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Social Struggle and the Political Economy of Natural Resource Extraction in Peru

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Social Struggle and the Political

Economy of Natural ResourceExtraction in Peru

Jan LustAutonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico

Abstract

In the period 200212, the Peruvian economy almost doubled in size. This growth was mainly theconsequence of the commodity boom in these years. The importance of the mining sector for thePeruvian Treasury is politically translated in the immense difficulties Peruvian Governments havein closing the doors to transnational mining corporations. The government of Ollanta Humalaactually inserted the fiscal contribution of extractive industries into the cornerstone of its socialpolicies. In Peru, a growing body of literature is emerging regarding mining issues. However, itlacks an analysis of the development of the mining sector in relation to the general workings ofcapitalism. In this article we analyze the development of mining in Peru from a critical political

economy perspective as this enables us to identify the forces that are advancing the capitalistdevelopment process as well as the forces of resistance to this development.

Keywords

Peru, Humala, political economy, commodities boom, natural resource extraction, transnationalmining corporations, imperialism, neoliberalism

Introduction

The first decade of the 21st century unveiled a major offensive of the Peruvian indigenous com-munities against the interests of transnational mining capital. This struggle, however, cannot sim-

ply be regarded as a continuation of the battles of the 1980s and 1990s. The actual Peruvian political

and social context is completely different. In recent years, the fight of the indigenous communities

has literally become bloody. The capitalist state has shed its smiling demeanor and is showing its

real character.

The presidency of Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s and the spread of neoliberal ideology in the

society impacted heavily upon Peruvian social movements. By following the dictates of the

Corresponding author:Jan Lust, Doctoral Program in Development Studies at the Autonomous University of Zacatecas (UAZ), AvenidaPreparatoria s/n. Col. Hidrulica, Zacatecas, Zac. C.P. 98065, Mexico.Email: [email protected]

01354CRS0010.1177/0896920513501354LustCritical SociologyLustcle2014

Article

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2 Critical Sociology

Washington Consensus and implementing state terror, the government was able to repress what-

ever remained of the anti-capitalist popular resistance. The governments policies in this regard

were combined with an ideological attack on any ideas concerning state intervention in the econ-

omy and regulation of foreign investment and of the private sector (code for transnational capital-

ist enterprises).

Since the return of democracy in 2001, social struggles have shown an upward trend. The fight

against transnational extractive capital, initiated in the middle of the first decade of the new millen-

nium, created a political platform for new social actors: the indigenous communities. It seems

that the class struggle has returned to the countryside.

In 2011, the nationalist and former Army captain Ollanta Humala was elected President of Peru.

Humala was supported by a variety of progressive and left-wing organizations, groups and intel-

lectuals. He was also able to count on a large popular base in the countryside. There is no question

that his election gave rise to many expectations. It was thought that the new government would put

an end to neoliberal policies and that it would direct the use of water for agricultural and consumer

purposes over mining. As was written in Humalas election program,La gran transformacin(The

Great Transformation), the state would recuperate (not renationalize) its natural resources, such as

water and land, forests and biodiversity, gas and minerals. Their exploitation by foreign economic

minorities could not continue (Gana Peru, 2010: 8). Once in power, however, Humala was soon to

reverse his program and embrace extractive capital as the panacea for Peruvian development.

The Peruvian Government actually inserted the fiscal contribution of extractive industries into

the cornerstone of its social policies. Even before his inauguration as President, Humala succeeded

in closing a deal with the mining corporations. Their contribution to the Treasury was to increase

considerably and thanks to these funds a number of social and infrastructural projects would be

financed.

The first 23 months of the Humala government were characterized by the struggle of the indig-

enous communities to protect their livelihoods and habitats against the invasion of extractive capi-

tal (resource-seeking foreign direct investments). During these months, 19 people died as a

consequence of the repression of the social protest movements generated by the operations of

extractive (particularly mining) capital. The regime viewed and continues to view mining, gas and

petroleum extraction as essential for the development of the country.

Over the last 10 years we have witnessed a growing body of literature in Peru on issues related

to extractive industries, particularly mining. In general it points to the introduction of new environ-

mental regulations and the strengthening of the Ministry of Environmental Affairs in a project

ostensibly to democratize decision-making regarding mining, gas and petroleum concessions.

Although the information and ideas provided in the literature are interesting and abundant, there is

a lack of in-depth analysis of the development of the mining sector in Peru. The workings of thecapitalist system and the actual policies of the government in political practice differ substantively

from the governmental rhetoric and public discourse.

In this article we elaborate on the political economy of mining in Peru. We consider it essential

to analyze the economics and politics of natural resource extraction (mining, to be precise) from a

critical political economy perspective. This enables us to identify both the forces of capitalist

development and the forces of resistance to this development. Furthermore it might enable us to

bring into focus proposals that structurally address economic and social issues related to the

destructive operations of extractive capital in the form of open pit and other types of mining.

The article is organized as follows. After having explained the form taken by capitalist develop-

ment in Peru, the context of changes in the global economy and the resulting primary commoditiesboom, we present relevant data and facts regarding the upswing in the demand for, and production

of, minerals and metals. Subsequently, we delve into the mining interests of imperialism in Peru.

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Lust 3

We present data regarding the profitability of mining investments and examine the nature of cor-

porate social responsibility programs. In the last two parts of our argument we show how the

Peruvian Governments of Fujimori (19902000), Toledo (20016) and Garcia (200611) favored

mining capital and we review the policies of the current Peruvian Government under Ollanta

Humala.

The Nature of Capitalism

It is undoubtedly the case that the current primary commodities boom reinforces the importance of

Perus role as exporter of natural resources in primary commodity form, and consolidates as well

as intensifies the historical role it has played in the international division of labor. Development

strategies based on the extraction of natural resources deepen the dependency of governments and

economies of resource-rich countries that are on the periphery of the system of global capital and

the imperial state at its center (Veltmeyer and Petras, forthcoming). These strategies are actually

conditioned and determined by the demand of China and other emerging markets for energy,

minerals and agrofood products primary commodities and the response to this demand by

global extractive capital in the search for private profit and a capital accumulation process.

The prices of primary commodities are determined both by international markets and by the

machinations of transnational capital in the imperialist countries. As such, Latin Americas devel-

opment is constrained by the visible hand of economic shocks, fluctuations and speculative capital

flows. The consulting company PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007: 50) indicated in its 2007 review

of global trends in the mining industry that hedge funds have a significant impact on the mining

industry given their involvement in metal trading activities and the volatility this creates in com-

modity prices.

The commodities boom and more specifically the commodification of nature (the global com-

mons of land, water and natural resources) have been intrinsically related to the dynamics of a capi-

tal accumulation process. The tendency of capital to expand and to produce surplus value on an

extended scale is embodied in its search to extend its reach into the pores of peripheral societies. In

fact, what currently is being denominated as globalization results from the continuous hunt of capi-

tal for higher rates of profit, facilitated by the neoliberal prescription of abolishing capital controls,

the opening of markets and favorable tax regimes for capital (Veltmeyer and Petras, forthcoming).

Even the trading of greenhouse gas emissions through a so-called carbon market is not a surprising

development, being as it is the logical consequence of the laws that govern capitalist development.

The necessity of capital to expand increases the demand placed upon nature. According to Lwy

(2004), capitalism has two general contradictions. The first, as pointed out by Marx, is between the

productive forces and the relations of production. In other words, the development and the sociali-zation of the productive forces contradict the private ownership of the means of production. The

second contradiction, however, is between the productive forces and the conditions of production

(including the workforce, urban space and nature). As capital is obliged to develop its productive

forces in order to be able to compete in the world market, by increasing productivity by all means,

it tends to destroy the conditions for its own reproduction. For instance, by increasing the exploita-

tion of the workforce, capital might kill labor and by using more and more energy it contributes

to the depletion of the very natural reserves that it desperately needs.

The Commodities Boom in PeruIn the last 20 years, South America, and in particular Peru, has been the object of large investments

by transnational mining capital. According to the World Bank (2005: 20), in the period 199097



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worldwide investment in mining exploration and exploitation grew by 90 percent. However, for

Latin America this percentage was 400 percent and for Peru 2000 percent. In 2010, of all Latin-American countries, Peru received the most investments in mining exploration and was third

worldwide, after Canada and Australia (Coronel and Panfichi, 2011: 395).1

In 2006, Peru occupied second place in Latin America in the production of copper (fifth in the

world) and first in the production of gold and zinc, occupying respectively the sixth and third

places in the world (De Echave, 2008: 323). The Department of Foreign Affairs and International

Trade Canada (2012: 5) indicated that in 2012 Peru led the worldwide production of silver; it was

second in the production of zinc and copper, third for tin and fourth for lead, mercury and molyb-

denum. According to the pro-business magazineMining Journal(2012), currently Peru is the larg-

est producer of gold, zinc, tin and lead in Latin America.

Over the last two decades, the significance of mining for the Peruvian economy has increasedconsiderably. The National Institute for Statistics and Informatics (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas

e Informatica, INEI) informs that since 1991 the participation of the mining sector in the gross

domestic product (GDP) has shown a rising trend (INEI, 2010). While in 1991 in current prices it

contributed 4.1 percent to GDP, in 2010 this grew to 10.6 percent. The extractive sector as a whole,

composed of the subsectors mining, hydrocarbon, agriculture, forestry and fishing, in 2010 con-

tributed 16.8 percent to GDP. Based on GDP growth figures the effect of mining on GDP is very

clear. According to the International Monetary Fund (2013: 5), over the period 200212 the

Peruvian economy almost doubled in size and real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 6.34

percent (the highest 10-year average growth in Perus history).

The exports of the mining sector in the period 1990 to 2004 increased by 490 percent; fromUS$1.4b to US$6.9b (De Echave, 2008: 79; Glave and Kuramoto, 2007: 139). In 2010, the value

of mining exports rose to US$21.7b (Alayza and Gudynas, 2012: 199). According to De Echave

(2012: 66), while these accounted for 48 percent of total exports in 1995, in the years 20069 they

contributed to around 60 percent.

Table 1 shows the development of mining exports in relation to the exports of other products in

the period 20002012. Rounding differences means that the percentages do not add up to 100 per-

cent or exceed 100 percent.

The real significance of the mining sector for Peru, apart from its positive impact on the stock

of international reserves, can be found in its fiscal contribution. Governmental income, or fiscal

revenues, from the activities of extractive industries is of crucial importance to the government inorder to finance its social and infrastructural programs. Governmental social programs help to cre-

ate political stability by weakening the objective conditions for protest to spread and deepen against

the presence and activities of extractive industries. For instance, social benefits that arise from tax

Table 1. Peruvian export structure 20002012.

2000 2004 2008 2012

Traditional products Fishing 13.7% 8.6% 5.8% 5% Agriculture 3.6% 2.5% 2.2% 2.4%

Mining 46.3% 55.6% 58.4% 56.8% Petroleum and

derivatives5.5% 5% 8.6% 10.9%

Non-traditional products 29.4% 27.2% 24.4% 24.2%Others 1.5% 1% 0.6% 0.8%

Source: Peruvian Central Bank. Available (consulted 1 April 2013) at: http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/cuadros-anuales-historicos.html



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Lust 5

income generated by mining operations (scholarships for students or pensions for retired people,

for example) help to maintain the popular balance in favor of mining capital. Infrastructural pro-

jects might enable extractive capital to broaden the scope of resource exploitation and to create the

proper conditions to efficiently transport the resources to the countries of the North. The con-

struction and the improvement of roads, airports and waterways help this capital to cover a larger

territory for its activities and facilitate getting the minerals quickly out of the country.

In this context it is interesting to note that Peruvian Governments, starting with the one led byAlejandro Toledo, stepped up their basic social expenditures as the mining boom started to unfold.

In Table 2 we present the basic social expenditures for the period 200211, composed of expendi-

tures on education, culture, protection and social care, and health and sanitation. The figures show

considerable volatility and the trend is uneven, with a rise between 20045 followed by a sharp

decline between 20068 and recovery.

The Interests of Imperialism in Peru

The baseline of the politics of imperialism has not changed in the contemporary period of the new

extractivism.2The interests of transnational extractive capital are politically and militarily defendedby US and Canadian imperialism, under the flag of multilateral institutions such as the World

Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In this context it is interesting to refer to two US Embassy

cables published by Wikileaks and the 2008 visit of the then Canadian Minister of International

Cooperation, Bev Oda, to Peru.

In August 2005, in the light of resurging protests in the department of Cajamarca against trans-

national mining corporations, the US Embassy (2005a) increased its efforts to improve coordina-

tion with the embassies of Canada, Great Britain, Australia, Switzerland and South Africa, as well

as with major foreign mining investors, in order to try to reduce the anti-mining violence. A cable

dated 19 August (US Embassy, 2005b) describes a meeting hosted by the Ambassadors of the USAand Canada with representatives of the mining corporations Antamina, Newmont, Minera

Quellaveco, Barrick and BHP Billiton. The Swiss Charg dAffaires, the Australian Consul

Table 2. Basic social expenditures at current prices: 20022011.

Year Basic social expenditures in millions US$

2002 1291.92003 1361.3

2004 6881.72005 5775.62006 4274.82007 2603.12008 2882.12009 4062.12010 4718.42011 5236.7

Source: The National Institute for Statistics and Informatics. Available (consulted April 20 2013) at: http://www.inei.gob.pe/Sisd/index.asp.

Note: The expenditures in millions of US dollars are based on the yearly average exchange rate published by thePeruvian Central Bank. Available (consulted 20 April 2013) at: http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/cuadros-anuales-historicos.html



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General, and the British Embassy Trade and Investment official also participated. The meetings

objective was to review their operating difficulties in Peru and to coordinate efforts to improve the

investment climate. In the meeting, US Ambassador James Curtis Struble

encouraged the companies to bring to his and the other Ambassadors attention NGO-funded groups or

individuals that advocate violence. He requested, for example, public statements, newspaper reports orradio spots that encourage violence. Armed with this information, Ambassadors would be able to confront

any NGOs for their respective countries about such dangerous activities.

In the cable it was furthermore announced that representatives of the USA, Canada, UK, Australia,

Switzerland and South Africa would meet with the Peruvian Government, the Catholic Church and

political party leaders to tackle the lawlessness issue in mining communities.

In January 2008, as was reported by the Canadian magazine Embassy, the former Canadian

Minister of International Cooperation, Bev Oda, visited Peru to talk with the Peruvian Minister of

Energy and Mining, Canadian and Peruvian mining corporations and with certain non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) about reforms in the mining sector. However, this was not a visit to bringideas to enhance the well-being of all those affected by transnational extractive capital but, rather,

to assure and defend Canadian imperial interests.3At present, according to a special report of the

Mining Journal in February 2013, of the 308 Canadian mining companies exploring in South

America, 92 have a presence in Peru. Peru leads Argentina which has 70 companies, followed by

Chile with 55, Brazil 50, Colombia 35, and the other eight South American countries with a com-

bined total lower than 20 (Mining Journal, 2013).

The World Bank plays a key role in the strategy of imperialism to appropriate Latin Americas

natural resources. In the 1990s, it stimulated changes in the legal framework products of a broader

set of neoliberal policies (Bebbington et al., 2008: 6) that favored most of all the transnational

corporations; it supported the privatization of state-owned mining companies; and it helped tofinance important mining projects. In the period 19932001, the mining sector was one of the main

investment objects of the Bank (De Echave, 2009: 12). Through the International Finance

Corporation (IFC) it has a direct stake in certain mining companies, such as Yanacocha in Peru. In

2011, IFC held an extractive industry portfolio of around US$2.1b: 75 percent in oil and gas and

25 percent in mining. The interests of the corporation expand to 40 countries, of which those in

Peru valued at US$387m occupy a second place (World Bank, 2011: 19).

Profits and Corporate Social Responsibility

In the first decade of the 21st century, investment in mining has been extremely profitable for com-panies in Peru. According to the financial statements of the five most important mining corpora-

tions, in the period 20059 they obtained profits of around US$20b (Alayza and Gudynas, 2012:

198). The Ministry of Energy and Mining (2012: 1617) stated that in the years 2009 and 2010 the

net profits of the main mining corporations increased from approximately US$4.2b to US$5.7b

(Ministerio de Energa y Minas, 2012). The consortium of NGOs, Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana

(2012: 16), calculated that the profits of the mining corporations listed at the Lima stock market

augmented from US$5.7b in 2008 to around US$10b in 2011.4

Mining in Peru is principally a foreign business. Production of the main minerals that determine

the dynamics of the sector, copper and gold, is in the hands of just a few companies. For example,

80 percent of the production of copper is concentrated in the mining units Antamina (owned byBHP Billiton, Xstrata, Teck and Mitsubishi Corporation), Southern (a majority-owned, indirect

subsidiary of Grupo Mexico S.A.B.) and Cerro Verde (property of Freeport-McMoRan Copper &



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Lust 7

Gold Inc., SMM Cerro Verde Netherlands B.V.), a subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Company

Ltd., Compaia de Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.). Similarly, Minera Yanacocha and Barrick control

about 60 percent of domestic gold production (Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, 2012: 10).

The major players in the Peruvian mining business in 2012 (data for June 2012), measured by

investments, were China, USA, Canada, Switzerland and Australia. Investments by Peruvian com-

panies only made up 2.5 percent of total mining investments (Department of Foreign Affairs and

International Trade Canada, 2012: 9). It is interesting to note that, while before 1990 there was not

one Canadian company operating in Peru, in 1997, 70 percent of total Canadian investments were

directed towards mining and 50 percent of all new mining projects in development were controlled

by Canadian companies (De Echave, 2005, 2008).

The mining business has not been unaffected by the protests of the indigenous communities. As

a response, the corporations started to develop social responsibility programs to try to remove

some objective conditions for the struggle of the communities and to undermine its popular base.

For instance, the Peruvian National Mining, Petroleum and Gas Association (Sociedad Nacional de

Minera, Petroleo y Energia, SNMP) created a Committee for Social Affairs in order to deal with

conflicts which were imminent and as a response to the formation in 1999 of the indigenous

organization National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining (Confederacin

Nacional de Comunidades del Per Afectadas por la Minera, CONACAMI) (De Echave, 2009: 8).

The emphasis on the social responsibility of corporations obscures the real issues at stake. It

forms part of all those mechanisms that are designed to install and legitimize the extractivist model

(Svampa, 2009: 48), to disarticulate the conflicts that the presence and activities of extractive capi-

tal cause, and to close down public debate (Bebbington, 2010: 89). As a matter of fact, private

corporations are more willing to introduce, voluntarily, self-regulative mechanisms like codes of

conduct, instead of breaking the legal framework introduced in the 1990s.

The main objective of the social responsibility programs of transnational mining capital is to

break the unity of the communities or unity between the communities within a particular region.

By benefiting certain groups within a community or dividing different communities within the area

of operations of the company through avoiding negotiations with the official representatives of the

communities, mining capital is able to advance its interests by converting some of their opponents

into defenders of the mine. In addition, as Bebbington (2010: 9) argues, social responsibility initia-

tives can also have the effect of narrow[ing] debates on development options by financing foun-

dations that contribute to local development. Examples are the Associacin los Andes de

Cajamarca(Yanacocha mine) and theFundacin Ancash(Antamina).

Notwithstanding possible positive effects of social responsibility programs, these programs

coexist with intimidation against activists and other persons who may obstruct mining activities,

the bribing of the leaders of the resistance (Bebbington, 2009a: 133, 140141; 2010: 8) and by try-ing to sabotage local referenda. The activities of paramilitary organizations such asForzain the

department of Cajamarca, the center of current resistance against transnational mining capital, are

a case in point.

Peruvian Governmental Policies and Mining Capital

Over the last decade, the significance of mining for Peru has increased considerably. The Peruvian

Government not only defends its own interests (tax income), but also those of transnational mining

capital. In 2004, the narrow cooperation between the Peruvian police andForzawas documented

in the case of the mining company Majaz in the department of Piura (Kamphuis, 2012: 543547).Three years later, cooperation agreements were signed between the mining companies Barrick

Misquilchilca S.A., Poderoso S.A., Minera Aurfera Retamas S.A., Minera Yanacocha S.R.L. and



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the Peruvian national police (Policia Nacional del Per, 2013). Agreements also exist between

mining companies and the Peruvian army, for instance between the Sixth Jungle Brigade of the

Army and the mining company Afrodita (No a la Mina, 2012).

The increased demand for Peruvian minerals and the rise in the prices of commodities were the

prime reasons for investment growth in the last decade. However, the Peruvian (under)develop-

ment model installed in the 1990s was a prerequisite for this to happen. This model, backed by the

Washington Consensus, could be considered as a pure form of neoliberalism designed primarily to

serve the imperialist agenda.

The changes in the legal and regulatory framework, which were introduced at the beginning of

the 1990s, established the objective conditions for the growth of mining investments in Peru. The

complete package of economic and anti-regulation measures taken by the first Fujimori govern-

ment (199092) included legal stability agreements with transnational corporations. And also such

preferential legal mechanisms as accelerated depreciation; possibilities to deduct investments in

public infrastructure from tax payments due; the exoneration of tax payments until the initial

investment was recuperated or until income generated was used to do reinvestments to increase

production more than 10 percent; and the deduction of the costs for research and mining explora-

tion tax payments (Campodnico Snchez, 1999: 1724). For the next 10 to 15 years, it became

prohibited to change any laws that protected the interests of transnational extractive capital. Legal

regulations needed to safeguard the natural environment were subjugated to economic policies and

were to be implemented by a non-defined office within the Ministry of Energy and Mining (Pinto,

2009: 9395). Mining concessions were being granted for an indefinite period and capital only had

to pay US$2 a year to maintain their rights (Campodnico Snchez, 1999: 57, note 10). The General

Mining Law of 1992 made the forced reallocation or displacement of communities and populations

for mining purposes possible (Dominguez, 2010: 24). The Land Law of 1995, on the other hand,

liberalized the land market (Castillo, 2009: 72). In 2013, the Ministry of Energy and Mining,

instead of the Ministry of Environmental Affairs, is the determining authority regarding the

approval of environmental impact studies. In addition, to maintain their concession, the companies

are currently obliged to pay only US$3 per hectare a year.

This neoliberal attack on the state by the state itself has been accompanied by the privatization

of state-owned companies and the selling of state participation in private companies. In the period

19922000, more than 200 mining operations were privatized (Bury, 2011: 90). According to

Campodnico (1999: 25, 27), practically all state-owned mining companies were transferred into

private foreign hands, predominantly to US, Chinese, Canadian and Australian capital (Ruiz, 2002:

70). As a consequence, whereas in 1990 private companies produced 55 percent of all minerals in

Peru, in 1999 this had increased to 95 percent (Bury, 2011: 90).

The governments that succeeded Fujimori continued with the neoliberal policies. PresidentAlejandro Toledo reinserted the country within the family of democratic nations. As a matter of

fact, it was his government that formally established the Peruvian Agency to Promote Private

Investments (Proinversin) that was assigned the task to systematically sell off the wealth and

assets of the nation. In addition, his regime enacted a Supreme Decree Law to reduce the import

duties paid on capital goods from 20 percent to 7 percent and 12 percent on capital goods to be used

in exploration and production of certain minerals, such as oil and gas in the Amazon region. And it

enacted a law that eliminated the 18 percent sales tax on capital goods and services for mineral

exploration (Gurmendi, 2012: 17.3).

The government of Alan Garcia (200611) tried to speed up the process to parcel up indigenous

land (and consequently the water rights) and to provide individual ownership titles of this land. Inthis way, it would be easier to sell it to (transnational) mining capital with the backing of interna-

tional multilateral institutions, as it would appear less to have been robbed from the communities.



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Lust 9

While in 2004 13 percent of indigenous communities territory was given in concession to gas and

petroleum companies, by the end of 2008 this had been increased to 70 percent (Bebbington,

2009b: 14; Pinto, 2009: 86). In 2010, more than 70 percent of the Amazon region was parceled out

(Huertas, 2011: 217) and approximately 16 percent of the national territory was given in conces-

sion (De Echave, 2012: 72; Urteaga, 2011: 40).

Ollanta Humala: Neoliberalism with State Intervention

The regime of Ollanta Humala can be regarded as a government attempting to overcome the fail-

ures of the neoliberal experiences of the last two decades by increasing its social expenditures. Thedevelopment model introduced by the regime could be defined as a socially inclusive form of

neoliberalism.

Extractive industries are of major importance to the Peruvian state. This sector is essential for

the financing of social programs and infrastructural projects. In addition, these funds help provide

overall economic stability by increasing the countrys exports and international reserves. In the

period 200710, extractive industries contributed about 22 percent of total tax revenue. The par-

ticipation of these industries in the corporate tax revenue was approximately 42 percent (Francke

and Sotelo, 2012: 109). In 2011, the mining sector contributed 17 percent of all domestic taxes and

accounted for 33 percent of total income tax collection (Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, 2012: 18

19). In Table 3 below, we show the contribution of the mining sector to total income tax revenue inthe period 200512.

The first Humala cabinet (June-December 2011) tried to build a cooperative relationship

between the indigenous communities and the corporations dedicated to extractive activities, in

order to differentiate from the previous government of Alan Garcia. Just before the beginning of

his presidency, Humala closed a deal with the mining corporations that, supposedly, permitted the

government to obtain more resources. These funds would enable it to finance the proposed great

transformation of Peruvian society.

The agreement with the corporations was acclaimed by broad sectors of society, as Humala had

been able to extract more taxes than his predecessor Alan Garca, who had been able to persuade

the corporations to donate only a small portion of their super profits to a private fund, one in largepart managed by the corporations themselves. The Garcia mining tax determined that those cor-

porations that signed a tax contract with the government had to pay, after income tax and before

dividend payments, 2 percent of their profits (De Echave, 2008: 373374).

Table 3. Contribution of the mining sector in total income tax revenue.

Year in millions of US$ % participation in total income tax

2005 657,6 302006 1761 44

2007 2781,4 50.92008 2304,6 39.32009 1002,1 23.42010 1985,2 32.12011 2823,4 33.32012 2445,6 25.7

Source: Cooperaccin (2013).Note. The contribution in millions of US$ is based on the yearly average exchange rate published by the Central Bank ofPeru. Available (consulted 20 April 2013) at: http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/cuadros-anuales-historicos.html



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The Humala agreement envisions a new tax regime for mining corporations that should struc-

turally increase the state budget. However, because these tax payments can be considered as costs,

they are deductible from the taxes the corporations pay on income generated by their economic

activities. Therefore, although the government claims the new tax regime would yearly collect

approximately US$1b, total tax revenues will not increase with the same figure.5

It can be imagined that the mining corporations did not sign a treaty without obtaining some

political benefits for themselves, apart from getting the new tax payments considered as costs.6The

government of Alan Garcia had also struck a deal with mining capital, and as a consequence it tried

to break the communities by making use of legislative powers that were granted to implement the

Free Trade Agreement with the USA. About 100 Decree Laws were proposed by the Garcia admin-

istration. These included laws that had as an objective to increase possibilities to parcel up the land

of the communities; to appropriate supposedly uncultivated land (tierras eriazadas), mainly

belonging to the communities; to break the democratic decision-making in the communities; and

to broaden the legal possibilities for the police to repress social protests against these laws. The

resistance of the indigenous population in the Amazon region helped to revoke these laws, but

ended sadly in the Bagua massacre of 2010.

The global mining corporations have applauded the tax agreements and the continuation of poli-

cies that favor capital. In its 201112 survey of mining corporations, the right-wing Canadian

based Fraser Institute evaluated the policies of the regime and the countrys attractiveness for min-

ing investments as being most favorable (Fraser Institute, 2012). In addition, according to Forbes

Magazine, in 2012, just as in the previous year, Peru was considered the second best country for

business in Latin America.

It cannot be overlooked that the Peruvian Government has augmented the budget of ministries

that favor the well-being of the population. In the period 2010-12, the part of the budget of the

public sector reserved for organisms of national government was increased by 10 percent.7The

apportionment for the Ministry of Education in this budget was raised from 6.3 to 7.4 percent and

the Ministry of Health saw an increase from 4.7 to 6.3 percent.8However, as might be expected due

to the governments preference for transnational extractive capital, the Ministry of Agriculture saw

its apportionment of the budget decreased (from 1.5% to 1%). Regarding the Ministry of

Environmental Affairs, things are worse: it maintained its weight at 0.1 percent. In other words, the

ministry that should, somehow, control the mining corporations, does not really have a budget and

is not able to properly perform its functions. For ministries such as the Ministry of Defense and the

Ministry of Internal Affairs, which are responsible for the repressive function of the state, their

weights in the budget also changed. While Defense saw this diminished from 9.3 to 8.3 percent,

Interior increased from 7.9 to 8.1 percent. Although we cannot conclude from these figures that the

Humala government has a fixed preference for the repressive apparatus, it is clear that it has notchanged the status quo within the budget. Defense is more highly prioritized than education, health

and the environment.9

The operations of the mining companies have increased the gross departmental income of the

regions. According to figures of the Business Research Center of Perucmaras, an organization

dedicated to improving the workings of the Chambers of Commerce in the country, in the period

200513 the central government transferred around US$4b to the regions. These financial trans-

fers, called canon minero, are derived from the income tax paid by the mining corporations.

According to Law 27506 enacted in 2001, 50 percent of the income tax generated by these compa-

nies is relegated to the regions with mining activities.10

The surge in the gross departmental income of the regions does not provide evidence, however,that the quality of life has been improved (Bebbington et al., 2011: 225) or that poverty has been

reduced significantly (Alayza, 2009: 164). In addition, because mining complexes are often shaped



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Lust 11

like enclave economies with relative few links to local suppliers, it can be argued that multiplier

effects in the local and regional economy are weak (Bebbington et al., 2008: 6). Although in the

20019 period the number of persons working in the mining sector grew considerably, as a per-

centage of the total economically active population (EAP), the contribution of the mining sector

was low. While in 2001 it employed 0.5 percent of total EAP, in 2009 it grew to 1 percent (INEI,

2010: 80).

In Table 4 we present data regarding the development of the poverty rates in what are denomi-

nated Peruvian mining departments. We have selected these departments on the basis of the defini-tion used by the former Vice-Minister of Environmental Affairs, Jos De Echave (2008: 344). His

strict classification of a mining region is one in which its mining GDP contributes 4 percent or

more to the national mining GDP. Using this definition, in 2006 the following departments would

be considered mining departments: Ancash, Arequipa, Cajamarca, Ica, Junn, La Libertad, Lima,

Moquega, Pasco, Puno and Tacna.

It is evident that poverty was reduced in the period 200410. However, it cannot be demon-

strated that the mining sector is directly responsible for this development. At best, we might estab-

lish these links indirectly. As a matter of fact, the downward trend of poverty rates shows similarities

with the upward trend of the basic social expenditures and the contribution of the mining sector to

total income tax revenue. The canon minerohas certainly contributed to declining poverty rates inthe mining districts. In addition, the definition of poverty has been and still is subject to political

manipulation. For example, during the second government of Alan Garcia the methodology used

to determine the poverty rates was changed.

Conclusion

The operations of mining capital are crucial for Peruvian economic growth. Tax income derived

from mining activities helps to finance the countrys social and infrastructural necessities. The

importance of the mining sector for the Peruvian Treasury politically translates into immense dif-

ficulties for a government wishing to close any doors to transnational mining capital. This makesit understandable why successive governments are so eager to strike deals with these globally

functioning companies. On the other hand, when we compare the net profits of the principal mining

corporations to the corporate tax payments, it can be understood why this capital is very willing to

Table 4. Peruvian poverty rates according to department: 20042010.

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

ncash 53.3 48.4 42 42.6 38.4 31.5 29Arequipa 34.2 24.9 26.2 23.8 19.5 21 19.6

Cajamarca 66.2 68.8 63.8 64.5 53.4 56 49.1Ica 27.3 23.9 23.8 15.1 17.3 13.7 11.6Junn 49.6 56 49.9 43 38.9 34.3 32.5La Libertad 48.5 43 46.5 37.3 36.7 38.9 32.6Lima 32.2 32.9 25.1 19.4 18.3 15.3 13.5Moquegua 38.7 30.3 27.3 25.8 30.2 19.3 15.7Pasco 65.7 72.9 71.2 63.4 64.3 55.4 43.6Puno 78.3 75.2 76.3 67.2 62.8 60.8 56Tacna 24.7 30.3 19.8 20.4 16.5 17.5 14

Source: National Institute for Statistics and Informatics. Available (consulted 20 April 2013) at: http://www.inei.gob.pe/Sisd/index.asp



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cooperate with Peruvian Governments. Their huge net profits are not in the least comparable to

the taxes they pay.

A radical change in the development model based on the extraction of natural resources within

the capitalist system of production and distribution should be considered to be impossible.

Capitalism is naturally not able to solve its own contradictions and it is very unlikely that the capi-

talist state will put brakes on the laws and logic that govern capitalist development. In addition, it

merits further discussion whether the imperial countries would sit idly by and do nothing if their

interests were to be adversely affected by the restrictions set by the nations on the periphery.

In the particular case of Peru, radical modifications of the development model seem to be espe-

cially complicated as the Peruvian bourgeoisie is absolutely hegemonic in society and its integra-

tion into the international ruling class is overt. In the last two decades, it was not only capable of

implementing a large-scale privatization process, but it was also the major political force behind

the free trade agreements that Peru signed with a variety of countries. Currently, it is the principal

defender of the interests of transnational extractive capital, having succeeded in avoiding any

placements of extra tax on the super profits of the mining corporations. It is encouraging infrastruc-

tural projects that facilitate the activities of extractive capital, considered by Gudynas (2011: 399)

to be state-subsidies just like tax exonerations. In addition, the neoliberal policies that were intro-

duced in the 1990s have dehumanized Peruvian society as human relations tend to be reduced to

mere expressions of consumerism.

Another important factor that makes any radical change in Peru difficult is the weakness of the

major left-wing organizations and political parties. At present, they have surrendered completely to the

project of the Peruvian bourgeoisie; i.e. instead of fighting or arguing against the model or questioning

its foundations, they propose changes within the model and, as such, consider it possible to humanize

the capitalist system. While in the 1990s their space of action was diminished by state repression and

they lost ground due to the popularity of the implemented neoliberal measures, now, amidst ongoing

social protests, it seems they have fallen to ground zero. As a matter of fact, in September 2012 some

major left-wing organizations and progressive intellectuals that were forced out of government in

December 2011 decided to unite in preparation for the regional elections in 2014 and the presidential

elections in 2016. In June 2013, this platform of the reformist left was broadened to incorporate the

political parties of the President of the Cajamarca region and the Mayor of Lima.

The dominance of neoliberal ideology in Peruvian society and the absolute hegemony of the

Peruvian bourgeoisie, together with the complicity of the reformist left in the political arena and

the state, make the implementation of an alternative development strategy limited by restrictions

set by capital almost impossible. Perus dependency on the export of raw materials, principally

extracted by foreign capital, condemns it to designate any structural transformation of the economy

as a project for the indeterminable future.In the current political and economic Peruvian context, the epic struggle of the indigenous com-

munities in Peru against transnational extractive capital assumes an extraordinary importance. Its

capacity to bring the internal contradictions of capitalism into the open forges the kind of class

consciousness needed to bring the Peruvian population onto the side of transformative struggle,

both for substantive change and for the possible supersession or overthrow of capitalism that may

lie ahead. This struggle points to the social transformation of Peruvian society, defined as an irre-

versible change of the production relations, which can be deconstructed in relations of ownership,

functionality and exploitation; who produces what, for whom and how (Carchedi, 1987: 95). This

revolutionary change can make a more efficient, socially conscious and ecologically responsible

use of the means of production possible. And by doing so this historic struggle may enable collec-tive society to change the course of the means of production that Lwy and Gonzlez (2011) argue

are technical carriers of the dynamic of ecological devastation.



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Lust 13

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit

sectors.

Notes

1. Coronel and Panfichi refer for these data to a 2010 document of the Metals Economics Group, titled

World Exploration Trends: A special report from Metals Economics Group for the PDAC International

Convention 2010.

2. Veltmeyer (2013: 82) describes the new extractivism as a reliance on foreign direct investment in the

natural resource sector and the export of natural resources in primary commodity form.

3. See No a la Mina (2011)La minera en Per. el nuevo territorio de Canad?Available (consulted 19

November 2012) at: http://www.noalamina.org/mineria-latinoamerica/mineria-peru/la-mineria-en-peru-

iel-nuevo-territorio-de-canada. It is interesting to note that when in March 2013 Peru was promoting

investments in the mining sector in Canada, it also signed a military cooperation agreement. Likewise,

the Peruvian Minister of Defense had meetings with the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) to

materialize corporation support in matters of defense and security. According to its website, CCC facili-tates trade on behalf of Canadian industry.

4. The profits in US$ are based on the yearly average exchange rate published by the Central Bank of

Peru. Available (consulted 20 April 20 2013) at: http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/cuadros-anuales-

historicos.html

5. In its first year, the Humala Law succeeded in collecting more than US$1b (El Comercio, 2013a)

6. In April 2013, the government announced that it had changed its definition of indigenous communities.

Quechua-speaking communities are no longer considered indigenous. As a consequence of the changed

definition, these communities do not need to be consulted, as is established by the International Labour

Organisations Convention 169, when the government decides to put their land into concession.

7. The budget of the public sector is divided into: national government, regional governments and local

governments. 8. It was not possible to compare the data of the Ministry for Women and Social Development for the period

201012, as this ministry was completely restructured in 2012. This state organism was central in the

development and implementation of Perus social programs. Nowadays, this ministry is called Ministry

for Women and Vulnerable Populations. Programs related to social development are concentrated in

the newly created Ministry of Social Inclusion. Although it could be argued that by adding the budgets

of both ministries we would have recreated the budget of the former Ministry for Women and Social

Development, this is, however, not possible because many functions within the new ministries are not

comparable with those of the former ministry.

9. The presented data are based on statistics provided by the Ministry of Economics and Finance. These can

be found at the following websites (all consulted 23 November 2012). For 2010: http://www.mef.gob.pe/

contenidos/presu_publ/sectr_publ/presu_2010/anexos/Anexo7.pdfFor 2011: http://www.mef.gob.pe/contenidos/presu_publ/sectr_publ/presu_2011/anexos/Anexo7.pdf

For 2012: http://www.mef.gob.pe/contenidos/presu_publ/sectr_publ/presu_2012/Anexos/Anexo4.pdf

10. SeeEl Comercio(2013b) The US$4b are calculated on the basis of the average exchange rate for the

period January-March 2013, published by the Central Bank of Peru. Available (consulted 20 April 2013)

at: http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/cuadros-anuales-historicos.html

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