TX 77001 Norman, Prof. Kenneth Roy (F), Faculty of Oriental Studies,

Sidgwich Ave., Cambridge CB3 9DA, ENGLAND O'Hanlon, Prof. Daniel John, The "Jesuit School of Theology at

Berkeley, 1735 Le Roy Ave., Berkeley, CA 94709 Palmer, Prof. Spencer J., 156 JSB Religious Studies Center,

Brigham Young Univ., Proveo, UT 84602 Park, A. Prof. Sung-Bae, Program in Religious Studies, 105 Old

Physics, State University of New York, Stony Brook NY 11794

Parsons, Prof. Howard L., Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Bridgport, Bridgeport, CT 06602

Paul, Prof. Diana, Dept. of Religious Studies, Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA 94305

Pauly, Else (L&F), Byskellet 8, DK 2960 Rungsted Kyst, DAN­MARK

Penkower, Linda L. (S), 535 W. 110 St. No. 14F, New York, NY 10025

Pilgrim, Richard B. (A), Dept. of Religion, 316 H.B.C., Syracuse Univ., Syracuse, NY 13210

Poppe, Prof. Nicholas (H), 3220 NE 80th St. Seattle, WA 98115 Potter, Prof. Karl H., Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Washington,

Seattle, WA 98195 Prebish, Prof. Charles S., Dept. of Religious Studies, Pennsylvania

State Univ. 1001 Liberal Arts Tower, University Park, PA 16802

Prithipaul, A. Prof. K. Dad, Dept. of Religious StUdies, The Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2E6, CANADA

Quiles, Dr. Ismael, Universidad del Salvador, Callao 542, Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA

Raducha, Joan A. (S), 610H Eagle Heights, Madison, WI 53705 Rao, M. Rajagopala (A), Dept. of Philosophy, Gettysburg College,

Gettysburg, PA 17325 Rasmussen Douglas James, 6101 Eagle Heights, Univ. of Wiscon­

sin, Madison, WI 53705

99

Ratnayaka, Prof. Shanta, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion, Uni­versity of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602

Ray, Prof. Reginald Alden, Naropa Institute, 1111 Pearl St., Boulder, CO 80302

Riccardi, Jr., Prof. Theodore (F), Dept of Middle East Languages & Cultures, Columbia University, 624 Kent Hall, New York, NY 10027

Robinson, Hannah G., Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, 5001 Main Library, S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11789

Robinson, Prof. James B., Dept of Philosophy and Religion, Univ. of N. Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA 50613

Roth, Prof. Gustav, Seminar fuer Indologie und Buddhismuskunde, Hainbundstrasse 21, 3400 Goettingen, FEDERAL RE­PUBLIC OF GERMANY

Ruegg, Prof. D. Seyfort, Dept. of Asian Languages and Literature, Gowen Hall DO-2l, Univ. of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195

Samtani, Prof. N.H., Buddha Kuti, Banaras Hindu Univ., Varana­si-5 (U.P.), INDIA

Santucci, A. Prof. James A., Dept. of Linguistics & Religious Studies, California State Univ., 1800 North State College Boulevard, Fullerton, CA 92634

Sarkar, A. Prof. Kalyan K., pept. of Asian Studies, Univ. of Wind­sor, Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4, CANADA

Schopen, Gregory (S), c/o Dr. V. C. Thorpe, 106 S. Sumner St., New Castle WY 82701

Schuster, Prof. Nancy, Dept. of Religion, Wesleyan Univ., Middle­town, CT 06457

Shafer, Prof. Robert Lloyd, Dept. of English, Western Michigan Univ., Kalamazoo, MI 49008

Sharma, Arvind, Lecturer, Studies in Religion, Universicj of

Queensland, Brisbane, 4067, AUSTRALIA

Sharpe, Patricia L. (S), 5728 S. Slackstone St. Apt. 103, Chicago,

IL 60637

Sherburne, A. Prof. Richard, Loyola Hall, Seattle Univ., Seattle,

WA 98122

Shig, Prof. Hiu-Wan, Prajiia-dhyana. Sangharama, No. 22., Lane

110, 2Sec., Yang-te Rd., 111 shih-Lin, Taipei, Taiwan, RE­PUBLIC OF CHINA

Shimomisse, Prof. Eiichi, Dept. of Philosophy, California State

University, Dominquez Hills, Carson, CA 90747

Smith, Prof. Bardwell, (L&F), Asian Studies Program, Carleton

College, Northfield, MN 55057 100

Smith, Bill (S), Box 912, Sta. 2, Amherst College, Amherst, MA

01002

Snyder, Jeanette Marie, c/o Midori Snyder, Apt. M, 405 N.

Francis, Madison, WI 53703

Sopa, Geshe Lhundup (F), Dept. of South Asian Studies, 1250

Van Hise Hall, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706

Soule, Katheryn A., 9691 Delta Line Rd., Blaine, WA 98230 .

Spae, Rev. Joseph J. CCIM (A), 32 Geldmuntstraat, B-8000

Brugge, BELGIUM

Spellman, Prof. John W., Institute of Asian Cultures, Univ. of

Windsor, Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4 CANADA

Spiro, Prof. Melford E., Dept. of Anthropology, University of

California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92037

Sprung, Prof. Mervyn, Dept. of Philosophy, Brock Univ., St.

Catherines, Ontario, CANADA

Stablein, William, 5253 15th N.E., Seatde, WA 98105

Stalker, Susan C. (S), 3418 Sansum St., Apt. 1, Philadelphia PA

191Q4

Stavisky, B.J., WCNILKR, 10, Krestyansaya Pl., J-l72 Moscow, 109172, USSR

Streng, Prof. Frederick J., Dept. of Religious Studies, Southern

Methodist Univ., Dallas, TX 75275

Sumner, Bradford Roberts (S), 153 Elm St., Northampton, MA

01060

Swearer, Prof. Donald K., Dept. of Religion, Swarthmore College,

Swarthmore, PA 19081

Takeuchi, Prof. Shoko, 2-59, Hamadacho, Amagasaki-shi, Hyogo,

660, JAPAN

Tanabe, Jr., Visiting Acting Assistant Prof. George]., 66-851

Haleiwa Rd., Haleiwa, Hawaii 96712

Tatia, Prof. Nathmal, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, P. O. Nalanda

803 111, Bihar, INDIA

Terakawa, Prof. Shunsho (F), Shin Buddhist Studies Dept., Otani

Univ., Kita-ku, Kyoto, JAPAN

Thaw, Dr. U. Aung, Director, Archaeological Survey of Burma,

Rangoon, BURJ\tlA

Thompson, Kirill O. (S), 2440 Date St., Apt. 1106, Honolulu,

Hawaii 96814

Thurman, Prof. Robert A. F., Amherst College, Dept. of Philo­

sophy & Religion, Amherst, MA 01002

101

Tominaga, Thomas T., Asst. Prof., Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of

Nevada, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Las Vegas, NV 89154

Tucci, Prof. Giuseppe (H), ISMEO, Via Merulana, 248, 00185

Roma, ITALY

Underwood, A. Prof. Frederic Bradley, 626 Kent Hall, Columbia

Univ., New York, NY 10027

Unno, Prof. Taitetsu, Dept. of Religion, Smith College,. North­

ampton, MA 01063

Upadhyaya, Prof. K.N., Dept. of Philosophy, 121 George Hall,

2560 Campus Rd., Univ. of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822

Victoria, Brian Andre (S), 928 South New Hampshire, Los Ange­

les, CA 90006

Waldschmidt, Dr. Ernst (H), Prof. Em. of Indology, University of

Gottingen, Hainbundstrasse 21, D-34 Gottingen, FEDERAL

REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Wayman, Prof. Alex, Dept. of Middle East Languages & Cultures,

Columbia Univ., 603 Kent Hall, New York, N.Y. 10027

Weinstein, Prof. Stanley,- Dept. of Religion, Yale Univ., New

Haven CT 06520

Wekerle, Prof. Frank F., Director, Institute of Religion & Social

Science, Dept. of Philosophy, Hofstra Univ., Hempstead,

New York 11550

Welbon, Prof. G. R., Dept. of Religious Thought, Box 36, College

Hall, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104

Welty, Leslie C. (S), 1315 NE 47th, Apt. F, Seattle, WA 98105

Wijesekera, Prof. O.H. de A. (H), 613 High Level Rd., Nugegoda,

SRI LANKA

Wilkinson, Christopher (S), 6202 25th N.W., Seattle, WA 98115

Williams, Bruce Charles (S), 916 E. Gorham, Apt. A, Madison,

Wisc.53703

Willis, A. Prof. Janice D., Dept. of Religion, Wesleyan Univ.,

Middleton, CT 06457

Wilson, Prof. Frances, Dept. of South Asian Studies, 1242 Van

Hise Hall, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706

Wortz Dr.' Edward C., 580 Prospect Boulevard, Pasadena, CA

91103

Yamada, Prof. Isshi, Dept. of Religion, Northwestern Univ., 1940

Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60201

Young, Katherine Kidd, William and Henry Rirks Building, 3520

University St., Montreal, Quebec H3A 2A7, CANADA

102

Young, Serinity, 99 Claremont Ave., New YODk, NY 10027

Yuyama, Akira, Director, The Reiyukai Library, 5-3-23 Torano-

mon, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105, JAPAN

Zelliot, Prof. Elanor (F), Carleton College, Northfield, MN 55057

Zurcher. Prof, Erik (F), Oosteinde 16, Warmond, NETHERLANDS

Zwilling, Dr. Leonard, 148 Tinker St. Woodstock, N.Y. 12498

Zysk, Kenneth G. (S), Dept. of Asian Civilizations, P.O. Box 4,

Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA

Naropa Institute (1),1111 Pearl St., Boulder, CO 80302

NDEA Center for South Asian Studies (1), 113 3 lAB, Columbia

Univ., New York, NY 10025

The Reiyukai Library (I), 5-3-23 Toranomon, Minato-ku, Tokyo

105, JAPAN

The Department of Religious Studies (I), The Univ. of Calgary,

2920-24th Ave., N.W., Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, CANADA

Seminar fur Indologie und Buddhismuskunde (I), Der Universitat

Gottingen, Akademie d. Wissenschaftern D-34 Gottingen,

Hainbundstrasse 21, F.O.G.

103

with the studies on Alambanaparz""k~a and the Vigrahavya.vartani, both of which appeared in 1929.

His scholarly fame was established soon after his retum to Japan with the publication of his excellent studies on the Madhy­anta.vibhiigatika based on a manuscript from Nepal which S. Levi had entruste.d to him for researches. Since then his tireless efforts bore a succession of achievements. In his later life he was not o.nly ranked among first class scholars but also esteemed for his ad­visory opinion on the rapidly changing society of Japan.

105

Yamaguchi Susumu~ a brief sketch of career

1895

1922

1924-31

1927-29

1934-64

1935-50

1948-52

1950-58

1957

1964-76

1965

1976

Born in Kyoto on jan. 27.

Finished the Post-graduate Course of Shinshu Otani Daigaku.

Asst. Professor, Otani Daigaku.

Studied in Paris.

Professor, Otani Daigaku.

During these years, made lectures in Kyoto Dai-· gaku, Ryukoku Daigaku and other universities.

A member of the Japan Science Council.

President, Otani Daigaku.

Selected for the honorary membership of la Societe Asiatique.

Professor, Kyoto Sangyo Daigaku.

Elected a member of the Japan Academy.

Passed away on Oct. 21.

A Lz"st of Prof Yamaguchz"'s Prz"ncz"pal Publz"catz"ons

1. Vi:rp.satika-vrtti, Chinese and Tibetan Versions COqJ.pared and Annotated (included in Sasaki Gessho: Pi~=+ffifBO)J,i~7ifF~ A Comparative Study on the Virpsatika of the Vijiiana School, Tokyo, 1923).

2. Mahayanasarpgraha, Text in Tibetan (appended to Sasaki Gessho: ~~Im*Jf~.*~~!fS Mahayanasarpgraha; Four Chinese Versions Compared, Tokyo, 1931).

3. Sthiramati, Madhyantavibhagatika, Exposition systematique du Yogacaravijiiaptivada. Edition d'apres un manuscrit rapporte du Nepal par M. Sylvain Levi. Tome I-Texte, Nagoya, 1934.

4. ~1J~m~{J'!;,~~jijjt (-), (=) Abhidharmakosavyakhya Ch. 2, a Japanese translation in collaboration with Wogihara Unrai, 2 vols., Tokyo, 1934-39.

5. *./fiiJ~~JnH1!!9=r~5.t~Ij~'-'jijjt~tt Sthiramati's Madhyanta­vibhagatika, annotated translation into Japanese, Nagoya, 1935 (Tome II in sequence of3).

6. ~.J,i~m9=r~~ffl9=r~5.t~Ij~'-'jijjt~**5 [ Madhyantavi-bhaga, Chinese and Tibetan versions compared, with an index to the Sanskrit text of Madhyantavibhagatika as an appendix, Nagoya, 1937 (Tome III in sequence of3 & 5).

7. ~~ K 1P: l1" .0 ~ ~ fir ~ O)J,i~ A Study on the Fifth Chapter of the Madhyamakahrdaya, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1941.

8. 9=r1l~~ffifBliC Essays in Madhyamaka Buddhism (including the studies on the Madhyamakakarika, the Yukti~a~tika, the Vaidal­ya-siltra, the Catu~sataka, etc.), Tokyo-Kyoto, 1944.

9. ~M 1:i]~!fS ~ ~ -::5 < .o}j m~9=r~~ I, II Prasannapada Madhya­makavrtti of Candraklrti, Ch. I-XI, annotated translation into Japanese, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1947-49.

lO. l!Bt*,'i!t,~§I:: History of Prajiia Thought, Kyoto, 1951. 11. ff!:~ 0) nlt*ffifB The KarmasiddhiprakaraI,la of Vasubandhu

(Tibetan text of the PrakaraI,la; a Japanese translation of both the PrakaraI,la and Sum~ti§na's commentary on it), Kyoto, 1951.

12. tb~ ~ H-{~~K1P:l1" .0 ~~O)f**-, Tokyo, 1952 (Eng. tr. by Watanabe Shoko: Dynamic Buddha and Static Buddha, Tokyo, 1958).

13. ff!:~pl~O) )]{#I!-mM Textual Study in Vasubandhu's Vijiiana Thought (i.ncluding annotated translation into Japanese of the

106

ViI!1satika, the TriI!1sika and the· AlaI!1banaparik~a, together with Vinltadeva's commentaries), in collaboration with Nozawa Josho, Kyoto, 1953. .

14. 7'7:/ .A{~~~0).li+::q:. Fifty Years of Buddhist Study in France, Kyoto, 1953.

15. ~'@rMaO)l~J1!m§J3 Textual Study on the Kosa (annotated tran­slation into Japanese of the 3rd chapter of the Abhidharmakosa together with Yasomitra's commentary), in collaboration with Funahashi Issai, Kyoto, 1955.

16. -1:/ F'3t11::;~ Cultural History of India (a Japanese translation in collaboration with Sasaki Kyogo of S. Levi's L'Inde civilis a­trice), Kyoto, 1958.

17. ~~¥FfWt What is Buddhism? -Introduction to Buddhology, in collaboration with Ocho Enichi, Ando Toshio and Funahashi Issai, Kyoto, 1961.

18. ffttl!O)~±~~ Vasubandhu's Upadesa to the Amitayul;tst1tra, Kyoto, 1962.

19. ~~,~;mAr~ An Introduction to Buddhist Thought, Tokyo, 1968.

20. JlJ I::::J 1iil:~~¥3t~J:.""f Selected Essays in Buddhist Studies by Yamaguchi Susumu, 2 vol., Tokyo, 1972-73.

21. {~~~:!11! Buddhist Scripture (ed.), Translation into Japanese of Selected Parts from the Nikayas and Mahayana St1tras, Kyoto, 1974.

22. Index to the Prasannapada Madhyamaka-vrtti, 2 vols., Kyoto, 1975.

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ERRATA TO ISSUE 1

Professor Waldschmidt, who did not have the opportunity to check the proofs, asks for the following corrections:

p. 25, line 10: "on the request" (scl. of the Buddha) instead of "on their request".

p. 26, line 20: ".1" instead of ".i", p. 27, line 14: "supposed" instead of "suppose". p. 27, line 17: "Mara" instead of Mara". p. 28 line 1: "bhikru" instead of "bhik~u". p. 28 line 31: "iiyu-?mato" instead of "iiyusmato". p. 29, line 5: Insert: Again and repeatedly you should preach to

the monks the sermon of letting in and not letting in (sensitive influences) .

p. 29, line 13: "udgrhI.1idhv(am) " instead of "udgrhnidhv(am)". p. 30/31: Exchange R-and-O, 0 and Rrespectively. p. 33, line 22 has to read: "anavassutapariyiiyarrz, ca / tarIJ sur;,iitha

siidhukam manasi karota bhiisissiimiti." in one or two cases a (not ii) has been printed.

CHAIRPERSON

Gadjin M. Nagao 1 Sennyuji-sannai, Higashiyama, Kyoto 605, Japan

. VICE CHAIRPERSONS

A.L. Basham Australian National University Canberra, A.C. T. 2600, Australia

Louis Ligeti H-1364 PF 107 Hungary

D.H. de A. Wijesekera 613 High Level Road Nugegoda, Sri Lanka

GENERAL SECRETARY

A. K. Narain Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison,

Wisconsin, 53706, U.S.A.

(Asia) Yuichi Kajiyama

Kyoto University, Japan

SECRET ARIES

(Europe) Erik Zurcher

Warmund, Nerherlands

(Americas) Bardwell L. Smith

Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota

ASSOCIATE SECRETARY Charles F. Prebish

Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, U.S.A.

JOINT LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE EXECUTIVE

Gadjin M. Nagao (Japan); A.L. Basham (Australia); Louis Ligeti (Hungary); D.H. de A. Wijesekera (Sri Lanka); Beatrice D. Miller (U.S.A.); A.K. Narain (U.S.A.); Yuichi Kajiyama (Japan); Bardwell L. Smith (U.S.A.); Erik Zurcher (The Netherlands); Heinz Bechert (West Germany); A. W. Macdonald (France); M.C. Subhadradis Diskul (Thailand);Jan Yun-hua (Canada); Richard Gombrich (United Kingdom); Charles F. Prebish (U.S.A.); Leon Hurvitz (U.S.A.); Pad­manabh S. Jaini (U.S.A.); Alex Wayman (U.S.A.); Lokesh Chandra (India); A.H. Dani (Pakistan); Ismael Quiles (Argentina); Theodore Riccardi (U.S.A.); U. Aung Thaw (Burma).

HONORARY FELLOWS P. V. Bapat (India); Kenneth K.S. Ch 'en (U.S.A.); Edward Conze (United King­dom); Paul Demieville (France); LB. Horner (United Kingdom); Etienne Lamotte (Belgium); Giuseppe Tucci (Italy); P.L. Vaidya (India); E. Wald­schmidt (Federal Republic of Germany); S. Yamaguchi (jap£n).