January 2013 · 2018-08-03 · AbStrAct Against the background of the low-intensity conflict that...

South African Instit

ute of Inte

rnat

iona

l Affa

irs

African perspectives. Global insights.

South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme

O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 1 3 2

Wade’s Senegal and its Relations with Guinea-Bissau: Brother, Patron or Regional Hegemon?

J a n u a r y 2 0 1 3

V i n c e n t F o u c h e r

A b o u t S A I I A

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as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,

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A b o u t t h e S o u t h A f r I c A n f o r e I g n p o l I c y A n d A f r I c A n d r I v e r S p r o g r A m m e

Since the fall of Apartheid in 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy has prioritised the

development of Africa. To achieve its ‘African Agenda’ objectives, South Africa needs to

intensify its strategic relations with key African countries. SAIIA’s South African Foreign Policy

and African Drivers (SAFPAD) Programme has a two-pronged focus. First, it unpacks South

Africa’s post-1994 Africa policy in two areas: South Africa as a norm setter in the region and

South Africa’s potential to foster regional co-operation with key African states and other

external partners, in support of the continent’s stabilisation and development. Second, it

focuses on key African driver countries’ foreign policy objectives that have the ability to

influence, positively or negatively, the pace of regional co-operation and integration.

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each driver country’s foreign policy decisions by exploring contemporary domestic factors;

the scope of their bilateral relations; their role in the regional economic communities; and

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SAIIA gratefully acknowledges the Danish International Development Agency and

the Swedish International Development Agency which generously support the SAFPAD

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Programme head: Tjiurimo Hengari, [email protected]

© SAIIA January 2013

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Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.

A b S t r A c t

Against the background of the low-intensity conflict that affects its Casamance region,

Senegal should pay particular attention to its relations with its southern neighbour, Guinea-

Bissau. Since 2000 Senegal has used its democratic legitimacy, diplomatic network and

scarce resources to pursue a policy of influence and patronage towards a neighbour

weakened by the war of 1998. In return, the Senegalese government has received special

support from the Guinea-Bissau armed forces in its fight against secessionist rebel forces

in Casamance. Far from being merely a representative of – or channel for – French or

Western interests, under the leadership of Abdoulaye Wade Senegal showed its capacity

for exercising a policy of influence in the West Africa sub-region and the African continent

as a whole, albeit as a consequence of some favourable conditions, and with only limited

financial resources.

A b o u t t h e A u t h o r

Vincent Foucher obtained his PhD in political studies from the School of Oriental and

African Studies, London. Between 2003 and 2011 he was a researcher with the French

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, based at the Centre d’Études d’Afrique Noire

(now Les Afriques dans le Monde), Bordeaux. From 2006 to 2008 he was also the editor in

chief of Politique Africaine, the leading French academic journal on contemporary African

affairs. He now works with the International Crisis Group as a senior analyst in its West

Africa Office, Dakar.

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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 13 2

S O U T H A F R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y & A F R I C A N D R I V E R S P R O G R A M M E

A b b r e v I A t I o n S A n d A c r o n y m S

AFP AgenceFrance-Presse

APS AgencedePresseSénégalaise

CFA FinancialCommunityofAfricaorAfricanFinancialCommunity

(Communauté financière d’Afrique);

alsoknowasWestAfricanfranc(ISOcodeXOF)

CPLP CommunityofPortugueseLanguageCountries

(Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa)

ECOWAS EconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates

Fesman WorldFestivalofBlackArts (Festival Mondial des Arts Nègres)

FLING LiberationFrontfortheNationalIndependenceofGuinea

(Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné)

ICG InternationalCrisisGroup

MFDC MovementofDemocraticForcesintheCasamance

(Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance)

PAIGC AfricanPartyfortheIndependenceofGuineaandCapeVerde

(Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde)

PANA Pan-AfricanNewsAgency

UNESCO UNEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization

WAEMU WestAfricanEconomicandMonetaryUnion

W A D E ’ S S E N E G A L A N D I T S R E L A T I O N S W I T H G U I N E A - B I S S A U

5


I n t r o d u c t I o n

Opération Gabou was unquestionably one of the most impressive foreign policy

initiativesundertakenbyanindependentSenegal.Amilitaryinterventionthatlasted

fromJune1998toMarch1999,itrequiredDakartodeploymorethan2000soldiers

to itssmall southernneighbour,Guinea-Bissau.The intentionwas tohelpPresident

JoãoBernardo(‘Nino’)Vieirastaveoffanattemptedcoupd’étatbymilitaryrebelsledby

Brigadier-GeneralAnsumaneMané,thatresultedintheso-called‘SeventhofJuneWar’.1

ThatSenegalwaspreparedtomakeconsiderablesacrificesinthatinstanceclearlyindicates

Guinea-Bissau’simportancetoDakar.ToSenegal,Bissaumattersprimarilybecauseof

thelowlevel,apparentlyinsoluble,conflictthatforthepast30yearshastroubledthe

CasamanceregioninthesouthofSenegal,whichbordersonbothGuinea-BissauandThe

Gambia.2

AlthoughSenegalesetroopswithdrewinMarch1999afteraceasefire,thewarproper

endedonlyinMay1999onadefeatforDakar:Manétookover,chasingVieira.Kumba

Yala,headofGuinea-Bissau’sSocialRenewalPartyandanotherofVieira’sopponents,won

thesubsequentpresidentialelectioninFebruary2000.Soonafterwardsamajorpolitical

upheaval took place in Senegal, with the March 2000 election of the long-standing

oppositionfigure,AbdoulayeWade,aspresident.Thiswasthefirstpoliticalturnover

inSenegal’spoliticaldirectionsince independence in1960.Afterassumingofficeon

1April2000WadequicklytookstepstoreinforceSenegal’srelationshipwithGuinea-

Bissau;thefirstdiplomatictripofhispresidentialtermwastoBissaulessthanamonth

later.UnderhispresidencySenegalsucceededinexercisingconsiderableinfluenceoverits

smallsouthernneighbourwithoutfurthermajorinterventionsonthelinesofOpération

Gabou;itwastheGuinea-Bissauarmy,not‘foreign’forces,thateventuallydislodgedthe

mostextremeelementsoftherebelMovementofDemocraticForcesintheCasamance

(MFDC)fromtheirbasesalongtheborderwithSenegal.

Howcanoneunderstandthere-establishmentofsuchstrongtiesbetweenDakarand

BissausosoonafterOpération Gabou,whichthepopulationofGuinea-Bissauhadmet

withmarkedhostility?Onemust firstestablishwhichdevelopmentswerestructural

andwhichcircumstantial;whichstrategicandwhichtactical;andinwhatwaysevents

wereinfluencedbythelong,tangledhistoriesofthetwocountries,especiallyagainst

thebackgroundofpost-conflictGuinea-Bissauontheonehandandontheother,the

fundamentalchangesinSenegalesepoliticsbroughtaboutbythe2000election.What

doesthisrelationshiptellusaboutthecapabilitiesandlimitationsofSenegalgiventhat

thecountry isoftendescribedeitherasadiplomaticpawnofFrance,orof theWest

ingeneral,oranultra-opportunisticplayerthatusesforeignpolicyasaninstrumentto

attractresourcesforinternaluse?3Finally,onemustalsoconsiderthewayinwhichthe

relationshipbetweenBissauandDakarfitsintothewiderWestAfrican,Africanandworld

context.ByexaminingSenegal’shandlingofsuchamajorstrategicquestionforitselfas

Guinea-Bissau,thispaperseekstoshedlightontheforeignpolicyoftheWaderegime

byanalysingitstools,‘style’,connectionsanddevelopmentsbetween2000andtheend

ofWade’spresidencyin2012.ItalsolooksatSenegal’srelativepowerandinfluenceinits

immediateregion,aswellasinitsbroadercontinentalenvironment.

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A m b I v A l e n t n e I g h b o u r S

Somehistoricalbackgroundisnecessarybeforetracingthecomplexpathoftherelationship

betweenSenegalandGuinea-Bissauafter2000,anddrawingsomegeneralconclusions.

TheterritoriesthattodayconstituteSenegalandGuinea-Bissauhavealongcommon

history,basedonthedynamicsofcolonialismandlinkedtothecoastalpresenceofthe

Portuguesefromthe15thcentury,andconsequentinvolvementwiththeAtlantictrade.4

Evenafterthecolonialbordersweredrawn,tiesbetweenSenegalandthePortuguese

coloniesofCapeVerdeandGuinea–nowGuinea-Bissau–remainedstrong.Theywere

nourishedbySenegal’srelativelydynamiceconomy.ImmigrantsfromPortugueseGuinea

providedcheaplabourforFrenchSenegal,withsomemovingontometropolitanFrance.

MeanwhileFrenchcompaniesinSenegalwenttheotherway,extendingtheirtradinginto

PortugueseGuinea.

WhentheRepublicofSenegalbecameindependentin1960,variousemigrantgroups

fromtheGuineaandCapeVerdediasporabecameinvolvedinavarietyofindependence

movements;theyenjoyedthetacitsupportofSenegalesepresidentLéopoldSédarSenghor.

EventuallytheAfricanPartyfortheIndependenceofGuineaandCapeVerde(PAIGC),

establishedin1956byagronomistAmilcarCabral,cametothefore.Duringthe1960s

thePAIGCoptedforarmedstruggle,winningsupportfromtheSovietblocandfrom

formerFrenchGuinea(bythentheRepublicofGuinea),underPresidentSékouTouré,

aMarxistnationalisthostiletoSenghor’spro-Westernline.Inevitablytherelationship

betweenDakarand thePAIGCdeterioratedandSenegalopenlysupportedmoderate

nationalistshostiletothePAIGC,whichby1962hadgatheredtoformtheLiberation

FrontfortheNationalIndependenceofGuinea(FLING),tolittleavail.TheOrganisation

ofAfricanUnityacknowledgedPAIGCastheonlylegitimateindependencemovement

in1965,andtheSenegaleseauthoritieslatertoleratedthepresenceonSenegalesesoilof

numerousGuinea-Bissaurefugees,oftenlinkedtothePAIGC,andturnedablindeyeon

theiractivities.5

PAIGCprevailed,andPortugalrecognisedtheindependenceofGuinea-Bissau6 in

1974.SenegalandGuinea-Bissau,however,belongedtoopposingColdWarblocsand

formal contactbetween themwas limited;but from the1980s tiesbecame stronger

asBissauopenedupitseconomyandin1997joinedSenegalintheAfricanFinancial

Community,thusbecomingthefirstnon-FrancophonecountrytoadopttheWestAfrican

CFAfranc(XOF)asitscurrency.

The formationofa separatistmovement insouthernSenegalat theendof1982,

ledbytheMFDC,didnotbringaboutadeteriorationinrelationsbetweenDakarand

Bissau,despitenumerousSenegaleseobserversdismissingtheMFDCasaninstrument

ofmalevolentneighbours–Mauritania,TheGambia,orGuinea-Bissau–orevenofthe

contemporaryinternational ‘badguys’,Iraq,LibyaorLiberia.Skirmishesoverborder

delimitationbetweenSenegaleseandGuinea-Bissauforcesin1990fuelledsuchsuspicions

butalthoughtheMFDCenjoyedsomesympathyamongelementsoftheGuinea-Bissau

political elite, the Bissau government did not offer its support. Instead it took an

opportunisticapproachandinclinedtowardthemostpowerfulpartytothedispute,the

Senegalesestate,whileusingtheCasamancesituationasabargainingcounter.Guinea-

BissauandSenegaloftencollaborated in securitymattersandapparently therewere

‘extrajudicialarrests,betweenservices’;7anMFDCmemberreportedbeingarrestedwith

7


WA D E ’ S S E N E G A L A N D I T S R E L AT I O N S W I T H G U I N E A - B I S S A U

anotheractivistin1986bytheBissauauthoritiesandexchangedforfourFLINGmilitants

basedinSenegal8,andinMarch1993thepoliticalheadoftheMFDC,FatherAugustin

DiamacouneSenghor,wasdeportedfromGuinea-BissautoDakar.BissauenjoyedSenegal’s

support,includingmaterialassistanceforitsarmy,diplomaticbackupforitsentryinto

thefranczone,andconcessionsovertheborderdisputeaftertheInternationalCourtof

JusticeatTheHaguein1989and1991camedownonthesideofSenegal.9Dakartrusted

BissauenoughtoacceptitsmediationinnegotiationswiththeMFDC,whichledtoa

short-livedceasefireagreementsignedintheGuineancityofCacheuinApril1992.

Itwasthatsameopportunismratherthananydeepcommitmenttotheseparatist

cause,thatpromptedGuineansatalllevelstosell(orlease)weaponstotheCasamance

separatists.ItwaspreciselythisarmstraffickingwithCasamanceseparatiststhatplunged

Guinea-Bissauintowarin1998.10UnderpressurefromSenegalandFrance,whichwere

unhappyattheincreasingstrengthoftheMFDC,PresidentVieiraplacedtheblamefor

thearmssuppliesonGeneralMané,thechiefofstaffofthearmedforces(althoughothers

closetothepresidencymayhavebeenalsoinvolved).Thisact,grantedthatitwasmade

indifficulteconomicandpoliticalcircumstances,hadseriousconsequences.InJune1998,

ManémountedanunsuccessfulassassinationattemptonVieira,afterwhichheheadeda

militaryrevolt,gatheringaroundhimadisparategroupthatincludedveteransofthewar

ofindependenceunhappywiththeirdeterioratingconditions,youthsinsearchofafuture,

andopponentsofVieirawithinthePAIGCandthelegalopposition.Paradoxicallyacall

forhelpfromVieiratoalliesinDakarandtheGuineancapital,Conakry,11strengthened

Mané, as experienced MFDC combatants as well as the Guinea-Bissau population

generallyralliedaroundhiminpatrioticenthusiasm,heightenedbyangeratthepillaging,

vandalism and racketeering of the foreign forces coming to Vieira’s aid.12 After the

centreofBissauwasoccupiedbyMané’sforcesinMay1999theSenegaleseembassywas

pillagedinaclearindicationoftheangerarousedbytheinvasion.Diplomaticoffices

ofSenegal’sstrategically,France,whichmaintained(and,toanextent,reinforced)its

militaryco-operationwithSenegalthroughouttheconflict,werealsoaffected.Bytheend

oftheSeventhofJuneWar,relationsbetweenSenegalandGuinea-Bissauseemedtohave

sufferedlong-termdamage.

f o r g I n g A n e W A l l I A n c e , 2 0 0 0 – 2 0 0 3

Fromlate2000–onlyafewmonthsaftertheendoftheSeventhofJuneWar–until

2006,theGuinea-BissauarmyoperateddirectlyagainstSalifSadio,aseniorfigureinthe

MFDCandaformerallyagainstVieira.Threemainattackstookplace,eachlastingseveral

weeksandcausingsignificantcasualties.Sadiowaseventuallyforcedtowithdrawtothe

Gambianborder.SuchextensiveinvolvementbytheGuineanarmyagainstanadversary

oftheSenegalesestateconstitutedstrikingevidenceofanewalliancebetweenDakar

andBissau.

Presidential alliance and military co-operation

When Wade made his presidential trip to Bissau in April 2000 the situation was

tense.Eversince theendof theSeventhof JuneWar therehadbeenahigh levelof

8



insecurityontheborderbetweenthetwocountries;MFDCcombatantswereincreasing

theiroperationsandGuinea-Bissausoldierswereinvolvedinthetheftoflivestockin

Casamance.Severaltimesduring2000Casamancevillagersclosedtheborderinprotest;

such action threatened the Guinea-Bissau economy, dependent as it was on those

Senegalesepointsofpassage.Meetingsbetweenthetwocountrieswereincreasedand

co-ordinationmeasuresestablished,withtheSenegaleseprovidingthenecessaryradio

communicationsequipment. InAugust2000 thenewlyelectedpresidentofGuinea-

Bissau,Yala,visitedDakar,whereinagestureofgoodwill,Wadeimprovedtermsforthe

sharingofanyrevenuesthatmighteventuallyresultfrompetroleumexplorationinthe

commonmaritimezone.13

This good relationship might perhaps be explained by the somewhat similar

backgroundsofWadeandYala,bothofwhomwereoppositionfigureselectedafterlong

yearsofstruggle.Buttheirpersonalrelationshipwasunderpinnedbywell-understood

commoninterestsandasharedmistrustofManéandhisMFDCallies.Intruth,Mané

maintainedstrongtieswiththeCasamanceseparatistsandrumourscirculatedofajoint

offensivetocaptureZiguinchorbytheseparatistsandtheGuinea-Bissauarmy.

Mané had supported an opponent of Yala during the presidential elections and

althoughheagreedtorelinquishtheformalcommandofthearmedforcestoGeneral

VerissimoCorreiaSeabra,hecontinuedtowieldconsiderableinfluenceinBissau.Forhis

part,Yalawaskeentodevelophislinkswiththearmy,favouringrecruitmentofyoung

loyalistslargelyfromhisownethnicgroup,theBalantas,anditwaswhenhebeganto

insinuatehisfollowersintotheofficercorpsthathisrelationshipwithManécollapsed.

Thecontestbetweenthetwoendedon30November2000withthedeathofManéin

ashoot-outwiththearmy,andasubsequentpurgeofthoseclosetohim.Thisepisode

sealedwhatwasineffectatriplealliancebetweenDakar,Yalaandthemilitaryelite.

TheSenegaleseministerof the interior,GeneralMamadouNiang,whohadbeen

closelyinvolvedwiththeCasamancesituation,proceededtoincreasehiscontactswith

Bissau.DakardirectlysupportedGuinea-Bissau,whichatthetimewasembroiledina

seeminglynever-endingbudgetarycrisis,andSenegalwasoneoftheAfricancountries

fromwhich,inNovember2002,Yalawasabletocollectthemoneytopaygovernment

salaries.14DakaralsonurtureditstieswiththeGuinea-Bissaumilitarydirectly,forexample

byfinancingtherefurbishmentofmilitarybuildings,openingDakarmilitaryhospitalsto

Guinea-Bissauofficers,andprovidingmilitarysuppliesandmaterial–andalso,probably,

money.

TheCasamanceissuewasatthecoreofthisrelationship.Ironically,thetiesestablished

duringtheSeventhofJuneWarbetweentheGuinea-BissauarmyandtheMFDC,andthe

newrelationsbetweenDakarandBissau,allcombinedtodetermineamajorturninthe

historyoftheseparatistmovement:theemergenceofa‘moderate’MFDCguerrillagroup

ontheGuinea-Bissauborder.

Strange bedfellows on the Casamance front

Mané’sdeath,theeffectofwhichwasquicklyfeltintheborderareaswithSenegal,fed

earlierinternaltensionsintheMFDC‘southernfront’.Bissaubecamethefocalpointof

whatamountedtoatacitcoalitionbetweentheSenegaleseauthoritiesandanMFDC

factioninoppositiontoSalifSadio,thenheadofthesouthernfront.


9


Sadio,whohadbeenclosetoMané,facedoppositionwithintheMFDC15andMané’s

deathofferedseparatistmilitantshostiletoSadiotheopportunitytotaketheinitiative.

They were supported by the new military chiefs in Bissau, who were close to Yala,

mistrustedSadioandwereundoubtedlysensitivetoSenegal’sbroaderconcerns.Inthe

militaryoffensives that followed,Guinea-Bissau troops co-operatedwith theMFDC

separatists,operatinginSenegaleseterritorywiththetacit(orperhapssecret)agreement

ofDakar.

InJanuary2001Sadio,inaletteraddressedtothechairmanoftheGuinea-Bissau

national assembly,denounced theassaultbyGuinea-Bissau troops.16Despiteofficial

denialsofmilitaryaction17controversyexploded inBissau.On17January2001 the

PAIGC–atthattimeinparliamentaryopposition–askedthegovernmenttokeepto

its roleofmediator in theCasamanceconflict. Inresponse toSenegaleseconcernsa

committeeofthenationalassemblyrequestedthearmynottointerfereinpoliticsandto

respectinstitutions,18tacitconfirmationthattheGuinea-Bissaumilitarywasactingina

quasi-independentmannerinthisaffair.Fightingcontinueduntilthesummerof2001,

withSadio’sMFDCopponentsconsolidatingtheirholdontheareaaroundacampsituated

nexttothevillageofKassolol.In2002,Guinea-BissauforcesputfurtherpressureonSadio

andhissupporters,arrestingthoseofthemlivinginBissauorexpellingthemtoSenegal,

andoccupyinganddestroyinganumberofrefugeevillages.

TheKassololfactionoftheMFDCwasambiguousfromthestart.Allitsmemberswere

hostiletoSadioandsomewouldhavelikedtocontinuethearmedstrugglewithouthim,

butothers,tiredofendlesswar,wantedanegotiatedsettlement.Overtime,someofits

leaderswentsofarastoestablishcontactwithDakarandreceivemoneyfromthatsource.

Inexchangefortheirsupport,theGuinea-BissauarmyobligedtheKassololfaction

toabstainfromattacksinCasamance.AsSadio’spositionwasprogressivelyweakening,

thesouthernfrontceasedtobeahotspotintheCasamanceconflict.19Thus,soonafter

itsdefeatintheSeventhofJuneWar,Senegalhadobtainedamajorstrategicsuccessin

Guinea-Bissauactingwithrelativerestraintandprudenceandatthelowestpossiblecost

byenteringintoanalliancewiththeGuinea-Bissaupresidencyandarmyandturningthem

againsttheSadiofaction.

A r e S I l I e n t A l l I A n c e : 2 0 0 3 – 2 0 0 9

ItwasindicativeofacontinuedunderstandingbetweenDakarandBissauthatthispeculiar

alliancebetweentheSenegalesegovernment,thefightersofKassololandtheGuinea-

Bissauauthoritiesheldtogetherreasonablywell.Itdidsointhefaceofseverepolitical

turbulencethataffectedGuinea-Bissaubetween2003and2009,spanningtheperiodfrom

thefallofYalatothedeathofVieira,whohadbythenreturnedtothepresidency.

The fall of Yala: renewed alliance

Yala’spoormanagement,particularlyasitaffectedgovernmentsalaries,washisdownfall

andarmed forceschiefof staff,Seabra,assumedpower inabloodlesscoupd’état in

September2003.TheSenegalesepressreportedthiseventwithadegreeofconcern:the

dailynewspaperWal Fadjriaffirmedthat‘thenewmastersofBissau[favour]theMFDC’.20

10



Yala’sfallfrompowerdidnot,however,createtensionbetweenGuinea-BissauandSenegal;

onthecontrary,itsawastrengtheningoftheirties.Thecoupistswantedtoavoidanother

SenegalesearmedinterventionandonthedayofthecouptheycalledWadetoassure

himthattheiractionwasnotcountertotheinterestsofSenegal.21Wade,whoatfirstwas

notconvinced,promptlysetoffforBissautogetherwithPresidentOlusegunObasanjoof

NigeriaandGhanaianPresidentJohnKufuor(thelatteralsochairmanoftheEconomic

CommunityofWestAfricanStates [ECOWAS]) tomeetwith thenew ruling junta.

Obasanjo’sfirmstand,reinforcedbyathreatofinterventionfromECOWAS,helpedWade

obtaintheguaranteeshesought.ThereaftertheemissariesshuttledbetweenBissauand

Dakar,whichthenkeptabenevolenteyeonthe‘transition’andindeedpubliclydefended

theputschistsontheregionalandinternationalscenes.

TheeffectsofthisrenewedalliancewerefeltontheCasamancefront.InFebruary2004

SeabralaunchedanewoffensiveagainstSadio’sseparatists,thistimefurthertotheeast

oftheborderzoneofFouladou,whereSadiohadretreated.Officially,theoperationwas

aimedatprotectingGuineancitizensfromthedepredationsoftheseparatists,butSadio

denounceditasajointassaultbytheGuinea-BissauarmyandtheKassololfaction.22

On19February,Seabraannouncedtheendoftheoperationandthedismantlingofthe

separatists’bases.Heacknowledgedthat fourGuinea-Bissausoldiershadbeenkilled

and14injured.23By25February,however,amilitarysourcenotedthat fightinghad

recommencedandannouncedthecaptureofanotherbase,thedeathsoffiveseparatists

andthecaptureofseveralprisoners.24

ThevictoryofthePAIGCledbyCarlosGomesJúniorinanelectioninMarch2004

andJúnior’ssubsequentappointmentasprimeminister,markedabreakinGuinea-Bissau’s

driveagainstSadio.ForthemostpartthePAIGChadsupportedthejuntaandtheMFDC

againstSenegalduringtheSeventhofJuneWar,andhadtakentheirsideagainstYala’s

supportfortheKassololfaction.ThedeathofSeabraatthehandsofmutinoussoldiers

on6October2004,however,workedtoSenegal’sadvantage.Hisreplacementaschief

ofstaff,GeneralBatistaTagmeNaWai,wasnotunknowntoDakar:hehadheadedthe

2001offensiveagainstSadioandenjoyedagoodrelationshipwithSenegal.Indeedcertain

elementsinthemilitaryfeltthatitwashispopularitywithinthearmy,dueinpartto

Senegal’sassistance,thatledtohisappointment.25Dakarkeptacloseeyeonthesituation

andon8October2004Senegaleseministerofstate,LandingSavané,(whohailedfrom

Bignona inCasamance)accompanied theexecutive secretaryofECOWASonavisit

toBissau.26ByFebruary2005NaWaiwasinDakarforthe‘strengtheningofmilitary

co-operationbetweenSenegalandGuinea-Bissau’andwasreceivedbyWadeinperson.27

Amonthlater,SenegaldispatchedvehiclesandmilitaryequipmenttotheGuinea-Bissau

army.Onthatoccasion,NaWaistressedthathewould‘doeverythingtorestoreorderand

tranquillityattheborderbetween[our]twocountries’.28

The clean-up revived

Afterthecoupsof2003and2004civilauthoritywasrestoredtoBissau.Adegreeof

internationalconsensuswasreachedtonormalisethesituation,whichinturnenabled

thetwoformerpresidents,YalaandVieira,toreturntothepoliticalarenaintherun-upto

anewpresidentialelection.VieirareliedforsupportonGuinea-Conakry,inparticularon

itspresident,LansanaConté,whowasapersonalfriend.ln2005Contéwelcomedsenior



11

Guinea-BissaumilitaryfigurestoConakry,tomeetVieiraandhisadvisers.Bytheendof

thediscussionsanagreementhadbeenreached,albeitsomewhatopaque;29theGuinea-

BissaumilitaryguaranteedVieira’ssafety,anditwasundertheirprotectionandoverthe

protestsofciviltransitionalauthoritiesthatamilitaryhelicopterfromGuinea-Conakry

tookhimtoBissauinApril2005.

Dakarseemedtoremainalooffromthismanoeuvring,butunderstooditsportent:

althoughtheSenegaleseauthoritiescontinuedtosupportYalaintheelection(including

financially)theyrealisedthattheycouldhaveonlylimitedsuccess,bearinginmindYala’s

lossoflegitimacyintheeyesofthearmy,aiddonorsandindeedmostoftheGuineans.30

Vieirabecameapossiblealternativeprotégéwhileathirdplausiblecandidate,MalamBacai

Sanhá,whowassupportedbythePAIGC,stillboreastigmaintheeyesofDakarduetohis

pastalliancewithMané.TieswereestablishedbetweenWadeandVieira,withCasamance

entrepreneurPierreAtépaGoudiabyplayingacentralroleinforgingthisnewalliance.

AnimportantpersonalityintheinformaldiplomaticgameinWestAfrica,Goudiabywas

anadvisertoWadeandinvolvedinthemanagementoftheCasamancesituation.Hewas

alsoacloserelativeofVieira.AlltheevidenceindicatesthatVieira’scampaignbenefited

frommaterialsupportfromSenegal,andalsothatWadeandGoudiabyhelpedhimobtain

assistancefromotherAfricanheadsofstate.31

LinkedtobothYalaandVieiraashewas,Wadeplayedadecisiveroleinthe2005

presidentialelections.WhenYalarefusedtoacceptthirdplaceinthefirstroundofthe

electionWadesenthisplanetocollecthimandpersuadedhimtoaccepttheresultsand

supportVieira,thuscontributingtothelatter’svictory.32SoonaftertheelectionVieira

pushed his advantage and asked Dakar to keep Yala away from Bissau. Wade then

organisedYala’sexiletoMorocco,acountryveryfriendlytoSenegal.Onhispart,Vieira

saidthathewasreadytodoeverythinginhispowertosettletheCasamanceconflict,and

theSenegalesepresshailedhimas‘anassetforpeaceinCasamance’.33Therelationship

betweenWadeandVieiraremainedcloseuntilWade’sdeath,andVieirawasoneofeight

headsofstatewhoattendedtheceremonyfortheUNESCO’sFélixHouphouët-Boigny

PeacePrizeawardedtotheSenegalesepresidentinMay2006.34

Itfollowedthatafterthe2005electionsSenegalhadtwopointsofleverageinBissau:

thechiefofstaffandthepresident.UnderVieira,SenegalcontinuedtosupporttheGuinea-

Bissausecurityforcesbywayofshipmentsofrice,militaryequipmentandvehicles.Hence

astheSenegalesepresidentialelectionsof2007drewnear,Dakarwasinapositionto

requestarenewedeffortfromtheGuinea-Bissauarmy.InJanuary2006Guinea-Bissau

establishedacommitteetoexamineandanalysetheCasamancecrisis.HeadedbyNaWai,

itcomprisedabout10officers,aswellastheministerofInternalAdministration,Ernesto

Carvalho(whowasclosetoYala)andMinisterofDefenceHelderProença.Thiscommittee

washeldresponsiblefor‘aprogrammeofmediationbetweentheSenegalesegovernment

andtheMFDC’.35Inreality,itwasamilitaryoffensivethatwasintheworks,anditbegan

on14March2006.Lieutenant-ColonelAntónioInjai,NaWai’snephew,tookthereinsof

theso-called‘OperationClean-up’,stillinpartnershipwithKassololagainstSadio.Just

asinpreviousoffensives,Casamancerefugees–someofthemwithtiestotheseparatist

fighters–whohadsetupcampclosetoSadio’sbaseswerechasedbacktoSenegaland

theirhousesburned.By23Marchmorethan2 000refugeeshadfledGuinea-Bissau.36

Mineslaidbytheseparatiststooktheirtoll;militarysourcesadmittedtothedeathof60

Guinea-Bissausoldiers.37

12



Thisnewoffensivewascriticisedamongcivilsocietyaswellasbytheparliamentary

oppositioninBissau.NaWaiaccusedsomedeputiesoftieswiththeMFDC;theministry

ofInternalAdministrationrequestedliftingtheimmunityofonedeputy;andaformer

ministerwasdetainedforaweek.38WithinthiscontextVieiracontinuedtourgeonthe

army;39itbarelyneededencouragement,buthissupportclearlyrevealedVieira’ssympathy

fortheSenegalesecauseandhispowerlessnesswhenfacedwithanarmythathadadirect

relationshipwithSenegalandoverwhich,inreality,hecouldexerciselittleifanyauthority.

On13April2006,theGuinea-BissauchiefofstaffannouncedthefallofSadio’slast

remainingcampatBarracaMandioca,althoughSadiohimselfescapedcapture,crossing

Casamance tosetupcampnext to theGambianborder.Confiscatedequipmentand

documentsweresenttotheSenegaleseauthorities.ColonelLassanaMassaly,thedeputy

commanderofoperations,showedhiszealbyclaiming‘therighttopursueSalifSadiointo

Senegaleseterritory…totheborderwithTheGambia’.40

Between2000and2006,therefore,despitepoliticalupheavalsandcriticismsfrom

civilsocietyandthepoliticalclassesinBissau,theGuinea-Bissauarmywasinvolved

inseveralattacksagainstSadio,incurringsignificantlosses.Italsoforcedtheremnants

oftheKassololseparatistsintoaninformalceasefirewiththeSenegalesearmy.Bissau

supportedmeetingsbetweenKassololandmediatorscarefullyselectedbySenegal(such

astheso-called‘WiseMenofCasamance’arbitrationgroup).41BissauhadrenderedDakar

considerableservices.Guinea-Bissau’spoliticalstrugglesin2009,however,dealtanew

handandDakarhadonlylimitedsuccessintryingtore-establishitslinkswithBissau.

t h e A f t e r m A t h o f m A r c h 2 0 0 9 : A b r o K e n r e l A t I o n S h I p

TheviolentdeathsinMarch2009ofDakar’stwoalliesinBissau,PresidentVieiraand

chiefofstaffNaWai,transformedtherelationshipbetweenthetwocountries.Suddenly

deprivedofitsconnections,Senegalbecameworriedaboutthegrowingpowerofmen

withwhomithadhardlyanyties.Itwasnotbychancethatthisphasecoincidedwitha

progressiverenewaloftensionontheCasamancefront.

The events of March and June 2009

On1March2009,NaWaiwaskilledinabombattackandonthesamedayVieirawas

assassinatedbythemilitary,apparentlybecausehewassuspectedofinvolvementinNa

Wai’sdeath.Thetwomurdersarestillthesubjectofspeculation.42Thesituationtook

anotherturninJunewhentwopeopleclosetoVieira–theformerMinisterofDefence

ProençaandBaciroDabo,MinisterofInternalAdministrationandacandidateinthe

presidentialelections–werekilledbymeninuniform,andseveralotherswhohadbeen

closetoVieirawerearrested.ThearmedforcesandthegovernmentofGomesJúnior

accusedDaboandProençaofpreparingforacoupd’état in leaguewithotherVieira

partisans.TheyhintedattheinvolvementofSenegaleseauthorities,notingthatsome

VieiraassociateshadmetinDakarshortlybeforetheevents.Thatepisode,too,remains

shroudedinmysteryalthoughmanyinGuinea-Bissau’soppositionhaveopenlydenounced

amanipulationbyGomesJúnior.


13


WhatiscertainisthattheseepisodesshooktherelationshipbetweenDakarandBissau.

ThedeathsofNaWai,VieiraandProença(whohadplayedacentralroleinforgingthe

relationshipbetweenDakarandtheGuinea-Bissauarmy),togetherwiththepoliticalrise

ofGomesJúnior,representedasevereblowtoSenegaleseinfluence.Significantly,Wade

decidednottoattendVieira’sfuneral,citingsecurityreasons.43TheSenegaleseleadership,

afterhavingreapedsomebenefitsfromit,despairedoftheautonomyexercisedbythe

Guinea-Bissauarmy,goingsofarastocallforthedeploymentofanECOWAS‘supervisory

force’,asuggestionturneddownbyGomesJúniorandthearmy.44

Gomes Júnior and Zamora Induta: suspicion and separatist renewal

ThedeathofVieiraledtothepoliticalriseofGomesJúnior,aprosperousbusinessman

withclosetiestotheformercolonialpowerPortugal.ZamoraInduta,theinterimchief

of staffbeforebeingconfirmed inOctober2009,wasacloseassociateandayoung,

intellectualofficerwhoalsoenjoyedverycloselinkswithPortugal.Hehadattracted

Dakar’sattentionasspokesmanfortheManéjunta.

Withconcern,SenegalnotedthatthedeathsofNaWaiandVieiracoincidedwitha

reactivationofthesouthernfrontoftheMFDC.WhileDakarkeptrefusingtonegotiate

substantiallywiththemilitaryfactionsoftheMFDCandstucktoastrategyofattrition,

somemoderateseparatistsagaintriedtheirluckonmilitaryterrain,thistimewithoutNa

Waitostopthem.Accordingtoonesource,someoftheGuinea-Bissaumilitaryresumed

salesofweaponrytotheseparatists.45SomeKassololfightersbroketheceasefireand

launchedanunsuccessfulattacktowardsZiguinchorinthesummerof2009.46InJanuary

andFebruary2010again,separatistsoperatedontheoutskirtsofZiguinchor.ByJune

ofthatyearthesplitwithinKassololseemedfinal:undertheleadershipofOusmane

NiantangDiatta anewbasewas established in theborder zone to the south-eastof

Ziguinchor,andwentontheoffensive.MeanwhileCésarBadiate,theKassololfaction

leader,whocontrolledtheborderstriptothesouthandsouth-westofZiguinchor,stuck

totheceasefire.

WhilethepowerbrokersinBissauinsistedthattheywerenotsupportingtheMFDC

butputtinganendtooffensives thathadprovedcostly inhumanlives,Senegalsaw

theneutralityobservedbytheGuinea-Bissauarmy,nowheadedbyInduta, inapoor

light,becauseDakarwassuddenlydeprivedofacentraltoolinitsmanagementofthe

Casamanceconflict.

Itssuspicionswerereciprocated,becausetheGuinea-Bissauauthoritiesseemedto

believethatDakarmayhavefavouredtheallegedattemptedcoupd’étatofJune2009.

TherelationshipbetweenDakarandBissaubecameincreasinglycomplex.InMarch2009,

IndutahadmetwithGambianpresidentYahyaJammeh–whosedifficultrelationshipwith

DakarandtieswithSadiowerewellknown–tosignamilitaryco-operationagreement.47

Followingaborderdisagreement in theVarelazone inOctober2009,Guinea-Bissau

authoritiesreactedbydeployingtroops,48andanillegalincursionofSenegalesefishermen

intoGuinea-BissauwatersresultedinswiftreactionbyBissau.Theseincidentsrevealed

atouchierandmoreindependentGuinea-Bissauthanbefore.Facedwiththissituation,

DakarsoughtnewavenuestoBissauthroughMalamBacaiSanhá.

14



Sanhá: a new charter

AttheoutsetSanhá–aninfluentialfigurewithinthePAIGCandasupporterofGeneral

ManéagainstVieiraduringtheSeventhofJuneWar,andMané’scandidateduringthe

2000election–seemedlikeanunlikelyallyforDakar.Indeeditwasagainsthimthat

WadehadencouragedthealliancebetweenYalaandVieiraduringthe2005elections.

Learningfromhisdefeatsin2000and2005,however,Sanháhadtriedtodrawcloser

toSenegal.InDecember2005,duringoneoftheimpasseslinkedtoVieira’smanoeuvres,

hewenttoDakartorequesttheinvolvementofWade,whohehadthenreferredtoas

his‘bigbrother’.Onthatoccasion,heaskedtheMFDCtolaydowntheirarms.49With

VieiradeadSenegalsawSanháasafreshprotégé,undoubtedlyencouragedinitsthinking

byProença,BotchéCandéandRobertoCacheu,Vieira’sallieswithinthePAIGCwho,

deprivedoftheirleader,hadbecomeclosetoSanhá.

ThecloserelationshipbetweenWadeandSanhábecamewellknown;somuchsothat

arumourspreadthatSanhá,althoughhewasnotknownforhisfaith,begantoadopt

Wade’sownMuslimSufiaffiliation.Asthepresidentialelectionsof2009drewnearSanhá

paidavisittoSenegal,duringwhichhedeclaredtotheSenegalesemediathatWadewas

his‘father’and‘oneofthemostimportantfiguresinthecontemporaryhistoryofAfrica’.

Hethenexplained:‘ThisiswhyIcameinpersontoinformhimofmycandidacy…Iam

relyingonhissupport.AndiftomorrowIamelectedpresidentoftheRepublic,wewill

worktogether.’50

SenegaleseadvisersweredispatchedtoassistSanháanditseemsthatSenegalhelped

financepartofhispowerfulelectoralcampaign.51Hisvictoryinthesecondroundof

theelectionsof26July2009waswellreceivedinDakar.WadetravelledtoBissaufor

theswearing-inofhisnewallyon8September2009,ataceremonyorganisedbya

Senegalese communications agency.52 The Senegalese Press Agency also showed its

supportbypraising thenewpresident.53ByAugust2009, Senegalhaddonated100

tonnesofsugar,twocarsandtwobusestotheGuinea-Bissaupresidency.Iran,which

atthetimewasapreferreddiplomaticpartnerofSenegalandwhichWadehadputin

contactwithSanhá,donated20carsthatthepresidencygaveto‘formerfightersinthe

struggleforindependence’.54UntilhisdeathinJanuary2012Sanhá,whosufferedfrom

chronicdiabetes,washospitalisedregularlyinDakar,sometimesattheexpenseofthe

Senegalesestate.55LikeVieira,Sanháwasgraciousinmeetinghisobligationsasanallyof

theSenegalesepresident;forexampletravellingtodiplomaticeventshostedbyWade.56

Towards a new balance?

After his election Sanhá contributed to an improved relationship between Dakar

and Bissau. After negotiations following border tensions in October 2009, Guinea-

Bissautroopswithdrew.SanháfearedexcessivedependenceonSenegal,however,and

maintainedhisdistance.57Mostimportantlythepresidencyplayedafairlylimitedrolein

Guinea-BissauandasprimeministerGomesJúnior,whowaswellregardedbydonorsand

whocontrolledthePAIGCandtheassembly,hadgreaterinfluencethanSanhá.Hencethe

revisionoftheco-operationagreementof1975betweenthetwocountries,proposedin

February2010bySenegal,didnotcomeabout.58Diatta’sseparatistfighterscontinuedtheir

activitiesandSenegalcouldnolongerdependontheGuinea-Bissauarmytoexertpressure.


15


Thesituationevolvedsomewhatwithapoliticalshake-upinBissauinApril2010

thatbroughtaboutthefallofInduta.GeneralAntónioInjai,whohadcommandedthe

lastassaultagainstSadio,wasappointedchiefofstaff,buthedidnothelpDakarmuch.

WeakenedbythefallofInduta,GomesJúniortookupthecudgelsagainandestablished

acloserelationshipwithInjai.59Thisnewphasewasinitiallymarkedbyserioustension

between the Sanhá and Gomes Júnior camps with charges and strenuous counter-

accusations,buteventuallyledtoamodusvivendibetweenthetwopartiesunderstrong

pressurefromaiddonors.Senegalseemedtohaveresigneditselftoalossofinfluenceand

triedtogetclosertoGomesJúniorbyofferingdiplomaticsupport.InFebruary2011,in

adiplomaticcampaigntoremobilisedonors,GomesJúniormadehisfirstofficialtripto

Dakar,meetingWadeandobtaininghissupport.60

DakaralsotriedtoreconnectwiththeGuinea-Bissauarmy.AttheendofJune2011

thechiefsofstaffofthetwocountriessignedanagreementinBissau,followingwhich

Guinea-Bissaupledgedto‘arrestalltherebelswhohadtakenrefugeonitsterritory’.61

Inturn,theSenegalesearmyundertooktotrainGuinea-Bissausoldiersandtocontribute

totheupgradingofthenavalbarracksinBissau.InJuly2011Senegaleseprimeminister

SouleymaneNdénéNdiayevisitedBissau. InSeptemberof that yearSenegalese and

Guinea-BissaucommandersoftheborderzonemetinthecityofKolda,intheeastof

Casamance.Themeetingincludedaconcertandafootballmatchbetweenthemilitary

corpsof the twocountries to ‘strengthen thebrotherlyandcordial relationship that

unitestheSenegaleseandGuinea-Bissauarmies’andendedwithanannouncementof

theestablishmentofjointpatrols,whichuntilthenhadbeenadeadissue.62Although

suchjointoperationswerefarfrommarkingaGuinea-Bissauoffensiveagainstcontinued

operationsbytheDiattafighters,inthisnewphaseDakarcouldatleastcountonacertain

levelofco-operation,althoughnothingmorecouldbeachievedintermsofestablishing

Guinea-BissauasanallyandusingitsarmytoassistinthecampaignagainsttheMFDC.

A S p e c t S o f t h e A l l I A n c e A n d I t S d e t e r I o r A t I o n

Thedeeptiesbetweenthetwocountries,inparticulartheireconomiclinkages,acted

asaconstraintonBissau’spoliticaloptions.Takingstockofthecriticalthoughdiscreet

roleSenegalhasplayedinGuinea-Bissau’spoliticallifesince2000andidentifyingits

structuraldimensionsdoesnotmeanthatDakardecidesinBissau.Theinternaldynamics

ofGuinea-Bissauheldtotheirownlogicandfrom2009werefedbysubstantialchanges

inGuinea-Bissau’sinternationalaffairs.ThegrowinginfluenceofAngolahasbeenamajor

factor.Attheendofthe2000stheWaderegimewashavingtroublefindingalliesofweight

inBissauwhileLuandaestablishedacloserelationshipwithGomesJúnior,weakeningthe

tiesthatDakarhadforgedwiththeGuinea-Bissaustateapparatusanditsarmy.

Senegal as an economic pole

SomecommentatorshaddepictedtheSeventhofJuneWarasanactionagainstthejoint

forcesofneo-liberalglobalisationandla francophonie,drivenbySenegalandtheWest

AfricanEconomicandMonetaryUnion(WAEMU).63Certainly, theviolenteventsof

1998–1999thatfollowedGuinea-Bissau’spainfuleconomicliberalisationinthe1980s

16



mightbesubjecttosuchaninterpretation:thepopulationwelcomedMané’sseizureof

powernotleastbecausethoseyearshadbeensodifficult.Farfromreversingthegrowing

inscriptionofGuinea-BissauinWestAfrica’sregionaleconomy,thedecadefollowing2000

confirmedthattrend.ThedynamiceconomyofSenegalhasbeenamajorfactorinthis

process.

Guinea-Bissau’sattractiontoitsFrancophoneneighbourswasnotnew:eversince

thecolonialeratheSenegaleseeconomyhasbeenadriverofcommercialandhuman

circulations in the region.AlthoughPortugal continued tobean importantpartner,

Guinea-Bissau’s linkswithWestAfricagrewincreasinglystrong.Portugalusedtobe

Guinea-Bissau’smainsupplier,providing56.6%ofthecountry’s importsin1990and

40.5% in1994.By2005,however, itwasonly the third-largest supplier, accounting

for 12.7% of imports, far behind Senegal (34.6%) and Italy (20.4%).64 Senegalese

businessmen,aswellascommercialinterestsfromotherbusinesscommunitiesconnected

withSenegal–Mauritania,LebanonorGuinea-Conakry–havebeensettlinginBissau.

Thecountry’sentryintoWAEMUsimilarlycontributedtothereworkingofitsbanking

profile:aftertheSeventhofJuneWartherewasnoPortuguesebankinBissauandby2009

threeofitsfourcommercialbanks(Ecobank,BanqueRégionaledeSolidaritéandBanco

daUnião)wereWestAfrican.65

Dakar’sseaportandinternationalairport,itsrelativelylargebusinessenterprisesand

markets,aswellasitsuniversitiesandtrainingcentres,haveallgonetomakeSenegal

accessible,influentialandattractive.SomebusinessesinGuinea-Bissauarebranchesof

companiesbasedinDakar,themostimportantbeingtelephoneoperatorOrange,abranch

oftheSenegal-basedSonatel.DakarprovidesmanyofthetechniciansworkinginBissau

intelecommunications,informationtechnologyandthemanagementofpetroleumor

portfacilities.66StudentsfromGuinea-BissaugotoDakar(evenCasamance,wheretwo

universitieswereestablishedinthesecondhalfofthepastdecade).67

Thistrendwasallthestrongerduringthesecondhalfofthe1990sandmostofthe

2000s,whenSenegalexperiencedaperiodofexceptionalgrowthwhileGuinea-Bissau

movedfromcrisistocrisis.68From1995to2008Guinea-Bissau’sgrossdomesticproduct

wasalmoststagnant,withanaverageannualgrowthof0.03%,whereastheSenegalese

economygrewby4.9%onayearlyaverage.ThedevastationoftheSeventhofJuneWar

andthepillagingofBissauexacerbatedthesituationinGuinea-Bissau,asBissau’sbusiness

elites lostmuchcapital,whichbenefitedbusinessmen fromneighbouringcountries,

beginningwithSenegal.ThedegradationofBissau’sportanditschannelreinforcedthe

roleoftheportsofDakarandZiguinchorinhandlingBissau’sexternaltrade,andtraffic

wasfurtherfacilitatedwhentheJoãoLandimbridgeprojectontheroadfromZiguinchor

toBissauwascompletedin2004.Tellingly,theGuineanbordertownofSãoDomingos

wasnotableforitsremarkablegrowthinthe2000s.69Furthermore,fortheyoungcitizens

ofGuinea-Bissau,criticaloftheirownnationalheritage,70Senegalwasinmanywaysa

modelcountry.Thephrase‘Dakar,littleParis!’wasoftenheardinBissauandSenegalese

immigrantsbecamerolemodelsformanyyoungstersinGuinea-Bissauhopingtoemigrate.

All this translates into languagechoices.Non-governmentalorganisations,banks

andbusinessesbasedinBissauhaveincreasinglydemandedthattheiremployeesmaster

French.ThroughoutGuinea-BissausocietytheattractionofFrenchhasgainedstrength:

theAllianceFrançaiseofZiguinchorisfullofGuineanslearningFrenchandmanyof

thehigh-levelmilitaryandcivilianofficialswhodidnotalreadyspeakFrench,hasten


17


toobtainthebasicssothattheycanparticipateinWestAfricandiplomaticlife.71Wolof,

theSenegaleselinguafranca,hasalsoacquiredapresenceinBissau–todayitispossible

tofindyouthswhohavelearntthelanguagewithouthavinglefttheircountry,through

contactswithSenegalesebusinessmen,shopowners,carriersortradersinBissau.Ithas

beentheattractionofSenegalandWestAfrica,morethanofFrance,thathasledtothe

riseoftheFrenchlanguageinGuinea-Bissau.

This long-term trendhas certainly annoyedLisbon.The continuationofFrench

militarysupporttotheSenegalesearmyduringtheSeventhofJuneWar,wasoftenseen

byPortugueseobserversasevidenceofadesirebyFrancetoextenditszoneofinfluence

usingSenegalasalink,althoughFrenchdiplomatshavemaintainedthatFrancedidnot

wishtobecomeatoddswithanimportantEuropeanpartnersuchasPortugaljustto

protectthefewinterestsithadinGuinea-Bissau.72Indeed,althoughrecognisingthat

FranceremainedclosetoSenegal,Portuguesediplomatsnowseemtothinkthatithas

beenDakarratherthanParisthathashadambitionsinGuinea-Bissau.Senegal’spolicy

agendahasnotbeenembodiedinthesamefiguresasthatofPortugal,whichhasindicated

sympathyforGomesJúnior,amanconnectedtoPortuguesebusinessinterestsandone

who,fromthePortuguesestandpoint,broughthopeofstabilityanddevelopment.

The early 2000s: favourable years for the Senegalese state

AlthoughSenegalhasbecomeaneconomicandculturalcentreofincreasingimportance

toGuinea-Bissau,itsspecificinfluenceintheearlypartofthepastdecadeowedmuch

tothepoliticsofpersonalpatronageandprotectionthattheWaderegimeexercisedover

criticalelementsoftheGuineanstate.Theeffectivenessofthesepolicieswasreinforced

bythenewprosperityoftheSenegalesestate,whichgrewinstrengthintheearly2000s.

Withinternationalsupport(promptedbythetransitiontodemocracyin2000)alliedto

economicgrowth,greaterfiscalcloutandreformscarriedoutbyhispredecessor,Wade

enjoyedsignificantandgrowingstateresources.73 In2005theGuinea-Bissaubudget

amountedtoXOF48.3billion,ofwhich20.3billioncamefromforeignaid,whereasthe

SenegalesebudgetwasXOF955.8billion,only 75.6billionofitinexternaldonations.74

WhileGuinea-Bissauwasmiredininstabilityandbadgovernancethatdiscouraged

externalsupport,Senegalpossessedsufficientresourcestoexerciseconsiderablepolitical

influence.Testimonytothiswasitspolicyofmilitaryco-operationforthebenefitofthe

Guinea-Bissauarmy,whichatthetimewasindisarray.Dakar’sleverageinBissauincreased

furtherwiththedifficultrelationshipbetweenGuinea-Bissauauthoritiesandaiddonors

duringYala’sincumbencyaswellasinthesecondVieirapresidency,whichwasmarkedby

severegovernmentalinstability.Senegalwasabletoassumethepositionof‘bigbrother’to

Guinea-Bissau,defendingitintheinternationalarenaandpleadingwithdonorstosupport

thecountry.Moreprosaically,Wadeseveraltimesmadeavailablehispersonalaircraftto

enablepresidentsYalaandVieiratoattendinternationalmeetings.

End of the 2000s: the turn to Angola

AlthoughSenegalbenefited fromleverage inBissau in the2000s, itwasparticularly

successful because Guinea-Bissau was diplomatically isolated and the Senegalese

government’sresourceswerestrongenoughforittoexercisesuchinfluence.Thesituation

18



changedprogressivelyduringthesecondhalfofthe2000s:Guinea-Bissau,whichhadbeen

marginalisedforsometime,appearedontheinternationalsceneattheendofaseriesof

crisesandaparadigmshift.AtthesametimeSenegalwasfacingnewdifficulties.Dakar’s

influenceinBissauwasreduced.AfteranewpoliticalandmilitaryupheavalinBissauin

April2010,Angola,whichinvolveditselfinGuinea-Bissaufrom2007,tookoverasthe

country’smaindiplomaticpartner.

Guinea-Bissauhadbeenaninternational issue inthe late1990sbut itwas inthe

secondhalfofthe2000s,afteradegreeofstabilityhadreturnedtocrisis-riddenLiberia,

Côted’IvoireandSierraLeone,thatitbecameacauseforconcern.

TheslowemergenceamongWestAfricanpoliticalelitesofagrowingsensethatregional

politicalinstabilityshouldbecontaineddidmuchtobringGuinea-Bissautotheforefront.

Senegalplayeditspartinthisprocess,involvingitselfintheGuinea-Bissauissuewithinthe

ECOWASdiplomaticsphere.Dakarderivedsomesupplementaryleveragebecauseitcould

speakwiththesupportofECOWASandinparticularofNigerianPresidentObasanjo,with

whomWadehadbuiltagoodrelationship.Nigerianoilincomethusregularlycontributed

to supportingECOWASactions inGuinea-Bissau,which strongly reflectedSenegal’s

concerns.ButthearrivalonthestageofnewplayersdidsomethingtodiminishDakar’s

influence.

Thisnewinterest inBissauacceleratedduringthesecondhalfofthedecade.The

explosionofclandestineseabornemigrationfromWestAfricancoastsarousedtheinterest

oftheEUandinparticularofSpain,anewplayerinBissau.Duringthesameperiodthe

traffickingofcocaineandofGuinea-Bissauchildrenraisedequallystronginternational

attention.Al-Qaedaalsomadeanappearance:itwasinBissauthatMauritanianjihadists

werearrestedinJanuary2008afterhavingassassinatedFrenchtouristsinMauritania.All

thesedevelopmentswereinterpretedbyinternationalinstitutionsanddevelopedcountries

assymptomaticofafailedstate:Guinea-Bissauwasseenasbecomingasourceofmajor

risks(throughdrugtrafficking,clandestineimmigrationandinternationalterrorism)for

thewholeworld.AccordinglyinDecember2007itwasregisteredintheprogrammeof

theUNPeacebuildingCommission,andtheUNreinforceditspresence.In2009itturned

theUNPeacebuildingSupportOfficeinGuinea-Bissau,establishedin1999,intoafully

representativeoffice.InFebruary2008theEUalsobecameinvolvedthroughasupport

programmeforreformofGuinea-Bissau’ssecuritysector.

Thedevelopmentofaninternationalparadigmofstrengtheningratherthanmerely

‘adjusting’Africanstateshasbeenreinforcedbyageneralstrategicreclassificationof

Africaintheeconomicanddiplomaticarena.Guinea-Bissau’srelativelyunder-exploited

natural resources (bauxite, phosphates, petroleum, fisheries and forestry) aroused

increasinginterest.AselsewhereinAfrica,ChinaaddedtoitspresenceinGuinea-Bissau;

similarlyinvolved,withvaryingagendas,wereSouthAfrica,BrazilandVenezuela.Plans

forestablishingorreopeningembassiesinBissauwerefurtherevidenceoftheongoing

strategicreclassification.

Certainly,Guinea-Bissau isnotamajorconcern for the internationalcommunity,

butbytheendofthe2000sithadhadattractedsufficientinterestfortheauthorities

todiversifytheirdiplomaticportfolioandalsostrengthenthestate, inthesensethat

salariescouldbepaid,internaldebtreimbursed,externaldebtrenegotiatedandthelike.

BissauthereforedependedlessonDakarthanbefore.Guinea-Bissau’sbudgetincreased

significantlyoververyfewyears,fromXOF48billionin2005tomorethanXOF120


19


billion in2009.75Certainly, international involvement inBissaudid takeSenegalese

concernsoverCasamanceinconsideration,andtheproliferationoftrafficinweapons

destinedfortheMFDCwasseenbytheinternationalcommunityasasymptomofthe

weaknessoftheGuinea-Bissaustate–aweaknessthatitbecameinvolvedincorrecting.

Senegal’squasi-monopolyoverBissauhad,however,beenbrokenpreciselyatthetime

thatSenegalwasexperiencingarelativeweakening.Wade’sdiplomacywasbecomingever

moreconfusedandhiscontroversialcandidacyforathirdpresidentialtermweakened

Senegal’sinternationalstanding,whilebudgetgrowthwasdropping.Almostinevitablythe

balanceofpowerwaslessfavourabletoSenegalin2012thanithadbeen10yearsearlier.

ItwastheinvolvementofAngola,however,thatwasthemostsignificantfactor.Calling

onoldideologicalcamaraderieaswellasdiplomaticambitionsandeconomicandfinancial

plans,76Angolahadbytheendofthe2000squicklybecomeamajorplayerontheGuinea-

Bissauscene.Beyondtakingamedium-termviewoftheminingsector,Luandaprovided

Guinea-Bissauwithsignificantbudgetaryaid,aswellascreditlinesfortheprivatesector.

Luandaalsoproposed theconstructionof adeepwaterport,whichwouldcall into

questiontheroleofDakarandZiguinchoraspointsoftransitforcommerceinGuinea-

BissauandpossiblyinthewiderWestAfricanregion;AngolaalsobackedBissauinthe

internationalarena,forexamplebypleadingitscausebeforetheEUandtheUN.

Finally,althoughECOWASandtheCommunityofPortugueseLanguageCountries

(CPLP),towhichAngolabelongs,collaboratedaftertheeventsofApril2010totryto

stabiliseGuinea-Bissau(togetherpreparingaroadmapforthereformofthesecurity

sector),therelationshipbetweenthetwoblocsquicklysoured.InSeptember2010Luanda

andBissausignedabilateralagreementfortheprovisionofAngolanmilitaryandpolice

assistance.Inthesamemonth,atanextraordinaryECOWASsummit,Wadeinsistedthat

theenvisagedstabilisationforcecomposedexclusivelyofsoldiersfromECOWASmember

countries,totrytocounteraneventualAngolandeployment.77SanháandWadehad

pleadedinvainsincemid-2010foranECOWASinterventionforce,aproposalforcefully

rejectedbytheGuinea-Bissauarmy,butAngolawasabletodispatchasmallmilitary

contingenttoBissauinMarch2011.Officially,theAngolansoldiersprovidedmilitary

co-operationforthebenefitoftheGuinea-Bissauarmy,buttheywerealsoguarantorsof

thecivilpower:duringanattemptedcoupd’étatinDecember2011,GomesJúniortook

refugeintheAngolanembassy.

Angola,asprotectorandpartnerofPrimeministerGomesJúnior,seemednowto

haveassumedthemainleverageinBissau.‘Eh,Angolaissobig,’sangPresidentSanhá

duringtheceremonyforaccreditationoftheAngolanmilitarymission,takingupafamous

Angolansong.78DakartriedtouseitsinfluenceinECOWAStoaddsomeweight,for

examplebyusingasleveragethepromiseofanECOWAScontributiontopensionfunds

fortheGuineanmilitary.Senegalappearedresignedtoitsdiminishinginfluence,however:

inthepresidentialelectionofMarch2012inthewakeofSanhá’sdeathinJanuary,Dakar

seemedtohaveacceptedthelikelihoodofavictoryofGomesJúnioranddidnotfollow

uponrequestsforassistancefromopponentsseekingSenegalesesupport.79

UsingacombinationoftoolssimilartothatofDakarbutwithheavierresourcesto

backit–diplomaticsupport,materialaidandpersonaltiesandpatronage–Luandaalso

establishedarelationshipwithGomesJúniorbutalsowithInjal,thearmedforceschief

ofstaff.CouldnewpoliticaltroublesinGuinea-BissauenableDakartore-establishits

influence?IfAngolaninvolvementweretolast,couldtheattractionofGuinea-Bissau

20



totheFrancophoneandSenegalesearenasbetempered,orindeedreversedthroughthe

magnetismoftheAngolanpole?AlreadyGuinea-Bissauimmigrants,legalandillegal,have

begunmovingtowardsLuanda.

c o n c l u S I o n

ArealisticanalysisofthediplomaticgameduringWade’stwopresidentialtermsfrom

2000to2012showsthatDakardeployedafirmandcoherentpolicywithaveryrealist

inspirationtoinfluencepoliticsinBissau.Thankstothisapproach,Wadewasableto

secure,throughchangesofleadershipinBissau,Bissau’sinvolvementinthemanagement

oftheCasamancecrisis,whichfordecadeshadbeenoneofSenegal’scoreissues.Farfrom

beingapawnofFrance(orservantoflaFrancophonie),Senegalplayedanindependent

gameusingFranceforlinkageandsupport.

The politics of Senegal in Bissau, supported by strong economic and cultural

influences,hasbeensimilarinsomeaspectstotherelationshipsFrancemaintainedover

theyearswithitsAfricanpartners:militaryco-operation,accesstohealthcare,diplomatic

brokerage,andfinancingselectedcandidatesduringelections–akindofpatronagewith

aquasi-‘familial’dimension80withhandpickedGuinea-Bissaustakeholders.Senegalese

foreignpolicyismarkedbyatraittypicalindiplomaticrelationshipswithinFrancophone

Africa:moneycirculatesinformallybetweenpowerbrokersfromonecountrytoanother

(sometimes to thebenefitof thepoliticalopposition)andserves to financeelection

campaignsorregulatecrises(egfailuretopaygovernmentsalaries,giftingofmilitary

malcontents,andbuildingconsensusbetweenpoliticalfigures).81

Thispolicyfunctionsthrough‘back-channel’pathssuchasthebusinessmanPierre

Goudiaby,andthroughanextremelystableandexpertdiplomaticcorps,freefromthe

administrativeprincipleofperiodicrenewal.82Finally,althoughithaslimitedresources,

Senegalrunsavastinternationalnetworkandismakingitselfavailableasadiplomatic

link with other potential partners (France, the EU and ECOWAS, but also Nigeria,

EquatorialGuinea,LibyaandIran),enablingittodeploysomeweightinBissau.This

influencereacheditspeakin2006withthevictoriousoffensiveoftheGuinea-Bissauarmy

againstCasamance’schiefrebel,Sadio.

Although Senegal played its diplomatic cards well enough, this policy worked

onlyforawhile.Afteraprosperousfirstterm(2000–2007),inwhichSenegalenjoyed

diplomaticinfluenceandsawitspowergrow,Wade’ssecondtermwasmarkedbyrelative

deterioration.ThedeathinMarch2009ofitstwokeyGuineanallies,VieiraandNaWai,

weakenedSenegal’sinfluence.Finally,DakarowedsomethingofitsinfluenceinBissauto

Guinea-Bissau’sisolationattheendoftheSeventhofJuneWar.Ultimately,Wadeknew

howtouseGuinea-Bissau’smarginalisationat thebeginningof the2000s toacquire

influence.Hedeployedthesameapproachtothemilitaryregimesthatsubsequentlycame

topowerinMauritaniaandGuinea-Conakry:poorlyregarded,marginalisedandinsearch

ofrecognition,theywerereasonabletargetsforSenegalanditslimitedresourcesunder

Wade,whocouldcommitfortheirbenefithisinfluenceandprestigetoplaytheroleof

friendandmediatorwiththeinternationalcommunity.

Bissaushookoffsomeof itsdiplomatic isolationinthesecondhalfof the2000s.

Seizingtheopportunityleftopenbythemilitaryshake-upofApril2010,Angolahas


21


establisheditselfasthenewfriendofGuinea-Bissau,formingarelationshipasprimary

patron,withCarlosGomesJúnior,favouredasthedefaultoptionbytheinternational

community,butalsowithAntónioInjai.Senegalcontinuedtoworkitsconnectionsand

alliancesinBissau,butitisnotsurethatitwilleverregainthekindofinfluenceexercised

intheearlyyearsofWade’smandate.

p o S t S c r I p t

ThistextwasfinalisedatthebeginningofMarch2012,whenSenegalandGuinea-Bissau

wereeachorganisingpresidentialelections.On25March2012Wadewasdefeatedinthe

secondroundofSenegaleseelectionsbyMackySall,oneofhisformerprimeministers.A

weekearlier,on18March,GomesJúnior,Guinea-Bissau’soutgoingprimeminister,won

49%ofvotesinthefirstroundofthatcountry’spresidentialelections.InBissau,numerous

militarymenandpoliticiansfearedthatGomesJúnior’slikelyvictoryinthesecondround

wouldallowhimtoassumehispersonalhegemony,all inthenameof thenecessary

reformsandwiththesupportoftheinternationalcommunity–inparticularPortugal

andAngola.On12April2012,encouragedbytheblockingoftheelectionbyopponents

whorefusedtovalidatetheresultsofthefirstround,themilitarysuspendedtheelectoral

processandarrestedGomesJúnior,whomtheyaccusedofhavingbeeninvolvedwith

Angolainaplotagainstthenationalarmy.Withthesupportofthemainoppositionparties

andopponentsofGomesJúniorwithinthePAIGC,themilitaryestablishedtransitional

authoritiesthatGomesJúniorandtheparliamentarymajorityPAIGCrefusedtorecognise.

ForSenegal,whichseemedtohaveaccepteditsdiminishedinfluence,GomesJúnior’s

likelyvictoryandhisfavouredrelationshipwithAngola,thisnewshake-upprovidedthe

opportunitytoplayaroleoncemore.AlongwithNigeria,BurkinaFasoandCôted’Ivoire

–otherECOWAScountriesunhappywithAngola’sinvolvementinWestAfrica–Senegal

supported the transitionopenedby themilitary’s actionwhereAngolaandPortugal

rejecteditandadvocatedtheimmediaterestorationofGomesJúnior’sauthorityandthe

continuationoftheelectoralprocess.ECOWASstressedtheneedtotakeintoaccountthe

de factopowerofthevictoriouscoupists,butitiscleartoobserversthatseveralinfluential

WestAfricanstates,includingSenegal,arehappytoseeAngolaanditsallyGomesJúnior

introuble.TheGomesJúniorcampunhesitatinglyaccusedECOWAS(orsomeof its

members),andevenFrance,ofhavingorganisedthecoupd’état.

UnderpressurefromtheGuineanmilitary,AngolantroopswithdrewfromBissauand

ECOWASdeployeda600-strongforcewhichincludedasmallSenegalesecontingent.83

Thus,alittlemorethan10yearsafterOpération Gabou,Senegalesesoldiersweresetting

foot inBissauonceagain, this timetobewell receivedby theGuineanarmy. In the

internationalarena,alliedwithsomekeypartnersinECOWAS,Senegalwasinvolvedin

defendingtheGuinea-Bissautransitionalauthorities.ItwastoDakarthatthetransitional

president,ManuelSerifoNhamadjo,madehisfirstdiplomaticexcursionon14June2012.

Theoutcomeofthetransitionisstilluncertain.ThePAIGCeventuallysignedthe

transitionpacton16January2013,butitisnotsureyethowthiswilltranslateinterms

ofpowerdistribution,notwhennewelectionswillbeheld.GomesJúniorisstillinexile

inPortugalandCPLPcountriesmaintaintheircriticismofECOWASandthetransition

authorities.AlthoughtheauthoritiesandtheGuinea-Bissauarmyhavethecountryunder

22



propercontrol,theyarediplomaticallyisolatedandrequireresourcesthatECOWASand

WAEMUcannotprovideallbythemselves.Theevents,however,confirmthestrategic

importanceofBissauforSenegal,andthecapacityofthissmallcountryfordiplomatic

action–whichitisabletosupportwithitslimitedmilitaryresources,84usingECOWAS

asitschannel.

e n d n o t e S

1 Thematerialinthispaperresultsfromresearchconductedbytheauthoronbehalfofand

withsupportfromtheCentreNationaldelaRechercheScientifique,andtheCentred’Etudes

d’AfriqueNoireofInstitutd’ÉtudesPolitiquesdeBordeaux,beforehejoinedtheInternational

CrisisGroup.ThispaperdoesnotrepresentinanywaytheviewsoftheInternationalCrisis

Group.TheauthorthanksCamilleBauer,MarinaTemudo,Momar-CoumbaDiop,DanielBach,

Jean-ClaudeMarut,RichardMoncrieff,AristidesGomesandVictorPereirafortheirvaluable

comments.

2 FortheCasamanceconflict,seeMarutJ-C,Le conflit de Casamance. Ce que disent les armes.

Paris:Karthala,2010;aswellasFoucherV,‘Onthematter(andmateriality)ofthenation:

interpretingCasamance’sunresolvedseparatiststruggle’,Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism,

11,1,2011;andFoucherV,‘Senegal:theresilientweaknessofCasamanceseparatists’,inBoas

M&KCDunn(eds),African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine.Boulder:LynneRienner,

2007.

3 BayartJ-F,‘Africaintheworld:ahistoryofextraversion’,African Affairs,99,2000,pp.217–267.

4 BarryB,La Sénégambie du XVe au XIXe siècle. Traite négrière, islam et conquête coloniale.Paris:

L’Harmattan,1988.

5 ThisincludedthemovementsofheavyartillerypiecesonSenegaleseground.Interview,former

memberofthearmybranchofthePAIGC,Bissau,June2010.

6 InaccordancewithPAIGCpolicy,Guinea-BissauandCapeVerdehad formedaunionat

independence,whichwasdissolvedin1980.

7 Interview,officialoftheGuineanministryoftheinterior,Bissau,October2009.

8 Interview,officialoftheMFDC,Mandinari(Gambia),March2000.

9 On14October1993,thetwocountriessignedanagreementforthejointmanagementofthe

disputedzone.TheagreementresultedintheestablishmentoftheAgencyforManagement

andCooperation(Agence de Gestion et de Coopération)betweenSenegalandGuinea-Bissau

(http://www.agc.sn).

10 OntheSeventhofJuneWar,seeMartinsM, ‘Le conflit en Guinée Bissau: chronologie d’une

catastrophe’,L’Afrique politique,1999,pp.213–218,aswellasthespecialeditionofSoronda:

Revista de Estudos Guineenses, December2000.

11 DakarsupporteditsputativeallyagainsttheMFDCandapparentlyconsideredattackingthe

MFDCfrombehind,whereasGuinea-Conakry’sassistancewasmorepersonal:PresidentConté,

hadbeenafriendofNinoVieirasincethedaysofthe‘liberationstruggle’.

12 DjaloT,‘Lições e legitimidade dos conflitos politicos na Guiné-Bissau’,Soronda: Revista de Estudos

Guineenses,December2000,pp.29–32.Ablackmarketwasestablishedduringthewar,as

soldierssentconsumergoodspillagedinBissautoDakarandConakry.Interview,former

receiver,Bissau,October2009.

13 WadebroughtGuinea-Bissau’sshareofthepotentialincomefrom15%to20%.


23


14 Lusa, ‘Guiné-Bissau – Kumba Ialá distribui um milhão de euros a Governo, FA’s e MAI’,

29November2002.

15 Someseparatistsattackedhimforhisauthoritarianism,brutality,lackofconsiderationfor

civiliansandhisdisregardforthemovement’spoliticalwing.Inaddition,likemanyMFDC

militants,SadiowasaMuslimfromBuluf,northoftheCasamanceRiver,andwasaccused

of favouringhisownpeople.FromSeptember2000therewasfactionalviolencebetween

militantsoftheMFDCinGuinea-Bissau;ManéwasinvolvedinthereleaseofSadiofollowers

arrestedbytheGuinea-Bissauauthorities.AFP(AgenceFrance-Presse),‘RebelsinCasamance

postponemeetingfollowinginternalstrife’,2January2001.

16 BBC Monitoring Service,‘CasamancefactionleaderaccusesGuinea-Bissaugovernmentof“open

war”’,18January2001.

17 AFP,‘Vingt-quatremaquisardscasamançaistuésdanslenorddelaGuinée-Bissau’,8January

2001.

18 PANA(Pan-AfricanNewsAgency),‘Legouvernementn’interviendrapasdanslesproblèmes

sénégalais’,21January2001.

19 TheKassololgroupthereafterlimiteditsuseofforcetoactingagainstinterferencefromthe

SenegalesearmyandCasamanceciviliansinitszoneofcontrol.

20 ‘InquiétudespourlaCasamance’,Wal Fadjri(Dakar),15September2003.

21 Interview,memberofNationalTransitionalCouncil,Bissau,May2008;andinterview,African

diplomat,Bissau,October2009.

22 Author’sachives.

23 IRIN(IntegratedRegional InformationNetworks), ‘Guinea-Bissau:Armyadmitssoldiers’

death’,Wal Fadjri,14–20February2004.

24 ‘Guinée Bissau: Cinq morts chez les rebelles’,26February2004.

25 Interviews,Guinea-Bissaumilitary,Bissau,October2009.

26 AFP,‘Guinée-Bissau:L’ONUpaierabientôtlesarriérésdeprimesdesmutins’,16October2004.

27 ‘GénéralTagméNaWayàDakar:pourunesurveillancecorrectedelafrontièresénégalo-bissau-

guinéenne’,Wal Fadjri,15February2005.

28 PANA,‘Dond’équipementsduSénégalàl’arméebissau-guinéenne’,1March2005.

29 ThereisatleastoneknowninstanceofConakry’ssupportfortheGuinea-Bissauarmy:anavy

vesselfromConakrysunkwhiledockingintheportofBissautooffload40tonnesofrice,a

fueltankeranduniforms.SeePANA,‘UnnaviredelaGuinéeConakrycouleauportdeBissau’,

4October2005.SomesourcesclaimthatseniormilitaryfiguresinBissauweregivenmoney

andwereofferedtoparticipateintransportingcocainefromLatinAmericatoWestAfrica,a

businessinwhichContéassociates,includingason,wereinvolved.Interviews,personsclose

toVieira,Dakar,May2011;andinterviews,Europeandrugsexperts,Conakry,April2011and

Dakar,January2012.

30 YalamadehisrelationshipwithSenegalacampaignissue,forexamplestatingthatifhewere

elected,Wadewouldprovide$10milliontotheGuinea-Bissauarmy.Lusa, ‘Guiné-Bissau:

Kumba Ialá reassume-se como candidato às presidenciais’,26May2005.

31 Jeune Afrique,‘Ninolecaméléon’,1August2005.Interview,formerGuineanminister,Paris,

December2011.

32 BBC Monitoring Africa,‘OustedGuinea-BissaupresidentflowntoSenegalfortalksaheadof

crucialpoll’,23May2005.

33 BBC Monitoring Africa,‘FrenchradiointerviewsGuinea-BissauPresident-electJoaoVieira’,

24



22September2005;‘NinoVieiraprésident,unatoutpourlapaixenCasamance’,Wal Fadjri,

25July2005.

34 Supportersincludedseveraloldallies(egChirac,Obasanjo,ObiangNguemafromEquatorial

Guinea) and other clients (Mamadou Tandja from Niger and Marc Ravalomanana from

Madagascar).APS (AgencedepresseSénégalaise),‘8 Chefsd’Etatserontprésentsàlacérémonie

deremiseduPrixHouphouëtBoigny’,12May2006.

35 AFP,‘TagméNaWaiinvestichefd’Etat-majordesarmées’,6January2006.

36 PANA,‘2.178réfugiésbissau-guinéenssontarrivésàZiguinchor’,23March2006.

37 PANA,‘Prèsde60soldatsbissau-guinéenstuésparleMFDC’,1April2006.

38 PANA,‘L’ancienministredel’IntérieurdelaGuinée-Bissauarrêté’,3April2006.

39 PANA,‘LeprésidentVieirademandelapoursuitedescombatscontreleMFDC’,3April2006.

40 PANA,‘BissauréclameledroitdepoursuivreSalifSadio’,24April2006.

41 ‘Casamance–Bissaudonneuncoupdepouceauprocessusdepaix’,Wal Fadjri,17August

2007.

42 SeeICG(InternationalCrisisGroup), ‘Guinea-Bissau:beyondtheruleofthegun’,Africa

Briefing,61,25June2009.

43 ‘Peursurlesobsèquesde“Nino”VieiraàBissau:Wadereculefaceaudanger’,Le Quotidien,

11March2009.

44 Interview,Africandiplomat,Bissau,October2009.

45 Interview,Bissau,October2009.

46 Interview,‘radical’memberoftheSouthernFrontoftheMFDC,Bissau,September2009.

47 ‘GAF,Guinea-BissauarmedforcessignMoU’,The Daily Observer,30March2009.

48 AFP, ‘L’arméedeGuinée-BissauenalerteprèsduSénégal(sourcemilitaire)’, 14October2009.

49 Le Soleil, ‘SituationpolitiqueenGuinée-Bissau:MalamBacaiSanhademandeauprésidentWade

des’impliquerdavantage’,5December2005;‘MalamBacaiSanhá:“Larébelliondoitdéposerles

armesenCasamance”’,Wal Fadjri, 5December2005.

50 Malan Bécaye Sagna, candidate to the Guinea-Bissau presidency: ‘L’indépendance de la

Casamance est une utopie’,15May2009.

51 SanhátookspecialcareofhiscommunicationswiththeFrancophoneworld:aPRfirminParis

publishedaLettre de la Lusophonie inwhichSanháwasinvariablypresentedinafavourable

light.

52 APS,‘MalamBacaiSanha“trèssatisfait”dutravaildeSénégalBâches’,7 September2009.

53 APS, ‘Malam Bacaï Sanha, l’espoir d’un retour à un Etat moderne’, 4 September 2009;

‘InvestituredeMalamBacaïSanha:uncachetpopulaireannonciateurderuptures’,4September

2009.

54 Africa 21 Digital,‘PresidentedoSenegaloferecequatroviaturasaoseuhomólogoguineense’,

24August2010.

55 Les Afriques,‘C’estl’Etatsénégalaisquiaprisenchargelesfraisd’hospitalisationduprésident

deGuinéeBissau’,27October2010.

56 ForexampletheFestival mondial des Arts nègresorwelcomingHaitianstudentstoSenegalafter

theearthquakeinHaiti.Le Soleil,‘MeAbdoulayeWadeauxétudiantshaïtiens–“Vousêteschez

vousenterreafricaineduSénégal”’,14October2010;‘Ouverture3èmeFESMAN:simplement

grandiose!’,Le Point du Jour (Dakar),11December2010.

57 Interview,formeradvisertoPresidentSanhá,Bissau,24May2012.

58 APS,‘Sénégal:AbdoulayeBaldépourletraitementde“questionsplusimportantes”quecelle

delafrontière’,12February2010.


25


59 OnGuinea-BissausinceApril2010,seeICG,‘Au-delà des compromis: les perspectives de réforme

en Guinée-Bissau’,Rapport Afrique,183,23January2012.

60 APS,‘CarlosGomesJúniorattenduàDakar,lundi’,13February2011.

61 SudOnLine,‘Casamance:LeCEMGAlegénéralAbdoulayeFallàBissau’,25June2011;Lusa,

‘Rebeldes são problema do Senegal, mas não vamos permitir perturbações à paz – CEMGFA

guineenses’,23June2011.

62 ‘Sénégal: Banditisme transfrontalier –Le Sénégal et laGuinée-Bissau vont organiserdes

patrouillescommunes’,Le Soleil (Dakar),19September2011.

63 See,forexample,VanderDriftR,‘Democracy:legitimatewarfareinGuinea-Bissau’,Soronda:

Revista de Estudos Guineense,December2000,pp.37–65.

64 DatafromIMFTradeStatisticsDepartment,citedinTheEconomistIntelligenceUnit,‘Country

profile.SãoToméandPríncipe,Guinea-Bissau,CapeVerde1996–97’,p.63;and‘Country

profile2007.Guinea-Bissau’,p.30.

65 APortuguesebankthatretained15%ofthecapitalofBissau’sfourthbank,BancodaÁfrica

Ocidental,wassoldin2007toChinesebusinessmanStanleyHo,whooperatesfromtheformer

PortuguesecolonyofMacau.SeeAngop(AngolaPress),‘Guiné-Bissau:Actividadereduzidae

integraçãonaUEMOAdeixapaísforadarededosbancosportugueses’,6November2009.

66 Interviews,Bissau,October2009.

67 See,forexample,‘UniversitéCheikhAntaDiopdeDakar:Lanouvelledestinationdesétudiants

delaGuinée-Bissau’,Le Soleil, 8April2008.

68 OndevelopmentsinSenegalinthe2000sseeDahouT&VFoucher,‘Senegalsince2000:

rebuildingstatehegemonyinaglobalage’,inMustafaR&LWhitfield(eds),Turning Points In

African Democracy.Oxford:JamesCurrey,2009,pp.13–30.

69 ‘São Domingos corre a ritmo galopante’,http://www.jornalnopintcha.com(undated).

70 SeeBordonaroL,‘LivingattheMargins.YouthandModernityintheBijagóIslands(Guinea-

Bissau)’,PhDdissertation.Lisbon:ISCTE,2007;andVighH,Navigating Terrains of War. Youth

and Soldiering In Guinea-Bissau.NewYork:BerghahnBooks,2006.

71 Theauthorhadaninterviewwithanimportantmemberofthenationalassemblycutshort

becausethelatterhadtoattendhisFrenchlesson.

72 Interviews,Frenchdiplomats,Paris,June2011.CitedbyWikileaks,anAmericandiplomat

pointed out in 2005 that while Senegal was satisfied with its relationship with Yala

Francewouldrather followthePortuguese lineontheGuineancase.USEmbassyParis,

‘MFA official discusses CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea’, 25 April 2005, http://wikileaks.org/

cable/2005/04/05PARIS2789.html.

73 DahouT&VFoucher,op. cit.,p.19.

74 The data used is from Banque de France, http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/eurosys/zonefr/

page2_2008.htm.Forcomparisonpurposes,Guinea-Bissauhad1.5millioninhabitantsand

Senegalalmost10timesmore(13million).

75 APA(Agence depresseafricaine),‘Economie:Lesdéputésapprouventlebudgetdel’Etatqui

s´élèveàprèsde120milliardsdeF.CFA’,10December2009.

76 OntheriseofAngolainGuinea-Bissau,seeICG,2012,op. cit.,pp.5–8.

77 ‘Conseildesministres:Lechefdel’Etatmaintientleprixdel’huileàsonniveauactuel’,Le Soleil,

1October2010,http://www.lesoleil.sn.

78 ‘MISSANGinstaladaemBissau’,O País(Luanda),29March2011.

79 Two of Gomes Júnior’s opponents, Serifo Nhamadjo and Afonso Té, the political heirs

respectively of Malam Bacai Sanhá and Nino Vieira, went to Dakar during the electoral

26



campaign,butwereapparentlynotwellreceived.Interview,high-levelSenegaleseofficial,

Dakar,April2012.

80 NotethatMalamBacaiSanhácalledhimselfthebrother,thentheson,ofAbdoulayeWade.

81 PresidentWadehimselfmentionedthatduringhistimeinoppositionhehadreceivedmoney

fromPresidentOmarBongoofGabon.WadeA,Une vie pour l’Afrique. Entretiens avec Jean-Marc

Kalflèche et Gilles Delafon.Paris:MichelLafon,2006,p.202.InOctober2009theoutgoing

representativeoftheIMFinSenegal,AlexSegura,reportedtotheIMFthathehadbeenoffered

asuitcasewithEUR100000and$50 000asapartinggift–theresultofamistake,saidthe

presidency.Themoneywasreturned.Inautumn2011FrenchlawyerRobertBourgiaskedfor

asubstantialcontributionfromtheSenegalesepresidencytoJacquesChirac’s2002French

presidentialcampaign.

82 AbdoulayeDieng,SenegaleseambassadorinBissau,reservegeneraloftheSenegalesearmy,has

heldofficesince2002.Itisdifficultnottocomparethissituationtothelongtenureofsome

FrenchambassadorsinparticularlystrategicAfricancountries:MichelDupuchinAbidjan

1979–1993,orMauriceDelauneyinLibreville1967–1972and1975–1979.

83 ProbablytoavoidrevivingmemoriesoftheSeventhofJuneWar,Senegaldeployedonlynon-

combatanttroops:anengineeringunitandamedicalunit.

84 SenegalaskedFrancetoprovidetransportforitsmentoBissau.

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African perspectives. Global insights.South Africa

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January 2013 · 2018-08-03 · AbStrAct Against the background of the low-intensity conflict that...

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