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The logic of power sharing after civil war

© Anna Jarstad, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

Paper prepared for the workshop on Power-sharing and Democratic Governance in Divided Society, Center for

the Study of Civil War, PRIO, Oslo, Norway, 21–22 August 2006. Work in progress!1

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Abstract: Warring minority parties are likely to demand some form of power

sharing to sign a peace deal. However, after a peace deal is signed, power sharing

may have negative effects on democratization as well as on peacebuilding. The

paper analyzes separate meanings of power sharing, based on the one hand on

research on conflict management, and on the other hand on democratic theory. The

logics underlying the two discourses are found two be competing. I also outline

mechanisms that are triggered by political pacts after intrastate conflict. The

potential negative effects of power sharing on long-term democratization and peace

are illustrated by experiences from recent power-sharing accords. I claim that the

causal mechanisms of political pacts after civil war can further either peace or

democracy, but each mechanism cannot further both peace and democracy at the

same time.

IntroductionIn Lebanon in 1989 the Ta’if Charter of National Reconciliation contributed to ending of the

fifteen-year long civil war. The National Assembly now has an equal number of Christian and

Muslim members instead of the previous six to five ratio.2 Democratic elections regularly

result in inclusion of a wide spectrum of society in central government. Broadcasting is well

developed and literacy rates high. Civil peace holds, although violence lingers (with support

from Syria and Iran among other actors) and several politicians have been assassinated. In

1 This paper draws on one of my chapters in “Dilemmas of Peacebuilding and Democratization in War-TornSocieties”, eds. Jarstad & Sisk, forthcoming, presented at ISA 2006.

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May 2000, after a decade of Hezbollah attacks, Israel ended the occupation of southern

Lebanon. Hezbollah’s military achievements were rewarded during the democratic elections

in 2005, when Hezbollah won 14 out the 128 seats in parliament. In February 2006,

Hezbollah was officially recognized as resistance movement against Israel with the right to

remain armed. The ongoing war with Israel – or rather international demands to disarm the

military wing of the increasingly popular parliamentary party Hezbollah – threatens to end

power sharing. If the Lebanese government endorses demands that Hezbollah dislikes, there

is a risk that Shi’ite ministers will leave government and joint governance ends (ICG, 2006).

As this case demonstrates, power sharing does not always end violence and promote

moderation. Although external actors – factors exogenous to power sharing – explain much of

the present conflict in Lebanon3, power sharing itself can trigger mechanisms that have

negative implications for long-term democratization and peace.

Nevertheless, power-sharing accords have become a popular model for ending civil

wars. There is no consensus among researchers on how to design power-sharing accords in

such a way as to promote both peace and democracy. Rather, researchers learn from a moving

target, from the recent experiences of practitioners, from mediators and constitutional

engineers, and analyze the establishment and effects of power sharing. This paper departs

from the scholarly debate to summarize the state of the art and also outline a framework for

further research.4

2 The prior consociational system held for thirty years and during this period it managed to prevent full-scalecivil war and, according to Arend Lijphart, also established a remarkable record of democratic stability (Lijphart,1977, 150).3 External actors were also important factors explaining the failures of power sharing in Cyprus and previouslyin Northern Ireland.4 In the initial phase, research will be conducted in a project together with Desirée Nilsson and Ralph Sundberg.

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Advocates of power sharing for governance in divided societies typically depart from

one of two strands of research; conflict management theory of democratic theory. Power

sharing as a means to end violence rests on the logic of deterrence by a system of power

balance and separate decision-making. Power sharing as a means to develop democratic

governance rests on the logic of inclusion by joint decision-making that is expected to lead to

moderation. Are these two meanings of power sharing mutually compatible, complementary

or competitors? Can these two discourses work together or not? Can power sharing in practice

function to accommodate the two desirable goals of democracy and peace?

In this paper, I claim that there are separate and contradictory mechanisms at work

under power sharing after civil war. Simultaneous peacebuilding and democratization is

inherently unstable; a country’s direction at a given time, and end point, is uncertain. Power

sharing is a method to prolong and hopefully ease the route towards democracy and peace.

Ideally, the deterrence aspect of power sharing is downplayed over the course of time, as the

parties feel more comfortable with joint decision-making and responsibility. Under such

circumstances, power sharing can contribute to both peace and democracy. However, several

mechanisms triggered by power sharing pulls the parties even further apart. When power-

sharing systems are caught by such centrifugal spin, it obstructs rather than facilitates the

transition towards a secure democracy.

Power sharing is generally believed to enable a negotiated ending of war. By offering

the combatants a share in the future government, the conflict over power can thus be

accommodated. But power sharing is also associated with fragmentation, stalled decision-

making and return to war. Two separate strands of research use the term ‘power sharing’ in

relation to violent conflict, namely research on conflict management and research on

consociational democracy. Often scholars do not acknowledge that these two different strands

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of research use different definitions and also different theories concerning power sharing. An

example is when Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell’s works are cited as examples of

studies that prove that power sharing understood as political pacts are vital for reaching a

peace deal. However, political pact is not a necessary criterion in Hoddie and Hartzell’s 2005

definition of power sharing. In fact, many of their power sharing cases do not have any form

of joint governance at the national level. This conceptual confusion on the meaning of power

sharing has hampered research. It also means that policy advice to promote political pacts

have been formulated based on weak empirical and theoretical evidence.

This paper discusses different definitions of power sharing and outlines the different

causal mechanisms at work within the two strands of research. It discusses how previous

research has affected our understanding of the consequences of power sharing with regard to

long-term conflict management and democratization. I suggest that, in fact, we know very

little about which type of power sharing works to accommodate conflict and why.

To overcome this research gap I use a narrow definition on power sharing as political

pacts after civil war.5 I focus on the potential negative consequences of political pacts on

democratization and joint rule by discussing three functions and six mechanisms of power

sharing.

The meaning of power sharing

Power sharing stipulated in part of the conflict management literature differs from power

sharing in accordance with democratic theory. Because of different definitions, there is little

overlap between the characteristics, the cases and the mechanisms related to these two

concepts of power sharing. To one strand of research, which takes its starting point in Arend

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Lijphart’s theory on consociationalism, political pacts are key. Here the main issue is how to

make democracy function in societies divided along ethnic lines. This means that the theory

of consociationalism primarily addresses conflicts that are clearly ethnic. Lijphart coined the

concept of consociational democracy in 1968 to denote an institutionalized form of

democratic conflict management for divided societies (Lijphart 1968). Majoritarian electoral

systems are inapt, he writes, since they presuppose shifting majorities in parliament and fairly

similar policies of major parties in order not to exclude the other parties’ interests. However,

in divided societies, the political parties diverge to a great extent. Where people vote along

ethnic lines, political parties representing ethnic minorities have no chance of ever forming a

majority, and shifting majorities in parliament are therefore unlikely. Under such conditions,

Lijphart holds that majoritarian rule is not only undemocratic, but also dangerous and risks

resulting in civil strife (Lijphart 1999, 31-33). For countries such as Lebanon in 1985,

Lijphart writes, “the choice is not between consociational and majoritarian democracy, but

between consociational democracy and no democracy at all” (Lijphart 1985, 13).

To avoid partition or majoritarian dictatorship, Lijphart advocates a group-based form

of democracy, which he calls consociational democracy. The two main components are grand

coalition, implying that all rival groups should be included in government and autonomy for

each ethnic segment in all matters not of common concern. Two additional features are

mutual veto rights and proportionality in political representation, civil service appointments,

and the allocation of public funds (Lijphart 1993, 188-9).

Donald L. Horowitz, Timothy D. Sisk, Benjamin Reilly, Andrew Reynolds and others,

have recognized that there are also other forms of democratic power sharing (e.g. Horowitz

1985; Reilly 2001; Reynolds 2002; Sisk 1996). The integrative approach to power sharing

5 Civil war refers in this paper to intra-state armed conflict, including also conflicts with less than 1000 battle-

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eschews ethnic groups as the organizing principle for democracy.6 Instead, incentives for

moderation and cooperation across ethnic divides are engineered. These constitutional designs

can include majoritarian as well as non-majoritarian forms of electoral design. However,

proponents of the consociational as well as the integrative approach agree on the base line that

some form of joint rule is the only option for democratic governance in divided societies.

Another strand of research stems from the field of conflict management. In the

discourse of conflict management, the main function of power sharing is to end violence, not

to build democracy. Here, power sharing denotes all types of sharing and dividing power

between former foes, with less emphasis on democratic representation and elections (Hartzell

and Hoddie 2003; Rothchild 2005; Spears 2000; Walter 1999). Ian S. Spears writes that

power sharing “can be compatible with democracy” (Spears 2000, 105, my italics). However,

power sharing is sometimes constructed as an alternative to competitive elections (ibid.,

p.108).

Power sharing arrangements defined as political pacts remain largely unexplored in

quantitative research. Barbara Walter’s 2002 study is an exception. However, this study is

limited in many regards as it does not cover the post-Cold War period and only includes those

peace deals where all warring parties are signatories. Walter explains the function of power

sharing as a mechanism for solving the commitment problem in a context of severe distrust

and vulnerability. She outlines several reasons why combatants have difficulty in credibly

committing to a peace agreement. The concessions involved in a peace deal increase the

related deaths.6 ‘Centripetalism’ denotes a similar approach (Lijphart, 1969). Timothy D. Sisk uses this term to refer toelectoral engineering (in a similar vein to Horowitz) aiming for moderation and compromises by reinforcing “thecentre of a deeply divided political spectrum” (Sisk, Timothy. 1995a. Democratization in South Africa. TheElusive Social Contract. Princeton: Princeton University Press.). Ben Reilly uses a wider definition includingelectoral incentives, arenas for bargaining and centrist, aggregative political parties (Reilly, Benjamin. 2001.Democracy in Divided Societies. Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.).

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parties’ vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the treaty’s other terms. Once the

parties have laid down their arms and surrendered territory, they become vulnerable to

surprise attacks. Also, the parties cannot trust each other to implement the agreement.

Therefore, provisions for democratic governance do not by themselves settle the issue of

uncertainty. With less control over resources, parties may fear that the other party will form a

one-party state if they win the election, and that those in power would exploit minority and

opposition groups. In the absence of a strong civic culture, the population may not reject

parties advocating authoritarian control to foster order and economic advancement. For this

reason, the losers of the first post-war elections cannot count on another opportunity to gain

power. Under such circumstances, Walter argues, each side is likely to demand some form of

power sharing as the ‘price for peace’ (Walter 1999). She has demonstrated that warring

parties are 38 per cent more likely to sign an agreement if it includes guaranteed positions in

the future government (Walter 2002).

Among quantitative research on war endings, Mattew Hoddie and Caroline A.

Hartzell’s works are well-cited. They suggest that of the total of 38 civil wars ended by

negotiated settlement between 1945 and 1998, only one did not include provisions for power

sharing. Furthermore, they conclude that the more power sharing, the higher the likelihood

that peace will endure (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 319). However, in contrast to the most

common notion of power sharing, guaranteed positions in the government is not a necessary

component of their definition. Rather, power sharing denotes any type of institution dividing

or sharing political, economic, territorial and military power. Military power sharing refers,

for example, to provisions allowing antagonists to remain armed or retain their own armed

forces. In order to qualify as political power sharing, it is sufficient that the peace deal

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provides for electoral proportional representation or administrative proportional

representation (e.g. appointment of representatives of warring groups to courts).7

Consequently, their data set includes cases with no guaranteed power sharing in central

government – the essence of consociational power sharing. Instead, it is sufficient that at least

one provision regarding what they term territorial, economic or military power sharing is

present. On the basis of their study, other authors have nevertheless suggested that power

sharing – implicitly understood as political pacts – is positively related to democracy and

peace. Hartzell and Hoddie have specifically analyzed what they term central power sharing.

This is defined as a promise of any of the following: a proportional representation system,

appointments of warring parties to the administrative branch and/or appointments of warring

parties to the executive branch of government. They find no relationship between this type of

power sharing and democracy or peace (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005a). Their analysis, which

does include some cases of political pacts, in addition to other arrangements, suggest a need

to look into the specific logic of political pacts in relation to democracy and peace.

7 In their 2005 definition of power sharing, Hoddie and Hartzell include four categories of sharing and dividingpower. These are promises of political, territorial, military and economic power sharing in civil war settlements(Hoddie and Hartzell 2005b). Their power-sharing indicator is a composite measure varying from zero to four.Political power-sharing refers in this context to provisions for a) electoral proportional representation, b)administrative representation by appointment of warring groups to courts, civil service, foreign service, andcommissions, and /or c) appointment of representatives of warring groups to the executive branches such as theministerial, sub-ministerial, and cabinet positions. Hence, this definition of power sharing ignores the definingcharacteristic of consociationalism, grand coalition, while putting its emphasis on one of Lijphart’s additionalfeatures of consociationalism, namely proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments.

Consequently, Hoddie and Hartzell include all peace deals after major wars, which stipulate PR, in theirdata as cases of power sharing, while not clarifying whether or not all contending groups are included ingovernment.

Territorial power sharing refers in their chapter to provisions for federalism or autonomy. Thesefeatures may sometime overlap with what Lijphart calls segmented autonomy (Lijphart 1993, 188-9). However,to Lijphart consociationalism means shared decisions in all matters of common concern, and autonomousdecision-making only in matters such as religion. Economic power sharing, according to Hoddie and Hartzell,entails provisions for resource distributions and/or policies targeting groups or regions.

Furthermore, Hoddie and Hartzell stipulate the term military power sharing for provisions forintegration of former antagonists in a single chain of command in the army, navy, air force or state militia andappointment of representatives of weaker armed fractions to key leadership positions within the military sector.In addition, they include provisions allowing antagonists to remain armed or retain their own armed forces inthis category. Their conceptualization of power sharing implies that quotas in the legislature does not qualify for

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Two objectives – two logics

Hoddie and Hartzell’s study is important for the understanding of what peace agreements

contain and the effects of different types of provisions. However, the ‘conceptual stretching’

(Sartori 1994, 21) regarding the concept of power sharing, has several implications for an

analysis of power sharing as a tool for conflict management and its effects on

democratization. My interpretation is that the type of power sharing captured in Hartzell and

Hoddie’s work, relies on the logic of deterrence: By allowing groups to remain armed their

sense of security may increase, and by establishment of separate structures for political

decision-making and control over economic resources, groups increase their potential for

secession and credible threat thereof. These measures increase the costs of return to war and

may function as an internal guarantee in the absence of a neutral third party.

I suggest that the political component of this type of power sharing has little, or even

adverse effects, on peacebuilding and democratization. Firstly, it is difficult to see why a

proportional representation (PR) system would be a sufficient incentive for the weaker party

to sign an agreement. Under PR, the only possibility for minority parties to gain access to

positions in the executive is to form a coalition with larger parties. Although this is difficult

even under normal circumstances, the obstacles for forming coalitions in a warn-torn society

are more severe. The number of potential coalition partners is reduced, as it is uncommon that

parties at war with each other form coalitions. Furthermore, many war-torn societies are

polarized along ethnic lines and cross-ethnic parties tend to receive little support in such

societies. Where people vote along ethnic lines, political parties representing ethnic minorities

have no chance of ever forming a majority, and shifting majorities in parliament is therefore

power sharing, while failure to demilitarize — which has very little to do with the original meaning of powersharing — is seen as an indicator of power sharing.

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unlikely. Hence, under this type of system, an ethnopolitical minority risks being excluded

from power, despite democratic elections.8

Secondly, this version of power sharing does not specify if and why cooperation

between the contending parties would take place. Thus, it does not include any mechanisms

for conflict transformation. Thirdly, it does not have any claims of improving the quality of

democracy as a tool for conflict management.

Consociationalism, on the other hand, claims to contribute both to conflict management

and to democratization. It has been suggested that grand coalitions both increase the

likelihood of reaching an agreement and the prospects for long-term democracy and peace.

The first part of the argument has been supported by Barbara Walter’s findings. She has

demonstrated that the chances of reaching a peace deal is 38% higher if it includes provisions

for power sharing pacts (Walter 2002, 80). Ensured stake in the government in a grand

coalitions thus seem to function as an incentive for weaker groups to sign.

In terms of the quality of democracy, Lijphart has demonstrated that non-majoritarian

democracy outperforms majoritarian democracies on indicators of macroeconomic variables,

gender issue, voter participation, welfare policies, environmental protections, criminal justice

and economic aid to developing countries (Lijphart 1999). Furthermore, he suggests that

consociational democracy is more democratic than majoritarian types: The government by all

major parties, is more legitimate than the government by the majority (Lijphart 1999, 31-32).

However, the evidence for consociationalism as a tool for conflict transformation is

weaker. Lijphart expects consociationalism to promote compromise and conciliation (Lijphart

1994, 12). Therefore power sharing could ideally work as a catalyst for peaceful cooperation

among contending parties after a deal is signed. Lijphart is not clear on exactly what drives

8 Majority groups tend to prefer a winner-take all system, although under PR minorities would not threaten their

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this process. Interdependence and repetition seems to be key components. The majority is

dependent on the minority’s allegiance to the regime (Lijphart 1999, 33). Iterative

cooperation in a grand coalition is expected to promote an understanding of the other party so

that policies do not discriminate against any group.9 My interpretation is that the logic of

consociationalism suggests that recognition of ethnic demands increases the perception of

security, which in turn promotes mutual trust and reduces grievances. In the long run,

consociationalism is expected to depoliticize ethnicity and allow development of a common

national identity (Jarstad 2001, 46-48).

Two sets of cases

The two main approaches to power sharing recognized here, result in two very different lists

of cases. Below is a list of consociational democracies as defined and classified by Lijphart

(Lijphart, 1977; 1985, 89-90; 1996, 259; 1998, 101-2).10

hegemonic position.9 Such repeated rounds of cooperation can be understood by the reciprocal strategy of Tit for Tat by matchingthe other player’s move in iterative games (Morrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists.Princeton: Princeton University Press.).10 Lijphart acknowledges that other authors have used consociationalism as an analytical tool or normativemodel also for Chile, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Guyana, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Nigeria,Portugal, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia (Lijphart,1985, 84).

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Table 1. Consociational democracies according to Lijphart.11

Austria 1945-1966

Belgium since 1970

Canada 1840-67

Colombia 1958-74

Cyprus 1960-63

Czechoslovakia 1989-93

India

Israel

Lebanon 1943-1975, since 1989

Malaysia since 1955 (temporary breakdown in 1969-71)

The Netherlands 1917-1967

Netherlands Antilles

South Africa interim constitution of 1994

Suriname

Switzerland since 1943

Lijphart has altered the scope of the consociational category over the years. There are two

explanations for his changes: firstly, a stricter definition of consociationalism is applied in

some writings; secondly, the political realities have changed.12

Hoddie and Hartzell include 49 cases in their list of “power sharing and power dividing

institutions specified in agreements to end civil wars”. There are a few cases of

11 This table is originally from Jarstad 2001, 28.12 In addition to these cases of democratic power sharing, the centripetal version includes the divided societiesof Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Northern Island. According to Reilly, Australia and Estonia are not dividedsocieties, but still have used centripetal forms of institutional design (Reilly, Benjamin. 2001. Democracy inDivided Societies. Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.).

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correspondence with Lijphart’s list of cases in the table above. Both lists include the peace

accords after the civil wars in Colombia1948-57, Lebanon1958-58 and 1975-89, Malaysia

1948-56 and South Africa 1983-94. The other 44 of Hoddie and Hartzell’s cases have not

been recognized by Lijphart as consociational solutions. Hoddie and Hartzell include only

wars ended by negotiated settlement or truce. For example, the peace accords after the

Cyprus conflicts 1963-64 and 74-74 do not qualify, according to Hoddie and Hartzell, as the

provisions for these war endings are coded as imposed.13 Furthermore, cases that encompass

at least one of the features specified in their own definition of power sharing in peace

agreements are included. For example, the peace deal after the war between Georgia and

South Ossetia, 1989-92, is classified as a case of power sharing, because of what they classify

as provisions for military and territorial power sharing. Also the peace deal after Congo/Zaire

1998-99, is classified as a case of power sharing, the military version. The agreement after the

war in Mozambique 1982-92 contains, according to Hoddie and Hartzell, provisions for

political, military and territorial power sharing.

Power sharing as political pacts after civil warIn the conflict management discourse, power sharing is seen as a mechanism to manage the

uncertainty involved in a peace process – if need be, as a substitute for elections – while

research based on democratic theory treats power sharing as a mechanism to foster

moderation and to improve the quality of democracy. This means that researchers of both

schools advocate power sharing for war-shattered societies, albeit for different reasons.

However, the lack of integration between the two discourses means that there is limited

knowledge on the long-term consequences of power sharing in societies emerging from war.

13 I question the interpretation of the Cyprus cases as imposed (Jarstad, Anna. 2001. Changing the Game:Consociational Theory and Ethnic Quotas in Cyprus and New Zealand. Doctoral Dissertation, Department ofPeace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala).

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Of particular importance for the study of power sharing with regard to the issues of

democratization and peacebuilding in war-torn societies are provisions for guaranteed

positions in government, stipulated in peace accords.14 The list below gives examples of such

power sharing accords. These power-sharing accords (PSA) include an agreement between

contending parties formally outlining the composition of a future government. In addition

there are other pertinent post-war power-sharing experiences, including the one in Kosovo. In

the latter case, the guaranteed governmental positions for Kosovo Serbs did not result from a

negotiated settlement between warring parties, but are stipulated by a United Nations

regulation.15

14 This means that provisions for decentralization (federalism, autonomy and so called territorial power sharing)is excluded from the study.15 The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government (UNMIK Regulation UNMIK/REG/2001/9,15 May 2001).

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Table 1. Examples of Power-Sharing Accords.

Conflict Location Name and Year of Power Sharing Accord16

Angola The Lusaka Protocol 1994

Bosnia and Herzegovina The Dayton Accords 1995

Burundi The Arusha Accord 2000

Cambodia The Paris Agreement 1991

Cyprus The London Accords 1959

DRC The Pretoria Agreement 2002

Ivory Coast The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement 2003

Lebanon The Ta’if Agreement 1989

Liberia The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003

Rwanda The Arusha Accords 1993

Sierra Leone The Lomé Accord 1999

South Africa The Interim Constitution Agreement 1993

Sudan The Naivasha Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005

Tajikistan The Moscow Declaration 1997

Uganda The Yumbe Agreement 2002

Zimbabwe The Lancaster House Settlement 1979

This list is based on a narrow conception of power sharing as political pacts after intrastate

conflict.17 In the next phase of the study the above listed cases, and other similar cases, will

16 These are the common labels of the peace accords, which in some cases correspond to the formal title.17 A solid theoretical definition is yet to be formulated.

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be analyzed thoroughly. Because several peace accords listed above are fairly recent, their

long-term consequences will not be known for several years. For analysis of long-term

effects, a subpopulation of older cases has to be identified.

It can be noted that power-sharing provisions have been stipulated to manage several

types of conflicts. Some power sharing accords reflect ethnic divisions. For example, the

Dayton agreements stipulated power sharing among Serb, Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. The Burundi agreement provided for two types of ethnic power sharing: during

a transitional period ethnopolitical parties shared power, whereas the permanent constitution

fixed the ratio between Hutu and Tutsi representatives. By contrast, other peace accords do

not make any reference to ethnic groups, for example the peace accords in Angola, Cambodia,

Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone. By integrating the two discourses on power sharing,

ethnic as well as non-ethnic PSA can be taken into account. The long-term consequences of

many of these PSA are yet to be seen.

The causal mechanisms of power sharingBelow I develop theoretical arguments for how power sharing (i.e. political pacts) succeeds or

fails to contribute to peaceful relations and democratization after violent conflict.18

Power sharing performs three functions19; 1) inclusion; 2) leveling of power relations;

and 3) regulation of the primary conflict between elites. These functions are expected to

18 My idea is to do a quantitative analysis of causal mechanisms of power sharing, together with DesiréeNilsson and Ralph Sundberg. This study will also address the following issues: 1) How frequent is politicalpower sharing in central government after civil war?; 2) Which conditions are associated with which type ofpower sharing?; 3) What is the relationship between different types of power sharing in central government anda) return to war; b) sustainable peace; c) the holding of elections; d) consolidation of democracy?; 4) Whatexplains the performance of different types of power sharing?19 For the sake of clarity, I term these three categories ‘functions’ rather than mechanisms. These are alsooverarching mechanisms, but I reserve the term mechanism for the six different subcategories that can lead topotential negative effects on peace or democracy. Jon Elster describes mechanisms as “frequently occurring andeasily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminateconsequences” (Elster, 1999, 1). Elster distinguishes between different types of mechanisms; one type whichtriggers one of several mutually exclusive causal chains, another type triggers the independent variable in

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promote peace and democracy. However, each of these three functions can also trigger two

mechanisms each with potentially negative effects on peace or democracy – one that can have

negative effects on peacebuilding and one that can have negative effects on democratization.

Political pacts after civil war often mean that former rebels become part of government.

Some actors continue to use violence as a strategy parallel to democratic means, and thus

threaten peace. The function of inclusion leads in practice often to exclusion of certain groups

or individuals. Exclusion of moderates can undermine the process of democratization.

A peace accord that rests on the leveling of power relations between groups become

fragile if the original basis for calculation of the quota, such as demography, changes.

Democracy building can also be hampered when the principle of groups over individuals is

endorsed. Finally elite-negotiated regulation of the primary conflict can result in extremist

splinter groups that threaten peace and lack of local ownership that undermine

democratization. It is logically impossible to design a power-sharing system that avoids

triggering any of these six mechanisms in order to promote peace and democracy

simultaneously. Rather, in order to avoid the most devastating negative effects of power

sharing a mix of mechanisms could be chosen, where some are conducive to peacebuilding

and others promote democratization.

Power-sharing accords and their effect on conflict dynamics

The logic of power sharing as a way to manage violent conflicts can be understood in terms of

a basic two-player game. In brief, conflict is then seen as a result of a situation where one

party strives for total political control whereas the other demands partition. If one of the

parties has its way, it will gain a hegemonic position. If the other party has its way, the game

opposite directions and a third type triggers other mechanisms. Thus, according to Elster, the same trigger canlead to different processes. Here I do not follow Elster, but instead distinguish between function and

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will result in partition. Under such circumstances, or when both parties strive for total

political control, the only solution to manage conflict is joint rule (Jarstad 2001).

For this reason, power sharing is attractive to peace negotiators. However, there are

several reasons why the warring parties are reluctant to end conflicts by power sharing and

why PSA fail. A first reason concerns the issues of security and trust. One interpretation of

Lijphart’s theory is that it assumes that the provisions of consociationalism change the value

of cooperation for the parties involved. In a similar vein Walter suggests that power sharing

solves the commitment problem. However, in many war-shattered societies, power sharing

might be inadequate to mitigate the parties’ vulnerability during the peace process.20 Under

such circumstances, the parties cannot trust each other to uphold an agreement on power

sharing.

Secondly, power sharing entails great concessions for many parties. Per definition,

power sharing levels the power relations between contending groups. A strong party is likely

to be reluctant to accept a peace deal which renders all parties equal powers. In the choice

between democratic options, the larger party is likely to consider a majoritarian electoral

system more democratic and legitimate than a power sharing system, as the latter gives small

groups too a share of power, and in several cases even veto rights.

But a minority group may also be reluctant to sign a power-sharing deal. Territorial

control of part of a state may be preferable to the inclusion in a power-sharing government.

mechanisms. I suggest here that each ‘function’ can trigger two mechanisms, one that can have negative effectson peacebuilding and one that can have negative effects on democratization.20 In game-theoretical terms, this is the case when the rank orders of the parties’ preferences result in aPrisoner’s Dilemma. Consociationalism provides no mechanism to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Therefore, asWalter demonstrates, a combination of third-party security guarantees and power-sharing pacts are critical to thepeaceful resolution of civil wars (2002). For a review of the role of third parties in relation to power sharing, seefor example the introduction by Brendan O' Leary and J. McGarry (McGarry and O'Leary 2004).

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This is particularly true for regions with valuable resources such as oil or diamonds.21

Furthermore, inclusion in central government implies accountability also for decisions that go

against your own group. Thus, leaders may fear that if they accept a power-sharing deal, their

followers would see them as traitors.22

Thirdly, even in cases where war ends in a power sharing accord, the risk of a

resumption of violence remains. This is not always a consequence of power-sharing

provisions, but of conditions which obstruct any form of peace deal. For example, lingering

violence may prevent power sharing from taking root. This was the case in Angola 1994,

where violence continued even after the Lusaka agreement was signed. However, it would be

incorrect to argue that power sharing led to the resumption of war in 1998, as the agreement

was not implemented until many years later. In Sierra Leone in 1999, on the other hand, it

was violence that caused power sharing to break down. In this case, power sharing was a

condition for the peace accord and the subsequent international peace operation, which

eventually contributed to the marginalization of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

Fourthly, power sharing affects the intergroup relations in war-torn societies. Below, I

nuance the analysis of how power-sharing accords affect the conflict dynamics. I discuss the

impact of three power-sharing features: inclusion of warring parties, the leveling of power

relations and intra-group competition as a result of regulation of the primary intergroup

21 In recent years there has been an upsurge of research on what has become known as the greed and grievancemotives for conflict (for example, Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier et al. 2003).Based on several case studies, Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman demonstrate that the combatants’opportunities for mobilization and/or incentives for self-enrichment were not the primary causes of theseconflicts. Nevertheless, access to natural and financial resources does in some cases create serious impedimentsto conflict resolution. ”Lootable” resources such as diamonds and illegal narcotics has been found to prolongnon-separatist insurgencies, while “unlootable” resources, such as oil, gas and deep-shaft mineral deposits isassociated with separatist conflicts (Ballentine and Sherman 2003). Hence, there are reason to believe thatnatural resources impact on the parties’ preferences, the type of power sharing agreed on and the success ofpower sharing in terms of conflict management.22 This argument is, for example, illustrated by the case of South Africa, where the National Party withdrewfrom the power-sharing agreement in 1996 (Sisk and Stefes 2005).

20

conflict. Although these three mechanisms can have positive effects on conflict dynamics, I

propose that they can also affect intergroup relations negatively.

Negative effect 1: When inclusion implies inclusion of violence-makers

A peace deal is per definition an agreement between contending actors. In many conflicts

power sharing is key for reaching a peace deal at all. Negotiated settlements result from

compromises between warring parties, who maintain the option of resumption to war should

the costs of peace outweigh the prospective gains of future outcomes. For warring groups who

see little chance of winning the war on the battlefield, a stake in the government, stipulated by

a PSA, may work as an incentive to lay down arms.

Other actors continue to use violence, in spite of participation in the democratic

institutions. This is the case of Hezbollah, which is a political party of the government with its

own autonomous militia. In other cases, the military wing is not officially recognized by the

political party (e.g. IRA–Sinn Fein). Lingering violence threatens peace in several ways, most

notably when political groups have the capacity to challenge the state.

Negative effect 2: When the leveling of power does not correspond to perceived power

relations

Power sharing entails the leveling of power relations between contending groups. Such

ensured inclusion in government contributes to conflict management by reducing the

uncertainty of elections. However, a PSA tends to reflect the power relations at the time of

negotiations. If power relations shift, there is a risk of defection from the agreement. In

Cyprus, the constitution of 1960 was a result of the negotiations between Great Britain,

Turkey, Greece, a Greek Cypriot delegation headed by Makarios and a Turkish Cypriot

21

delegation headed by Kutchuk. It allotted the Turkish Cypriots more than their proportional

share of seats in parliament to be elected separately by the Turkish Cypriot electorate, veto

rights in vital matters, and a Turkish Vice President. The consociational arrangement was a

compromise between the Turkish Cypriot demand for partition (taksim) and the Greek

Cypriot desire for unification of Cyprus with Greece (enosis), or at least Greek hegemonic

control of political power.

However, shortly after the formation of joint government Makarios felt confident of

international support for removing provisions enhancing Turkish Cypriot political power. In

December 1963 President Makarios, unilaterally announced revision of the constitution,

which in fact eroded its consociational character. As a consequence, ethnic conflict erupted all

over the island and since then Turkish Cypriots have no representation in the government.

Nevertheless, the United Nations decided to recognize the now all Greek Cypriot parliament

as the only legitimate government of Cyprus. Still today, when a parallel Turkish Cypriot

administration in the north has assumed the features of statehood, the government controlling

the southern part of the island is the only internationally recognized Cypriot government.

Thus, the reason for Makarios defection from the agreement was that he believed that his

bargaining position had improved (Jarstad 2001).

In the Cypriot case the changing power relation depended on the actions of international

actors. However, power relations may also shift as a consequence of changing military

capabilities or shifting demographic proportions. After independence, a power sharing system

in Lebanon lasted 1943-1975. As the Muslim share of the population in Lebanon increased,

many Muslims saw the 1926 constitution with a fixed Muslim-Christian ratio in parliament as

unjust. The civil war, which begun in 1975, was ended by the Ta’if Accord in 1989. By this

agreement the constitution was amended, but the quotas were not removed. Instead, the new

22

ratio fixed the numbers of parliamentary seats to 64 for the Christians (including 24

Maronites) and 64 for the Muslims (including 27 Sunni, 27 Shi’it, 8 Druse, 2 Alawi). There is

a risk that also this agreement will break down, for example if the discrepancy between

demographic figures and the ratio in parliament is perceived as too large.

Negative effect 3: When the regulation of primary conflict leads to violent splinter groups

Power sharing changes the dynamic of political contestation by what I call the ‘eclipse’

mechanism. By fixing the ratio of government positions for each contending group, the

primary conflict is regulated – or at least concealed. When the limelight is removed from the

main incompatibilities, there is a possibility to focus on other tangible political issues that cut

across the former conflictual lines. Ideally, this provides space for moderate factions in

support of peace and democracy.

In some cases, it takes time for power sharing to have this effect. The power-sharing

provisions of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol were not fully implemented until the death of Jonas

Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

rebel movement. Partial implementation of the power sharing provisions did not begin until

the formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation in April 1997, when

some UNITA deputies took up their seats in parliament (Hodges 2001, 58). However,

Savimbi never assumed the position of minister, nor did he take up one of the two positions as

Vice-President as stipulated in a constitutional amendment (Ohlson 1998, 79, footnote 76).

Hence, it was not power sharing per se that caused the peace agreement to break down, but

rather the failure to implement the agreement. A more convincing explanation of why the

conflict lingered on despite the peace accord, suggested by several authors, is UNITA’s

23

control of the lucrative diamond mines (Hodges 2001; Zahar 2005). Thus, for Savimbi the

spoils of war outweighed any potential gains of political influence via power sharing.

Nevertheless, many other UNITA members saw power sharing as more attractive than

resumption to war. After the death of Savimbi in February 2002, and the subsequent ceasefire

agreement that reinforced the provisions of the Lusaka accords of 1994, UNITA assumed four

ministerial posts and began the transformation into a political party. It could therefore be

suggested that the power sharing provisions of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol has contributed to

peace in Angola.23

However, in societies polarized by ethnic warfare, intragroup contestation does not

always promote moderation. On the contrary, in divided societies power sharing freezes the

conflict lines, and the parties do not need to compete for votes among their former foes.

Despite more than ten years of intragroup contestation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, moderate

parties receive little electoral support. Instead, nationalist parties prevail in elections.

Pierre M. Atlas and Roy Licklider have suggested that societies in civil war are often

driven by a whole variety of conflicts. When the primary conflict is handled, other conflicts

may come to the foreground (Atlas and Licklider 1999). For this reason, intragroup

competition can also have the negative effect of resulting in extremist splinter groups. In

severe cases, this can lead to resumption of violence.24 This was the case in Rwanda 1993,

where the inclusive Arusha Accords could not prevent genocide. An extremist faction of the

Hutu government (MNDR) feared exclusion from power sharing stipulated in the agreement,

23 Power sharing to pacify warring groups is not a new phenomenon. In New Zealand, the process ofsubstituting warfare with the incorporation of Maori in the political process took some thirty years. In 1867 theBritish Crown offered Maori tribes reserved seats in the New Zealand parliament on condition that they agreedto lay down their weapons. Although several tribes continued their warfare, eventually all Maori were pacified.Thus, also in this case power sharing did eventually work as an incentive for moderation (Jarstad 2001).24 One example of this took place in Northern Ireland, where a splinter group from the IRA planted a bomb inOmagh in August 1998, after the peace deal was signed.

24

and formed a splinter group (CDR), which aimed to eliminated all Hutu moderates and Tutsi

(Rothchild 2005b).

Exclusion of opposition groups can trigger these groups to take up arms and thus

threaten peace. A PSA which stipulates guaranteed positions in government only for some of

the warring groups provides a strong incentive for excluded groups to resort to violence. The

purpose is to gain leverage for future negotiations or to win militarily.25 Thus, when a peace

agreement involves power-sharing provisions, inclusion of all warring groups may be a

necessary condition for peace. The number of sufficient signatories is a particular problem in

conflicts with many warring groups where there are reasons to fear that groups excluded from

power sharing will use violence to fight their way into the power-sharing deal.

The 2000 Burundi PSA is a case of partial inclusion. After the “Arusha Agreement for

Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi” was signed on 28 August 2000, four non-signatories

continued to fight. For several years the rebel movement CNDD-FDD refused to participate

in the peace talks. Under strong pressure from the mediation team, led by Nelson Mandela,

CNDD-FDD eventually laid down their arms. The Pretoria Protocol of 8 October 2003

allotted them, among other provisions for power sharing, four seats in the transitional cabinet

and 15 seats in the National Assembly. The Global Peace Accords of 16 November 2003

stipulated that CNDD-FDD should get three ministry positions and the Minister of State

(Bentley and Southall 2005; Rothchild 2005b).26

25 On the risk that exclusion leads to violence, see (Darby and Mac Ginty 2000; Hampson 1996; Nilsson; Zahar2003).26 The election on 19 August 2005, rendered CNDD-FDD a massive victory for the former rebel movement(ICG 2005). CNDD-FDD is an acronym for Conceil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour laDéfense de la Démocratie (FDD).

25

Power sharing and democratization in war-torn societies

In terms of the quality of democracy, Lijphart has demonstrated that non-majoritarian

democracy outperforms majoritarian democracies on indicators of macroeconomic variables,

gender issues, voter participation, welfare policies, environmental protection, criminal justice

and economic aid to developing countries (Lijphart 1999).27 Lijphart holds that the majority

is dependent on the minority’s allegiance to the regime. He suggests that broad participation,

bargaining and compromise are essential for legitimate decision-making. Therefore,

according to Lijphart, the principle of maximum inclusion is more democratic than majority

rule (Lijphart 1999, 2, 32-33).

In addition, Lijphart expects consociationalism to promote compromise and conciliation

(Lijphart 1994, 12). Lijphart is not clear on exactly how this transformation comes about, but

interdependence and recursive negotiations seem to be key components in this process. One

interpretation of the logic of consociationalism suggests that recognition of ethnic demands is

expected to increase the perception of security, which in turn promotes mutual trust and

reduces grievances. Iterative cooperation in a grand coalition is expected to promote an

understanding of the other party.28 In the long run, the policies of the parties are expected to

conform, to avoid exclusion or discrimination of the other group. In this way

consociationalism is expected to depoliticize ethnicity and allow development of a common

national identity. In other words, consociationalism is expected to produce moderation

(Jarstad 2001, 46-48). For this reason, power sharing could ideally work as a catalyst for

peaceful cooperation among contending parties after a peace deal is signed.

27 In this work Lijphart analyses consensus democracies. However, most of the consociational democracies areincluded in this category. For the difference between consensus and consociational democracy see Jarstad(2001).28 Such repeated rounds of cooperation can be understood by the reciprocal strategy of Tit for Tat by matchingthe other player’s move in iterative games (Morrow 1994, 264).

26

However, Lijphart’s theory on consociational democracy is mainly based on the

analysis of reforms in already democratic societies, such as the Netherlands. The theory fails

to analyze how the particular conditions of a war-shattered society affect the democracy-

promoting aspects of power sharing. Below, I discuss three types of potential democratic

shortcomings that designers of a PSA confront: exclusion of moderates, leveling of power

between groups at the cost of individuals, and elite-negotiated settlements.

Negative effect 4: When inclusion implies exclusion of moderates

When consociational democracy develops as a result of reform in countries with prior

experience of democracy, it indeed broadens participation in decision-making. According to

the consociational logic, recurring rounds of bargaining and compromises foster moderation.

However, in many war-torn societies, power sharing may have the adverse effect of

preventing the development of moderate political parties.

In some peace accords, warring parties decide to share power, and at the same time

effectively block other political movements from power. When this is the case, the former

warring parties control economic resources as well as media and other channels to mobilize

political support. Even if the government eventually opens up the political space, any

opposition groups lag behind, due to the lack of resources. This uneven start for parties in a

democratization process can have long-term effects on the prospects of multi-party

democracy.

One possibility to overcome this negative effect of power sharing is to include other

actors in the peace negotiations and also in the future government. This was done for example

in the Ivory Coast, where the 2003 PSA also included the main political parties, in addition to

the warring parties. The Liberia 2003 PSA included not only all warring parties to the conflict

27

(the government and the two rebel groups LURD and MODEL), but also representatives from

the civil society. Likewise, the 2002 PSA for the Democratic Republic of Congo included

government representatives, rebel groups, militias, opposition parties and different civil

society organizations (Nilsson, forthcoming).

Although inclusion of a broad spectrum of society in the peace agreement is likely to

improve legitimacy of the peace process, inclusion of warring groups remains an obstacle to

democratization. A typical peace deal stipulating power sharing tends to reflect power

relations during negotiations, rather than the size of potential electorates. By granting warring

parties a stake in government, violence is rewarded. This in itself violates a fundamental

principle of democracy. The Sudan 2005 power-sharing accord only includes warring parties

in government. Under such conditions the only access to political power is via the battlefield.

Such arrangements lack any form of democratic legitimacy.

Also when power-sharing governments are elected, reserved seats for warring parties

may undermine democratic legitimacy. There is a risk that the actors continue to use violent

tactics to affect the outcome of future elections. Thus, the inclusion of warring parties in

government gives rise to several questions regarding legitimacy: Will they conform to

democratic norms of non-violence, tolerance and compromise? How representative are these

actors?

Negative effect 5: When the leveling of power between groups prevents individual choice

It has been questioned whether power sharing at all can be democratic. One reason for this is

that power sharing emphasizes representation of certain target groups, rather than

representation of ideologies. In addition, the issue of accountability is problematic for all

types of broad-coalition governments. When all groups are included in government it is

difficult to hold politicians accountable and elections may even seem meaningless. However,

28

elections can make a difference also in power sharing systems, by allowing voters to choose

between different candidates. Cyprus 1960 and Burundi 2000 are examples of different types

of power-sharing constitutions. In Cyprus, the constitution stipulated that voters could choose

between candidates on separate ethnic rolls. This meant that Greek Cypriots could only vote

for Greek Cypriot candidates and Turkish Cypriots could only vote for Turkish Cypriot

candidates. Political parties with candidate of different ethnic affiliation could not stand for

elections. In practice, there was a lack of political alternatives, especially among the Turkish

Cypriots.

The 2000 Burundi PSA stipulates two types of power sharing; during the transitional

period power was shared among ethnopolitical parties, while the permanent constitution

stipulated quotas for ethnic representation in the democratically elected national assembly.

Both types are based on a 40/60 formula, to overrepresent the Tutsi minority. In the

Transitional Government, 40 per cent of the seats were allocated to political parties then

largely representing Tutsi, and 60 per cent were reserved for the Hutu parties (ICG 2004,

3).29 The permanent constitution stipulates a quota for Tutsi candidates, not Tutsi parties.

This means that people are allowed to vote for any party and that the Hutu parties have an

incentive to include Tutsi in order to gain more seats. In the government elected on 19 August

2005, 40 per cent are Tutsi, but most of them belong to traditionally Hutu parties and only

two Tutsi parties remain in the official institutions. This system has had tangible effects on

ethnic relations. The traditional Hutu-Tutsi interethnic conflict has been substituted by violent

dispute over power among Hutu parties. Furthermore, fewer exclusive Tutsi parties remain in

power (ICG 2005). This system implies that both groups lose ensured ethnoexclusive

representation and thereby less power to extremists. Typically, the minority has more to fear

29

from such an arrangement as it risks absorption by the majority. It is yet to be seen whether

Tutsi interests are sufficiently taken care of by this government. The system results in the

dilemma of providing incentives for moderate parties to attract voters from both ethnic

groups, while increasing the risk that extremist Tutsi parties challenge the power-sharing

setup by military means.

It is often suggested that power-sharing arrangement are inefficient and that the

decision-making process is slowed down when all groups have a say in the process. This is

true: power sharing does entail the risk of stalemates and problems of accountability.

However, this is a consequence of any coalition government, and does not imply that such a

system is not democratic. On the contrary, after a civil war, it is of particular importance that

all interests are represented, in order to render decisions a high degree of legitimacy and to

facilitate implementation.

It is no easy task to define the groups and who should represent them. Even in societies

where power sharing develops in the course of peaceful and democratic procedures, there is

no obvious principle for defining target groups for reserved seats in parliament. In New

Zealand, each individual, no matter their ethnic affiliation, can now enlist either on the Maori

roll or the General roll prior to each election. This allows for some flexibility regarding

definition of politicized ethnicity. In the case of New Zealand, it is clear that Maori are the

indigenous people, and no other ethnic group, such as the large Chinese community, is

allotted a quota. However, it is contested whether or not aboriginal status is a just basis for

special representation. The number of seats depends on the share of registered voters on the

Maori roll. In addition to quotas for Maori, all main political parties include Maori among

their top candidates. As a result, in the last elections the number of Maori in parliament

29 The group of Tutsi parties was referred to as G10, whereas the group of Hutu parties was called G7.

30

roughly corresponds to their demographic share. There is no mechanism ensuring

proportional ethnic representation. At present, however, it is in the interest of all political

parties to appeal also to Maori voters and it could therefore be argued that the quotas have

become a self-enforcing institution of conflict management (Jarstad 2001).

Negative effect 6: When elite-negotiated conflict regulation undermines local ownership

Increasing the number of political parties in decision-making beyond a mere majority (or even

plurality, as is the case in some systems) may enhance legitimacy of the political system.

However, all power sharing systems have to settle the difficult issues of defining which

groups should be represented and the share of seats for each group. Democratic forms of

power sharing also have to regulate who is eligible to vote for the group representatives

(separate or common electoral rolls), who can stand for elections, and the design of the

electoral system. These issues affect the legitimacy of power sharing.

The legitimacy of power sharing can also be questioned when such arrangements are

imposed by third parties. In Kosovo, the provision regulating seats reserved for minorities is

stipulated by the United Nations, not by parties to a peace agreement.30 During the

negotiations in Dayton 1995 concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, no representative from the

civil society was represented. Furthermore, the High Representative has used his mandate to

remove elected officials from politics on several occasions, thus undermining local ownership

as the democratic foundation for the power sharing government.

30 The parties never signed the exact same agreement. Thaci, leader of UCK, signed an accord 23 February1999 (“Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government In Kosovo”), while Milosevic signed an accord 3June 1999. Neither accord included any provision for power sharing. The accords were translated into UNSCR1244, which defines the mandate for United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).Power sharing was then stipulated by an UNMIK regulation (UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001).

31

It has been suggested that power sharing is more likely to last when it is arrived at

indigenously (Sisk 1997, 118). An example of such an effort is the Congolese peace accord of

200231, which was mediated by a third party (South Africa) and involved a broad spectrum of

society. The agreement was reached after discussion under the so-called Inter-Congolese

dialogue, which brought together the government, civil society groups, political opposition

groups and rebel movements (UCDP 2005).

Even when peace negotiations are exclusively elite-driven, there are ways to gain public

acceptance of the agreement. One way to ensure that the system as a whole is seen as

legitimate, is to make power sharing the object of a referendum.32 In Sudan the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in Naivasha 9 January 2005, stipulates a

referendum on self-determination for the southern part of Sudan to be held early 2011.33

Thus, during the interim period the North has a chance of making unity attractive to the

South. For such a referendum to result in the support of the peace agreement, the political

leaders have to ‘sell’ the agreement to the public, and explain why concessions are necessary

and desirable for sustainable peace. If not, the public is likely to remain polarized. This was

the reason why the Greek Cypriot majority voted against United Nations Secretary General

Kofi Annan’s plan to unite Cyprus in April 2004.

A more straightforward option is to abolish power sharing after a period of transition to

peace. The case of transitional power sharing in Sierra Leone is a telling one. The

Revolutionary United Front, RUF, initiated a rebellion in 1991. The peace agreement reached

31 The formal title of the agreement is the “Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo”.32 An example of a referendum that rendered the peace deal legitimacy, is the one concerning power sharing inNorthern Ireland, where the Belfast Agreement won the support of both communities in 1998. Roberto Belloniand Shelley Deane argue that the approval in the referendum is an important factor explaining why the peacedeal have not collapsed, despite the many obstacles (Belloni and Deane 2005).33 The CPA is based on the Machkos Protocol of July 2002 and The Protocol on Power-Sharing of May 2004.

32

in Abidjan in November 1996 fell apart within weeks. After taking power in a coup, the

military junta known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, ARFC, formed an alliance

with RUF. Despite intervention by the Economic Community of West African States,

ECOWAS, the AFRC/RUF junta remained in power for almost a year before being driven out

of the capital. However, already in January 1999, the rebels attacked Freetown yet again in an

attempt to retake the city. The Lomé Accord of 7 July 1999 reflected the enhanced bargaining

position of RUF due to its military capacity. In the transitional arrangement, the post of Vice-

President was allotted to RUF’s leader Foday Sankoh, along with four cabinet positions and

four deputy ministerial positions (Francis 2000, 363). UN troops were deployed to the country

and in spite of repeated outbreaks of violence by the RUF during the implementation period,

by January 2002 the disarmament and demobilization was completed and the war declared

over. The transitional period ended with the holding of elections in May 2002, in which the

political arm of RUF only received 1.7 per cent of the votes. Without any guaranteed seats in

government, no domestic popular support and with a significantly diminished battlefield

capacity, the RUF soon thereafter disappeared as a significant military or political force in

Sierra Leone (ICG 2002). However, power-sharing provisions proved to be sufficient for

RUF to sign a peace accord, and without a peace accord it is not likely that the larger

UNAMSIL operation would have been launched. Thus, one interpretation is that transitional

power sharing did play an important role in Sierra Leone by paving the way for peacekeeping

troops and thereby contributed to peace and democratic elections. In this case, the lack of

democratic legitimacy of RUF put an end to their political role in Sierra Leone.

However, in other cases, the abolishment of power sharing is a source of conflict. After

a period of transitional power sharing in Cambodia, stipulated in the Paris Agreement in

October 1991, elections were held in May 1993. The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) under

33

Hun Sen refused to accept that they lost the elections. A coalition government was formed

between CPP and the winning party FUNCINPEC with a dual prime minister arrangement.

This power-sharing arrangement had no basis in either the 1991 peace agreement or the

constitution of 1993 (Brown 1998, 90-100). In addition, the ad hoc nature of the power-

sharing arrangements probably contributed to the renewed outbreak of violence between the

parties in 1997 and the attempt by the CPP to oust FUNCINPEC from power in a coup in the

run up to the next elections. Nevertheless, the CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition was revived after

the 1998 elections, due to the two-thirds constitutional requirement for government formation.

The 2003 elections again led to a standoff between the two major parties (Reilly

forthcoming).

Summary of trade-offs regarding power sharing designsA contemporary power sharing accord aims at ending violence as well as promoting

democratization. The functions of inclusion, leveling of power relations and elite-regulation

of the primary conflict are expected to further these desirable goals. However, I have shown

that each of these three functions can backfire and inadvertently undermine both

peacebuilding and democratization. The table below summarizes the mechanisms that can

lead to potential negative effects of power sharing after civil war.

34

Functions of powersharing

Mechanisms affectingpeace

Mechanisms affectingdemocratization

Inclusion Inclusion of violence-makers

Exclusion of moderateactors

Leveling of powerWeak basis for quotadue to shifting powerrelations betweengroups

Weak basis for quotadue to dynamic groupsand individuals outsideascribed groups

Elite-regulation Exclusion of(potential) rebels

Lack of local ownership

Table 1. Functions and mechanisms of power sharing after civil war.

A first challenge is to transform the principle of inclusion into practice. Total inclusion in

parliament may be possible in small city-states, but is not feasible in modern states. Hence,

contemporary democracy means representative democracy, but who shall be represented and

who shall represent? For the sake of short-term peace, warring parties and also potential

warring parties can be granted seats in parliament in return for disarmament. However, former

rebels sometimes use violent means as a parallel strategy to influence politics or return to

violence if they dislike the outcome of democratic processes. Rewarding warlords by granting

them political power also contradicts the democratic principle of non-violence. The influence

of moderate forces is weakened as the number of warring parties increases, and even more so

when no moderate representatives are included. After many civil wars, civil society is

fragmented and the basis for moderate political parties is weak. Hence, inclusion to foster

moderation can be difficult. In theory, a balance to control rebels by inclusion and a flexible

system to incorporate present and future moderate actors would be conducive for both peace

35

and democracy. In practice, designers of power sharing accords are often confronted with a

choice of granting most power to warring groups or no peace deal at all.

Also the basis for the quota that levels the power relation is often a result of

negotiations. The perception of fairness differs among the actors. Majorities tend to prefer a

reflection of demographic relations, while smaller groups may insist that they should be

treated as equal partners (on a 50-50 basis), or at least be overrepresented to have real impact

on politics. In this regard, the threat against peace lays in future challenges to the agreed basis

on the allocation of seats. A dilemma for democratization under power sharing is how to

reconcile group-based politics with individuals that do not fit into the ascribed categories and

to provide equal opportunities for all. Hence, the function of leveling power also entails trade-

offs, especially pertaining to democracy, but in the long run also to stability and peace.

Translation of the function of elite-negotiated regulation of the primary conflict also

gives rise to trade-offs. If the elites fail to get everybody on board, extremist splinter groups

or radical popular movements may disrupt the move towards democracy and peace. The

trade-off here regards who to include in the negotiations and when to make the content of

agreements public. For the sake of short-term peace, the most vital parties are the largest

armed groups, but in the long run also opposition groups and civilians need to be included in

the process to prevent democratic deficit and relapse into war.

In sum, power sharing contains functions that can be complementary. However, the

mechanisms that are triggered by these functions can lead to contradictory chains of causal

effects. I therefore agree with Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder who writes that the

decisions made at each stage of the peace and democratization processes constrain the choices

made at the next stage (Rothchild and Roeder 2005, 14).

36

Knowns and unknowns regarding power sharing and civil warWe know that power sharing can help ending the war, but that it at the same time may

undermine long-term peace and democratization. Power sharing often implies democratic

constraints. Furthermore, parties are unlikely to sign an interim agreement that contains

temporary (‘sunset’) provisions. There also seem to be support for the conventional wisdom

that bifurcation is dangerous and that a high degree of fragmentation may be better for

sustainable democracy and peace (e.g., Rothchild and Roeder 2005, 24). Finally, power

sharing that result as gestures of goodwill seems to be better than formal agreements (e.g.,

Sisk and Stefes 2005).

We know that promise of future power sharing may be helpful in reaching a peace deal,

but we do not know what the relation is between implemented power sharing and peace and

democracy, respectively. There seems to be competing findings on which type of political

power sharing is best suited to promote peace and democracy, and whether or not it would be

possible to design power sharing that promotes democracy and peace simultaneously, and

whether designs can be effective both in the short and in the long run (e.g., Jarstad 2006;

Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Walter 2002).

Another aspect that needs further investigation regards the conditions which facilitate

the creation of power sharing institutions. The demographic conditions seem to matter.

Bifurcation might be associated with failed power sharing accords, as for example the case of

Cyprus suggests. Some scholars have suggested that a high degree of fragmentation is a more

conducive condition for power sharing. But we do not know if the relationship rather is

curvilinear. In this regard, it is also important to bear in mind that there are limits to possible

ways of changing the demographic conditions of a country by democratic means. Therefore,

we need to be cautious when translating potential findings on this into policy.

37

Crosscutting cleavages is an often-proposed favorable condition for power sharing.

However, effective ways to promote such crosscutting cleavages are relatively unknown.

Informal power sharing as a sign of goodwill seems to be better than formal agreements, but

this needs to be tested on a large-N population. If such a relationship exists, this finding can

perhaps also be difficult to translate into policy.

ConclusionsPower sharing has become a tool for ending conflicts by the inclusion of warring parties in

government. In this paper, I have outlined how previous research expects power sharing to

contribute to peace and democratization. My conclusion is that the two meanings of power

sharing rest on competing logics. However, I believe that the two discourses can work

together and that, at least in theory, it is possible to combine ‘separation’ in one level or field

of politics with ‘inclusion’ in another. Measures to promote ‘deterrence’ and ‘moderation’ is

perhaps more difficult to integrate into the same system, so in this regard a phased transition

from reliance on deterrence towards trust-building would be preferable.

I suggest a narrow definition of power sharing, namely political pacts after civil war,

and have begun to identify pertinent cases. Although it is yet to early to evaluate the long-

term effects of many of the power-sharing accords discussed here, I have formulated

theoretically based arguments for when and how power sharing in war-torn societies can have

negative effects on war-to-democracy transitions.

Power sharing may not only fail to end the violent conflict. In addition, it may enhance

the risk of violence and undermine democratization. Three main functions of power sharing –

inclusion, leveling of power relations and elite-based regulation of the primary conflict – can

have positive as well as negative effects on peace. Possible negative consequences for

sustainable peace were discussed in relation to three mechanisms of power sharing: inclusion

38

of rebels, shifting power relations, and extremist splinter groups. Firstly, while power sharing

works as an incentive for some groups to lay down arms, other groups continue the use of

violent tactics. Secondly, shifting power relations mean that it may be difficult to avoid a

breakdown of the agreed power-sharing balance. Thirdly, partial inclusion provides incentives

for excluded groups to try to fight their way into government positions. The ‘eclipse’

mechanism may give rise to intragroup conflict by providing an incentive for excluded

fractions to continue fighting or to take up arms. In the short run, power sharing may take the

heat off the major conflict and allow other political issues to emerge. But at the same time,

there is a risk that extremist splinter groups are formed. In war-torn societies this risk is

particularly acute, and its consequences may be devastating.

Furthermore, three potential negative effects of power sharing on democratization were

discussed: exclusion of moderates, group representation, and lack of local ownership. Firstly,

power sharing among warring parties risks undermining the development of moderate

political parties. PSA allotting government positions to warring parties also sharply

contradicts the principle of democratic legitimacy and undermines long-term democratization

by limiting the space for moderate parties. Secondly, power sharing often presupposes the

definition of groups and may prove inapt to accommodate new groups that emerge. Thirdly,

the lack of local ownership may hinder the development towards a democracy.

These six negative consequences of power sharing cannot all be addressed at the same

time. Rather, the design of a PSA involves trade-offs between the desirable goals of

promoting conditions conducive to peacebuilding, on the one hand, and democratization, on

the other hand. At the same time, in particular cases there are no alternative to power sharing.

At best, a mix that balances the potential negative impact of each of the three functions can

contribute both peace and democracy.

39

Despite a lot of research on power sharing, a lot remains to be investigated, especially

with regard to political pacts after civil war. This is partly due to the lack of integration in

previous research of the two main discourses, namely research on conflict management and

research on consociational democracy. In addition, many new peace accords have emerged

during the last couple of years. No systematic research on the conditions of the creation of

these peace deals and their consequences on long-term democratization and sustainable peace

has yet been conducted. This paper has sought to lay a basis for such research. I have

suggested the use of a narrow definition of power sharing to tease out the role played by

political pacts after civil war, outlined the logic of such power sharing, and the mechanisms at

work.

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