J. Stalin Works, Vol. 5Volume 5 contains works of J. V. Stalin written in the years 1921-23. The...

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII

1921-23

SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCEOF COMMUNISTS OF THE TYURK PEOPLES OF THE

R.S.F.S.R., January 1, 1921 (Record in the Minutes) 1

OUR DISAGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . 4

I. Two Methods of Approach to the Mass of theWorkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

II. Conscious Democracy and Forced “Democracy” . . 8

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE PARTY IN THENATIONAL QUESTION. Theses for the Tenth Congressof the R.C.P.(B.) Endorsed by the Central Committeeof the Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

I. The Capitalist System and National Oppression . . 16

II. The Soviet System and National Freedom . . . 20

III. The Immediate Tasks of the R.C.P. . . . . . 24

THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.), March8-16, 1921 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

1. Report on the mmediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question, March 10 . . . . . . . . . 33

2. Reply to the Discussion, March 10 . . . . . . . 45

A LETTER TO V. I. LENIN . . . . . . . . . . 50

CONTENTSVIII

CONCERNING THE PRESENTATION OF THE NA-TIONAL QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

GREETINGS TO THE FIRST CONGRESS OF HIGH-LAND WOMEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

THE POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THERUSSIAN COMMUNISTS. Synopsis of a Pamphlet . . 63

I. Definition of Terms and Subject of Investigation 63II. Historic Turns in the Development of Russia . . 68

III. Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF COMMUNISM IN GEOR-GIA AND TRANSCAUCASIA. Report to a General Meet-ing of the Tiflis Organisation of the Communist Party ofGeorgia, July 6, 1921 . . . . . . . . . . . 90

THE PARTY BEFORE AND AFTER TAKING POWER . 103

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE NATIONALPOLICY OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS . . . 115

THE PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

1922

TO PRAVDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF PRAVDA (Reminis-cences) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

1. The Lena Events . . . . . . . . . . . . 1312. The Foundation of Pravda . . . . . . . . . 1323. The Organisational Significance of Pravda . . . . 134

COMRADE LENIN ON VACATION. NOTES . . . . 136

GREETINGS TO PETROGRAD, TO THE SOVIET OFDEPUTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

THE QUESTION OF THE UNION OF THE INDEPEND-ENT NATIONAL REPUBLICS. Interview With aPravda Correspondent . . . . . . . . . . . 141

CONTENTS IX

THE UNION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS. ReportDelivered at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets,December 26, 1922 . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SO-CIALIST REPUBLICS. Report Delivered at the FirstCongress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., December 30, 1922 159

1923

CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE STRATEGYAND TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS . 163

I. Preliminary Concepts . . . . . . . . . . 163

1. Two Aspects of the Working-Class Movement . . . 163

2. The Theory and Programme of Marxism . . . . 165

3. Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

4. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

5. Forms of Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . 171

6. Forms of Organisation . . . . . . . . . . 172

7. The Slogan. The Directive . . . . . . . . 174

II. The Strategic Plan . . . . . . . . . . . 176

1. Historic Turns. Strategic Plans . . . . . . . . 176

2. The First Historic Turn and the Course Towards the

Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution in Russia . . . 177

3. The Second Historic Turn and the Course Towards the

Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Russia . . . . . 179

4. The Third Historic Turn and the Course Towards the Pro-letarian Revolution in Europe . . . . . . . . 181

NATIONAL FACTORS IN PARTY AND STATE AF-FAIRS. Theses for the Twelfth Congress of the Rus-sian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Approved by theCentral Committee of the Party . . . . . . . . 184

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

CONTENTSX

THE TWELFTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.), April17-25, 1923 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

1. The Organisational Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), April 17 . . . . . . . . . 199

2. Reply to the Discussion on the Central Committee’s Organisational Report, April 19 . . . . . . . 227

3. Report on National Factors in Party and State Af- fairs, April 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

4. Reply to the Discussion on the Report on National Factors in Party and State Affairs, April 25 . . . 269

5. Answer on the Amendments to the Resolution, April 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

6. Supplement to the Report of the Commission on the National Question, April 25 . . . . . . . . 284

THE PRESS AS A COLLECTIVE ORGANISER . . . . 286

CONFUSION WORSE CONFOUNDED . . . . . . . 291

FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL COMMIT-TEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) WITH RESPONSIBLEWORKERS OF THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS ANDREGIONS, June 9-12, 1923 . . . . . . . . . 297

1. Draft Platform on the National Question for the Fourth Conference, Endorsed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee . . . . . . . . . 299

The General Line on Party Work on the National Question 299

Questions Connected With the Institution or a Second Cham- ber or the Central Executive Committee or the Union and With the Organisation of the People’s Commissariats or the Union or Republics . . . . . . . . . 301

Measures for Drawing Working People or the Local Popula- tion Into Party and Soviet Affairs . . . . . . . 303

Measures to Raise the Cultural Level or the Local Population 304

Economic Construction in the National Republics and Re- gions From the Standpoint of the Specific National Fea- tures or Their Manner or Life . . . . . . . . 305

CONTENTS XI

Practical Measures for the Organisation of National Military Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

The Organisation or Party Educational Work . . . . . 306

Selection or Party and Soviet officials With a View to Im- plementing the Resolution on the National Question Adopted by the Twelfth Congress . . . . . . . . . . 307

2. Rights and “Lefts” in the National Republics and Regions. Speech on the First Item of the Conference Agenda: “The Sultan-Galiyev Case,” June 10 . . 308

3. Practical Measures for Implementing the Resolution on the National Question Adopted by the Twelfth Party Congress. Report on the Second Item of the Agenda, June 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . 320

4. Reply to the Discussion, June 12 . . . . . . . 334

5. Reply to Speeches, June 12 . . . . . . . . 347

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE QUESTIONOF THE MIDDLE STRATA . . . . . . . . . 349

THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST CON-GRESS OF WORKING WOMEN AND PEASANTWOMEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356

SPEECH AT A CELEBRATION MEETING AT THE MIL- ITARY ACADEMY, November 17, 1923 (Brief News- paper Report) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

THE PARTY’S TASKS. Report Delivered at an EnlargedMeeting of the Krasnaya Presnya District Committee ofthe R.C.P.(B.) With Group Organisers, Members of theDebating Society and of the Bureau of the Party Units,December 2, 1923 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362

Discussion—a Sign of the Party’s Strength. . . . . 362

Causes of the Discussion . . . . . . . . . . 364

Defects in Internal Party Life . . . . . . . . 365

The Causes of the Defects . . . . . . . . . . 368

How Should the Defects in Internal Party Life Be

Removed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

CONTENTSXII

THE DISCUSSION, RAFAIL, THE ARTICLES BYPREOBRAZHENSKY AND SAPRONOV, ANDTROTSKY’S LETTER . . . . . . . . . . . 380

The Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380

Rafail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384

Preobrazhensky’s Article . . . . . . . . . . 387

Sapronov’s Article . . . . . . . . . . . . 390

Trotsky’s Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

A NECESSARY COMMENT (Concerning Rafail) . . . 398

GREETINGS TO THE NEWSPAPER COMMUNIST . . 402

Appendices

Appendix 1. Declaration on the Formation of the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics . . . . . . . . 403

Appendix 2. Treaty on the Formation of the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics . . . . . . . . . . 405

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411

Biographical Chronicle (1921-1923) . . . . . . . . 432

PREFACE

Volume 5 contains works of J. V. Stalin written inthe years 1921-23.

The volume consists chiefly of articles, reports andspeeches on the Party’s tasks in connection with the re-storation of the national economy, on the new forms ofthe alliance of the working class and peasantry underthe conditions of the New Economic Policy, on strength-ening the organisational and ideological unity of theParty, on the forms and methods of contact between theParty and the masses (“Our Disagreements,” “The Imme-diate Tasks of Communism in Georgia and Transcauca-sia,” “The Prospects,” the reports to the Tenth andTwelfth Party Congresses).

The volume includes the synopsis of the pamphletThe Political Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Commu-nists and the articles: “The Party Before and After TakingPower” and “Concerning the Question of the Strategyand Tactics of the Russian Communists ,” in whichJ. V. Stalin develops Lenin’s doctrine on the politicalstrategy and tactics of the Bolshevik Party.

A considerable number of the works in this volumeare devoted to the development of the theory of the

PREFACEXIV

national question, to the Bolshevik Party’s nationalpolicy, to the building of the Soviet multi-national stateand the elaboration of the fundamental principles ofthe first Constitution of the U.S.S.R. (theses for theTenth and Twelfth Party Congresses, the reports to theTenth and Twelfth Party Congresses and to the FourthConference of the Central Committee of the RussianCommunist Party (Bolsheviks) With Responsible Workersof the National Republics and Regions, reports to theTenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets and to the FirstCongress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., and the articles:“Concerning the Presentation of the National Question,”“The October Revolution and the National Policy ofthe Russian Communists,” etc.). In this volume, the following are published for thefirst time: The Political Strategy and Tactics of theRussian Communists (synopsis of a pamphlet); “DraftPlatform on the National Question”; report on “Practi-cal Measures for Implementing the Resolution on theNational Question Adopted by the Twelfth PartyCongress”; Reply to the Discussion and Reply toSpeeches at the Fourth Conference oI the Central Com-mittee of the R.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Workers ofthe National Republics and Regions.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute

of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

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SPEECH

AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE

OF COMMUNISTS OF THE TYURK PEOPLES

OF THE R.S.F.S.R.1

January 1, 1921(Record in the Minutes)

After declaring the conference open and mentioning the un-satisfactory character of the work of the Central Bureau whichwas to be elected anew, Comrade Stalin went on to describebriefly the conditions of the development of communism among theTyurk peoples in the R.S.F.S.R.

The development of communism in Russia has a longhistory, covering several decades, of theoretical workand theoretical struggle within the Russian socialistmovement. As a result of that struggle a compact groupof leading elements was formed, possessing sufficienttheoretical knowledge and firmness of principle to leadthe Party membership.

In the eastern part of our country, however, commu-nism arose only recently, in the course of the practicalrevolutionary struggle for socialism, without the prelim-inary theoret ical s tage of development. Hence, theweakness of Tyurk communism in the field of theory,a weakness that can be eliminated only by the creationof a literature, based on the principles of communism,in the Tyurk languages spoken in our country.

In the history of the development of Russian commu-nism, the struggle against the nationalist deviation

J. V. S T A L I N2

never played an important part. Having been in the pastthe ruling nation, the Russians, including the RussianCommunists, did not suffer national oppression, didnot, generally speaking, have to deal with nationalisttendencies in their midst, except for certain moodsin the direction of “dominant-nation chauvinism,” andtherefore did not have to overcome, or hardly had toovercome, such tendencies.

The Tyurk Communists, on the other hand, sons ofoppressed peoples who have gone through the stage ofnational oppression, always had to deal and still haveto deal with the nationalist deviation, with nationalistsurvivals in their midst, and the immediate task of theTyurk Communists is to overcome these survivals. Thiscircumstance undoubtedly serves to retard the crystalli-sation of communism in the eastern part of our country.

But communism in the East also enjoys an advan-tage. In the practical work of introducing socialism,the Russian Communists had little or no experience ofthe advanced European countries to go by (Europe pro-vided experience chiefly of the parliamentary struggle)and, consequently, they had to lay the road to socialismby their own efforts, so to speak, and inevitably madea number of mistakes.

Tyurk communism, on the other hand, arose in thecourse of the practical struggle for socialism, wagedside by side with the Russian comrades, and the TyurkCommunists were able to utilise the practical experienceof the Russian comrades and avoid mistakes. This cir-cumstance serves as a guarantee that communism in theEast has every chance of developing and gaining strengthat a rapid rate.

SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE 3

All these circumstances determined the relativelymild policy of the Central Committee of the Party to-wards Tyurk communism, which is still very young,a policy directed towards helping the firm communistelements in the East to combat the above-mentionedweaknesses and shortcomings of Tyurk communism.

The Central Bureau is the apparatus through whichmeasures must be carried out to combat nationalist sur-vivals and for the theoretical strengthening of commu-nism in the eastern part of our country.

Pravda, No. 6,January 12, 1921

OUR DISAGREEMENTS

Our disagreements on the trade-union question arenot disagreements in principle about appraisal of thetrade unions. The well-known points of our programmeon the role of the trade unions, and the resolution ofthe Ninth Party Congress on the trade unions,2 whichTrotsky often quotes, remain (and will remain) in force.Nobody disputes that the trade unions and the eco-nomic organisations ought to and will permeate eachother (“coalescence”). Nobody disputes that the presentperiod of the country’s economic revival dictates thenecessity of gradually transforming the as yet nominalindustrial unions into real industrial unions, capableof putting our basic industries on their feet. In short,our disagreements are not disagreements about mattersof principle.

Nor do we disagree about the necessity of labourdiscipline in the trade unions and in the working classgenerally. The talk about a section of our Party “lettingthe reins slip out of its hands,” and leaving the massesto the play of elemental forces, is foolish. The fact thatParty elements play the leading role in the trade unions

OUR DISAGREEMENTS 5

and that the trade unions play the leading role in theworking class remains indisputable.

Still less do we disagree on the question of the qual-ity of the membership of the Central Committees ofthe trade unions, and of the All-Russian Central Coun-cil of Trade Unions. All agree that the membership ofthese institutions is far from ideal, that the ranks of thetrade unions have been depleted by a number of militaryand other mobilisations, that the trade unions mustget back their old officials and also get new ones, thatthey must be provided with technical resources, andso forth.

No, our disagreements are not in this sphere.

I

TWO METHODS OF APPROACH

TO THE MASS OF THE WORKERS

Our disagreements are about questions of the meansby which to strengthen labour discipline in the workingclass, the methods of approach to the mass of the workerswho are being drawn into the work of reviving industry,the ways of transforming the present weak trade unionsinto powerful, genuinely industrial unions, capable ofreviving our industry.

There are two methods: the method of coercion (themilitary method), and the method of persuasion (thetrade-union method). The first method by no meansprecludes elements of persuasion, but these are subor-dinate to the requirements of the coercion method andare auxiliary to the latter. The second method, in turn,

J. V. S T A L I N6

does not preclude elements of coercion, but these aresubordinate to the requirements of the persuasion methodand are auxiliary to the latter. It is just as impermis-sible to confuse these two methods as it is to confuse thearmy with the working class.

A group of Party workers headed by Trotsky, intox-icated by the successes achieved by military methodsin the army, supposes that those methods can, and must,be adopted among the workers, in the trade unions, inorder to achieve similar successes in strengthening theunions and in reviving industry. But this group forgetsthat the army and the working class are two differentspheres, that a method that is suitable for the armymay prove to be unsuitable, harmful, for the workingclass and its trade unions.

The army is not a homogeneous mass; it consists oftwo main social groups, peasants and workers, the formerbeing several times more numerous than the latter. Inurging the necessity of employing chiefly methods ofcoercion in the army, the Eighth Party Congress3 baseditself on the fact that our army consists mainly of peas-ants, that the peasants will not go to fight for social-ism, that they can, and must, be compelled to fightfor socialism by employing methods of coercion. Thisexpla ins the r i se of such pure ly mi l i ta ry methodsas the system of Commissars and Poli t ical Depart-ments, Revolutionary Tribunals, disciplinary measures,appointment and not e lec t ion to a l l pos ts , and soforth.

In contrast to the army, the working class is a homo-geneous social sphere; its economic position disposesit towards socialism, it is easily influenced by commu-

OUR DISAGREEMENTS 7

nist agitation, it voluntarily organises in trade unionsand, as a consequence of all this, constitutes the foun-dation, the salt, of the Soviet state. It is not surprising,therefore, that the practical work of our industrial unionshas been based chiefly on methods of persuasion. Thisexplains the rise of such purely trade-union methods asexplanation, mass propaganda, encouragement of ini-tiative and independent activity among the mass of theworkers, election of officials, and so forth.

The mistake Trotsky makes is that he underratesthe difference between the army and the working class,he puts the trade unions on a par with the military organ-isations, and tries, evidently by inertia, to transfermilitary methods from the army into the trade unions,into the working class. Trotsky writes in one of hisdocuments:

“The bare contrasting of military methods (orders, punish-ment) with trade-union methods (explanation, propaganda, in-dependent activity) is a manifestation of Kautskian-Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary prejudices. . . . The very contrasting oflabour organisations with mili tary organisation in a workers’state is shameful surrender to Kautskyism.”

That is what Trotsky says.Disregarding the irrelevant talk about “Kautskyism,”

“Menshevism,” and so forth, it is evident that Trotskyfails to understand the difference between labour organ-isations and mili tary organisations, that he fails tounderstand that in the period of the termination of the warand the revival of industry it becomes necessary, inevi-table, to contrast military with democratic (trade-union)methods, and that, therefore, to transfer military methodsinto the trade unions is a mistake, is harmful.

J. V. S T A L I N8

Failure to understand that l ies at the bottom ofthe recently published polemical pamphlets of Trotskyon the trade unions.

Failure to understand that is the source of Trotsky’smistakes.

II

CONSCIOUS DEMOCRACY AND FORCED

“DEMOCRACY”

Some think that talk about democracy in the tradeunions is mere declamation, a fashion, called forth bycertain phenomena in internal Party life, that, in time,people will get tired of “chatter” about democracy andeverything will go on in the “old way.” Others believe that democracy in the trade unionsis, essentially, a concession, a forced concession, to theworkers’ demands, that i t is diplomacy rather thanreal, serious business.

Needless to say, both groups of comrades are pro-foundly mistaken. Democracy in the trade unions, i.e.,what is usually called “normal methods of proletariandemocracy in the unions,” is the conscious democracycharacteristic of mass working-class organisations, whichpresupposes consciousness of the necessity and utilityof systematically employing methods of persuasionamong the millions of workers organised in the tradeunions. If that consciousness is absent, democracy be-comes an empty sound.

While war was raging and danger stood at the gates,the appeals to “aid the front” that were issued by ourorganisations met with a ready response from the work-

OUR DISAGREEMENTS 9

ers, for the mortal danger we were in was only too pal-pable, for that danger had assumed a very concrete formevident to everyone in the shape of the armies of Kolchak,Yudenich, Denikin, Pilsudski and Wrangel, which wereadvancing and restoring the power of the landlords andcapitalists. It was not difficult to rouse the masses atthat time. But today, when the war danger has beenovercome and the new, economic danger (economicruin) is far from being so palpable to the masses, thebroad masses cannot be roused merely by appeals. Ofcourse, everybody feels the shortage of bread and tex-tiles; but firstly, people do contrive to obtain both breadand textiles in one way or another and, consequently,the danger of a food and goods famine does not spur themasses to the same extent as the war danger did; secondly,nobody will assert that the masses are as conscious ofthe reality of the economic danger (shortage of locomo-tives and of machines for agriculture, for textile millsand iron and steel plants, shortage of equipment forelectric power stations, and so forth) as they were of thewar danger in the recent past. To rouse the millions ofthe working class for the struggle against economic ruinit is necessary to heighten their initiative, consciousnessand independent activity; it is necessary by means ofconcrete facts to convince them that economic ruin isjust as real and mortal a danger as the war danger wasyesterday; it is necessary to draw millions of workersinto the work of reviving industry through the mediumof trade unions built on democratic lines. Only in thisway is it possible to make the entire working classvitally interested in the struggle which the economicorganisations are waging against economic ruin. If this

J. V. S T A L I N10

is not done, victory on the economic front cannot beachieved.

In short, conscious democracy, the method of pro-letarian democracy in the unions, is the only correctmethod for the industrial unions.

Forced “democracy” has nothing in common withthis democracy.

Reading Trotsky’s pamphlet The Role and Tasksof the Trade Unions , one might think that he, in es-sence, is “also” in favour of the “democratic” method.This has caused some comrades to think that we donot disagree about the methods of work in the tradeunions. But that is absolutely wrong, for Trotsky’s“democracy” is forced, half-hearted and unprincipled,and, as such, merely supplements the military-bureau-cratic method, which is unsuitable for the tradeunions.

Judge for yourselves.At the beginning of November 1920, the Central

Committee adopted, and the Communist group at theFifth All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions carriedthrough, a resolution stating that the “most vigorous andsystematic struggle must be waged against the degenera-tion of centralism and militarised forms of work intobureaucracy, tyranny, officialdom and petty tutelageover the trade unions . . . that also for the Tsektran(the Central Committee of the Transport Workers Union,led by Trotsky) the time for the specific methods of admin-istration for which the Central Political Administra-tion of the Railways was set up, owing to special cir-cumstances, is beginning to pass away,” that, in viewof this, the Communist group at the conference “advises

OUR DISAGREEMENTS 11

the Tsektran to strengthen and develop normal methodsof proletarian democracy in the union,” and instructsthe Tsektran “to take an active part in the general workof the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions andto be represented in it on an equal footing with othertrade-union associations” (see Pravda, No. 255). In spiteof that decision, however, during the whole of November,Trotsky and the Tsektran continued to pursue the old,semi-bureaucratic and semi-military line, continuedto re ly on the Centra l Pol i t ica l Adminis t ra t ion ofthe Railways and the Central Political Administration ofWater Transport, strove to “shake up,” to blow up, theA.R.C.C.T.U. and upheld the privileged position of theTsektran compared with other trade union associations.More than that. In a letter “to the members of the Polit-ical Bureau of the Central Committee,” dated Novem-ber 30, Trotsky, just as “unexpectedly,” stated that “theCentral Political Administration of Water Transport . . .cannot possibly be dissolved within the next two or threemonths.” But what happened? Six days after that letterwas written (on December 7), the same Trotsky, just as“unexpectedly,” voted in the Central Committee for“the immediate abolition of the Central Political Ad-ministration of the Railways and the Central PoliticalAdministration of Water Transport, and the transferof all their staffs and funds to the trade-union organi-sation on the basis of normal democracy.” And he wasone of the eight members of the Central Committee whovoted for this against the seven who considered that theabolition of these institutions was no longer enough,and who demanded, in addition, that the existing com-position of the Tsektran be changed. To save the existing

J. V. S T A L I N12

composition of the Tsektran, Trotsky voted for the abo-lition of the Central Political Administrations in theTsektran.

What had changed during those six days? Perhapsthe railway and water transport workers had matured somuch during those six days that they no longer needed theCentral Political Administration of the Railways andthe Central Political Administration of Water Trans-port? Or, perhaps, an important change in the internalor external political situation had taken place in thatshort period? Of course not. The fact is that the watertransport workers were vigorously demanding that theTsektran should dissolve the Central Political Adminis-trations and that the composition of the Tsektran itselfshould be changed; and Trotsky’s group, fearing defeatand wishing at least to retain the existing compositionof the Tsektran, was compelled to retreat, to make par-tial concessions, which, however, satisfied nobody.

Such are the facts.It scarcely needs proof that this forced, half-hearted,

unprincipled “democracy” has nothing in common withthe “normal methods of proletarian democracy in theunions,” which the Central Committee of the Party hadrecommended already at the beginning of November,and which are so essential for the revival of our indus-trial trade unions.

* *

*

In his reply to the discussion at the meeting of theCommunist group at the Congress of Soviets,4 Trotskyprotested against the introduction of a political ele-


ment into the controversy about the trade unions, onthe ground that politics had nothing to do with the mat-ter. It must be said that in this Trotsky is quite wrong.It scarcely needs proof that in a workers’ and peasants’state, not a single important decision affecting the wholecountry, and especially if it directly concerns the work-ing class, can be carried through without in one way oranother affecting the political condition of the country.And, in general, it is ridiculous and shallow to separatepolitics from economics. For that very reason everysuch decision must be weighed up in advance also fromthe political point of view.

Judge for yourselves.It can be now taken as proved that the methods of

the Tsektran, which is led by Trotsky, have been con-demned by the practical experience of the Tsektran it-self. Trotsky’s aim in directing the Tsektran and in-fluencing the other unions through it was to reanimateand revive the unions, to draw the workers into thetask of reviving industry. But what has he actuallyachieved? A conflict with the majority of the Commu-nists in the trade unions, a conflict between the ma-jority of the trade unions and the Tsektran, a virtualsplit in the Tsektran, the resentment of the rank-and-file workers organised in trade unions against the “Com-missars.” In other words, far from a revival of the unionstaking place, the Tsektran itself is disintegrating. Therecan be no doubt that if the methods of the Tsektran wereintroduced in the other unions, we would get the samepicture of conflict, splits and disintegration. And theresult would be that we would have dissension and asplit in the working class.

J. V. S T A L I N14

Can the political party of the working class ignorethese facts? Can it be asserted that it makes no differenceto the political condition of the country whether wehave a working class solidly united in integral tradeunions, or whether it is split up into different, mutual-ly hostile groups? Can it be said that the political factorought not to play any role in appraising the methodsof approach to the masses, that politics have nothingto do with the matter?

Obviously not.The R.S.F.S.R. and i ts associated republics now

have a population of about 140,000,000. Of this popula-tion, 80 per cent are peasants. To be able to governsuch a country, the Soviet power must enjoy the firmconfidence of the working class, for such a country canbe directed only through the medium of the workingclass and with the forces of the working class. But inorder to retain and strengthen the confidence of themajority of the workers, it is necessary systematicallyto develop the consciousness, independent act ivi tyand initiative of the working class, systematically toeducate it in the spirit of communism by organising itin trade unions and drawing it into the work of buildinga communist economy.

Obviously, it is impossible to do this by coercivemethods and by “shaking up” the unions from above,for such methods split the working class (the Tsektran!)and engender distrust of the Soviet power. Moreover,it is not difficult to understand that, speaking generally,it is inconceivable that either the consciousness of themasses or their confidence in the Soviet power can bedeveloped by coercive methods.


Obviously, only “normal methods of proletariandemocracy in the unions,” only methods of persuasion,can make it possible to unite the working class, to stim-ulate its independent activity and strengthen its con-fidence in the Soviet power, the confidence that is neededso much now in order to rouse the country for the struggleagainst economic ruin.

As you see, politics also speak in favour of methodsof persuasion.

January 5, 1921

Pravda, No. 12,January 19, 1921

Signed: J. Stalin

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE PARTY

IN THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Theses for the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)Endorsed by the Central Committee of the Party5

I

THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM

AND NATIONAL OPPRESSION

1. Modern nations are the product of a definite epoch—the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimina-tion of feudalism and development of capitalism is atthe same time a process of the constitution of peopleinto nations. The British, French, Germans and Italianswere formed into nations at the time of the victoriousdevelopment of capitalism and its triumph over feudaldisunity.

2. Where the formation of nations on the wholecoincided in time with the formation of centralisedstates, the nations naturally assumed state forms, theydeveloped into independent bourgeois national states.That is what happened in Britain (excluding Ireland),in France and Italy. In Eastern Europe, on the contrary,the formation of centralised states, accelerated by theneeds of self-defence (invasion by Turks, Mongols, etc.),took place before feudalism was liquidated; hence, beforethe formation of nations. As a consequence, the na-tions here did not, and could not, develop into national

IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE PARTY IN THE NATIONAL QUESTION 17

states; instead, several mixed, multi-national bourgeoisstates were formed, usually consisting of one strongdominant nation and of several weak, subject nations.Examples: Austria, Hungary, Russia.

3. In national states like France and Italy, which atfirst relied mainly on their own national forces, therewas, generally speaking, no national oppression. In con-trast to that, the multi-national states that are basedon the domination of one nation—more exactly, of theruling class of that nation—over the other nations arethe original home and chief arena of national oppressionand of national movements. The contradictions betweenthe interests of the dominant nation and those of thesubject nations are contradictions which, unless theyare resolved, make the stable existence of a multi-na-tional state impossible. The tragedy of the multi-nationalbourgeois state lies in that it cannot resolve these con-tradictions, that every attempt on its part to “equalise”the nations and to “protect” the national minorities,while preserving private property and class inequality,usually ends in another failure, in a further aggravationof national conflicts.

4. The further growth of capitalism in Europe, theneed for new markets, the quest for raw materials andfuel, and finally, the development of imperialism, theexport of capital and the necessity of securing importantsea and railway routes, led, on the one hand, to the sei-zure of new territories by the old national states and tothe transformation of the lat ter into mult i-national(colonial) states, with their inherent national oppressionand national conflicts (Britain, France, Germany, Italy);on the other hand, among the dominant nations in the

J. V. S T A L I N18

old multi-national states they intensified the strivingnot only to retain the old state frontiers, but to expandthem, to subjugate new (weak) nationalities at the ex-pense of neighbouring states. This widened the nationalquestion and, finally, by the very course of developmentsmerged it with the general question of the colonies;and national oppression was transformed from an intra-state question into an inter-state question, a questionof the struggle (and war) between the “great” impe-rialist powers for the subjugation of weak, unequal na-tionalities.

5. The imperialist war, which laid bare to the rootsthe irreconcilable national contradictions and internalbankruptcy of the bourgeois multi-national states, ex-tremely intensified the national conflicts within the victorcolonial states (Britain, France, Italy), caused the ut-ter disintegration of the vanquished old multi-nationalstates (Austria, Hungary, Russia in 1917), and finally,as the most “radical” bourgeois solution of the nationalquestion, led to the formation of new bourgeois nationalstates (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Finland,Georgia, Armenia, etc.). But the formation of the new in-dependent national states did not, and could not, bringabout the peaceful co-existence of nationalities; it did not,and could not, eliminate either national inequality or na-tional oppression, for the new national states, being basedon private property and class inequality, cannot exist:

a) wi thout oppress ing thei r na t ional minor i t ies(Poland, which oppresses Byelorussians, Jews, Lithua-nians and Ukrainians; Georgia, which oppresses Osse-tians, Abkhazians and Armenians; Yugoslavia, whichoppresses Croatians, Bosnians, etc.);


b) without enlarging their territories at the expenseof their neighbours, which gives rise to conflicts andwars (Poland against Lithuania, the Ukraine and Rus-sia; Yugoslavia against Bulgaria; Georgia against Ar-menia, Turkey, etc.);

c) without submitting to the financial, economicand military domination of the “great” imperialist powers.

6. Thus, the post-war period reveals a sombre pictureof national enmity, inequality, oppression, conflicts,war, and imperialist brutality on the part of the nationsof the civilised countries, both towards one another andtowards the unequal nations. On the one hand, there area few “great” powers, which oppress and exploit all thedependent and “independent” (actually totally depend-ent) national states, and there is a struggle of thesepowers among themselves in order to monopolise theexploitation of the national states. On the other hand,there is a struggle of the dependent and “independent”national states against the unbearable oppression of the“great” powers; there is a struggle of the national statesamong themselves in order to enlarge their nationalterritories; there is a struggle of each national stateagainst the national minorities that it is oppressing.Lastly, there is an intensification of the liberation move-ment in the colonies against the “great” powers and anaggravation of the national conflicts both within thesepowers and also within the national states which, asa rule, contain a number of national minorities.

Such is the “picture of the peace” bequeathed by theimperialist war.

Bourgeois society has proved to be utterly incapableof solving the national question.

J. V. S T A L I N20

II

THE SOVIET SYSTEM

AND NATIONAL FREEDOM

1. Whereas private property and capital inevitablydisunite people, foment national strife and intensifynational oppression, collective property and labour justas inevitably unite people, strike at the root of nationalstrife and abolish national oppression. The existenceof capitalism without national oppression is just as in-conceivable as the existence of socialism without theliberation of the oppressed nations, without nationalfreedom. Chauvinism and national strife are inevitable,unavoidable, so long as the peasantry (and the pettybourgeoisie in general), full of nationalist prejudices,follows the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, national peaceand national freedom can be regarded as ensured if thepeasantry follows the proletariat, i.e., if the proletar-ian dictatorship is ensured. Hence, the victory of theSoviets and the establishment of the proletarian dicta-torship are a fundamental condition for abolishing na-tional oppression, establishing national equality andguaranteeing the rights of national minorities.

2. The experience of the Soviet revolution has fullyconfirmed this thesis. The establishment of the Sovietsystem in Russia and the proclamation of the right ofnations to secede changed completely the relations be-tween the labouring masses of the different nationalitiesin Russia, struck at the root of the old national enmity,removed the ground for national oppression and wonfor the Russian workers the confidence of their brothersof other nationalities not only in Russia, but also in


Europe and Asia, and heightened this confidence intoenthusiasm, into readiness to fight for the common cause.The establishment of Soviet republics in Azerbaijanand Armenia has led to the same results, for i t haseliminated national conflicts and has settled the “age-old” enmity between the Turkish and Armenian, andbetween the Armenian and Azerbaijanian, labouringmasses. The same must be said about the temporaryvictory of the Soviets in Hungary, Bavaria and Latvia.On the other hand, it can be confidently stated that theRussian workers could not have defeated Kolchak andDenikin, and the Azerbaijanian and Armenian Republicscould not have got firmly on their feet, had they noteliminated national enmity and national oppression athome, had they not won the confidence and roused theenthusiasm of the labouring masses of the nationalitiesin the West and in the East. The strengthening of theSoviet republics and the abolition of national oppres-sion are two sides of one and the same process of liberat-ing the working people from imperialist bondage.

3. But the existence of Soviet republics, even of thesmallest dimensions, is a deadly menace to imperialism.The menace lies not only in that by breaking away fromimperialism the Soviet republics were transformed fromcolonies and semi-colonies into really independent states,thereby depriving the imperialists of some extra terri-tory and extra income, but also, and primarily, in thatthe very existence of the Soviet republics, every stepthey take in suppressing the bourgeoisie and in strength-ening the proletarian dictatorship, constitutes tremen-dous agitation against capitalism and imperialism, agi-tation for the liberation of the dependent countries from

J. V. S T A L I N22

imperialist bondage, and is an insuperable element in thedisintegration and disorganisation of capitalism in allits forms. Hence the inevitable struggle of “great” im-perialist powers against the Soviet republics, the en-deavour of the “great” powers to destroy these republics.The history of the fight of the “great” powers againstSoviet Russia, rousing against her one border-countrybourgeois government after another, one group of coun-ter-revolutionary generals after another, closely blockad-ing Soviet Russia and, in general, trying to isolate hereconomically, eloquently testifies that in the presentstate of international relations, in the conditions of capi-talist encirclement, not a single Soviet republic, stand-ing alone, can regard itself as ensured against economicexhaustion and military defeat by world imperialism.

4. Therefore, the isolated existence of individual Soviet republics is unstable and precarious owing totheir existence being threatened by the capitalist states.The common interests of defence of the Soviet republics,in the first place, the task of restoring the productiveforces destroyed by the war, in the second place, and thenecessary assistance the grain-growing Soviet republicsmust render those which do not grow grain, in the thirdplace, all imperatively dictate the necessity of a stateunion of the individual Soviet republics as the onlymeans of salvation from imperialist bondage and na-tional oppression. The national Soviet republics whichhave liberated themselves from “their own” and the“foreign” bourgeoisie can maintain their existence anddefeat the combined forces of imperialism only by unit-ing in a close state union, or they will not defeat themat all.

J. V. S T A L I N 23

5. A federation of Soviet republics based on com-mon military and economic interests is the general formof the state union that will make it possible:

a) to ensure the integrity and economic developmentof each individual republic and of the federation as awhole;

b) to embrace all the diversity as regards manner oflife, culture and economic condition of the various na-tions and nationalities, which are at present at differentstages of development, and to apply corresponding formsof federation;

c) to arrange the peaceful co-existence and fraternalco-operation of the nations and nationalities which, inone way or another, have linked their fate with thatof the federation.

Russia’s experience in employing different forms offederation, ranging from federation based on Sovietautonomy (Kirghizia, Bashkiria, Tataria, the Highlands,Daghestan) to federation based on treaty relations withindependent Soviet republics (the Ukraine, Azerbaijan),and permitting intermediate stages (Turkestan, Bye-lorussia), has fully proved the expediency and flexibil-ity of federation as the general form of state union ofthe Soviet republics.

6. But federation can be stable and the results offederation effective only if it is based on mutual con-fidence and the voluntary consent of the federating coun-tries. If the R.S.F.S.R. is the only country in the worldwhere the experiment in the peaceful co-existence andfraternal co-operation of a number of nations and na-tionalities has been successful, it is because there arehere neither dominant nor subject nations, neither

J. V. S T A L I N24

metropolises nor colonies, neither imperialism nor na-tional oppression; federation here rests on mutual confi-dence and the voluntary striving of the labouring massesof the different nations towards union. This voluntarycharacter of the federation must be preserved withoutfail, for only such a federation can serve as the transi-tional stage to that higher unity of the toilers of allcountries in a single world economic system, the ne-cessity for which is becoming increasingly apparent.

III

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS

OF THE R.C.P.

1. The R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet republics asso-ciated with it have a population of about 140,000,000.Of these non-Great-Russians number about 65,000,000(Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Turkme-nians, Tajiks, Azerbaijanians, Volga Tatars, CrimeanTatars, Bukharans, Khivans, Bashkirs, Armenians, Che-chens, Kabardinians, Ossetians, Cherkesses, Ingushes,Karachais, Balkarians,* Kalmyks, Karelians, Avars,Darghinians, Kasi-kumukhians, Kyurinians, Kumyks,**Mari, Chuvashes, Votyaks, Volga Germans, Buryats,Yakuts, etc.).

The policy of tsarism, the policy of the landlordsand the bourgeoisie towards these peoples, was to kill

* The last seven nationalities are united in the “Highland”group.

** The last five nationalities are united in the “Daghestan-ian” group.


whatever germs of statehood existed among them, tomutilate their culture, to restrict their languages, tokeep them in ignorance, and lastly, as far as possibleto Russify them. The resul t of this pol icy was theunderdevelopment and political backwardness of thesepeoples.

Now that the landlords and the bourgeoisie have beenoverthrown and Soviet power has been proclaimed bythe masses of the people in these countries too, the Party’stask is to help the labouring masses of the non-Great-Russian peoples to catch up with central Russia, whichhas forged ahead, to help them:

a) to develop and strengthen their Soviet statehoodin forms corresponding to the national complexion ofthese peoples;

b) to set up their courts, administration, economicorganisations and organs of power, functioning in thenative languages and staffed with local people familiarwith the manner of life and the mentality of the localpopulation;

c) to develop their press, schools, theatres, recrea-tion clubs, and cultural and educational institutionsgenerally, functioning in the native languages.

2. If from the 65,000,000 non-Great-Russian popula-tion we exclude the Ukraine, Byelorussia, a small partof Azerbaijan, and Armenia, which in some degree havebeen through the period of industrial capitalism,there remains a population of about 25,000,000, mainlyTyurks (Turkestan, the greater part of Azerbaijan, Da-ghestan, the Highlanders, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz, etc.),who have not gone through any capitalist development,have l i t t le or no industrial proletariat , and in most

J. V. S T A L I N26

cases have retained their pastoral economy and patriar-chal-tribal manner of life (Kirghizia, Bashkiria, NorthCaucasus), or who have not gone beyond the primitiveforms of a semi-patriarchal, semi-feudal manner of life(Azerbaijan, the Crimea, etc.) but have already beendrawn into the common channel of Soviet development.

The Party’s task in relation to the labouring massesof these peoples (in addition to the task indicated inPoint 1) is to help them to eliminate the survivals ofpatriarchal-feudal relations and to draw them into thework of building a Soviet economy on the basis of Sovietsof toiling peasants, by creating among these peoplesstrong communist organisations capable of utilisingthe experience of the Russian workers and peasants inSoviet-economic construction and, at the same time,capable of taking into account in their construction workall the specific features of the economic situation, theclass structure, culture and manner of life of each nation-ality concerned, while refraining from mechanicallytransplanting from central Russia economic measuresthat are suitable only for a different, higher stage ofeconomic development.

3. If from the 25,000,000, mainly Tyurk, populationwe exclude Azerbaijan, the greater part of Turkestan, theTatars (Volga and Crimean), Bukhara, Khiva, Daghestan,part of the Highlanders (Kabardinians, Cherkesses andBalkarians) and several other nomad nationalities whohave already become settled and have firmly establishedthemselves in a definite territory, there remain about6,000,000 Kirghiz, Bashkirs, Chechens, Ossetians andIngushes, whose lands had until recently served as ob-jects of colonisation by Russian settlers, who have man-


aged to take from them the best arable land and aresteadily pushing them into the barren desert.

The policy of tsarism, the policy of the landlordsand the bourgeoisie, was to colonise these districts asmuch as possible with kulak elements from among Rus-sian peasants and Cossacks, converting the latter intoa reliable support for dominant-nation strivings. Theresult of this policy was the gradual extinction of thenative population (Kirghiz, Bashkirs) who had beendriven into the wilderness.

The Party’s task in relation to the labouring massesof these nationalities (apart from the tasks mentionedin Points 1 and 2) is to unite their efforts with those ofthe labouring masses of the local Russian population inthe struggle for liberation from the kulaks in general,and from the rapacious Great-Russian kulaks in particular,to help them by every possible means to throw off theyoke of the kulak colonisers and in this way supply themwith arable land necessary for a human existence.

4. In addition to the above-mentioned nations andnationalities which have a definite class structure andoccupy a def ini te terr i tory, there s t i l l exis t in theR.S.F.S.R. floating national groups, national minori-ties, interspersed among compact majorities of othernationalities, and in most cases having neither a defi-nite class structure nor a definite territory (Letts, Esto-nians, Poles, Jews and other national minorities). Thepolicy of tsarism was to obliterate these minorities byevery possible means, even by pogroms (the anti-Jewishpogroms).

Now that national privileges have been abolished,that equality of rights for nations has been put into effect,

J. V. S T A L I N28

and that the right of national minorities to free nationaldevelopment is guaranteed by the very character ofthe Soviet system, the Party’s task in relation to thelabouring masses of these national groups is to help themto make the fullest use of their guaranteed right to freedevelopment.

5. The communist organisations in the border regionsare developing under somewhat peculiar conditionswhich retard the normal growth of the Party in theseregions. On the one hand, the Great-Russian Commu-nists who are working-in the border regions and whogrew up during the existence of a “dominant” nationand did not suffer national oppression, often underratethe importance of specific national features in their Partywork, or completely ignore them; they do not, in theirwork, take into account the specific features of the classstructure, culture, manner of life and past history of thenationality concerned, and thus vulgarise and distortthe Party’s policy on the national question. This leadsto a deviation from communism to a dominant-nationand colonialist outlook, to Great-Russian chauvinism.On the other hand, the Communists from the local nativepopulation who experienced the harsh period of nationaloppression, and who have not yet fully freed themselvesfrom the haunting memories of that period, often exag-gerate the importance of specific national features intheir Party work, leave the class interests of the work-ing people in the shade, or simply confuse the interestsof the working people of the nation concerned with the“national” interests of that nation; they are unable toseparate the former from the latter and base their Partywork on them. That, in its turn, leads to a deviation


from communism towards bourgeois-democratic nation-alism, which sometimes assumes the form of Pan-Is-lamism, Pan-Turkism6 (in the East).

This congress, emphatically condemning both thesedeviations as harmful and dangerous to the cause ofcommunism, considers it necessary to point out thespecial danger and special harmfulness of the first-men-tioned deviation, the deviation towards a dominantnation, colonialist outlook. The congress reminds theParty that unless colonialist and nationalist surviv-als in its ranks are overcome it will be impossible tobuild up in the border regions strong, genuinely com-munist organisations which are linked with the massesand which unite in their ranks the proletarian ele-ments of the local native and Russian populations onthe basis of internationalism. The congress thereforeconsiders that the elimination of nationalist and, prima-rily, of colonialist vacillations in communism is oneof the Party’s most important tasks in the borderregions.

6. As a result of the successes achieved on the warfronts, particularly after the liquidation of Wrangel,in some of the backward border regions where there islit t le or no industrial proletariat, there has been anincreased influx of petty-bourgeois nationalist elementsinto the Party for the sake of a career. Taking into con-sideration the Party’s position as the actual ruling force,these elements usually disguise themselves in communistcolours and often pour into the Party in entire groups,carrying with them a spirit of thinly disguised chauvinismand disintegration, while the generally weak Party organ-isations in the border regions are not always able to

J. V. S T A L I N30

resist the temptation to “expand” the Party by acceptingnew members.

Calling for a resolute struggle against all pseudo-communist elements that attach themselves to the Partyof the proletariat, the congress warns the Party against“expansion” through accepting intellectual, petty-bour-geois nationalist elements. The congress considers thatthe ranks of the Party in the border regions should bereinforced chiefly from the proletarians, the poor, andthe labouring peasants of these regions, and that at thesame time work should be conducted to strengthen theParty organisations in the border regions by improvingthe quality of their membership.

Pravda, No. 29,February 10, 1921

THE TENTH CONGRESS

OF THE R.C.P.(B.)7

March 8-16, 1921

The Tenth Congress of theRussian Communist Party.Verbatim Report,Moscow, 1921.

1. REPORT ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKSOF THE PARTY

IN THE NATIONAL QUESTION

March 10, 1921

Before proceeding to deal with the Party’s concreteimmediate tasks in the national question, it is necessaryto lay down certain premises, without which the nation-al question cannot be solved. These premises concernthe emergence of nations, the origin of national oppres-sion, the forms assumed by national oppression in thecourse of historical development, and then the methodsof solving the national question in the different periodsof development.

There have been three such periods.The first period was that of the elimination of feu-

dalism in the West and of the triumph of capitalism.That was the period in which people were constituted intonations I have in mind countries like Britain (exclud-ing Ireland), France and Italy. In the West—in Brit-ain, France, Italy and, partly, Germany—the periodof the liquidation of feudalism and the constitution ofpeople into nations coincided, on the whole, with theperiod in which centralised states appeared; as a con-sequence of this, in the course of their development, thenations there assumed state forms. And since there wereno other national groups of any considerable size withinthese states, there was no national oppression there.

J. V. S T A L I N

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

34

In Eastern Europe, on the contrary, the process offormation of nations and of the liquidation of feudaldisunity did not coincide in time with the process offormation of centralised states. I have in mind Hungary,Austria and Russia. In those countries capitalism hadnot yet developed; it was, perhaps, only just beginningto develop; but the needs of defence against the invasionof the Turks, Mongols and other Oriental peoples calledfor the immediate formation of centralised states capableof checking the onslaught of the invaders. Since the proc-ess of formation of centralised states in Eastern Europewas more rapid than the process of the constitution ofpeople into nations, mixed states were formed there, con-sisting of several peoples who had not yet formed them-selves into nations, but who were already united in acommon state.

Thus, the first period is characterised by nationsmaking their appearance at the dawn of capitalism;in Western Europe purely national states arose in whichthere was no national oppression, whereas in EasternEurope multi-national states arose headed by one, moredeveloped, nation as the dominant nation, to which theother, less developed, nations were politically and latereconomically subjected. These multi-national states inthe East became the home of that national oppressionwhich gave rise to national conflicts, to national move-ments, to the national question, and to various methodsof solving this question.

The second period in the development of nationaloppression and of methods of combating it coincidedwith the period of the appearance of imperialism in theWest, when, in its quest for markets, raw materials,

THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 35

fuel and cheap labour power, and in its fight for the exportof capital and for securing important railway and searoutes, capitalism burst out of the framework of thenational state and enlarged its territory at the expenseof its neighbours, near and distant. In this second pe-riod the old national states in the West—Britain, Italyand France—ceased to be national states, i.e., owingto having seized new territories, they were transformedinto multi-national, colonial states and thereby becamearenas of the same kind of national and colonial oppres-sion as already existed in Eastern Europe. Characteris-tic of this period in Eastern Europe was the awakeningand strengthening of the subject nations (Czechs, Polesand Ukrainians) which, as a result of the imperialistwar, led to the break-up of the old, bourgeois multi-national states and to the formation of new nationalstates which are held in bondage by the so-called greatpowers.

The third period is the Soviet period, the period ofthe abolition of capitalism and of the elimination ofnational oppression, when the question of dominant andsubject nations, of colonies and metropolises, is rele-gated to the archives of history, when before us, in theterritory of the R.S.F.S.R., nations are arising havingequal rights to development, but which have retaineda certain historically inherited inequality owing to theireconomic, polit ical and cultural backwardness. Theessence of this national inequality consists in the factthat, as a result of historical development, we have in-herited from the past a situation in which one nation,namely, the Great-Russian, is politically and industriallymore developed than the other nations. Hence the actual

J. V. S T A L I N36

inequality, which cannot be abolished in one year, butwhich must be abolished by giving the backward nationsand nationalities economic, political and cultural as-sistance.

Such are the three periods of development of thenational question that have historically passed before us.

The first two periods have one feature in common,namely: in both periods nations suffer oppression andbondage, as a consequence of which the national strugglecontinues and the national question remains unsolved.But there is also a difference between them, namely:in the first period the national question remains withinthe framework of each multi-national state and affectsonly a few, chiefly European, nations; in the secondperiod, however, the national question is transformedfrom an intra-state question into an inter-state question—into a question of war between imperialist states to keepthe unequal nationalities under their domination, tosubject to their influence new nationalities and racesoutside Europe.

Thus, in this period, the national question, whichformerly had been of significance only in cultured coun-tries, loses its isolated character and merges with thegeneral question of the colonies.

The development of the national question into thegeneral colonial question was not a historical accident.It was due, firstly, to the fact that during the imperial-ist war the imperialist groups of belligerent powersthemselves were obliged to appeal to the colonies fromwhich they obtained man-power for their armies. Un-doubtedly, this process, this inevitable appeal of theimperialists to the backward nationalities of the colo-


nies, could not fail to rouse these races and nationali-ties for the struggle for liberation. The second factorthat caused the widening of the national question, itsdevelopment into the general colonial question embrac-ing the whole world, first in the sparks and later in theflames of the liberation movement, was the attemptof the imperialist groups to dismember Turkey and toput an end to her existence as a state. Being more devel-oped as a state than the other Moslem peoples, Turkeycould not resign herself to such a prospect; she raised thebanner of struggle and rallied the peoples of the Eastaround herself against imperialism. The third factor wasthe appearance of Soviet Russia, which achieved a num-ber of successes in the struggle against imperialism andthereby naturally inspired the oppressed peoples of theEast, awakened them, roused them for the struggle, andthus made it possible to create a common front of op-pressed nations stretching from Ireland to India.

Such are all those factors which in the second stageof the development of national oppression not only pre-vented bourgeois society from solving the national ques-tion, not only prevented the establishment of peaceamong the nations, but, on the contrary, fanned thespark of national struggle into the flames of the struggleof the oppressed peoples, the colonies and the semi-colonies against world imperialism.

Obviously, the only regime that is capable of solv-ing the national question, i.e., the regime that is ca-pable of creating the conditions for ensuring the peacefulco-existence and fraternal co-operation of different na-tions and races, is the Soviet regime, the regime of thedictatorship of the proletariat.

J. V. S T A L I N38

It scarcely needs proof that under the rule of capi-tal, with private ownership of the means of productionand the existence of classes, equal rights for nationscannot be guaranteed; that as long as the power of capi-tal exists, as long as the struggle for the possession ofthe means of production goes on, there can be no equalrights for nations, just as there can be no co-operationbetween the labouring masses of the different nations.History tells us that the only way to abolish nationalinequality, the only way to establish a regime of frater-nal co-operation between the labouring masses of theoppressed and non-oppressed nations, is to abolish capi-talism and establish the Soviet system.

Further, history shows that although individual peo-ples succeed in liberating themselves from their own na-tional bourgeoisie and also from the “foreign” bourgeoisie,i.e., although they succeed in establishing the Sovietsystem in their respective countries, they cannot, aslong as imperialism exists, maintain and successfullydefend their separate existence unless they receive theeconomic and military support of neighbouring Sovietrepublics. The example of Hungary provides eloquentproof that unless the Soviet republics form a state union,unless they unite and form a single military and eco-nomic force, they cannot withstand the combined forcesof world imperialism either on the military or on theeconomic front.

A federation of Soviet republics is the needed formof state union, and the living embodiment of this formis the R.S.F.S.R.

Such, comrades, are the premises that I wanted tospeak of here first of all, before proceeding to prove


that our Party must take certain steps in the matter ofsolving the national question within the R.S.F.S.R.

Although, under the Soviet regime in Russia and inthe republics associated with her, there are no longereither dominant or nations without rights, no metrop-olises or colonies, no exploited or exploiters, neverthe-less, the national question still exists in Russia. Theessence of the national question in the R.S.F.S.R. liesin abolishing the actual backwardness (economic, polit-ical and cultural) that some of the nations have inher-ited from the past, to make it possible for the backwardpeoples to catch up with central Russia in political,cultural and economic respects.

Under the old regime, the tsarist government didnot, and could not, make any effort to develop the state-hood of the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkestan and otherborder regions; it opposed the development of the state-hood, as well as of the culture, of the border regions,endeavouring forcibly to assimilate their native pop-ulations.

Further, the old state, the landlords and capitalists,left us a heritage of such downtrodden nationalities asthe Kirghiz, Chechens and Ossetians, whose lands werecolonised by Cossack and kulak elements from Russia.Those nationalities were doomed to incredible sufferingand to extinction.

Further, the position of the Great-Russian nation,which was the dominant nation, has left traces of itsinfluence even upon Russian Communists who are unable,or unwilling to draw closer to the labouring masses ofthe local population, to understand their needs and tohelp them to extricate themselves from backwardness

J. V. S T A L I N40

and lack of culture. I am speaking of those few groupsof Russian Communists who, ignoring in their workthe specific features of the manner of life and culture ofthe border regions, sometimes deviate towards Russiandominant-nation chauvinism.

Further, the position of the non-Russian nationali-ties which have experienced national oppression has notfailed to influence the Communists among the localpopulation who are sometimes unable to distinguishbetween the class interests of the labouring masses oftheir respective nations and so-called “national” inter-ests. I am speaking of the deviation towards local na-tionalism that is sometimes observed in the ranks ofthe non-Russian Communists, and which finds expres-sion in the East in, for example, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism.

Lastly, we must save the Kirghiz, the Bashkirs andcertain mountain races from extinction, we must providethem with the necessary land at the expense of the kulakcolonisers.

Such are the problems and tasks which togetherconstitute the essence of the national question in ourcountry.

Having described these immediate tasks of the Partyin the national question, I would like to pass to the gen-eral task, the task of adapting our communist policy inthe border regions to the specific conditions of economiclife that obtain mainly in the East.

The point is that a number of nationalities, chieflyTyurk—comprising about 25,000,000 people—have notbeen through, d id not manage to go through, theperiod of industrial capitalism, and, therefore, have no


industrial proletariat, or scarcely any; consequently,they will have to skip the stage of industrial capitalismand pass from the primitive forms of economy to thestage of Soviet economy. To be able to perform this verydifficult but by no means impossible operation, it isnecessary to take into account all the specific featuresof the economic condition, and even of the historicalpast, manner of life and culture of these nationalities. Itwould be unthinkable and dangerous to transplant to theterritories of these nationalities the measures that hadforce and significance here, in central Russia. Clearly,in applying the economic policy of the R.S.F.S.R., itis absolutely necessary to take into account all the spe-cific features of the economic condition, the class struc-ture and the historical past confronting us in these borderregions. There is no need for me to dwell on the necessityof putting an end to such incongruities as, for example,the order issued by the People’s Commissariat of Foodthat pigs be included in the food quotas to be obtainedfrom Kirghizia, the Moslem population of which hasnever raised pigs. This example shows how obstinatelysome people refuse to take into account peculiaritiesof the manner of life which strike the eye of every trav-eller.

I have just been handed a note requesting me to an-swer Comrade Chicherin’s articles. Comrades, I thinkthat Chicherin’s articles, which I have read carefully,are nothing more than literary exercises. They containfour mistakes, or misunderstandings.

Firstly, Comrade Chicherin is inclined to deny thecontradictions among the imperialist states; he over-estimates the international unity of the imperialists and

J. V. S T A L I N42

loses sight of, under-estimates, the internal contradic-tions among the imperialist groups and states (France,America, Britain, Japan, etc.), which exist and containthe seeds of war. He has over-estimated the unity of theimperialist upper circles and under-estimated the con-tradictions existing within that “trust.” But these con-tradictions do exist, and the activities of the People’sCommissariat of Foreign Affairs are based on them.

Next, Comrade Chicherin makes a second mistake.He under-estimates the contradictions that exist betweenthe dominant great powers and the recently formednational states (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, etc.),which are in financial and military subjection to thosegreat powers. Comrade Chicherin has completely lostsight of the fact that, although those national states arein subjection to the great powers, or to be more exact,because of this, there are contradictions between thegreat powers and those states, which made themselvesfel t , for example, in the negotiat ions with Poland,Estonia, etc. It is precisely the function of the Peo-ple’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to take all thesecontradictions into account, to base itself on them, tomanoeuvre within the framework of these contradic-tions. Most surprisingly, Comrade Chicherin has under-estimated this factor.

The third mistake of Comrade Chicherin is that hetalks too much about national self-determination, whichhas indeed become an empty slogan conveniently usedby the imperialists. Strangely enough, Comrade Chiche-rin has forgotten that we parted with that slogan twoyears ago. That slogan no longer figures in our pro-gramme. Our programme does not speak of national


self-determination, which is a very vague slogan, butof the right of nations to secede, a slogan which is moreprecise and definite. These are two different things.Strangely enough, Comrade Chicherin fails to take thisfactor into account in his articles and, as a result, allhis objections to the slogan which has become vagueare like firing blank shot, for neither in my theses norin the Party’s programme is there a single word about“self-determination.” The only thing that is mentionedis the right of nations to secede. At the present time,however, when the liberation movement is flaring up inthe colonies, that is for us a revolutionary slogan. Sincethe Soviet states are united voluntarily in a federation,the nations constituting the R.S.F.S.R. voluntarily re-frain from exercising the right to secede. But as regardsthe colonies that are in the clutches of Britain, France,America and Japan, as regards such subject countriesas Arabia, Mesopotamia, Turkey and Hindustan, i.e.,countries which are colonies or semi-colonies, the rightof nations to secede is a revolutionary slogan, and toabandon it would mean playing into the hands of theimperialists.

The fourth misunderstanding is the absence of prac-tical advice in Comrade Chicherin’s articles. It is easy,of course, to write articles, but to justify their title:“In Opposition to Comrade Stalin’s Theses” he shouldhave proposed something serious, he should at leasthave made some practical counter-proposals. But I failedto find in his articles a single practical proposal that wasworth considering.

I am finishing, comrades. We have arrived at thefollowing conclusions. Far from being able to solve the

J. V. S T A L I N44

national question, bourgeois society, on the contrary,in its attempts to “solve” it, has fanned it into becom-ing the colonial quest ion, and has created againstitself a new front that stretches from Ireland to Hin-dustan. The only state that is capable of formulatingand solving the national question is the state that isbased on the collective ownership of the means andinstruments of production—the Soviet state. In the So-viet federative state there are no longer either oppressedor dominant nations, national oppression has been abol-ished; but owing to the actual inequali ty (cultural ,economic and political) inherited from the old bourgeoisorder, inequality between the more cultured and lesscultured nations, the national question assumes a formwhich calls for the working out of measures that willhelp the labouring masses of the backward nations andnationalities to make economic, political and culturalprogress, that will enable them to catch up with cen-tral—proletarian—Russia, which has forged ahead. Fromthis follow the practical proposals which constitute thethird section of the theses on the national questionwhich I have submitted. (Applause.)

2. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

March 10

Comrades, the most characteristic feature of thiscongress as regards the discussion on the national ques-tion is that we have passed from declarations on thenational question, through the administrative redivi-sion of Russia, to the practical presentation of the ques-tion. At the beginning of the October Revolution weconfined ourselves to declaring the right of peoples tosecede. In 1918 and in 1920 we were engaged in the ad-ministrative redivision of Russia on national lines withthe object of bringing the labouring masses of the back-ward peoples closer to the proletariat of Russia. Today,at this congress, we are presenting, on a purely practicalbasis, the question of what policy the Party shouldadopt towards the labouring masses and petty-bour-geois elements in the autonomous regions and independ-ent republics associated with Russia. Therefore, Za-tonsky’s statement that the theses submitted to youare of an abstract character astonished me. I have beforeme his own theses which, for some reason, he did notsubmit to the congress, and in them I have not beenable to find a single practical proposal, literally, notone, except, perhaps, the proposal that the word “East-European” be substituted for “R.S.F.S.R.,” and that

J. V. S T A L I N46

the word “Russian” or “Great-Russian” be substitutedfor “All-Russian.” I have not found any other practicalproposals in these theses.

I pass on to the next question.I must say that I expected more from the delegates

who have spoken. Russia has twenty-two border regions.Some of them have undergone considerable industrialdevelopment and differ little from central Russia in in-dustrial respects; others have not been through the stageof capitalism and differ radically from central Russia;others again are very backward. It is impossible in a setof theses to deal with all this diversity of the borderregions in all its concrete details. One cannot demandthat theses of importance to the Party as a whole shouldbear only a Turkestan, an Azerbaijanian, or a Ukrainiancharacter. Theses must seize on and include the commoncharacteristic features of all the border regions, ab-stracted from the details. There is no other method ofdrawing up theses.

The non-Great-Russian nat ions must be dividedinto several groups, and this has been done in the theses.The non-Russian nations comprise a total of about65,000,000 people. The common characteristic featureof all these non-Russian nations is that they lag behindcentral Russia as regards the development of their state-hood. Our task is to exert al l efforts to help thesenations, to help their proletarians and toilers generallyto develop their Soviet statehood in their nativelanguages. This common feature is mentioned in thetheses, in the part dealing with practical measures.

Next, proceeding further in concretising the spe-cific features of the border regions, we must single out


from the total of nearly 65;000,000 people of non-Rus-sian nationalities some 25,000,000 Tyurks who have notbeen through the capitalist stage. Comrade Mikoyanwas wrong when he said that in some respects Azerbaijanstands higher than the Russian provincial districts. Heis obviously confusing Baku with Azerbaijan. Baku didnot spring from the womb of Azerbaijan; it is a super-structure erected by the efforts of Nobel, Rothschild,Whishaw, and others. As regards Azerbaijan itself, itis a country with the most backward patriarchal-feudalrelations. That is why I place Azerbaijan as a whole inthe group of border regions which have not been throughthe capitalist stage, and in relation to which it is neces-sary to employ specific methods of drawing them intothe channel of Soviet economy. That is stated in thetheses.

Then there is a third group which embraces not morethan 6,000,000 people; these are mainly pastoral races,which still lead a tribal life and have not yet adoptedagriculture. These are chiefly the Kirghiz, the northernpart of Turkestan, Bashkirs, Chechens, Ossetians andIngushes. The first thing to be done in relation to thisgroup of nationalities is to provide them with land. TheKirghiz and Bashkirs here were not given the floor; thedebate was closed. They would have told us more aboutthe sufferings of the Bashkir highlanders, the Kirghizand the Highlanders, who are dying out for want of land.But what Safarov said about this applies only to a groupconsisting of 6,000,000 people. Therefore, it is wrongto apply Safarov’s practical proposals to all the borderregions, for his amendments have no significance what-ever for the rest of the non-Russian nationalities, which

J. V. S T A L I N48

comprise about 60,000,000 people. Therefore, while rais-ing no object ion to the concret isat ion, supplemen-tation and improvement of individual points movedby Safarov relating to certain groups of nationalities,I must say that these amendments should not be uni-versalised. I must next make a comment on one of Safa-rov’s amendments. In one of his amendments there hascrept in the phrase “national-cultural self-determination”:

“Before the October Revolution,” it says there, “the colonialand semi-colonial peoples of the eastern border regions of Russia,as a result of imperialist policy, had no opportunity whatever ofsharing the cultural benefits of capitalist civilisation by meansof their own national-cultural self-determination, education intheir native languages,” etc.

I must say that I cannot accept this amendmentbecause it smacks of Bundism. National-cultural self-determination is a Bundist formula. We parted withnebulous slogans of self-determination long ago andthere is no need to revive them. Moreover, the entirephrase is a most unnatural combination of words.

Further, I have received a note alleging that we Com-munists are artificially cultivating a Byelorussian na-tionality. That is not true, for there exists a Byelorussiannation, which has its own language, different from Russian.Consequently, the culture of the Byelorussian peoplecan be raised only in its native language. We heard simi-lar talk five years ago about the Ukraine, about theUkrainian nation. And only recently it was said thatthe Ukrainian Republic and the Ukrainian nation wereinventions of the Germans. It is obvious, however, thatthere is a Ukrainian nation, and it is the duty of theCommunists to develop its culture. You cannot go against


history. It is obvious that although Russian elementsstill predominate in the Ukrainian towns, in the courseof time these towns will inevitably be Ukrainianised.About forty years ago, Riga had the appearance of a Ger-man city; but since towns grow at the expense of thecountryside, and since the countryside is the guardianof nationality, Riga is now a purely Lettish city. Aboutfifty years ago all Hungarian towns bore a Germancharacter; now they have become Magyarised. The samewill happen in Byelorussia, where non-Byelorussiansstill predominate in the towns.

In conclusion, I propose that the congress elect acommission, containing representatives of the regions,for the purpose of further concretising those practicalproposals in the theses that interest all our border re-gions. (Applause.)

A LETTER TO V. I. LENIN

Comrade Lenin,During the last three days I have had the opportu-

nity to read the symposium: A Plan for the Electrifica-tion of Russia.8 My illness made this possible (it is anill wind that blows nobody any good!). An excellent,well-compiled book. A masterly draft of a really singleand really state economic plan, not in quotation marks.The only Marxist attempt in our time to place the So-viet superstructure of economically backward Russiaon a really practical technical and production basis, theonly possible one under present conditions.

You remember Trotsky’s “plan” (his theses) of lastyear for the “economic revival” of Russia on the basisof the mass application of the labour of unskilled peas-ant-worker masses (the labour army) to the remnantsof pre-war industry. How wretched, how backward, com-pared with the Goelro plan! A medieval handicraftsmanwho imagines he is an Ibsen hero called to “save” Rus-sia by an ancient saga. . . . And of what value are thedozens of “single plans” which to our shame appear fromtime to time in our press—the childish prattle of pre-paratory-school pupils. . . . Or again, the philistine “real-ism” (in fact Manilovism) of Rykov, who continues to

A LETTER TO V. I. LENIN 51

“criticise” the Goelro and is immersed to his ears inroutine. . . .

In my opinion:1) Not a single minute more must be wasted on idle

talk about the plan.2) A p r a c t i c a l start on the work m u s t b e

m a d e immediately.3) To this start must be devoted at least one-third

of our work (two-thirds will be required for “current”needs) in transporting materials and men, restoringenterprises, distributing labour forces, delivering food-stuffs, organising supply bases and supply itself, andso on.

4) Since the staff of the Goelro, for all their excellentqualities, lack a sound practical outlook (a professorialimpotence can be detected in the articles), we mustwithout fail include in the planning commission livepractical men who act on the principle—“Report the ful-filment,” “Fulfil on time,” etc.

5) Pravda, Izvestia, and especially EkonomicheskayaZhizn9 must be instructed to popularise the Plan for theElectrification both as a whole and as regards its con-crete points dealing with individual parts, bearing inmind that there is o n l y o n e “single economic plan”—the Plan for the Electrification, and that all other“plans” are just idle talk, empty and harmful.

Yours,Stalin

Written in March 1921

First published in: Stalin.A Symposium on His Fiftieth Birthday.Moscow-Leningrad, 1929

CONCERNING THE PRESENTATION

OF THE NATIONAL QUESTION

The presentation of the national question as givenby the Communists differs essentially from the presen-tation adopted by the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals10 and by all the various “So-cialist,” “Social-Democratic,” Menshevik, Socialist-Revolutionary and other parties.

It is particularly important to note four principalpoints that are the most characteristic and distinguish-ing features of the new presentation of the national ques-tion, features which draw a line between the old andthe new conceptions of the national question.

The first point is the merging of the national ques-tion, as a part, with the general question of the libera-tion of the colonies, as a whole. In the epoch of the Sec-ond International it was usual to confine the nationalquestion to a narrow circle of questions relating exclu-sively to the “civilised” nations. The Irish, the Czechs,the Poles, the Finns, the Serbs, the Armenians, theJews and some other European nationalities—such wasthe circle of unequal nations in whose fate the SecondInternational took an interest. The tens and hundreds

CONCERNING THE PRESENTATION OF THE NATIONAL QUESTION 53

of millions of people in Asia and Africa who are sufferingfrom national oppression in its crudest and most brutalform did not, as a rule, come within the field of visionof the “socialists.” They did not venture to place whitesand blacks, “uncultured” Negroes and “civilised” Irish,“backward” Indians and “enlightened” Poles on thesame footing. It was tacitly assumed that although itmight be necessary to strive for the liberation of theEuropean unequal nations, it was entirely unbecomingfor “respectable socialists” to speak seriously of theliberation of the colonies, which were “necessary” forthe “preservation” of “civilisation.” These socialists,save the mark, did not even suspect that the abolitionof national oppression in Europe is inconceivable withoutthe liberation of the colonial peoples of Asia and Africafrom imperialist oppression, that the former is organi-cally bound up with the latter. It was the Communistswho first revealed the connection between the nationalquestion and the question of the colonies, who provedit theoretically and made it the basis of their practicalrevolut ionary act ivi t ies . That broke down the wallbetween whites and blacks, between the “cultured”and the “uncultured” slaves of imperialism. This cir-cumstance greatly facilitated the co-ordination of thestruggle of the backward colonies with the struggle ofthe advanced proletariat against the common enemy,imperialism.

The second point is that the vague slogan of the rightof nations to self-determination has been replaced by theclear revolutionary slogan of the right of nations andcolonies to secede, to form independent states. Whenspeaking of the right to self-determination, the leaders

J. V. S T A L I N54

of the Second International did not as a rule even hintat the right to secede—the right to self-determinationwas at best interpreted to mean the right to autonomyin general. Springer and Bauer, the “experts” on thenational question, even went so far as to convert theright to self-determination into the right of the oppressednations of Europe to cultural autonomy, that is, the rightto have their own cultural institutions, while all polit-ical (and economic) power was to remain in the handsof the dominant nation. In other words, the right ofthe unequal nations to self-determination was convert-ed into the privilege of the dominant nations to wieldpolitical power, and the question of secession was exclud-ed. Kautsky, the ideological leader of the Second In-ternational, associated himself in the main with thisessentially imperialist interpretation of self-determina-tion as given by Springer and Bauer. I t is not sur-prising that the imperialists, realising how convenientthis feature of the slogan of self-determination was forthem, proclaimed the slogan their own. As we know,the imperialist war, the aim of which was to enslavepeoples, was fought under the flag of self-determination.Thus the vague slogan of self-determination was con-verted from an instrument for the liberation of nations,for achieving equal rights for nations, into an instru-ment for taming nations, an instrument for keepingnations in subjection to imperialism. The course of eventsin recent years all over the world, the logic of revolu-tion in Europe, and, lastly, the growth of the liberationmovement in the colonies demanded that this, now reac-tionary slogan should be cast aside and replaced byanother slogan, a revolutionary slogan, capable of dispel-


ling the atmosphere of distrust of the labouring massesof the unequal nat ions towards the proletar ians ofthe dominant nations and of clearing the way towardsequal rights for nations and towards the unity of the toilersof these nations. Such a slogan is the one issued by theCommunists proclaiming the right of nations and coloniesto secede.

The merits of this slogan are that it:1) removes all grounds for suspicion that the toil-

ers of one nation entertain predatory designs againstthe toilers of another nation, and therefore creates abasis for mutual confidence and voluntary union;

2) tears the mask from the imperialists, who hypo-critically prate about self-determination but who arestriving to keep the unequal peoples and colonies insubjection, to retain them within the framework of theirimperialist state, and thereby intensifies the strugglefor liberation that these nations and colonies are wagingagainst imperialism.

It scarcely needs proof that the Russian workerswould not have gained the sympathy of their comradesof other nationalities in the West and the East if, havingassumed power, they had not proclaimed the right ofnations to secede, if they had not demonstrated in prac-tice their readiness to give effect to this inalienableright of nations, if they had not renounced their “rights,”let us say, to Finland (1917), if they had not withdrawntheir troops from North Persia (1917), if they had notrenounced all claims to certain parts of Mongolia, China,etc., etc.

I t is equally beyond doubt that i f the policy ofthe imperialists, skilfully concealed under the flag of

J. V. S T A L I N56

self-determination, has nevertheless lately been meetingwith defeat after defeat in the East, it is because, amongother things, it has encountered there a growing libera-tion movement, which has developed on the basis of theagitation conducted in the spirit of the slogan of theright of nations to secede. This is not understood by theheroes of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internation-als, who roundly abuse the Baku “Council of Actionand Propaganda” 11 for some s l ight mis takes i t hascommitted; but it will be understood by everyone whotakes the t rouble to acquaint h imself wi th the ac-tivities of that “Council” during the year it has been inexistence, and with the l iberation movement in theAsiatic and African colonies during the past two orthree years.

The third point is the disclosure of the organic con-nection between the national and colonial question andthe question of the rule of capital, of overthrowing capi-talism, of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In theepoch of the Second International, the national question,narrowed down to the extreme, was usually regardedas an isolated question, unrelated to the coming prole-tarian revolution. It was tacitly assumed that the na-tional question would be settled “naturally,” before theproletarian revolution, by means of a series of reformswithin the framework of capitalism; that the proletarianrevolution could be accomplished without a radicalsettlement of the national question, and that, on thecontrary, the national question could be settled withoutoverthrowing the rule of capital, without, and before,the victory of the proletarian revolution. That essentiallyimperialist view runs like a red thread through the well-


known works of Springer and Bauer on the nationalquestion. But the past decade has exposed the utterfalsity and rottenness of this conception of the nationalquestion. The imperialist war has shown, and the revo-lutionary experience of recent years has again confirmedthat:

1) the national and colonial questions are insepara-ble from the question of emancipation from the ruleof capital;

2) imperialism (the highest form of capitalism) can-not exist without the political and economic enslave-ment of the unequal nations and colonies;

3) the unequal nations and colonies cannot be liber-ated without overthrowing the rule of capital;

4) the victory of the proletariat cannot be lastingwithout the liberation of the unequal nations and colo-nies from the yoke of imperialism.

If Europe and America may be called the front or thearena of the major battles between socialism and impe-rialism, the unequal nations and the colonies, with theirraw materials, fuel, food and vast store of man-power,must be regarded as the rear, the reserve of imperialism.To win a war it is necessary not only to triumph at thefront, but also to revolutionise the enemy’s rear, hisreserves. Hence, the victory of the world proletarianrevolution may be regarded as assured only if the pro-letariat is able to combine its own revolutionary strugglewith the liberation movement of the labouring massesof the unequal nations and the colonies against therule of the imperialists and for the dictatorship of theproletariat. This “trifle” was overlooked by the leadersof the Second and Two-and-a-Half In ternat ionals ,

J. V. S T A L I N58

who divorced the national and colonial question fromthe question of power in the epoch of growing proletarianrevolution in the West.

The fourth point is that a new element has been in-troduced into the national question—the element of theactual (and not merely juridical) equalisation of nations(help and co-operation for the backward nations in rais-ing themselves to the cultural and economic level of themore advanced nations), as one of the conditions necessaryfor securing fraternal co-operation between the labouringmasses of the various nations. In the epoch of the Sec-ond International the matter was usually confined toproclaiming “national equality of rights”; at best, thingswent no further than the demand that such equalityof rights should be put into effect. But national equal-ity of rights, although a very important political gainin itself, runs the risk of remaining a mere phrase inthe absence of adequate resources and opportunities forexercising this very important right. It is beyond doubtthat the labouring masses of the backward peoples arenot in a position to exercise the rights that are accordedthem under “national equality of rights” to the samedegree to which they can be exercised by the labouringmasses of advanced nations. The backwardness (culturaland economic), which some nations have inherited from thepast, and which cannot be abolished in one or two years,makes itself felt. This circumstance is also perceptiblein Russia, where a number of peoples have not gonethrough, and some have not even entered, the phase ofcapitalism and have no proletariat, or hardly any, oftheir own; where, although complete national equalityof rights has already been established, the labouring


masses of these nationalities are not in a position tomake adequate use of the rights they have won, owingto their cultural and economic backwardness. This cir-cumstance will make itself felt still more “on the morrow”of the victory of the proletariat in the West, when nu-merous backward colonies and semi-colonies, standingat most diverse levels of development, will inevitablyappear on the scene. For that very reason the victoriousproletariat of the advanced nations must assist, mustrender assistance, real and prolonged assistance, to thelabouring masses of the backward nations in their cul-tural and economic development, so as to help themto rise to a higher stage of development and to catchup with the more advanced nations. Unless such aidis forthcoming it will be impossible to bring about thepeaceful co-existence and fraternal co-operation of thetoilers of the various nations and nationalities withina single world economic system that are so essential forthe final triumph of socialism.

But from this i t fol lows that we cannot confineourselves merely to “national equality of rights,” thatwe must pass from “national equality of rights” to meas-ures that wil l bring about real equali ty of nations,that we must proceed to work out and put into effectpractical measures in relation to:

1) the study of the economic conditions, manner oflife and culture of the backward nations and nationali-ties;

2) the development of their culture;3) their political education;4) their gradual and painless introduction to the

higher forms of economy;

J. V. S T A L I N60

5) the organisation of economic co-operation be-tween the toilers of the backward and of the advancednations.

Such are the four principal points which distinguishthe new presentation of the national question given bythe Russian Communists.

May 2, 1921

Pravda, No. 98,May 8, 1921

Signed: J. Stalin

GREETING TO THE FIRST CONGRESS

OF HIGHLAND WOMEN12

Convey my fraternal greetings to the First Congressof Working Women of the Highland Republic.13 I deeplyregret that I am unable to be present at the congressowing to ill health. Comrade Highland Women, there has not been asingle important movement for emancipation in the his-tory of mankind in which women have not closely partic-ipated, for every step taken by an oppressed class alongthe road towards emancipation brings with it an im-provement in the position of women. The movement forthe emancipation of the slaves in ancient times, as wellas the movement for the emancipation of the serfs inmodern times, had in its ranks not only men, but alsowomen—fighters and martyrs, who with their bloodsealed their devotion to the cause of the toilers. Lastly,the present movement for the emancipation of the prole-tariat—the profoundest and mightiest of all the emanci-pation movements of mankind—has brought to the forenot only heroines and women martyrs, but also a masssocialist movement of millions of working women, whoare fighting victoriously under the common proletarianbanner.

J. V. S T A L I N62

Compared with this mighty working-women’s move-ment, the liberal movement of the bourgeois womenintellectuals is a child’s game, invented as a pastime.

I am convinced that the Congress of Highland Womenwill conduct its proceedings under the Red Flag.

StalinJune 17, 1921

Bulletin of the First Congressof Eastern Working Women of theHighland Soviet Socialist Republic

Vladikavkaz, 1921

THE POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS

OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS

Synopsis of a Pamphlet

I

DEFINITION OF TERMS

AND SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION

1) The limits of operation of political strategy andtactics, their field of application. If it is granted that theproletarian movement has two sides, objective and sub-jective, then the field of operation of strategy and tacticsis undoubtedly limited to the subjective side of themovement. The o b j e c t i v e side comprises the proc-esses of development which take place outside of andaround the proletariat independently of its will and of thewill of its party, processes which, in the final analysis,determine the development of the whole of society. Thes u b j e c t i v e side comprises the processes which takeplace within the proletariat as the reflection in the con-sciousness of the proletariat of the objective processes,accelerating or retarding the latter, but not determiningthem.

2) The Marxist t h e o r y, which primarily studiesobjective processes in their development and decline,defines the trend of development and points to the classor classes which are inevitably rising to power, or areinevitably falling, which must fall.

J. V. S T A L I N64

3) The Marxist p r o g r a m m e, based on deduc-tions from the theory, defines the aim of the movementof the rising class, in the present case the proletariat,during a certain period in the development of capitalism,or during the whole of the capitalist period (the minimumprogramme and the maximum programme).

4) S t r a t e g y, guided by the programme, andbased on a calculation of the contending forces, internal(national) and international, defines the g e n e r a l r o u t e, the g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n, in which therevolutionary proletarian movement must be guided witha view to achieving the greatest results under the incip-ient and developing relation of forces. In conformitywith this it outlines a plan of the disposition of the forcesof the proletariat and of its allies on the social front(g e n e r a l d i s p o s i t i o n). “Outlining a plan ofthe disposition of forces” must not be confused withthe actual (concrete and practical) operation of dispos-ing, allocating the forces, which is carried out jointlyby tactics and strategy. That does not mean that strategyis limited to defining the route and outlining a plan ofthe disposition of the fighting forces in the proletariancamp; on the contrary, it directs the struggle and intro-duces corrections in current tactics during the wholeperiod of a turn, making skilful use of the available re-serves, and manoeuvring with the object of supportingthe tactics.

5) T a c t i c s, guided by strategy and by the expe-rience of the revolutionary movement at home and inneighbouring countries, taking into account at everygiven moment the state of forces within the proletariatand its allies (higher or lower level of culture, higher

POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS 65

or lower degree of organisation and political conscious-ness, existing traditions, forms of the movement, formsof organisation, main and auxiliary), and also in theenemy’s camp, taking advantage of disharmony or anyconfusion in the enemy’s camp—indicate such definiteways of winning the broad masses to the side of the revo-lutionary proletariat and of placing them in their fight-ing positions on the social front (in fulfilment of theplan for the disposition of forces outlined in the strate-gic plan) as will most surely prepare the success of strat-egy. In conformity with this, they issue or change theParty’s slogans and directives.

6) S t r a t e g y alters at turns, radical changes, inhistory; it embraces the period from one turn (radicalchange) to another. Hence, it directs the movement to-wards the general objective that covers the interests ofthe proletariat during the whole of this period. Its aimis to w i n t h e w a r of classes that is waged duringthe whole of this period and, therefore, it remains un-changed during this period.

T a c t i c s, on the other hand, are determined bythe flows and ebbs on the basis of the given turn, thegiven strategic period, by the relation of the contend-ing forces, by the forms of the struggle (movement), bythe tempo of the movement, by the arena of the struggleat each given moment, in each given district. And sincethese factors change in conformity with the conditionsof place and time during the period from one turn toanother, tactics, which do not cover the whole war, butonly individual battles, that lead to the winning or lossof the war, change (may change) several times in thecourse of the strategic period. A strategic period is longer

J. V. S T A L I N66

than a tactical period. Tactics are subordinate to theinterests of strategy. Speaking generally, tactical suc-cesses prepare for strategic successes. The function oftactics is to lead the masses into the struggle in such away, to issue such slogans, to lead the masses to new po-sitions in such a way, that the struggle should, in sum,result in the winning of the war, i.e., in strategic suc-cess. But cases occur when a tactical success frustrates,or postpones, strategic success. In view of this, it isnecessary, in such cases, to forgo tactical successes.

Example. The agitation against the war that we con-ducted among the workers and soldiers at the beginningof 1917, under Kerensky, undoubtedly resulted in a tac-tical setback, for the masses dragged our speakers offthe platforms, beat them up, and sometimes tore themlimb from limb; instead of the masses being drawn intothe Party, they drew away from it. But in spite of thetactical setback, this agitation brought nearer a big stra-tegic success, for the masses soon realised that we wereright in agitating against the war, and later this has-tened and facilitated their going over to the side ofthe Party.

Or again. The Comintern’s demand for a dissociationfrom the Reformists and Centrists in conformity withthe twenty-one conditions,14 undoubtedly involves acertain tactical setback for it deliberately reduces thenumber of “supporters” of the Comintern and tempora-rily weakens the latter; but it leads to a big strategicgain by ridding the Comintern of unreliable elements,which will undoubtedly strengthen the Comintern, willweld its ranks more closely, i.e., will enhance its powergenerally.


7) Agitation s l o g a n and action slogan. These mustnot be confused. It is dangerous to do so. In the periodfrom April to October 1917, the slogan “All power tothe Soviets” was an agitation slogan; in October it be-came an action slogan—after the Central Committee of theParty, at the beginning of October (October 10), adoptedthe decision on the “seizure of power.” In its action inPetrograd in April, the Bagdatyev group was guilty ofsuch a confusion of slogans.

8) D i r e c t i v e (general) is a direct call for action,at a c e r t a i n t i m e and in a c e r t a i n p l a c e,binding upon the Party. The slogan “All power to theSoviets” was a propaganda slogan at the beginning ofApril (the “theses”15); in June it became an agitationslogan; in October (October 10) it became an action slogan;but at the end of October it became an immediate direc-tive. I am speaking of a general directive for the wholeParty, having in mind that there must also be localdirectives detailing the general directive.

9) V a c i l l a t i o n o f t h e p e t t y b o u r-g e o i s i e especially during intensification of politicalcrises (in Germany during the Reichstag elections, inRussia under Kerensky in April, in June and in August,and again in Russia during the Kronstadt events, 192116);this must be carefully studied, taken advantage of, takeninto account, but to yield to it would be dangerous, fatalto the cause of the proletariat. Agitation slogans mustnot be changed because of such vacillation, but it ispermissible, and sometimes necessary, to change orpostpone a particular directive , and, perhaps, also aslogan (of action). Changing tactics “overnight” meansprecisely changing a directive, or even a n a c t i o n

J. V. S T A L I N68

s l o g a n, but not an agitation slogan. (Cf. the callingoff of the demonstration on June 9, 1917, and similarfacts.)

10) The art of the strategist and tactician lies in skil-fully and opportunely transforming an agitation sloganinto an action slogan, and in moulding, also opportunelyand skilfully, an action slogan into definite, concrete,directives.

II

HISTORIC TURNS

IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA

1) T h e t u r n i n 1 9 0 4-0 5 (the Russo-Japanesewar revealed the utter instability of the autocracy onthe one hand, and the might of the proletarian and peas-ant movement, on the other) and Lenin’s book Two Tac-tics17 as the strategic plan of the Marxists correspondingto this turn. A turn towards the bourgeois-democraticrevolution (this was the essence of the turn). Not a bour-geois-liberal deal with tsarism under the hegemony ofthe Cadets, but a bourgeois-democratic revolution underthe hegemony of the proletariat. (This was the essence of thestrategic plan.) This plan took as its starting point thatthe bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia wouldgive an impetus to the socialist movement in the West,would unleash revolution there and help Russia to passfrom the bourgeois to the socialist revolution (see alsoMinutes of the Third Party Congress, Lenin’s speechesat the congress,18 and also his analysis of the conceptof dictatorship both at the congress and in the pamphletThe Victory of the Cadets19). A calculation of the contend-


ing forces, internal and international, and, in general,an analysis of the economics and politics of the periodof the turn are essential . The February Revolutionmarked the culmination of this period by carrying outat least two-thirds of the strategic plan outlined in TwoTactics.

2) T h e t u r n i n F e b r u a r y - M a r c h1 9 1 7 t o w a r d s t h e S o v i e t r e v o l u t i o n (the imperialist war, which swept away the autocraticregime, revealed the utter bankruptcy of capitalism andshowed that a socialist revolution was absolutely inev-itable as the only way out of the crisis).

Difference between the “glorious” F e b r u a r yRevolution brought about by the people, the bourgeoi-sie and Anglo-French capital (this revolution, since ittransferred power to the Cadets, caused no changes ofany importance in the international situation, for it wasa continuation of the policy of Anglo-French capital),and the October Revolution, which overturned every-thing.

L e n i n’s “T h e s e s”—as the strategic plan corre-sponding to the new turn. Dictatorship of the proletariatas the way out. This plan took as its starting point that“we shall begin the socialist revolution in Russia, over-throw our own bourgeoisie and in this way unleash the rev-olution in the West, and then the Western comrades willhelp us to complete our revolution.” It is essential to ana-lyse the internal and international economics and poli-tics of this turning-point period (the period of “dualpower,” coalition combinations, the Kornilov revolt asa symptom of the death of the Kerensky regime, unrestin Western countries due to discontent with the war).

J. V. S T A L I N70

3) The turn in October 1917 (a turn not only in Rus-sian, but in world history), establishment of the prole-tarian dictatorship in Russia (October-November-Decem-ber 1917, and first half of 1918), a s a b r e a c h o ft h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l f r o n t, a g a i n s tw o r l d i m p e r i a l i s m, w h i c h c a u s e da t u r n t o w a r d s t h e l i q u i d a t i o n o fc a p i t a l i s m a n d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o ft h e s o c i a l i s t o r d e r o n a w o r l d s c a l e,and as opening the era of civil war in place of impe-rialist war (the Decree on Peace, the Decree on Land,the Decree on the Nationali t ies, publicat ion of thesecret treaties, programme of construction, Lenin’sspeeches at the Second Congress of Soviets,20 Lenin’s pam-phlet The Tasks of the Soviet Power,21 economic construc-tion).

M a k e a n a l l - r o u n d a n a l y s i s o ft h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e s t r a t e g ya n d t a c t i c s o f c o m m u n i s m w h e n n o ti n p o w e r, w h e n i n o p p o s i t i o n a n d t h es t r a t e g y a n d t a c t i c s o f c o m m u n i s mw h e n i n p o w e r.

Internat ional s i tuat ion: cont inuat ion of the warbetween the two imperialist cliques as a favourablecondition (after the conclusion of the Brest Peace) forthe exis tence and development of Soviet power inRussia.

4) T h e c o u r s e t o w a r d s m i l i t a r y o p-e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n-i s t s (s u m m e r o f 1 9 1 8 t o e n d o f 1 9 2 0),which began after the brief period of peaceful construc-tion, i.e., after the Brest Peace. This course began after


the Brest Peace, which reflected Soviet Russia’s militaryweakness and emphasised the necessity of creating aRed Army in Russia to serve as the chief bulwark ofthe Soviet revolution. The hostile action of the Czecho-slovaks, the occupation of Murmansk, Archangel, Vladi-vostok and Baku by Entente troops, and the Entente’sdeclaration of war against Soviet Russia—all this defi-nitely marked t h e t u r n f r o m i n c i p i e n tp e a c e f u l c o n s t r u c t i o n t o m i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o n s, t o d e f e n c e o f t h e c e n t r eo f t h e w o r l d r e v o l u t i o n f r o m a t t a c k sb y i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l e n e m i e s.(Lenin’s speeches on the Brest Peace, etc.) Since the socialrevolution was a long time coming and we were left toour own resources, especially after the occupation ofthe above-mentioned districts, which met with no seri-ous protest on the part of the proletarians of the West,we were obliged to conclude the indecent Brest Peace inorder to obtain a respite during which to build our RedArmy and defend the Soviet Republic by our own ef-forts.

“A l l f o r t h e f r o n t, a l l f o r t h e d e-f e n c e o f t h e R e p u b l i c.” Hence, the set-ting up of the Council of Defence, etc. Thiswas the war period, which left its impress upon thewhole of Russia’s internal and external life.

5) T h e c o u r s e t o w a r d s p e a c e f u l c o n-s t r u c t i o n f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g o f 1 9 2 1,after the defeat of Wrangel, peace with a number ofbourgeois states, the treaty with Britain, etc.

The war is over, but as the Western Socialists arenot yet able to help us to restore our economy, we, being

J. V. S T A L I N72

economically encircled by industrially more developedbourgeois states, are compelled to grant concessions, toconclude trade agreements with individual bourgeoisstates and concession agreements with individual capi-talist groups; in this (economic) sphere also we are leftto our own resources, we are obliged to manoeuvre. A l lf o r t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e n a t i o n a le c o n o m y. (See Lenin’s well-known speeches andpamphlets.) The Council of Defence is transformed intothe Council of Labour and Defence.

6) The stages in the Party’s development up to 1917:a) Welding of the main core, especially the “Iskra”

group , and so forth. Fight against Economism. TheCredo.22

b) Formation of Party cadres as the basis of thefuture workers’ party on an all-Russian scale (1895-1903). The Second Party Congress.

c) The expansion of the cadres into a workers’ partyand its reinforcement with new Party workers recruitedin the course of the proletarian movement (1903-04).The Third Party Congress.

d) The fight of the Mensheviks against the Party ca-dres with the object of dissolving the latter among the non-Party masses (the “Labour Congress”) and the fight ofthe Bolsheviks to preserve the Party cadres as the basisof the Party. The London Congress and defeat of theadvocates of a Labour Congress.

e) Liquidators and Party Supporters. Defeat of theLiquidators (1908-10).

f) 1908-16 inclusive. The period of the combinationof illegal and legal forms of activity and the growth of theParty organisations in all spheres of activity.


7) The Communist Party as a sort of Order of Knightsof the Sword within the Soviet state, directing the or-gans of the latter and inspiring their activities.

The importance of the old guard within this powerfulOrder. Reinforcement of the old guard with new forceswho have been steeled during the past three or fouryears.

Was Lenin right in waging an uncompromising strug-gle against the conciliators? Yes, for had he not done so,the Party would have been diluted and would have beennot an organism, but a conglomeration of heterogeneouselements; it would not have been so welded and unitedinternally; it would not have possessed that unexampleddiscipline and unprecedented flexibility without whichit, and the Soviet state which it guides, could not havewithstood world imperialism. “The Party becomes strongby purging itself,” rightly said Lassalle. Quality firstand then quantity. 8) The question whether a proletarian party is neededor not, and of the role of the latter. The Party consti-tutes the officer corps and general staff of the proletariat,who direct the struggle of the latter in all its forms andin all spheres without exception, and combine the di-verse forms of the struggle into one whole. To say that aCommunist Party is not needed is equivalent to sayingthat the proletariat must fight without a general staff,without a leading core, who make a special study ofthe conditions of the struggle and work out the methodsof fighting; it is equivalent to saying that it is betterto fight without a general staff than with one, which isstupid.

J. V. S T A L I N74

III

QUESTIONS

1) T h e r o l e o f t h e a u t o c r a c y b e f o r ea n d a f t e r t h e R u s s o - J a p a n e s e w a r.The Russo-Japanese war exposed the utter rottennessand weakness of the Russian autocracy. The successfulgeneral political strike in October 1905 made this weak-ness absolutely clear (a colossus with feet of clay). Fur-ther, 1905 not only exposed the weakness of the autocracy,the feebleness of the liberal bourgeoisie and the mightof the Russian proletariat, but also refuted the formerlycurrent opinion that the Russian autocracy was the gen-darme of Europe, that it was strong enough to be the gen-darme of Europe. The facts showed that the Russianautocracy was unable to cope even with its own workingclass, without the aid of European capital. The Russianautocracy was, indeed, able to be the gendarme of Europeas long as the working class of Russia was dormant andas long as the Russian peasantry was quiescent, contin-uing to have faith in the Little Father, the tsar; but1905, and above all the shooting on January 9, 1905,roused the Russian proletariat; and the agrarian move-ment in the same year undermined the muzhik’s faithin the tsar. The centre of gravity of European counter-revolution shifted from the Russian landlords to the An-glo-French bankers and imperialists. The German So-cial-Democrats who tried to justify their betrayal ofthe proletariat in 1914 on the plea that the war was aprogressive war against the Russian autocracy as thegendarme of Europe were actually making play with ashadow of the past, and playing dishonestly, of course,


for the real gendarmes of Europe, who had sufficientforces and funds at their command to be gendarmes,were not in Petrograd, but in Berlin, Paris and London. It now became clear to everybody that Europe wasintroducing into Russia not only socialism, but alsocounter-revolution in the shape of loans to the tsar, etc.,whereas, in addition to political émigrés, Russia wasintroducing revolution into Europe. (At all events, in1905 Russia introduced the general strike into Europeas a weapon in the proletarian struggle.)

2) “Ripeness of the fruit .” How is i t possible todetermine when the moment for revolutionary upheavalshas arrived?

When is it possible to say that the “fruit is ripe,”that the period of preparation has ended and that actioncan begin?

—— a) When the revolutionary temper of the massesis brimming over and our action slogans and directiveslag behind the movement of the masses (see Lenin’s“For Going Into the Duma,” the period before October1905), when we restrain the masses with difficulty andnot always successfully, for example, the Putilov work-ers and machine-gunners at the time of the July dem-onstrations in 1917 (see Lenin’s book “Left-Wing” Com-munism . . .23);

—— b) When uncertainty and confusion, decay anddisintegration in the enemy’s camp have reached aclimax; when the number of deserters and renegadesfrom the enemy’s camp grows by leaps and bounds;when the so-called neutral elements, the vast mass of theurban and rural petty bourgeoisie, are beginning defi-nitely to turn away from the enemy (from the autocracy

J. V. S T A L I N76

or the bourgeoisie) and are seeking an alliance with theproletariat; when, as a result of all this, the enemy’sorgans of administration, together with the organs ofsuppression, cease to function, become paralysed anduseless, etc., thus leaving the road open for the proletar-iat to exercise its right to seize power;

—— c) When both these factors (points a and b) coin-cide in time, which, actually, is what usually happens.

Some people think that it is enough to note the ob-jective process of extinction of the class in power in orderto launch the attack. But that is wrong. In addition tothis, the subjective conditions necessary for a successfulattack must have been prepared. It is precisely the taskof strategy and tactics skilfully and opportunely to makethe preparation of the subjective conditions for attacksfit in with the objective processes of the extinction ofthe power of the ruling class.

3) Choice of the moment. Correct choice of the moment,in so far as the moment to strike is really chosen by theParty and not imposed by events, presupposes the exist-ence of two conditions: a) “ripeness of the fruit,” andb) some glaring event, action by the government or somespontaneous outburst of a local character that can serveas a suitable reason, obvious to the broad masses, forstriking the first blow, for beginning the attack. Failureto observe these two conditions may mean that the blowwill not only fail to serve as the starting point for gen-eral attacks of increasing scale and intensity upon theenemy, will not only fail to grow into a thundering,crushing blow (and that is precisely the meaning andpurpose of the proper choice of the moment), but, on thecontrary, may degenerate into a ludicrous putsch, which

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77

the government, and the enemy generally, will welcomeand exploit to raise their prestige, and which may becomea pretext and starting point for wrecking the Party, orin any case, for demoralising it. For example, the pro-posal made by a section of the Central Committee to ar-rest the Democratic Conference,24 but rejected by theCentral Committee because it failed to comply (totallyfailed to comply) with the second requirement (seeabove), was inappropriate from the standpoint of choiceof the moment.

In general, care must be taken that the first blow(choice of the moment) does not turn into a putsch. Toprevent this, it is essential that the two conditions in-dicated above are strictly observed.

4) “Trial of strength.” Sometimes the Party, havingmade preparations for decisive actions and having accu-mulated, as it thinks, sufficient reserves, considers itexpedient to undertake a trial action, to test the enemy’sstrength and to ascertain whether its own forces are readyfor action. Such a trial of strength may be undertakenby the Party deliberately, by its own choice (the demon-stration that it was proposed to hold on June 10, 1917,but was later called off and replaced by the demonstra-tion on June 18), or may be forced upon it by circum-stances, by premature action by the opposing side, or, ingeneral, by some unforeseen event (the Kornilov revoltin August 1917 and the Communist Party’s counter-action which served as a splendid trial of strength). A“trial of strength” must not be regarded merely as a dem-onstration, like a May Day demonstration; therefore,it must not be described merely as a calculation of forces;as regards i ts importance and possible results i t is

POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS

J. V. S T A L I N78

undoubtedly more than an ordinary demonstration, al-though less than an uprising—it is something betweena demonstration and an uprising or a general strike.Under favourable circumstances it may develop into thefirst blow (choice of the moment), into an uprising (ourParty’s action at the end of October); under unfavourablecircumstances it may put the Party in immediate dangerof being wrecked (the demonstration of July 3-4, 1917).It is therefore most expedient to undertake a trial ofstrength when the “fruit is ripe,” when the enemy’scamp is sufficiently demoralised, when the Party hasaccumulated a certain number of reserves; briefly: whenthe Party is ready for an offensive, when the Party isnot daunted by the possibility that circumstances maycause the trial of strength to become the first blow andthen to become a general offensive against the enemy.When undertaking a trial of strength the Party must beready for all contingencies.

5) “Calculation of forces.” Calculation of forces issimply a demonstration which can be undertaken in al-most any situation (for example, a May Day demonstra-tion, with or without a strike). If a calculation of forcesis not undertaken on the eve of an open upheaval, butat a more or less “peaceful” time, it can end at most ina skirmish with the government’s police or troops, with-out involving heavy casualties for the Party or for theenemy. If, however, it is undertaken in the white-hotatmosphere of impending upheavals, it may involve theParty in a premature decisive collision with the enemy,and if the Party is still weak and unready for such col-lisions, the enemy can take advantage of such a “calcu-lation of forces” to crush the proletarian forces (hence


the Party’s repeated appeals in September 1917: “don’tallow yourselves to be provoked”). Therefore, in applyingthe method of a calculation of forces in the atmosphereof an already ripe revolutionary crisis, it is necessary tobe very careful, and it must be borne in mind that ifthe Party is weak, the enemy can convert such a calcu-lation into a weapon with which to defeat the prole-tariat, or at least, to weaken it seriously. And, on theother hand, if the Party is ready for action, and theenemy’s ranks are obviously demoralised, then, hav-ing begun a “calculation of forces,” the opportunitymust not be lost to pass on to a “trial of strength” (as-suming that the conditions for this are favourable—“ripeness of fruit,” etc.) and then to launch the generalassault.

6) Offensive tactics (tactics of wars of liberation,when the proletariat has already taken power).

7) Tactics of orderly retreat. How skilfully to retreatinto the interior in face of obviously superior enemy forcesin order to save if not most of the army, then at least itscadres (see Lenin’s book “Left-Wing” Communism . . .).How we were the last to retreat, for example, during theboycott of the Witte-Dubasov Duma. The differencebetween tactics of retreat and “tactics” of flight (com-pare the Mensheviks).

8) Defence tactics, as a necessary means of preservingcadres and accumulating forces in anticipation of futurebattles. They impose on the Party the duty of taking uppositions on all fields of the struggle without exception,of bringing all kinds of weapon, i.e., all forms of organi-sation, into proper order, not neglecting a single one ofthem, even the seemingly most insignificant, for nobody

J. V. S T A L I N80

can tell in advance which field will be the first arena ofbattle, or which form of the movement, or form of organi-sation, will be the starting point and tangible weaponof the proletariat when the decisive battles open. In otherwords: in the period of defence and accumulation offorces, the Party must make itself fully prepared in antic-ipation of decisive battles. In anticipation of battles. . . .But this does not mean that the Party must wait withfolded arms and become an idle spectator, degeneratingfrom a revolutionary party (if it is in the opposition)into a wait-and-see party—no, in such a period it mustavoid battles, not accept battle, if it has not yet accumu-lated the necessary amount of forces or if the situationis unfavourable for it, but it must not miss a single oppor-tunity, under favourable conditions, of course, to forcea battle upon the enemy when that is to the enemy’sdisadvantage, to keep the enemy in a constant state oftension, step by step to disorganise and demoralise hisforces, step by step to exercise the proletarian forces inbattles affecting the everyday interests of the proletariat,and in this way increase its own forces.

Only if this is done can defence be really active de-fence and the Party preserve all the attributes of a realparty of action and not of a contemplative, wait-and-seeparty; only then will the Party avoid missing, overlook-ing, the moment for decisive action, avoid being takenunawares by events. The case of Kautsky and Co. over-looking the moment for the proletarian revolution inthe West owing to their “wise” contemplative waitingtactics and still “wiser” passivity is a direct warning. Oragain: the case of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolu-tionaries missing the opportunity to take power owing


to their tactics of endless waiting on the questions ofpeace and land should also serve as a warning. On theother hand, it is also obvious that the tactics of activedefence, the tactics of action, must not be abused, forthat would create the danger of the Communist Party’stactics of revolutionary action being converted into tac-tics of “revolutionary” gymnastics, i.e., into tactics thatlead not to the accumulating the forces of the proletariatand to their increased readiness for action, hence, notto the acceleration of the revolution, but to the dissipa-tion of the proletarian forces, to the deterioration oftheir readiness for action, and hence, to retarding thecause of the revolution.

9) The general principles of communist strategy andtactics. There are three such principles:

a) The adoption, as a basis, of the conclusion, arrivedat by Marxist theory and confirmed by revolutionarypractice, that in capital ist countries the proletariatis the only completely revolutionary class, which isinterested in the complete emancipation of mankindfrom capitalism and whose mission it is, therefore, tobe the leader of all the oppressed and exploited massesin the struggle to overthrow capitalism. Consequently,all work must be directed towards the establishment ofthe dictatorship of the proletariat.

b) The adoption, as a basis, of the conclusion, arrivedat by Marxist theory and confirmed by revolutionarypractice, that the strategy and tactics of the CommunistParty of any country can be correct only if they are notconfined to the interests of “their own” country, “theirown” fatherland, “their own” proletariat, but, on thecontrary, if, while taking into account the conditions

J. V. S T A L I N82

and situation in their own country, they make the inter-ests of the international proletariat, the interests ofthe revolution in other countries, the corner-stone, i.e.,if, in essence, in spirit, they are internationalist, if theydo “the utmost possible in one (their own) country forthe development, support and awakening of the revolu-tion in all countries” (see Lenin’s book The ProletarianRevolution and the Renegade Kautsky25). c) The adoption, as a starting point, of the repudia-tion of all doctrinairism (Right and Left) when changingstrategy and tactics, when working out new strategicplans and tactical lines (Kautsky, Axelrod, Bogdanov,Bukharin), repudiation of the contemplative method andthe method of quoting texts and drawing historical paral-lels, artificial plans and lifeless formulas (Axelrod, Ple-khanov); recognition that it is necessary to stand by thepoint of view of Marxism, not to “lie down on it,” thatit is necessary to “change” the world, not “merely tointerpret” it, that it is necessary to lead the proletariatand be the conscious expression of the unconscious proc-ess, and not “contemplate the proletariat’s rear” anddrag at the tail of events (see Lenin’s “Spontaneity andConsciousness”26 and the well-known passage in Marx’sCommunist Manifesto27 to the effect that the Communistsare the most far-sighted and advanced section of theproletariat).

Illustrate each of these principles with facts fromthe revolutionary movement in Russia and in the West,especially the second principle, and the third.

10) Tasks:a) To win the vanguard of the proletariat to the side

of communism (i.e., build up cadres, create a Communist


Party, work out the programme, the principles of tac-tics). Propaganda as the chief form of activity.

b) To win the broad masses of the workers and of thetoilers generally to the side of the vanguard (to bring themasses up to the fighting positions). Chief form of activ-i ty—practical action by the masses as a prelude todecisive battles.

11) Rules:a) Master all forms of organisation of the proletariat

without exception and all forms (fields) of the movement,of the struggle. (Forms of the movement: parliamentaryand extra-parliamentary, legal and illegal.)

b) Learn to adapt oneself to rapid changes from someforms of the movement to others, or to supplement someforms with others; learn to combine legal forms with ille-gal, parliamentary with extra-parliamentary forms (exam-ple: the Bolsheviks’ rapid transition from legal to ille-gal forms in July 1917; combination of the extra-parlia-mentary movement with action in the Duma during theLena events).

12) The Communist Party’s strategy and tactics beforeand after taking power. Four specific features.

a) The most important feature of the situation thatarose in Europe in general, and in Russia in particular,after the October Revolution was the breach of the inter-national social front (as a result of the victory over theRussian bourgeoisie) in the region of Russia carried outby the Russian proletariat (rupture with imperialism,publication of the secret treaties, civil war instead ofimperialist war, the call to the troops to fraternise, thecall to the workers to rise against their governments).That breach marked a turn in world history, for it directly

J. V. S T A L I N84

menaced the entire edifice of international imperial-ism and radically changed the relation of the contendingforces in the West in favour of the working class of Europe.This meant that the Russian proletariat and its Partychanged from a national into an international force, andtheir former task of overthrowing their own nationalbourgeoisie was superseded by the new task of overthrow-ing the international bourgeoisie. Since the internationalbourgeoisie, sensing mortal danger, set itself the imme-diate task of closing the Russian breach and concentratedits unengaged forces (reserves) against Soviet Russia,the latter could not, in her turn, refrain from concentrat-ing all her forces for defence, and was obliged to draw themain blow of the international bourgeoisie upon herself.All this greatly facili tated the struggle the Westernproletarians were waging against their own bourgeoisieand increased tenfold their sympathy with the Russianproletariat as the vanguard fighter of the internationalproletariat.

Thus, the accomplishment of the task of overthrow-ing the bourgeoisie in one country led to the new taskof fighting on an international scale, of fighting on adifferent plane—to a fight waged by the proletarianstate against hostile capitalist states; and the Russianproletariat, which hitherto had been one of the detach-ments of the international proletariat, henceforth becamethe advanced detachment, the vanguard, of the interna-tional proletariat.

Thus, the task of unleashing revolution in the Westin order to make it easier for her, i.e., Russia, to com-plete her revolution, was transformed from a wish intoa purely practical task of the day. This change in rela-


tions (particularly in international relations) broughtabout by October is e n t i r e l y due to October. TheFebruary Revolution did not affect international rela-tions in the least.

b) The second important feature of the situation thatarose in Russia after October was the change in the po-sition both of the proletariat and its Party within Russia.Formerly, before October, the proletariat’s main concernwas to organise all the fighting forces for overthrowingthe bourgeoisie, i.e., its task was chiefly of a critical anddestructive character. Now, after October, when thebourgeoisie is no longer in power, and the state hasbecome proletarian, the old task has dropped out; itsplace has been taken by the new task of organising allthe working people of Russia (the peasants, artisans, hand-icraftsmen, intellectuals, the backward nationalities inthe R.S.F.S.R.) for building the new Soviet Russia, hereconomic and military organisations, on the one hand,and for crushing the resistance of the overthrown, but notyet completely crushed, bourgeoisie, on the other hand.*

c) Corresponding to the change in the proletariat’sposition within Russia, and in conformity with the newtask, a change has taken place in the policy of the proletar-iat in relation to the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois groupsand strata of the population of Russia. Formerly (onthe eve of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie) the prole-tariat refused to enter into individual agreements with

* Correspondingly, some of the old forms of the movementhave dropped out, such as strikes, uprisings, etc., and, correspond-

ingly, the character and forms (functions) of the working-classorganisations (the Party, Soviets, trade unions, co-operatives,cultural and educational institutions) have also changed.

J. V. S T A L I N86

bourgeois groups, for such a policy would have strength-ened the bourgeoisie, which was in power. Now, however,the proletariat is in favour of individual agreements,for they strengthen its power, cause disintegration amongthe bourgeoisie, help the proletariat to tame, to assimi-late, individual groups of the bourgeoisie. The differ-ence between “reformism” and the policy of individualagreements (the former absolutely rejects the method ofrevolutionary action, the latter does not, and when revo-lutionaries do employ it, they base it on the revolutionarymethod; the former is narrower, the latter is wider inscope). (See “reformism” and “agreements policy.”)

d) Corresponding to the colossal growth of the strengthand resources of the proletariat and the CommunistParty, the scope of the Communist Party’s strategic ac-tivities increased. Formerly the strategy of the CommunistParty was limited to the drawing up of the strategicplan, to manoeuvring between the different forms of themovement and of proletarian organisations, and alsobetween the different demands of the movement (slo-gans), advancing some, changing others, employing thescanty reserves in the shape of the contradictions betweenthe different classes. As a rule, the scope and possibilityof employing these reserves were restricted to narrowlimits owing to the weakness of the Party. Now, how-ever, after October, firstly, the reserves have grown (con-tradictions between the social groups in Russia, contra-dictions between classes and nationalities in the sur-rounding states, contradictions between the surroundingstates, the growing socialist revolution in the West, thegrowing revolutionary movement in the East and inthe colonies generally, etc.); secondly, the means and


possibilities of manoeuvring have increased (the old meanshave been supplemented with new ones in the shape, forexample, of diplomatic activity, establishment of moreeffective connections both with the Western socialistmovement and with the Eastern revolutionary movement);thirdly, new and wider possibilities have arisen for employ-ing reserves owing to the increase of the strength and re-sources of the proletariat which, in Russia, has becomethe dominant political force, possessing its own armedforces, and in the international field has become the van-guard of the world revolutionary movement.

13) Special: a) the question of the tempo of the move-ment and its role in determining strategy and tactics;b) the question of reformism, of the policy of agreements,and the relation between them.

14) “R e f o r m i s m” (“compromise”), “p o l i c yo f a g r e e m e n t s” and “i n d i v i d u a l a g r e e-m e n t s” are t h r e e d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s (writeabout each separately). A g r e e m e n t s as concludedby the Mensheviks are unacceptable because they arebased on reformism, i.e., on the repudiation of revolution-ary action, whereas agreements as concluded by the Bol-sheviks are based on the requirements of revolutionaryaction. For that very reason agreements as concluded bythe Mensheviks become converted into a system, into apolicy of agreements, whereas the Bolsheviks are only forindividual, concrete agreements, and do not make theminto a special policy of agreements.

15) Three periods in the development of the Commu-nist Party of Russia:

a) the period of the formation of the vanguard (i.e.,the party) of the proletariat, the period of mustering the

J. V. S T A L I N88

Party’s cadres (in this period the Party was weak; it hada programme and general principles of tactics, but as aparty of mass action it was weak);

b) the period of revolutionary mass struggle under theleadership of the Communist Party. In this period theParty was transformed from an organisation for massagitation into an organisation for mass action; the periodof preparation was superseded by the period of revolu-tionary action;

c) the period after taking power, after the CommunistParty had become the government party.

16) The political s t r e n g t h o f t h e R u s-s i a n p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n lies in thatthe peasant agrarian revolution (overthrow of feudalism)took place here under the leadership of the proletariat(and not of the bourgeoisie), and, as a consequence ofthis, the bourgeois-democratic revolution served as theprologue of the proletarian revolution; in that the con-nection between the labouring elements of the peasantryand the proletariat, and the support the latter renderedthe former, were not only ensured politically, but consol-idated organisationally in the Soviets, and this arousedfor the proletariat the sympathy of the vast majorityof the population (and that is why i t d o e s n o tm a t t e r if the proletariat itself does not constitute themajority in the country).

T h e w e a k n e s s o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a nr e v o l u t i o n s i n E u r o p e (the continent) liesin that there the proletariat lacks t h i s connection withand t h i s support of the countryside; there, the peasantswere emancipated from feudalism under the leadershipof the bourgeoisie and not of the proletariat, which


was weak at the time), and this, combined with the indif-ference Social-Democracy displayed towards the interestsof the countryside, for a long time ensured the bourgeoi-sie the sympathy of the majority of the peasants.*

July, 1921

Published for the first time

* This synopsis was used by the author for his pamphletThe Foundations of Leninism, published in 1924, and included inVolume 6 of J. V. Stalin’s Works. Part I of the synopsis was usedfor the article “Concerning the Question of the Strategy and Tac-tics of the Russian Communists,” published in 1923, and includedin the present volume. Some of the theses of the synopsis wereused by the author for the article “The Party Before and AfterTaking Power,” published in August 1921, and also included inthe present volume.—Ed.

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF COMMUNISM

IN GEORGIA AND TRANSCAUCASIA

Report to a General Meeting of the TiflisOrganisation of the Communist Party of Georgia28

July 6, 1921

Comrades, the committee of your organisation hasinstructed me to deliver a report to you on the immediatetasks of communism in Georgia.

The immediate tasks of communism are questions oftactics. But to be able to determine a party’s tactics,particularly the tactics of a government party, i t isfirst of all necessary to weigh up the general situationin which the party finds itself, which it must not ignore.What, then, is this situation?

It scarcely needs proof that with the outbreak of theCivil War the world split up into two opposite camps,the imperialist camp headed by the Entente, and the so-cialist camp headed by Soviet Russia; that in the firstcamp are all kinds of capitalist, “democratic” and Men-shevik states, and in the second are the Soviet states,including Georgia. The principal feature of the situationin which the Soviet countries find themselves today isthat the period of armed struggle between the two above-mentioned camps ended with a more or less prolongedarmistice between them; that the period of war has beensuperseded by a period of peaceful economic construc-tion of the Soviet republics. Before, in the war period,so to speak, the Soviet republics operated under the general

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF COMMUNISM 91

slogan “All for the war,” for the Soviet republics werea beleaguered camp, blockaded by the imperialist states.In that period, the Communist Party devoted all i tsenergy to throwing all active forces into the work ofbuilding the Red Army, into strengthening the front ofthe armed struggle against imperialism. Needless tosay, in that period the Party was unable to concentrateits attention on economic construction. It may be saidwithout exaggeration that in that period the economicsof the Soviet countries were confined to the developmentof war industry and to the maintenance, as best theycould, of certain branches of the national economy, alsoconnected with the war. This, indeed, explains the eco-nomic ruin that we inherited from the war period of theSoviet states.

Now that we have entered the new period of economicconstruction, now that we have passed from war topeaceful labour, the old slogan “All for the war” is nat-urally replaced by a new slogan “All for the nationaleconomy.” This new period imposes on the Communiststhe duty of throwing all forces on to the economic front,into industry, agriculture, food supply, the co-opera-tives, transport, etc. For if we fail to do this we shall beunable to overcome economic ruin.

Whereas the war period produced Communists of themilitary type—supply officers, mobilisation officers, op-erations officers, and so forth, in the new period, the pe-riod of economic construction, the Communist Partymust, in drawing the broad masses into the task of eco-nomic revival, train a new type of Communist, a commu-nist business-manager—managers of industry, agricul-ture, transport, the co-operatives, and so forth.

J. V. S T A L I N92

But, while developing the work of economic construc-tion, Communists must not ignore two very importantcircumstances that we have inherited from the past.These circumstances are: firstly, the existence of highlyindustrialised bourgeois states surrounding the Sovietcountries; secondly, the existence of a numerous peas-ant petty bourgeoisie within the Soviet states.

The point is that by the will of history the Sovietpower has triumphed, not in the more highly developedcountries, but in those relatively less developed in acapitalist respect. History has shown that it is mucheasier to overthrow the bourgeoisie in countries likeRussia, where capitalism is relatively young, where theproletariat is strong and concentrated and the nation-al bourgeoisie is weak, than in the classical countriesof capitalism like Germany, Britain and France, wherecapitalism has existed for several centuries, and wherethe bourgeoisie has succeeded in becoming a powerfulforce that controls the whole of social life.

When the proletarian dictatorship is established incountries like Germany and Britain, it will, no doubt,be easier there to develop and complete the socialistrevolution, i.e., it will be easier to organise socialisteconomy there, for industry is more developed there,it is more highly equipped technically, and the prole-tariat is relatively more numerous than in the presentSoviet countries. For the time being, however, we arefaced with the fact that, on the one hand, the proletar-ian dictatorship has been established in countries thatare less developed industrially and have a numerousclass of small commodity producers (peasants) and, onthe other hand, that the bourgeois dictatorship exists


in the countries that are more highly developed industri-ally and have a numerous proletariat. It would be un-wise, thoughtless, to ignore this fact.

Since the Soviet countries have abundant sourcesof raw materials and fuel, while the industrially devel-oped bourgeois countries are suffering from a shortageof these, individual capitalist groups in bourgeois statesare undoubtedly interested in concluding agreementswith the Soviet states with a view to exploiting thesesources of raw materials and fuel on definite terms.On the other hand, since the small producer class in theSoviet states (the peasantry) needs manufactured goods(textiles, agricultural machines), it is also undoubtedlyinterested in concluding an agreement with its proletar-ian government with a view to receiving such goodson a barter basis (in exchange for agricultural produce).

The Soviet Government, in its turn, is also interestedin concluding temporary agreements both with indi-vidual capitalist groups in foreign countries, and withthe class of small commodity producers in its own country,for such agreements will undoubtedly accelerate and facil-itate the restoration of the productive forces that weredestroyed by the war, and the development of elec-trification, the technical-industrial basis of the futuresocialist economy.

These circumstances dictate to the Communists ofthe Soviet states a policy of concluding temporary agree-ments both with individual capitalist groups in theWest (with a view to exploiting their capital and techni-cal forces), and with the petty bourgeoisie at home (witha view to obtaining the necessary raw materials andfood products).

J. V. S T A L I N94

Some people may say that these tactics of concludingagreements with the bourgeoisie smack of Menshevism,for the Mensheviks in their activities employ the tacticsof agreements with the bourgeoisie. But that is not cor-rect. There is a wide gulf between the tactics of concludingagreements with individual bourgeois groups, now pro-posed by the Communists, and the Menshevik tacticsof concluding agreements with the bourgeoisie. The Men-sheviks usually propose the conclusion of agreementswith the bourgeoisie when the capitalists are in power,when, in order to strengthen their power and to corruptthe proletariat, the capitalists in power are not aversefrom handing down from above some “reforms,” smallconcessions to individual groups of the proletariat. Suchagreements are harmful to the proletariat and profitableto the bourgeoisie, for they do not weaken but strengthenthe power of the bourgeoisie, cause dissension among theproletariat and split its ranks. That is precisely why theBolsheviks always opposed, and always will oppose, theMenshevik tactics of concluding agreements with thebourgeoisie when the latter is in power. That is preciselywhy the Bolsheviks regard the Mensheviks as vehicles ofbourgeois influence on the proletariat.

In contrast to the Menshevik tactics, however, thetactics of concluding agreements proposed by the Bolshe-viks are of an altogether different character, for theypresuppose an entirely different situation, one in whichthe proletariat and not the bourgeoisie is in power;and the inevitable result of the conclusion of agreementsbetween individual bourgeois groups and the proletariangovernment must be the strengthening of proletarianpower, on the one hand, and the disintegration of the


bourgeoisie, the taming of some of its groups, on theother. It is only necessary that the proletariat shouldkeep a tight hold on the power it has won and makeskilful use of the resources and knowledge of these bour-geois groups for the economic revival of the country.

You see that these tactics and the Menshevik tacticsare as far apart as heaven and earth.

Thus, to throw all active forces on to the economicfront and, by means of agreements with individual bour-geois groups, to make use of the latter’s resources, knowl-edge and organising skill in the interests of the economicrevival of the country—such is the first immediate taskdictated by the general situation to the Communistsin Soviet countries, including the Communists in Georgia.

It is not, however, sufficient to weigh up the generalsituation in order to be able to determine the tacticsof individual Soviet countries, in this case, the tactics ofSoviet Georgia. To be able to determine the tacticsthe Communists in each Soviet country must pursue,it is also necessary to take into account the particular,concrete conditions of existence of each country. Whatare the particular, concrete conditions of existence ofSoviet Georgia, in which the Communist Party of Geor-gia has to operate?

A number of facts that characterise these conditionscan be established beyond doubt.

First, it is beyond doubt that in view of the utterhostility of the capitalist states towards the Soviet coun-tries, the totally isolated existence of Soviet Georgia,or of any other Soviet country, is inconceivable bothfrom the military and from the economic point of view.The mutual economic and military support of the Soviet

J. V. S T A L I N96

states is a condition without which the developmentof these states is inconceivable.

Secondly, it is obvious that Georgia, which is suf-fering from a shortage of food products, needs Russiangrain and cannot do without it.

Thirdly, Georgia, having no liquid fuel, obviouslyneeds the oil products of Azerbaijan, and cannot dowithout them, in order to maintain her transport and in-dustry.

Fourthly, it is also beyond doubt that, suffering froma shortage of goods for export, Georgia needs assist-ance from Russia in the form of gold for coveringthe deficit in the balance of trade.

Lastly, i t is impossible to ignore the distinctiveconditions created by the national composition of thepopulation of Georgia: a large percentage of this popula-tion consists of Armenians, and in Tiflis, the capital ofGeorgia, they constitute as much as half the population.This, undoubtedly, under any form of government andin particular under the Soviet regime, makes it the dutyof Georgia to maintain absolute peace and fraternal co-operation both with the Armenians in Georgia and withArmenia.

It scarcely needs proof that these, and many otherconcrete conditions of a similar kind, impose on SovietGeorgia, as well as upon Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan,the duty of in some way uniting their economic activi-ties, of uniting their economic efforts, in order, say, toimprove transport, for joint action in foreign markets,organisation of land reclamation schemes (irrigation,drainage), etc. I shall not dwell on the necessity ofmutual support and contact between the Transcaucasian


independent Soviet republics, and between them and So-viet Russia, in the event of our having to defend our-selves against attacks from outside. All this is obviousand indisputable. And if I mention these commonplacetruths it is only because certain circumstances havearisen during the past two or three years which hindersuch union, which threaten to frustrate attempts at suchunion. I am referring to nationalism—Georgian, Arme-nian and Azerbaijanian—which has shockingly increasedin the Transcaucasian republics during the past fewyears and is an obstacle to joint effort.

I remember the years 1905-17, when complete frater-nal solidarity was to be observed among the workersand among the labouring population of the Transcau-casian nationalities in general, when fraternal ties boundthe Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijanian and Russianworkers into one socialist family. Now, upon my arrivalin Tiflis, I have been astounded by the absence of theformer solidarity between the workers of the nationalitiesof Transcaucasia. Nationalism has developed among theworkers and peasants, a feeling of distrust of their com-rades of other nationalities has grown strong: anti-Ar-menian, anti-Tatar, anti-Georgian, anti-Russian and ev-ery other sort of nationalism is now rife. The old ties offraternal confidence are severed, or at least greatly weak-ened. Evidently, the three years of existence of nationalistgovernments in Georgia (Mensheviks), in Azerbaijan (Mus-savatists29) and in Armenia (Dashnaks30) have left theirmark. By pursuing their nationalist policy, by workingamong the toilers in a spirit of aggressive nationalism,these nationalist governments finally brought mattersto the point where each of these small countries found

J. V. S T A L I N98

itself surrounded by a hostile nationalist atmosphere,which deprived Georgia and Armenia of Russian grain andAzerbaijanian oil, and Azerbaijan and Russia of goodspassing through Batum—not to speak of armed clashes(Georgian-Armenian war) and massacres (Armenian-Ta-tar), as the natural results of the nationalist policy. Nowonder that in this poisonous nationalist atmospherethe old international ties have been severed and theminds of the workers poisoned by nationalism. And sincethe survivals of this nationalism have not yet been elim-inated among the workers, this circumstance (national-ism) is the greatest obstacle to uniting the economic(and military) efforts of the Transcaucasian Soviet Re-publics. Well, I have said already that without suchunion, the economic progress of the TranscaucasianSoviet Republics, and especially of Soviet Georgia, isinconceivable. Hence the immediate task of the Commu-nists of Georgia is to wage a ruthless struggle againstnationalism, to restore the old fraternal internationalbonds that existed before the nationalist Menshevik gov-ernment came on the scene, and thus to create thathealthy atmosphere of mutual confidence which is nec-essary for uniting the economic efforts of the Transcau-casian Soviet Republics and for the economic revivalof Georgia.

This does not mean, of course, that there ought nolonger to be an independent Georgia, or an independentAzerbaijan, and so forth. In my opinion, the draft schemethat is circulating among some comrades for restoringthe old gubernias (Tiflis, Baku, Erivan), to be headedby a single Transcaucasian government, is a utopia, anda reactionary utopia at that; for this scheme is undoubt-


edly prompted by the desire to turn back the wheel ofhistory. To restore the old gubernias and to dissolvethe national governments in Georgia, Azerbaijan andArmenia would be tantamount to restoring landlordismand liquidating the gains of the revolution. This hasnothing in common with communism. It is precisely inorder to dispel the atmosphere of mutual distrust, andto restore the bonds of fraternity between the workersof the nationalities of Transcaucasia and Russia, thatthe independence both of Georgia and of Azerbaijan andArmenia must be preserved. This does not preclude, but,on the contrary, presupposes the necessity of mutualeconomic and other support, and also the necessity ofuniting the economic efforts of the independent Sovietrepublics on the basis of voluntary agreement, on thebasis of a convention.

According to information I have received, it wasrecently decided in Moscow to render Georgia, Armeniaand Azerbaijan some small assistance in the shape ofa loan of 6,500,000 rubles in gold. Furthermore, I havelearned that Georgia and Armenia are receiving oil prod-ucts from Azerbaijan free of charge, something that isinconceivable in the life of bourgeois states, even suchas are united by the notorious “Entente Cordiale.”31

It scarcely needs proof that these and similar acts donot weaken, but strengthen the independence of thesestates.

Thus, to eliminate nationalist survivals, to cauter-ise them with red-hot irons, and to create a healthy at-mosphere of mutual confidence among the toilers ofthe Transcaucasian nationalities in order to facilitateand hasten the uniting of the economic efforts of the

J. V. S T A L I N100

Transcaucasian Soviet Republics (without which the eco-nomic revival of Soviet Georgia is inconceivable), whilepreserving the independence of Soviet Georgia—such isthe second immediate task dictated to the Communistsof Georgia by the concrete conditions of existence ofthat country.

Lastly, the third immediate task, equally impor-tant and equally necessary, is to preserve the purity,staunchness and flexibility of the Communist Party ofGeorgia.

Comrades, you must remember that our Party is thegovernment party, that often whole groups of unreliablecareerist elements, alien to the proletarian spirit, getinto or try to get into, the Party and carry into it thespirit of disintegration and conservatism. It is the vitaltask of the Communists to guard the Party against suchelements. We must remember once and for all that thestrength and weight of a party, and especially of theCommunist Party, do not depend so much on the quanti-ty of members as on their quality, on their staunchnessand devotion to the cause of the proletariat. The RussianCommunist Party has all-in-all 700,000 members. I canassure you, comrades, that it could raise its membershipto 7,000,000 if it wished to do so, and if it did not knowthat 700,000 staunch Communists constitute a muchstronger force than 7,000,000 unwanted and good-for-nothing fellow-travellers. If Russia has withstood theonslaught of world imperialism, if she has achieved anumber of most important successes on the externalfronts, and if in the course of two or three years she hasdeveloped into a force that is shaking the foundations ofworld imperialism, this is due, among other things, to the


existence of the united Communist Party, forged outof hard steel and tempered in battle, which has nevergone out for quantity of members, but which has madeits first concern the improvement of their quality. Las-salle was right when he said that the party becomes strongby purging itself of dross. On the other hand, there canbe no doubt that the reason why the German Social-Democratic Party, for example, the biggest Social-Demo-cratic Party in the world, proved to be a plaything inthe hands of imperialism during the imperialist war andcollapsed like a colossus with feet of clay after the warwas that for years it had devoted itself to enlarging itsorganisations by admitting all sorts of petty-bourgeoistrash, which killed its living spirit.

Thus, to preserve the staunchness and purity of itsranks, not to go out for quantity of Party members,systematically to improve the quality of the Party mem-bership, to guard itself against an influx of intellec-tual, petty-bourgeois nationalist elements—such is thethird and last immediate task of the Communist Partyof Georgia.

I am finishing my report, comrades. I pass now tothe conclusions:

1) Develop all-round economic construction work,concentrating all your forces on this work and utilisingin it the forces and resources both of capitalist groupsin the West and of petty-bourgeois groups at home.

2) Crush the hydra of nationalism and create a healthyatmosphere of in ternat ional i sm in order to fac i l i -tate the union of the economic efforts of the Trans-caucasian Soviet Republics, while preserving their inde-pendence.


3) Guard the Party against an influx of petty-bour-geois elements and preserve its staunchness and flex-ibi l i ty, systematical ly improving the qual i ty of i tsmembership.

Such are the three principal immediate tasks ofthe Communist Party of Georgia.

Only by carrying out these tasks will the CommunistParty of Georgia be able to keep a tight hold on the

helm and defeat economic ruin. (Applause.)

Pravda Gruzii (Tiflis), No. 108,July 13, 1921

THE PARTY BEFORE AND AFTER

TAKING POWER

Three periods must be noted in the development ofour Party.

The first period was the period of formation, of thecreation of our Party. It embraces the interval of timeapproximately from the foundation of Iskra32 to theThird Party Congress inclusively (end of 1900 to begin-ning of 1905).

In this period the Party, as a driving force, wasweak. It was weak not only because it itself was young,but also because the working-class movement as a wholewas young and because the revolutionary situation, therevolutionary movement, was lacking, or little developed,particularly in the init ial stages of this period (thepeasantry was silent or did not go beyond sullen murmur-ing; the workers conducted only partial economic strikesor political strikes covering a whole town; the formsof the movement were of an underground or semi-legalcharacter; the forms of working-class organisation werealso mainly of an underground character).

The Party’s strategy—since strategy presupposesthe existence of reserves and the possibility of manoeuvr-ing with them—was necessarily narrow and restricted.The Party confined itself to mapping the movement’s


s t ra tegic p lan , i . e . , the route tha t the movementshould take; and the Party’s reserves—the contradictionswithin the camp of the enemies inside and outside ofRussia—remained unused, or almost unused, owing tothe weakness of the Party.

The Party ’s tactics, since tactics presuppose theutilisation of all forms of the movement, forms of pro-letarian organisation, their combination and mutualsupplementation, etc., with the object of winning themasses and ensuring strategic success, were also neces-sarily narrow and without scope.

In this period the Party focussed its attention andcare upon the Party itself, upon its own existence andpreservation. At this stage it regarded itself as a kindof self-sufficing force. That was natural: tsarism’s fierceattacks upon the Party, and the Mensheviks’ effortsto blow it up from within and to replace the Party cadreswith an amorphous, non-Party body (recall the Menshe-viks’ campaign for a labour congress launched in connec-tion with Axelrod’s notorious pamphlet A People’s Dumaand a Labour Congress, 1905), threatened the Party’svery existence and, as a consequence, the question ofpreserving the Party acquired paramount importancein this period.

The principal task of communism in Russia in thatperiod was to recruit into the Party the best elementsof the working class, those who were most active and mostdevoted to the cause of the proletariat; to form the ranksof the proletarian party and to put it firmly on its feet.Comrade Lenin formulates this task as follows: “to winthe vanguard of the proletariat to the side of communism”(see “Left-Wing” Communism . . .33).

THE PARTY BEFORE AND AFTER TAKING POWER 105

The second period was the period of winning the broadmasses of the workers and peasants to the side of the Par-ty, to the side of the vanguard of the proletariat. Itembraces the interval of time approximately from Octo-ber 1905 to October 1917.

In this period the situation was much more complexand rich in events than in the preceding one. The defeatstsarism sustained on the battlefield in Manchuria andthe revolution of October 1905, on the one hand, the ter-mination of the Russo-Japanese war, the triumph of thecounter-revolution and the liquidation of the gains ofthe revolution, on the other, and thirdly, the imperial-ist war, the revolution of February 1917 and the famous“dual power”—all these events stirred up all classes inRussia and pushed them into the political arena one afterthe other, strengthened the Communist Party and awak-ened the broad masses of the peasants to political life. The proletarian movement was enriched by suchpowerful forms as the general political strike and armeduprising.

The peasant movement was enriched by the boycottof the landlords (“smoking” the landlords out of theircount ry sea ts ) which developed in to insurrec t ion .

The activities of the Party and of other revolution-ary organisations were invigorated by the mastery ofsuch forms of work as the extra-parliamentary, legal,open form.

Working-class organisation was enriched not onlyby a tried and important form like the trade unions, butalso by such a powerful form of working-class organisa-tion as the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies, a form unprec-edented in history.


The peasants followed in the footsteps of the work-ing class and set up Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies.

The Party’s reserves were also enriched. It becameclear in the course of the struggle that the peasantrycould and would constitute an inexhaustible reserve forthe proletariat and its party. It also became clear thatthe proletariat and its party would play the leading rolein overthrowing the rule of capital.

In this period the Party was by no means as weak asit was in the preceding one; as a driving force, it becamea most important factor. It could now no longer be aself-sufficing force, for its existence and developmentwere now definitely assured; it changed from a self-suffic-ing force into an instrument for winning the masses ofthe workers and peasants , in to an ins t rument forleading the masses in overthrowing the rule of capital.

In this period the Party’s strategy acquired widescope; it was directed primarily to gaining and utilisingthe peasantry as a reserve, and it achieved importantsuccess in this work.

The Party’s tactics also acquired wide scope as aresult of the enrichment of the movement of the masses,of their organisation, and of the activities of the Partyand other revolutionary organisations, by new formswhich had previously been absent.

The Party’s principal task in this period was towin the vast masses to the side of the proletarian van-guard, to the side of the Party, for the purpose of over-throwing the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, for the pur-pose of seizing power. The Party now no longer focussedits attention upon itself, but upon the vast masses ofthe people. Comrade Lenin formulates this task as fol-


lows: “disposition of the vast masses” on the social frontin such a way as to ensure victory “in the forthcomingdecisive battles” (see the above-mentioned pamphlet byComrade Lenin).

Such are the characteristic features of the first twoperiods in the development of our Party.

The difference between the first and the second pe-riod is undoubtedly great. But there is also somethingin common between them. Both in the first and in thesecond period the Party was nine-tenths, if not entirely,a national force, effective only for and within Russia(one of the detachments of the international organisedproletariat). That is the first point. The second pointis that both in the first and in the second period the Rus-sian Communist Party was a party of upheaval, theparty of revolution within Russia, hence in these periodsthe elements of criticism and destruction of the old orderpredominated in its work.

An entirely different picture is presented by thethird period, the one we are in now.

The third period is the period of taking and holdingpower with the object, on the one hand, of drawing all theworking people of Russia into the work of building so-cialist economy and the Red Army, and, on the otherhand, of applying all forces and resources for renderingassistance to the international proletariat in its struggleto overthrow capital. This period embraces the intervalof time from October 1917 to the present day.

The fact that the proletariat in Russia has takenpower has created a very distinctive situation, both in-ternationally and within Russia, such as the world hasnever seen before.


To begin with, October 1917 marked a breach in theworld social front and created a turn in the whole ofworld history. Picture to yourselves the boundless so-cial front, stretching from the backward colonies to ad-vanced America, and then the immense breach forcedin this front by the Russian detachment of the interna-tional proletariat, a breach that menaces the existenceof imperialism, that has upset all the plans of the im-perialist sharks and has greatly, radically, eased thetask of the international proletariat in its struggle againstcapital—such is the historical significance of October1917. From that moment our Party was transformed froma national force into a predominantly international force,and the Russian proletariat was transformed from abackward detachment of the international proletariatinto its vanguard. Henceforth, the tasks of the interna-tional proletariat are to widen the Russian breach, tohelp the vanguard, which has pushed forward, to preventthe enemies from surrounding the brave vanguard andcutting it off from its base. The task of internationalimperialism, on the contrary, is to close the Russianbreach, to close it without fail. That is why our Party,if it wants to retain power, pledges itself to do “the ut-most possible in one (its own—J. St.) country for thedevelopment, support and awakening of the revolutionin all countries” (see Lenin’s book The Proletarian Revo-lution and the Renegade Kautsky34). That is why ourParty, since October 1917, has been transformed froma national into an international force, into the Party ofrevolution on an international scale.

An equally radical change has taken place in theParty’s position within the country as a result of October


1917. In the preceding periods the Party was an instru-ment for the destruction of the old order, for overthrow-ing capital in Russia. Now, on the contrary, in the thirdperiod, it has been transformed from a party of revolu-tion within Russia into a party of construction, into aparty for the creation of new forms of economy. In thepast it recruited the best forces of the workers for thepurpose of storming the old order; now it is recruitingthem for the purpose of organising the food supply, trans-port and the basic industries. In the past it rallied therevolutionary elements of the peasantry for the purposeof overthrowing the landlords; now it is recruiting themfor the purpose of improving agriculture, of consolidatingthe alliance between the labouring elements of the peas-antry and the proletariat which is in power. In the pastit recruited the best elements of the belated nationalitiesfor the struggle against capital; now it is recruiting themfor the purpose of building the life of the labouring ele-ments of these nationalities on the basis of co-operationwith the Russian proletariat. In the past it destroyedthe army, the old militarist army; now it must buildup a new, a workers’ and peasants’ army, which is need-ed to protect the gains of the revolution from externalenemies.

From a party of revolution within Russia, the Rus-sian Communist Party has been transformed into a partyof peaceful construction. That is why it has removedfrom the arsenal of the proletariat such forms of struggleas strikes and insurrection, which are now unnecessaryin Russia.

In the past we could dispense with experts in mili-tary and economic affairs, for at that time the Party’s


activity was mainly critical, and it is easy to criticise. . . .Now, the Party cannot dispense with experts; in additionto utilising the old specialists i t must train its ownexperts: mobilisation, supply and operations officers (forthe army), food officials, agricultural experts, railwaymanagers, co-operators, experts in industry and foreigntrade (in the economic sphere). Without this we shallbe unable to build.

A change has also taken place in the Party’s posi-tion in that its forces and resources, its reserves, havegrown and multiplied to a colossal degree.

The Party’s reserves are:1) The contradictions between the different social

groups within Russia.2) The contradictions and conflicts, which some-

times grow into military collisions, between the capital-ist states around us.

3) The socialist movement in the capitalist coun-tries.

4) The national-liberation movement in the backwardand colonial countries.

5) The peasantry and the Red Army in Russia.6) The diplomatic and foreign trade services.7) The entire might of state power.Such, in general, are the forces and potentialities

within the framework of which—and this framework issufficiently wide—the Party’s strategy can manoeuvre,and on the basis of which the Party’s tactics can carryout the day-to-day work of mobilising forces.

All these are the favourable aspects of October 1917.But October also has an unfavourable aspect. The

fact is that the proletariat took power in Russia under


distinctive internal and external circumstances which lefttheir impress on the entire work of the Party after powerwas taken.

Firstly, Russia is an economically backward coun-try; it is very difficult for her to organise transport, de-velop industry, and electrify urban and rural industryby her own efforts unless she exchanges her raw materialsfor machinery and equipment from the Western countries.Secondly, to this day Russia is a socialist island surround-ed by hostile, industrially more developed capitaliststates. If Soviet Russia had as her neighbour one bigindustrially developed Soviet state, or several Sovietstates, she could easily establish co-operation with thosestates on the basis of exchange of raw materials for ma-chinery and equipment. But as long as that is not the case,Soviet Russia, and our Party which guides its govern-ment, are obliged to seek forms and methods of economicco-operation with the hostile capitalist groups in the Westin order to obtain the necessary technical equipmentuntil the proletarian revolution triumphs in one or sev-eral industrial capitalist countries. The concession formof relations and foreign trade—such are the means forachieving this aim. Without this i t will be difficultto count on decisive successes in economic construction,in the electrification of the country. This process willundoubtedly be slow and painful, but it is inevitable,unavoidable, and what is inevitable does not cease to beinevitable because some impatient comrades get nervousand demand quick results and spectacular operations.

From the economic standpoint the present conflictsand military collisions between the capitalist groups,and also the struggle of the proletariat against the


capitalist class, are based on the conflict between the pres-ent-day productive forces and the national imperial-ist framework of their development and the capitalistforms of appropriation. The imperialist framework andthe capitalist form of appropriation strangle the produc-tive forces, prevent them from developing. The only wayout is to organise world economy on the basis of economicco-operation between the advanced (industrial) and back-ward (fuel and raw material supplying) countries (andnot on the basis of the plunder of the latter by the for-mer). It is precisely for this purpose that the interna-tional proletarian revolution is needed. Without this rev-olution it is useless thinking of the organisation andnormal development of world economy. But in order tobe able to start (at least to start) organising world econ-omy on proper lines, the proletariat must triumph atleast in several advanced countries. So long as that isnot the case, our Party must seek roundabout ways ofco-operation with capitalist groups in the economic field.

That is why the Party, which has overthrown thebourgeoisie in our country and has raised the banner ofthe proletarian revolution, nevertheless considers it ex-pedient to “untie” small production and small industryin our country, to permit the partial revival of capital-ism, although making it dependent upon the state author-ity, to attract leaseholders and shareholders, etc., etc.,until the Party’s policy of “doing the utmost possiblein one country for the development, support and awaken-ing of the revolution in all countries” produces realresults.

Such are the distinctive conditions, favourable andunfavourable, that were created by October 1917, and


in which our Party is operating and developing in thethird period of its existence.

These conditions determine the colossal might thatour Party now possesses inside and outside Russia. They,too, determine the incredible difficulties and dangersthat the Party is facing, and which it must overcome atall costs.

The Party’s tasks in this period in the sphere offoreign policy are determined by its position as the partyof international revolution. These tasks are:

1) To util ise all the contradictions and conflictsamong the capitalist groups and governments which sur-round our country, with the object of disintegratingimperialism.

2) To stint no forces and resources to assist the pro-letarian revolution in the West.

3) To take all measures to strengthen the national-liberation movement in the East.

4) To strengthen the Red Army.The Party’s tasks in this period in the sphere of

home policy are determined by its position within Russiaas the party of peaceful construction. These tasks are:

1) To strengthen the alliance between the proletar-iat and the toiling peasantry by:

a) recruiting for the work of state construction thoseelements of the peasantry which possess most initiativeand business ability;

b) assisting peasant farming by disseminating agricul-tural knowledge, repairing machines, and so forth;

c) developing proper exchange of products betweentown and country;

d) gradually electrifying agriculture.


An important circumstance must be borne in mind.In contrast to the revolutions and proletarian partiesin the West, a fortunate feature of our revolution, anda tremendous asset for our Party, is the fact that in Rus-sia, the largest and most powerful strata of the pettybourgeoisie, namely the peasantry, were transformed froma potential reserve of the bourgeoisie into an actual re-serve of the proletariat. This circumstance determinedthe weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie and servedthe interests of the Russian proletariat. It is mainly dueto the fact that, in contrast to what occurred in the West,the liberation of the peasants from bondage to the land-lords took place in Russia under the leadership of theproletariat. That served as the basis also for the alliancebetween the proletariat and the toiling peasantry in Rus-sia. It is the duty of the Communists to cherish thatalliance and to strengthen it.

2) To develop industry by:a) concentrating the maximum forces on the task

of mastering the basic industries and improving suppliesfor the workers engaged in them;

b) developing foreign trade with a view to importingmachinery and equipment;

c) a t t rac t ing shareholders and leaseholders ;d) creating at least a minimum food fund for ma-

noeuvring;e) electrifying transport and large-scale industry.

Such, in general, are the Party’s tasks in its present periodof development.

Pravda, No. 190,August 28, 1921

Signed: J. Stalin

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

AND THE NATIONAL POLICY

OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS

The strength of the October Revolution lies, amongother things, in that, unlike the revolutions in the West,it rallied around the Russian proletariat the many mil-lions of the petty bourgeoisie, and, above all, its mostnumerous and powerful strata—the peasantry. As a re-sult, the Russian bourgeoisie was isolated and left withoutan army, while the Russian proletariat became the arbi-ter of the destiny of the country. But for that the Russianworkers would not have retained power.

Peace, the agrarian revolution and freedom for thenationalities—these were the three principal factors whichserved to rally the peasants of more than twenty na-tionalities in the vast expanse of Russia around the RedFlag of the Russian proletariat.

There is no need to speak here of the first two fac-tors. Enough has been said about them in the literatureon the subject, and indeed they speak for themselves.As for the third factor—the national policy of the Rus-sian Communists—apparently, its importance has notyet been fully realised. It will therefore not be superflu-ous to say a few words on this subject.

To begin with, of the 140,000,000 of the populationof the R.S.F.S.R. (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuaniaand Poland excluded), the Great Russians do not number


more than 75,000,000. The remaining 65,000,000 belongto nations other than the Great-Russian.

Furthermore, these nations mainly inhabit the bor-der regions, which are the most vulnerable from themilitary point of view; and these border regions aboundin raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs.

Lastly, in industrial and military respects these borderregions are less developed than central Russia (or are notdeveloped at all), and, as a consequence, they are notin a position to maintain their independent existencewithout the military and economic assistance of centralRussia, just as central Russia is not in a position tomaintain its military and economic power without as-sistance in fuel, raw materials and food from the borderregions.

These circumstances, coupled with certain provisionsof the national programme of communism, determinedthe character of the national policy of the Russian Com-munists.

The essence of this policy can be expressed in a fewwords: renunciation of all “claims” and “rights” to re-gions inhabited by non-Russian nations; recognition (notin words but in deeds) of the right of these nations toexist as independent states; a voluntary military andeconomic union of these nations with central Russia;assistance to the backward nations in their cultural andeconomic development, without which what is knownas “nat ional equal i ty of r ights” becomes an emptysound; all this based on the complete emancipation ofthe peasants and the concentration of all power in thehands of the labouring elements of the border nations—such is the national policy of the Russian Communists.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE NATIONAL POLICY 117

Needless to say, the Russian workers who came topower would not have been able to win the sympathyand confidence of their comrades of other nations, andabove all of the oppressed masses of the unequal nations,had they not proved in practice their willingness to carryout such a national policy, had they not renounced their“right” to Finland, had they not withdrawn their troopsfrom Northern Persia, had they not renounced the claimsof the Russian imperialists to certain regions of Mongoliaand China, and had they not assisted the backward na-tions of the former Russian Empire to develop theirculture and statehood in their own languages.

That conf idence a lone could serve as the basisfor that indestruct ible union of the peoples of theR.S.F.S.R., against which all “diplomatic” machina-tions and carefully executed “blockades” have provedimpotent.

More than that. The Russian workers could not havedefeated Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel had they notenjoyed the sympathy and confidence of the oppressedmasses of the border regions of former Russia. It mustnot be forgotten that the field of action of these muti-nous generals was limited to border regions inhabitedmainly by non-Russian nations, and the latter couldnot but hate Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel for theirimperialist policy and policy of Russification. The En-tente, which intervened and supported these generals,could rely only on those elements in the border regionswhich were the vehicles of Russification. That servedonly to inflame the hatred of the people of the borderregions for the mutinous generals and increased theirsympathy for the Soviet power.


This circumstance accounted for the internal weak-ness of the Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel rears, andtherefore for the weakness of their fronts, that is, in thelong run, for their defeat.

But the beneficial results of the national policy ofthe Russian Communists are not confined to the territoryof the R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet republics associatedwith it. They are also seen, indirectly, it is true, in theat t i tude of the neighbouring countr ies towards theR.S.F.S.R. The radical improvement in the att i tudeof Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India and other Easterncountries towards Russia, which was formerly a bogeyto these countries, is a fact which even so valiant a poli-tician as Lord Curzon does not now venture to dispute.It scarcely needs proof that if the national policy out-lined above had not been systematically carried out inthe R.S.F.S.R. during the four years of the existenceof Soviet power, this radical change in the attitude ofthe neighbouring countries towards Russia would havebeen inconceivable.

Such, in the main, are the results of the nationalpolicy of the Russian Communists. And these results areespecially clear today, on the fourth anniversary of So-viet power, when the hard war is over, when extensiveconstruction work has begun, and when one involuntarilylooks back along the path travelled in order to take it inat a single glance.

Pravda, No. 251,November 6-7, 1921

Signed: J. Stalin

THE PROSPECTS

The international situation is of paramount impor-tance in the life of Russia. It is so not only becauseRussia, like every other country in Europe, is linked byinnumerable threads with the neighbouring capitalistcountries, but also, and primarily, because, being a Sovietcountry and therefore a “menace” to the bourgeois world,she finds herself, as a result of the course of events,surrounded by a hostile camp of bourgeois states. Itis obvious that the state of affairs in that camp, the re-lation of the contending forces within that camp, can-not but be of paramount importance for Russia.

The chief factor that characterises the internationalsituation is that the period of open war has been replacedby a period of “peaceful” struggle, that there has arisensome degree of mutual recognition of the contendingforces and an armistice between them, between the En-tente, as the head of the bourgeois counter-revolution,on the one hand, and Russia, as the advanced detach-ment of the proletarian revolution, on the other. Thestruggle has shown that we (the workers) are not yetstrong enough to put an end to imperialism forthwith.But the struggle has also shown that they (the bourgeoi-sie) are no longer strong enough to strangle Soviet Russia.

As a consequence of this, the “fright” or “horror”which the proletarian revolution aroused in the world


bourgeoisie when, for example, the Red Army was ad-vancing on Warsaw, has disappeared, evaporated. Atthe same time the boundless enthusiasm with which theworkers of Europe received almost every bit of newsabout Soviet Russia is also disappearing.

A period of sober weighing up of forces has set in,a period of molecular work in training and accumulat-ing forces for future battles.

That does not mean that the certain degree of equi-librium of forces that was established already at thebeginning of 1921 has remained unchanged. Not at all.

Recovering from the blows of revolution sustainedas a consequence of the imperialist war, and pulling it-self together, the world bourgeoisie passed from defenceto an attack on “its own” workers and, making skilfuluse of the industrial crisis, hurled the workers back intoworse conditions of existence (reduction of wages, long-er working day, mass unemployment). The results ofthat offensive were exceptionally severe for Germanywhere (besides everything else) the precipitous fall inthe rate of exchange of the mark still further worsenedthe conditions of the workers.

That gave rise to a powerful movement within theworking class (particularly in Germany) for the creationof a united workers’ front and for the establishment ofa workers’ government, a movement that called for agree-ment and joint struggle against the common enemy on thepart of all the more or less revolutionary groups amongthe working class, from the “moderates” to the “extrem-ists.” There is no ground for doubting that in the strug-gle for a workers’ government the Communists will bein the front ranks, for such a struggle must lead to the

THE PROSPECTS 121

further demoralisation of the bourgeoisie and to the con-version of the present Communist Parties into genuinemass workers’ parties.

But the matter is by no means confined to the of-fensive of the bourgeoisie against “its own” workers.The bourgeoisie is aware that it cannot crush “its own”workers unless it curbs Russia. Hence the ever-increas-ing activity of the bourgeoisie in preparing a new of-fensive against Russia, a more complex and thorough of-fensive than all the previous ones.

Of course, trade and other treaties are being andwill be concluded with Russia, and this is of immenseimportance for Russia. But it must not be forgottenthat the trading and all other sorts of missions and asso-ciations that are now pouring into Russia, trading withher and aiding her, are at the same time most efficientspy agencies of the world bourgeoisie, and that, therefore,the world bourgeoisie now knows Soviet Russia, knowsher weak and strong sides, better than at any time before,a circumstance fraught with grave danger in the event ofnew interventionist actions.

Of course, the friction over the Eastern questionhas been reduced to “misunderstandings.” But it mustnot be forgotten that Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan andthe Far East are being flooded with agents of imperial-ism, gold and other “blessings,” in order to create aneconomic (and not only economic) cordon around SovietRussia. It scarcely needs proof that the so-called “peace”conference in Washington35 promises us nothing reallypeaceful.

Of course, we are on the “very best” terms with Po-land, with Rumania and with Finland. But it must


not be forgotten that these countries, especially Polandand Rumania, are vigorously arming with the assistanceof the Entente, are preparing for war (against whom ifnot against Russia?), that now, as in the past, they con-stitute the immediate reserves of imperialism, that itwas they who recently landed on Russian territory (forespionage purposes?) whiteguard Savinkov and Petluradetachments.

All these facts, and much more of a similar kind,are evidently separate links in the whole activity ofpreparing a new attack on Russia.

A combination of economic and military struggle, acombined assault from within and from without—such isthe most likely form of this attack.

Whether we succeed in making th is a t tack im-possible , or, i f i t i s launched, in turning i t in to adeadly weapon against the world bourgeoisie, dependsupon the vigilance of the Communists in the rear andin the army, upon the success of our work in the eco-nomic field and, lastly, upon the staunchness of the RedArmy.

Such, in general, is the external situation.No less complex and, if you l ike, “peculiar,” is

the internal situation in Soviet Russia. It may be de-scribed in these words: a struggle to strengthen the alli-ance between the workers and the peasants on a new, eco-nomic, basis for the development of industry, agricultureand transport, or in other words: a struggle to maintainand strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat in asituation of economic ruin.

There is a theory current in the West that the work-ers can take and hold power only in a country where

THE PROSPECTS 123

they constitute the majority, or, at all events, wherethe people engaged in industry constitute the majority.It is indeed on these grounds that Messrs. the Kautskysdeny the “legitimacy” of the proletarian revolution inRussia, where the proletariat is in the minority. Thistheory is based on the tacit assumption that the pettybourgeoisie, primarily the peasantry, cannot support theworkers in their struggle for power, that the mass ofthe peasantry constitutes a reserve of the bourgeoisieand not of the proletariat. The historical basis of thisassumption lies in the fact that at crit ical momentsin the West (France, Germany) the petty bourgeoisie(the peasantry) were usually found on the side of the bour-geoisie (1848 and 1871 in France, attempts at proletar-ian revolution in Germany after 1918).

The reasons for this are:1) The bourgeois revolution took place in the West

under the leadership of the bourgeoisie (at that timethe proletariat merely served as the battering ram of therevolution); there the peasantry received land and eman-cipation from feudal bondage from the hands of thebourgeoisie, so to speak, and, as a consequence, the in-f luence of the bourgeois ie over the peasantry wasalready then considered to be assured.

2) More than half a century elapsed from the begin-ning of the bourgeois revolution in the West to the firstattempts at proletarian revolution. During that periodthe peasantry managed to give rise to a powerful ruralbourgeoisie, exercising strong influence in the country-side, which served as a connecting bridge between thepeasantry and big urban capital, thereby strengtheningthe hegemony of the bourgeoisie over the peasantry.


It was in that historical situation that the above-mentioned theory arose.

An entirely different picture is revealed in Russia.First, in contrast to the West, the bourgeois revo-

lution in Russia (February-March 1917) took placeunder the leadership of the proletariat, in fierce battlesagainst the bourgeoisie, in the course of which thepeasantry ra l l ied around the prole tar ia t as aroundtheir leader.

Secondly, the attempt (successful) at proletarianrevolution in Russia (October 1917), also in contrast tothe West, did not begin half a century after the bour-geois revolution, but immediately after it, within a mat-ter of 6-8 months, during which period it was, of course,impossible for a powerful and organised rural bourgeoi-sie to spring up from among the peasantry; moreover,the big bourgeoisie that was overthrown in October 1917was never able to recover.

This latter circumstance still further strengthenedthe alliance between the workers and the peasants.

That is why the Russian workers, although constitut-ing a minority of the population of Russia, neverthelessfound themselves the masters of the country, won thesympathy and support of the vast majority of the popu-lation, primarily of the peasantry, and took and heldpower, whereas, in spite of all theories, the bourgeoi-sie found itself isolated, was left without the peasantreserves.

From this it follows that:1) The above-mentioned theory that the proletariat

“must constitute the majority” of the population is in-adequate and incorrect from the standpoint of Russian

THE PROSPECTS 125

reality, or, at all events, is interpreted in too simpleand vulgar a manner by Messrs. the Kautskys.

2) Under the present historical conditions, the ac-tual alliance between the proletariat and the toilingpeasantry that was formed in the course of the revolutionis the basis of Soviet power in Russia.

3) It is the duty of the Communists to maintain andstrengthen that actual alliance.

The whole point in the present case is that theforms of this alliance are not always the same.

Previously, during the war, we had to deal with whatwas chiefly a military-political alliance, i.e., we ex-pelled the landlords from Russia and gave the peasantsthe land for their use, and when the landlords went towar to recover “their property” we fought them and up-held the gains of the revolution; in return the peasantsprovided food for the workers and men for the army.That was one form of the alliance.

Now that the war is over and danger no longer threat-ens the land, the old form of alliance is not adequateany more. Another form of alliance is needed. Now it isno longer a matter of saving the land for the peasants,but of ensuring the peasants the right freely to disposeof the produce of that land. In the absence of such rightthere will inevitably be: a further diminution of the croparea, a progressive decline of agriculture, paralysis oftransport and industry (due to food shortage), demoralisa-tion of the army (due to food shortage), and, as a resultof all this, the inevitable collapse of the actual alliancebetween the workers and the peasants. It scarcely needsproof that possession by the state of a certain minimumof grain stocks is the mainspring of the revival of

J. V. S T A L I N

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

126

industry and the preservation of the Soviet state. Kron-stadt (the spring of 1921) was a warning that the oldform of alliance was obsolete and that a new form wasneeded, an economic form, that would be of economicadvantage both to the workers and to the peasants.

That is the key to an understanding of the New Eco-nomic Policy.

Abolition of the surplus appropriation system andof other similar obstacles was the first step along thenew road that freed the hands of the small producerand gave an impetus to the production of more food, rawmaterials and other produce. It will not be difficultto understand the colossal importance of this step if itis borne in mind that Russia is making the same massonrush towards the development of productive forces asNorth America experienced after the Civil War. There isno doubt that, while releasing the productive energy ofthe small producer and ensuring certain advantages forhim, this step will, however, put him in a position—bearing in mind that the state remains in control of trans-port and industry—in which he will be compelled to bringgrist to the mill of the Soviet state.

But it is not enough to secure an increase in theproduction of food and raw materials. It is also neces-sary to collect, to accumulate, a certain minimum stockof these products necessary for the maintenance of trans-port, industry, the army, etc. Therefore, leaving asidethe tax in kind, which simply supplements the abolitionof the surplus appropriation system, we must regardas the second step the transfer of the collection of foodand raw materials to the Central Union of Consumers’Co-operatives (Centrosoyuz). It is true that the lack

THE PROSPECTS 127

of discipline in the local organisations of the Centrosoyuz,their inability to adapt themselves to the commoditymarket that has rapidly developed, the unsuitabilityof barter as a form of exchange and the rapid develop-ment of the money form, the shortage of currency, etc.,have prevented the Centrosoyuz from fulfilling the assign-ments allotted to it. But there are no grounds for doubt-ing that the role of the Centrosoyuz as the principal appa-ratus for the wholesale purchase of the chief items of foodand raw materials will grow day by day. It is only neces-sary that the state should:

a) make the Centrosoyuz the centre for financing tradeoperations (other than state) within the country;

b) make the other forms of co-operative organisationwhich are still hostilely disposed to the state financial-ly subordinate to the Centrosoyuz;

c) in some form or other give the Centrosoyuz accessto foreign trade.

The opening of the State Bank as the organ for regu-lating the currency within the country must be regardedas the third step. The development of the commoditymarket and the currency leads to the following twochief results:

1) it will make commercial operations (private andstate) and production operations (wage rates, and soforth) completely dependent on the fluctuations of theruble;

2) it will transform Russia’s national economy fromthe isolated, self-contained economy it was during theblockade into an exchange economy that will trade withthe outside world, i.e., that will depend on the fortui-tous fluctuations of the exchange rate of the ruble.


But from this it follows that if the currency is notput in order and if the exchange rate of the ruble is notimproved, our economic operations, both home and for-eign, will be in a bad way. The State Bank as the regula-tor of the currency, capable of being not only a creditorbut also a pump for extracting the colossal private sav-ings which could be put into circulation and make itpossible for us to do without new emissions—this StateBank is still “music of the future,” although, accordingto all the data, it has a great future.

The next means of raising the exchange rate of theruble must be an extension of our exports and an improve-ment of our desperately unfavourable balance of trade.It must be supposed that drawing the Centrosoyuz intoforeign trade will be of assistance in this matter.

Furthermore, we need a foreign loan not only as ameans of payment, but also as a factor that will enhanceour credit abroad and, consequently, enhance confidencein our ruble.

Further, the mixed trading and transit and other com-panies that Sokolnikov wrote about in Pravda recentlywould undoubtedly also help matters. It must be observed,however, that the granting of industrial concessionsand the development of the proper exchange of our rawmaterials for foreign machinery and equipment, aboutwhich so much was written in our press some time ago,while being factors promoting the development of moneyeconomy, are themselves wholly dependent upon a pre-liminary improvement of the exchange rate of our ruble.

Lastly, the fourth step must be the placing of ourenterprises on a business basis, the closing and leasingout of the small non-paying enterprises, the singling

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE NATIONAL POLICY 129

out of the soundest of the big enterprises, drastic reduc-tion of inflated staffs in government offices, the drawingup of a firm material and financial state budget and, asa result of all this, the expulsion of the charity spiritfrom our enterprises and offices, the general tighteningup of discipline among factory and office workers, andimprovement and intensification of their labour.

Such, in general, are the measures that have beenand are to be taken and which, in the aggregate, consti-tute the so-called New Economic Policy.

Needless to say, in carrying out these measures we,as was to be expected, have made a large number of mis-takes, which have distorted their true character. Never-theless, it can be taken as proved that it is preciselythese measures that open the road along which we canpromote the economic revival of the country, raise agri-culture and industry and strengthen the economic alli-ance between the proletarians and the toiling peasants,in spite of everything, in spite of threats from withoutand famine within Russia.

The first results of the New Economic Policy in theshape of the incipient expansion of the crop area, theincrease in the productivity of labour in the factories,and the improvement in the mood of the peasants (cessa-tion of mass banditry) undoubtedly confirm this conclu-sion.

Pravda, No. 286,December 18, 1921

Signed: J. Stalin

TO PRAVDA

Pravda was born in the waves of the revolutionaryupsurge during the famous “Lena events.” The appear-ance of Pravda , the newspaper for the masses of theworkers, precisely during those days marked:

1) the passing of the period of general weariness inthe country following the Stolypin regime of “peace andquiet,”

2) the mighty awakening of the Russian workingclass for a new revolution, the second after the 1905revolution,

3) the beginning of the winning of the broad massesof the working class to the side of the Bolsheviks.

The Pravda of 1912 was the laying of the corner-stone of the victory of Bolshevism in 1917.

J. StalinPravda, No. 98,May 5, 1922

THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF PRAVDA

(Reminiscences)

1. THE LENA EVENTS

The Lena events were the result of the Stolypin re-gime of “pacification.” The younger members of the Par-ty, of course, have not experienced and do not rememberthe charms of this regime. As for the old ones, they, nodoubt, remember the punitive expeditions of accursedmemory, the savage raids on working-class organisa-tions, the mass flogging of peasants, and, as a screento al l this , the Black-Hundred-Cadet Duma. Publicopinion in shackles, general lassitude and apathy, wantand despair among the workers, the peasantry down-trodden and terrified, with gangs of the police, landownersand capitalists rampant everywhere—such were the typ-ical features of Stolypin’s “pacification.”

To the superficial observer it might have seemedthat the epoch of revolution had passed away forever,and that a period of the “constitutional” developmentof Russia on the lines of Prussia had set in. The Menshe-vik Liquidators openly shouted that this was so andpreached the necessity of organising a Stolypin legalworkers’ party. And certain old “Bolsheviks,” who in theirhearts sympathised with this preaching, made haste todesert the ranks of our Party. The triumph of the knoutand the powers of darkness was complete. At that time


The Lena events burst into this “abomination ofdesolation” like a hurricane and revealed a new pictureto everybody. It turned out that the Stolypin regime wasnot so stable after all, that the Duma was rousing thecontempt of the masses, and that the working class hadaccumulated sufficient energy to rush into battle for anew revolution. The shooting down of workers in the re-mote depths of Siberia (Bodaibo on the Lena) sufficedto call forth strikes all over Russia, and the St. Peters-burg workers poured into the streets and at one strokeswept from the path the boastful Minister Makarov andhis insolent slogan “So it was, so it will be.” These werethe first harbingers of the mighty movement that wasthen beginning. Zvezda36 was right when it exclaimed atthat time: “We live! Our scarlet blood seethes with thefire of unspent strength. . . .” The upsurge of a new revo-lutionary movement was evident.

It was in the waves of this movement that the massworking-class newspaper Pravda was born.

2. THE FOUNDATION OF PRAVDA

It was in the middle of April 1912, one evening atComrade Poletayev’s house, where two members of theDuma (Pokrovsky and Poletayev), two writers (Olminskyand Baturin) and I, a member of the Central Committee(I, being in hiding, had found “sanctuary” in the houseof Poletayev, who enjoyed “parliamentary immunity”)reached agreement concerning Pravda’s platform and com-piled the first issue of the newspaper. I do not rememberwhether Demyan Byedny and Danilov, two very closecontributors to Pravda, were present at this conference.

THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF PRAVDA 133

The technical and financial prerequisites for thenewspaper had already been provided thanks to the agi-tation conducted by Zvezda, the sympathy of the broadmasses of the workers, and the mass voluntary collec-tion of funds for Pravda in the mills and factories. Truly,Pravda came into being as a result of the efforts of theworking class of Russia, and above all of St. Petersburg.Had it not been for these efforts, the newspaper couldnot have existed.

Pravda’s complexion was clear: its mission was topopularise Zvezda’s programme among the masses. Inits very first issue Pravda wrote: “Anyone who readsZvezda and knows its contributors, who are also con-tributors to Pravda, will not find it difficult to under-stand the l ine Pravda will pursue.”37 The only dif-ference between Zvezda and Pravda was that the latter,unlike the former, did not address i tself to the ad-vanced workers, but to the broad masses of the workingclass. It was Pravda’s function to help the advancedworkers to rally around the Party’s banner the broadstrata of the Russian working class who had awakenedfor a fresh struggle but were still politically backward.That is precisely why one of the aims Pravda set itselfa t tha t t ime was to t ra in wr i te rs f rom among theworkers and to draw them into the work of directingthe paper.

In its very first issue Pravda wrote: “We would likethe workers not to confine themselves to sympathy alone,but to take an active part in the conduct of our newspa-per. Let not the workers say that they are ‘not used to’writing. Working-class writers do not drop ready-madefrom the skies, they can be trained only gradually, in the


course of literary activity. All that is needed is to starton the job boldly: you may stumble once or twice, butin the end you will learn to write. . . .”38

3. THE ORGANISATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

OF PRAVDA

Pravda made its appearance in that period of ourParty’s development when the underground organisa-tion was entirely in the hands of the Bolsheviks (the Men-sheviks had fled from it), but the legal forms of organisa-tion—the group in the Duma, the press, sick-benefitsocieties, insurance societies, trade-union organisations—had not yet been completely won from the Mensheviks.It was a period in which the Bolsheviks were waging adetermined struggle to expel the Liquidators (Menshe-viks) from the legal working-class organisations. Theslogan “Dismiss the Mensheviks from their posts” wasthen a most popular slogan of the working-class move-ment. The columns of Pravda bristled with reports ofthe expulsion from the insurance societies, sick-benefitsocieties and trade-union organisations of the Liquida-tors who at one time had entrenched themselves in them.All six deputies’ seats in the workers’ curia had beenwon from the Mensheviks. The Menshevik press was alsoin the same, or almost the same, hopeless position. Itwas truly a heroic struggle that the Bolshevik-mindedworkers waged for the Party, for the agents of tsarismwere wide awake, hunting and rooting out the Bolshe-viks, and the Party, driven deep underground, couldnot develop further unless it had a legal cover. Morethan that: under the political conditions prevailing at

THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF PRAVDA 135

that time, the Party could not put out feelers towardsthe broad masses and rally them around its banner un-less it won the legal organisations; it would have beencut off from the masses and would have been trans-formed into an isolated group, stewing in its own juice.

Pravda was the centre of this struggle for the Partyprinciple, for the creation of a mass workers’ party. Itwas not merely a newspaper that summed up the suc-cesses of the Bolsheviks in winning the legal workers’organisations; it was also the organising centre whichunited these organisations around the underground cen-tres of the Party and directed the working-class move-ment towards a single definite goal. Already in his bookWhat Is To Be Done? (1902), Comrade Lenin had writtenthat a well-organised all-Russian militant newspapermust be not only a collective agitator, but also a collec-tive organiser. That is exactly the kind of newspaperwhich Pravda became in the period of the struggle againstthe Liquidators for the preservation of the undergroundorganisation and for winning the legal organisations ofthe workers. If it is true that, had we not defeated theLiquidators we would not have had the Party which,strong in its unity and invincible because of its devotionto the proletariat, organised October 1917, then it isequally true that the persevering and devoted struggleof the old Pravda to a considerable degree prepared andhastened this victory over the Liquidators. In this sensethe old Pravda was undoubtedly the herald of the futureglorious victories of the Russian proletariat.


Signed: J. Stalin

COMRADE LENIN ON VACATION

NOTES

It seems to me that it would not be fitting now to writeof “Comrade Lenin on Vacation,” when the vacationis coming to an end and Comrade Lenin will soon returnto work. Besides, my impressions are so many and soprecious that it is not quite expedient to write aboutthem in a brief note, as the editorial board of Pravdarequests. However, I must write, for the editorial boardinsists on it.

I had occasion to meet at the front veteran fighterswho, after fighting continuously for several days “onend,” without sleep or rest, would come back from thefiring line looking like shadows and drop like logs, butafter having “slept the clock round” they would rise re-freshed and eager for new battles, without which they“cannot live.” When I first visited Comrade Lenin inJuly, not having seen him for six weeks, that was justthe impression he made on me—that of a veteran fighterwho had managed to get some rest after incessant andexhausting battles, and who had been refreshed by hisrest. He looked fresh and recuperated, but still boretraces of overwork and fatigue.

COMRADE LENIN ON VACATION 137

“I am not allowed to read the newspapers,” ComradeLenin remarked ironically, “and I must not talk poli-tics. I carefully avoid every scrap of paper lying on thetable, lest it turn out to be a newspaper and lead to abreach of discipline.”

I laughed heartily and praised him to the skies forhis obedience to discipline. We proceeded to make merryover the doctors, who cannot understand that when pro-fessional men of politics get together they cannot helptalking politics.

What struck one in Comrade Lenin was his thirstfor information and his craving, his insuperable crav-ing for work. It is clear that he had been famished.The trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries,39 Genoa andThe Hague,40 the harvest prospects, industry and fi-nance all these questions came up in swift succes-sion. He was in no hurry to express his opinion, com-plaining that he was out of touch with events; for themost part he asked questions and took silent note. Hebecame very cheerful on learning that the harvest pros-pects were good.

I found an entirely different picture a month later.This time Comrade Lenin was surrounded by stacksof books and newspapers (he had been given permis-sion to read and talk politics to his heart’s content).There was no longer any trace of fatigue, of overwork.There was no sign of that nervous craving for work—he was no longer famished. Calmness and self-as-surance had fully returned. This was our old Lenin,screwing up his eyes and gazing shrewdly at his in-terlocutor. . . .


And this time our talk, too, was of a more livelycharacter.

Home affairs . . . the harvest . . . the state of in-dustry . . . the rate of exchange of the ruble . . . thebudget. . . .

“The situation is difficult. But the worst is over.The harvest will make a fundamental difference. It isbound to be followed by an improvement in industryand f inance. The thing now is to re l ieve the s ta teof unnecessary expenditure by retrenchment in ourinstitutions and enterprises and by improving them.We must be particularly firm in this matter, and weshall squeeze through, we shall most certainly squeezethrough.”

Foreign affairs . . . the Entente . . . France’s be-haviour . . . Bri tain and Germany . . . the role ofAmerica . . . .

“They are greedy, and they hate one another profound-ly. They will be at loggerheads yet. We need be in nohurry. Ours is a sure road: we are for peace and for agree-ment, but we are against enslavement and enslavingterms of agreement. We must keep a firm hand on thewheel and steer our own course, without yielding toeither flattery or intimidation.”

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, andtheir rabid agitation against Soviet Russia . . . .

“Yes, they have made it their aim to defame So-viet Russia. They are facilitating the imperialists’ fightagainst Soviet Russia. They have been caught in themire of capitalism, and are sliding into an abyss. Letthem flounder. They have long been dead as far as theworking class is concerned.”

COMRADE LENIN ON VACATION 139

The whiteguard press . . . the émigrés . . . the in-credible fairy-tales about Lenin’s death, with full de-tails . . . .

Comrade Lenin smiled and remarked: “Let them lieif it is any consolation to them; one should not rob thedying of their last consolation.”

September 15, 1922

Comrade Lenin on Vacation,Illustrated supplement to Pravda,No. 215, September 24, 1922

Signed: J. Stalin

GREETINGS TO PETROGRAD,

TO THE SOVIET OF DEPUTIES

On the fifth anniversary of the birth of the proletar-ian dictatorship I greet Red Petrograd, the cradle ofthis dictatorship.

J. Stalin

Petrogradskaya Pravda, No. 25November 5, 1922

THE QUESTION OF THE UNION

OF THE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL

REPUBLICS

Interview With a Pravda Correspondent

Interviewed by our correspondent on questions concerningthe formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ComradeStalin gave the following explanations:41

Who initiated the movement for the union of theindependent republics?

—The republics themselves initiated the movement.About three months ago, leading circles of the Trans-caucasian republics already raised the question of form-ing a united economic front of Soviet Socialist Repub-lics and of uniting them in a single union state. Thequestion was then put before wide Party meetings insome districts of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and,as is evident from the resolutions that were passed, itroused unprecedented enthusiasm. At about the sametime the question of union was raised in the Ukraine andin Byelorussia, and there too, as in Transcaucasia, itroused marked enthusiasm among wide Party circles.

These facts are indubitable evidence of the vitalityof the movement and show that the question of unitingthe republics has certainly matured.

What gave rise to the movement; what are its basicmotives?


—The motives are chiefly economic. Assistance topeasant farming, the raising of industry, improving meansof transport and communication, financial questions,questions concerning concessions and other economicagreements, joint action in foreign markets as buyers orsellers of commodities—such are the questions that gaverise to the movement for the formation of a Union ofRepublics. The exhaustion of the internal economic re-sources of our republics as a result of the Civil War, onthe one hand, and the absence of any considerable in-flux of foreign capital, on the other, have created a situa-tion in which none of our Soviet republics is in a positionto restore its national economy by its own unaided efforts.This circumstance makes itself specially felt now whenfor the first time since the termination of the Civil Warthe Soviet republics have set to work in earnest to solvetheir economic problems, and here, in the course of thiswork, have, for the first time, realised the utter inade-quacy of the isolated efforts of the individual republics,and how utterly inevitable is the combination of thoseefforts and the economic union of the republics as thesole way of really restoring industry and agriculture.

But in order really to combine the economic effortsof the individual republics to the degree of uniting themin a single economic union, it is necessary to set upappropriate permanently functioning Union bodies ca-pable of directing the economic life of these republicsalong one definite road. That is why the old economicand commercial treaties between these republics havenow proved to be inadequate. That is why the movementfor a Union of Republics has outgrown these treatiesand has brought up the question of uniting the republics.

QUESTION OF UNION OF INDEPENDENT NATIONAL REPUBLICS 143

Do you think that this trend towards unity is anentirely new phenomenon, or has it a history?

—The movement for uniting the independent repub-lics is not something unexpected and “unprecedented.”It has a history. This unification movement has alreadypassed through two phases of its development and hasnow entered the third.

The first phase was the period 1918-21, the periodof intervention and civil war, when the existence of therepublics was in mortal danger, and when the republicswere compelled to combine their military efforts in orderto defend their existence. That phase culminated in themilitary union, the military alliance of the Soviet re-publics.

The second phase was at the end of 1921 and begin-ning of 1922, the period of Genoa and The Hague, whenthe Western capitalist powers, disappointed in the effi-cacy of intervention, attempted to secure the resto-ration of capitalist property in the Soviet republics notby military but by diplomatic means, when a uniteddiplomatic front of the Soviet republics was the inevi-table means by which alone they could withstand theonslaught of the Western powers. On this ground arosethe well-known agreement between the eight independentfriendly republics and the R.S.F.S.R.,42 concluded beforethe opening of the Genoa Conference, which cannot becalled anything else than the diplomatic union of theSoviet republics. Thus ended the second phase, the phaseof the diplomatic union of our republics.

Today, the movement for uniting the national repub-lics has entered the third phase, the phase of economicunion. It is not difficult to understand that the third


phase is the culmination of the two preceding phases ofthe movement for unification.

Does it follow from this that the union of the re-publics will end in re-union with Russia, in merging withher, as is happening with the Far Eastern Republic?

—No. It does not! There is a fundamental differ-ence between the Far Eastern Republic43 and the above-mentioned national republics:

a) whereas the former was established artificially (as abuffer), for tactical reasons (it was thought that the bour-geois-democratic form would serve as a reliable guaranteeagainst the imperialist designs of Japan and other pow-ers) and not at all on a national basis, the latter, onthe contrary, arose as the natural result of the develop-ment of the respective nationalities, and have chieflya national basis;

b) whereas the Far Eastern Republic can be abolishedwithout in the least harming the nat ional interestsof the predominant population (for they are Russians,like the majority of the population of Russia), the aboli-tion of the national republics would be a piece of reac-tionary folly, calling for the abolition of the non-Russiannationalities, their Russification, i.e., a piece of reac-tionary fanaticism that would rouse the protest even ofobscurantist Russian chauvinists like the Black-Hun-dred member Shulgin.

This explains the fact that as soon as the Far East-ern Republic became convinced that the bourgeois-dem-ocratic form was useless as a guarantee against the im-perialists, it was able to abolish itself and become aconstituent part of Russia, a region, like the Urals orSiberia, without a Council of People’s Commissars or


Central Executive Committee, whereas the national re-publics, which are built on an entirely different basis,cannot be abolished, cannot be deprived of their CentralExecutive Committees and Councils of People’s Com-missars, of their national bases, as long as the nationali-ties which gave rise to them exist, as long as the nationallanguages, culture, manner of life, habits and customsexist. That is why the union of the national Soviet re-publics into a single union state cannot end in their re-union, their merging, with Russia.

What, in your opinion, should be the character andform of the union of the republics into a single Union?

—The charac ter of the union should be volun-tary, exclusively voluntary, and every national republicshould retain the right to secede from the Union. Thus,the voluntary principle must be made the basis of theTreaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics.

The parties to the treaty of union are: the R.S.F.S.R.(as an integral federal unit), the Transcaucasian Fed-eration44 (also as an integral federal unit), the Ukraineand Byelorussia. Bukhara and Khorezm,45 not beingSocialist, but only People’s Soviet Republics, may, per-haps, remain outside of the union until their naturaldevelopment converts them into Socialist Republics.

The supreme organs of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics are: the Union Central Executive Committee,to be elected by the constituent republics of the Unionwith representation in proportion to population; and theUnion Council of People’s Commissars, to be elected bythe Union Central Executive Committee, as its executiveorgan.


The funct ions of the Union Centra l Execut iveCommittee are: to draw up the fundamental guiding prin-ciples of the political and economic life of the republicsand federations constituting the Union.

The functions of the Union Council of People’sCommissars are:

a) direct and undivided control of the military af-fairs, foreign affairs, foreign trade, railways, and postsand telegraphs of the Union;

b) leadership of the activities of the Commissariatsof Finance, Food, National Economy, Labour, and StateInspection of the republics and federations constitutingthe Union; the Commissariats of Internal Affairs, Agri-culture, Education, Justice, Social Maintenance, andPublic Health of these republics and federations are toremain under the undivided and direct control of theserepublics and federations.

Such, in my opinion, should be the general form ofunion in the Union of Republics, so far as it can be per-ceived in the movement for the union of the nationalrepublics.

Some people are of the opinion that in addition tothe two Union organs (Central Executive Committee andCouncil of People’s Commissars) it is necessary to setup a third Union organ, an intermediary one, an UpperChamber, so to speak, in which all the nationalitiesshould be equally represented; but there can be no doubtthat this opinion will not meet with any sympathy amongthe national republics, if only for the reason that a two-chamber system, with an Upper Chamber, is incompat-ible with the structure of the Soviet system, at al levents in its present stage of development.


How soon, in your opinion, will the Union of Re-publics be formed, and what will be its internationalsignificance?

—I think that the day of the formation of the Unionof Republics is not far off. It is quite possible that theformation of the Union will coincide with the forth-coming convocation of the Tenth Congress of Soviets ofthe R.S.F.S.R.

As for the international significance of this Union,it scarcely needs special explanation. If the militaryalliance of the Soviet republics in the period of the CivilWar enabled us to repulse the military interventionof our enemies, and the diplomatic alliance of thoserepublics in the period of Genoa and The Hague facili-tated our struggle against the diplomatic onslaught ofthe Entente, the union of the Soviet republics in a singleunion state will undoubtedly create a form of all-roundmilitary and economic co-operation that will greatly fa-cilitate the economic progress of the Soviet republicsand convert them into a citadel against attacks by in-ternational capitalism.

Pravda, No. 261,November 18, 1922

THE UNION OF THE SOVIET

REPUBLICS

Report Delivered at the TenthAll-Russian Congress of Soviets46

December 26, 1922

Comrades, a few days ago, before this congress be-gan, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central ExecutiveCommittee received a number of resolutions from Con-gresses of Soviets of the Transcaucasian republics, theUkraine and Byelorussia on the desirability and neces-sity of uniting these republics into a single union state.The Presidium of the All-Russian Central ExecutiveCommittee has had this question under considerationand has declared that such a union is opportune. As aresult of its resolution, the question of uniting the re-publics is included in the agenda of this congress.

The campaign for the union of the Soviet SocialistRepublics began some three or four months ago. The ini-tiative was taken by the Azerbaijanian, Armenian andGeorgian Republics, which were later joined by theUkrainian and Byelorussian Republics. The idea of thecampaign is that the old treaty relations—the relationsestablished by the conventions between the R.S.F.S.R.and the other Soviet republics—have served their pur-pose and are no longer adequate. The idea of the campaignis that we must inevitably pass from the old treaty re-lations to relations based on a closer union—relationswhich imply the creation of a single union state with

THE UNION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS 149

corresponding Union executive and legislative organs,with a Central Executive Committee and a Council ofPeople’s Commissars of the Union. To put it briefly, itis now, in the course of the campaign, proposed that whatwas formerly decided from time to time, within theframework of convention relations, should be put on apermanent basis.

What are the reasons that impel the republics totake the path of union? What are the circumstances thathave determined the necessity for union?

Three groups of circumstances have made the unionof the Soviet republics into a single union state inevi-table.

The first group of circumstances consists of factsrelating to our internal economic situation.

First, the meagreness of the economic resources leftat the disposal of the republics after seven years of war.This compels us to combine these meagre resources soas to employ them more rationally and to develop themain branches of our economy which form the backboneof Soviet power in all the republics.

Secondly, the historically evolved natural divisionof labour, the economic division of labour, between thevarious regions and republics of our federation. For in-stance, the North supplies the South and East with tex-tiles, the South and East supply the North with cotton,fuel, and so forth. And this division of labour establishedbetween the regions cannot be eliminated by a mere strokeof the pen: it has been created historically by the wholecourse of economic development of the federation. Andthis division of labour, which makes the full developmentof the individual regions impossible as long as each


republic leads a separate existence, is compelling therepublics to unite in a single economic whole.

Thirdly, the unity of the principal means of commu-nication in the entire federation, constituting the nervesand foundation of any possible union. It goes withoutsaying that the means of communication cannot be al-lowed to have a divided existence, at the disposal of theindividual republics and subordinated to their interestsfor that would convert the main nerve of economic life—transport—into a conglomeration of separate parts uti-lised without a plan. This circumstance also inclinesthe republics towards union into a single state.

Lastly, the meagreness of our financial resourcesComrades, it must be bluntly stated that our financialposition now, in the sixth year of existence of the So-viet regime, has far less opportunities for large-scaledevelopment than, for instance, under the old regimewhich had vodka, which we will not have, yielding500,000,000 rubles per annum, and which possessed for-eign credits to the amount of several hundred millionrubles, which we also do not have. All this goes to showthat with such meagre opportunities for our financialdevelopment we shall not succeed in solving the funda-mental and current problems of the financial systems ofour republics unless we join forces and combine the finan-cial strength of the individual republics into a singlewhole.

Such is the first group of circumstances that areimpelling our republics to take the path of union.

The second group of circumstances that have deter-mined the union of the republics are facts relating toour international situation. I have in mind our military


situation. I have in mind our relations with foreigncapital through the Commissariat of Foreign Trade.Lastly, I have in mind our diplomatic relations withthe bourgeois states. It must be remembered, comrades,that in spite of the fact that our republics have happilyemerged from the condition of civil war, the danger ofattack from without is by no means excluded. This dan-ger demands that our military front should be absolute-ly united, that our army should be an absolutely unitedarmy, particularly now that we have taken the path,not of moral disarmament, of course, but of a real, ma-terial reduction of armaments. Now that we have reducedour army to 600,000 men, it is particularly essential tohave a single and continuous military front capable ofsafeguarding the republic against external danger.

Furthermore, apart from the military danger, thereis the danger of the economic isolation of our federation.

You know that although the economic boycott of ourRepublic failed after Genoa and The Hague, and afterUrquhart,47 no great influx of capital for the needs ofour economy is to be observed. There is a danger of ourrepublics being economically isolated. This new formof intervention, which is no less dangerous than militaryintervention, can be eliminated only by the creation ofa united economic front of our Soviet republics in faceof the capitalist encirclement.

Lastly, there is our diplomatic situation. You haveall seen how, recently, on the eve of the Lausanne Con-ference,48 the Entente states made every effort to isolateour federation. Diplomatically, they did not succeed.The organised diplomatic boycott of our federation wasbroken. The Entente was forced to reckon with our


federation and to withdraw, to retreat to some extent. Butthere are no grounds for assuming that these and similarfacts about the diplomatic isolation of our federationwill not be repeated. Hence the necessity for a unitedfront also in the diplomatic field.

Such is the second group of circumstances that areimpelling the Soviet Socialist Republics to take thepath of union.

Both the first and the second groups of circumstanceshave operated up to the present day, being in force dur-ing the whole period of the existence of the Soviet re-gime. Our economic needs, of which I have just spoken,as well as our military and diplomatic needs in the sphereof foreign policy were, undoubtedly, also felt before thepresent day. But those circumstances have acquired spe-cial force only now, after the termination of the CivilWar, when the republics have for the first time obtainedthe opportunity to start economic construction, and forthe first time realise how very meagre their economicresources are, and how very necessary union is as regardsboth internal economy and foreign relations. That iswhy now, in the sixth year of existence of the Sovietregime, the question of uniting the independent SovietSocialist Republics has become an immediate one.

Finally, there is a third group of facts, which alsocall for union and which are associated with the struc-ture of the Soviet regime, with the class nature of theSoviet regime. The Soviet regime is so constructed that,being international in its intrinsic nature, it in everyway fosters the idea of union among the masses anditself impels them to take the path of union. Whereascapital, private property and exploitation disunite peo-


ple, split them into mutually hostile camps, examplesof which are provided by Great Britain, France and evensmall multi-national states like Poland and Yugoslaviawith their irreconcilable internal national contradictionswhich corrode the very foundations of these states—whereas, I say, over there, in the West, where capitalistdemocracy reigns and where the states are based on pri-vate property, the very basis of the state fosters nationalbickering, conflicts and struggle, here, in the worldof Soviets, where the regime is based not on capital buton labour, where the regime is based not on privateproperty, but on collective property, where the regimeis based not on the exploitation of man by man, but onthe struggle against such exploitation, here, on the con-trary, the very nature of the regime fosters among thelabouring masses a natural striving towards union in asingle socialist family.

Is i t not s ignif icant that whereas over there, inthe West, in the world of bourgeois democracy, we arewitnessing the gradual decline and disintegration ofthe multi-national states into their component parts (asin the case of Great Britain, which has to settle matterswith India, Egypt and Ireland, how, I do not know, oras in the case of Poland, which has to settle matters withits Byelorussians and Ukrainians, how, I do not knoweither), here, in our federation, which unites no fewerthan thirty nationalities, we, on the contrary, are wit-nessing a process by which the state ties between theindependent republics are becoming stronger, a processwhich is leading to an ever closer union of the inde-pendent nationalit ies in a single independent state!Thus you have two types of state union, of which the


first, the capitalist type, leads to the disintegration of thestate, while the second, the Soviet type, on the contrary,leads to a gradual but enduring union of formerly in-dependent nationalities into a single independent state.Such is the third group of facts that are impell ingthe individual republics to take the path of union.

What should be the form of the union of the republics?The principles of the union are outlined in the resolu-tions which the Presidium of the All-Russian CentralExecutive Committee has received from the Soviet Re-publics of the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Transcaucasia.

Four Republics are to unite: the R.S.F.S.R. as anintegral federal unit, the Transcaucasian Republic, alsoas an integral federal unit, the Ukraine, and Byelorus-sia. Two independent Soviet Republics, Khorezm andBukhara, which are not Socialist Republics, but People’sSoviet Republics, remain for the time being outside thisunion solely and exclusively because these republics arenot yet socialist . I have no doubt, comrades, and Ihope that you too have no doubt, that, as they developinternally towards socialism, these republics will alsojoin the union state which is now being formed.

It might seem to be more expedient for the R.S.F.S.R.not to join the Union of Republics as an integral federalunit, but that the republics comprising it should joinindividually, for which purpose it would evidently benecessary to dissolve the R.S.F.S.R. into its componentparts. I think that this way would be irrational andinexpedient, and that it is precluded by the very courseof the campaign. First, the effect would be that, parallelwith the process that is leading to the union of the re-publics, we would have a process of disuniting the already


existing federal units, a process that would upset thetruly revolutionary process of union of the republicswhich has already begun. Secondly, if we took this wrongroad we would arrive at a situation in which we wouldhave to separate out of the R.S.F.S.R., in addition tothe eight autonomous republics, a specifically RussianCentral Executive Committee and a Russian Councilof People’s Commissars, and this would lead to con-siderable organisational perturbations, which are entirelyunnecessary and harmful at the present time, and whichare not in the least demanded by either the internal orexternal situation. That is why I think that the partiesto the formation of the union should be the four Repub-lics: the R.S.F.S.R., the Transcaucasian Federation, theUkraine, and Byelorussia.

The treaty of union must be based on the followingprinciples: Commissariats of Foreign Trade, Military andNaval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Transport, and Posts andTelegraphs shall be set up only within the Council ofPeople’s Commissars of the Union. The People’s Com-missariats of Finance, National Economy, Food, Labour,and State Inspection shall continue to function withineach of the contracting republics, with the proviso thatthey operate in accordance with the instructions of thecorresponding central Commissariats of the Union. Thisis necessary in order that the forces of the labouringmasses of the republics may be united under the direc-tion of the Union centre as regards food supply, the Su-preme Council of National Economy, the People’s Com-missariat of Finance, and the People’s Commissariat ofLabour. Lastly, the remaining Commissariats, i.e., theCommissariats of Internal Affairs, Justice, Education,


Agriculture, and so on—there are six in all—which aredirectly connected with the manner of life, customs,special forms of land settlement, special forms of legal pro-cedure, and with the language and culture of the peoplesforming the republics, must be left as independent Com-missariats under the control of the Central ExecutiveCommittees and Councils of People’s Commissars of thecontracting republics. This is necessary in order to pro-vide a real guarantee of freedom of national developmentfor the peoples of the Soviet republics.

Such, in my opinion, are the principles that mustbe made the basis of the treaty that is shortly to besigned between our republics.

Accordingly, I move the following draft resolution,which has been approved by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee:

1 . The union of the Russ ian Socia l i s t Federa t ive Sovie tRepublic, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, the Transcau-casian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and the ByelorussianSocialist Soviet Republic into a Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-lics is to be regarded as opportune.

2. The union is to be based on the principle of voluntary con-sent and equal rights of the republics, each of which shall retainthe right freely to secede from the Union of Republics.

3. The delegation from the R.S.F.S.R., in collaboration withthe delegations from the Ukraine, the Transcaucasian Republicand Byelorussia, is to be instructed to draft a declaration on theformation of the Union of Republics, setting forth the considera-tions which dictate the union of the republics into a single unionstate.

4. The delegation is to be instructed to draw up the terms onwhich the R.S.F.S.R. is to enter the Union of Republics andwhen examining the treaty of union, is to adhere to the followingprinciples:


a) the formation of the appropriate Union legislat ive andexecutive organs;

b) the merging of the Commissariats of Military and NavalAffa i r s , Transpor t , Fore ign Affa i r s , Fore ign Trade , andPosts and Telegraphs;

c) the subordination of the Commissariats of Finance, Food,National Economy, Labour, and Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspec-tion of the contracting republics to the instructions of the corre-sponding Commissariats of the Union of Republics;

d) complete guarantee of national development for the peo-ples belonging to the contracting republics.

5. The draft treaty is to be submitted for the approval of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee represented by i tsPresidium before it is submitted to the First Congress of the Unionof Republics.

6. On the basis of the approval of the terms of union by theAll-Russian Central Executive Committee, the delegation is tobe empowered to conclude a treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. andthe Socialist Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Transcaucasia andByelorussia for the formation of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics.

7. The treaty is to be submitted for ratification to the FirstCongress of the Union of Republics.

Such is the draft resolution I submit for your con-sideration.

Comrades, since the Soviet republics were formed,the states of the world have split into two camps: thecamp of socialism and the camp of capitalism. In thecamp of capitalism there are imperialist wars, nationalstrife, oppression, colonial slavery and chauvinism. Inthe camp of the Soviets, the camp of socialism, thereare, on the contrary, mutual confidence, national equali-ty of rights and the peaceful co-existence and fraternalco-operation of peoples. Capitalist democracy has beenstriving for decades to eliminate national contradictions


by combining the free development of nationalit ieswith the system of exploitation. So far it has not succeed-ed, and it will not succeed. On the contrary, the skeinof national contradictions is becoming more and moreentangled, threatening capital ism with death. Herealone, in the world of the Soviets, in the camp of socialism,has it been possible to eradicate national oppression andto establish mutual confidence and fraternal co-operationbetween peoples. And only after the Soviets succeededin doing this did it become possible for us to build up ourfederation and to defend it against the attack of the ene-mies, both internal and external.

Five years ago the Soviet power succeeded in layingthe foundation for the peaceful co-existence and frater-nal co-operation of peoples. Now, when we here are de-ciding the question of the desirability and necessity ofunion, the task before us is to erect on this foundationa new edifice by forming a new and mighty union stateof the working people. The will of the peoples of ourrepublics, who recently assembled at their congressesand unanimously resolved to form a Union of Republics,is incontestable proof that the cause of union is on theright road, that it is based on the great principle ofvoluntary consent and equal rights for nations. Let ushope, comrades, that by forming our Union Republicwe shall create a reliable bulwark against internationalcapitalism, and that the new Union State will be anotherdecisive step towards the union of the working people ofthe whole world into a World Soviet Socialist Republic.(Prolonged applause. The “Internationale” is sung.)


THE FORMATION OF THE UNION

OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS

Report Delivered at the First Congressof Soviets of the U.S.S.R.49

December 30, 1922

Comrades, this day marks a turning point in the his-tory of the Soviet power. It places a landmark betweenthe old period, now past, when the Soviet republics,although they acted in common, yet each followed itsown path and was concerned primarily with its ownpreservation, and the new period, already begun, whenan end is being put to the isolated existence of the So-viet republics, when the republics are being united intoa single union state for a successful struggle againsteconomic ruin, and when the Soviet power is concernednot only with its preservation, but with developing intoan important international force, capable of influenc-ing the international situation and of modifying it inthe interests of the working people.

What was the Soviet state five years ago? A small,scarcely noticeable entity, which evoked the derisionof all its enemies and the pity of many of its friends.That was the period of wartime ruin, when the Sovietpower relied not so much upon its own strength as uponthe impotence of its opponents; when the enemies of theSoviet power, split into two coalit ions, the Austro-German coalition and the Anglo-French coalition, were


engaged in mutual warfare and were not in a positionto turn their weapons against the Soviet power. In thehistory of the Soviet power that was the period of war-time ruin. In the struggle against Kolchak and Denikin,however, the Soviet power created the Red Army andsuccessfu l ly emerged f rom the per iod of war t imeruin.

Later, the second period in the history of the Sovietpower began, the period of struggle against economicruin. This period is by no means over yet, but it hasalready borne fruit, for during this period the Sovietpower has successfully coped with the famine which af-flicted the country last year. During this period we havewitnessed a considerable advance in agriculture and aconsiderable revival of the light industries. Cadres ofindustrial leaders have already come to the fore and arethe object of our hope and trust. But that is far fromenough for the purpose of overcoming economic ruin.To vanquish and eliminate that ruin the forces of allthe Soviet republics must be pooled; all the financialand economic potentialities of the republics must beconcentrated on the task of restoring our basic in-dustries. Hence the necessity for uniting the Sovietrepublics into a single union state. Today is the day ofthe union of our republics into a single state for thepurpose of pooling all our forces for the restoration of oureconomy.

The period of combating wartime ruin gave us theRed Army, one of the foundations of the existence of theSoviet power. The next period, the period of struggleagainst economic ruin, is giving us a new framework ofstate existence—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

FORMATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 161

which will undoubtedly promote the work of restoringSoviet economy.

What is the Soviet power now? A great state of theworking people which evokes among our enemies notderision but the gnashing of teeth.

Such are the results of the development of the Sovietpower during the five years of its existence.

But, comrades, today is not only a day for summingup, it is at the same time the day of triumph of the newRussia over the old Russia, the Russia that was the gen-darme of Europe, the Russia that was the hangman ofAsia. Today is the day of triumph of the new Russia,which has smashed the chains of national oppression,organised victory over capital, created the dictatorshipof the proletariat, awakened the peoples of the East,inspires the workers of the West, transformed the RedFlag from a Party banner into a State banner, and ral-lied around that banner the peoples of the Soviet repub-lics in order to unite them into a single state, the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics, the prototype of the fu-ture World Soviet Socialist Republic.

We Communists are often abused and accused of be-ing unable to build. Let the history of the Soviet powerduring these five years of its existence serve as proofthat Communists are also able to build. Let today’sCongress of Soviets, whose function it is to ratify theDeclaration and Treaty of Union of the Republics thatwere adopted at the Conference of Plenipotentiary Dele-gations yesterday, let this Union Congress demonstrateto all who have not yet lost the ability to understand,that Communists are as well able to build the new asthey are to destroy the old.


Here, comrades, is the Declaration that was adoptedyesterday, at the Conference of Plenipotentiary Delega-tions.50 I shall read it (see appendix No. 1).

And here is the text of the Treaty that was adoptedat the same conference. I shall read it (see appendixNo. 2).

Comrades, on the instructions of the Conference ofPlenipotentiary Delegations of the Soviet Republics Imove that you ratify the texts I have just read of theDeclaration and Treaty on the Formation of the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics.

Comrades, I propose that you adopt them with theunanimity characteristic of Communists, and thereby adda new chapter to the history of mankind. (Applause.)


CONCERNING THE QUESTION

OF THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS

OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS51

This article is based on the lectures “On the Strategyand Tactics of the Russian Communists” that I deliv-ered at different times at the workers’ club in the PresnyaDistrict and to the Communist group at the SverdlovUniversity.52 I have decided to publish it not only be-cause I think it is my duty to meet the wishes of thePresnya and Sverdlov comrades, but also because it seemsto me that the article itself will be of some use for ournew generation of Party workers. I consider it necessaryto say, however, that this article does not claim to pre-sent anything new in substance compared with what hasalready been said several times in the Russian Partypress by our leading comrades. The present article mustbe regarded as a condensed and schematic exposition ofthe fundamental views of Comrade Lenin.

I

PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS

1. TWO ASPECTS OF THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

Political strategy, as well as tactics, is concernedwith the working-class movement. But the working-class movement itself consists of two elements: the objec-tive or spontaneous element, and the subjective or con-scious element. The objective, spontaneous element is


the group of processes that take place independently ofthe conscious and regulating will of the proletariat. Theeconomic development of the country, the developmentof capitalism, the disintegration of the old regime, thespontaneous movements of the proletariat and of theclasses around it, the conflict of classes, etc.—all theseare phenomena whose development does not depend onthe will of the proletariat. That is the objective side ofthe movement. Strategy has nothing to do with thoseprocesses, for it can neither stop nor alter them; it canonly take them into account and proceed from them.That is a field which has to be studied by the theory ofMarxism and the programme of Marxism.

But the movement has also a subjective, consciousside. The subjective side of the movement is the re-flection in the minds of the workers of the spontaneousprocesses of the movement; it is the conscious and sys-tematic movement of the proletariat towards a definitegoal. It is this side of the movement that interests usbecause, unlike the objective side, it is entirely subjectto the directing influence of strategy and tactics. Where-as strategy is unable to cause any change in the courseof the objective processes of the movement, here, on thecontrary, on the subjective, conscious side of the move-ment, the field of application of strategy is broad andvaried, because strategy can accelerate or retard themovement, direct it along the shortest path or divert itto a more difficult and painful path, depending on theperfections or shortcomings of strategy itself.

To accelerate or retard the movement, facilitate orhinder it—such is the field and the limits within whichpolitical strategy and tactics can be applied.

CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS 165

2. THE THEORY AND PROGRAMME

OF MARXISM

Strategy itself does not study the objective processesof the movement. Nevertheless, it must know them andtake them into account correctly if gross and fatal errorsin the leadership of the movement are to be avoided. Theobjective processes of the movement are studied, in thefirst place, by the theory of Marxism and also by the pro-gramme of Marxism. Hence, strategy must base itselfentirely on the data provided by the theory and pro-gramme of Marxism.

From a study of the objective processes of capitalismin their development and decline, the theory of Marxismarrives at the conclusion that the fall of the bourgeoisieand the seizure of power by the proletariat are inevitable,that capitalism must inevitably give way to socialism.Proletarian strategy can be called truly Marxist onlywhen its operations are based on this fundamental conclu-sion of the theory of Marxism.

Proceeding from the data of theory, the programmeof Marxism determines the aims of the proletarian move-ment, which are scientifically formulated in the pointsof the programme. The programme may be designed tocover the whole period of capitalist development andhave in view the overthrow of capitalism and the organi-sation of socialist production, or only one definite phaseof the development of capitalism, for instance, the over-throw of the survivals of the feudal-absolutist system andthe creation of conditions for the free development ofcapitalism. Accordingly, the programme may consistof two par ts : a maximum and a minimum. I t goeswithout saying that strategy designed for the minimum


part of the programme is bound to differ from strategydesigned for the maximum part; and strategy can becalled truly Marxist only when it is guided in its opera-tions by the aims of the movement as formulated inthe programme of Marxism.

3. STRATEGY

The most important function of strategy is to deter-mine the main direction which ought to be taken by theworking-class movement, and along which the prole-tariat can most advantageously deliver the main blow atits enemy in order to achieve the aims formulated in theprogramme. A strategic plan is a plan of the organisa-tion of the decisive blow in the direction in which theblow is most likely to achieve the maximum results.

The principal features of political strategy couldeasily be described by drawing an analogy with militarystrategy: for instance, in the fight against Denikin dur-ing the Civil War. Everybody remembers the end of 1919,when Denikin’s forces were standing near Tula. At thattime an interesting dispute arose among our militarymen about the point from which the decisive blow atDenikin’s armies should be delivered. Some militarymen proposed that the line Tsaritsyn-Novorossiisk bechosen for the main direction of the blow. Others, on thecontrary, proposed that the decisive blow be deliveredalong the line Voronezh-Rostov, to proceed along thisline and thus cut Denikin’s armies in two and then crusheach part separately. The first plan undoubtedly had itsmerits in that it provided for the capture of Novoros-siisk, which would have cut off the retreat of Denikin’s


armies. But, on the one hand, it was faulty because itassumed our advance through districts (the Don Region)which were hostile to Soviet power, and thus wouldhave involved heavy casualties; on the other hand, itwas dangerous because it opened for Denikin’s armiesthe road to Moscow via Tula and Serpukhov. The onlycorrect plan for the main blow was the second one,because, on the one hand, it assumed the advance ofour main group through districts (Voronezh Gubernia-Donets Basin) which were friendly towards Soviet powerand, therefore, would not involve any considerable cas-ualties; on the other hand, it would disrupt the opera-tions of Denikin’s main group of forces which were mov-ing towards Moscow. The majority of the military mendeclared in favour of the second plan, and this deter-mined the fate of the war against Denikin.

In other words, determining the direction of the mainblow means deciding in advance the nature of opera-tions during the whole period of the war, i.e., decidingin advance, to the extent of nine-tenths, the fate ofthe whole war. That is the function of strategy.

The same must be said about political strategy. Thefirst serious, collision between the political leaders ofthe Russian proletariat on the question of the main di-rection of the proletarian movement took place at thebeginning of the twentieth century, during the Russo-Japanese war. At that time, as we know, one sectionof our Party (the Mensheviks) held the view that themain direction of the proletarian movement in its struggleagainst tsarism should be along the line of a bloc betweenthe proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie; the peasantrywas omitted, or almost entirely omitted from the plan


as a major revolutionary factor, while the leading rolein the general revolutionary movement was assigned tothe liberal bourgeoisie. The other section of the Party(the Bolsheviks) maintained, on the contrary, that themain blow should proceed along the line of a bloc betweenthe proletariat and the peasantry, and that the leadingrole in the general revolutionary movement should beassigned to the proletariat, while the liberal bourgeoisieshould be neutralised.

If, by analogy with the war against Denikin, we de-pict our whole revolutionary movement, from the begin-ning of this century to the February Revolution in 1917, asa war waged by the workers and peasants against tsarismand the landlords, it will be clear that the fate of tsarismand of the landlords largely depended upon which of thetwo strategic plans (the Menshevik or the Bolshevik) wouldbe adopted, and upon which direction would be chosenas the main direction of the revolutionary movement.

Just as during the war against Denikin military strat-egy, by deciding the main direction of the blow, deter-mined to the extent of nine-tenths the character of all sub-sequent operations, including the liquidation of Denikin’sarmies, so here, in the sphere of the revolutionary strug-gle against tsarism, our political strategy, by decidingthat the main direction of the revolutionary movementshould follow the Bolshevik plan, determined the charac-ter of our Party’s work during the whole period of theopen struggle against tsarism, from the time of the Russo-Japanese war down to the February Revolution in 1917.

The function of political strategy is, primarily, onthe basis of the data provided by the theory and pro-gramme of Marxism, and taking into account the exper-


rience of the revolutionary struggle of the workers of allcountries, correctly to determine the main direction ofthe proletarian movement of the given country in thegiven historical period.

4. TACTICS

Tactics are a part of strategy, subordinated to andserving it. Tactics are not concerned with the war as awhole, but with its individual episodes, with battlesand engagements. Strategy strives to win the war, orto carry through the struggle, against tsarism let us say,to the end; tactics, on the contrary, strive to win partic-ular engagements and battles, to conduct particularcampaigns successfully, or particular operations, thatare more or less appropriate to the concrete situation ofthe struggle at each given moment.

A most important function of tactics is to determinethe ways and means, the forms and methods of fightingthat are most appropriate to the concrete situation atthe given moment and are most certain to prepare theway for strategic success. Consequently, the operationand results of tactics must be regarded not in isolation,not from the point of view of their immediate effect,but from the point of view of the aims and possibilitiesof strategy.

There are times when tactical successes facilitatethe achievement of strategic aims. Such was the case,for instance, on the Denikin front at the end of 1919,when our troops liberated Orel and Voronezh, when thesuccesses of our cavalry at Voronezh and of our infantryat Orel created a situation favourable for delivering the


blow at Rostov. Such was the case in August 1917 inRussia, when the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets cameover to the side of the Bolsheviks and thereby createda new political situation, which subsequently facilitat-ed the blow delivered by our Party in October.

There are also times when tactical successes, bril-liant from the point of view of their immediate effectbut not corresponding to the strategic possibilities, cre-ate an “unexpected” situation, fatal to the whole cam-paign. Such was the case with Denikin at the end of 1919when, carried away by the easy success of a rapid and strik-ing advance on Moscow, he stretched his front from theVolga to the Dnieper, and thereby prepared the way forthe defeat of his armies. Such was the case in 1920, duringthe war against the Poles, when, under-estimating thestrength of the national factor in Poland, and carriedaway by the easy success of a striking advance, we under-took a task that was beyond our strength, the task ofbreaking into Europe via Warsaw, which rallied thevast majority of the Polish population against the Sovietforces and so created a situation which nullified the suc-cesses of the Soviet forces at Minsk and Zhitomir anddamaged the Soviet Government’s prestige in the West.

Lastly, there are also times when a tactical successmust be ignored and when tactical losses and reversesmust be deliberately incurred in order to ensure futurestrategic gains. This often happens in time of war, whenone side, wishing to save its army cadres and to withdrawthem from the onslaught of superior enemy forces, beginsa systematic retreat and surrenders whole cities and re-gions without a fight in order to gain time and to musterits forces for new decisive battles in the future. Such was


the case in Russia in 1918, during the German offensive,when our Party was forced to accept the Brest Peace,which was a tremendous setback from the point of view ofthe immediate political effect at that moment, in orderto preserve the alliance with the peasants, who werethirsting for peace, to obtain a respite, to create a newarmy and thereby ensure strategic gains in the future.

In other words, tactics must not be subordinated tothe transient interests of the moment, they must not beguided by considerations of immediate political effect,still less must they desert firm ground and build castlesin the air. Tactics must be devised in accordance withthe aims and possibilities of strategy.

The function of tactics is primarily to determine—in accordance with the requirements of strategy, andtaking into account the experience of the workers’ revo-lutionary struggle in all countries—the forms and meth-ods of fighting most appropriate to the concrete situa-tion of the struggle at each given moment.

5. FORMS OF STRUGGLE

The methods of warfare, the forms of war, are notalways the same. They change in accordance with theconditions of development, primarily, in accordance withthe development of production. In the time of GenghisKhan the methods of warfare were different from thosein the time of Napoleon III; in the twentieth century theyare different from those in the nineteenth century.

The art of war under modern conditions consists inmastering all forms of warfare and all the achievementsof science in this sphere, utilising them intelligently,


combining them skilfully, or making timely use of oneor another of these forms as circumstances require.

The same must be said about the forms of strugglein the political sphere. The forms of struggle in the po-litical sphere are even more varied than the forms ofwarfare. They change in accordance with the developmentof economic life, social life and culture, with the condi-tion of classes, the relation of the contending forces,the kind of government and, finally, with internationalrelations, and so forth. The illegal form of struggle underabsolutism, combined with partial strikes and workers’demonstrations; the open form of struggle when “legalpossibilities” exist, and workers’ mass political strikes;the parliamentary form of struggle at the time, say, ofthe Duma, and extra-parliamentary mass action whichsometimes develops into armed uprising; lastly, stateforms of struggle, after the proletariat has taken powerand obtains the opportunity to utilise all the resourcesand forces of the state, including the army—such, ingeneral, are the forms of struggle that are brought tothe fore by the practical experience of the revolutionarystruggle of the proletariat.

It is the task of the Party to master all forms ofstruggle, to combine them intelligently on the battle-field and skilfully to intensify the struggle in those formswhich are specially suitable in the given situation.

6. FORMS OF ORGANISATION

The forms of organisation of armies and the differ-ent arms of the service are usually adapted to the formsand methods of warfare. When the latter change, the


former change. In a war of manoeuvre the issue is oftendecided by massed cavalry. In positional warfare, on thecontrary, cavalry plays either no part at all, or playsa subordinate part; heavy artillery and aircraft, gas andtanks decide everything.

The task of the art of war is to ensure having all armsof the service, bring them to perfection and skilfullycombine their operations.

The same can be said about the forms of organisationin the political sphere. Here, as in the military sphere,the forms of organisation are adapted to the forms ofthe struggle. Secret organisations of professional revolu-tionaries in the period of absolutism; educational, trade-union, co-operative and parliamentary organisations (theDuma group, etc.) in the period of the Duma; factoryand workshop committees, peasant committees, strikecommittees, Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies,revolutionary military committees, and a broad prole-tarian party which unites all these forms of organisation,in the period of mass action and insurrection; finally,the state form of organisation of the proletariat in theperiod when power is concentrated in the hands of theworking class—such, in general, are the forms of organi-sation on which, under certain conditions, the proletar-iat can and must rely in its struggle against the bour-geoisie.

The task of the Party is to master all these forms oforganisation, bring them to perfection and skilfully com-bine their operations at each given moment.


7. THE SLOGAN. THE DIRECTIVE

Skilfully formulated decisions which express the aimsof the war, or of individual engagements, and which arepopular among the troops, are sometimes of decisiveimportance at the front as a means of inspiring the armyto action, of maintaining its morale, and so forth. Appro-priate orders, slogans, or appeals to the troops are asimportant for the whole course of a war as first-classheavy artillery, or first-class fast-moving tanks.

Slogans are sti l l more important in the polit icalsphere, when one has to deal with tens and hundreds ofmillions of the population, with their diverse demandsand requirements.

A slogan is a concise and clear formulation of the aimsof the struggle, near or remote, given by the leadinggroup, let us say, of the proletariat, by its party. Slogansvary in accordance with the different aims of the struggle,aims embracing either a whole historical period or indi-vidual stages and episodes of the given historical period.The slogan “Down with the autocracy” which was firstadvanced by the “Emancipation of Labour” group53 inthe ’eighties of the last century, was a propagandaslogan, since its aim was to win over to the Party individ-uals and groups of the most steadfast and sturdy fight-ers. In the period of the Russo-Japanese war, when theinstability of the autocracy became more or less evidentto large sections of the working class, this slogan becamean agitation slogan, for it was designed to win over vastmasses of the toilers. In the period just before the Febru-ary Revolution of 1917, when tsarism had already becomecompletely discredited in the eyes of the masses, the


slogan “Down with the autocracy” was transformedfrom an agitation slogan into an action slogan, since itwas designed to move vast masses into the assault ontsarism. During the February Revolution this sloganbecame a Party directive , i .e. , a direct call to seizecertain institutions and certain positions of the tsaristsystem on a definite date, for it was already a matterof overthrowing and destroying tsarism. A directive isthe Party’s direct call for action, at a certain time andin a certain place, binding upon all members of the Par-ty and, if the call correctly and aptly formulates thedemands of the masses, and if the time is really ripefor it, it is usually taken up by the broad masses of thetoilers.

To confuse slogans with directives, or an agitation slo-gan with an action slogan, is as dangerous as prematureor belated action, which is sometimes fatal. In April1917, the slogan “All power to the Soviets” was an agi-tation slogan. The well-known demonstration which tookplace in Petrograd in April 1917 under the slogan “Allpower to the Soviets,” and which surrounded the WinterPalace, was an attempt, premature and therefore fatal,to convert this slogan into an action slogan.54 That wasa very dangerous example of the confusion of an agitationslogan with an action slogan. The Party was right whenit condemned the initiators of this demonstration, forit knew that the conditions necessary for the transforma-tion of this slogan into an action slogan had not yet arisen,and that premature action on the part of the proletariatmight result in the defeat of its forces.

On the other hand, there are cases when the Partyis faced with the necessity of cancelling or changing


“overnight” an adopted slogan (or directive) for whichthe time is ripe, in order to guard its ranks against a trapset by the enemy, or with the necessity of postponingthe execution of the directive to a more favourable mo-ment. Such a case arose in Petrograd in June 1917, when,because the situation had changed, the Central Commit-tee of our Party “suddenly” cancelled the workers’ andsoldiers’ demonstration, which had been carefully pre-pared and fixed to take place on June 10.

It is the Party’s duty skilfully and opportunely totransform agitation slogans into action slogans, or actionslogans into definite and concrete directives, or, if thesituation demands it, to display the necessary flexibilityand determination to cancel the execution of any givenslogan in good time, even if it is popular and the timeis ripe for it.

II

THE STRATEGIC PLAN

1. HISTORIC TURNS. STRATEGIC PLANS

The Party’s s t rategy is not something constant ,fixed once and for all. It alters in accordance with theturns in history, with historic changes. These alterationsin strategy find expression in the fact that with eachseparate turn in history a separate strategic plan isdrawn up corresponding to that turn, and effective duringthe whole period from that turn to the next. The strate-gic plan defines the direction of the main blow to be de-livered by the revolutionary forces and the correspondingdisposition of the vast masses on the social front. Nat-urally, a strategic plan suitable for one period of his-


tory, which has its own specific features, cannot be suit-able for another period of history, which has entire-ly different specific features. Corresponding to each turnin history is the strategic plan essential for it and adaptedto its tasks.

The same may be said about the conduct of war. Thestrategic plan that was drawn up for the war againstKolchak could not have been suitable for the war againstDenikin, which called for a new strategic plan, which,in its turn, would not have been suitable for, say, thewar against the Poles in 1920, because the direction ofthe main blows, as well as the disposition of the mainfighting forces, could not but be different in each ofthese three cases.

The recent history of Russia knows of three main his-toric turns, which gave rise to three different strategicplans in the history of our Party. We consider it neces-sary to describe them briefly in order to show how theParty’s strategic plans in general change in conformitywith new historic changes.

2. THE FIRST HISTORIC TURN AND THE COURSE

TOWARDS THE BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC

REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

This turn began at the beginning of the present cen-tury, in the period of the Russo-Japanese war, when thedefeat of the tsar’s armies and the tremendous politicalstrikes of the Russian workers stirred up all classes ofthe population and pushed them into the arena of thepolitical struggle. This turn came to an end in the daysof the February Revolution in 1917.


During this period two strategic plans were at issuein our Party: the plan of the Mensheviks (Plekhanov-Martov, 1905), and the plan of the Bolsheviks (ComradeLenin, 1905).

The Menshevik strategy planned the main blow attsarism along the line of a coalition between the liberalbourgeoisie and the proletariat. Proceeding from the factthat at that time the revolution was regarded as a bour-geois revolution, this plan assigned the hegemony (leader-ship) of the movement to the liberal bourgeoisie anddoomed the proletariat to the role of “extreme left opposi-tion,” to the role of “prompter” to the bourgeoisie,while the peasantry, one of the major revolutionary forces,was entirely, or almost entirely, left out of account.It is easy to understand that since this plan left out ofaccount the millions of peasants in a country like Rus-sia it was hopelessly utopian, and since it placed the fateof the revolution in the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie(the hegemony of the bourgeoisie) it was reactionary, forthe liberal bourgeoisie was not interested in achievingthe complete victory of the revolution, it was alwaysready to end the matter by a deal with tsarism.

The Bolshevik strategy (see Comrade Lenin’s book TwoTactics55) planned the revolution’s main blow at tsarismalong the line of a coalition between the proletariat andthe peasantry, while the liberal bourgeoisie was to beneutralised. Proceeding from the fact that the liberalbourgeoisie was not interested in the complete victoryof the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that it preferreda deal with tsarism at the expense of the workers andpeasants to the victory of the revolution, this plan as-signed the hegemony of the revolutionary movement to


the proletariat as the only completely revolutionary classin Russia. This plan was remarkable not only because ittook into account correctly the driving forces of therevolution, but also because it contained in embryo theidea of the dictatorship of the proletariat (the hegemonyof the proletariat), because it brilliantly foresaw the next,higher phase of the revolution in Russia and facilitatedthe transition to it.

The subsequent development of the revolution rightup to February 1917 fully confirmed the correctness ofthis strategic plan.

3. THE SECOND HISTORIC TURN AND

THE COURSE TOWARDS THE DICTATORSHIP

OF THE PROLETARIAT IN RUSSIA

The second turn began with the February Revolutionin 1917, after tsarism was overthrown, when the imperial-ist war had exposed the fatal ulcers of capitalism all overthe world; when the liberal bourgeoisie, incapable oftaking in its hands the actual government of the coun-try, was compelled to confine itself to holding formalpower (the Provisional Government); when the Sovietsof Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, after getting actualpower into their hands, had neither the experience northe will to make the necessary use of it; when the sol-diers at the front and the workers and peasants in therear were groaning under the burdens of the war and eco-nomic disruption; when the “dual power” and “contactcommittee”56 regime, torn by internal contradictions andcapable neither of waging war nor of bringing aboutpeace, not only failed to find “a way out of the impasse”


but confused the situation still more. This period endedwith the October Revolution in 1917.

Two strategic plans were at issue in the Soviets atthat time: the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary plan,and the Bolshevik plan.

The Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary strategy, vac-illating at first between the Soviets and the Provision-al Government, between revolution and counter-revo-lution, took final shape at the time of the opening ofthe Democratic Conference (September 1917). It tookthe line of the gradual but steady removal of the Sovietsfrom power and the concentration of all power in thecountry in the hands of the “Pre-parliament,” the pro-totype of a future bourgeois parliament. The questionsof peace and war, the agrarian and labour questions,as well as the national question, were shelved, pendingthe convocation of the Constituent Assembly, which, inits turn, was postponed for an indefinite period. “Allpower to the Constituent Assembly”—this was how theSocialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks formulatedtheir strategic plan. It was a plan for the preparation ofa bourgeois dictatorship, a combed and brushed-up, “per-fectly democratic” dictatorship it is true, but a bourgeoisdictatorship for all that.

The Bolshevik strategy (see Comrade Lenin’s “The-ses,” published in April 191757) planned the main blowalong the line of liquidating the power of the bourgeoi-sie by the combined forces of the proletariat and thepoor peasants, along the line of organising the dictator-ship of the proletariat in the shape of a Soviet Republic.Rupture with imperialism and withdrawal from the war;liberation of the oppressed nationalities of the former


Russian Empire; expropriation of the landlords and capi-talists; preparation of the conditions for organising so-cialist economy—such were the elements of the Bolshe-viks’ strategic plan in that period. “All power to theSoviets”—this was how the Bolsheviks then formulatedtheir strategic plan. This plan was important not onlybecause it took into account correctly the actual drivingforces of the new, proletarian revolution in Russia, but al-so because it facilitated and accelerated the unleashing ofthe revolutionary movement in the West.

Subsequent developments right up to the OctoberRevolution fully confirmed the correctness of this stra-tegic plan.

4. THE THIRD HISTORIC TURNAND THE COURSE TOWARDS THE PROLETARIAN

REVOLUTION IN EUROPE

The third turn began with the October Revolution,when the mortal combat between the two imperialistgroups in the West had reached its climax; when therevolutionary crisis in the West was obviously growing;when the bourgeois government in Russia, bankrupt and

entangled in contradictions, fell under the blows of theproletarian revolution; when the victorious proletarianrevolution broke with imperialism and withdrew fromthe war, and thereby made bitter enemies in the shape ofimperialist coalitions in the West; when the new SovietGovernment’s decrees on peace, the confiscation of thelandlords’ land, the expropriation of the capitalists andthe liberation of the oppressed nationalities earned forit the confidence of millions of toilers throughout theworld. This was a turn on an international scale, because,


for the first time, the international front of capital wasbreached, the question of overthrowing capitalism wasfor the first time put on a practical footing. This trans-formed the October Revolution from a national, Russianforce into an international force, and the Russian work-ers from a backward detachment of the internationalproletariat into its vanguard, which by its devoted strug-gle rouses the workers of the West and the oppressedcountries of the East. This turn has not yet come to theend of its development, for it has not yet developed onan international scale, but its content and general direc-tion are already sufficiently clear.

Two strategic plans were at issue in political circlesin Russia at that time: the plan of the counter-revolution-aries, who had drawn into their organisations the activesections of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries,and the plan of the Bolsheviks.

The counter-revolutionaries and active Socialist-Rev-olutionaries and Mensheviks planned along the lineof uniting in one camp all the discontented elements:the old army officers in the rear and at the front, thebourgeois-nationalist governments in the border regions,the capitalists and landlords who had been expropriatedby the revolution, the agents of the Entente who werepreparing for intervention, and so forth. They steereda course towards the overthrow of the Soviet Governmentby means of revolts or foreign intervention, and the res-toration of the capitalist order in Russia.

The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, planned along theline of internally strengthening the dictatorship of theproletariat in Russia and extending the sphere of opera-tion of the proletarian revolution to all countries of the


world by combining the efforts of the proletarians ofRussia with the efforts of the proletarians of Europeand with the efforts of the oppressed nations of the Eastagainst world imperialism. Highly noteworthy is theexact and concise formulation of this strategic plangiven by Comrade Lenin in his pamphlet The Prole-tarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, namely:“To do the utmost possible in one country (one’s own—J. St.) for the development, support and awakening of therevolution in all countries.” The value of this strategicplan lies not only in that it took into account correctlythe driving forces of the world revolution, but alsoin that it foresaw and facilitated the subsequent processof transformation of Soviet Russia into the focus of at-tention of the revolutionary movement throughout theworld, into the banner of liberation of the workers inthe West and of the colonies in the East.

The subsequent development of the revolution allover the world, and also the five years’ existence ofSoviet power in Russia, have fully confirmed the correct-ness of this strategic plan. The fact that the counter-revolutionaries, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Menshe-viks, who made several attempts to overthrow the SovietGovernment, are now emigres, while the Soviet Govern-ment and the international proletarian organisation arebecoming the major instruments of the policy of the worldproletariat, and other facts of this kind, are obvioustestimony in favour of the Bolsheviks’ strategic plan.

Pravda, No. 56,March 14, 1923

Signed: J. Stalin

NATIONAL FACTORS IN PARTY

AND STATE AFFAIRS

Thesis for the Twelfth Congressof the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks),

Approved by the Central Committee of the Party58

I

1. Already in the last century the development ofcapitalism revealed the tendency to internationalise themodes of production and exchange, to eliminate nationalisolation, to bring peoples into closer economic relations,and gradually to unite vast terri tories into a singleconnected whole. The further development of capitalism,the development of the world market, the establishmentof the great sea and rail routes, the export of capital,and so on, still further strengthened this tendency andbound peoples of the most diverse types by the ties ofinternational division of labour and all-round mutualdependence. In so far as this process was a reflection ofthe colossal development of productive forces, in so faras it helped to destroy national aloofness and the oppo-sition of interests of the various peoples, it was and isa progressive process, for it is creating the material pre-requisites for the future world socialist economic system.

2. But this tendency developed in peculiar formsthat were completely at variance with its intrinsic his-torical significance. The mutual dependence of peoplesand the economic union of territories took place in thecourse of the development of capitalism not as a resultof the co-operation of nations as entities with equal

NATIONAL FACTORS IN PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS 185

rights, but by means of the subjugation of some nationsby others, by means of the oppression and exploitationof less developed nations by more developed nations.Colonial plunder and annexations, national oppressionand inequality, imperialist tyranny and violence, colo-nial slavery and national subjection, and, finally, thestruggle among the “civilised” nations for dominationover the “uncivilised” peoples—such were the formswithin which the development of closer economic rela-tions of peoples took place. For that reason we find that,side by side with the tendency towards union, there arosea tendency to destroy the forcible forms of such union,a struggle for the liberation of the oppressed colonies anddependent nationalities from the imperialist yoke. Sincethe latter tendency signified a revolt of the oppressedmasses against imperialist forms of union, since it de-manded the union of nations on the basis of co-operationand voluntary union, it was and is a progressive tenden-cy, for it is creating the spiritual prerequisites for thefuture world socialist economy.

3. The struggle between these two principal tenden-cies, expressed in forms that are natural to capitalism,filled the history of the multi-national bourgeois statesduring the last half-century. The irreconcilable contra-diction between these tendencies within the frameworkof capitalist development was the underlying cause ofthe internal unsoundness and organic instability of thebourgeois colonial states. Inevitable conflicts: withinsuch states and inevitable wars between them; the disin-tegration of the old colonial states and the formation ofnew ones; a new drive for colonies and a new disintegra-tion of the multi-national states leading to a new


refashioning of the political map of the world—such arethe results of this fundamental contradiction. The break-upof the old Russia, of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey, onthe one hand, and the history of such colonial states asGreat Britain and the old Germany, on the other; and, last-ly, the “great” imperialist war and the growth of the revo-lutionary movement of the colonial and unequal nations—all these and similar facts clearly point to the instabilityand insecurity of the multi-national bourgeois states.

Thus, the irreconcilable contradiction between the proc-ess of economic union of peoples and the imperialist meth-ods of accomplishing this union was the cause of the in-ability, helplessness and impotence of the bourgeoisie infinding a correct approach to the solution of the nationalquestion.

4. Our Party took these circumstances into accountand based its policy in the national question on the rightof nations to self-determination, the right of peoplesto independent state existence. The Party recognisedthis inalienable right of nations from the moment itcame into being, at its first congress (in 1898), when thecontradictions of capitalism in connection with the na-tional question were not yet fully and clearly defined. La-ter it invariably re-affirmed its national programme inspecial decisions and resolutions of its congresses and con-ferences, up to the October Revolution. The imperialistwar, and the mighty revolutionary movement in thecolonies to which it gave rise, only provided new confir-mation of the correctness of the Party’s decisions on thenational question. The gist of these decisions is:

a) emphatic repudiation of every form of coercionin relation to nationalities;

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b) recognition of the equality and sovereignty ofpeoples in determining their destinies;

c) recognition of the principle that a durable unionof peoples can be achieved only on the basis of co-opera-tion and voluntary consent;

d) proclamation of the truth that such a union canbe realised only as the result of the overthrow of thepower of capital.

In the course of its work our Party never tired ofadvancing this programme of national liberation in oppo-sition to the frankly oppressive policy of tsarism, and alsoto the half-hearted, semi-imperialist policy of the Men-sheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Whereas the tsar-ist Russification policy created a gulf between tsarismand the non-Russian nationalities of the old Russia, andwhereas the semi-imperialist policy of the Mensheviksand Socialist-Revolutionaries caused the best elementsamong these nationalities to desert Kerenskyism, theliberation policy pursued by our Party won for it thesympathy and support of the broad masses among thosenationalities in their struggle against tsarism and theimperialist Russian bourgeoisie. There can scarcely beany doubt that this sympathy and support was one ofthe decisive factors that determined the victory ourParty achieved in the October days.

5. The October Revolution gave practical effect toour Party’s decisions on the national question. By over-throwing the power of the landlords and capitalists,the chief vehicles of national oppression, and by puttingthe proletariat in power, the October Revolution at oneblow shattered the chains of national oppression, upsetthe old relations between peoples, struck at the root of

NATIONAL FACTORS IN PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS


the old national enmity, cleared the way for the co-op-eration of peoples, and won for the Russian proletariatthe confidence of its brothers of other nationalitiesnot only in Russia, but also in Europe and Asia. It scarce-ly needs proof that had it not won this confidence, theRussian proletariat could not have defeated Kolchakand Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel. On the other hand,there is no doubt that the oppressed nationalities couldnot have achieved their liberation if the dictatorshipof the proletariat had not been established in centralRussia. National enmity and national conflicts are in-evitable, unavoidable, as long as capital is in power,as long as the petty bourgeoisie, and above all the peas-antry of the formerly “dominant” nation, permeated asthey are with nationalist prejudices, follow the capital-ists; and, on the contrary, national peace and nationalfreedom may be considered assured if the peasantry andthe other petty-bourgeois sections of the population fol-low the proletariat, that is, if the dictatorship of the pro-letariat is assured. Hence, the victory of the Sovietsand the establishment of the dictatorship of the prole-tariat are the basis, the foundation, on which the fra-ternal co-operation of peoples within a single state unioncan be built up.

6. But the results of the October Revolution are notlimited to the abolition of national oppression and thecreation of a basis for the union of peoples. In the courseof its development the October Revolution also evolvedthe forms of this union and laid down the main linesfor the union of the peoples in a single union state. Inthe first period of the revolution, when the labouringmasses among the nationalities first began to feel that


they were independent national units, while the threatof foreign intervention had not yet become a real danger,co-operation between the peoples did not yet have a fullydefined, well-established form. During the Civil Warand intervention, when the requirements of the militaryself-defence of the national republics came into theforefront, while questions of economic construction werenot yet on the order of the day, co-operation took theform of a military alliance. Finally, in the post-warperiod, when questions of the restoration of the produc-tive forces destroyed by the war came into the forefront,the military alliance was supplemented by an economicalliance. The union of the national republics into theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics marks the conclud-ing stage in the development of the forms of co-operation,which have now assumed the character of a military, eco-nomic and political union of peoples into a single, multi-national, Soviet state.

Thus, in the Soviet system the proletariat found thekey to the correct solution of the national question, discov-ered the way to organise a stable multi-national stateon the basis of national equality of rights and voluntaryconsent.

7. But finding the key to the correct solution of thenational question does not yet mean solving it fullyand finally, does not yet mean giving the solution con-crete and practical shape. In order to put into effect cor-rectly the national programme advanced by the OctoberRevolution, it is also necessary to surmount the obstacleswhich we have inherited from the past period of nationaloppression, and which cannot be surmounted at onestroke, in a short space of time.


This heritage consists, firstly, in the survivals ofdominant-nation chauvinism, which is a reflection of theformer privileged position of the Great Russians. Thesesurvivals still persist in the minds of our Soviet offi-cials, both central and local; they are entrenched inour state institutions, central and local; they are beingreinforced by the “new,” Smyena Vekh,59 Great-Russianchauvinist spirit, which is becoming stronger and strong-er owing to the N.E.P. In practice they find expressionin an arrogantly disdainful and heartlessly bureaucraticattitude on the part of Russian Soviet officials towardsthe needs and requirements of the national republics.The multi-national Soviet state can become really du-rable, and the co-operation of the peoples within it reallyfraternal, only if these survivals are vigorously and ir-revocably eradicated from the practice of our state in-stitutions. Hence, the first immediate task of our Partyis vigorously to combat the survivals of Great-Russianchauvinism.

This heritage consists, secondly, in the actual, i.e.,economic and cultural, inequality of the nationalitiesof the Union of Republics. The legal national equalitywon by the October Revolution is a great gain for thepeoples, but it does not in itself solve the whole nationalproblem. A number of republics and peoples, which havenot gone through, or had scarcely entered, the stage ofcapitalism, which have no proletariat of their own,or scarcely any, and which are therefore backward eco-nomically and culturally, are incapable of making fulluse of the rights and opportunities afforded them bynational equality of rights; they are incapable of risingto a higher level of development and thus catching up


with the nationalities which have forged ahead unlessthey receive real and prolonged assistance from outside.The causes of this actual inequality lie not only in thehistory of these peoples, but also in the policy pursuedby tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie, which stroveto convert the border regions into areas producing nothingbut raw materials and exploited by the industriallydeveloped central districts. This inequality cannot beremoved in a short space of time, this heritage cannotbe eliminated in a year or two. The Tenth Congress of ourParty already pointed out that “the abolition of actualnational inequality is a lengthy process involving astubborn and persistent struggle against all survivals ofnational oppression and colonial slavery.”60 But to over-come it is absolutely necessary. And it can be overcomeonly by the Russian proletariat rendering the backwardpeoples of the Union real and prolonged assistance intheir economic and cultural advancement. Otherwise therecan be no grounds for expecting the establishment ofproper and durable co-operation of the peoples withinthe framework of the single union state. Hence, the sec-ond immediate task of our Party lies in the struggleto abolish the actual inequality of the nationalities, thestruggle to raise the cultural and economic level of thebackward peoples.

This heritage consists, lastly, in the survivals of na-tionalism among a number of nations which have bornethe heavy yoke of national oppression and have not yetmanaged to rid their minds of old national grievances.These survivals find practical expression in a certainnational aloofness and the absence of full confidence ofthe formerly oppressed peoples in measures proceeding


from the Russians. However, in some of the republicswhich consist of several nationalities, this defensivenationalism often becomes converted into aggressivenationalism, into blatant chauvinism on the part of astrong nationality directed against the weak nationali-ties of these republics. Georgian chauvinism (in Georgia)directed against the Armenians, Ossetians, Ajarians andAbkhazians; Azerbaijanian chauvinism (in Azerbaijan)directed against the Armenians; Uzbek chauvinism (inBukhara and Khorezm) directed against the Turkme-nians and Kirghiz—all these forms of chauvinism, which,moreover, are fostered by the conditions of the N.E.P. andby competition, are a grave evil which threatens to con-vert some of the national republics into arenas of squab-bling and bickering. Needless to say, all these phenomenahinder the actual union of the peoples into a single unionstate. In so far as the survivals of nationalism are a dis-tinctive form of defence against Great-Russian chau-vinism, the surest means of overcoming them lies in avigorous struggle against Great-Russian chauvinism. Inso far, however, as these survivals become convertedinto local chauvinism directed against the weak nationalgroups in individual republics, it is the duty of Partymembers to wage a direct struggle against these sur-vivals. Thus, the third immediate task of our Party is tocombat nationalist survivals and, primarily, the chau-vinist forms of these survivals.

8. We must regard as one of the clear expressionsof the heritage of the past the fact that a considerablesection of Soviet officials in the centre and in the local-ities appraise the Union of Republics not as a union ofstate units with equal rights whose mission it is to guar-


antee the free development of the national republics,but as a step towards the liquidation of those republics,as the beginning of the formation of what is called the“one and indivisible.” Condemning this conception asanti-proletarian and reactionary, the congress calls uponmembers of the Party vigilantly to see to it that the unionof the republics and the merging of the Commissariatsare not utilised by chauvinistically-minded Soviet offi-cials as a screen for their attempts to ignore the economicand cultural needs of the national republics. The mergingof the Commissariats is a test for the Soviet apparatus:if this experiment were in practice to assume a dominant-nation tendency, the Party would be compelled to adoptthe most resolute measures against such a distortion,even to the extent of raising the question of annullingthe merging of certain Commissariats until such time asthe Soviet apparatus has been properly re-trained, sothat it will pay genuinely proletarian and genuinelyfraternal attention to the needs and requirements of thesmall and backward nationalities.

9. Since the Union of Republics is a new form of co-existence of peoples, a new form of their co-operationwithin a single union state, from which the survivalsdescribed above must be eliminated in the course of thejoint activities of the peoples, the supreme organs of theUnion must be formed in such a way as fully to reflectnot only the common needs and requirements of all thenationalities of the Union, but also the special needs andrequirements of each individual nationality. Therefore,in addition to the existing central organs of the Union,which represent the labouring masses of the entire Unionirrespective of nationality, a special organ should be


created representing the nationalities on the basis of equal-ity. Such a structure of the central organs of the Unionwould make it fully possible to lend an attentive earto the needs and requirements of the peoples, to renderthem the necessary aid in good time, to create an atmos-phere of complete mutual confidence, and thus eliminatethe above-mentioned heritage in the most painless way.

10. On the basis of the above, the congress recom-mends that the members of the Party secure the ac-complishment of the following practical measures:

a) within the system of higher organs of the Uniona special organ should be instituted that will representall the national republics and national regions withoutexception on the basis of equality;

b) the Commissariats of the Union should be con-structed in such a way as to ensure the satisfaction of theneeds and requirements of the peoples of the Union;

c) the organs of the national republics and regionsshould be staffed mainly with people from among thelocal inhabitants who know the language, manner oflife, habits and customs of the peoples concerned.

II

1. The development of our Party organisations inthe majority of the national republics is proceedingunder conditions not entirely favourable for their growthand consolidation. The economic backwardness of theserepublics, the small size of their national proletariat,the shortage, or even absence, of cadres of old Party work-ers belonging to the local population, the lack of se-rious Marxist literature in the native languages, the weak-


ness of Party educational work, and, further, the presenceof survivals of radical-nationalist traditions, which havenot yet been completely effaced, have given rise amongthe local Communists to a definite deviation towardsoverrating the specifically national features and under-rating the class interests of the proletariat, to a devia-tion towards nationalism. This phenomenon is becomingparticularly dangerous in republics where there are sev-eral nationalities, where, among the Communists ofa stronger nationality, it frequently assumes the formof a deviation towards chauvinism directed against theCommunists of the weak nationalities (Georgia, Azer-baijan, Bukhara, Khorezm). The deviation towards na-tionalism is harmful because, by hindering the processof liberation of the national proletariat from the ideo-logical influence of the national bourgeoisie, it impedesthe work of uniting the proletarians of the various na-tionalities into a single internationalist organisation.

2. On the other hand, the presence both in the cen-tral Party institutions and in Communist Party organi-sations of the national republics of numerous cadres ofold Party workers of Russian origin who are unfamil-iar with the habits, customs and language of the labour-ing masses of these republics, and who for this reasonare not always attentive to their requirements, has givenrise in our Party to a deviation towards underratingthe specifically national features and the national lan-guage in Party work, to an arrogant and disdainful atti-tude towards these specific features—a deviation towardsGreat-Russian chauvinism. This deviation is harmfulnot only because, by hindering the formation of commu-nist cadres from local inhabitants who know the national


language, it creates the danger that the Party may be-come isolated from the proletarian masses of the nationalrepublics, but also, and primarily, because it fosters andbreeds the above-mentioned deviation towards nation-alism and impedes the struggle against it.

3. Condemning both these deviations as harmfuland dangerous to the cause of communism, and drawingthe attention of the Party members to the exceptionalharmfulness and exceptional danger of the deviationtowards Great-Russian chauvinism, the congress callsupon the Party speedily to eliminate these survivals ofthe past from our Party work.

The congress instructs the Central Committee tocarry out the following practical measures:

a) to form advanced Marxist study circles amongthe local Party workers of the national republics;

b) to develop a literature based on Marxist princi-ples in the native languages;

c) to strengthen the University of the Peoples ofthe East and its local branches;

d) to establish under the Central Committees of thenational Communist Parties groups of instructors re-cruited from among local Party workers;

e) to develop a Party literature for the masses in thenative languages;

f) to intensify Party educational work in the repub-lics;

g) to intensify work among the youth in the republics.

Pravda, No. 65,March 24, 1923

Signed: J. Stalin

THE TWELFTH CONGRESS

OF THE R.C.P. (B.) 61

April 17-25, 1923

The Twelfth Congress of theRussian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).Verbatim Report,Moscow, 1923

1. THE ORGANISATIONAL REPORTOF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

April 17

Comrades, I think that the Central Committee’sreport published in Izvestia of the Central Committee62

is quite sufficient as far as details are concerned, andthere is no need to repeat it here, in the Central Commit-tee’s organisational report.

I think that the Central Committee’s organisationalreport should consist of three parts.

The first part should deal with the Party’s organisa-tional ties with the working class, with those ties andapparatuses of a mass character which surround the Party,and by means of which the Party exercises leadership ofthe working class, and the working class is transformedinto the army of the Party.

The second part of the report should, in my opinion,deal with those organisational ties and apparatuses ofa mass character by means of which the working class islinked with the peasantry. This is the state apparatus.By means of the state apparatus the working class, ledby the Party, exercises leadership of the peasantry.

The third and last part should deal with the Partyitself, as an organism living its own separate life, andas the apparatus which issues slogans and supervisestheir implementation.


I pass to the first part of the report. I speak of theParty as the vanguard, and of the working class as thearmy of our Party. It may seem from this analogy thatthe relations here are the same as in the military sphere,i.e., that the Party issues orders, that slogans are sentout by telegraph, and the army, i.e., the working class,carries out those orders. Such a view would be radicallywrong. The point is that in the political sphere mattersare much more complicated. In the military sphere, thecommanders themselves create the army, they themselvesenrol it. In the political sphere, however, the Party doesnot create its army, it finds it ready-made; that armyis the working class. The second difference is that in themilitary sphere the commanders not only create thearmy, but provide it with food, clothing and footwear.That is not the case in the political sphere. The Partydoes not provide food, clothing and footwear for its army,the working class. For that very reason, matters aremuch more complicated in the political sphere. For thatvery reason, in the political sphere, it is not the classthat depends upon the Party, but vice versa. That iswhy, in the political sphere, in order that the vanguardof the class, i.e., the Party, may exercise leadership, itmust surround itself with a wide network of non-Party,mass apparatuses to serve as its feelers, by means of whichit conveys its will to the working class, and the latter isconverted from a diffuse mass into the army of the Party.

And so I pass to an examination of these apparatuses,these transmission belts, which link the Party with theclass, to see what these apparatuses are, and what theParty has succeeded in doing during the past year tostrengthen them.

THE TWELFTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 201

The first and principal transmission belt, the firstand principal transmission apparatus by means of whichthe Party links itself with the working class, is the tradeunions. During the past year of activity, as is shown bythe figures dealing with what has been done to strengthenthis principal transmission belt which connects the Partywith the class, the Party has increased, has strengthenedits influence in the leading bodies of the trade unions.I am not referring to the All-Union Central Council ofTrade Unions. Everybody knows what its compositionis. Nor am I referring to the Central Committees ofthe trade unions. I have in mind, chiefly, the GuberniaTrade-Union Councils. Last year, at the Eleventh Con-gress of our Party, 27 per cent of the chairmen of Guber-nia Trade-Union Councils were Party members of pre-October standing; this year the figure is over 57 per cent.Not a very great achievement, but an achievement nev-ertheless. It shows that leading elements of our Partyof pre-October standing hold in their hands the mainthreads of the unions with the aid of which they link theParty with the working class.

I shall not deal with the composition of the workers’trade unions as a whole. The figures show that at thetime of the last congress the total membership of thetrade unions was about 6,000,000. This year, at thetime of the present congress, the total membership is4,800,000. That looks like a step backward, but it onlyappears to be so. Last year—permit me to tell the truthhere!—the union membership figures were inflated. Thefigures that were given did not correctly reflect the ac-tual situation. The figures given at this congress, al-though smaller than last year’s, are more real, and are


nearer the truth. I regard this as a step forward, in spiteof the fact that the membership of the trade unions hasdiminished. Thus, the transformation of the trade unionsfrom unreal and bureaucratic bodies into real live unions,having a common life with their leading bodies, on theone hand, and the increase in the percentage of leadingParty elements in the Gubernia Trade-Union Councilsfrom 27 per cent to 57 per cent on the other—such isthe success we have to record in our Party’s activitiesin strengthening the trade unions during the past year.

It cannot be said, however, that everything wentwell in this sphere. The primary units of the trade unions—the factory committees—are not yet ours everywhere.For example, of the 146 factory committees in the Khar-kov Gubernia, 70 have not a single Communist in them.But such cases are rare. In general it must be admittedthat the development of the trade unions, as regards thegrowth of the Party’s influence in the gubernia and inthe lower units, undoubtedly shows progress. This frontcan be regarded as secure for the Party. In the trade-union sphere we have no strong opponents.

The second transmission belt, the second transmissionapparatus of a mass character by means of which theParty links itself with the class, is the co-operatives.First of all I have in mind the consumers’ co-operatives,their working-class members; and then the rural co-oper-atives, those in which the rural poor are organised. Atthe time of the Eleventh Congress the workers’ sectionsaffiliated to the Centrosoyuz had a total membership ofabout 3,000,000. This year, at the time of the presentcongress, there is a slight increase: the total membershipis 3,300,000. This is very little. But for all that, under


present conditions, under the conditions of the N.E.P.,it is a step forward. Counting three consumers in eachworker’s family, it works out that about 9,000,000 ofthe working-class population are organised as consumersin the consumers’ co-operatives, in which our Party’sinfluence is growing from day to day. . . .

At the last congress we had no data about the sizeof the Party’s forces in the consumers’ co-operatives;2-3-5 per cent, not more. At the time of the present con-gress not less than 50 per cent of the members of thegubernia organs of the Centrosoyuz are Communists. Thistoo is a step forward.

The situation is not quite so good in the rural co-oper-atives. These co-operatives are certainly growing. Lastyear, at the time of the congress, not less than 1,700,000peasant households belonged to rural co-operatives.This year, at the time of the present congress, not lessthan 4,000,000 peasant households belong to them.These include a certain section of the rural poor, whichgravitates towards the proletariat. Precisely for thisreason it is of interest to ascertain to what extent theParty’s influence has grown in the rural co-operatives.We have no figures for last year. This year, it appears(although it seems to me that the figures are doubtful),not less than 50 per cent of the members of the guberniaorgans of the rural co-operatives are Communists. Ifthat is true, it is a colossal step forward. The situationis not quite so good in the lower units; we are still unableto liberate the primary co-operative organisations fromthe influence of forces hostile to us.

The th i rd t ransmiss ion be l t which l inks theclass with the Party is the Youth Leagues. The colossal


importance of the Youth League, and of the youth in gen-eral, for our Party’s development scarcely needs proof.The figures we have at our disposal show that last year, atthe time of the Eleventh Congress, the Youth Leaguehad a membership of not less than 400,000. Later, inthe middle of 1922, when staffs were reduced, before thesystem of reserving places in the factories for youngworkers had been fully introduced, and before the YouthLeague had been able to adapt itself to the new condi-tions, the membership dropped to 200,000. Now, espe-cially since last autumn, we have a colossal increase inthe membership of the Youth League. It has a member-ship of not less than 400,000. The most welcome thing isthat the increase is primarily due to the influx of youngworkers. The Youth Leagues are growing primarily inthose districts where our industry is reviving.

You know that the Youth League’s chief activityamong the workers lies in the factory apprenticeshipschools. The relevant figures show that last year, at thetime of the Eleventh Congress, we had about 500 factoryapprenticeship schools, with a total of 44,000 pupils.By January of this year we had over 700 schools, witha total of 50,000 pupils. The main thing, however, isthat the increase comes from working-class members ofthe Youth League.

Like the previously mentioned front—the rural co-operative front—the youth front must be regarded asbeing under special threat because the attacks of ourParty’s enemies are specially persistent in this field.It is on these two fronts that the Party and its organisa-tions must exert all efforts to secure predominating in-fluence.


I pass next to the delegate meetings of workingwomen. This, too, is for our organisations a, perhaps,inconspicuous, but very important, highly essential, trans-mission mechanism, which links our Party with working-class women. The figures at our disposal show the fol-lowing: last year, at the time of the Eleventh Congress,we had in 57 gubernias and three regions about 16,000women delegates, predominantly working women. Thisyear, at the time of the present congress, in the same gu-bernias and regions, we have not less than 52,000 wom-en delegates, of whom 33,000 are working women. Thisis a colossal step forward. It must be borne in mind thatthis is a front to which we have devoted little attentionup till now, although it is of colossal importance for us.Since there is progress here, since there is a basis forstrengthening this apparatus too, for extending and di-recting the Party’s feelers with the object of undermin-ing the influence of the priests among the youth whomthese women are bringing up, it must naturally be oneof the Party’s immediate tasks to develop the maximumenergy also on this front, which is undoubtedly in danger.

I pass to the schools. I refer to the political schools,the Soviet-Party schools and the Communist Universi-ties. These are also an apparatus with the aid of whichthe Party spreads communist education, trains the edu-cational commanding personnel who sow the seeds ofsocialism, the seeds of communism, among the workingpopulation and thereby link the Party with the workingclass by spiritual ties. The figures show that last yearabout 22,000 students attended the Soviet-Party schools.This year there are not less than 33,000, counting alsothose attending the urban political education schools


that are financed by the Central Political EducationDepartment. As regards the Communist Universities,which are of enormous importance for communist edu-cation, the increase is small: there were about 6,000students, now there are 6,400. The Party’s task is to exertgreater efforts on this front, to intensify activity in train-ing, in forging commanding staffs for communist edu-cation.

I pass to the press. The press is not a mass appa-ratus, a mass organisation, nevertheless, it establishesan imperceptible link between the Party and the workingclass, a link which is as strong as any mass transmissionapparatus. It is said that the press is the sixth power.I do not know whether that is so or not, but that it is apotent one and carries great weight is beyond dispute.The press is a most powerful weapon by means of whichthe Party daily, hourly, speaks in its own language, thelanguage it needs to use, to the working class. There areno other means of stretching spiritual threads-betweenthe Party and the class, there is no other apparatus ofequal flexibility. That is why the Party must pay specialattention to this sphere, and it must be said that herewe have already achieved some success. Take the news-papers. According to figures issued, last year we had380 newspapers; this year we have no less than 528. Thetotal circulation last year was 2,500,000, but this wasa semi-artificial, not a live circulation. Last summer,when subsidies to the press were reduced and the presswas faced with the necessity of standing on its ownfeet, the circulation dropped to 900,000. At the time ofthe present congress we have a circulation of about2,000,000. Thus, it is becoming less artificial, the press


is living on its own resources and is a sharp weaponin the hands of the Party; it gives it contact with themasses, otherwise the circulation could not increase andthe increase be maintained.

I pass to the next transmission apparatus—the army.People are accustomed to regard the army as an appara-tus of defence or attack. I, however, regard the armyas a mustering centre of the workers and peasants. Thehistory of all revolutions tells us that the army is theonly mustering centre where workers and peasants fromdifferent gubernias, and who are strangers to one anoth-er, come together, and having come together, hammerout their political opinions. It is not by chance thatbig mobilisations and important wars always give riseto social conflicts, to mass revolutionary movements, ofone kind or another. This occurs because it is in thearmy that peasants and workers from the most widelyseparated parts meet one another for the first time. Ordi-narily, peasants from Voronezh do not meet Petrogradpeople, and men from Pskov never see men from Siberia;but in the army they do meet. The army is a school,a mustering centre of the workers and peasants, andfrom this point of view the Party’s strength and in-fluence in the army is of colossal importance, and in thisrespect the army is a tremendous apparatus that linksthe Party with the workers and the poor peasants. Thearmy is the only mustering centre for the whole of Russia,for the entire federation, where people of different guber-nias and regions come together, learn, and are drawninto political life. In this extremely important masstransmission apparatus the fol lowing changes havetaken place: at the time of the last congress, Communists


in the army numbered 7.5 per cent; this year the figurehas reached 10.5 per cent. During this period the armywas reduced in size, but in quality it has improved. TheParty’s influence has grown; in this principal mustering centre, too, we have achieved a victory as regardsthe growth of communist influence.

Last year, of the commanding staff, taking the lat-ter as a whole, down to platoon commanders, 10 per centwere Communists; this year 13 per cent are Communists.Excluding platoon commanders, the corresponding fig-ures of the proportion of Communists among the com-manding staff are: 16 per cent last year, and 24 per centthis year.

Such are the transmission belts, the mass appara-tuses, which surround our Party, and by linking it withthe working class enable it to become a vanguard andthe working class to become an army.

Such is the network of connections and transmissionpoints by means of which the Party, as distinct from amilitary commanding staff, is transformed into a van-guard, and the working class is transformed from a dif-fuse mass into a real political army.

The successes shown by our Party in these spheresin strengthening these connections are due not only tothe fact that the Party has grown in experience in thismatter, and not only to the fact that the means of in-fluencing these transmission apparatuses have been im-proved, but also to the fact that the general politicalstate of the country has assisted, facilitated this.

Last year we had the famine, the results of the fam-ine, depression in industry, dispersion of the workingclass, and so forth. This year, on the contrary, we have


had a good harvest , a partial revival of industry, abeginning of the process of the re-concentration of theproletariat, and an improvement in the conditions ofthe workers. The old workers who had been compelledearlier to disperse to the villages are coming back to themills and factories, and all this is creating a favourablepolitical situation for the Party to conduct extensivework in strengthening the above-mentioned connectingapparatuses.

I pass to the second part of the report: concerningthe Party and the state apparatus. The state apparatusis the chief mass apparatus linking the working class inpower, represented by its party, with the peasantry, andwhich enables the working class, represented by its party,to lead the peasantry. I link this part of my report directlywith the two well-known articles by Comrade Lenin.63

It seemed to many people that the idea ComradeLenin elaborated in those two articles is entirely new.I think that the idea that is elaborated in those articlesis one with which Vladimir Ilyich was already pre-occu-pied last year. You no doubt remember the politicalreport he made last year. He said that our policy wascorrect, but the apparatus was not working properly and,therefore, the car was not running in the right direction,it swerved. I remember that Shlyapnikov, commentingon this, said that the drivers were no good. That is wrong,of course, absolutely wrong. The policy is correct, thedriver is excellent, and the type of car is good, it is aSoviet car, but some of the parts of the state car, i.e.,some of the officials in the state apparatus, are bad,they are not our men. That is why the car does not runproperly and, on the whole, we get a distortion of the


correct political line. We get not implementation butdistortion. The state apparatus, I repeat, is of the righttype, but its component parts are still alien to us, bu-reaucratic, half tsarist-bourgeois. We want to have a stateapparatus that will be a means of serving the mass of thepeople, but some persons in this state apparatus wantto convert it into a source of gain for themselves. Thatis why the apparatus as a whole is not working properly.If we fail to repair it, the correct political line by itselfwill not carry us very far; it will be distorted, and therewill be a rupture between the working class and the peas-antry. We shall have a situation in which, although weshall be at the steering wheel, the car will not obey.There will be a crash. These are the ideas Comrade Leninelaborated as far back as a year ago, and which onlythis year he formulated in a harmonious system in theproposal to reorganise the Central Control Commissionand the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection in such away that the reorganised inspection apparatus should betransformed into a device for re-arranging all the partsof the car, for replacing the old useless parts with newones, which must be done if we really want the car to goin the right direction.

That is the essence of Comrade Lenin’s proposal.I could mention a fact like the inspection of the

Orekhovo-Zuyevo Trust, organised on Soviet lines, thefunction of which was to turn out the utmost quantityof manufactured goods to be supplied to the peasants,whereas this trust, organised on Soviet lines, deliveredthe goods it manufactured into private hands to thedetriment of the state. The car was not going in the rightdirection.


I could mention the following fact, which ComradeVoroshilov told me the other day. We have an institu-tion that is called the Industrial Bureau. There was aninstitution like that in the South-East. This apparatushad a staff of about 2,000. The function of this apparatuswas to direct industry in the South-East. Comrade Vo-roshilov told me in despair that it was a difficult jobto manage this apparatus, that to do so they had to setup an additional small apparatus, i.e., to manage themanaging apparatus, Well, we found some good men:Voroshilov, Eismont and Mikoyan, who set about makinga thorough investigation. And it turned out that insteadof a staff of 2,000, one of 170 was enough. And what hap-pened? It turns out that it is working much better thanbefore. Formerly, the apparatus ate up all it produced.Now it is serving industry. A multitude of facts of thiskind could be quoted, more than there are hairs onmy head.

All these facts point only to one thing, namely, thatour Soviet apparatuses, although of the right type, arefrequently staffed with people whose habits and tradi-tions upset our essentially correct political line. Thatis why the whole mechanism is not working properly, andthe result is a great political setback, the danger of arupture between the proletariat and the peasantry.

The matter stands as follows: either we improve theeconomic apparatuses, reduce their staffs, s implifythem, make them cheaper to run, staff them with peoplewho are akin to the Par ty in sp i r i t , and then weshall achieve the purpose for which we introduced theso-called N.E.P., i.e., industry will turn out the maxi-mum quantity of manufactured goods to supply the


countryside and receive the produce it needs, and inthis way we shall establish a bond between peasanteconomy and industrial economy; or we fail to do this,and there will be a crash.

Or again: either the state apparatus itself, the tax-collecting apparatus, will be simplified, reduced, andthe thieves and scoundrels driven out of it, and thenwe shall be able to take less from the peasants than wedo now and the national economy will come through thestrain; or this apparatus will become an end in itself,as was the case in the South-East, and all that is takenfrom the peasants will go to maintain the apparatusitself, and then there will be a political crash.

These, I am convinced, are the considerations thatguided Vladimir Ilyich when he wrote those articles.

There is yet another side to Comrade Lenin’s pro-posals. His aim is not only to improve the apparatus andto increase the Party’s leading role in it to the utmost—for the Party built the state and it is its duty to im-prove it; but evidently he also has in mind the moralside. His aim is that there should not be left in the coun-try a single official, no matter how highly-placed, con-cerning whom the ordinary man might say: he is abovethe law. This moral aspect is the third aspect of Ilyich’sproposal; it is precisely this proposal that sets the taskof purging not only the state apparatus, but also theParty, of those traditions and habits of domineeringbureaucrats which discredit our Party.

I now pass to the question of choosing staffs, i.e.,the question which Ilyich spoke about already at theEleventh Congress. If it is clear to us that as regardsits composition, habits and traditions our state appara-


tus is no good, and that this threatens to cause a rup-ture between the workers and the peasants, then it isclear that the Party’s leading role must find expressionnot only in the issue of directives, but also in the ap-pointment to certain posts of people who are capableof understanding our directives and capable of carryingthem out honestly. That no impassable border-line can bedrawn between the Central Committee’s political workand its organisational work needs no proof.

Hardly anyone of you would assert that it is enoughto give a correct political line and the matter is finished.No, that is only half the matter. After a correct politicalline has been given it is necessary to choose staffs in sucha way as to fill the various posts with people who arecapable of carrying out the directives, able to understandthe directives, able to accept these directives as theirown and capable of putting them into effect. Otherwisethe policy becomes meaningless, becomes mere gesticu-lation. That is why the Registration and DistributionDepartment, i.e., the organ of the Central Committeewhose function it is to register our principal workers,at the bottom as well as at the top, and to distributethem, acquires immense importance. Until now thisdepartment has confined itself to registering and dis-tributing comrades for Uyezd Committees, GuberniaCommittees and Regional Committees. Beyond this, toput it bluntly, it did not stick its nose. Now that thewar is over and there are no more mass, wholesale mo-bilisations, now that these have become quite purpose-less—as was proved by the mobilisation of a thousandParty workers that was thrust upon the shoulders of theCentral Committee last year, and which failed, because


under present conditions, when our work has becomemore thorough and we are steering towards specialisa-tion, when the qualifications of every single individualmust be thoroughly scrutinised, wholesale mobilisa-tions only make things worse and the localities gainnothing from them—now, the Registration and Distri-bution Department cannot confine i tself to the Gu-bernia and Uyezd Committees.

I could quote several figures. The Eleventh Con-gress instructed the Central Committee to mobilise notless than a thousand Moscow Par ty workers . TheCentral Committee registered for mobilisation about1,500. Owing to sickness and all sorts of other reasons,only 700 were mobilised; of these, according to the opin-ions expressed by the districts, 300 proved to be moreor less suitable. Thus you have a fact which shows thatthe old type of wholesale mobilisation, such as was car-ried out in the past, is no longer suitable, because ourParty work has become more thorough, it has becomespecialised for the different branches of the nationaleconomy, and to shift people about from place to placeindiscriminately means, firstly, dooming them to idle-ness, and secondly, failing to satisfy even the minimumrequirements of the organisations which demand newworkers.

I would like to quote a few figures from a study ofour industrial commanding staffs given in the pamphlet64

by Sorokin, who works in the Registration and Distri-bution Department. But before quoting these figuresI must speak about the reform of this department whichthe Central Committee carried out in the course of itswork on the registration of responsible workers. For-


merly, as I have already said, the Registration andDistribution Department confined itself to the Guberniaand Uyezd Committees. Now that our work has becomemore thorough and construction work is expanding ev-erywhere, it must not confine itself to the Uyezd andGubernia Committees. It must now cover all branchesof the administration without exception, and the entireindustrial commanding personnel by means of whichthe Party keeps control of our economic apparatus andexercises its leadership. With this in view, the CentralCommittee decided to enlarge the staffs of the Registra-tion and Distribution Departments both at the centreand in the localities, so that their chiefs could have dep-uties for the economic and Soviet spheres respectively,and assistants to register commanding staffs according tofactories, trusts and business organisations, local andcentral, in the Soviets and in the Party.

The effect of this reform soon made itself felt. Ina short space of time it was possible to register the in-dustrial commanding staff, consisting of about 1,300 fac-tory managers. Of these, 29 per cent are Party membersand 70 per cent non-Party. It might seem that non-Partypersons predominate in importance in the basic enter-prises, but that is not true. It appears that the Commu-nists, the 29 per cent, are managers of the largest enter-prises which employ a total of over 300,000 workers,while the non-Party persons, the 70 per cent, are man-agers of enterprises which embrace not more than 250,000industrial workers. The small enterprises are managedby non-Party people, the big ones are managed byParty members. Further, among the managers who areParty members, those from the working class outnumber


the others by three to one. This shows that unlike thetop of the industrial structure—the Supreme Councilof National Economy and its departments where thereare few Communists, at the bottom, in the basic units,Communists, and primarily workers, have begun to takecontrol of the enterprises. An interesting point is that asregards quality and suitability, there were more profi-cient factory managers among the Communists thanamong the non-Party people. This shows that in distrib-uting Communists among the enterprises, the Party isguided not by purely Party considerations, not onlyby the aim of increasing the Party’s influence in theenterprises, but also by practical considerations. Notonly the Party as such, but the whole of our economicconstruction gains by this, for it turns out that thereare far more proficient factory managers among theCommunists than among the non-Party people.

That, then, is the first experiment in registeringour industrial commanding staff, a new experiment,which, as I have said, covers by no means all the enter-prises, for the 1,300 factory managers registered in thispamphlet represent only about half the number of en-terprises that still have to be registered. But the ex-periment shows that this is an inexhaustibly rich field,and that the work of the Registration and DistributionDepartment must be expanded to the utmost so as toenable the Party to staff the managements of our basicenterprises with Communists and thereby exercise itsleadership of the state apparatus.

The comrades are no doubt familiar with the propos-als on the organisational question which the CentralCommittee is submitting for the consideration of the con-


gress, proposals concerning both the Party and the So-viet sides. As regards the Soviet side, about which I havejust spoken in the second part of my report, the CentralCommittee proposes that this question be submittedfor detailed discussion to a special committee, whichshould study both the Party and the Soviet sides ofthe question and then submit its findings to the con-gress.

I pass to the third part of the report: on the Partyas an organism, and the Party as an apparatus.

First of all I must say a word or two about the numer-ical strength of our Party. The figures show that lastyear, at the time of the Eleventh Congress, the Party hada membership of several tens of thousands over 400,000.This year, owing to the subsequent reduction of the Par-ty membership, to the fact that in a number of regionsthe Party rid itself of non-proletarian elements, the mem-bership has become smaller, it is a little below 400,000.This is not a loss, but a gain, for the social compositionof the Party has improved. The most interesting thingin our Party’s development as regards the improvementin its social composition is that the former tendency ofthe non-prole tar ian e lements in the Par ty to growfaster than the working-class element ceased in the yearunder review; there was a turn for the better, a definiteswing was to be noted towards an increase in the per-centage of the working-class element of the membershipover the non-proletarian element. This is precisely thesuccess we strove for before the purge, and which we havenow achieved. I will not say that we have already doneall that should be done in this sphere; that is far frombeing the case. But we have achieved a turn for the


better, we have achieved a certain minimum of uniform-ity, we have ensured the working-class composition ofthe Party, and evidently we shall have to continue thisline of further reducing the non-proletarian elementsin the Party and further increasing the proletarian ele-ments. The measures by which the Central Committeeproposes to achieve a further improvement in the Partymembership are outlined in the Central Committee’sproposals; I shall not repeat them. Evidently, we shallhave to strengthen the barriers against an influx of non-proletarian elements, for at the present time, under theconditions of the N.E.P., when the Party is certainlyexposed to the corrupting influence of N.E.P. elements,i t is necessary to achieve the utmost uniformity inour Party’s membership, or, at all events, a decisivepreponderance of working-class over non-working-classelements . The Party must do this , i t is i ts duty todo this, if it wants to remain the party of the workingclass.

I pass to the question of the life and activities ofthe Gubernia Committees. Often a note of irony creepsinto some of the articles published in the press aboutthe Gubernia Committees; the latter are often ridiculedand their activities are underrated. I, however, mustsay, comrades, that the Gubernia Committees are themain bulwark of our Party, that without the GuberniaCommittees, without their guidance of Soviet and Partywork, the Party would have no ground to stand on.In spite of all their shortcomings, in spite of the defectsthey still suffer from, in spite of the so-called squab-bling and wrangling in the Gubernia Committees, takenas a whole they are the main bulwark of our Party.


How are the Gubernia Committees living and devel-oping? About ten months ago I read letters from GuberniaCommittees showing that the secretaries of our Gu-bernia Committees were then still confused about eco-nomic matters, that they had not yet adapted themselvesto the new conditions. I have also read letters writtenten months later; I read them with pleasure, with joy,because it is evident from them that the Gubernia Com-mittees have matured, they have got into their stride,they have taken up construction work in earnest, theyhave put the local budgets in order, they have takencontrol of local economic development, they have reallymanaged to take the lead of the entire economic andpolitical life of their respective gubernias. This, com-rades, is a great gain. The Gubernia Committees un-doubtedly have their defects, but I must say that if theyhad not gained this Party and economic experience, ifthere had not been this tremendous step forward in thesense of the growth of maturity of the Gubernia Commit-tees in directing local economic and political life, we couldnot even dream of the Party ever undertaking the lead-ership of the state apparatus.

There is talk about squabbling and friction in theGubernia Committees. I must say that in addition totheir bad sides, squabbling and friction have their goodsides. The chief cause of the squabbling and wranglingis the effort of the Gubernia Committees to create withinthemselves a united, compact core capable of directingaffairs smoothly. This aim and striving are quite healthyand legit imate, al though they are often pursued bymethods that are out of harmony with the aim. This isdue to the diversity of our Party membership? to the fact


that we have in our Party old hands and new, proletar-ians and intellectuals, people from the centre and fromthe border districts, and people of various nationali-ties; and all these diverse elements in the Gubernia Com-mittees introduce there diverse customs and traditionsand this gives rise to friction and squabbling. For allthat, although it assumes impermissible forms, nine-tenths of this squabbling and friction is prompted by thehealthy striving to create a solid core capable of directingthe work. It needs no proof that if there were no suchleading groups in the Gubernia Committees, if thingswere so arranged that the “good” and the “bad” coun-ter-balanced each other, there would be no leadershipin the gubernias, the tax in kind would not be collected,and we would be unable to carry through any campaigns.Such is the healthy side of the squabbling, which mustnot be obscured by the fact that it sometimes assumesugly forms. This does not mean, of course, that the Partymust not combat squabbling, especially when it ariseson personal grounds.

That is how matters stand with the Gubernia Com-mittees.

Below the Gubernia Committees, however, the Party,unfortunately, is not yet as strong as it might appearto be. Our Party’s chief weakness, as far as the appa-ratus is concerned, lies precisely in the weakness ofour Uyezd Committees, in the absence of reserves, name-ly, of uyezd secretaries. I think that the reason whywe have not yet taken complete control of the principalapparatuses which l ink our Party with the workingclass—the apparatuses I spoke about in the first partof my report (I have in mind the lower Party units,


the co-operatives, the women’s delegate meetings, theYouth Leagues, etc .) , the reason why the guberniaorgans have not yet taken complete control of theseapparatuses, is precisely that we are too weak in theuyezds.

I think that this is a fundamental question.I think that one of our Party’s fundamental tasks

is to set up under the auspices of the Central Committeea school for training uyezd secretaries from among themost devoted and capable people, from among the peas-ants and workers. If the Party could by next year buildaround itself a reserve of 200 or 300 uyezd secretarieswho could be sent to assist the Gubernia Committees indirecting activit ies in the uyezds, i t would therebyensure guidance of all the mass transmission appara-tuses. There would not then be a single consumers’co-operative, a single rural co-operative, a single fac-tory or works committee, a single women’s delegatemeeting, a single Youth League unit , a single massapparatus in which the Party’s influence would notpredominate.

Now about the regional organs. The past year hasshown that the Party and the Central Committee wereright in setting up regional organs, partly elected andpartly appointed. When discussing the general ques-tion of delimiting administrative areas, the CentralCommittee arrived at the conclusion that in buildingup the regional Party organs, the Party must pass grad-ually from the principle of appointment to the prin-ciple of election, having in mind that such a changewill undoubtedly create a favourable moral atmos-phere around the Regional Par ty Commit tees and


make it easier for the Central Committee to lead theParty.

I pass to the question of improving the Party’s cen-tral organs. You have no doubt read the Central Com-mittee’s proposal that the functions of the Secretariatof the Central Committee should be quite clearly andprecisely delimited from the functions of the OrganisingBureau and of the Political Bureau. It is scarcely nec-essary to deal with this question separately, becauseit is perfectly clear. But there is one question—theenlargement of the Central Committee itself—which wehave discussed several times inside the Central Com-mittee, and which at one time gave rise to serious con-troversy. Some members of the Central Committee areof the opinion that the Central Committee should notbe enlarged, but, on the contrary, reduced. I shall notgive their reasons; let the comrades speak for themselves.I shall briefly give the reasons in favour of enlargingthe Central Committee.

The present state of affairs in the central apparatusof our Party is as follows: we have 27 members on theCentral Committee. The Central Committee meets onceevery two months; but within the Central Committeethere is a core of 10-15 persons who have become soskilled in the matter of directing the political and eco-nomic activities of our organs that they are in dangerof becoming something in the nature of high priests inthe art of leadership. This may be a good thing, butit has a very dangerous side: these comrades who haveacquired great experience in leadership may becomeinfected by self-conceit, may isolate themselves and becomedivorced from work among the masses. If some members


of the Central Committee, or, say, the core of fifteen,have acquired such experience and have become so skilledthat in drawing up instructions they make no mistakesin nine cases out of ten, that is a very good thing. But ifthey have not around themselves a new generation offuture leaders who are closely connected with the workin the localities, all the chances are that these highly-skilled men will become ossified and divorced from themasses.

Secondly, the core within the Central Committee thathas gained great experience in the art of leadership isgrowing old; we must have people to take their place.You are aware of the state of Vladimir Ilyich’s health.You know that the other members, too, of the main coreof the Central Committee are pretty well worn out. Thetrouble is that we have not yet the new cadres to taketheir place. The training of Party leaders is a very dif-ficult matter, it takes years, 5 to 10 years, more than 10.It is much easier to conquer a country with the aid ofComrade Budyonny’s cavalry than to train two or threeleaders from the rank and file capable of becoming realleaders of the country. And it is high time to thinkabout training young leaders to take the place of the old.There is only one way of doing this, namely, to drawnew, fresh forces into the work of the Central Committeeand to promote them in the course of work, to promotethe most capable and independent of them, those whoseheads are screwed on in the right way. Leaders cannotbe trained by means of books. Books help to make pro-gress, but they do not create leaders. Leading workersmature only in the course of the work itself. Only byelecting new members to the Central Committee, by


letting them experience the entire burden of leadership,shall we be able to train the replacements whom we needso much in the present state of things. That is why I thinkthat the congress would make a profound mistake if itdisagreed with the Central Committee’s proposal thatit be enlarged to at least forty members.

In concluding my report I must mention a fact whichis not conspicuous—perhaps because it is too well known—but which should be mentioned because it is very impor-tant. I mean the unity of our Party, that unexampledsolidari ty which enabled our Party to avoid a spli tduring such a turn as the introduction of the N.E.P.Not a single party in the world, not a single politicalparty, could have made such an abrupt turn withoutconfusion, without a split, without some group or otherfalling out of the cart. It is well known that when a turnlike this is made, some group or other falls out of thecart, and confusion, if not a split, begins in the party.We had such a turn in the history of our Party in 1907and 1908, when, after 1905 and 1906, having been accus-tomed to revolutionary struggle, we did not want to goover to humdrum legal activity, we did not want to go in-to the Duma, to make use of legal institutions, to strength-en our positions in legal organisations and, in general,refused to adopt new methods. This turn was not as ab-rupt as the introduction of the N.E.P., but, evidentlybecause we were then still a young party and had notyet gained experience in manoeuvring, the result wasthat two whole groups fell out of the cart at that time.Our present turn towards the N.E.P. after our policyof the offensive is an abrupt turn. And yet, during sucha turn, when the proletariat was obliged temporarily to


give up the offensive and retire to its former positions,was obliged to turn towards the peasantry in the rear inorder not to lose contact with it, when the proletariathad to think about strengthening, reinforcing, its re-serves in the East and in the West—during such an abruptturn the Party not only avoided a split, but made theturn without confusion.

It testifies to the Party’s unexampled flexibility,unity and solidarity.

It is a guarantee that our Party will triumph.Last year our enemies croaked about disintegration

in our Party, and they are croaking about it this year too.Nevertheless, while entering on the New EconomicPolicy we retained our posit ions, we have kept thethreads of the national economy in our hands, and theParty continues to march forward, united to a man,whereas it is our enemies who are actually undergo-ing disintegration and liquidation. You have no doubtheard, comrades , that a congress of the Socia l is t -Revolutionaries took place in Moscow recently.65 Thatcongress decided to appeal to our congress to open thedoor of our Party to the Social is t-Revolutionaries.You have no doubt also heard that Georgia, the formercitadel of Menshevism, where the Menshevik Party hasno less than 10,000 members, that stronghold of Men-shevism is already collapsing and about 2,000 mem-bers have left the Menshevik ranks. That would seem toshow that i t is not our Party that is disintegrating,but that it is our enemies who are disintegrating. Andlastly, you no doubt know that one of the most hon-est and practical of the Menshevik leaders—ComradeMartynov—has left the ranks of the Mensheviks, and


the Central Committee has accepted him as a memberof our Party and moves that this congress endorsethis acceptance. (Some applause.) All these facts show,comrades, not that things are bad in our Party, butthat disintegration has set in among our enemies allalong the line, while our Party has remained solid andunited, it has stood the test of a momentous turn, andis marching forward with flying colours. (Loud and pro-longed applause.)

2. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSIONON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE’S

ORGANISATIONAL REPORT

April 19

Comrades, my reply to the discussion will consist oftwo parts. In the first part I shall deal with the CentralCommittee’s organising work, since it was criticised byspeakers. In the second part I shall deal with those ofthe Central Committee’s organisational proposals whichspeakers did not criticise, and with which the congressevidently agrees.

First I shall say a few words about the critics of theCentral Committee’s report.

About Lutovinov. He is displeased with the regimein our Party: there is no free speech in our Party, thereis no legality, no democracy. He knows, of course, thatnever in the past six years has the Central Committee pre-pared for a congress so democratically as it prepared forthis one. He knows that immediately after the FebruaryPlenum, the members of the Central Committee and thecandidate members of the Central Committee dispersedto all parts of our federation and delivered reports on thework of the Central Committee. He, Lutovinov, mustknow that four issues of the Discussion Sheet66 havealready appeared, and in them the Central Committee’s


activities are analysed and interpreted quite at ran-dom, I repeat, at random. But that is not enough forLutovinov. He wants “real” democracy; he wants tohave at least all the major questions discussed in allthe units , from the bottom up; he wants the wholeParty to be stirred up on every question and to takepart in the discussion of it. But, comrades, now that weare in power, now that we have no fewer than 400,000members and no fewer than 20,000 Party units, I do notknow what that sort of thing would lead to. The Partywould be transformed into a debating society that wouldbe eternally talking and would decide nothing. But aboveall our Party must be a party of action, for we are inpower.

Furthermore, Lutovinov forgets that although we arein power within the federation and enjoy all the advan-tages of legality, from the international standpoint, how-ever, we are going through a period similar to that whichwe went through in 1912, when the Party was semi-legal,or rather, illegal, when the Party had a few legal footholdsin the shape of the group in the Duma, in the shape oflegal newspapers and clubs, but at the same time wassurrounded by enemies, and was striving to accumulateforces in order to push forward, and to enlarge the legalframework. We are now going through a similar period onan international scale. We are surrounded by enemies—that is evident to everybody. The imperialist wolveswho surround us are wide awake. Not a moment passeswithout our enemies trying to capture some gap throughwhich to crawl and do us damage. There are no groundsfor asserting that the enemies who surround us are notconducting some kind of preparatory work for a blockade,


or for intervention. Such is the situation. Is it possiblein such a situation to discuss all questions of war andpeace in public? To discuss a question at meetings of20,000 Party units is tantamount to discussing it in pub-lic. What would have become of us had we discussedin public all our preliminary work for the Genoa Con-ference? We would have gone down with a crash. It mustbe borne in mind that in a situation, when we are sur-rounded by enemies, a sudden stroke, an unexpectedmanoeuvre on our part, swift action, decides everything.What would have become of us if instead of discussing ourpolitical campaign at the Lausanne Conference in a nar-row circle of trusted Party people, we had discussed allthis work publicly, had exposed our hand? Our enemieswould have taken all the weak and strong points intoaccount, they would have defeated our campaign, andwe would have left Lausanne in disgrace. What wouldbecome of us if we were to discuss publicly in advancethe questions of war and peace, the most important ofall important questions? For, I repeat, to discuss ques-tions at meetings of 20,000 units is tantamount to discus-sing them in public. We would be smashed in no time.It is obvious, comrades, that for both organisationaland political reasons Lutovinov’s so-called democracyis a fantasy, is democratic Manilovism. It is false anddangerous. Lutovinov’s road is not ours.

I pass on to Osinsky. He pounced upon the phrasein my statement that in enlarging the Central Commit-tee we must get independent people on it. Yes, yes,Sorin, independent, but not freelances. Osinsky thinksthat on this point I established some sort of a link withOsinsky, with democratic centralism.67 I did say that


the Central Committee should be reinforced with com-rades who are independent. I did not say independentof what, knowing in advance that it is unwise to dealexhaustively with all points in the main speech, thatsomething should be left for the speech in reply to thediscussion. (Laughter. Applause.) We need independentpeople in the Central Committee, but not people inde-pendent of Leninism—no comrades, God forbid! We needindependent people, people free from personal influ-ences, free from the habits and traditions of the internalstruggle in the Central Committee that we have ac-quired, and which sometimes cause anxiety in the CentralCommittee. You remember Comrade Lenin’s article. Hesays in it that we are faced with the prospect of a split.Since that passage in Comrade Lenin’s article mighthave caused the organisations to think that a split isalready maturing in the Party, the members of the Cen-tral Committee unanimously decided to dispel doubtsthat might arise and said that there is no split in theCentral Committee, which is quite in accordance with thefacts. But the Central Committee also said that the pros-pect of a split is not excluded. That, too, is quite cor-rect. In the course of its work during the past six yearsthe Central Committee has acquired (and was boundto acquire) certain habits and traditions of struggle withinit which sometimes create an atmosphere that is notquite good. I felt this atmosphere at one of the lastplenary meetings of the Central Committee in February,and I remarked at the t ime that the intervention ofpeople from the districts often decides the whole matter.We need people who are independent of those traditionsand of those personal influences in order that, on becom-


ing members of the Central Committee and bringinginto it the experience of practical work and contact withthe districts, they should serve as the mortar, so tospeak, to cement the Central Committee as a single andindivisible collective body leading our Party. We needsuch independent comrades, free from the old traditionsthat have become established in the Central Committee,precisely as people who will introduce a new, refreshingelement that will cement the Central Committee, andavert any possibility of a split within it. That is whatI meant when I spoke about independent people.

Comrades, I cannot ignore the thrust that Osinskymade at Zinoviev. He praised Comrade Stalin, he praisedKamenev, but he kicked Zinoviev, calculat ing thatit will be enough to get rid of one for the time being,and that the turn of the others will come later. He hasset out to break up the core that has been formed withinthe Central Committee in the course of years of workin order gradually, step by step, to break up the whole.If Osinsky seriously thinks of pursuing that aim, if heseriously thinks of launching such attacks against in-dividual members of the core of our Central Committee,I must warn him that he will collide with a wall againstwhich, I am afraid, he will break his head.

Lastly, about Mdivani. May I be permitted to saya few words about this question, which has bored thewhole congress. He talked about the Central Committee’svacillations. He said that one day it decides to unitethe economic efforts of the three Transcaucasian re-publics, the next day it decides that these republicsshould unite in a federation, and the day after that ittakes a third decision that all the Soviet republics should


unite in a Union of Republics. That is what he callsthe Central Committee’s vacillations. Is that right? No,comrades, that is not vacillation, it is system. The inde-pendent republics first drew together on an economicbasis. That step was taken as far back as 1921. Afterit was found that the experiment of drawing togetherthe republics was producing good results the next stepwas taken—federation, particularly in a place like Trans-caucasia, where it is impossible to dispense with a spe-cial organ of national peace. As you know, Transcauca-sia is a country where there were Tatar-Armenian mas-sacres while stil l under the tsar, and war under theMussavatists, Dashnaks and Mensheviks. To put a stopto that strife an organ of national peace was needed, i.e.,a supreme authority whose word would carry weight.It was absolutely impossible to create such an organof national peace without the participation of represent-atives of the Georgian nation. And so, several monthsafter the economic efforts were united, the next stepwas taken—a federation of republics, and a year afterthat yet another step was taken, marking the final stagesin the process of uniting the republics—a Union ofRepublics was formed. Where is there vacillation inthat? I t is the system of our nat ional pol icy. Mdi-vani has s imply fai led to grasp the essence of ourSoviet policy, although he regards himself as an oldBolshevik.

He asked a number of questions, insinuating thatthe major questions concerning the national aspect ofaffairs in Transcaucasia, and particularly in Georgia,were decided either by the Central Committee or by indi-viduals. The fundamental question in Transcaucasia


is the question of the federation of Transcaucasia. Permitme to read a small document that gives the history ofthe directive of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.on the Transcaucasian Federation.

On November 28, 1921, Comrade Lenin sent me adraft of his proposal for the formation of a federation ofthe Transcaucasian republics. It states:

“1) to recognise the federation of the Transcauca-sian republics as absolutely correct in principle andi ts real isat ion as absolutely necessary, a l though i twould be premature to apply it in practice immediately,i.e., it would require several weeks for discussion andpropaganda, and for carrying it through from below;

“2) to instruct the Central Committees of Georgia,Armenia and Azerbaijan to carry out this decision.”

I wrote to Comrade Lenin and suggested that thereshould be no hurry about this, that we ought to wait alittle to give the local people a certain period of timeto carry through the federation. I wrote to him:

“Comrade Lenin, I am not opposed to your resolu-tion, if you agree to accept the following amendment:instead of the words ‘would require several weeks fordiscussion,’ in Point 1, say: ‘would require a certain pe-riod of time for discussion,’ and so on, in accordancewith your resolution. The point is that in Georgia it isimpossible to ‘carry through’ federation ‘from below’by ‘Soviet procedure’ in ‘several weeks,’ since theSoviets in Georgia are only just beginning to be organ-ised. They are not yet completely built. A month agothey did not exist at all, and to call a Congress of Sovietsthere in ‘several weeks’ is inconceivable; and, well, aTranscaucasian federation without Georgia would be

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a federation on paper only. I think we must allow twoor three months for the idea of federation to triumphamong the broad masses of Georgia. Stalin.”

Comrade Lenin answered: “I accept this amendment.”Next day that proposal was adopted by the votes of

Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Molotov and Stalin. Zinovievwas absent, his place was taken by Molotov. The deci-sion was adopted by the Political Bureau at the endof 1921, as you see, unanimously. The struggle whichthe group of Georgian Communists headed by Mdivaniis waging against the Central Committee’s directiveconcerning federation dates back to that time. You see,comrades, that the case is not as Mdivani presented it.I quote this document against those unseemly insinua-tions which Mdivani made here.

The second question: how is the fact to be explainedthat the group of comrades headed by Mdivani has beenrecalled by the Central Committee of the Party, what isthe reason of that? There are two chief and, at the sametime, formal reasons. I must say this because reproacheshave been levelled at the Central Committee, and at mein particular.

The f i rs t reason is tha t the Mdivani group hasno influence in its own Georgian Communist Party, thatit is repudiated by the Georgian Communist Party itself.This Party has held two congresses: the first congresswas held at the beginning of 1922, and the second washeld at the beginning of 1923. At both congresses theMdivani group, and its idea of rejecting federation, wasemphatically opposed by its own Party. At the firstcongress, I think, out of a total of 122 votes he obtainedsomewhere about 18; and at the second congress, out


of a total of 144 votes he obtained about 20. Mdivani waspersistently refused election to the Central Committee;his position was systematically rejected. On the firstoccasion, at the beginning of 1922, we in the CentralCommittee brought pressure to bear upon the Commu-nist Party of Georgia and compelled it against its willto accept these old comrades (Mdivani is certainly anold comrade, and so is Makharadze), thinking that thetwo groups, the majority and the minority, would even-tually work together. In the interval between the firstand second congresses, however, there were a numberof conferences, city and all-Georgian, at which the Mdi-vani group was everywhere severely trounced by itsown Party, until finally, at the last congress, Mdivanibarely scraped together 18 votes out of 140.

The Transcaucasian Federation is an organisationthat affects not only Georgia, but the whole of Transcau-casia. As a rule, the Georgian Party congress is followedby a Transcaucasian congress. There we have the samepicture. At the last Transcaucasian congress, out of atotal of, I think, 244 votes, Mdivani barely obtainedabout 10 votes. Such are the facts. What is the CentralCommittee of the Party to do in such a situation, wherethe Party, the Georgian organisation itself, cannot standthe Mdivani group? I understand our policy in thenational question to be a policy of concessions to non-Russians and to national prejudices. That policy is un-doubtedly correct. But is it permissible to go on with-out end thwarting the will of the Party in which theMdivani group has to work? In my opinion it is not. Onthe contrary, we must as far as possible harmonise ouractions with the will of the Party in Georgia. That is


what the Central Committee did when it recalled certainmembers of this group.

The second reason that prompted the Central Com-mittee to recall certain comrades of this group is thatthey repeatedly disobeyed the decisions of the CentralCommittee of the R.C.P. I have already told you thehistory of the decision concerning federation; I havealready said that without this organ national peace isimpossible; that in Transcaucasia only the Soviet Govern-ment succeeded in establishing national peace by creat-ing the federation. That is why we in the Central Com-mittee regarded that decision as being absolutely bind-ing. But what do we see? That the Mdivani group dis-obeys that decision. More than that, it opposes it. Thathas been established both by Comrade Dzerzhinsky’scommission and by the Kamenev-Kuibyshev commis-sion. Even now, after the decision of the March Plenumconcerning Georgia, Mdivani is continuing to opposefederation. What is that if not contempt for the CentralCommittee’s decisions?

Such are the circumstances that compelled the Cen-tral Committee of the Party to recall Mdivani.

Mdivani tries to make it appear that, in spite ofhis recall, he is the victor. If that is victory, I don’tknow what defeat is. You know, of course, that DonQuixote, of blessed memory, also regarded himself as thevictor when he was knocked head over heels by windmillsails. I have a notion that certain comrades who areworking in a certain piece of Soviet territory calledGeorgia are not all there in their upper storeys.

I pass on to Comrade Makharadze. He declared herethat he is an old Bolshevik in the national question,


that he belongs to the school of Lenin. That is not true,comrades. At the conference held in April 1917,68 Com-rade Lenin and I fought against Comrade Makharadze.He was then against the self-determination of nations,against the basis of our programme, against the right ofnations to exist as independent states. He upheld thatstandpoint and fought the Party. Later he changed hisopinion (that, of course, is to his credit), but still, heshould not have forgotten this! He is not an old Bol-shevik in the national quest ion, but rather a fair lyyoung one.

Comrade Makharadze put to me a parliamentary in-terpellation: do I admit, or does the Central Committeeadmit, that the organisation of the Georgian Communistsis a real organisation which is to be trusted, and if so,does the Central Committee agree to this organisationhaving the right to raise questions and put forward itsproposals? If all that is admitted, does the Central Com-mittee consider that the regime that has been estab-lished there, in Georgia, is intolerable?

I shall answer this parl iamentary interpellat ion.Of course, the Central Committee trusts the Commu-

nist Party of Georgia—whom else should it trust?! TheCommunist Party of Georgia represents the essence, thebest elements, of the Georgian people, without whom itwould be impossible to govern Georgia. But every organi-sation consists of a majority and a minority. We havenot a single organisation in which there is not a major-ity and a minority. And in practice we see that theCentral Committee of the Communist Party of Georgiaconsists of a majority which is carrying out the Partyline, and of a minority which does not always carry out


this line. Obviously, we are referring to trust in theorganisation as represented by its majority.

The second question: Have the national Central Com-mittees the right to initiative, to raise questions; havethey the right to make proposals?

Of course they have. That is obvious. What I do notunderstand is, why did Comrade Makharadze not pre-sent us with any facts to prove that the Central Commit-tee of the Communist Party of Georgia is not allowedto raise questions, is not allowed to make proposals andto discuss them? I am not aware of any such facts. Ithink that Comrade Makharadze would submit suchmaterials to the Central Committee if he had any at all.

The third question: can the regime that has beencreated in Georgia be tolerated?

Unfortunately, the question lacks concreteness. Whatregime? If he means the regime under which the Sovietpower in Georgia has recently been ejecting the noblesfrom their nests, and also Mensheviks and counter-revo-lutionaries, if he means that regime, then, in my opinion,there is nothing bad about it. It is our Soviet regime.If, however, he means that the Transcaucasian Territo-rial Committee has created conditions making it impossi-ble for the Communist Party of Georgia to develop, Ihave no facts to show that this is so. The Georgian Cen-tral Committee that was elected at the last congress ofthe Georgian Communist Party by 110 votes against 18,did not raise this question with us. It is working in com-plete harmony with the Transcaucasian Territorial Com-mittee of our Party. If there is a small group, a trend,in short, members of the Party, who are dissatisfied withthe Party regime, they ought to submit the relevant ma-


terial to the Central Committee. Two commissions havealready been to Georgia to investigate such complaints,one that of Dzerzhinsky, and the other that of Kamenevand Kuibyshev. We can set up a third commission ifneed be.

With this I conclude the first part of my reply tothe discussion on the Central Committee’s organisationalactivities during the past year.

I pass on to the second part, to the proposals onorganisation which the Central Committee has submit-ted for the consideration of the congress. As far as Iknow, none of the speakers has criticised any of the pro-posals submitted by the Central Committee. I interpretthis as an expression of complete agreement with theproposals the Central Committee has submitted for yourconsideration. Nevertheless, I would like to help, andto move a number of amendments. I shall submit theseamendments to the committee which the Central Com-mittee thinks should be set up, to the OrganisationalCommittee, in which Comrade Molotov will be in chargeof the main work as regards Party affairs, and ComradeDzerzhinsky as regards Soviet affairs.

The first amendment is that the number of candi-date members of the Central Committee be increasedfrom five to at least fifteen.

The second amendment is that special attention bedevoted to strengthening and enlarging the Registrationand Distribution departments both at the top and bottomlevels, because these bodies are now acquiring enormous,first-rate importance, because they are the most effectivemeans by which the Party can keep hold of all thethreads of our economy and of the Soviet apparatus.


The third amendment is that the congress shouldapprove the proposal to set up under the auspices of theCentral Committee a school for training uyezd secreta-ries, so that by the end of the year the Gubernia Commit-tees may have 200 to 300 uyezd secretaries at their dis-posal.

And the fourth amendment concerns the press. Ihave nothing concrete to propose on this point, but Iwould like the congress to pay particular attention tothe task of raising the press to the proper level. It ismaking progress, i t has made big progress, but notas much as is needed. The press must grow day in andday out—it is our Party’s sharpest and most powerfulweapon.

In conclusion, a few words about the present con-gress. Comrades, I must say that I have not for a longtime seen a congress so united and inspired by a singleidea as this one is. I regret that Comrade Lenin is nothere. If he were here he would be able to say: “I tendedthe Party for twenty-five years and made it great andstrong.” (Prolonged applause.)

3. REPORT ON NATIONALFACTORS IN PARTY AND STATE

AFFAIRS

April 23

Comrades, this is the third time since the OctoberRevolution that we are discussing the national question:the first time was at the Eighth Congress, the secondwas at the Tenth, and the third at the Twelfth. Doesthis indicate that some fundamental change has takenplace in our views on the national question? No, ourfundamental outlook on the national question has re-mained what it was before and after the October Revolu-tion. But since the Tenth Congress the international sit-uation has changed in that the heavy reserves of the rev-olution which the countries of the East now constitutehave acquired greater importance. That is the first point.The second point is that since the Tenth Congress ourParty has also witnessed certain changes in the internalsituation in connection with the New Economic Policy.All these new factors must be taken into account andthe conclusions must be drawn from them. It is in thissense that it can be said that the national question isbeing presented at the Twelfth Congress in a new way.

The international significance of the national ques-tion. You know, comrades, that by the will of historywe, the Soviet federation, now represent the advanceddetachment of the world revolution. You know that we


were the first to breach the general capitalist front, thatit has been our destiny to be ahead of all others. Youknow that in our advance we got as far as Warsaw, thatwe then retreated and entrenched ourselves in the posi-tions we considered strongest. From that moment wepassed to the New Economic Policy, from that momentwe took into account the slowing down of the interna-tional revolutionary movement, and from that momentour policy changed from the offensive to the defensive.We could not advance after we had suffered a reverseat Warsaw (let us not hide the truth); we could not ad-vance, for we would have run the risk of being cut offfrom the rear, which in our case is a peasant rear; and,lastly, we would have run the risk of advancing too farahead of the reserves of the revolution with which desti-ny has provided us, the reserves in the West and the East.That is why we made a turn towards the New EconomicPolicy within the country, and towards a slower advanceoutside; for we decided that it was necessary to havea respite, to heal our wounds, the wounds of the advanceddetachment, the proletariat, to establish contact withthe peasant rear and to conduct further work among thereserves, which were lagging behind us—the reserves inthe West and the heavy reserves in the East which arethe main rear of world capitalism. It is these reserves—heavy reserves, which at the same time are the rear ofworld imperialism—that we have in mind when discuss-ing the national question.

One thing or the other: either we succeed in stirringup, in revolutionising, the remote rear of imperialism—the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East—and thereby hasten the fall of imperialism; or we fail


to do so, and thereby strengthen imperialism and weak-en the force of our movement. That is how the questionstands.

The fact of the matter is that the whole East regardsour Union of Republics as an experimental field. Eitherwe find a correct practical solution of the national ques-tion within the framework of this Union, either we here,within the framework of this Union, establish truly fra-ternal relations and true co-operation among the peoples—in which case the whole East will see that our federationis the banner of its liberation, is its advanced detach-ment, in whose footsteps it must follow—and that willbe the beginning of the collapse of world imperialism.Or we commit a blunder here, undermine the confidenceof the formerly oppressed peoples in the proletariat ofRussia, and deprive the Union of Republics of the powerof attraction which it possesses in the eyes of the East—in which case imperialism will win and we shall lose.

Therein lies the international significance of the na-tional question.

The national question is also of importance for usfrom the standpoint of the internal situation, not onlybecause the former dominant nation numbers about75,000,000 and the other nations 65,000,000 (not a smallfigure, anyway), and not only because the formerly op-pressed nationalities inhabit areas that are the mostessential for our economic development and the mostimportant from the standpoint of military strategy, butabove all because during the past two years we have in-troduced what is known as the N.E.P., as a result ofwhich Great-Russian nationalism has begun to grow andbecome more pronounced, the Smena-Vekhist idea has


come into being, and one can discern the desire to accom-plish by peaceful means what Denikin failed to accom-plish, i.e., to create the so-called “one and indivisible.”

Thus, as a result of the N.E.P., a new force is aris-ing in the internal life of our country, namely, Great-Russian chauvinism, which entrenches itself in our in-stitutions, which penetrates not only the Soviet institu-tions, but also the Party institutions, and which is tobe found in all parts of our federation. Consequently,if we do not resolutely combat this new force, if we donot cut it off at the root—and the N.E.P. conditions fosterit—we run the risk of being confronted by a rupturebetween the proletariat of the former dominant nationand the peasants of the formerly oppressed nations—which will mean undermining the dictatorship of theproletariat.

But the N.E.P. fosters not only Great-Russian chau-vinism—it also fosters local chauvinism, especially inthose republics where there are several nationalities. Ihave in mind Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bukhara and partlyTurkestan; in each of these there are several nationalities,the advanced elements of which may soon begin to com-pete among themselves for supremacy. Of course, thislocal chauvinism as regards its strength is not such adanger as Great-Russian chauvinism. But it is a dangernevertheless, for it threatens to convert some of the re-publics into arenas of national squabbling and to weakenthe bonds of internationalism there.

Such are the international and internal circumstancesthat make the national question one of great, of first-rate, importance in general, and at the present momentin particular.


What is the class essence of the national question?Under the present conditions of Soviet development, theclass essence of the national question lies in the estab-lishment of correct mutual relations between the prole-tariat of the former dominant nation and the peasantryof the formerly oppressed nationalities. The question ofthe bond has been more than sufficiently discussed here,but when this question was discussed in connection withthe report of Kamenev, Kalinin, Sokolnikov, Rykov andTrotsky, what was mainly in mind was the relationsbetween the Russian proletariat and the Russian peasant-ry. Here, in the national sphere, we have a more complexmechanism. Here we are concerned with establishing cor-rect mutual relations between the proletariat of the for-mer dominant nation, which is the most cultured sectionof the proletariat in our entire federation, and the peas-antry, mainly of the formerly oppressed nationalities.This is the class essence of the national question. If theproletariat succeeds in establishing with the peasantryof the other nationalities relations that can eradicate allremnants of mistrust towards everything Russian, a mis-trust implanted and fostered for decades by the policyof tsarism—if, moreover, the Russian proletariat suc-ceeds in establishing complete mutual understanding andconfidence, in effecting a genuine alliance not only be-tween the proletariat and the Russian peasantry, but alsobetween the proletariat and peasantry of the formerlyoppressed nationalities, the problem will be solved. Toachieve this, proletarian power must become as dear tothe peasantry of the other nationalities as it is to theRussian peasantry. And in order that Soviet power maybecome dear also to the peasants of these nationalities, it


must be understood by these peasants, it must functionin their native languages, the schools and governmentalbodies must be staffed with local people who know thelanguage, habits, customs and manner of life of the non-Russian nationalities. Soviet power, which until very re-cently was Russian power, will become a power which isnot merely Russian but inter-national, a power dearto the peasants of the formerly oppressed nationalities,only when and to the degree that the institutions andgovernmental bodies in the republics of these countriesbegin to speak and function in the native languages.

That is one of the fundamentals of the national ques-tion in general, and under Soviet conditions in par-ticular.

What is the characteristic feature of the solution ofthe national question at the present moment, in 1923?What form have the problems requiring solution in thenational sphere assumed in 1923? The form of establish-ing co-operation between the peoples of our federationin the economic, military and political spheres. I havein mind inter-national relations. The national question,at the basis of which lie the tasks of establishing correctrelations between the proletariat of the former dominantnation and the peasantry of the other nationalities, as-sumes at the present time the special form of establishingthe co-operation and fraternal co-existence of those na-tions which were formerly disunited and which are nowuniting in a single state.

Such is the essence of the national question in theform it has assumed in 1923.

The concrete form of this state union is the Unionof Republics, which we already discussed at the Congress


of Soviets at the end of last year, and which we thenestablished.

The basis of this Union is the voluntary consentand the juridical equality of the members of the Union.Voluntary consent and equality—because our nationalprogramme starts out from the clause on the right of na-tions to exist as independent states, what was formerlycalled the right to self-determination. Proceeding fromthis, we must definitely say that no union of peoples intoa single state can be durable unless it is based on abso-lutely voluntary consent, unless the peoples themselveswish to unite. The second basis is the juridical equalityof the peoples which form the Union. That is natural.I am not speaking of actual equality—I shall come tothat later—for the establishment of actual equality be-tween nations which have forged ahead and backwardnations is a very complicated, very difficult, matter thatmust take a number of years. I am speaking now aboutjuridical equality. This equality finds expression in thefact that all the republics, in this case the four repub-lics: Transcaucasia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine and theR.S.F.S.R., forming the Union, enjoy the benefits of theUnion to an equal degree and at the same time to anequal degree forgo certain of their independent rightsin favour of the Union. If the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukraine,Byelorussia and the Transcaucasian Republic are noteach to have its own People’s Commissariat of ForeignAffairs, it is obvious that the abolition of these Commis-sariats and the establishment of a common Commissariatof Foreign Affairs for the Union of Republics will entaila certain restriction of the independence which theserepublics formerly enjoyed, and this restriction will be


equal for all the republics forming the Union. Obviously,if these republics formerly had their own People’s Com-missariats of Foreign Trade, and these Commissariatsare now abolished both in the R.S.F.S.R. and in theother republics in order to make way for a common Com-missariat of Foreign Trade for the Union of Republics,this too will involve a certain restriction of the independ-ence formerly enjoyed in full measure, but now curtailedin favour of the common Union, and so on, and soforth. Some people ask a purely scholastic question,namely: do the republics remain independent after unit-ing? That is a scholastic question. Their independenceis restricted, for every union involves a certain restrictionof the former rights of the parties to the union. But thebasic elements of independence of each of these republicscertainly remain, if only because every republic retainsthe right to secede from the Union at its own discre-tion.

Thus, the concrete form the national question hasassumed under the conditions at present prevailing inour country is how to achieve the co-operation of thepeoples in economic, foreign and military affairs. Wemust unite the republics along these lines into a singleunion called the U.S.S.R. Such are the concrete formsthe national question has assumed at the present time.

But that is easier said than done. The fact of thematter is that under the conditions prevailing in ourcountry, there are, in addition to the factors conduciveto the union of the peoples into one state, a number offactors which hinder this union.

You know what the conducive factors are: first ofall, the economic coming together of the peoples that


was established prior to Soviet power and which wasconsolidated by Soviet power; a certain division of la-bour between the peoples, established before our time,but consolidated by us, by the Soviet power. That isthe basic factor conducive to the union of the republicsinto a Union. The nature of Soviet power must be regard-ed as the second factor conducive to union. That isnatural. Soviet power is the power of the workers, thedictatorship of the proletariat, which by its very naturedisposes the labouring elements of the republics andpeoples which form the Union to live in friendly relationswith one another. That is natural. And the third factorconducive to union is the imperialist encirclement, form-ing an environment in which the Union of Republicsis obliged to operate.

But there are also factors which hinder, which im-pede, this union. The principal force impeding the unionof the republics into a single union is that force which,as I have said, is growing in our country under the con-ditions of the N.E.P.: Great-Russian chauvinism. It isby no means accidental, comrades, that the Smena-Vekh-ites have recruited a large number of supporters amongSoviet officials. That is by no means accidental. Nor is itaccidental that Messieurs the Smena-Vekhites are sing-ing the praises of the Bolshevik Communists, as muchas to say: You may talk about Bolshevism as much asyou like, you may prate as much as you like about yourinternationalist tendencies, but we know that you willachieve what Denikin failed to achieve, that you Bol-sheviks have resurrected, or at all events will resurrect,the idea of a Great Russia. All that is not accidental.Nor is it accidental that this idea has even penetrated


some of our Party institutions. At the February Plenum,where the question of a second chamber was first raised,I witnessed how certain members of the Central Com-mittee made speeches which were inconsistent with com-munism—speeches which had nothing in common withinternationalism. All this is a sign of the times, an epi-demic. The chief danger that arises from this is that,owing to the N.E.P., dominant-nation chauvinism isgrowing in our country by leaps and bounds, strivingto obliterate all that is not Russian, to gather all thethreads of government into the hands of Russians andto stifle everything that is not Russian. The chief dangeris that with such a policy we run the risk that the Rus-sian proletarians will lose the confidence of the formerlyoppressed nations which they won in the October days,when they overthrew the landlords and the Russian cap-italists, when they smashed the chains of national op-pression within Russia, withdrew the troops from Persiaand Mongolia, proclaimed the independence of Finlandand Armenia and, in general, put the national questionon an entirely new basis. Unless we all arm ourselvesagainst this new, I repeat, Great-Russian chauvinism,which is advancing, creeping, insinuating itself dropby drop into the eyes and ears of our officials and stepby step corrupting them, we may lose down to the lastshreds the confidence we earned at that time. It is thisdanger, comrades, that we must defeat at all costs. Other-wise we are threatened with the prospect of losing theconfidence of the workers and peasants of the formerlyoppressed peoples, we are threatened with the prospectof a rupture of the ties between these peoples and theRussian proletariat, and this threatens us with the dan-


ger of a crack being formed in the system of our dicta-torship.

Do not forget, comrades, that if we were able to marchagainst Kerensky with flying colours and overthrow theProvisional Government it was because, among otherthings, we were backed by the confidence of the op-pressed peoples that were expecting liberation at the handsof the Russian proletarians. Do not forget such reservesas the oppressed peoples, who are silent, but who bytheir silence exert pressure and decide a great deal. Thisis often not felt, but these peoples are living, they exist,and they must not be forgotten. Do not forget that ifwe had not had in the rear of Kolchak, Denikin, Wran-gel and Yudenich the so-called “aliens,” if we had nothad the formerly oppressed peoples, who disorganised therear of those generals by their tacit sympathy for theRussian-proletarians—comrades, this is a special factorin our development, this tacit sympathy, which nobodyhears or sees, but which decides everything—if it had notbeen for this sympathy, we would not have knockedout a single one of these generals. While we were march-ing against them, disintegration began in their rear.Why? Because those generals depended on the Cossackcolonising elements, they held out to the oppressed peo-ples the prospect of further oppression, and the oppressedpeoples were therefore pushed into our arms, whilewe unfurled the banner of the liberation of these op-pressed peoples. That is what decided the fate of those gen-erals; such is the sum-total of the factors which, althoughovershadowed by our armies’ victories, in the long rundecided everything. That must not be forgotten. That iswhy we must make a sharp turn towards combating


the new chauvinist sentiments and pillory those bureau-crats in our institutions and those Party comrades whoare forgetting what we gained in October, namely, theconfidence of the formerly oppressed peoples, a confi-dence that we must cherish.

It must be understood that if a force like Great-Rus-sian chauvinism blossoms and spreads, there will be noconfidence on the part of the formerly oppressed peoples,we shall have no co-operation within a single union, andwe shall have no Union of Republics.

Such is the first and most dangerous factor that isimpeding the union of the peoples and republics into asingle union.

The second factor, comrades, which is also hinderingthe union of the formerly oppressed peoples around theRussian proletariat, is the actual inequality of nationsthat we have inherited from the period of tsarism.

We have proclaimed juridical equality and are prac-tising it; but juridical equality, although in itself ofvery great importance in the history of the developmentof the Soviet republics, is still far from being actualequality. Formally, all the backward nationalities andall the peoples enjoy just as many rights as are enjoyedby the other, more advanced, nations which constituteour federation. But the trouble is that some nationali-ties have no proletarians of their own, have not under-gone industrial development, have not even started onthis road, are terribly backward culturally and are en-tirely unable to take advantage of the rights grantedthem by the revolution. This, comrades, is a far moreimportant question than that of the schools. Some ofour comrades here think that the knot can be cut by put-


ting the question of schools and language in the fore-front. That is not so, comrades. Schools will not carryyou very far. These schools are developing, so are thelanguages, but actual inequality remains the basis of allthe discontent and friction. Schools and language willnot settle the matter; what is needed is real, systematic,sincere and genuine proletarian assistance on our partto the labouring masses of the culturally and economicallybackward nationalities. In addition to schools and lan-guage, the Russian proletariat must take all measures tocreate in the border regions, in the culturally backwardrepublics—and they are not backward because of anyfault of their own, but because they were formerly re-garded as sources of raw materials—must take all meas-ures to ensure the building of centres of industry inthese republics. Certain attempts have been made in thisdirection. Georgia has taken a factory from Moscow andit should start operating soon. Bukhara has taken onefactory, but could have taken four. Turkestan is takingone large factory. Thus, all the facts show that theseeconomically backward republics, which possess no prole-tariat, must with the aid of the Russian proletariat estab-lish their own centres of industry, even though smallones, in order to create in these centres groups of localproletarians to serve as a bridge between the Russianproletarians and peasants and the labouring masses ofthese republics. In this sphere we have a lot of work todo, and schools alone will not settle the matter.

But there is still a third factor that is impeding theunion of the republics into a single union: the existenceof nationalism in the individual republics. The N.E.P.affects not only the Russian, but also the non-Russian


population. The New Economic Policy is developingprivate trade and industry not only in the centre ofRussia, but also in the individual republics. And it isthis same N.E.P., and the private capital associatedwith it, which nourish and foster Georgian, Azerbaija-nian, Uzbek and other nationalism. Of course, if therewere no Great-Russian chauvinism—which is aggressivebecause it is strong, because it was also strong previous-ly and has retained the habit of oppressing and humiliat-ing—if there were no Great-Russian chauvinism, then,perhaps, local chauvinism also, as a retaliation to Great-Russian chauvinism, would exist only in a much reducedform, in miniature, so to speak; because, in the finalanalysis, anti-Russian nationalism is a form of defence,an ugly form of defence against Great-Russian national-ism, against Great-Russian chauvinism. If this nation-alism were only defensive, it might not be worth makinga fuss about. We could concentrate the entire force ofour activities, the entire force of our struggle, againstGreat-Russian chauvinism, in the hope that as soon asthis powerful enemy is overcome, anti-Russian national-ism will be overcome with it; for, I repeat, in the lastanalysis, this nationalism is a reaction to Great-Russiannationalism, a retaliation to it, a certain form of de-fence. Yes, that would be so if anti-Russian nationalismin the localities were nothing more than a reaction toGreat-Russian nationalism. But the trouble is that insome republics this defensive nationalism is turning intoaggressive nationalism.

Take Georgia. Over 30 per cent of her populationare non-Georgians. They include Armenians, Abkhazi-ans, Ajarians, Ossetians and Tatars. The Georgians are


at the head. Among some of the Georgian Communiststhe idea has sprung up and is gaining ground that theres no particular need to reckon with these small nation-alities; they are less cultured, less developed, they say,and there is therefore no need to reckon with them. Thatis chauvinism—harmful and dangerous chauvinism; forit may turn the small republic of Georgia into an arenaof strife. In fact, it has already turned it into an arenaof strife.

Azerbaijan. The basic nationality here is the Azer-baijanian, but there are also Armenians. Among a sectionof the Azerbaijanians there is also a tendency, sometimesquite unconcealed, to think that the Azerbaijanians arethe indigenous population and the Armenians intruders,and therefore, it is possible to push the Armenians some-what into the background, to disregard their interests.That is chauvinism too. It undermines the equality ofnationalities on which the Soviet system is based.

Bukhara. In Bukhara there are three nationalities—Uzbeks, the basic nationality; Turkmenians, a “less im-portant” nationality from the point of view of Bukha-ran chauvinism; and Kirghiz, who are few in numberhere and, apparently, “less important.”

In Khorezm you have the same thing: Turkmenians andUzbeks. The Uzbeks are the basic nationality and theTurkmenians “less important.”

All this leads to conflict and weakens the Sovietregime This tendency towards local chauvinism must alsobe cut off at the root. Of course, compared with Great-Russian chauvinism, which in the general scheme of thenational question comprises three-quarters of the whole,local chauvinism is not so important; but for local work,


for the local people, for the peaceful development of thenational republics themselves, this chauvinism is a mat-ter of first-rate importance.

Sometimes this chauvinism begins to undergo a veryinteresting evolution. I have in mind Transcaucasia. Youknow that Transcaucasia consists of three republics em-bracing ten nationalities. From very early times Trans-caucasia has been an arena of massacre and strife and,under the Mensheviks and Dashnaks, it was an arena ofwar. You know of the Georgian-Armenian war. You alsoknow of the massacres in Azerbaijan at the beginning andat the end of 1905. I could mention a whole list of dis-tricts where the Armenian majority massacred all therest of the population, consisting of Tatars. Zangezur,for instance. I could mention another province—Nakhi-chevan. There the Tatars predominated, and they mas-sacred all the Armenians. That was just before the lib-eration of Armenia and Georgia from the yoke of imperial-ism. (Voice: “That was their way of solving the nationalquestion.”) That, of course, is also a way of solving thenational question. But it is not the Soviet way. Of course,the Russian workers are not to blame for this state ofmutual national enmity, for it is the Tatars and Arme-nians who are fighting, without the Russians. That iswhy a special organ is required in Transcaucasia toregulate the relations between the nationalities.

It may be confidently stated that the relations be-tween the proletariat of the formerly dominant nation andthe toilers of all the other nationalities constitute three-quarters of the whole national question. But one-quarterof this question must be attributed to the relations be-tween the formerly oppressed nationalities themselves.


And if in this atmosphere of mutual distrust theSoviet Government had failed to establish in Transcauca-sia an organ of national peace capable of settling allfriction and conflict, we would have reverted to the eraof tsarism, or to the era of the Dashnaks, the Mussavat-ists, the Mensheviks, when people maimed and slaugh-tered one another. That is why the Central Committeehas on three occasions affirmed the necessity of preserv-ing the Transcaucasian Federation as an organ of nationalpeace.

There has been and still is a group of Georgian Com-munists who do not object to Georgia uniting with theUnion of Republics, but who do object to this union beingeffected through the Transcaucasian Federation. They,you see, would like to get closer to the Union, they saythat there is no need for this partition wall in the shapeof the Transcaucasian Federation between themselves—the Georgians—and the Union of Republics, the federa-tion, they say, is superfluous. This, they think, soundsvery revolutionary.

But there is another motive behind this. In the firstplace, these statements indicate that on the nationalquestion the attitude towards the Russians is of sec-ondary importance in Georgia, for these comrades, thedeviators (that is what they are called), have no objec-tion to Georgia joining the Union directly; that is, theydo not fear Great-Russian chauvinism, believing thatits roots have been cut in one way or another, or, at anyrate, that it is not of decisive importance. Evidently,what they fear most is the federation of Transcaucasia.Why? Why should the three principal nations which in-habit Transcaucasia, which fought among themselves so


long, massacred each other and warred against each other,why should these nations, now that Soviet power has atlast united them by bonds of fraternal union in the formof a federation, now that this federation has producedpositive results, why should they now break these fed-eral ties? What is the point, comrades?

The point is that the bonds of the TranscaucasianFederation deprive Georgia of that somewhat privilegedposition which she could assume by virtue of her geograph-ical position. Judge for yourselves. Georgia has her ownport—Batum—through which goods flow from the West;Georgia has a railway junction like Tiflis, which theArmenians cannot avoid, nor can Azerbaijan avoid it,for she receives her goods through Batum. If Georgiawere a separate republic, if she were not part of the Trans-caucasian Federation, she could present something inthe nature of a little ultimatum both to Armenia, whichcannot do without Tiflis, and to Azerbaijan, which can-not do without Batum. There would be some advantagesfor Georgia in this. It was no accident that the notorioussavage decree establishing frontier cordons was draftedin Georgia. Serebryakov is now being blamed for this.Let us allow that he is to blame, but the decree origi-nated in Georgia, not in Azerbaijan or Armenia.

Then there is yet another reason. Tiflis is the capitalof Georgia, but the Georgians there are not more than30 per cent of the population, the Armenians not lessthan 35 per cent, and then come all the other nationali-ties. That is what the capital of Georgia is like. If Georgiawere a separate republic the population could be reshiftedsomewhat—for instance, the Armenian population couldbe shifted from Tiflis. Was not a well-known decree


adopted in Georgia to “regulate” the population of Tiflis,about which Comrade Makharadze said that it was notdirected against the Armenians? The intention was toreshift the population so as to reduce the number of Ar-menians in Tiflis from year to year, making them fewerthan the Georgians, and thus convert Tiflis into a realGeorgian capital. I grant that they have rescinded theeviction decree, but they have a vast number of possi-bilities, a vast number of flexible forms—such as “de-congestion”—by which it would be possible, while main-taining a semblance of internationalism, to arrange mat-ters in such a way that Armenians in Tiflis would be inthe minority.

It is these geographical advantages that the Geor-gian deviators do not want to lose, and the unfavourableposition of the Georgians in Tiflis itself, where thereare fewer Georgians than Armenians, that are causingour deviators to oppose federation. The Mensheviks sim-ply evicted Armenians and Tatars from Tiflis. Now, how-ever, under the Soviet regime, eviction is impossible;therefore, they want to leave the federation, and thiswill create legal opportunities for independently per-forming certain operations which will result in the ad-vantageous position enjoyed by the Georgians being fullyutilised against Azerbaijan and Armenia. And all thiswould create a privileged position for the Georgians inTranscaucasia. Therein lies the whole danger.

Can we ignore the interests of national peace in Trans-caucasia and allow conditions to be created under whichthe Georgians would be in a privileged position in rela-tion to the Armenian and Azerbaijanian Republics? No.We cannot allow that.


There is an old, special system of governing nations,under which a bourgeois authority favours certain na-tionalities, grants them privileges and humbles the othernations, not wishing to be bothered with them. Thus byfavouring one nationality, it uses it to keep down theothers. Such, for instance, was the method of governmentemployed in Austria. Everyone remembers the statementof the Austrian Minister Beust, who summoned the Hun-garian Minister and said: “You govern your hordes andI will cope with mine.” In other words: you curb and keepdown your nationalities in Hungary and I will keep downmine in Austria. You and I represent privileged nations,let’s keep down the rest.

The same was the case with the Poles in Austria it-self. The Austrians favoured the Poles, granted themprivileges, in order that the Poles should help the Aus-trians strengthen their position in Poland; and in returnthey allowed the Poles to strangle Galicia.

This system of singling out some nationalities andgranting them privileges in order to cope with the restis purely and specifically Austrian. From the point ofview of the bureaucracy, it is an “economical” methodof governing, because it has to bother only with one na-tionality; but from the political point of view it meanscertain death to the state, for to violate the principleof equality of nationalities and to grant privileges toany one nationality means dooming one’s national policyto certain failure.

Britain is now ruling India in exactly the same way.To make it easier, from the point of view of the bureauc-racy, to deal with the nationalities and races of India,Britain divided India into British India (240,000,000


population) and Native India (72,000,000 population).Why? Because Britain wanted to single out one groupof nations and grant it privileges in order the more easi-ly to govern the remaining nationalities. In India thereare several hundred nationalities, and Britain decidedthat, rather than bother with these nationalities, it wasbetter to single out a few nations, grant them certain priv-ileges and through them govern the rest; for, firstly,the discontent of the other nations would be directedagainst these favoured ones and not against Britain, and,secondly, it would be cheaper to have to “bother” withonly two or three nations.

That is also a system of governing, the British sys-tem. What does it lead to? To the “cheapening” of the appa-ratus—that is true. But, comrades, leaving aside bureau-cratic conveniences, it means certain death to Britishrule in India; this system harbours inevitable death, assurely as twice two make four, the death of British ruleand British domination.

It is on to this dangerous path that our comrades,the Georgian deviators, are pushing us by opposing feder-ation in violation of all the laws of the Party, by want-ing to withdraw from the federation in order to retainan advantageous position. They are pushing us on to thepath of granting them certain privileges at the expenseof the Armenian and Azerbaijanian Republics. But thisis a path we cannot take, for it means certain death toour entire policy and to Soviet power in the Caucasus.

It was no accident that our comrades in Georgiasensed this danger. This Georgian chauvinism, which hadpassed to the offensive against the Armenians and Azer-baijanians, alarmed the Communist Party of Georgia.


Quite naturally, the Communist Party of Georgia, whichhas held two congresses since it came into legal existence,on both occasions unanimously rejected the stand of thedeviator comrades, for under present conditions it isimpossible to maintain peace in the Caucasus, impossi-ble to establish equality, without the TranscaucasianFederation. One nation must not be allowed more priv-ileges than another. This our comrades have sensed.That is why, after two years of contention, the Mdivanigroup is a small handful, repeatedly ejected by theParty in Georgia itself.

It was also no accident that Comrade Lenin was insuch a hurry and was so insistent that the federationshould be established immediately. Nor was it an acci-dent that our Central Committee on three occasions af-firmed the need for a federation in Transcaucasia, havingits own Central Executive Committee and its own execu-tive authority, whose decisions would be binding on therepublics. It was no accident that both commissions—Comrade Dzerzhinsky’s and that of Kamenev and Kuiby-shev—on their arrival in Moscow stated that federationwas indispensable.

Lastly, it is no accident either that the Mensheviksof Sotsialistichesky Vestnik 69 praise our deviator com-rades and laud them to the skies for opposing federa-tion: birds of a feather flock together.

I pass to an examination of the ways and means bywhich we must eliminate these three main factors thatare hindering union: Great-Russian chauvinism, actualinequality of nations and local nationalism, particularlywhen it is growing into chauvinism. Of the means thatmay help us painlessly to rid ourselves of all this heri-


tage of the past which is hindering the peoples from com-ing together I shall mention three.

The first means is to adopt all measures to make theSoviet regime understood and loved in the republics, tomake the Soviet regime not only Russian but inter-nation-al. For this it is necessary that not only the schools, butall institutions and all bodies, both Party and Soviet,should step by step be made national in character, thatthey should be conducted in the language that is under-stood by the masses, that they should function in condi-tions that correspond to the manner of life of the givennation. Only on this condition will we be able to convertthe Soviet regime from a Russian into an inter-nationalone, understood by and near and dear to the labour-ing masses of all the republics, particularly those whichare economically and culturally backward.

The second means that can help us in painlesslygetting rid of the heritage from tsarism and the bour-geoisie is to construct the Commissariats of the Unionof Republics in such a way as to enable at least the prin-cipal nationalities to have their people on the colle-giums, and to create a situation in which the needs andrequirements of the individual republics will be met with-out fail.

The third means: i t is necessary to have amongour supreme central organs one that will serve to expressthe needs and requirements of all the republics and na-tionalities without exception.

I want especially to draw your attention to this lastmeans.

If within the Central Executive Committee of theUnion we could create two chambers having equal powers,


one of which would be elected at the Union Congress ofSoviets, irrespective of nationality, and the other bythe republics and national regions (the republics beingequally represented, and the national regions also beingequally represented) and endorsed by the same Congressof Soviets of the Union of Republics, I think that thenour supreme institutions would express not only the classinterests of all the working people without exception,but also purely national needs. We would have an organwhich would express the special interests of the national-ities, peoples and races inhabiting the Union of Repub-lics. Under the conditions prevailing in our Union, whichas a whole unites not less than 140,000,000 people, ofwhom about 65,000,000 are non-Russians, in such acountry it is impossible to govern unless we have withus, here in Moscow, in the supreme organ, emissaries ofthese nationalities, to express not only the interestscommon to the proletariat as a whole, but also special,specific, national interests. Without this it will be impossi-ble to govern, comrades. Unless we have this barometer,and people capable of formulating these special needsof the individual nationalities, it will be impossible togovern.

There are two ways of governing a country. One wayis to have a “simplified” apparatus, headed, say, by agroup of people, or by one man, having hands and eyesin the localities in the shape of governors. This is avery simple form of government, under which the ruler,in governing the country, receives the kind of informa-tion that can be received from governors and comfortshimself with the hope that he is governing honestly andwell. Presently, friction arises, friction grows into con-


flicts and conflicts into revolts. Later, the revolts arecrushed. Such a system of government is not our sys-tem, and in addition, although a simple one, it is toocostly. But there is another system of government, theSoviet system. In our Soviet country we are operatingthis other system of government, the system which en-ables us to foresee with accuracy all changes, all the cir-cumstances among the peasants, among the nationals,among the so-called “aliens” and among the Russians;this system of supreme organs possesses a number ofbarometers which forecast every change, which registerand warn against a Basmach movement,70 a bandit move-ment, Kronstadt, and all possible storms and disasters.That is the Soviet system of government. It is calledSoviet power, people’s power, because, relying on thecommon people, it is the first to register any change, ittakes the appropriate measures and rectifies the line intime, if it has become distorted, criticises itself and recti-fies the line. This system of government is the Sovietsystem, and it requires that the system of our higheragencies should include agencies expressing absolutelyall national needs and requirements.

The objection is made that this system will compli-cate the work of administration, that it means setting upmore and more bodies. That is true. Hitherto we had theCentral Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R., then wecreated the Central Executive Committee of the Union,and now we shall have to split the Central ExecutiveCommittee of the Union into two. But it can’t be helped.I have already said that the simplest form of governmentis to have one man and to give him governors. But now,after the October Revolution, we cannot engage in such


experiments. The system has become more complex, butit makes government easier and lends the whole govern-mental system a profoundly Soviet character. That is whyI think that the congress must agree to the establishmentof a special body, a second chamber within the CentralExecutive Committee of the Union, since it is absolutelyessential.

I do not say that this is a perfect way of arrangingco-operation between the peoples of the Union; I do notsay that it is the last word in science. We shall putforward the national question again and again, for na-tional and international conditions are changing, andmay change again. I do not deny the possibility thatperhaps some of the Commissariats that we are mergingin the Union of Republics will have to be separated againif, after being merged, experience shows that they areunsatisfactory. But one thing is clear, namely, thatunder present conditions, and in the present circum-stances, no better method and no more suitable organis available. As yet we have no better way or means ofcreating an organ capable of registering all the oscilla-tions and all the changes that take place within the indi-vidual republics than that of establishing a secondchamber.

It goes without saying that the second chamber mustcontain representatives not only of the four republicsthat have united, but of all the peoples; for the questionconcerns not only the republics which have formally unit-ed (there are four of them), but all the peoples andnationalities in the Union of Republics. We thereforerequire a form that will express the needs of all the na-tionalities and republics without exception.


I shall sum up, comrades.Thus, the importance of the national question is

determined by the new situation in international affairs,by the fact that here, in Russia, in our federation wemust solve the national question in a correct, a modelway, in order to set an example to the East, which con-stitutes the heavy reserves of the revolution, and there-by increase their confidence in our federation and itsattraction for them.

From the standpoint of the internal situation, theconditions created by the N.E.P. and the growing Great-Russian chauvinism and local chauvinism also obligeus to emphasise the special importance of the nationalquestion.

I said, further, that the essence of the national ques-tion lies in establishing correct relations between theproletariat of the formerly dominant nation and the peas-antry of the formerly subject nations, and that from thispoint of view the concrete form of the national questionat the present moment is expressed by having to findways and means of arranging the co-operation of thepeoples within a Union of Republics, within a singlestate.

I spoke, further, of the factors which are conduciveto such a coming together of the peoples. I spoke of thefactors impeding such a union. I dwelt especially onGreat-Russian chauvinism, as a force that is gaining instrength. That force is a basic danger, capable of under-mining the confidence of the formerly oppressed peoplesin the Russian proletariat. It is a most dangerous ene-my, which we must overcome; for once we overcome it,we shall have overcome nine-tenths of the nationalism


which has survived, and which is growing in certain re-publics.

Further. We are faced with the danger that certaingroups of comrades may push us on to the path of grant-ing privileges to some nationalities at the expense ofothers. I have said that we cannot take this path, be-cause it may undermine national peace and kill the confi-dence of the masses of the other nations in Soviet power.

I said, further, that the chief means that will en-able us most painlessly to eliminate the factors that hin-der union lies in the creation of a second chamber ofthe Central Executive Committee, of which I spoke moreopenly at the February Plenum of the Central Committee,and which is dealt with in the theses in a more veiledform in order to enable the comrades themselves, perhaps,to indicate some other more flexible form, some othermore suitable organ, capable of expressing the interestsof the nationalities.

Such are the conclusions.I think that it is only in this way that we shall be

able to achieve a correct solution of the national question,that we shall be able to unfurl widely the banner of theproletarian revolution and win for it the sympathy andconfidence of the countries of the East, which are theheavy reserves of the revolution, and which can play adecisive role in the future battles of the proletariat againstimperialism. (Applause.)

4. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSIONON THE REPORT ON NATIONAL FACTORS

IN PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

April 25

Comrades, before proceeding to report on the workof the committee on the national question, permit me todeal with two main points in answer to the speakers inthe discussion on my report. It will take about twentyminutes, not more.

The first point is that a group of comrades headedby Bukharin and Rakovsky has over-emphasised thesignificance of the national question, has exaggerated it,and has allowed it to overshadow the social question,the question of working-class power.

It is clear to us, as Communists, that the basis ofall our work lies in strengthening the power of the work-ers, and that only after that are we confronted by theother question, a very important one but subordinateto the first, namely, the national question. We are toldthat we must not offend the non-Russian nationalities.That is perfectly true; I agree that we must not of-fend them. But to evolve out of this a new theory tothe effect that the Great-Russian proletariat must beplaced in a position of inequality in relation to the for-merly oppressed nations is absurd. What was merely afigure of speech in Comrade Lenin’s well-known article,


Bukharin has converted into a regular slogan. Neverthe-less, it is clear that the political basis of the dictator-ship of the proletariat is primarily and chiefly the cent-ral, industrial regions, and not the border regions, whichare peasant countries. If we exaggerate the importanceof the peasant border regions, to the detriment of theproletarian districts, i t may result in a crack in thesystem of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That isdangerous, comrades. We must not exaggerate things inpolitics, just as we must not underrate them.

It should be borne in mind that in addition to theright of nations to self-determination, there is also theright of the working class to consolidate its power, andthe right of self-determination is subordinate to this latterright. There are cases when the right of self-determinationconflicts with another, a higher right—the right of theworking class that has come to power to consolidate itspower. In such cases—this must be said bluntly—theright of self-determination cannot and must not serveas an obstacle to the working class in exercising its rightto dictatorship. The former must yield to the latter.That was the case in 1920, for instance, when in orderto defend working-class power we were obliged to marchon Warsaw.

It must therefore not be forgotten when handing outall sorts of promises to the non-Russian nationalities,when bowing and scraping before the representatives ofthese nationalities, as certain comrades have done atthe present congress, it must be borne in mind that, inour external and internal situation, the sphere of actionof the national question and the limits of its jurisdic-tion, so to speak, are restricted by the sphere of action


and jurisdiction of the “labour question,” as the mostfundamental question.

Many speakers referred to notes and articles by Vla-dimir Ilyich. I do not want to quote my teacher,Comrade Lenin, since he is not here, and I am afraidthat I might, perhaps, quote him wrongly and inappro-priately. Nevertheless, I am obliged to quote one pas-sage, which is axiomatic and can give rise to no misun-derstanding, in order that no doubt should be left in theminds of comrades with regard to the relative importanceof the national question. Analysing Marx’s letter onthe national question in an article on self-determination,Comrade Lenin draws the following conclusion:

“Marx had no doubt about the subordinate significance of thenational question as compared with the ‘labour question.’”71

Here are only two lines, but they are decisive. Andthat is what some of our comrades who are more zealousthan wise should drill into their heads.

The second point is about Great-Russian chauvinismand local chauvinism. Rakovsky and especially Bukharinspoke here, and the latter proposed that the clause deal-ing with the harmfulness of local chauvinism shouldbe deleted. Their argument was that there is no need tobother with a little worm like local chauvinism when weare faced by a “Goliath” like Great-Russian chauvinism.In general, Bukharin was in a repentant mood. That isnatural: he has been sinning against the nationalitiesfor years, denying the right to self-determination. Itwas high time for him to repent. But in repenting hewent to the other extreme. It is curious that Bukharincalls upon the Party to follow his example and also


repent, although the whole world knows that the Party isin no way involved, for from its very inception (1898)it recognised the right to self-determination and there-fore has nothing to repent of. The fact of the matter isthat Bukharin has failed to understand the essence of thenational question. When it is said that the fight againstGreat-Russian chauvinism must be made the corner-stoneof the national question, the intention is to indicate theduties of the Russian Communist; it implies that it isthe duty of the Russian Communist himself to combatRussian chauvinism. If the struggle against Russian chau-vinism were undertaken not by the Russian but by theTurkestanian or Georgian Communists, it would be inter-preted as anti-Russian chauvinism. That would confusethe whole issue and strengthen Great-Russian chauvinism.Only the Russian Communists can undertake the fightagainst Great-Russian chauvinism and carry it throughto the end.

And what is intended when a struggle against localchauvinism is proposed? The intention is to point tothe duty of the local Communists, the duty of the non-Russian Communists, to combat their own chauvinists.Can the existence of deviations towards anti-Russianchauvinism be denied? Why, the whole congress has seenfor itself that local chauvinism exists, Georgian, Bashkirand other chauvinism, and that it must be combated.Russian Communists cannot combat Tatar, Georgian orBashkir chauvinism; if a Russian Communist were toundertake the difficult task of combating Tatar or Geor-gian chauvinism it would be regarded as a fight waged bya Great-Russian chauvinist against the Tatars or theGeorgians. That would confuse the whole issue. Only the


Tatar, Georgian and other Communists can fight Tatar,Georgian and other chauvinism; only the Georgian Com-munists can successfully combat Georgian nationalismor chauvinism. That is the duty of the non-Russian Com-munists. That is why it is necessary to refer in the thesesto the double task, that of the Russian Communists (Irefer to the fight against Great-Russian chauvinism) andthat of the non-Russian Communists (I refer to theirfight against anti-Armenian, anti-Tatar, anti-Russianchauvinism). Otherwise, the theses will be one-sided,there will be no internationalism, whether in state orParty affairs.

If we combat only Great-Russian chauvinism, it willobscure the fight that is being waged by the Tatar andother chauvinists, a fight which is developing in the local-ities and which is especially dangerous now, under theconditions of the N.E.P. We cannot avoid fighting ontwo fronts, for we can achieve success only by fightingon two fronts—on the one hand, against Great-Russianchauvinism, which is the chief danger in our work of con-struction, and, on the other hand, against local chauvin-ism; unless we wage this double fight there will be no solid-arity between the Russian workers and peasants and theworkers and peasants of the other nationalities. Failureto wage this f ight may result in encouraging localchauvinism, a policy of pandering to local chauvinism,which we cannot allow.

Permit me here too to quote Comrade Lenin. I wouldnot have done so, but since there are many comrades atour congress who quote Comrade Lenin right and left anddistort what he says, permit me to read a few wordsfrom a well-known article of his:


“The proletariat must demand freedom of political secessionfor the colonies and nations that are oppressed by ‘its’ nation.Unless it does this, proletarian internationalism will remain ameaningless phrase; neither mutual confidence nor class solidaritybetween the workers of the oppressing and the oppressed na-tions will be possible.”72

These are, so to say, the duties of proletarians of thedominant or formerly dominant nation. Then he goes onto speak of the duties of proletarians or Communists ofthe formerly oppressed nations:

“On the other hand, the Socialists of the oppressed nationsmust particularly fight for and put into effect complete and abso-lute unity, including organisational unity, between the workersof the oppressed nation and the workers of the oppressing nation.Otherwise, it is impossible to uphold the independent policy ofthe proletariat and i ts class solidari ty with the proletariat ofother countries against all the subterfuges, treachery and trickeryof the bourgeoisie. For the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nationsconstantly converts the slogans of national liberation into a meansfor deceiving the workers.”

As you see, if we are to follow in Comrade Lenin’sfootsteps—and some comrades here have sworn by him—both theses must be retained in the resolution—boththe thesis on combating Great-Russian chauvinism andthat on combating local chauvinism—as two aspects ofone phenomenon, as theses on combating chauvinismin general.

With this I conclude my answers to those who havespoken here.

Permit me now to report on the work of the committeeon the national question. The committee took the CentralCommittee’s theses as a basis. It left six points of thesetheses, namely, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, entirely unaltered.

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There was a dispute in the committee, primarily, on thequestion whether or not the autonomous republics shouldfirst be taken out of the R.S.F.S.R. and the independentrepublics in the Caucasus out of the TranscaucasianFederation, in order that they should then join the Unionof Republics individually. This was the proposal of asection of the Georgian comrades, but, as is known, itis a proposal which meets with no sympathy from theGeorgian, Armenian and Azerbaijanian delegations. Thecommittee discussed this quest ion and by an over-whelming majority decided in favour of retaining theproposition given in the theses, namely, that theR.S.F.S.R. should remain an integral unit , that theTranscaucasian Federation should also remain an integ-ral unit and each should enter the Union of Republics assuch. Not all the proposals submitted by this sectionof the Georgian comrades were put to the vote, because,seeing that the proposals met with no sympathy, theirauthors withdrew them. The dispute on this questionwas a serious one.

The second question on which there was a dispute wasthe question how the second chamber should be constitut-ed. One section of the comrades (the minority) proposedthat the second chamber should not consist of represent-atives of all the republics, nationalities and regions,but that it should be based on the representation of fourrepublics, namely: the R.S.F.S.R., the TranscaucasianFederation, Byelorussia and the Ukraine. The majorityrejected this proposal and the committee decided againstit on the grounds that it would be more advisable toform the second chamber on the principle of equal repre-sentation of all the republics (both independent and

THE TWELFTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)


autonomous) and of all national regions. I shall notpresent the arguments on this point, for Rakovsky, therepresentative of the minority, intends to speak here inorder to substantiate his proposal, which the committeerejected. After he has spoken I shall present my argu-ments.

There was also a dispute, not very heated, on thequestion whether the theses should be amended so as topoint to the necessity of looking to the West as well asto the East in solving the national question. This amend-ment was put to the vote. It was the minority’s amend-ment, moved by Rakovsky, The committee rejected it.I shall speak on this question too after Rakovsky hasspoken.

I shall read the amendments that we accepted. Sixpoints were adopted as they stood. In Point 7, paragraph2, line 3, before the words: “Hence, our Party’s first im-mediate task is vigorously to combat,” the followingis to be inserted:

“The situation in a number of national republics(Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Turkestan) is compli-cated by the fact that a considerable section of the work-ing class, which is the main bulwark of the Soviet system,belongs to the Great-Russian nationality. In these dis-tricts the establishment of the bond between town andcountry, between the working class and the peasantry,encounters extremely powerful obstacles in the shape ofsurvivals of Great-Russian chauvinism in both Partyand Soviet organs. Under these circumstances, talk aboutthe superiority of Russian culture, and advancementof the argument that the higher Russian culture mustinevitably triumph over the culture of the more back-


ward peoples (Ukrainian, Azerbaijanian, Uzbek, Kir-ghiz, etc.) are nothing but an attempt to perpetuate thedomination of the Great-Russian nationality.”

I accepted this amendment because it improves thetheses.

The second amendment also relates to Point 7. Be-fore the words: “Otherwise there can be no grounds forexpecting,” the following is to be added:

“This assistance must find expression primarily inthe adoption of a number of practical measures for form-ing in the republics of the formerly oppressed national-ities industrial centres with the maximum participa-tion of the local population. Lastly, in conformity withthe resolution of the Tenth Congress, this assistance mustbe accompanied by a struggle of the labouring massesto strengthen their own social positions in oppositionto the local and immigrant exploiting upper sections,which are growing as a consequence of the N.E.P. Sincethese republics are mainly agricultural districts, the inter-nal social measures must consist primarily in allottingthe labouring masses land out of the available state landfund.”

Further, in the same Point 7, middle of paragraph2, where it speaks of Georgian chauvinism, Azerbaijan-ian chauvinism, etc., insert: “Armenian chauvinism,etc.” The Armenian comrades did not want the Arme-nians to be left out in the cold, they wanted their chau-vinism to be mentioned too.

Further, in Point 8 of the theses, after the words“one and indivisible,” insert:

“We must regard as a similar heritage of the pastthe striving of some of the government departments of


the R.S.F.S.R. to subordinate to themselves the inde-pendent Commissariats of the autonomous republics andto prepare the ground for the liquidation of the latter.”

Further in Point 8, insert:“and procla iming the absolute necess i ty of the

existence and further development of the national re-publics.”

Further, Point 9. It should begin as follows:“The Union of Republics, formed on the principles

of equality and voluntary consent of the workers andpeasants of the various republics, is the first experimentof the proletariat in regulating the mutual internationalrelations of independent countries, and the first steptowards the creation of the future World Soviet Repub-lic of Labour.” Point 10 has a sub-point “a”; a new sub-point “a”was inserted before it, in the following terms:

“a) in the building up of the central organs of theUnion, equality of rights and duties of the individualrepublics should be ensured both in their relations withone another and in their relations with the central au-thority of the Union.”

Then follows sub-point “b”, worded as the formersub-point “a”:

“b) within the system of higher organs of the Uniona special organ should be instituted that will representall the national republics and national regions withoutexception on the basis of equality, providing as far aspossible for the representation of all the nationalitieswithin these republics.”

Then comes what was sub-point “b” and is now sub-point “c”, worded as follows:


“c) the executive organs of the Union should be con-structed on principles that will ensure the actual partici-pation in them of representatives of the republics andthe satisfaction of the needs and requirements of the peo-ples of the Union.”

Then comes sub-point “d”, an addendum:“d) the republics should be accorded sufficiently

wide financial and, in particular, budgetary powers,enabling them to display initiative in state administra-tion and cultural and economic matters.”

Then comes the former sub-point “c” as sub-point e”.“e) the organs of the national republics and regions

should be staffed mainly with people from among thelocal inhabitants who know the language, manner oflife, habits and customs of the peoples concerned.”

Further, a second sub-point has been added, name-ly, “f”:

“f) special laws should be passed ensuring the useof the native languages in all state organs and in allinstitutions serving the local and national populationand national minorities—laws that will prosecute andpunish with all revolutionary severity all violators ofnational rights, particularly the rights of national mi-norities.”

Then comes sub-point “g”, an addendum:“g) educational activities in the Red Army should

be increased with the aim of inculcat ing the ideasof the f ra tern i ty and so l idar i ty of the peoples ofthe Union, and the adoption of practical measures toorganise national military units, all precautions to betaken to ensure the complete defensive capacity of therepublics.”


Such are all the addenda that were adopted by the com-mittee and to which I have no objection, since they makethe theses more concrete.

As regards Part II, no really important amendmentswere introduced. There were some slight amendments,which the commission elected by the committee on thenational question decided to refer to the future CentralCommittee.

Thus, Part II remains in the shape in which it wasdistributed in the printed materials.

5. ANSWER TO THE AMENDMENTS

TO THE RESOLUTION

April 25

Although Rakovsky has changed two-thirds of theresolution he moved in the committee and has cut it downto a quarter, I am nevertheless emphatically opposedto his amendment, and for the following reason. Ourtheses on the national question are constructed in sucha way that we, as it were, turn to face the East, havingin view the heavy reserves that are latent there. We havelinked the entire national question with the article ofIlyich, who, as far as I know, does not say a single wordabout the West, because the centre of the national ques-tion does not lie there, but in the colonies and semi-colonies of the East. Rakovsky argues that, having turnedtowards the East, we must also turn towards the West.But that is impossible, comrades, and unnatural, be-cause, as a rule, people face either one way or another; itis impossible to face two ways at the same time. We can-not and must not upset the general tone of the theses,their Eastern tone. That is why I think that Rakovsky’samendment should be rejected.

* *

*

I regard this amendment as being of cardinal signifi-cance. I must say that if the congress accepts it, thetheses will be turned upside down. Rakovsky proposes


that the second chamber be constructed in such a waythat it should consist of representatives of state entities.He regards the Ukraine as a state entity, but not Bashki-ria. Why? We are not abolishing the Councils of Peo-ple’s Commissars in the republics. Is not the CentralExecutive Committee of Bashkiria a state institution?!Then why is Bashkiria not a state? Will the Ukrainecease to be a state after she has entered the Union? Statefetishism has confused Rakovsky. Since the nationali-ties have equal rights, since they have their own lan-guages, habits, manner of life and customs, since thesenationalities have set up their own state institutions—Central Executive Committees and Councils of People’sCommissars—is it not obvious that all these nationalunits are state entities? I think that we cannot departfrom the principle of equality between the republics andnationalities in the second chamber, particularly in re-lation to the Eastern nationalities.

Evidently, Rakovsky is captivated by the Prussiansystem of federation. The German federation is builtin such a way that there is no equality whatever betweenthe states. I propose that we should arrange matters insuch a way that in addition to class representation—Imean the first chamber, which is to be elected at the All-Union Congress of Soviets—we should have representa-tion of the nationalities on the basis of equality. The East-ern peoples, which are organically connected with China,with India, being connected with them by language,re l igion, customs, e tc . , are of pr imary importancefor the revolution. The relative importance of thesesmall nat ionali t ies is much higher than that of theUkraine.


If we make a slight mistake in the Ukraine, the effectupon the East will not be great. But we have only to makeone sl ight mistake in a small country, in Ajaristan(120,000 population), for the effect to be felt in Turkey,to be felt in the whole of the East, for Turkey is mostclosely connected with the East. We have only to com-mit a slight mistake in the small Kalmyk Region, theinhabitants of which are connected with Tibet and China,for the effect on our work to be far worse than that ofa mistake committed in relation to the Ukraine. We arefaced with the prospect of a mighty movement in theEast, and we must direct our work primarily towardsrousing the East and avoid doing anything that couldeven remotely, even indirectly, belittle the importanceof any, even the smallest, individual nationality in theEastern border regions. That is why I think that i twould be more just, more expedient and of greater advan-tage for the revolution from the standpoint of governinga big country like the Union of Republics with a popula-tion of 140,000,000, it would be better, I say, to arrangematters so that in the second chamber there shouldbe equal representation of all the republics and nationalregions. We have eight autonomous republics and alsoeight independent republics; Russia will join as a re-public, we have fourteen regions. All these will consti-tute the second chamber that will express all the require-ments and needs of the nationalities and facilitate thegovernment of such a big country. That is why I thinkthat Rakovsky’s amendment should be rejected.

6. SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT

OF THE COMMISSION

ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

April 25

Comrades, when reporting to you on the work ofthe committee on the national question I forgot to men-tion two other small addenda, which certainly must bementioned. To paragraph 10, point “b”, where it saysthat a special organ should be instituted that will rep-resent all the national republics and national regionswithout exception on the basis of equality, it is neces-sary to add: “providing as far as possible for all the na-tionalities within these republics,” because in some ofthe republics that will be represented in the second cham-ber there are several nationalities. For example, Tur-kestan. There, in addition to Uzbeks, there are Turkme-nians, Kirghiz and other nationalities, and the represen-tation must he so arranged that each of these nationali-ties is represented.

The second addendum is to Part II, at the very end.It reads:

“In view of the tremendous importance of the activi-ties of responsible workers in the autonomous and inde-pendent republics, and in the border regions in general(the establishment of contact between the working peo-ple in the given republic and the working people in thewhole of the rest of the Union), the congress instructs


the Central Committee to be particularly careful thatsuch responsible workers are selected as will fully en-sure the actual implementation of the Party’s decisionson the national question.”

And now a word or two about a remark Radek madein his speech. I am saying this at the request of the Arme-nian comrades. In my opinion that remark is contraryto the facts. Radek said here that the Armenians oppress,or might oppress, the Azerbaijanians in Azerbaijan and,vice versa, the Azerbaijanians might oppress the Arme-nians in Armenia. I must say that such things do nothappen. The opposite happens: in Azerbaijan, the Azer-baijanians, being the majority, oppress the Armeniansand massacre them, as happened in Nakhichevan, wherenearly all the Armenians were massacred; and the Ar-menians in Armenia massacred nearly all the Tatars.That happened in Zangezur. As for the minority in aforeign state oppressing the people who belong to themajority—such unnatural things have never happened.

THE PRESS AS A COLLECTIVE

ORGANISER

In his article “To the Roots” (see Pravda, No. 98),Ingulov touched upon the important question of the sig-nificance of the press for the state and the Party. Evi-dently, in order to reinforce his view he referred to theCentral Committee’s organisational report, where it saysthat the press “establishes an imperceptible link betweenthe Party and the working class, a link which is as strongas any mass transmission apparatus,” that “the pressis a most powerful weapon by means of which the Partydaily, hourly, speaks to the working class.”*

But in his attempt to solve the problem, Ingulovmade two mistakes: firstly, he distorted the meaning ofthe passage from the Central Committee’s report; second-ly, he lost sight of the very important role that the pressplays as an organiser. I think that, in view of the impor-tance of the question, a word or two should be said aboutthese mistakes.

1. The meaning of the report is not that the Party’srole is confined to speaking to the working class, whereasthe Party should converse with and not only speak to it.

* See this volume, p. 206.—Ed.

THE PRESS AS A COLLECTIVE ORGANISER 287

This contrasting of the formula “speak to” to the formula“converse with” is nothing more than mere juggling.In practice the two constitute an indissoluble whole, ex-pressed in continuous interaction between the reader andthe writer, between the Party and the working class,between the state and the masses of the working people.This has been taking place from the very inceptionof the mass proletarian party, from the time of the oldIskra. Ingulov is wrong in thinking that this interactionbegan only a few years after the working class had takenpower in Russia. The point of the passage quoted fromthe Central Committee’s report does not lie in “speak-ing,” but in the fact that the press “establishes a linkbetween the Party and the working class,” a link “whichis as strong as any mass transmission apparatus.” Thepoint of the passage lies in the organisational signifi-cance of the press. That is precisely why the press, asone of the transmission belts between the Party and theworking class, was included in the Central Committee’sorganisational report. Ingulov failed to understand thepassage and involuntarily distorted its meaning.

2. Ingulov emphasises the role of the press in agita-tion and in the exposure of abuses, believing that thefunction of the periodical press is confined to this. Herefers to a number of abuses in our country and arguesthat exposure in the press, agitation through the press,is the “root” of the problem. It is clear, however, thatimportant as the agitational role of the press may be,at the present moment its organisational role is the mostvital factor in our work of construction. The point isnot only that a newspaper must agitate and expose,but pr imari ly that i t must have a wide network of


collaborators, agents and correspondents all over thecountry, in all industrial and agricultural centres, in alluyezds and volosts, so that threads should run from theParty through the newspaper to all the working-class andpeasant districts without exception, so that the interac-tion between the Party and the state on the one hand, andthe industrial and peasant districts on the other, shouldbe complete. If a popular newspaper such as, let us say,Bednota73 were, from time to time, to call conferencesof its principal agents in different parts of our countryfor the purpose of exchanging opinions and of summingup experience, and if each of these agents, in his turn,were to call conferences of his correspondents in hisdistricts, centres and volosts for the same purpose, thatwould be a first important step forward not only in estab-lishing organisational connection between the Partyand the working class, between the state and the mostremote parts of our country, but also in improving andenlivening the press itself, in improving and enliveningall the staffs of our periodical press. In my opinion, suchconferences are of far more real importance than “all-Russian” and other congresses of journalists. To makethe newspapers collective organisers on behalf of theParty and the Soviet regime, a means of establishingconnection with the masses of the working people inour country and of rallying them around the Party andthe Soviet regime—such is now the immediate task ofthe press.

It will not be superfluous to remind the reader ofa few lines in Comrade Lenin’s article “Where To Begin”(written in 1901) on the organising role of the periodicalpress in the life of our Party:

THE PRESS AS A COLLECTIVE ORGANISER 289

“The role of a newspaper is not l imited, however, merelyto the spreading of ideas, merely to political education and attract-ing political allies. A newspaper is not only a collective propa-gandist and collective agitator, but also a collective organiser.In this respect it can be compared to the scaffolding erected arounda bui lding in construct ion, which marks the contours of thestructure, facili tates communication between the builders andpermits them to distribute the work and to view the commonresults achieved by their organised labour. With the aid of andin connection with a newspaper there will automatically developa permanent organisation that will engage not only in local butalso in regular general activities, training its members carefullyto watch political events, to appraise their significance and theinfluence they exercise upon various strata of the population,and to devise suitable means by which the revolutionary Partycould influence these events. The technical task alone—of ensur-ing a regular supply of copy for the newspaper and its properdistribution—will make it necessary to create a network of localagents of the united Party, agents who will have live contact withone another, who will be acquainted with the general state ofaffairs, get accustomed to carrying out regularly the detailed func-tions of all-Russian work and test their strength in the organisa-tion of various revolutionary actions. This network of agents willform the skeleton of precisely the organisation we need, namely,one that is sufficiently large to embrace the whole country; suffi-ciently wide and many-sided to effect a strict and detailed divi-sion of labour; sufficiently tried and tempered to be able unswerv-ingly to carry on its own work under all circumstances, at all‘turns,’ and in all contingencies; sufficiently flexible to be able toavoid open battle against an enemy of overwhelming strength,when he has concentrated all his forces at one spot, and yet ableto take advantage of the unwieldiness of this enemy and to attackhim when and where least expected.”74

At that time Comrade Lenin spoke of a newspaper asan instrument for building our Party. But there are nogrounds for doubting that what Comrade Lenin said is


wholly applicable to the present conditions of our Partyand state affairs.

In his article, Ingulov lost sight of this importantorganising role of the periodical press. That is his chiefmistake.

How could it happen that one of our principal pressworkers lost sight of this important function? Yesterday,a comrade said to me that, apparently, in addition tothe aim of solving the problem of the press, Ingulov hadanother aim, an ulterior one, namely, “to hit at some-one, and to do a good turn to someone else.” I myselfdo not undertake to say that this is so, and I am far fromdenying the right of anyone to set himself ulterior aimsin addition to immediate ones. But ulterior aims mustnot for a moment be allowed to obscure the immediatetask of revealing the organising role of the press in ourParty and state affairs.


Signed: J. Stalin

CONFUSION WORSE CONFOUNDED . . .

In my article in Pravda, No. 99* on the organisingrole of the press, I pointed to two mistakes that Ingulovmade on the question of the press. In his article in re-ply (see Pravda, No. 101), Ingulov makes the excuse thathis were not mistakes, but “misunderstandings.” I amwilling to call Ingulov’s mistakes “misunderstandings.”The trouble is, however, that Ingulov’s rejoinder con-tains three new mistakes, or, if you like, three new “mis-understandings,” which, unfortunately, cannot possiblybe ignored in view of the special importance of the press.

1. Ingulov asserts that in his first article he didnot consider it necessary to concentrate on the questionof the organising role of the press, and that he pursueda “limited aim,” namely, of ascertaining “who makesour Party newspaper.” All right. But, in that case, whydid Ingulov quote as a heading to his article a passagefrom the Central Committee’s organisational report, apassage which speaks exclusively about the organisingrole of our periodical press? One thing or the other: ei-ther Ingulov did not understand the meaning of thepassage, or he built his entire article in despite of and

* See this volume, pp. 286-90.—Ed.


running counter to the precise meaning of the passagefrom the Central Committee’s organisational report con-cerning the organising significance of the press. In eithercase, Ingulov’s mistake is glaring.

2. Ingulov asserts that “two or three years ago ourpress was not connected with the masses,” “did not con-nect the Party with them,” that, in general, connectionsbetween the press and the masses “did not exist.” It issufficient to read this assertion of Ingulov’s carefullyto realise how utterly incongruous, lifeless and divorcedfrom reality it is. Indeed, if our Party press, and throughit the Party itself, “had not been connected” with themasses of the workers “two or three years ago,” is it notobvious that our Party would not have been able to with-stand the internal and external enemies of the revolution,that it would have been buried, reduced to nothing, “inno time”? Just think: the Civil War is at its height, theParty is beating off the enemy, gaining a number ofbrilliant successes; the Party, through the press, callsupon the workers and peasants to defend their socialisthomeland; tens, hundreds of thousands of working peo-ple respond to the Party’s call in hundreds of resolutionsand go to the front, ready to sacrifice their lives; butIngulov, knowing all this, nevertheless finds it possibleto assert that “two or three years ago our press wasnot connected with the masses, and consequently, did notconnect the Party with them.” Isn’t that ridiculous?Have you ever heard of a Party “not connected with themasses” through a mass press being able to rouse intoaction tens and hundreds of thousands of workers andpeasants? But since the Party, nevertheless, did rouseinto action tens and hundreds of thousands of working

CONFUSION WORSE CONFOUNDED 293

people, is it not obvious that the mass party could not pos-sibly have done that without the aid of the press? Yes,somebody certainly did lose contact with the masses, butit was not our Party and not its press; it was somebodyelse. The press must not be maligned! The fact of thematter is that the Party certainly was connected withthe masses through its press “two or three years ago,”and it could not have been otherwise; but that connectionwas comparatively weak, as was justly noted by the Elev-enth Congress of our Party. The task now is to widenthis connection, to strengthen it in every way, to makeit firmer and more regular. That is the whole point.

3. Ingulov asserts further that “two or three yearsago there was no interaction between the Party andthe working class through the press.” Why? Because, itappears, at that time “our press, day after day, issueda call to struggle, reported the measures taken by theSoviet Government and the decisions of the Party, butthere was no response from the working-class reader.”That is what he says: “there was no response from theworking-class reader.”

It is incredible, monstrous, but it is a fact.Everybody knows that when the Party issued through

the press the call “All to aid transport!” the masses re-sponded unanimously, sent hundreds of resolutions tothe press expressing sympathy and readiness to upholdthe transport system, and sent tens of thousands of theirsons to maintain it. But Ingulov does not agree to regardthis as a response of the working-class reader, he does notagree to call it interaction between the Party and theworking class through the press, because this interac-tion took place not so much through correspondents as


directly between the Party and the working class, throughthe press, of course.

Everybody knows that when the Party issued the call“Fight the famine!” the masses unanimously respondedto the Party’s call, sent innumerable resolutions to theParty press, and sent tens of thousands of their sons tofight the kulaks. Ingulov, however, does not agree toregard this as a response of the working-class reader andas interaction between the Party and the working classthrough the press, because this interaction did not takeplace “according to rule,” certain correspondents wereby-passed, etc.

It turns out, according to Ingulov, that if tens andhundreds of thousands of workers respond to the call ofthe Party press, that is not interaction between the Partyand the working class, but if in response to the same callthe Party press receives written replies from a score or soof correspondents, that is real, genuine interaction be-tween the Party and the working class. And that is calleddefining the organising role of the Party press! For God’ssake, Ingulov, don’t confuse the Marxist interpretationof interaction with the bureaucratic interpretation.

If, however, interaction between the Party and theworking class through the press is looked at through theeyes of a Marxist, and not of a bureaucrat, it will beclear that this interaction has always taken place, both“two or three years ago,” and before that, and it couldnot but take place, for otherwise the Party could not haveretained the leadership of the working class, and the work-ing class could not have retained power. Obviously, thepoint now is to make this interaction more continuous andlasting. Ingulov not only underrated the organising signif-

CONFUSION WORSE CONFOUNDED 295

icance of the press, he also misrepresented it, replacingthe Marxist conception of interaction between the Partyand the working class through the press by the bureaucrat-ic, superficially technical conception. And this is whathe would call a “misunderstanding.” . . .

As regards Ingulov’s “ulterior aims,” which he em-phatically denies, I must say that his second article hasnot dispelled the doubts on that score that I expressed inmy previous article.

Pravda, No. 102,May 10, 1923

Signed: J. Stalin

FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL

COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P. (B.)

WITH RESPONSIBLE WORKERS OF THE

NATIONAL REPUBLICS AND REGIONS75

June 19-12, 1923

Fourth Conference of theCentral Committee of the R.C.P. WithResponsible Workers of theNational Republics and Regions.Verbatim Report,Moscow, 1923

1. DRAFT PLATFORMON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

FOR THE FOURTH CONFERENCE,ENDORSED BY THE POLITICAL BUREAU

OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE76

THE GENERAL LINE OF PARTY WORKON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

The line of Party work on the national question asregards combating deviations from the position adoptedby the Twelfth Party Congress must be defined by therelevant points of the resolution on the national questionadopted by that congress, namely, Point 7 of Part I ofthe resolution, and Points 1, 2 and 3 of Part II.

One of the Party’s fundamental tasks is to rear anddevelop in the national republics and regions youngcommunist organisations consisting of proletarian andsemi-proletarian elements of the local population; to doeverything to assist these organisations to stand firmlyon their feet, to acquire real communist education andto unite the genuinely internationalist communist cadres,even though they may be few at first. The Soviet regimewill be strong in the republics and regions only whenreally important communist organisations are firmlyestablished there.

But the Communists themselves in the republics andregions must bear in mind that the situation there, ifonly because of the different social composition of the


population, is markedly different from the situation inthe industrial centres of the Union of Republics and that,for this reason, it is often necessary to employ differ-ent methods of work in the border regions. In particular,here, in the endeavour to win the support of the labour-ing masses of the local population, it is necessary toa larger extent than in the central regions to meet half-way the revolutionary democratic elements, or eventhose who are simply loyal in their attitude to the Sovietregime. The role of the local intelligentsia in the re-publics and regions differs in many respects from thatof the intelligentsia in the central regions of the Unionof Republics. There are so few local intellectual workersin the border regions that all efforts must be made towin every one of them to the side of the Soviet regime.

A Communist in the border regions must rememberthat he is a Communist and therefore, acting in conform-ity with the local conditions, must make concessionsto those local national elements who are willingand able to work loyally within the framework of theSoviet system. This does not preclude, but, on the con-trary, presupposes a systematic ideological struggle forthe principles of Marxism and for genuine internation-alism, and against a deviation towards nationalism.Only in this way will it be possible successfully to elim-inate local nationalism and win broad strata of thelocal population to the side of the Soviet regime.

FOURTH CONFERENCE 301

QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE INSTITUTIONOF A SECOND CHAMBER OF THE CENTRAL

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION AND WITH

THE ORGANISATION OF THE PEOPLE’SCOMMISSARIATS OF THE UNION OF REPUBLICS

Judging by as yet incomplete data, there are in allseven such questions:

a) The composition of the second chamber. This cham-ber must consist of representatives of the autonomousand independent republics (four or more from each) andof representatives of the national regions (one from eachwill be enough). It is desirable that matters be arrangedin such a way that members of the first chamber shouldnot, as a rule, be at the same time members of the secondchamber. The representatives of the republics and regionsmust be endorsed by the Congress of Soviets of the Unionof Republics. The first chamber should be called theUnion Soviet, the second—the Soviet of Nationalities.

b) The rights of the second chamber in relation to thefirst. The two chambers should have equal rights, eachhaving power to initiate legislation, with the provisothat no Bill introduced in either of the chambers canbecome law unless it receives the consent of both cham-bers, voting separately. In the event of disagreement,the questions in dispute should be referred to a concil-iation commission of the two chambers, and if no agree-ment is reached they should be put to another voteat a joint sitting of the two chambers. If the disputedBill thus amended fails to obtain a majority of the twochambers, the matter should be referred to a special orto an ordinary Congress of Soviets of the Union of Re-publics.


c) The jurisdiction of the second chamber. The ques-tions to come within the jurisdiction of the second (asof the first) chamber are indicated in Point 1 of theConstitution of the U.S.S.R. The legislative functionsof the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee ofthe Union and of the Council of People’s Commissarsof the Union are to remain in force.

d) The Presidium of the Central Executive Committeeof the Union of Republics. There should be one Presidiumof the Central Executive Committee. It should be electedby both chambers of the Central Executive Committee,provision being made, of course, for representation ofthe nationalities, at least for the largest ones. The pro-posal of the Ukrainians for setting up two presidiumswith legislative functions, one for each chamber of theCentral Executive Committee, in place of a single Pre-sidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union,is inadvisable. The Presidium is the supreme authority inthe Union, functioning constantly, continuously, from ses-sion to session. The formation of two presidiums withlegislative functions would mean a divided supreme au-thority, and this would inevitably create great difficultiesin practice. The chambers should have their presidiums,which, however, should not possess legislative functions.

e) The number of merged Commissariats. In conformitywith the decisions of previous plenums of the CentralCommittee, there should be five merged Commissariats(Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, War, Transport, andPosts and Telegraphs), and also five directive Commis-sariats (People’s Commissariat of Finance, SupremeCouncil of National Economy, People’s Commissariat ofFood, People’s Commissariat of Labour, Workers’ and


Peasants’ Inspection), the rest of the Commissariatsshould be quite autonomous. The Ukrainians proposethat the Commissariats of Foreign Affairs and of ForeignTrade be transferred from the merged to the directivecategory, i.e., that these Commissariats be left in therepublics parallel with the Union Commissariats of For-eign Affairs and of Foreign Trade, but subordinate totheir directives. This proposal cannot be accepted, ifwe are really going to form a single Union State capableof coming before the outside world as a united whole.The same must be said about concession agreements,the conclusion of which must be concentrated in theUnion of Republics.

f) The structure of the People’s Commissariats of theUnion of Republics. The collegiums of these People’sCommissariats should be enlarged by the inclusion ofrepresentatives of the biggest and most important na-tionalities.

g) The budget rights of the republics. The republicsshould be given more independence in regard to theirbudgets, within the limits of the share allotted to them,the dimensions of the share to be specially determined.

MEASURES FOR DRAWING WORKING PEOPLEOF THE LOCAL POPULATION IN TO PARTY

AND SOVIET AFFAIRS

Judging by incomplete data, it is already possibleto propose four measures:

a) To purge the state and Party apparatuses of nation-alist elements (this refers primarily to the Great-Rus-sian nationalists, but it also refers to the anti-Russian


and other nationalists). The purge must be carried outwith caution, on the basis of proved data, under the con-trol of the Central Committee of the Party.

b) To conduct systematic and persevering work tomake the state and Party institutions in the republicsand regions national in character, i .e. , gradually tointroduce the local languages in the conduct of affairs,making it obligatory for responsible workers to learnthe local languages.

c) To choose and enlist for the Soviet institutionsthe more or less loyal elements among the local intelli-gentsia. At the same time our responsible workers inthe republics and regions must train cadres of Soviet andParty officials from among the members of the Party.

d) To arrange non-Party conferences of workers andpeasants at which People’s Commissars, and responsibleParty workers in general, should report on the mostimportant measures taken by the Soviet Government.

MEASURES TO RAISE THE CULTURAL

LEVEL OF THE LOCAL POPULATION

It is necessary, for example:a) to organise clubs (non-Party) and other education-

al institutions to be conducted in the local languages;b) to enlarge the network of educational institutions

of all grades to be conducted in the local languages;c) to draw into school work the more or less loyal

school-teachers of local origin;d) to create a network of societies for the dissemi-

nation of literacy in the local languages;e) to organise publishing activity.


ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION IN THE NATIONALREPUBLICS AND REGIONS FROM THE STANDPOINT

OF THE SPECIFIC NATIONAL FEATURES

OF THEIR MANNER OF LIFE

It is necessary, for example:a) to regulate and, where necessary, to stop the

transference of populations;b) as far as possible to provide land for the local

working population out of the state land fund;c) to make agricultural credit available to the local

population;d) to expand irrigation work;e) to give the co-operatives, and especially the pro-

ducers’ co-operatives, al l possible assistance (witha view to attracting handicraftsmen);

f) to transfer factories and mills to republics in whichsuitable raw materials abound;

g) to organise trade and technical schools for thelocal population;

h) to organise agricultural courses for the local popu-lation.

PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR THE ORGANISATION

OF NATIONAL MILITARY UNITS

It is necessary to proceed at once with the organi-sation of military schools in the republics and regionsfor the purpose of training within a certain time com-manders from among the local people who could laterserve as a core for the organisation of national mili-tary units. It goes without saying that a satisfactoryParty and social composition of these national units,


particularly of the commanders, must be ensured. Wherethere are old military cadres among the local people(Tataria, and, partly, Bashkiria), it would be possibleto organise regiments of national militia at once. Georgia,Armenia and Azerbaijan already have, I think, a divi-sion each. In the Ukraine and in Byelorussia it would bepossible, at once, to form one division of militia in each(particularly in the Ukraine).

The question of forming national military units isone of prime importance, both as regards defence againstpossible attacks by Turkey, Afghanistan, Poland, etc.,and as regards the possibility of the Union of Republicsbeing compelled to take action against neighbouringstates. The importance of national military units fromthe standpoint of the internal situation in the Union ofRepublics needs no proof. It must be supposed that inthis connection the numerical strength of our army willhave to be increased by approximately 20-25 thousandmen.

THE ORGANISATION OF PARTY

EDUCATIONAL WORK

It is necessary, for example:a) to organise schools for elementary political educa-

tion in the native languages;b) to create a Marxist literature in the native lan-

guages;c) to have a well-organised periodical press in the

native languages;d) to widen the activities of the University of the

Peoples of the East at the centre and in the localitiesand to provide this university with the necessary funds;


e) to organise a Party debating society at the Uni-versity of the Peoples of the East, and to enlist the co-operation of members of the Central Committee livingin Moscow;

f) to intensify work in the Youth League and amongwomen in the republics and regions.

SELECTION OF PARTY AND SOVIETOFFICIALS WITH A VIEW TO IMPLEMENTING

THE RESOLUTION ON THE NATIONAL QUESTIONADOPTED BY THE TWELFTH CONGRESS

It is necessary to bring into the Registration andDistribution, Agitation and Propaganda, Organisation,Women’s, and Instructors’ Departments of the Cen-tral Committee, a definite number of people (two orthree in each) from the nationalities to facilitate theCentral Committee’s current Party work in the borderregions, and properly to distribute Party and Sovietoff icials among the republics and regions so as toensure the implementation of the line on the nationalquestion adopted by the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.

2. RIGHTS AND “LEFTS”IN THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS

AND REGIONS

Speech on the First Item of the Conference Agenda:“The Sultan-Galiyev Case”

June 10

I have taken the floor in order to make a few com-ments on the speeches of the comrades who have spokenhere. As regards the principles involved in the Sultan-Galiyev case, I shall endeavour to deal with them in myreport on the second item of the agenda. First of all, with regard to the conference itself. Some-one (I have forgotten who exactly it was) said herethat this conference is an unusual event. That is not so.Such conferences are not a novelty for our Party. Thepresent conference is the fourth of its kind to be heldsince the establishment of Soviet power. Up to the be-ginning of 1919 three such conferences were held. Condi-tions at that time permitted us to call such conferences.But later, after 1919, in 1920 and 1921, when we were en-tirely taken up with the civil war, we had no time for con-ferences of this kind. And only now that we have finishedwith the civil war, now that we have gone deeply into thework of economic construction, now that Party work itselfhas become more concrete, especially in the national re-gions and republics, has it again become possible for usto call a conference of this kind. I think the Central Commit-tee will repeatedly resort to this method in order to estab-


lish full mutual understanding between those who arecarrying out the policy in the localities and those whoare making that policy. I think that such conferencesshould be called, not only from all the republics and re-gions, but also from individual regions and republicsfor the purpose of drawing up more concrete decisions.This alone can satisfy both the Central Committee andthe responsible workers in the localities.

I heard certain comrades say that I warned Sultan-Galiyev when I had the opportunity of acquaintingmyself with his first secret letter, addressed, I think,to Adigamov, who for some reason is silent and has notuttered a word here, although he should have been thefirst to speak and the one to have said most. I have beenreproached by these comrades with having defendedSultan-Galiyev excessively. It is true that I defendedhim as long as it was possible, and I considered, andstill consider, that it was my duty to do so. But I defend-ed him only up to a certain point. And when Sultan-Galiyev went beyond that point I turned away from him.His first secret letter shows that he was already breakingwith the Party, for the tone of his letter is almost white-guard; he writes about members of the Central Commit-tee as one can write only about enemies. I met him bychance in the Political Bureau, where he was defendingthe demands of the Tatar Republic in connection withthe People’s Commissariat of Agriculture. I warned himthen, in a note I sent him, in which I called his secretletter an anti-Party one, and in which I accused himof creating an organisation of the Validov type; I toldhim that unless he desisted from illegal, anti-Partywork he would come to a bad end, and any support from


me would be out of the question. He replied, in greatembarrassment, that I had been misled; that he hadindeed written to Adigamov, not, however, what wasalleged, but something else; that he had always been aParty man and was so still, and he gave his word ofhonour that he would continue to be a Party man in fu-ture. Nevertheless, a week later he sent Adigamov asecond secret letter, instructing him to establish contactwith the Basmachi and with their leader Validov, andto “burn” the letter. The whole thing, therefore, wasvile, it was sheer deception, and it compelled me to breakoff all connection with Sultan-Galiyev. From that mo-ment Sultan-Galiyev became for me a man beyond thepale of the Party, of the Soviets, and I considered itimpossible to speak to him, although he tried severaltimes to come to me and “have a talk” with me. As farback as the beginning of 1919, the “Left” comrades re-proached me with support ing Sul tan-Galiyev, withtrying to save him for the Party, with wanting to sparehim, in the hope that he would cease to be a nationalistand become a Marxist. I did, indeed, consider it my dutyto support him for a time. There are so few intellectuals,so few thinking people, even so few literate people gen-erally in the Eastern republics and regions, that onecan count them on one’s fingers. How can one help cher-ishing them? It would be criminal not to take all meas-ures to save from corruption people of the East whom weneed and to preserve them for the Party. But there isa limit to everything. And the limit in this case wasreached when Sultan-Galiyev crossed over from the com-munist camp to the camp of the Basmachi. From thattime on he ceased to exist for the Party. That is why he


found the Turkish ambassador more congenial than theCentral Committee of our Party.

I heard a similar reproach from Shamigulov, to theeffect that, in spite of his insistence that we should fin-ish with Validov at one stroke, I defended Validovand tried to preserve him for the Party. I did indeeddefend Validov in the hope that he would reform. Worsepeople have reformed, as we know from the history ofpolitical parties. I decided that Shamigulov’s solutionof the problem was too simple. I did not follow his advice.It is true that a year later Shamigulov’s forecast provedcorrect: Validov did not reform, he went over to theBasmachi. Nevertheless, the Party gained by the factthat we delayed Validov’s desertion from the Party for ayear. Had we settled with Validov in 1918, I am certainthat comrades like Murtazin, Adigamov, Khalikov andothers would not have remained in our ranks. (Voice:“Khalikov would have remained.”) Perhaps Khalikovwould not have left us, but a whole group of comradesworking in our ranks would have left with Validov. Thatis what we gained by our patience and foresight.

I listened to Ryskulov, and I must say that his speechwas not altogether sincere, it was semi-diplomatic (voice:“Quite true!”), and in general his speech made a badimpression. I expected more clarity and sincerity fromhim. Whatever Ryskulov may say, it is obvious thathe has at home two secret letters from Sultan-Galiyev,which he has not shown to anyone, it is obvious thathe was associated with Sultan-Galiyev ideologically. Thefact that Ryskulov dissociates himself from the criminalaspect of the Sultan-Galiyev case, asserting that he isnot involved with Sultan-Galiyev in the course leading


to Basmachism, is of no importance. That is not whatwe are concerned with at this conference. We are con-cerned with the intellectual, ideological ties with Sul-tan-Galiyevism. That such ties did exist between Ry-skulov and Sultan-Galiyev is obvious, comrades; Rysku-lov himself cannot deny it. Is it not high time for himhere, from this rostrum, at long last to dissociate him-self from Sultan-Galiyevism emphatically and unreserv-edly? In this respect Ryskulov’s speech was semi-diplomatic and unsatisfactory.

Enbayev also made a diplomatic and insincere speech.Is it not a fact that, after Sultan-Galiyev’s arrest, En-bayev and a group of Tatar responsible workers, whomI consider splendid practical men in spite of their ideo-logical instability, sent a demand to the Central Commit-tee for his immediate release, fully vouching for himand hinting that the documents taken from Sultan-Galiyev were not genuine? Is that not a fact? But whatdid the investigation reveal? It revealed that all thedocuments were genuine. Their genuineness was ad-mitted by Sultan-Galiyev himself, who, in fact, gavemore information about his sins than is contained inthe documents, who fully confessed his guilt, and, afterconfessing, repented. Is it not obvious that, after all this,Enbayev ought to have emphatically and unreservedlyadmitted his mistakes and to have dissociated himselffrom Sultan-Galiyev? But Enbayev did not do this. Hefound occasion to jeer at the “Lefts,” but he would notemphatically, as a Communist should, dissociate him-self from Sultan-Galiyevism, from the abyss into whichSultan-Galiyev had landed. Evidently he thought thatdiplomacy would save him.


Firdevs’s speech was sheer diplomacy from beginningto end. Who the ideological leader was, whether Sultan-Galiyev led Firdevs, or whether Firdevs led Sultan-Galiyev, is a question I leave open, although I thinkthat ideologically Firdevs led Sultan-Galiyev rather thanthe other way round. I see nothing particularly repre-hensible in Sultan-Galiyev’s exercises in theory. If Sul-tan-Galiyev had confined himself to the ideology of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism it would not have been so badand I would say that this ideology, inspite of the ban pro-nounced by the resolution on the national question passedby the Tenth Party Congress, could be regarded as tolera-ble, and that we could confine ourselves to criticising itwithin the ranks of our Party. But when exercises in ideol-ogy end in establishing contacts with Basmach leaders,with Validov and others, it is utterly impossible to justifyBasmach practices here on the ground that the ideologyis innocent, as Firdevs tries to do. You can deceive no-body by such a justification of Sultan-Galiyev’s activi-ties. In that way it would be possible to find a justifi-cation for both imperialism and tsarism, for they toohave their ideologies, which sometimes look innocentenough. One cannot reason in that way. You are notfacing a tribunal, but a conference of responsible work-ers, who demand of you straightforwardness and sin-cerity, not diplomacy.

Khojanov spoke well, in my opinion. And Ikramovdid not speak badly either. But I must mention a passagein the speeches of these comrades which gives food forthought. Both said that there was no difference betweenpresent-day Turkestan and tsarist Turkestan, that onlythe signboard had been changed, that Turkestan had


remained what it was under the tsar. Comrades, if thatwas not a slip of the tongue, if it was a considered anddeliberate statement, then it must be said that in thatcase the Basmachi are right and we are wrong. If Turke-stan is in fact a colony, as it was under tsarism, then theBasmachi are right, and it is not we who should be try-ing Sultan-Galiyev, but Sultan-Galiyev who should betrying us for tolerating the existence of a colony in theframework of the Soviet regime. If that is true, I failto understand why you yourselves have not gone over toBasmachism. Evidently, Khojanov and Ikramov utteredthat passage in their speeches without thinking, for theycannot help knowing that present-day Soviet Turkestanis radically different from tsarist Turkestan. I wantedto point to that obscure passage in the speeches of thesecomrades in order that they should try to think this overand rectify their mistake.

I take upon myself some of the charges Ikramov madeagainst the work of the Central Committee, to the effectthat we have not always been attentive and have not al-ways succeeded in raising in time the practical questionsdictated by conditions in the Eastern republics and re-gions. Of course, the Central Committee is overburdenedwith work and is unable to keep pace with eventseverywhere. It would be ridiculous to think that theCentral Committee can keep pace with everything. Ofcourse, there are few schools in Turkestan. The locallanguages have not yet become current in the state in-stitutions, the institutions have not been made nationalin character. Culture in general is at a low level. Allthat is true. But can anybody seriously think that theCentral Committee, or the Party as a whole, can raise


the cultural level of Turkestan in two or three years? Weare all shouting and complaining that Russian culture,the culture of the Russian people, which is more cul-tured than the other peoples in the Union of Republics,is at a low level. Ilyich has repeatedly stated that wehave little culture, that it is impossible to raise Russianculture appreciably in two or three, or even ten years.And if it is impossible to raise Russian culture appreciablyin two or three, or even ten years, how can we demanda rapid rise of culture in the non-Russian backward re-gions with a low level of literacy? Is it not obvious thatnine-tenths of the “blame” falls on the conditions, onthe backwardness, and that you cannot but take thisinto account?

About the “Lefts” and the Rights.Do they exist in the communist organisations in the

regions and republics? Of course they do. That cannotbe denied.

Wherein lie the sins of the Rights? In the fact thatthe Rights are not and cannot be an antidote to, a reliablebulwark against, the nationalist tendencies which aredeveloping and gaining strength in connection with theN.E.P. The fact that Sultan-Galiyevism did exist, thatit created a certain circle of supporters in the Easternrepublics, especially in Bashkiria and Tataria, leaves nodoubt that the Right-wing elements, who in these repub-lics comprise the overwhelming majority, are not asufficiently strong bulwark against nationalism.

I t should be borne in mind that our communistorganisations in the border regions, in the republics andregions, can develop and stand firmly on their feet, canbecome genuine internationalist, Marxist cadres, only


if they overcome nationalism. Nationalism is the chiefideological obstacle to the training of Marxist cadres,of a Marxist vanguard, in the border regions and repub-lics. The history of our Party shows that the BolshevikParty, its Russian section, grew and gained strengthin the fight against Menshevism; for Menshevism is theideology of the bourgeoisie, Menshevism is a channelthrough which bourgeois ideology penetrates into ourParty, and had the Party not overcome Menshevismit could not have stood firmly on its feet. Ilyich wroteabout this a number of times. Only to the degree thatit overcame Menshevism in its organisational and ideo-logical forms did Bolshevism grow and gain strength asa real leading party. The same must be said of national-ism in relation to our communist organisations in theborder regions and republics. Nationalism is playingthe same role in relation to these organisations as Men-shevism in the past played in relation to the BolshevikParty. Only under cover of nationalism can various kindsof bourgeois, including Menshevik, influences penetrateour organisations in the border regions. Our organisa-tions in the republics can become Marxist only if theyare able to resist the nationalist ideas which are forcingtheir way into our Party in the border regions, and areforcing their way because the bourgeoisie is reviving,the N.E.P. is spreading, nationalism is growing, thereare survivals of Great-Russian chauvinism, which alsogive an impetus to local nationalism, and there is theinfluence of foreign states, which support nationalismin every way. If our communist organisations in thenational republics want to gain strength as genuinelyMarxist organisations they must pass through the stage


of fighting this enemy in the republics and regions.There is no other way. And in this fight the Rights areweak. Weak because they are infected with scepticismwith regard to the Party and easily yield to the influenceof nationalism. Herein lies the sin of the Right wing ofthe communist organisations in the republics and regions.

But no less, if not more, sinful are the “Lefts” inthe border regions. If the communist organisations inthe border regions cannot grow strong and develop intogenuinely Marxist cadres unless they overcome nation-alism, these cadres themselves will be able to becomemass organisations, to rally the majority of the workingpeople around themselves, only if they learn to be flex-ible enough to draw into our state institutions all thenational elements that are at all loyal, by making con-cessions to them, and if they learn to manoeuvre betweena resolute fight against nationalism in the Party and anequally resolute fight to draw into Soviet work all themore or less loyal elements among the local people, theintelligentsia, and so on. The “Lefts” in the borderregions are more or less free from the sceptical attitudetowards the Party, from the tendency to yield to the in-fluence of nationalism. But the sins of the “Lefts” liein the fact that they are incapable of flexibility in rela-tion to the bourgeois-democratic and the simply loyalelements of the population, they are unable and unwill-ing to manoeuvre in order to attract these elements,they distort the Party’s line of winning over the major-ity of the toiling population of the country. But thisflexibility and ability to manoeuvre between the fightagainst nationalism and the drawing of all the elementsthat are at all loyal into our state institutions must be


created and developed at all costs. It can be created anddeveloped only if we take into account the entire complex-ity and the specific nature of the situation encounteredin our regions and republics; if we do not simply engage intransplanting the models that are being created in thecentral industrial districts, which cannot be transplantedmechanically to the border regions; if we do not brushaside the nationalist-minded elements of the population,the nationalist-minded petty bourgeois; and if we learn todraw these elements into the general work of state admin-istration. The sin of the “Lefts” is that they are infectedwith sectarianism and fail to understand the paramountimportance of the Party’s complex tasks in the nationalrepublics and regions.

While the Rights create the danger that by theirtendency to yield to nationalism they may hinder thegrowth of our communist cadres in the border regions,the “Lefts” create the danger for the Party that by theirinfatuation with an over-simplified and hasty “commu-nism” they may isolate our Party from the peasantryand from broad strata of the local population.

Which of these dangers is the more formidable? Ifthe comrades who are deviating towards the “Left” in-tend to continue practising in the localities their policyof artificially splitting the population—and this policyhas been practised not only in Chechnya and in the YakutRegion, and not only in Turkestan . . . . (Ibrahimov:“They are tactics of differentiation.”) Ibrahimov hasnow thought of substituting the tactics of differentiationfor the tactics of splitting, but that changes nothing.If, I say, they intend to continue practising their policyof splitting the population from above; if they think


that Russian models can be mechanically transplantedto a specifically national milieu regardless of the mannerof life of the inhabitants and of the concrete conditions;if they think that in fighting nationalism everythingthat is national must be thrown overboard; in short,if the “Left” Communists in the border regions intendto remain incorrigible, I must say that of the two, the“Left” danger may prove to be the more formidable.

This is all I wanted to say about the “Lefts” andthe Rights. I have run ahead somewhat, but that is be-cause the whole conference has run ahead and has antic-ipated the discussion of the second item.

We must chastise the Rights in order to make themfight nationalism, to teach them to do so in order toforge real communist cadres from among local people.But we must also chastise the “Lefts” in order to teachthem to be flexible and to manoeuvre skilfully, so as towin over the broad masses of the population. All thismust be done because, as Khojanov rightly remarked,the truth lies “in between” the Rights and the “Lefts.”

3. PRACTICAL MEASURESFOR IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION

ON THE NATIONAL QUESTIONADOPTED BY THE TWELFTH

PARTY CONGRESS

Report on the Second Item of the AgendaJune 10

Comrades, you have no doubt already received thedraft platform* of the Polit ical Bureau of the Cen-tral Committee on the national question. (Voices: “Noteverybody has it.”) This platform concerns the seconditem of the agenda with all the sub-items. At all events,everybody has received the conference agenda in theshape of the Central Committee’s coded telegram.

The Political Bureau’s proposals may be divided intothree groups.

The first group of questions concerns the reinforce-ment of the communist cadres in the republics andregions from among local people.

The second group of questions concerns everythingconnected with the implementation of the concrete deci-sions on the national question adopted by the TwelfthCongress, namely: questions about drawing working peopleof the loca l popula t ion in to Par ty and Sovie t a f -fairs; questions about measures necessary for raisingthe cultural level of the local population; questionsabout improving the economic situation in the repub-

* See this volume, pp. 299-308.—Ed.


lics and regions with due regard to specific featuresof the manner of life; and lastly, questions about theco-operatives in the regions and republics, the transferof factories, the creation of industrial centres, and so on.This group of questions concerns the economic, culturaland political tasks of the regions and republics, withdue regard to local conditions.

The third group of questions concerns the Constitu-tion of the Union of Republics in general, and in partic-ular the question of amending this Constitution witha view to setting up a second chamber of the CentralExecutive Committee of the Union of Republics. As youknow, this last group of questions is connected with theforthcoming session of the Central Executive Committeeof the Union of Republics.

I pass to the first group of questions—those concern-ing the methods of training and reinforcing Marxistcadres from among local people, who will be capableof serving as the most important and, in the long run,as the decisive bulwark of Soviet power in the borderregions. If we examine the development of our Party(I refer to its Russian section, as the main section) andtrace the principal stages in its development, and then,by analogy, draw a picture of the development of ourcommunist organisations in the regions and republicsin the immediate future, I think we shall find the keyto the understanding of the specific features in thesecountries which distinguish the development of ourParty in the border regions.

The principal task in the first period of our Party’sdevelopment, the development of its Russian section,was to create cadres, Marxist cadres. These Marxist


cadres were made, forged, in our fight with Menshevism.The task of these cadres then, at that period—I amreferring to the period from the foundation of the Bol-shevik Party to the expulsion from the Party of theLiquidators, as the most pronounced representativesof Menshevism—the main task was to win over to theBolsheviks the most active, honest and outstandingmembers of the working class, to create cadres, to forma vanguard. The struggle here was waged primarilyagainst tendencies of a bourgeois character—especiallyagainst Menshevism—which prevented the cadres frombeing combined into a single unit, as the main core ofthe Party. At that time it was not yet the task of theParty, as an immediate and vital need, to establishwide connections with the vast masses of the workingclass and the toiling peasantry, to win over those masses,to win a majority in the country. The Party had notyet got so far.

Only in the next stage of our Party’s development,only in its second stage, when these cadres had grown,when they had taken shape as the basic core of our Party,when the sympathies of the best elements among theworking class had already been won, or almost won—only then was the Party confronted with the task, asan immediate and urgent need, of winning over the vastmasses, of transforming the Party cadres into a realmass workers’ party. During this period the core of ourParty had to wage a struggle not so much against Men-shevism as against the “Left” elements within our Party,the “Otzovists” of all kinds, who were attempting tosubstitute revolutionary phraseology for a serious studyof the specific features of the new situation which arose


after 1905, who by their over-simplified “revolutionary”tactics were hindering the conversion of our Party cadresinto a genuine mass party, and who by their activitieswere creating the danger of the Party becoming divorcedfrom the broad masses of the workers. It scarcely needsproof that without a resolute struggle against this “Left”danger, without defeating it, the Party could not havewon over the vast labouring masses.

Such, approximately, is the picture of the fight ontwo fronts, against the Rights, i.e., the Mensheviks,and against the “Lefts”; the picture of the developmentof the principal section of our Party, the Russian section.

Comrade Lenin quite convincingly depicted thisessential, inevitable development of the CommunistParties in his pamphlet “Left-Wing” Communism , anInfantile Disorder. There he showed that the Commu-nist Parties in the West must pass, and are alreadypassing, through approximately the same stages of de-velopment. We, on our part, shall add that the samemust be said of the development of our communist organ-isations and Communist Parties in the border regions.

It should, however, be noted that, despite the anal-ogy between what the Party experienced in the past andwhat our Party organisations in the border regions areexperiencing now, there are, after all, certain importantspecific features in our Party’s development in the na-tional republics and regions, features which we mustwithout fail take into account, for if we do not takethem carefully into account we shall run the risk ofcommitting a number of very gross errors in determiningthe tasks of training Marxist cadres from among localpeople in the border regions.


Let us pass to an examination of these specific fea-tures.

The fight against the Right and “Left” elements inour organisations in the border regions is necessary andobligatory, for otherwise we shall not be able to trainMarxist cadres closely connected with the masses. Thatis clear. But the specific feature of the situation in theborder regions, the feature that distinguishes it from ourParty’s development in the past, is that in the borderregions the forging of cadres and their conversion intoa mass party are taking place not under a bourgeoissystem, as was the case in the history of our Party, butunder the Soviet system, under the dictatorship of theproletariat. At that time, under the bourgeois system,it was possible and necessary, because of the conditionsof those times, to beat first of all the Mensheviks (inorder to forge Marxist cadres) and then the Otzovists(in order to transform those cadres into a mass party);the fight against those two deviations filled twoentire periods of our Party’s history. Now, under pres-ent conditions, we cannot possibly do that, for the Partyis now in power, and being in power, the Party needsin the border regions reliable Marxist cadres from amonglocal people who are connected with the broad massesof the population. Now we cannot first of all defeat theRight danger with the help of the “Lefts,” as was thecase in the history of our Party, and then the “Left”danger with the help of the Rights. Now we have to wagea fight on both fronts simultaneously, striving to defeatboth dangers so as to obtain as a result in the border re-gions trained Marxist cadres of local people connectedwith the masses. At that time we could speak of cadres


who were not yet connected with the broad masses, butwho were to become connected with them in the nextperiod of development. Now it is ridiculous even to speakof that, because under the Soviet regime it is impossibleto conceive of Marxist cadres not being connected withthe broad masses in one way or another. They would becadres who would have nothing in common either withMarxism or with a mass party. All this considerablycomplicates matters and dictates to our Party organi-sations in the border regions the need for waging a si-multaneous struggle against the Rights and the “Lefts.”Hence the stand our Party takes that it is necessary towage a fight on two fronts, against both deviationssimultaneously.

Further, i t should be noted that the developmentof our communist organisations in the border regionsis not proceeding in isolation, as was the case in ourParty’s history in relation to its Russian section, butunder the direct influence of the main core of our Party,which is experienced not only in forming Marxist cadres,but also in linking those cadres with the broad massesof the population and in revolutionary manoeuvringin the fight for Soviet power. The specific feature of thesituation in the border regions in this respect is that ourParty organisations in these countries, owing to theconditions under which Soviet power is developingthere, can and must manoeuvre their forces for the pur-pose of strengthening their connections with the broadmasses of the population, utilising for this purpose therich experience of our Party during the preceding pe-riod. Until recently, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.usually carried out manoeuvring in the border regions


directly, over the heads of the communist organisationsthere, sometimes even by-passing those organisations,drawing all the more or less loyal national elements intothe general work of Soviet construction. Now this workmust be done by the organisations in the border regionsthemselves. They can do it, and must do it, bearing inmind that that is the best way of converting the Marxistcadres from among local people into a genuine mass par-ty capable of leading the majority of the populationof the country.

Such are the two specific features which must be takenstrictly into account when determining our Party’s linein the border regions in the matter of training Marxistcadres, and of these cadres winning over the broad massesof the population.

I pass to the second group of questions. Since not allthe comrades have received the draft platform, I willread it and explain.

First , “measures for drawing the proletarian andsemi-proletarian elements into Party and Soviet af-fairs.” Why is this needed? It is needed to bring theParty, and particularly the Soviet, apparatus closer tothe population. These apparatuses must function inthe languages that are understood by the broad massesof the people, otherwise it will be impossible to bringthem closer to the population. Our Party’s task is tomake Soviet power near and dear to the masses, but thistask can be fulfilled only by making this power under-stood by the masses. Those who are at the head of thestate institutions, and the institutions themselves, mustfunction in the language understood by the people. Thechauvinistic elements who are destroying the feeling of


friendship and solidarity between the peoples in theUnion of Republics must be expelled from these insti-tutions; our institutions, both in Moscow and in the re-publics, must be purged of such elements, and localpeople who know the language and customs of the pop-ulation must be placed at the head of the state insti-tutions in the republics.

I remember that two years ago, the Chairman of theCouncil of People’s Commissars in the Kirghiz Re-public was Pestkovsky, who could not speak the Kirghizlanguage. Already at that time this circumstance gaverise to enormous difficulties in the matter of strengthen-ing the ties between the Government of the KirghizRepublic and the masses of the Kirghiz peasants. Thatis precisely why the Party arranged for a Kirghiz tobe Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars ofthe Kirghiz Republic.

I also remember that last year a group of comradesfrom Bashkiria proposed that a Russian comrade be putforward as Chairman of the Council of People’s Com-missars of Bashkiria. The Party emphatically rejectedthis proposal and secured the nomination of a Bashkirfor this post.

The task is to pursue this line, and, in general, theline of gradually making the governmental institutionsnational in character in all the national republics andregions, and first of all in such an important republic asthe Ukraine.

Secondly, “to choose and enlist the more or less loyalelements among the local intelligentsia, while at thesame time training Soviet cadres from among the mem-bers of the Party.” This proposition does not call for


special explanation. Now that the working class is inpower and has rallied the majority of the populationaround itself, there are no grounds for fearing to drawthe more or less loyal elements, even including former“Octobrists,” into the work of Soviet construction. Onthe contrary, all these elements must without fail bedrawn into the work in the national regions and republicsin order to assimilate and Sovietise them in the courseof the work itself.

Thirdly, “to arrange non-Party conferences of workersand peasants at which members of the Governmentshould report on the measures taken by the Soviet Govern-ment.” I know that many People’s Commissars in therepublics, in the Kirghiz Republic, for example, areunwilling to visit the districts, to attend meetings ofpeasants, to speak at meetings and inform the broadmasses about what the Party and the Soviet Governmentare doing in connection with questions that are partic-ularly important to the peasants. We must put a stopto this state of affairs. Non-Party conferences of workersand peasants must be convened without fail, and at themthe masses must be informed about the Soviet Govern-ment’s activities. Unless this is done we cannot evendream of bringing the state apparatus closer to the people.

Further, “measures to raise the cultural level of thelocal population.” Several measures are proposed, but,of course, the list cannot be regarded as exhaustive.These measures are: a) “to organise clubs (non-Party)and other educational institutions to be conducted inthe local languages”; b) “to enlarge the network of edu-cational institutions of all grades to be conducted inthe local languages “; c) “to enlist the services of the more


or less loyal school-teachers”; d) “to create a network ofsocieties for the dissemination of literacy in the locallanguages”; e) “to organise publishing activity.” Allthese measures are clear and intelligible and, therefore,do not need special explanation.

Further, “economic construct ion in the nat ionalrepublics and regions from the standpoint of the specificnational features of their manner of life.” The relevantmeasures proposed by the Political Bureau are: a) “toregulate and, where necessary, to stop the transferenceof populations”; b) “to provide land for the local work-ing population out of the state land fund”; c) “to makeagricultural credit available to the local population”;d) “to expand irrigation work”; e) “to transfer factoriesand mills to republics in which raw materials abound”;f) “to organise trade and technical schools”; g) “to organ-ise agricultural courses,” and lastly, h) “to give theco-operatives, and especially the producers’ co-opera-tives, all possible assistance (with a view to attractinghandicraftsmen).”

I must dwell on the last point owing to its specialimportance. In the past, under the tsar, developmentproceeded in such a way that the kulaks grew, agricul-tural capital developed, the bulk of the middle peasantswere in a state of unstable equilibrium, while the broadmasses of the peasants, the broad masses of small peasantproprietors, writhed in the clutches of ruin and poverty.Now, however, under the dictatorship of the proletariat,when credit, the land and power are in the hands of theworking class, development cannot proceed along theold lines, notwithstanding the conditions of the N.E.P.,notwithstanding the revival of private capital. Those


comrades are absolutely wrong who assert that in view ofthe development of the N.E.P. we must again go throughthe old history of developing kulaks at the cost of whole-sale ruin for the majority of the peasants. That pathis not our path. Under the new conditions, when theproletariat is in power and holds in its hands all thebasic threads of our economy, development must proceedalong a different path, along the path of uniting the smallproprietors of the villages in all kinds of co-operativesocieties, which will be backed by the state in their strug-gle against private capital; along the path of graduallydrawing the millions of small peasant proprietors intosocialist construction through the co-operatives; alongthe path of gradually improving the economic condi-tions of the small peasant proprietors (and not of im-poverishing them). In this respect, “all possible assist-ance to the co-operatives” in the border regions, in thesepredominantly agricultural countries, is of prime im-portance for the future economic development of theUnion of Republics.

Further, “practical measures for the organisation ofnational military units.” I think that we have delayedconsiderably in drawing up measures of this kind. It isour duty to organise national military units. Of course,they cannot be organised in a day; but we can, and must,proceed at once to set up military schools in the republicsand regions for the purpose of training within a certainperiod, from among local people, commanders who couldlater serve as a core for the organisation of national military units. It is absolutely necessary to start this and topush it forward. If we had reliable national militaryunits with reliable commanders in republics like Tur-


kestan, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armeniaand Azerbaijan, our republic would be in a far betterposition than it is now both in regard to defence andin regard to the contingency of our having to takeaction. We must start this work at once. Of course, thiswill involve an increase in the strength of our army by20-25 thousand men, but this cannot be regarded as aninsuperable obstacle.

I shall not dwell at length on the remaining points(see the draft platform), for their significance is self-evident and needs no explanation.

The third group of questions consists of those con-nected with the institution of a second chamber of theCentral Executive Committee of the Union and theorganisation of the People’s Commissariats of the Unionof Republics. Here the principal questions, the mostconspicuous ones, are singled out and, of course, thelist of such questions cannot be regarded as complete.

The Political Bureau conceives the second chamberas a component part of the Central Executive Committeeof the U.S.S.R. Proposals were made that, in additionto the existing Central Executive Committee, there shouldbe set up a Supreme Soviet of Nationalities separatefrom the Central Executive Committee. This project wasrejected and the Political Bureau decided that it wasmore advisable to divide the Central Executive Commit-tee itself into two chambers: the first, which can be calledthe Union Soviet, to be elected by the Congress of Sovietsof the Union of Republics, and the second, which shouldbe called the Soviet of Nationalities, to be elected by theCentral Executive Committees of the republics and by theregional congresses of national regions in the proportion

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cadres were made, forged, in our fight with Menshevism.The task of these cadres then, at that period—I amreferring to the period from the foundation of the Bol-shevik Party to the expulsion from the Party of theLiquidators, as the most pronounced representativesof Menshevism—the main task was to win over to theBolsheviks the most active, honest and outstandingmembers of the working class, to create cadres, to forma vanguard. The struggle here was waged primarilyagainst tendencies of a bourgeois character—especiallyagainst Menshevism—which prevented the cadres frombeing combined into a single unit, as the main core ofthe Party. At that time it was not yet the task of theParty, as an immediate and vital need, to establishwide connections with the vast masses of the workingclass and the toiling peasantry, to win over those masses,to win a majority in the country. The Party had notyet got so far.

Only in the next stage of our Party’s development,only in its second stage, when these cadres had grown,when they had taken shape as the basic core of our Party,when the sympathies of the best elements among theworking class had already been won, or almost won—only then was the Party confronted with the task, asan immediate and urgent need, of winning over the vastmasses, of transforming the Party cadres into a realmass workers’ party. During this period the core of ourParty had to wage a struggle not so much against Men-shevism as against the “Left” elements within our Party,the “Otzovists” of all kinds, who were attempting tosubstitute revolutionary phraseology for a serious studyof the specific features of the new situation which arose


Council of People ’s Commissars of the Union of Re-publics, while the other five Commissariats are directivebodies, i.e., the Supreme Council of National Economy,the People’s Commissariat of Food, the People’s Com-missariat of Finance, the People’s Commissariat ofLabour, and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectionare subordinate to two authorities, while the remainingsix Commissariats are independent. This project was crit-icised by some of the Ukrainians, Rakovsky, Skrypnik,and others. The Political Bureau, however, rejected theproposal of the Ukrainians that the People’s Commis-sariat of Foreign Affairs and the People’s Commissariatof Foreign Trade be transferred from the category ofmerged Commissariats to the directive category and, inthe main, accepted the principal clauses of the Constitu-tion in keeping with the decisions adopted last year.

Such, in general, are the considerations that guidedthe Political Bureau in drawing up the draft platform.

I think that on the question of the Constitution of theUnion of Republics and of the second chamber, the con-ference will have to limit itself to a brief exchange ofopinions, the more so that this question is being studied bya commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee.77

The question of the practical measures to implement theresolutions of the Twelfth Congress will, in my opinion,have to be discussed in greater detail. As for the questionof strengthening the local Marxist cadres, we shall haveto devote the greater part of the debate to this matter.

I think that it would be advisable before opening thedebate to hear the reports of the comrades from the re-publics and regions on the basis of the information theyhave brought from their localities.

4. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION

June 12

First of all I would like to say a few words aboutthe reports made by the comrades, and about the charac-ter of the conference in general, in the light of the re-ports presented. Although this is the fourth conferenceof this kind held since Soviet power came into exist-ence, it is the only one that can be called a full confer-ence, having heard more or less full and substantiatedreports from the republics and regions. It is evidentfrom the reports that the communist cadres in the regionsand republics have grown more mature and are learningto work independently. I think that the wealth of infor-mation the comrades have given us, the experience ofthe work performed in the regions and republics whichthe comrades related to us here, should certainly bebrought to the knowledge of the whole of our Party in theshape of the minutes of this conference. The people havegrown more mature and are making progress, they arelearning to govern—such is the first conclusion to bedrawn from the reports, the first impression that onegets from them.

Passing to the contents of the reports, we can dividethe material presented into two groups: reports fromthe Socialist Republics, and reports from the People’s,non-Socialist, Republics (Bukhara, Khorezm).


Let us proceed to examine the first group of reports.It is evident from these reports that as regards bringingthe Party and, particularly, the state apparatus closerto the language and manner of life of the people, Georgiamust be considered the most developed and advancedrepublic. Next to Georgia comes Armenia. The otherrepublics and regions are behind them. Such, to my mind,is the indisputable conclusion. This is due to the factthat Georgia and Armenia are more highly cultured thanthe others. The percentage of literates in Georgia isfairly high—as much as 80; in Armenia it is not lessthan 40. That is the secret why these two countries areahead of the other republics. From this it follows that themore literate and cultured a country, a republic, or aregion is, the closer is the Party and Soviet apparatusto the people, to its language, to its manner of life. Allthis, provided other conditions are equal, of course.This is obvious, and there is nothing new in this conclu-sion; and precisely because there is nothing new in it,this conclusion is often forgotten and, not infrequently,efforts are made to attribute cultural backwardness, andhence, backwardness in state affairs, to “mistakes” inthe Party’s policy, to conflicts, and so forth, whereasthe basis of all this is insufficient literacy, lack of cul-ture. If you want to make your country an advancedcountry, that is, to raise the level of its statehood, thenincrease the literacy of the population, raise the cultureof your country, the rest will come.

Approaching the matter from that angle, and apprais-ing the situation in the individual republics in the lightof these reports, it must be admitted that the situationin Turkestan, the present s ta te of affa i rs there , i s


the most unsatisfactory, and is the most alarming. Cultur-al backwardness, a terribly low percentage of literacy,divorce of the state apparatus from the language andmanner of life of the peoples of Turkestan, a terriblyslow tempo of development—such is the picture. Andyet it is obvious that, of all the Soviet republics, Tur-kestan is the most important from the standpoint ofrevolutionising the East; and not only because Turkestanpresents a combination of nationalities most closely con-nected with the East, but also because, owing to itsgeographical situation, it cuts right into the heart ofthe East, which is the most exploited, and which hasaccumulated in its midst the most explosive materialfor the fight against imperialism. That is why present-day Turkestan is the weakest point of Soviet power.The task is to transform Turkestan into a model republic,into an outpost for revolutionising the East. That isprecisely why it is necessary to concentrate attentionon Turkestan with a view to raising the cultural level ofthe masses, to making the state apparatus national incharacter, and so forth. We must carry out this task at allcosts, sparing no effort, and shrinking from no sacrifice.

The second weak point of Soviet power is the Ukraine.The state of affairs there as regards culture, literacy,etc., is the same, or almost the same, as in Turkestan.The state apparatus is as remote from the language andmanner of life of the people as it is in Turkestan. Andyet the Ukraine has the same significance for the peoplesof the West as Turkestan has for the peoples of the East.The situation in the Ukraine is still more complicatedby certain specific features of the country’s industrialdevelopment. The point is that the basic industries,


coal and metallurgy, appeared in the Ukraine not frombelow, not as a result of the natural development of hernational economy, but from above; they were introduced,ar t i f ic ia l ly implanted, f rom outs ide . Consequent lythe proletariat in those industries is not of local origin,its language is not Ukrainian. The result of this is thatthe exercise of cultural influence by the towns upon thecountryside and the establishment of the bond betweenthe proletariat and the peasantry are considerably hin-dered by these differences in the national compositionof the proletariat and the peasantry. All these circum-stances must be taken into account in the work of trans-forming the Ukraine into a model republic. And in viewof her enormous significance for the peoples of the West,it is absolutely essential to transform her into a modelrepublic.

I pass to the reports on Khorezm and Bukhara.I shall not speak about Khorezm because of the absenceof the Khorezm representative; it would be unfair tocriticise the work of the Khorezm Communist Party andof the Government of Khorezm merely on the basis ofthe information at the disposal of the Central Committee.What Broido said here about Khorezm concerns the past.It has little relation to the present situation in Khorezm.Concerning the Party there, he said that fifty per centof the members are merchants and the like. Perhapsthat was the case in the past, but at the present time theParty is being purged; not a single “uniform Party card”has yet been issued to Khorezm; properly speaking,there is no Party there, it will be possible to speak of aParty only when the purge is completed. It is said thatthere are several thousand members of the Party there.


I think that after the purge not more than some hundredsof Party members will be left. The situation was exactlythe same in Bukhara last year, when 16,000 memberswere registered in the Party there; after the purge notmore than a thousand were left.

I pass to the report on Bukhara. Speaking of Bukhara,I must first of all say a word or two about the generaltone and character of the reports presented. I considerthat, on the whole, the reports on the republics and re-gions were truthful and, on the whole, did not divergefrom reality. Only one report diverged very widely fromreality, that was the report on Bukhara. It was not evena report, it was sheer diplomacy, for everything that isbad in Bukhara was obscured, glossed over, whereas every-thing that glitters on the surface and strikes the eyewas pushed into the foreground, for display. Conclu-sion—all’s well in Bukhara. I think that we have gath-ered at this conference not for the purpose of playing atdiplomacy with one another, of making eyes at one another, while surreptitiously trying to lead one anotherby the nose, but for the purpose of telling the wholetruth, of revealing, exposing all the evils in the commu-nist way, and of devising means for improvement. Onlyin this way can we make progress. In this respect, thereport on Bukhara differs from the other reports by itsuntruthfulness. It was not by chance that I asked thereporter here about the composition of the Council ofNazirs in Bukhara. The Council of Nazirs is the Councilof People’s Commissars. Are there any dekhans, i.e.,peasants, on it? The reporter did not answer. But I haveinformation about this; it turns out that there is not asingle peasant in the Bukhara Government. The nine, or


eleven, members of the government include the son ofa rich merchant, a trader, an intellectual, a mullah, atrader, an intellectual, another trader, but not a singledekhan. And yet, as is well known, Bukhara is exclu-sively a peasant country.

This question is directly related to the question ofthe Bukhara Government’s policy. What is the policyof this government that is headed by Communists? Doesit serve the interests of the peasantry, of its own peasant-ry? I would like to mention only two facts which illus-trate the policy of the Bukhara Government that isheaded by Communists. From a document signed byhighly responsible comrades and old members of theParty it is evident, for example, that of the credits theState Bank of Bukhara has granted since it came in exist-ence, 75 per cent have gone to private merchants, where-as the peasant co-operatives have received 2 per cent.In absolute figures it works out like this: 7,000,000gold rubles to the merchants, and 220,000 gold rublesto the peasants. Further, in Bukhara the land has notbeen confiscated. But the Emir ’s cattle were confis-cated . . . for the benefit of the peasants. But what do wefind? From this same document it appears that about2,000 head of cattle were confiscated for the benefit ofthe peasants, but of this number the peasants receivedonly about 200; the rest were sold, to wealthy citizensof course.

And this government calls itself a Soviet, a People’s,government! It scarcely needs proof that in the ac-t ivi t ies of the Bukhara Government just descr ibedthere is nothing either of a People’s or of a Sovietcharacter.


The reporter painted a very radiant picture of theattitude of the Bukhara people towards the R.S.F.S.R.and the Union of Republics. According to what he said,all is well in this respect too. The Bukhara Republic,i t appears , wants to join the Union. Evident ly thereporter thinks that it is enough to want to enter theUnion of Republics for the gates to be flung open. No,comrades, the matter is not so simple. You have to askfirst whether you will be allowed to enter the Unionof Republics. To be able to join the Union you mustf i rs t show the peoples of the Union that you haveearned the right to join; you have to win this right.I must remind the Bukhara comrades that the Unionof Republ ics must not be regarded as a dumpingground.

Lastly, to conclude the first part of my reply to thediscussion on the reports, I should like to touch upona characteristic feature of them. Not one of the report-ers answered the question that is on the agenda of thisconference, namely: whether there are unused, unengagedreserves of local people. Nobody answered this question,nobody even touched upon it, except Grinko, who, how-ever, is not a reporter. And yet this question is of first-rate importance. Are there in the republics, or in theregions, local responsible workers who are free, who arenot being used? If there are, why are they not beingused? If there are no such reserves, and yet a shortage ofworkers is experienced, with what national elements arethe vacant places in the Party or Soviet apparatuses beingfilled? All these questions are of the highest importancefor the Party. I know that in the republics and regionsthere are some leading workers, mostly Russians, who


sometimes block the way for local people, hinder theirpromotion to certain posts, push them into the background.Such cases happen, and this is one of the causes of dis-content in the republics and regions. But the greatestand basic cause of discontent is that there are terriblyfew unengaged reserves of local people fit for the work;most likely there are none at all. That is the whole point.Since there is a shortage of local workers, it is obviouslynecessary to engage non-local workers for the work,people of other nationalities, for time will not wait;we must build and govern, and cadres of local peoplegrow slowly. I think that here the workers from theregions and republics showed a certain guile in sayingnothing about this. And yet it is obvious that nine-tenthsof the misunderstandings are due to the shortage of re-sponsible workers from among local people. Only oneconclusion can be drawn from this: the Party mustbe set the urgent task of accelerating the formation ofcadres of Soviet and Party workers from among localpeople.

From the reports I pass to the speeches. I must ob-serve, comrades, that not one of the speakers criticisedthe statement of principles in the draft platform submit-ted by the Political Bureau. (Voice: “It is above criti-cism.”) I take this as evidence of the conference’s agree-ment, of the conference’s solidarity with the princi-ples that are formulated in this part of the platform.(Voices: “Quite true!”)

Trotsky’s addendum, which he spoke about, or in-sertion (it concerns the part dealing with principles),ought to be adopted, for it in no way alters the characterof that part of the resolution; more than that, it naturally


follows from it. The more so because, in essence, Trots-ky’s addendum is a repetition of the well-known pointin the resolution on the national question adopted bythe Tenth Congress, where it is said that Petrograd andMoscow models must not be mechanically transplantedto the regions and republics. It is, of course, a repeti-tion, but I think that sometimes it does no harm to re-peat certain things. In view of this, I do not intend todwell at length on that part of the resolution which dealswith principles. Skrypnik’s speech gives some groundfor the conclusion that he interprets that part in hisown way, and in face of the main task—to combatGreat-Russian chauvinism, which is the chief danger—he tries to obscure the other danger, the danger of localnationalism. But such an interpretation is profoundlymistaken.

The second part of the Political Bureau’s platformconcerns the questions of the character of the Union ofRepublics, and of certain amendments to the Constitu-tion of the Union of Republics from the standpoint ofinstituting a so-called second chamber. I must say thaton this point the Political Bureau disagrees somewhatwith the Ukrainian comrades. What is formulated inthe Political Bureau’s draft platform, the Political Bu-reau adopted unanimously. But some points are disputedby Rakovsky. This, incidentally, was apparent in theCommission of the Plenum of the Central Committee.Perhaps we ought not to discuss this, because this ques-tion is not to be settled here. I have already reportedon this part of the platform; I said that this questionwas being studied by the Commission of the Plenum ofthe Central Committee and by the Commission of the


Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of theUnion.78 But since the question has been raised I cannotignore it.

It is wrong to say that the question of confederationor federation is a trivial one. Was it accidental that,when examining the well-known draft Constitution adopt-ed at the Congress of the Union of Republics, the Ukrain-ian comrades deleted from it the phrase which saidthat the republics “are uniting into a single union state”?Was that accidental? Did they not do that? Why did theydelete that phrase? Was it accidental that the Ukrainiancomrades proposed in their counter-draft that the Peo-ple’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade and the People’sCommissariat of Foreign Affairs should not be mergedbut be transferred to the directive category? What be-comes of the single union state if each republic retainsits own People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs andPeople’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade? Was it acci-dental that in their counter-draft the Ukrainians reducedthe power of the Presidium of the Central ExecutiveCommittee to nil by splitting it up between two presidi-ums of the two chambers? All these amendments of Ra-kovsky’s were registered and examined by the Commissionof the Plenum of the Central Committee, and rejected.Why, then, repeat them here? I regard this persistenceon the part of some of the Ukrainian comrades as evi-dence of a desire to obtain in the definition of the charac-ter of the Union something midway between a confeder-ation and a federation, with a leaning towards confeder-ation. It is obvious, however, that we are creating nota confederation, but a federation of republics, a singleunion state, uniting military, foreign, foreign trade and


other affairs, a state which in no way diminishes thesovereignty of the individual republics.

If the Union is to have a People’s Commissariat ofForeign Affairs, a People’s Commissariat of ForeignTrade, and so forth, and the republics constituting theUnion are also to have all these Commissariats, it is ob-vious that it will be impossible for the Union as a wholeto come before the outside world as a single state. Onething or the other: either we merge these apparatuses andface the external enemy as a single Union, or we do notmerge them and create not a union state, but a conglom-eration of republics, in which case every republic musthave its own parallel apparatus. I think that in thismatter truth is on the side of Comrade Manuilsky, andnot on the side of Rakovsky and Skrypnik.

From questions of state I pass to questions of a pure-ly concrete, practical character, connected partly withthe Political Bureau’s practical proposals, and partlywith the amendments that may be moved here by thecomrades who are engaged in practical work. Being thereporter on behalf of the Political Bureau, I did not,and could not, say that the list of concrete, practicalproposals made by the Political Bureau is exhaustive.On the contrary, I said at the very outset that there maybe omissions in the list, and that additions were inevi-table. Skrypnik is proposing one such addition in rela-tion to the trade unions. That one is acceptable. I alsoaccept some of the additions proposed by Comrade Miko-yan. As regards a fund for publishing work, and for thepress in general in some of the backward republics andregions, an amendment is certainly needed. That questionwas overlooked. So also was the question of schools in


some regions, and even republics. Primary schools arenot included in the State Budget. This is certainly anomission, and there may be a heap of such omissions.I therefore suggest to the comrades engaged in practicalwork, who spoke a lot about the state of their organisa-tions, but made less effort to propose something concrete,to think about this and to submit their concrete addenda,amendments, etc., to the Central Committee, which willunify them, insert them in the relevant points and circu-late them to the organisations.

I cannot pass over in silence a proposal made byGrinko to the effect that certain easier conditions shouldbe created to facilitate local people among the less cul-tured and, perhaps, less proletarian nationalities enter-ing the Party and being promoted to its leading bodies.The proposal is correct and, in my opinion, it ought tobe adopted.

I conclude my reply to the discussion with the fol-lowing motion: that the Political Bureau’s draft plat-form on the national question be adopted as a basis,Trotsky’s amendment to be taken into consideration.That the Central Committee be requested to classifyamendments of a practical character that have been, ormay be, proposed, and to embody them in the relevantpoints of the platform; that the Central Committee berequested to have the draft platform, the minutes, theresolution and the most important documents left bythe reporters printed in a week’s time and distributedto the organisations. That the draft platform be adoptedwithout setting up a special commission.

I have not touched on the question of setting up acommission on the national question under the Central


Committee. Comrades, I have some doubt about the ad-visability of creating such an organisation, firstly be-cause the republics and regions will certainly not providetop-level workers for this body. I am sure of that. Sec-ondly, I think that the Regional Committees and nation-al Central Committees will not agree to yield to theCentral Committee’s commission even a particle of theirrights in the distribution of responsible workers. At thepresent time, when distributing forces, we usually con-sult the Regional Committees and national CentralCommittees. If this commission is set up, the centre ofgravity will naturally shift to it. There is no analogybetween a commission on the national question andcommissions on questions concerning the co-operatives,or work among the peasants. Commissions on work inthe countryside, and on co-operatives, usually draw upgeneral instructions. On the national question, however,we need not general instructions, but the indication ofconcrete steps to be taken in each republic and region,and this a general commission will be unable to do. Itis doubtful whether any commission can draw up andadopt any decisions for, let us say, the Ukrainian Repub-lic: two or three men from the Ukraine cannot act assubstitutes for the Central Committee of the C.P.(B.)of the Ukraine. That is why I think that a commis-sion will not produce any effective results. The stepthat is here proposed—to appoint people f rom thenationalities to the chief departments of the CentralCommittee—is to my mind quite sufficient for the timebeing. If no particular success is achieved within thenext six months, the question can then be raised of set-ting up a special commission.

5. REPLY TO SPEECHES

June 12

Since I have been attacked (laughter), permit me toanswer the point about the “one and indivisible.” Noneother than Stalin, in the resolution on the national ques-tion, denounced the “one and indivisible” in Point 8.Obviously, what was meant was not “indivisible,” butfederation, whereas the Ukrainians are trying to forceconfederation upon us. That is the first question.

The second question is about Rakovsky. I repeat,for I have already said it once, that the Constitutionthat was adopted at the First Congress of Soviets of theU.S.S.R. says that such and such republics “are unitinginto a single union state”—“the Union of Soviet Social-ist Republics.” The Ukrainians sent their counter-draftto the Central Committee. That draft says: such and suchrepublics “are forming a Union of Socialist Republics.”The words “are uniting into a single union state” werethrown out. Six words were thrown out. Why? Was thataccidental? What has become of federation? I also per-ceive the germ of confederalism in Rakovsky’s action inthrowing out of the clause in the Constitution that wasadopted at the First Congress, the words describing thePresidium as being “vested with supreme authority inthe intervals between sessions,” and in dividing power


between the presidiums of two chambers, i.e., reducingthe Union power to a fiction. Why did he do that? Be-cause he is opposed to the idea of a union state, opposedto real Union power. That is the second question.

The third: in the draft proposed by the Ukrainians,the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and thePeople’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade are not merged,but are transferred from the merged category to the di-rective category.

Such are the three reasons which cause me to perceivethe germ of confederation in Rakovsky’s proposals. Whyis there such a divergence between your proposals andthe text of the Constitution, which the Ukrainian delega-tion also accepted? (Rakovsky: “We’ve had the TwelfthCongress.”)

Excuse me. The Twelfth Congress rejected your amend-ments and adopted the wording: “uniting the republicsinto a single union state.”

I can see that during the period from the First Con-gress of the Union of Republics to the Twelfth Party Con-gress and the present Conference, some of the Ukrainiancomrades have undergone a certain evolution from feder-alism to confederalism. Well, I am in favour of federa-tion, i.e., opposed to confederation, i.e., opposed to theproposals made by Rakovsky and Skrypnik.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

AND THE QUESTION

OF THE MIDDLE STRATA

The question of the middle strata is undoubtedly oneof the basic questions of the workers’ revolution. Themiddle strata are the peasantry and the small urban work-ing people. The oppressed nationalities, nine-tenths ofwhom consist of middle strata, should also be put inthis category. As you see, these are the strata whose eco-nomic status puts them midway between the proletariatand the capitalist class. The relative importance of thesestrata is determined by two circumstances: firstly, thesestrata constitute the majority, or, at any rate, a largeminority of the population of the existing states; second-ly, they constitute the important reserves from whichthe capitalist class recruits its army against the proletar-iat. The proletariat cannot retain power unless it enjoysthe sympathy and support of the middle strata, primarilyof the peasantry, especially in a country like our Unionof Republics. The proletariat cannot even seriouslycontemplate seizing power if these strata have not beenat least neutralised, if they have not yet managed tobreak away from the capitalist class, and if the bulkof them still serve as the army of capital. Hence the


fight for the middle strata, the fight for the peasantry,which was a conspicuous feature of the whole of our revo-lution from 1905 to 1917, a fight which is still far fromended, and which will continue to be waged in thefuture.

One of the reasons for the defeat of the 1848 Revolu-tion in France was that it failed to evoke a sympatheticresponse among the French peasantry. One of the reasonsfor the fall of the Paris Commune was that it encounteredthe opposition of the middle strata, especially of thepeasantry. The same must be said of the Russian revolu-tion of 1905.

Basing themselves on the experience of the Europeanrevolutions, certain vulgar Marxists, headed by Kautsky,came to the conclusion that the middle strata, especiallythe peasantry, are almost the born enemies of the workers’revolution, that, therefore, we must reckon with a length-ier period of development, as a result of which the prole-tariat will become the majority of the nation and the prop-er conditions for the victory of the workers’ revolutionwill thereby be created. On the basis of that conclusion,they, these vulgar Marxists, warned the proletariat against“premature” revolution. On the basis of that conclusion,they, from “motives of principle,” left the middle strataentirely at the disposal of capital. On the basis of thatconclusion, they prophesied the doom of the Russian Oc-tober Revolution, on the grounds that the proletariat inRussia constituted a minority, that Russia was a peasantcountry, and, therefore, a victorious workers’ revolutionin Russia was impossible.

It is noteworthy that Marx himself had an entirelydifferent appraisal of the middle strata, especially of

OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE QUESTION OF MIDDLE STRATA 351

the peasantry. Whereas the vulgar Marxists, washingtheir hands of the peasantry and leaving it entirely atthe political disposal of capital, noisily bragged abouttheir “firm principles,” Marx, the most true to principleof all Marxists, persistently advised the CommunistPar ty not to lose s ight of the peasantry, to win i tover to the side of the proletariat and to make sureof i ts support in the future proletar ian revolut ion.We know that in the ‘fifties, after the defeat of theFebruary Revolution in France and in Germany, Marxwrote to Engels, and through him to the CommunistParty of Germany:

“The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibilityof backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition ofthe Peasant War.”79

That was written about the Germany of the ‘fifties,a peasant country, where the proletariat comprised asmall minority, where the proletariat was less organ-ised than the proletariat was in Russia in 1917, and wherethe peasantry, owing to its position, was less disposedto support a proletarian revolution than the peasantryin Russia in 1917.

The October Revolution undoubtedly representedthat happy combination of a “peasant war” and a “pro-letarian revolution” of which Marx wrote, despite allthe “highly principled” chatterboxes. The October Revo-lution proved that such a combination is possible andcan be brought about. The October Revolution provedthat the proletariat can seize power and retain it, if itsucceeds in wresting the middle strata, primarily thepeasantry, from the capitalist class, if it succeeds in


converting these strata from reserves of capital into re-serves of the proletariat.

In brief: the October Revolution was the first of allthe revolutions in the world to bring into the forefrontthe question of the middle strata, and primarily of thepeasantry, and the first to solve it successfully, despiteall the “theories” and lamentations of the heroes of theSecond International.

That is the first merit of the October Revolution, ifone may speak of merit in such a connection.

But the matter did not stop there. The October Revo-lution went further and tried to rally the oppressed nation-alit ies around the proletariat. We have already saidabove that nine-tenths of the populations of these na-tionalities consist of peasants and of small urban work-ing people. That, however, does not exhaust the concept“oppressed nationality.” Oppressed nationalities areusually oppressed not only as peasants and as urbanworking people, but also as nationalities, i.e., as thetoilers of a definite nationality, language, culture, man-ner of life, habits and customs. The double oppressioncannot help revolutionising the labouring masses of theoppressed nationalities, cannot help impelling them tofight the principal force of oppression—capital. Thiscircumstance formed the basis on which the proletariatsucceeded in combining the “proletarian revolution”not only with a “peasant war,” but also with a “nationalwar.” All this could not fail to extend the field of actionof the proletarian revolution far beyond the borders ofRussia; it could not fail to jeopardise the deepest re-serves of capital. Whereas the fight for the middle strataof a given dominant nationality is a fight for the imme-


diate reserves of capital, the fight for the emancipationof the oppressed nationalities could not help becominga fight to win particular reserves of capital, the deepest ofthem, a fight to liberate the colonial and unequal peoplesfrom the yoke of capital. This latter fight is still farfrom ended. More than that, it has not yet achievedeven the first decisive successes. But this fight for thedeep reserves was started by the October Revolution,and it will undoubtedly expand, step by step, with thefurther development of imperialism, with the growthof the might of our Union of Republics, and with thedevelopment of the proletarian revolution in theWest.

In brief: the October Revolution actually initiatedthe fight of the proletariat for the deep reserves of cap-ital in the shape of the masses of the people in the op-pressed and unequal countries; it was the first to raisethe banner of the struggle to win these reserves. That isits second merit.

In our country the peasantry was won over underthe banner of socialism. The peasantry received landat the hands of the proletariat, defeated the landlordswith the aid of the proletariat and rose to powerunder the leadership of the proletariat; consequently, itcould not but fee l , could not but rea l ise , tha t theprocess of its emancipation was proceeding, and wouldcontinue, under the banner of the proletariat, under itsred banner. This could not but convert the banner ofsocialism, which was formerly a bogey to the peasant-ry, into a banner which won its attention and aidedits emancipation from subjection, poverty and oppres-sion.


The same is true, but to an even greater degree, ofthe oppressed nationalities. The battle-cry for the eman-cipation of the nationalities, backed by such facts asthe liberation of Finland, the withdrawal of troops fromPersia and China, the formation of the Union of Repub-lics, the moral support openly given to the peoples ofTurkey, China, Hindustan and Egypt—this battle-crywas first sounded by the people who were the victorsin the October Revolution. The fact that Russia, whichwas formerly regarded by the oppressed nationalities asa symbol of oppression, has now, after it has becomesocialist, been transformed into a symbol of emancipation,cannot be called an accident. Nor is it an accident thatthe name of the leader of the October Revolution, Com-rade Lenin, is now the most beloved name pronouncedby the downtrodden, oppressed peasants and revolution-ary intelligentsia of the colonial and unequal countries.In the past, the oppressed and downtrodden slaves ofthe vast Roman Empire regarded Christianity as a rockof salvation. We are now reaching the point where social-ism may serve (and is already beginning to serve!) asthe banner of liberation for the millions who inhabitthe vast colonial states of imperialism. It can hardlybe doubted that this circumstance has greatly facili-tated the task of combating prejudices against socialism,and has cleared the way for the penetration of socialistideas into the most remote corners of the oppressed coun-tries. Formerly it was difficult for a Socialist to comeout openly among the non-proletarian, middle strata ofthe oppressed or oppressor countries; but today he cancome forward openly and advocate socialist ideas amongthese strata and expect to be listened to, and even heeded,


for he is backed by so cogent an argument as theOctober Revolution. That, too, is a result of the OctoberRevolution.

In brief: the October Revolution cleared the wayfor socialist ideas among the middle, non-proletarian,peasant strata of all nationalities and races; it made thebanner of socialism popular among them. That is thethird merit of the October Revolution.

Pravda, No. 253,November 7, 1923

Signed: J. Stalin

THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST

CONGRESS OF WORKING WOMEN AND

PEASANT WOMEN80

Five years ago, the Central Committee of our Partyconvened in Moscow the First All-Russian Congress ofWorking Women and Peasant Women. Over a thousanddelegates, representing not less than a million wom-en toi lers , gathered at the congress. That congresswas a landmark in our Party’s work among womentoilers. The inestimable merit of that congress was thatit laid the foundation for organising political enlighten-ment of the working women and peasant women in ourRepublic.

Some people might think that there is nothing excep-tional about that, that the Party has always engaged inthe political enlightenment of the masses, including wom-en, that the political enlightenment of women cannotbe of great importance, seeing that we have unitedcadres consisting of workers and peasants. That opin-ion is radically wrong. Now that power has passedinto the hands of the workers and peasants, the politi-cal enlightenment of women toilers is of paramountimportance.

THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY 357

And for the following reasons.Our country has a population of about 140,000,000;

of these, no less than half are women, mainly workingwomen and peasant women, who are downtrodden, unen-lightened and ignorant. Since our country has earnestlyset to work to build the new, Soviet life, is it not obviousthat the women, who constitute half i ts population,will be like a weight on its feet every time a step forwardis taken if they remain downtrodden, unenlightened andignorant?

The working woman stands side by side with theworking man. Together with him she is carrying out thecommon task of building our industry. She can be of as-sistance in this common task if she is politically conscious,if she is politically enlightened. But she may wreckthe common task if she is downtrodden and ignorant,wreck it not maliciously, of course, but because of herignorance.

The peasant woman stands side by side with thepeasant. Together with him she is carrying out the com-mon task of developing our agriculture, of makingit prosperous, of making it flourish. She can beof tremendous assistance in this matter if she rids her-self of her ignorance. On the other hand, she mayhinder the whole matter if she remains the captive ofignorance.

Working women and peasant women are free citizens,equal with working men and peasants. They take part inthe election of our Soviets and co-operatives, and theycan be elected to these bodies. The working women andpeasant women can improve our Soviets and co-opera-tives, strengthen and develop them, if they are politically


enlightened. But they can weaken and undermine themif they are ignorant.

Lastly, the working women and peasant women aremothers; they are rearing our youth—the future of ourcountry. They can either warp a child’s soul or rear forus a younger generation that will be of healthy mind andcapable of promoting our country’s progress, depend-ing upon whether the mothers sympathise with the So-viet system or whether they follow in the wake of thepriests, the kulaks, the bourgeoisie.

That is why the political enlightenment of workingwomen and peasant women is now, when the workersand peasants have set to work to build the new life, amatter of paramount importance for the achievementof real victory over the bourgeoisie.

That is why the significance of the First Congressof Working Women and Peasant Women, which initiat-ed the work of political enlightenment among womentoilers, is really inestimable.

Five years ago, at the First Congress of WorkingWomen and Peasant Women, the Party’s immediatetask was to draw hundreds of thousands of working wom-en into the common task of building the new, Sovietlife; and in the front ranks stood the working women inthe industrial districts, for they were the most activeand politically conscious elements among the womentoilers. It must be admitted that no little has been donein this respect during the past five years, although muchstill remains to be done.

The Party’s immediate task now is to draw the mil-lions of peasant women into the common task of build-ing our Soviet life. The work of the past five years has

THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY 359

already resulted in the promotion of a number of leadersfrom the ranks of the peasant women. Let us hope thatthe ranks of the peasant women leaders will be rein-forced with additional enlightened peasant women. Let ushope that the Party will successfully cope with this tasktoo.

November 10, 1923

Magazine Kommunistka, No. 11,November, 1923

Signed: J. Stalin

SPEECH AT A CELEBRATION MEETING

AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY

November 17, 1923(Brief Newspaper Report)

At the celebration of the fourth anniversary of ourRed Cavalry, a speech was delivered by the founder ofthe Cavalry Army and its honorary Red Army man,Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin emphasised that at the time whenthe basic nucleus of the cavalry, the embryo of the futureCavalry Army, was being organised, its initiators cameinto conflict with the opinion of leading military circlesand military experts who denied the necessity of organis-ing any cavalry at all.

The most characteristic page of the history of theCavalry Army was written in the summer of 1919, whenour cavalry became a combination of masses of cavalrywith masses of machine guns. The celebrated “tachanka”*is the symbol of that combination.

However numerous our cavalry may be, if in itsoperations it is unable to combine the power of the horsewith the power of machine guns and artillery, it willcease to be a formidable force.

The most glorious page in the history of the CavalryArmy was written at the close of 1919, when twelve regi-

* A l ight horse-drawn car t on which a machine gun was

mounted.—Tr.

SPEECH AT A CELEBRATION MEETING AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY 361

ments of our cavalry routed some twenty-two enemy regi-ments at the approaches to Voronezh. That event markedthe actual conversion of our Cavalry Corps into a CavalryArmy.

The characteristic feature of that period was thatat that stage our cavalry acquired still another qualitywhich enabled it to achieve victory over Denikin’s cav-alry, namely: it attached to itself several infantry units,which it usually transported in carts, and employed as ascreen against the enemy, so as to be able to take a shortrest under cover of this screen, recuperate its strength,and then strike another blow at the enemy. That was thecombination of cavalry with infantry—the latter beingan auxiliary force. This combination, this additionalnew quality, transformed our cavalry into a formidablemobile force, which struck terror in the enemy.

In conclusion, Comrade Stalin said: “Comrades, I amnot the kind of man to go into raptures, but I must saythat if our Cavalry Army retains these new qualities,our cavalry and its leader, Comrade Budyonny, will beinvincible.”

Izvestia, No. 265,November 20, 1923

THE PARTY’S TASKS

Report Delivered at an Enlarged Meeting of the KrasnayaPresnya District Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)

With Group Organisers, Members of the Debating Societyand of the Bureau of the Party Units

December 2, 1923

Comrades, first of all I must say that I am deliveringa report here in my personal capacity and not in the nameof the Central Committee of the Party. If the meetingis willing to hear such a report, I am at your service.(Voices: “Yes.”) This does not mean that I disagree withthe Central Committee in any way on this question; notat all. I am speaking here in my personal capacity onlybecause the commission of the Central Committee fordrafting measures to improve the internal situation inthe Party81 is to present its findings to the Central Commit-tee in a day or two; these findings have not yet beenpresented, and therefore I have as yet no formal right tospeak in the name of the Central Committee, although Iam sure that what I am about to say to you will, in themain, express the Central Committee’s position on thesequestions.

DISCUSSION—A SIGNOF THE PARTY’S STRENGTH

The first question I would like to raise here is that ofthe significance of the discussion that is now takingplace in the press and in the Party units. What doesthis discussion show? What does it indicate? Is it a

THE PARTY’S TASKS 363

storm that has burst into the calm life of the Party? Isthis discussion a sign of the Party’s disintegration,its decay, as some say, or of its degeneration, asothers say?

I think, comrades, that it is neither one nor the other:there is neither degeneration nor disintegration. Thefact of the matter is that the Party has grown more ma-ture during the past period; it has adequately rid itselfof useless ballast; it has become more proletarian. Youknow that two years ago we had not less than 700,000members; you know that several thousand membershave dropped out, or have been kicked out, of the Party.Further, the Party membership has improved, its qualityhas risen in this period as a result of the improvementin the conditions of the working class due to the revivalof industry, as a result of the return of the old skilledworkers from the countryside, and as a result of the newwave of cultural development that is spreading amongthe industrial workers.

In short, owing to all these circumstances, the Partyhas grown more mature, its quality has risen, its needshave grown, it has become more exacting, it wants toknow more than it has known up to now, and it wantsto decide more than it has up to now.

The discussion which has opened is not a sign of theParty’s weakness, still less is it a sign of its disintegra-tion or degeneration; it is a sign of strength, a sign offirmness, a sign of the improvement in the quality ofthe Party’s membership, a sign of its increased activity.


CAUSES OF THE DISCUSSION

The second question that confronts us is: what hascaused the question of internal Party policy to becomeso acute precisely in the present period, in the autumnof this year? How is this to be explained? What werethe causes? I think, comrades, that there were twocauses.

The first cause was the wave of discontent and strikesover wages that swept through certain districts of therepublic in August of this year. The fact of the matteris that this strike wave exposed the defects in our organi-sations; it revealed the isolation of our organisations—both Party and trade-union—from the events taking placein the factories. And in connection with this strikewave the existence was discovered within our Party ofseveral secret organisations of an essentially anti-com-munist nature, which strove to disintegrate the Party.All these defects revealed by the strike wave were ex-posed to the Party so glaringly, and with such a soberingeffect , that i t fe l t the necess i ty for in ternal Par tychanges.

The second cause of the acuteness of the questionof internal Party policy precisely at the present momentwas the wholesale release of Party comrades to go onvacation. It is natural, of course, for comrades to go onvacation, but this assumed such a mass character, thatParty activity became considerably weaker preciselyat the time when the discontent arose in the factories,and that greatly helped to expose the accumulated defectsjust at this period, in the autumn of this year.


DEFECTS IN INTERNAL PARTY LIFE

I have mentioned defects in our Party life that wereexposed in the autumn of this year, and which broughtup the question of improving internal Party life. Whatare these defects in internal Party life? Is it that theParty line was wrong, as some comrades think; or that,although the Party’s line was correct, in practice it de-parted from the right road, was distorted because ofcertain subjective and objective conditions?

I think that the chief defect in our internal Partylife is that, although the Party’s line, as expressed inthe decisions of our congresses, is correct, in the locali-ties (not everywhere, of course, but in certain districts)it was put into practice in an incorrect way. While the proletarian-democratic line of our Party was correct, theway it was put into practice in the localities resulted incases of bureaucratic distortion of this line.

That is the chief defect. The existence of contradic-tions between the basic Party line as laid down by theCongresses (Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth), and the wayour organisations put this line into practice in the locali-ties—that is the foundation of all the defects in internalParty life.

The Party line says that the major questions of ourParty activities, except, of course, those that brook nodelay, or those that are military or diplomatic secrets,must without fail be discussed at Party meetings. Thatis what the Par ty l ine says . But in Par ty prac t icein the localities, not everywhere, of course, it was con-sidered that there is really no great need for a numberof questions concerning internal Party practice to be


discussed at Party meetings since the Central Committeeand the other leading organisations will decide thesequestions.

The Party line says that our Party officials mustwithout fail be elected unless there are insuperable ob-stacles to this, such as absence of the necessary Partystanding, and so forth. You know that, according to theParty rules, secretaries of Gubernia Committees musthave a pre-October Party standing, secretaries of UyezdCommittees must have at least three years’, and unitssecretaries a year ’s , Party standing. In Party prac-tice, however, it was often considered that since a cer-tain Party standing was needed, no real elections wereneeded.

The Party line says that the Party membership mustbe kept informed about the work of the economic organi-sations, the factories and trusts, for, naturally, our Partyunits are morally responsible to the non-Party massesfor the defects in the factories. Nevertheless, in Partypractice it was considered that since there is a CentralCommittee which issues directives to the economic organ-isations, and since these economic organisations arebound by those directives, the latter will be carried outwithout control from below by the mass of the Partymembership.

The Party line says that responsible workers in differ-ent branches of work, whether Party, economic, trade-union, or military workers, notwithstanding their spe-cialisation in their own particular work, are intercon-nected, constitute inseparable parts of one whole, for theyare all working in the common cause of the proletariat,which cannot be torn into parts. In Party practice, how-


ever, it was considered that since there is specialisation,division of labour according to properly Party activityand economic, military, etc., activity, the Party officialsare not responsible for those working in the economicsphere, the latter are not responsible for the Party offi-cials, and, in general, that the weakening and evenloss of connection between them are inevitable.

Such, comrades, are, in general, the contradictionsbetween the Party line, as registered in a number of de-cisions of our Congresses, from the Tenth to the Twelfth,and Party practice.

I am far from blaming the local organisations forthis distortion of the Party line, for, when you come toexamine it, this is not so much the fault as the misfor-tune of our local organisations. The nature of this mis-fortune, and how things could have taken this turn, Ishall tell you later on, but I wanted to register thisfact in order to reveal this contradiction to you andthen try to propose measures for improvement.

I am also far from considering our Central Commit-tee to be blameless. It, too, has sinned, as has everyinst i tut ion and organisat ion; i t , too, shares part ofthe blame and part of the misfortune: blame, at least,for not, whatever the reason, exposing these defectsin t ime, and for not taking measures to e l iminatethem.

But that is not the point now. The point now is toascertain the causes of the defects I have just spokenabout. Indeed, how did these defects arise, and how canthey be removed?


THE CAUSES OF THE DEFECTS

The first cause is that our Party organisations havenot yet rid themselves, or have still not altogether ridthemselves, of certain survivals of the war period, aperiod that has passed, but has left in the minds of ourresponsible workers vestiges of the military regime inthe Party. I think that these survivals find expressionin the view that our Party is not an independently actingorganism, not an independently acting, militant organi-sation of the proletariat, but something in the nature ofa system of institutions, something in the nature of acomplex of institutions in which there are offi-cials of lower rank and officials of higher rank. That,comrades, is a profoundly mistaken view that has noth-ing in common with Marxism; that view is a survivalthat we have inherited from the war period, when wemilitarised the Party, when the question of the independ-ent activity of the mass of the Party membership hadnecessarily to be shifted into the background and mili-tary orders were of decisive importance. I do not rememberthat this view was ever definitely expressed; neverthe-less, it, or elements of it, still influences our work. Com-rades, we must combat such views with all our might,for they are a very real danger and create favourable con-ditions for the distortion in practice of the essentiallycorrect line of our Party.

The second cause is that our state apparatus, whichis bureaucratic to a considerable degree, exerts a certainamount of pressure on the Party and the Party work-ers. In 1917, when we were forging ahead, towards Octo-ber, we imagined that we would have a Commune, a free


association of working people, that we would put an endto bureaucracy in government institutions, and that itwould be possible, if not in the immediate period, thenwithin two or three short periods, to transform the stateinto a free association of working people. Practice hasshown, however, that this is still an ideal which is along way off, that to rid the state of the elements of bu-reaucracy, to transform Soviet society into a free asso-ciation of working people, the people must have a highlevel of culture, peace conditions must be fully guaran-teed all around us so as to remove the necessity of main-taining a large standing army, which entails heavy ex-penditure and cumbersome administrative departments,the very existence of which leaves its impress upon allthe other state institutions. Our state apparatus is bu-reaucratic to a considerable degree, and it will remainso for a long time to come. Our Party comrades workin this apparatus, and the situation—I might say theatmosphere—in this bureaucratic apparatus is such thatit helps to bureaucratise our Party workers and our Partyorganisations.

The third cause of the defects, comrades, is thatsome of our units are not sufficiently active, they arebackward, and in some cases, particularly in the borderregions, they are even wholly illiterate. In these districts,the units display little activity and are politically andculturally backward. That circumstance, too, undoubt-edly creates a favourable soil for the distortion of theParty line.

The fourth cause is the absence of a sufficient num-ber of trained Party comrades in the localities. Recent-ly, in the Central Committee, I heard the report of a


representative of one of the Ukrainian organisations. Thereporter was a very capable comrade who shows great prom-ise. He said that of 130 units, 80 have secretaries whowere appointed by the Gubernia Committee. In answerto the remark that this organisation was acting wronglyin this respect, the comrade pleaded that there were noliterate people in the units, that they consisted of newmembers, that the units themselves ask for secretariesto be sent them, and so forth. I may grant that half ofwhat this comrade said was an overstatement, that thematter is not only that there are no trained people in theunits, but also that the Gubernia Committee was over-zealous and followed the old tradition. But even if theGubernia Committee was correct only to the extent of fiftyper cent, is it not obvious that if there are such units in theUkraine, how many more like them must there be in theborder regions, where the organisations are young, wherethere are fewer Party cadres and less literacy than inthe Ukraine? That is also one of the factors that createfavourable conditions for the distortion in practice ofthe essentially correct Party line.

Lastly, the fifth cause—insufficient information.We sent out too little information, and this applies pri-marily to the Central Committee, possibly because it isoverburdened with work. We receive too little infor-mation from the localities. This must cease. This is alsoa serious cause of the defects that have accumulatedwithin the Party.


HOW SHOULD THE DEFECTS

IN INTERNAL PARTY LIFE

BE REMOVED?

What measures must be adopted to remove these de-fects?

The first thing is tirelessly, by every means, to com-bat the survivals and habits of the war period in ourParty, to combat the erroneous view that our Party is asystem of institutions, and not a militant organisationof the proletariat, which is intellectually vigorous, actsindependently, lives a full life, is destroying the old andcreating the new.

Secondly, the activity of the mass of the Party mem-bership must be increased; all questions of interest tothe membership in so far as they can be openly dis-cussed must be submitted to it for open discussion, andthe possibility ensured of free criticism of all proposalsmade by the different Party bodies. Only in this way willit be possible to convert Party discipline into really con-scious, really iron discipline; only in this way will it bepossible to increase the political, economic and culturalexperience of the mass of Party members; only in thisway will it be possible to create the conditions neces-sary to enable the Party membership, step by step, topromote new active workers, new leaders, from its ranks.

Thirdly, the principle of election must be appliedin practice to all Party bodies and official posts, if thereare no insuperable obstacles to this such as lack of thenecessary Party standing, and so forth. We must elimi-nate the practice of ignoring the will of the majority ofthe organisations in promoting comrades to responsible


Party posts, and we must see to it that the principleof election is actually applied.

Fourthly, there must exist under the Central Com-mittee and the Gubernia and Regional Committees per-manently functioning conferences of responsible workersin all fields of work—economic, Party, trade-union andmilitary; these conferences must be held regularly anddiscuss any question they consider it necessary to discuss;the interconnection between the workers in all fieldsmust not be broken; all these workers must feel thatthey are all members of a single Party family, workingin a common cause, the cause of the proletariat, whichis indivisible; the Central Committee and the local or-ganisations must create an environment that will enablethe Party to acquire and test the experience of our re-sponsible workers in all spheres of work.

Fifthly, our Party units in the factories must bedrawn into dealing with the various questions relatingto the course of affairs in the respective enterprises andtrusts. Things must be so arranged that the units arekept informed about the work of the administrationsof our enterprises and trusts and are able to exert aninfluence on this work. You, as representatives of units,are aware how great is the moral responsibility of ourfactory units to the non-Party masses for the course ofaffairs in the factories. For the unit to be able to leadand win the following of the non-Party masses in thefactory, for it to be able to bear responsibility for thecourse of affairs in the factory—and it certainly has amoral responsibility to the non-Party masses for defectsin the work of the factory—the unit must be kept informedabout these affairs, it must be possible for it to in-


fluence them in one way or another. Therefore, the unitsmust be drawn into the discussion of economic ques-tions relating to their factories, and economic conferencesof representatives of the factory units in a given trustmust be called from time to time to discuss questionsrelating to the affairs of the trust. This is one of the sur-est ways both of enlarging the economic experience ofthe Party membership and of organising control frombelow.

Sixthly, the quality of the membership of our Partyunits must be improved. Zinoviev has already said inan article of his that here and there the quality of themembership of our Party units is below that of thesurrounding non-Party masses.

That statement, of course, must not be generalisedand applied to all the units. It would be more exactto say the following for example: our Party units wouldbe on a much higher cultural level than they are now,and would have much greater authority among non-Party people, if we had not denuded these units, if wehad not taken from them people we needed for economic,administrative, trade-union and all sorts of other work.If our working-class comrades, the cadres we have takenfrom the units during the past six years, were to returnto their units, does it need proof that those units wouldstand head and shoulders above all the non-Party work-ers, even the most advanced? Precisely because theParty has no other cadres with which to improve thestate apparatus, precisely because the Party will beobliged to continue using that source, our units willremain on a somewhat unsatisfactory cultural level un-less we take urgent measures to improve the quality


of their membership. First of all, Party educational workin the units must be increased to the utmost; further-more, we must get rid of the excessive formalism our lo-cal organisations sometimes display in accepting working-class comrades into the Party. I think that we must notallow ourselves to be bound by formalism; the Party can,and must, create easier conditions for the acceptance ofnew members from the ranks of the working class. Thathas already begun in the local organisations. The Partymust take this matter in hand and launch an organisedcampaign for creating easier access to the Party for newmembers from workers at the bench.

Seventhly, work must be intensified among the non-Party workers. This is another means of improving theinternal Party situation, of increasing the activity ofthe Party membership. I must say that our organisationsare still paying little attention to the task of drawingnon-Party workers into our Soviets. Take, for example,the elections to the Moscow Soviet that are being heldnow. I consider that one of the big defects in these elec-tions is that too few non-Party people are being elected.It is said that there exists a decision of the organisation tothe effect that at least a certain number, a certain percent-age, etc., of non-Party people are to be elected; but I seethat, in fact, a far smaller number is being elected. It issaid that the masses are eager to elect only Communists. Ihave my doubts about that, comrades. I think that un-less we show a certain degree of confidence in the non-Party people they may answer by becoming very distrust-ful of our organisations. This confidence in the non-Party people is absolutely necessary, comrades. Com-munists must be induced to withdraw their candidatures.


Speeches must not be delivered urging the election onlyof Communists; non-Party people must be encouraged,they must be drawn into the work of administering thestate. We shall gain by this and in return receive thereciprocal confidence of the non-Party people in our or-ganisations. The elections in Moscow are an exampleof the degree to which our organisations are beginningto isolate themselves within their Party shell insteadof enlarging their field of activity and, step by step,rallying the non-Party people around themselves.

Eighthly, work among the peasants must be intensi-fied. I do not know why our village units, which insome places are wilting, are losing their members andare not trusted much by the peasants (this must beadmitted)—I do not know why, for instance, two prac-tical tasks cannot be set these units: firstly, to interpretand popularise the Soviet laws which affect peasantlife; secondly, to agitate for and disseminate elementaryagronomic knowledge, if only the knowledge that it isnecessary to plough the fields in proper time, to siftseed, etc. Do you know, comrades, that if every peas-ant were to decide to devote a little labour to the siftingof seed, it would be possible without land improvement,and without introducing new machines, to obtain an in-crease in crop yield amounting to about ten poods perdessiatin? And what does an increase in crop yield of tenpoods per dessiatin mean? It means an increase in thegross crop of a thousand million poods per annum. Andall this could be achieved without great effort. Why shouldnot our village units take up this matter? Is it less im-portant than talking about Curzon’s policy? The peasantswould then realise that the Communists have stopped


engaging in empty talk and have got down to realbusiness; and then our village units would win the bound-less confidence of the peasants.

There is no need for me to stress how necessary itis, for improving and reviving Party life, to intensifyParty and political educational work among the youth,the source of new cadres, in the Red Army, among wom-en delegates, and among non-Party people in general.

Nor will I dwell upon the importance of increasingthe interchange of information, about which I have al-ready spoken, of increasing the supply of informationfrom the top downwards and from below upwards.

Such, comrades, are the measures for improvement,the course towards internal Party democracy which theCentral Committee set as far back as September of thisyear, and which must be put into practice by all Partyorganisations from top to bottom.

I would now like to deal with two extremes, twoobsessions, on the question of workers’ democracy thatwere to be noted in some of the discussion articles inPravda.

The first extreme concerns the election principle.It manifests itself in some comrades wanting to haveelections “throughout.” Since we stand for the electionprinciple, let us go the whole hog in electing! Partystanding? What do we want that for? Elect whomeveryou please. That is a mistaken view, comrades. TheParty will not accept it. Of course, we are not now atwar; we are in a period of peaceful development. But weare now l iving under the NEP. Do not forget that ,comrades. The Party began the purge not during, butafter the war. Why? Because, during the war, fear of


defeat drew the Party together into one whole, and someof the disruptive elements in the Party were compelledto keep to the general line of the Party, which was facedwith the question of life or death. Now these bonds havefallen away, for we are not now at war; now we havethe NEP, we have permitted a revival of capitalism, andthe bourgeoisie is reviving. True, all this helps to purgethe Party, to strengthen it; but on the other hand, weare being enveloped in a new atmosphere by the nas-cent and growing bourgeoisie, which is not very strongyet, but which has already succeeded in beating someof our co-operatives and trading organisations in in-ternal trade. It was precisely after the introduction ofthe NEP that the Party began the purge and reducedits membership by half; it was precisely after the intro-duction of the NEP that the Party decided that , inorder to protect our organisations from the contagionof the NEP, it was necessary, for example, to hinderthe influx of non-proletarian elements into the Party,that it was necessary that Party officials should havea definite Party standing, and so forth. Was the Partyright in taking these precautionary measures, which re-stricted “expanded” democracy? I think it was. That iswhy I think that we must have democracy, we must havethe elect ion principle, but the restr ict ive measuresthat were adopted by the Eleventh and Twelfth Con-gresses, at least the chief ones, must still remain in force.

The second extreme concerns the question of the lim-its of the discussion. This extreme manifests i tselfin some comrades demanding unlimited discussion; theythink that the discussion of problems is the be all andend all of Party work and forget about the other aspect


of Party work, namely, action, which calls for the imple-mentation of the Party’s decisions. At all events, thiswas the impression I gained from the short article byRadzin, who tried to substantiate the principle of unlim-ited discussion by a reference to Trotsky, who is allegedto have said that “the Party is a voluntary associa-tion of like-minded people.” I searched for that sentencein Trotsky’s works, but could not find it. Trotsky couldscarcely have uttered it as a finished formula for the def-inition of the Party; and if he did utter it, he could scarce-ly have stopped there. The Party is not only an asso-ciation of like-minded people; it is also an associationof like-acting people, it is a militant association of like-acting people who are fighting on a common ideologicalbasis (programme, tactics). I think that the reference toTrotsky is out of place, for I know Trotsky as one ofthe members of the Central Committee who most of allstress the active side of Party work. I think, therefore,that Radzin himself must bear responsibility for thisdefinition. But what does this definition lead to? Oneof two possibilities: either that the Party will degener-ate into a sect, into a philosophical school, for onlyin such narrow organisations is complete like-minded-ness possible; or that it will become a permanent debatingsociety, eternally discussing and eternally arguing, untilthe point is reached where factions form and the Partyis split. Our Party cannot accept either of these possi-bilities. This is why I think that the discussion of prob-lems is needed, a discussion is needed, but limits mustbe set to such discussion in order to safeguard the Party,to safeguard this fighting unit of the proletariat, againstdegenerating into a debating society.


In concluding my report, I must warn you, comrades,against these two extremes. I think that if we rejectboth these extremes and honestly and resolutely steerthe course towards internal Party democracy that theCentral Committee set already in September of thisyear, we shall certainly achieve an improvement in ourParty work. (Applause.)


THE DISCUSSION,

RAFAIL, THE ARTICLES

BY PREOBRAZHENSKY AND SAPRONOV,

AND TROTSKY’S LETTER

THE DISCUSSION

The discussion on the situation within the Partythat opened a few weeks ago is evidently drawing to aclose; that is, as far as Moscow and Petrograd are con-cerned. As is known, Petrograd has declared in favourof the line of the Party. The principal districts of Mos-cow have also declared in favour of the Central Commit-tee’s line. The general city meeting of active workersof the Moscow organisation held on December 11 fullyendorsed the organisational and political line of theCentral Committee of the Party. There is no ground fordoubting that the forthcoming general Party conferenceof the Moscow organisation will follow in the footstepsof its districts. The opposition, which is a bloc of a sec-tion of the “Left” Communists (Preobrazhensky, Stukov,Pyatakov, and others) with the so-called DemocraticCentralists (Rafail, Sapronov, and others), has suffereda crushing defeat.

The course of the discussion, and the changes that theopposition went through during the period of the discus-sion, are interesting.

The opposition began by demanding nothing more norless than a revision of the main line in internal Party

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affairs and internal Party policy which the Partyhas been pursuing during the past two years, during thewhole NEP period. While demanding the full imple-mentation of the resolution passed by the Tenth Congresson internal Party democracy, the opposition at the sametime insisted on the removal of the restrictions (prohi-bition of groups, the Party-standing rule, etc.) that wereadopted by the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Party Con-gresses. But the opposition did not stop at this. It assert-ed that the Party has practically been turned into anarmy type of organisation, that Party discipline hasbeen turned into military discipline, and demanded thatthe entire staff of the Party apparatus be shaken up fromtop to bottom, that the principal responsible workersbe removed from their posts, etc. Of strong language andabuse of the Central Committee there was, of course,no lack. The columns of Pravda were replete with articles,long and short, accusing the Central Committee of allthe mortal sins. It is a wonder that it was not accused ofcausing the earthquake in Japan.

During this period the Central Committee as a wholedid not intervene in the discussion in the columns ofPravda, leaving the members of the Party full freedomto criticise. It did not even think it necessary to repu-diate the absurd charges that were often made by critics,being of the opinion that the members of the Party aresufficiently politically conscious to decide the ques-tions under discussion themselves.

That was, so to speak, the first period of the dis-cussion.

Later, when people got tired of strong language,when abuse ceased to have effect and the members of


the Party demanded a business-like discussionof the question, the second period of the discus-sion set in. This period opened with the publication ofthe resolution of the Central Committee and the CentralControl Commission on Party affairs.82 On thebasis of the decision of the October Plenum of the Cen-tral Committee,83 which endorsed the course towardsinternal Party democracy, the Political Bureau of theCentral Committee and the Presidium of the CentralControl Commission drew up the well-known resolutionindicating the conditions for giving effect to internalParty democracy. This marked a turning point in thediscussion. It now became impossible to keep to generalcriticism. When the Central Committee and the CentralControl Commission presented their concrete plan theopposition was faced with the alternative of either accept-ing this plan or of presenting a parallel, equally concrete,plan of i ts own for giving effect to internal Par tydemocracy. At once it was discovered that the oppositionwas unable to counter the Central Committee’s plan witha plan of its own that would satisfy the demands of theParty organisations. The opposition began to retreat.The demand for cancellation of the main line of the pasttwo years in internal Party affairs ceased to bepart of the opposition’s arsenal. The demand of the oppo-sition for the removal of the restrictions on democracythat were adopted by the Tenth, Eleventh and TwelfthParty Congresses also paled and faded. The oppositionpushed into the background and moderated its demandthat the apparatus be shaken up from top to bottom.It deemed it wise to substitute for all these demandsthe proposals that it was necessary “to formulate pre-

THE DISCUSSION 383

cisely the question of factions,” “to arrange for the elec-tion of all Party bodies which hitherto have been appoint-ed,” “to abolish the appointment system,” etc. It ischaracteristic that even these much moderated propos-als of the opposition were rejected by the Krasnaya Pres-nya and Zamoskvorechye district Party organisations,which endorsed the resolution of the Central Committeeand the Central Control Commission by overwhelmingmajorities.

This was, so to speak, the second period of the dis-cussion.

We have now entered the third period. The character-istic feature of this period is the further retreat, I wouldsay the disorderly retreat, of the opposition. This time,even the latter’s faded and much moderated demandshave dropped out of its resolution. Preobrazhensky’s last resolution (the third, I think), which was submittedto the meeting of active workers of the Moscow organisa-tion (over 1,000 present), reads as follows:

“Only the speedy, unanimous and sincere implementat ionof the Political Bureau’s resolutions and, in particular, the reno-vation of the internal Party apparatus by means of new elections,can guarantee our Party’s transition to the new course withoutshocks and internal struggle, and strengthen the actual solidarityand unity of its ranks.”

The fact that the meeting rejected even this veryinnocuous proposal of the opposition cannot be regardedas accidental. Nor was it an accident that the meeting,by an overwhelming majority, adopted a resolution “toendorse the political and organisational line of the Cen-tral Committee.”


RAFAIL

I think that Rafail is the most consistent and thor-ough going representative of the present opposition, or,to be more exact, of the present opposition bloc. At oneof the discussion meetings Rafail said that our Party haspractically been turned into an army organisation, thatits discipline is army discipline, and that, in view ofthis, it is necessary to shake up the entire Party appara-tus from top to bottom, because it is unfit and alien tothe genuine Party spirit. It seems to me that these orsimilar thoughts are floating in the minds of the mem-bers of the present opposition, but for various reasonsthey dare not express them. It must be admitted thatin this respect Rafail has proved to be bolder than hiscolleagues in the opposition.

Nevertheless, Rafail is absolutely wrong. He is wrongnot only from the formal aspect, but also, and primarily,in substance. If our Party has indeed been turned, oris even only beginning to be turned, into an army organi-sation, is it not obvious that we would now have neithera Party in the proper sense of the term, nor the dictator-ship of the proletariat, nor the revolution?

What is an army?An army is a self-contained organisation built from

above. The very nature of an army presupposes the exist-ence at its head of a General Staff, which is appointedfrom above, and which forms the army on the principleof compulsion. The General Staff not only forms the army,but also supplies it with food, clothing, footwear, etc.The material dependence of the entire army on the Gen-eral Staff is complete. This, incidentally, is the basis

THE DISCUSSION 385

of that army discipline, breach of which entails a specificform of the supreme penalty—death by shooting. Thisalso explains the fact that the General Staff can movethe army wherever and whenever it pleases, guided onlyby its own strategic plans.

What is the Party?The Party is the advanced detachment of the prole-

tariat, built from below on the voluntary principle. TheParty also has its General Staff, but it is not appointedfrom above, it is elected from below by the whole Par-ty. The General Staff does not form the Party; on thecontrary, the Party forms its General Staff. The Partyforms itself on the voluntary principle. Nor doesthere exist that material dependence of the Party as awhole upon its General Staff that we spoke of above inrelation to the army. The Party General Staff does notprovide the Party with supplies, does not feed and clotheit. This, incidentally, explains the fact that the PartyGeneral Staff cannot move the ranks of the Party arbi-trarily wherever and whenever it pleases, that the PartyGeneral Staff can lead the Party as a whole only in con-formity with the economic and political interests of theclass of which the Party is itself a part. Hence the spe-cific character of Party discipline, which, in the main,is based on the method of persuasion, as distinct fromarmy discipline, which, in the main, is based on themethod of compulsion. Hence the fundamental differ-ence between the supreme penalty in the Party (expul-sion) and the supreme penalty in the army (death byshooting).

It is sufficient to compare these two definitions torealise how monstrous is Rafail’s mistake.


The Party, he says, has been turned into an army or-ganisation. But how is it possible to turn the Party intoan army organisation if it is not materially dependentupon its General Staff, if it is built from below on thevoluntary principle, and if it itself forms its GeneralStaff? How, then, can one explain the influx of workersinto the Party, the growth of its influence among thenon-Party masses, its popularity among working peopleall over the world?

One of two things:Either the Party is utterly passive and voiceless—

but then how is one to explain the fact that such a pas-sive and voiceless party is the leader of the most revolu-tionary proletariat in the world and for several yearsalready has been governing the most revolutionary coun-try in the world?

Or the Party is active and displays initiative—butthen one cannot understand why a party, which is soactive, which displays such initiative, has not by nowoverthrown the military regime in the Party, assumingthat such a regime actually reigns in the Party.

Is it not clear that our Party, which has made threerevolutions, which routed Kolchak and Denikin, andis now shaking the foundations of world imperialism,that this Party would not have tolerated for one weekthat military regime and order-and-obey system thatRafail talks about so lightly and recklessly, that it wouldhave smashed them in a trice, and would have introduceda new regime without waiting for a call from Rafail?

But: a frightful dream, but thank God only a dream.The fact of the matter is, firstly, that Rafail confusedthe Party with an army and an army with the Party,

THE DISCUSSION 387

for, evidently, he is not clear in his mind about whatthe Party and what an army is. Secondly, the fact of thematter is that, evidently, Rafail himself does not be-lieve in his discovery; he is forced to utter “frightful” wordsabout an order-and-obey system in the Party so as tojustify the principal slogans of the present opposition:a) freedom to form factional groups; and b) removalfrom their posts of the leading elements of the Party fromtop to bottom.

Evidently, Rafail feels that it is impossible to pushthrough these slogans without the aid of “frightful” words.

That is the whole essence of the matter.

PREOBRAZHENSKY’S ARTICLE

Preobrazhensky thinks that the chief cause of thedefects in internal Party life is that the main Party linein Party affairs is wrong. He asserts that “for twoyears now, the Party has been pursuing an essentiallywrong line in its internal Party policy,” that “the Par-ty’s main line in internal Party affairs and internalParty policy during the N.E.P. period” has proved tobe wrong.

What has been the Party’s main line since the N.E.P.was introduced? At its Tenth Congress, the Party adopt-ed a resolution on workers’ democracy. Was the Partyright in adopting such a resolution? Preobrazhensky thinksit was right. At the same Tenth Congress the Party im-posed a very severe restriction on democracy in the shapeof the ban on the formation of groups. Was the Partyright in imposing such a restriction? Preobrazhenskythinks that the Party was wrong, because, in his opinion,


such a restriction shackles independent Party thinking.At the Eleventh Congress the Party imposed further re-strictions on democracy in the shape of the definite Par-ty-standing rule, etc. The Twelfth Party Congress onlyreaffirmed these restrictions. Was the Party right inimposing these restrictions as a safeguard against petty-bourgeois tendencies under the conditions created by theN.E.P.? Preobrazhensky thinks that the Party was wrong,because, in his opinion, these restrictions shackled theinitiative of the Party organisations. The conclusion isobvious: Preobrazhensky proposes that the Party’s mainline in this sphere that was adopted at the Tenth andEleventh Congresses under the conditions created by theN.E.P. should be rescinded.

The Tenth and Eleventh Congresses, however, tookplace under the direct leadership of Comrade Lenin. Theresolution of the Tenth Congress prohibiting the forma-tion of groups (the resolution on unity) was moved andsteered through the congress by Comrade Lenin. Thesubsequent restrictions on democracy in the shape ofthe definite Party-standing rule, etc., were adopted bythe Eleventh Congress with the close participation ofComrade Lenin. Does not Preobrazhensky realise that,in effect, he is proposing that the Party line under theconditions created by the NEP, the line that is organi-cally connected with Leninism, should be rescinded? Is notPreobrazhensky beginning to understand that his proposalto rescind the Party’s main line in Party affairsunder the conditions created by the NEP is, in effect,a repetition of some of the proposals in the notorious“anonymous platform,”84 which demanded the revisionof Leninism?

THE DISCUSSION 389

It is sufficient to put these questions to realise thatthe Party will not follow in Preobrazhensky’s foot-steps.

What, indeed, does Preobrazhensky propose? He pro-poses nothing more nor less than a reversion to Partylife “on the lines of 1917-18.” What distinguished theyears 1917-18 in this respect? The fact that, at thattime, we had groups and factions in our Party, that therewas an open fight between the groups at that time, thatthe Party was then passing through a critical period,during which its fate hung in the balance. Preobrazhen-sky is demanding that this state of affairs in the Party,a state of affairs that was abolished by the Tenth Con-gress, should be restored, at least “partly.” Can theParty take this path? No, it cannot. Firstly, becausethe restoration of Party life on the lines that existedin 1917-18, when there was no NEP, does not, andcannot, meet the Party’s needs under the conditions pre-vailing in 1923, when there is the NEP. Secondly, be-cause the restoration of the former situation of faction-al struggle would inevitably result in the disruption ofParty unity, especial ly now that Comrade Lenin isabsent.

Preobrazhensky is inclined to depict the conditionsof internal Party life in 1917-18 as something desirableand ideal. But we know of a great many dark sides ofthis period of internal Party life, which caused the Partyvery severe shocks. I do not think that the internalParty struggle among the Bolsheviks ever reached suchintensity as it did in that period, the period of the BrestPeace. It is well known, for example, that the “Left”Communists, who at that time constituted a separate


faction, went to the length of talking seriously aboutreplacing the existing Council of People’s Commissarsby an other Council of People’s Commissars consisting ofnew people belonging to the “Left” communist faction.Some of the members of the present opposition—Preobra-zhensky, Pyatakov, Stukov and others—then belongedto the “Left” communist faction.

Is Preobrazhensky thinking of “restoring” those old“ideal” conditions in our Party?

It is obvious, at all events, that the Party will notagree to this “restoration.”

SAPRONOV’S ARTICLE

Sapronov thinks that the chief cause of the defectsin internal Party l ife is the presence in the Party’sapparatuses of “Party pedants,” “schoolmistresses,” whoare busy “teaching the Party members” according to“the school method,” and are thus hindering the realtraining of the Party members in the course of the strug-gle. Although dubbing the responsible workers in ourParty apparatus “schoolmistresses,” Sapronov does notthink of asking where these people came from, and howit came to pass that “Party pedants” gained control ofthe work of our Party. Advancing this more than recklessand demagogic proposition as proved, Sapronov forgotthat a Marxist cannot be satisfied with mere assertions,but must first of all understand a phenomenon, if itreally exists at all, and explain it, in order then to proposeeffective measures for improvement. But evidently Sap-ronov does not care a rap about Marxism. He wants atall costs to malign the Party apparatus—and all the rest

THE DISCUSSION 391

will follow. And so, in Sapronov’s opinion, the evil willof “Party pedants” is the cause of the defects in our in-ternal Party life. An excellent explanation, it must beadmitted.

Only we do not understand:1) How could these “schoolmistresses” and “Party

pedants” retain the leadership of the most revolutionaryproletariat in the world?

2) How could our “Party schoolchildren” who arebeing taught by these “schoolmistresses” retain the lead-ership of the most revolutionary country in the world?

At all events it is clear that it is easier to talk about“Party pedants” than to understand and appreciate thevery great merit of our Party apparatus.

How does Sapronov propose to remedy the defectsin our internal Party life? His remedy is as simple as hisdiagnosis. “Change our officers,” remove the presentresponsible workers from their posts—such is Sapronov’sremedy. This he regards as the principal guarantee thatinternal Party democracy will be practised. From thepoint of view of democracy, I am far from denying theimportance of new elections as a means of improving ourinternal Party life; but to regard that as the principalguarantee means to understand neither internal Partylife nor its defects. In the ranks of the opposition thereare men like Byeloborodov, whose “democracy” is stillremembered by the workers in Rostov; Rosenholtz, whose“democracy” was a misery to our water transport work-ers and rai lwaymen; Pyatakov, whose “democracy”made the whole of the Donets Basin not only cry out,but positively howl; Alsky, with the nature of whose“democracy” everybody is familiar; Byk, from whose


“democracy” Khorezm is still groaning. Does Sapronovthink that i f the places of the “Party pedants” aretaken by the “esteemed comrades” enumerated above,democracy will triumph in the Party? Permit me to havesome doubts about that.

Evidently, there are two kinds of democracy: thedemocracy of the mass of Party members, who are eagerto display initiative and to take an active part in thework of Party leadership, and the “democracy” of dis-gruntled Party big-wigs who think that dismissing someand putting others in their place is the essence of democ-racy. The Party will stand for the first kind of democra-cy and will carry it out with an iron hand. But the Partywill throw out the “democracy” of the disgruntled Partybig-wigs, which has nothing in common with genuineinternal Party democracy, workers’ democracy.

To ensure internal Party democracy it is necessary,first of all, to rid the minds of some of our responsibleworkers of the survivals and habits of the war period,which cause them to regard the Party not as an inde-pendently acting organism, but as a system of officialinstitutions. But these survivals cannot be got rid of ina short space of time.

To ensure internal Party democracy it is necessary,secondly, to do away with the pressure exerted by ourbureaucratic state apparatus, which has about a millionemployees, upon our Party apparatus, which has no morethan 20,000-30,000 workers. But it is impossible to doaway with the pressure of this cumbersome machine andgain mastery over it in a short space of time.

To ensure internal Party democracy it is necessary,thirdly, to raise the cultural level of our backward units,

FROM MARX

TO MAO

��NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

393

of which there are quite a number, and to distributeour active workers correctly over the entire territoryof the Union; but that, too, can not be achieved in ashort space of time.

As you see, to ensure complete democracy is not sosimple a matter as Sapronov thinks, that is, of course, ifby democracy we mean not Sapronov’s empty, formaldemocracy, but real, workers’, genuine democracy.

Obviously, the entire Party from top to bottom mustexert i ts will to ensure and put into effect genuineinternal Party democracy.

TROTSKY’S LETTER

The resolution of the Central Committee and the Cen-tral Control Commission on internal Party democracy,published on December 7, was adopted unanimously.Trotsky voted for this resolution. It might have beenexpected, therefore, that the members of the CentralCommittee, including Trotsky, would come forward ina united front with a call to Party members for unani-mous support of the Central Committee and its resolu-tion. This expectation, however, has not been realised.The other day Trotsky issued a letter to the Party con-ferences which cannot be interpreted otherwise than asan attempt to weaken the will of the Party membershipfor unity in supporting the Central Committee and itsposition.

Judge for yourselves.After referring to bureaucracy in the Party appara-

tus and the danger of degeneration of the old guard, i.e.,the Leninists, the main core of our Party, Trotsky writes:

THE DISCUSSION


“The degeneration of the ‘old guard’ has been observed in his-tory more than once. Let us take the latest and most glaring his-torical example: the leaders and the parties of the Second Inter-nat ional . We know that Wilhelm Liebknecht , Bebel , S inger,Victor Adler, Kautsky, Bernstein, Lafargue, Guesde, and others,were the immediate and direct pupils of Marx and Engels. Weknow, however, that all those leaders—some partly, and otherswholly—degenerated into opportunism.”. . . “We, that is , we‘old ones,’ must say that our generation, which naturally playsa leading role in the Party, has no self-sufficient guarantee againstthe gradual and imperceptible weakening of the proletarian andrevolutionary spirit, assuming that the Party tolerates a furthergrowth and consolidation of the bureaucratic-apparatus meth-ods of policy which are transforming the younger generation intopass ive educat ional mater ia l and are inevi tably creat ing es-t rangement be tween the appara tus and the membership , be-tween the old and the young.”. . . “The youth—the Party’s truestbarometer—react most sharply of a l l against Par ty bureauc-racy.”. . . “The youth must capture the revolutionary formulas

by storm. . . .”

First, I must dispel a possible misunderstanding.As is evident from his letter, Trotsky includes himselfamong the Bolshevik old guard, thereby showing read-iness to take upon himself the charges that may be hurledat the old guard if i t does indeed take the path ofdegeneration. It must be admitted that this readinessfor self-sacrifice is undoubtedly a noble trait. But I mustprotect Trotsky from Trotsky, because, for obvious rea-sons, he cannot, and should not, bear responsibility forthe possible degeneration of the principal cadres of theBolshevik old guard. Sacrifice is a good thing, of course,but do the old Bolsheviks need it? I think that theydo not.

Secondly, it is impossible to understand how oppor-tunists and Mensheviks like Bernstein, Adler, Kautsky,

THE DISCUSSION 395

Guesde, and the others, can be put on a par with theBolshevik old guard, which has always fought, and Ihope will continue to fight with honour, against opportu-nism, the Mensheviks and the Second International. Whatis the cause of this muddle and confusion? Who needs it,bearing in mind the interests of the Party and not ulte-rior motives that by no means aim at defence of theold guard? How is one to interpret these insinuationsabout opportunism in relation to the old Bolsheviks,who matured in the struggle against opportunism?

Thirdly, I do not by any means think that the oldBolsheviks are absolutely guaranteed against the dangerof degeneration any more than I have grounds for assert-ing that we are absolutely guaranteed against, say, anearthquake. As a possibility, such a danger can and shouldbe assumed. But does this mean that such a danger isreal, that it exists? I think that it does not. Trotsky him-self has adduced no evidence to show that the dangerof degeneration is a real danger. Nevertheless, there area number of elements within our Party who are capableof giving rise to a real danger of degeneration of cer-tain ranks of our Party. I have in mind that section ofthe Mensheviks who joined our Par ty unwil l ingly ,and who have not yet got rid of their old opportunisthabits. The following is what Comrade Lenin wrote aboutthese Mensheviks, and about this danger, at the timeof the Party purge:

“Every opportunist is distinguished for his adaptability . . .and the Mensheviks, as opportunists, adapt themselves ‘on prin-ciple,’ so to speak, to the prevailing trend among the workersand assume a protective colouring, just as a hare’s coat turnswhite in the winter. It is necessary to know this specific feature


of the Mensheviks and take it into account. And taking it intoaccount means purging the Party of approximately ninety-nineout of every hundred of the Mensheviks who joined the RussianCommunist Party after 1918, i.e., when the victory of the Bol-sheviks first became probable and then certain.” (see Vol. XXVII,p. 13.)

How could it happen that Trotsky, who lost sight ofthis and similar, really existing dangers, pushed intothe foreground a possible danger, the danger of the degen-eration of the Bolshevik old guard? How can one shutone’s eyes to a real danger and push into the foregroundan unreal, possible danger, if one has the interests of theParty in view and not the object of undermining the pres-tige of the majority in the Central Committee, the leadingcore of the Bolshevik old guard? Is it not obvious that“approaches” of this kind can only bring grist to themill of the opposition?

Fourthly, what reasons did Trotsky have for con-trasting the “old ones,” who may degenerate, to the“youth,” the Party’s “truest barometer”; for contrastingthe “old guard,” who may become bureaucratic, to the“young guard,” which must “capture the revolutionaryformulas by storm”? What grounds had he for drawingthis contrast, and what did he need it for? Have not theyouth and the old guard always marched in a unitedfront against internal and external enemies? Is not theunity between the “old ones” and the “young ones”the basic strength of our revolution? What was the objectof this attempt to discredit the old guard and demagogi-cally to flatter the youth if not to cause and widen afissure between these principal detachments of our Party?Who needs all this, if one has the interests of the Party

THE DISCUSSION 397

in view, its unity and solidarity, and not an attempt toshake this unity for the benefit of the opposition?

Is that the way to defend the Central Committee andits resolution on internal Party democracy, which, more-over, was adopted unanimously?

But evidently, that was not Trotsky’s object in is-suing his letter to the Party conferences. Evidentlythere was a different intention here, namely: diplomat-ically to support the opposition in its struggle againstthe Central Committee of the Party while pretending tosupport the Central Committee’s resolution.

That, in fact, explains the stamp of duplicity thatTrotsky’s letter bears.

Trotsky is in a bloc with the Democratic Central-ists and with a section of the “Left” Communists—there-in lies the political significance of Trotsky’s action.


Signed: J. Stalin

A NECESSARY COMMENT

(Concerning Rafail)

In my article in Pravda (No. 285) “The Discussion,Rafail, etc.” I said that according to a statement Ra-fail made at a meeting in the Presnya District “ourParty has practically been turned into an army organ-isation, its discipline is army discipline and, in viewof this, it is necessary to shake up the entire Party appa-ratus from top to bottom, because it is unfit.” Concern-ing th is , Rafa i l says in h is a r t ic le in Pravda tha tI did not correctly convey his views, that I “simpli-fied” them “in the heat of debate,” and so forth. Ra-fail says that he merely drew an analogy (comparison)between the Party and an army, that analogy is notidenti ty. “The system of administrat ion in the Par-ty is analogous to the system of administration in anarmy—this does not mean,” he says, “that it is an exactcopy; it only draws a parallel.” Is Rafail right?

No. And for the following reasons.First. In his speech at the meeting in the Presnya

District, Rafail did not simply compare the Party withan army, as he now asserts, but actually identified itwith an army, being of the opinion that the Party is

A NECESSARY COMMENT 399

built on the lines of an army. I have before me the ver-batim report of Rafail’s speech, revised by the speaker.There it is stated: “Our entire Party is built on thelines of an army from top to bottom.” It can scarcelybe denied that we have here not simply an analogy,but an identification of the Party’s structure with thatof an army; the two are placed on a par.

Can it be asserted that our Party is built on thelines of an army? Obviously not, for the Party is builtfrom below, on the voluntary principle; it is not mate-rially dependent on its General Staff, which the Partyelects. An army, however, is, of course, built from above,on the basis of compulsion; it is completely dependentmaterially upon its General Staff, which is not elected,but appointed from above. Etc., etc.

Secondly. Rafail does not simply compare the sys-tem of administration in the Party with that in an army,but puts one on a par with the other, identifies them,without any “verbal frills.” This is what he writes inhis article: “We assert that the system of administra-tion in the Party is identical with the system of admin-istration in an army not on any extraneous grounds, buton the basis of an objective analysis of the state of theParty.” It is impossible to deny that here Rafail doesnot confine himself to drawing an analogy between theadministration of the Party and that of an army, forhe “simply” identifies them, “without verbal frills.”

Can these two systems of administration be identi-fied? No, they cannot; for the system of administrationin an army, as a system, is incompatible with the verynature of the Party and with its methods of influencingboth its own members and the non-Party masses.


Thirdly. Rafail asserts in his article that, in the lastanalysis, the fate of the Party as a whole, and of itsindividual members, depends upon the Registration andDistribution Department of the Central Committee,that “the members of the Party are regarded as mobi-lised, the Registration and Distribution Departmentputs everybody in his job, nobody has the slightest rightto choose his work, and it is the Registration and Dis-tribution Department, or ‘General Staff,’ that deter-mines the amount of supplies, i.e., pay, form of work,etc.” Is all this true? Of course not! In peace time,the Registration and Distribution Department of theCentral Committee usually deals in the course of a yearwith barely eight to ten thousand people. We knowfrom the Central Committee’s report to the TwelfthCongress of the R.C.P.85 that, in 1922, the Registrationand Distribution Department of the Central Committeedealt with 10,700 people (i.e., half the number it dealtwith in 1921). If from this number we subtract 1,500people sent by their local organisations to various edu-cational institutions, and the people who went on sickleave (over 400), there remain something over 8,000.Of these, the Central Committee, in the course of theyear, distributed 5,167 responsible workers (i.e., less thanhalf of the total number dealt with by the Registrationand Distribution Department). But at that time the Partyas a whole had not 5,000, and not 10,000, but about500,000 members, the bulk of whom were not, and couldnot, be affected by the distribution work of the Registra-tion and Distribution Department of the Central Com-mittee. Evidently, Rafail has forgotten that in peacetime the Central Committee usually distributes only

A NECESSARY COMMENT 401

responsible workers, that the Registration and Distri-but ion Depar tment of the Centra l Commit tee doesnot, cannot, and should not, determine the “pay” of allthe members of the Party, who now number over 400,000.Why did Rafail have to exaggerate in this ridiculousway? Evidently, in order to prove “with facts” the“identity” between the system of administration in theParty and that in an army.

Such are the facts.That is why I thought , and st i l l think, that Ra-

fail “is not clear in his mind about what the Party andwhat an army is.”

As regards the passages Rafail quotes from the deci-sions of the Tenth Congress, they have nothing to dowith the present case, for they apply only to the sur-vivals of the war period in our Party and not to the al-leged “identity between the system of administrationin the Party and that in an army.”

Rafail is r ight when he says that mistakes mustbe corrected, that one must not persist in one’s mis-takes. And that is precisely why I do not lose hope thatRafail will, in the end, correct the mistakes he has made.


Signed: J. Stalin

GREETINGS TO THE NEWSPAPER

COMMUNIST86

I heartily congratulate the newspaper Communist onthe appearance of its thousandth issue. May it be areliable beacon, lighting up for the masses of workingpeople of the East the path to the complete triumph ofcommunism.

StalinSecretary of the Central Committee

of the R.C.P.

Bakinsky Rabochy, No. 294 (1022),December 30, 1923

A P P E N D I C E S

Appendix 1

DECLARATION

ON THE FORMATION OF THE UNION

OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Since the Soviet republics were formed, the states of the worldhave split into two camps: the camp of capitalism and the campof socialism.

There, in the camp of capitalism, we have national animosityand inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national oppres-sion and pogroms, imperialist brutalities and wars.

Here, in the camp of socialism, we have mutual confidenceand peace, national freedom and equality, the peaceful co-exist-ence and fraternal co-operation of peoples.

The attempts made by the capitalist world during the courseof decades to solve the problem of nationalities by combining thefree development of peoples with the system of exploitation ofman by man have proved fruitless. On the contrary, the skein ofnational contradictions is becoming more and more entangled andis threatening the very existence of capitalism. The bourgeoisiehas proved to be incapable of bringing about the co-operation ofpeoples.

Only in the camp of the Soviets, only in the conditions of thedictatorship of the proletariat, which has rallied the majority ofthe population around itself, has it been possible to eradicatenational oppression, to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence,and to lay the foundation for the fraternal co-operation of peoples.

It was these circumstances alone that enabled the Soviet re-publics to repel the attacks of the imperialists of the whole world,home and foreign.

It was these circumstances alone that enabled them to bringthe Civil War to a successful conclusion, to preserve their exist-ence and begin peaceful economic construction.

APPENDICES404

But the years of war have left their traces. Ruined fields,idle factories, shattered productive forces and exhausted economicresources left as a heritage by the war render inadequate the indi-vidual efforts of the individual republics to build up their econ-omy. The restoration of the national economy has proved to beimpossible while the republics continue to exist separately.

On the other hand, the instability of the international situa-tion and the danger of new attacks render inevitable the creationof a united front of the Soviet republics in face of the capitalistencirclement.

Lastly, the very structure of Soviet power, which is inter-national in its class nature, impels the toiling masses of the Sovietrepublics to unite into a single socialist family.

All these circumstances imperatively demand the union ofthe Soviet republics into a single union state, capable of en-suring external security, internal economic progress and the un-hampered national development of the peoples.

The will of the peoples of the Soviet republics, who recentlyassembled at their Congresses of Soviets and unanimously resolvedto form a “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” is a reliableguarantee that this Union is a voluntary association of peoplesenjoying equal rights, that each republic is guaranteed the rightof freely seceding from the Union, that admission to the Unionis open to all Socialist Soviet Republics, whether now existingor hereafter to arise, that the new union state will prove to bea worthy crown to the foundation for the peaceful co-existenceand fraternal co-operation of the peoples that was laid in October1917, and that i t wil l serve as a sure bulwark against worldcapitalism and as a new and decisive step towards the union ofthe working people of all countries into a World Socialist SovietRepublic.

Declaring all this before the whole world, and solemnly pro-claiming the firmness of the foundations of Soviet power as expressedin the Constitutions of the Socialist Soviet Republics by whomwe have been empowered, we, the delegates of these republics,acting in accordance with our mandates, have resolved to signa treaty on the formation of a “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”

Appendix 2

TREATY

ON THE FORMATION OF THE UNION

OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.),the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (Ukr.S.S.R.), the Byelo-russian Socialist Soviet Republic (B.S.S.R.) and the Transcau-casian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (T.S.F.S.R.—Geor-gia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) conclude the present treaty of unionproviding for uni t ing in to a s ingle union s ta te—“the Unionof Soviet Social is t Republics”—on the fol lowing principles:

1. Within the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics, as represented by its supreme organs, are the follow-ing:

a) representation of the Union in foreign relations;b) modification of the external boundaries of the Union;c) conclusion of treaties providing for the admission of new

republics into the Union;d) declaration of war and conclusion of peace;e) obtaining state loans abroad;f) ratification of international treaties;g) establishment of systems of foreign and home trade;h) establishment of the principles and the general plan of

the national economy of the Union as a whole and conclusionof concession agreements;

i) regulation of transport, posts and telegraphs;j) establishment of the principles of organisation of the armed

forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;k) ratification of the single state budget of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, establishment of a monetary, currency andcredit system and a system of All-Union, Republican and localtaxes;

APPENDICES406

l) establishment of the general principles of land settlementand tenure as well as of the exploitation of mineral wealth, for-ests and waters throughout the territory of the Union;

m) enactment of All-Union legislation on resettlement;n) establishment of the principles of court structure and court

procedure, as well as civil and criminal legislation for the Union;o) enactment of basic labour laws;p) establishment of general principles of public education;q) establishment of general measures for the protection of

public health;r) establishment of a system of weights and measures;s) organisation of statistics for the whole Union;t) enactment of fundamental laws relating to the rights of

foreigners in respect to citizenship of the Union;u) the right of general amnesty;v) annulment of decisions violating the Treaty of Union on

the part of Congresses of Soviets, Central Executive Committeesand Councils of People’s Commissars of the Union Republics.

2. The supreme organ of power in the Union of Soviet Social-ist Republics is the Congress of Soviets of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics and, in the intervals between congresses,the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics.

3. The Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics consists of representatives of town Soviets on the basisof one deputy for every 25,000 voters, and of representatives fromGubernia Congresses of Soviets on the basis of one deputy forevery 125,000 inhabitants.

4 . Delegates to the Congress of Soviets of the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics are elected at Gubernia Congresses ofSoviets.

5. Ordinary Congresses of Soviets of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics are convened by the Central Executive Com-mittee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics once a year;extraordinary Congresses are convened by the Central ExecutiveCommittee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at its owndiscretion, or upon the demand of not less than two Union Re-publics.

APPENDICES 407

6. The Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics elects a Central Executive Committee consisting ofrepresentatives of the Union Republics in proportion to the pop-ulation of each and to a total number of 371 members.

7. The ordinary sessions of the Central Executive Committeeof the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are convened threetimes a year. Extraordinary sessions are convened by decisionof the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union,or upon the demand of the Council of People’s Commissars of theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, or of the Central ExecutiveCommittee of a Union Republic.

8. Congresses of Soviets and sessions of the Central ExecutiveCommittee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are con-vened in the capitals of the Union Republics in accordance withthe procedure established by the Presidium of the Central ExecutiveCommittee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

9. The Central Executive Committee of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics elects a Presidium, which is the supremeorgan of power of the Union in the intervals between the sessionsof the Central Executive Committee of the Union.

10. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee ofthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is elected to the numberof 19 members, from among whom the Central Executive Com-mittee of the Union elects four chairmen of the Central ExecutiveCommittee of the Union, corresponding to the number of UnionRepublics.

11. The executive organ of the Central Executive Committeeof the Union is the Council of People’s Commissars of the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics (the C.P.C. of the Union), elected bythe Central Executive Committee of the Union for the period ofthe mandate of the latter, and consists of:

The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of theUnion;

The Vice-Chairmen;The People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs;The People’s Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs;The People’s Commissar. of Foreign Trade;The People’s Commissar of Transport;

APPENDICES408

The People’s Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs;The People ’s Commissar o f the Workers ’ and Peasan ts ’

Inspection;The Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy;The People’s Commissar of Labour;The People’s Commissar of Food;The People’s Commissar of Finance.12. In order to uphold revolutionary law within the territory

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to unite the effortsof the Union Republics in combating counter-revolution, a Su-preme Court is set up under the Central Executive Committee of theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics with the functions of supremejudicial control, and under the Council of People’s Commissarsof the Union a joint organ of State Political Administration is setup, the Chairman of which is a member of the Council of Peo-ple’s Commissars of the Union with voice but no vote.

13. The decrees and decisions of the Council of People’s Com-missars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are bindingon all the Union Republics and have immediate effect through-out the territory of the Union.

14. The decrees and decisions of the Central Executive Com-mittee and of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Unionare published in the languages in common use in the Union Re-publics (Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Georgian, Armenianand Tyurk).

15. The Central Executive Committees of the Union Republicsmay appeal against the decrees and decisions of the Council ofPeople’s Commissars of the Union to the Presidium of the Cen-tral Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-lics, without, however, suspending their operation.

16. Decisions and orders of the Council of People’s Commis-sars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may be annulledonly by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics and its Presidium; orders of the various Peo-ple’s Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republicsmay be annulled by the Central Executive Committee of the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics, by its Presidium, or by the Councilof People’s Commissars of the Union.

APPENDICES 409

17. Orders of the People’s Commissars of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics may be suspended by the Central ExecutiveCommittees, or by the Presidiums of the Central Executive Com-mittees of the Union Republics, only in exceptional cases, ifthe said orders are obviously at variance with the decisions ofthe Council of People’s Commissars or the Central ExecutiveCommittee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Whensuspending an order, the Central Executive Committee, or thePresidium of the Central Executive Committee, of the UnionRepublic concerned shall immediately notify the Council of People’sCommissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and thecompetent People’s Commissar of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics.

18. The Council of People’s Commissars of a Union Republicconsists of:

The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars;The Vice-Chairmen;The Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy;The People’s Commissar of Agriculture;The People’s Commissar of Food;The People’s Commissar of Finance;The People’s Commissar of Labour;The People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs;The People’s Commissar of Justice;The People ’s Commissar o f the Workers ’ and Peasan ts ’

Inspection;The People’s Commissar of Education;The People’s Commissar of Public Health;The People’s Commissar of Social Maintenance;The People’s Commissar for the Affairs of National i t ies;

and also, with voice but no vote, representatives of the UnionPeople’s Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, Military and NavalAffairs, Foreign Trade, Transport, and Posts and Telegraphs.

19 . The Supreme Counci l o f Nat iona l Economy and thePeople’s Commissariats of Food, Finance, Labour and the Work-ers’ and Peasants’ Inspection of each of the Union Republics,while being directly subordinate to the Central Executive Com-mittees and the Councils of People’s Commissars of the respective

APPENDICES410

Union Republics, are guided in their activities by the orders ofthe corresponding People’s Commissars of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics.

20. Each of the republ ics const i tu t ing the Union has i t sown budget, as an integral part of the general budget of the Unionendorsed by the Central Execut ive Commit tee of the Union.The budgets of the republ ics , both revenue and expendi tures ides , a re f ixed by the Centra l Execut ive Commit tee of theUnion. The items of revenue, and the size of allocations fromrevenue which go to make up the budgets of the Union Republics,are determined by the Central Executive Committee of the Union.

21. A common Union citizenship is established for all citizensof the Union Republics.

22. The Union of Soviet Social ist Republics has i ts f lag,arms and state seal.

23. The capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republicsis the City of Moscow.

24. The Union Republics will amend their Constitutions inconformity with the present treaty.

25. Ratification, alteration and supplementation of the Treatyof Union is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress ofSoviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

26. Every Union Republic retains the right freely to secedefrom the Union.

N O T E S

1The conference of Communists of the Tyurk peoples of theR.S .F.S .R. , convened by the Cent ra l Commit tee o f theR.C.P.(B.), took place in Moscow on January 1-2, 1921. Itwas attended by Party workers from Azerbaijan, Bashkiria,Turkestan, Tataria, Daghestan, the Terek Region, Kirghiziaand the Crimea. It discussed the report of the Central Bureauof Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, andorganisational and other questions. On January 2, J. V. Stalindelivered a report on the organisational question (no verbatimreport was taken). On J. V. Stalin’s report, the conferenceadopted “Regulations Governing the Central Bureau for WorkAmong the Tyurk Peoples of the R.S.F.S.R.,” in conformitywith which the Central Bureau of Communist Organisationsof the Peoples of the East, which had existed since 1918, wastransformed into the Central Bureau for Agitation and Propa-ganda Among the Tyurk Peoples of the R.S.F.S.R. p. 1

2This refers to the programme of the R.C.P.(B.) adopted atthe Eighth Party Congress, section: “The Economic Sphere,”and to the resolution adopted by the Ninth Congress of theR.C.P.(B.) on “The Question of the Trade Unions and TheirOrganisation” (see “Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.)Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums,”Part I, 1941, pp. 289-91, 357-40). p. 4

30n the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) and its resolutions onthe military and other questions, see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.),Short Course, Moscow, 1952, pp. 358-63, and also “Resolutionsand Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and

NOTES412

Central Commit tee Plenums,” Par t I , 1941, pp. 280-313.At this congress, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on the militaryquestion (see Works, Vol. 4, pp. 258-59); and he was a memberof the Military Commission set up by the congress to draftthe resolution on this question. p. 3

4This refers to the joint meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) groupsat the Eighth Congress of Soviets, in the All-Russian CentralCouncil of Trade Unions, and in the Moscow Gubernia Council ofTrade Unions, that was held on December 30, 1920. p. 9

5The theses: “The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the Na-tional Question” were discussed at a meeting of the PoliticalBureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on February5 , 1921 , and a commiss ion headed by V. I . Len in andJ. V. Stalin was appointed to make the final draft. The theseswere published in Pravda, No. 29, of February 10, 1921; theywere also published as a separate pamphlet in the same year.

p. 16

6Pan-Islamism—a reactionary religious and political ideologywhich a rose in the second ha l f o f the XIX cen tury inSultan Turkey among the Turkish landlords, bourgeoisie, andclergy. Later on it spread among the propertied classes of theother Moslem peoples. Pan-Islamism professed the unificationin one whole of all the peoples who worship Islam (Moslemreligion). With the help of Pan-Islamism the ruling classes ofthe Moslem peoples were striving to strengthen their positionsand to stifle the revolutionary movement of the toiling peoplesof the East.

The aim of Pan-Turkism is to subject all the Turkish peoplesto Turkish rule. It arose during the Balkan wars of 1912-13.During the war of 1914-18 it developed into an extremely aggres-sive and chauvinistic ideology. In Russia, after the OctoberSocialist Revolution, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism wereutilised by counter-revolutionary elements for the purposeof combating the Soviet power.

Subsequently the Anglo-American imperialists utilised Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism as their agency in the preparation for

NOTES 413

an imperialist war against the U.S.S.R. and the People’s De-mocracies and for the purpose of suppressing the national li-beration movement. p. 29

7The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) was held on March 8-16,1921. It discussed the reports of the Central Committee andthe Central Control Commission, and also reports on the tradeunions and their role in the economic life of the country, onthe tax in kind, on Party affairs , on the immediate tasksof the Party in the national question, on Party unity and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, etc. The political report of theCentral Committee, and the reports on the tax in kind, onParty unity, and on the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, weremade by V. I. Lenin. The congress summed up the discussionthat had taken place on the trade-union question and by anoverwhelming majori ty endorsed Lenin’s platform. In i tsresolu t ion on “Par ty Uni ty,” draf ted by V. I . Lenin , thecongress condemned all the factional groups, ordered theirimmediate dissolution, and pointed out that Party unity wasthe fundamental condition for the success of the proletariandictatorship. The congress adopted V. I. Lenin’s resolutionon “The Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party,”which condemned the so-called “Workers’ Opposition” anddeclared that propaganda of the ideas of the anarcho-syndi-calist deviation was incompatible with membership of theCommunist Party. The Tenth Congress adopted a decisionto pass from the produce surplus appropriation system to thetax in kind, to pass to the New Economic Policy. J. V. Stalin’sreport on “The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the NationalQuestion” was heard on March 10. The congress unanimouslyadopted J. V. Stalin’s theses on this question as a basis, andappointed a commission to elaborate them further. J. V. Stalinreported on the results of the commission’s work at the eveningsession on March 15. The resolution that he proposed on behalfof the commission was unanimously adopted by the congress,which condemned the anti-Party deviations on the nationalquestion, i.e., dominant-nation (Great-Russian) chauvinismand local nationalism, as being harmful and dangerous to

NOTES414

communism and proletarian internationalism. The congress par-ticularly condemned dominant-nation chauvinism as being thechief danger. (Concerning the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1952,pp. 391-97. Concerning the resolutions adopted by the congress,see “Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses,Conferences and Central Committee Plenums,” Part I, 1941,pp. 356-95.) p. 31

8The symposium entitled A Plan for the Electrification of theR.S.F.S.R. Report of the State Commission for the Electri-fication of Russia to the Eighth Congress of Soviets was publishedin December 1920 by the Scientific and Technical Departmentof the Supreme Council of National Economy. p. 50

9Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn (Economic Life)—a daily newspaper,organ of the economic and financial People’s Commissariatsand inst i tut ions of the R.S.F.S.R. and U.S.S.R. (SupremeCouncil of National Economy, Council of Labour and Defence,State Planning Commission, State Bank, People’s Commissar-iat of Finance, and others); it was published from Novem-ber 1918 to November 1937. p. 51

10The Two-and-a-Half International—the “International Asso-cia t ion of Labour and Socia l is t Par t ies”—was formed inVienna in February 1921 at an inaugural conference of Centristparties and groups which, owing to the pressure of the revo-lutionary-minded workers, had temporarily seceded from theSecond International. While criticising the Second Internationalin words, the leaders of the Two-and-a-Half International(F. Adler, O. Bauer, L. Martov, and others) in fact pursuedan opportunist policy on all the major questions of the prole-tarian movement, and strove to use the association to coun-teract the growing influence of the Communists among themasses of the workers. In 1923, the Two-and-a-Half Interna-tional rejoined the Second International. p. 52

11The “Council of Action and Propaganda of the Peoples ofthe East” was formed by decision of the First Congress of the

NOTES 415

Peoples of the East, held in Baku in September 1920. Theobject of the council was to support and unite the liberationmovement of the East. It existed for about a year. p. 56

12The First Congress of Working Women of the Highland Social-ist Soviet Republic was held in Vladikavkaz on June 16-18,1921. There were present 152 women delegates: Chechens,Ossetians, Tatars, Kabardinians, Balkarians, etc., who camefrom remote highland villages. The congress discussed thefollowing questions: the economic and legal position of womenin the East before and after the revolution; the handicraft in-dustries and the part played in them by the Highland women;public education and women of the East; mother and childwelfare, etc. J. V. Stalin’s telegram was read at the congressat the evening session of June 18. The congress sent a telegramof greetings to J. V. Stalin. p. 61

13The Autonomous Highland Social is t Soviet Republic was

formed on the basis of a Decree of the All-Russian CentralExecutive Committee on January 20, 1921. Originally, theHighland A.S.S.R. consisted of the Chechen, Nazran, Vladi-kavkaz, Kabardinian, Balkarian and Karachayev territories. Inthe period 1921-24 a number of Autonomous National Re-gions were formed from the Highland A.S.S.R. By a Decree ofthe All-Russian Central Executive Committee on July 7, 1924,the Highland A.S.S.R. was dissolved. p. 61

14This refers to the twenty-on e conditions of affi l iation to theCommunist International laid down by the Second Congressof the Comintern on August 6, 1920. p. 66

15This refers to V. I. Lenin’s April Theses on “The Tasks of thePro le ta r ia t in the Presen t Revolu t ion” ( see Works , 4 thRuss. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7). p. 67

16This refers to the counter-revolut ionary mutiny in Kron-stadt in March 1921 (see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), ShortCourse, Moscow 1952, pp. 385-86). p. 67

NOTES416

17V. I. Lenin, Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Demo-cratic Revolution (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 9, pp. 1-119).

p. 68

18See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 8. p. 68

19V. I. Lenin, The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of theWorkers ’ Par ty ( see Works , 4 th Russ . ed . , Vol . 10 , pp .175-250). p. 68

20See V. I. Lenin, Works , 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, pp. 217-29.

p. 70

21This refers to V. I. Lenin’s pamphlet The Immediate Tasksof the Sovie t Power ( see Works , 4 th Russ . ed . , Vol . 27 ,pp. 207-46). p. 70

22The “Credo”—the manifesto issued by the “Economist” group(see V. I. Lenin, “Protest of the Russian Social-Democrats,”Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 4, pp. 149-63). p. 72

23V. I. Lenin, “Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder(see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97). p. 75

24The Democratic Conference was held in Petrograd, September14-22, 1917. It was convened by the Menshevik and Social-ist-Revolutionary leaders of the All-Russian Central Execu-tive Committee of the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Depu-ties and of the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peas-ants’ Deputies, and attended by representatives of the social-ist parties, compromising Soviets, trade unions, Zemstvos,commercial and industrial circles and military units. The con-ference set up a Pre-parliament (The Provisional Council ofthe Republic) as an advisory body to the Provisional Govern-ment. With the assistance of the Pre-parliament the compro-misers hoped to halt the revolution and to divert the countryfrom the path of a Soviet revolution to the path of bourgeoisconstitutional development. p. 77

NOTES 417

25V. I. Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kaut-sky (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, pp. 207-302). p. 82

26This refers to V. I. Lenin’s book What Is To Be Done? (seeWorks, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 5, pp. 319-494). p. 82

27See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I,Moscow 1951, pp. 40-42. p. 82

28J. V. Stalin arrived in Tiflis at the end of June 1921 fromNalchik (where he had been taking a cure) to attend a plenarysession of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee ofthe R.C.P.(B.) held jointly with representatives of the localParty and trade-union organisations. The session, which lastedfrom July 2 to July 7, discussed important questions of polit-i ca l and economic a ffa i r s in the Transcaucas ian Sovie tRepublics. In the resolution it adopted on the report on thepolitical situation, drafted under J. V. Stalin’s direction, thePlenum defined the tasks of the Transcaucasian Communistsand struck a decisive blow at the nationalist deviators. ThePlenum adopted a decision to set up a commission to unitethe economic act ivi t ies of the Transcaucasian Soviet Re-publics. It also discussed the following questions: the con-dition of the Transcaucasian railway; currency circulationin the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics; the autonomy of Na-gorny Karabakh; Ajar ia ; the s i tua t ion in Abkhaz ia , e tc .At a general meeting of the Tiflis Party organisation held onJuly 6, J. V. Stalin delivered a report on “The Immediate Tasksof Communism in Georgia and Transcaucasia.” This reportwas published in the newspaper Pravda Gruzii, No. 108 ofJuly 13, 1921, and in the same year was also published in pam-phlet form by the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committeeof the R.C.P.(B.). p. 90

29Mussavatists—the members of the “Mussavat” Party, a na-tionalist party of the bourgeoisie and landlords in Azerbaijan,formed in 1912. In the period of the October Revolution andthe Civil War it was the chief counter-revolutionary forcein Azerbaijan. Supported by the Turkish, and later, by the

NOTES418

British interventionists, the Mussavatists were in power inAzerbaijan from September 1918 to April 1920, when the Mus-savat government was overthrown by the joint efforts of theBaku workers and the Azerbaijanian peasants, and of the RedArmy, which came to their assistance. p. 97

30Dashnaks—the members of the “Dashnaktsu tyun” Par ty,an Armenian bourgeois-nationalist party, formed in the 1890’s.In 1918-20, the Dashnaks headed the bourgeois-nationalistgovernment of Armenia and transformed that country intoa British interventionist base for fighting Soviet Russia. TheDashnak government was overthrown in November 1920 asa result of the struggle waged against it by the working peopleof Armenia, who were assisted by the Red Army. p. 97

31This refers to the military and political agreement concludedbetween Great Britain and France in 1904. It marked the be-ginning of the format ion of the Entente , the imper ia l i s talliance of Great Britain, France and tsarist Russia. p. 99

32Iskra (The Spark)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist news-paper, founded by V. I. Lenin in 1900 (for the significanceand role of Iskra, see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course,Moscow 1952, pp. 55-68). p. 103

33N. Lenin, “Left-Wing” Communism , an Infantile Disorder ,Pe t rograd 1920 ( see V. I . Len in , Works , 4 th Russ . ed . ,Vol. 31, pp. 1-97). p. 104

34See V. I . Len in , Works , 4 th Russ . ed . , Vol . 28 , p . 269 .

p. 108

35This refers to the conference on the limitation of armamentsand on Pacific and Far Eastern questions that took place inWashington from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922.The conference was attended by representatives of the UnitedSta tes , Great Br i ta in and her Dominions , Japan, France,Italy, China, Belgium, Holland and Portugal. Soviet Russia

NOTES 419

was not invited, notwithstanding the protest of the SovietGovernment. The Washington Conference marked the culmi-nation of the post-war re-division of the world, and was anattempt to establish a new correlation of imperialist forcesin the Pacific. The agreements signed in Washington fixedthe strength of the naval armaments of the imperialist pow-ers and the latter’s rights to islands in the Pacific and estab-lished the principle of the “open door” in China, i.e., “equalopportunity for the commerce and industry of al l nationsthroughout the territory of China.” Far from removing the con-tradictions among the imperialist powers, the Washington Con-ference intensified them. p. 121

36Zvezda (The Star)—a legal Bolshevik newspaper publishedin St. Petersburg from December 16, 1910 to April 22, 1912,first weekly and later two or three times a week. It was underthe ideological guidance of V. I. Lenin, who regularly sentarticles for it from abroad. Regular contributors to the paperwere V. M. Molo tov; M. S . Olminsky, N. G. Pole tayev,N. N. Baturin, K. S. Yeremeyev and others. Contributionswere also received from Maxim Gorky. In the spring of 1912,when J. V. Stalin was in St. Petersburg, the paper came outunder his direction, and he wrote a number of articles for it(see Works, Vol. 2, pp. 231-54). The circulation of individ-ual issues of the paper reached 50,000 to 60,000. Zvezda pavedthe way for the publication of the Bolshevik daily Pravda .On April 22, 1912, the tsarist government suppressed Zvezda.It was succeeded by Nevskaya Zvezda, which continued publi-cation until October 1912. p. 132

37Quoted from J. V. Stal in’s ar t icle “Our Aims,” publishedin Pravda, No. 1, April 22, 1912 (see Works, Vol. 2, p. 255).

p. 133

38See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 2, p. 256. p. 134

39The trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries by the SupremeRevolutionary Tribunal took place in Moscow, in 1922, fromJune 8 to August 7. Of the 34 accused, 11 were members of the

NOTES420

Centra l Commit tee of the Socia l i s t -Revolut ionary Par ty.The trial established that from the very first days of the Octo-ber Socialist Revolution, the Socialist-Revolutionary Partyhad fought against the Soviet power, had organised armedrevolts and conspiracies, had supported the foreign interven-tionists and had committed terroristic acts against leaders ofthe Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Government. p. 137

40This refers to the international economic conferences heldin Genoa (April 10-May 19, 1922) and at The Hague (June 15-July 20, 1922). The Genoa Conference was called for the pur-pose of determining the relations between the capitalist worldand Soviet Russia. The conference was attended, on the oneside, by representatives of Great Britain, Frame, Italy, Japanand of other capitalist states, and, on the other side, by repre-sentatives of Soviet Russia. The representatives of the capital-ist countries presented the Soviet delegation with demandswhich, if conceded, would have meant transforming the landof Soviets into a colony of West-European capital (the demandfor payment of all war and pre-war debts, for restitution toforeigners of nationalised property formerly owned by them,etc.). The Soviet delegation rejected the claims of the foreigncapitalists. The matter was referred to a conference of expertsthat was convened at The Hague. The Hague Conference alsofailed to reach agreement owing to the irreconcilability of thepoints of view of the two sides. p. 137

41J. V. Stalin headed the commission set up by the Plenum of theCentral Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on October 6, 1922,to draft the Bill for uniting the R.S.F.S.R., the UkrainianS.S.R., the Transcaucasian Federation and the ByelorussianS.S.R. into a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This com-mission directed all the preparations for the First Congressof Soviets of the U.S.S.R. p. 141

42This refers to the agreement signed in Moscow on February 22,1922, by the plenipotent iary representat ives of the inde-pendent republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Byelo-

NOTES 421

russia, the Ukraine, Khorezm, Bukhara, the Far Eastern Re-publ ic and the R.S .F.S .R. , au thor i s ing the R.S .F.S .R.to represent these republics at the European economic confer-ence in Genoa. p. 143

43The Far Eastern Republic included the Pribaikal, the Trans-baikal, the Amur Region, and the Maritime Province, Kamchatka,and the northern part of Sakhalin. It existed from April 1920to November 1922. p. 144

44The Transcaucasian Federat ion—the Federat ive Union ofSocialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia, was foundedon March 12, 1922, at a plenipotentiary conference of represent-atives of the Central Executive Committees of Georgia, Azer-baijan and Armenia. In December 1922, the Federative Unionwas transformed into the Transcaucasian Socialist FederativeSoviet Republic (T.S.F.S.R.). The Transcaucasian Federationexisted until 1936. In conformity with the Constitution of theU.S.S.R. adopted in 1936, the Armenian, Azerbaijanian andGeorgian Soviet Socialist Republics entered the U.S.S.R. asUnion Republics. (Concerning the Transcaucasian Federation,see this volume, pp. 231-36, 256-62.) p. 145

45The Bukhara and Khorezm People’s Soviet Republics wereformed in 1920 as a result of the successful people’s insurrectionsin the former Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva. At the endof 1924 and beginning of 1925, as a result of the demarcationof states in Central Asia on a national basis, the territoryof the Bukhara and Khorezm Republics became part of thenewly formed Turkmenian and Uzbek Union Soviet SocialistRepublics, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republicand the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Region. p. 145

46The Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets took place in Moscowon December 23-27, 1922. There were present 2,215 delegates,of whom 488 were delegates from the treaty republics—the Trans-caucasian S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Byelorus-sian S.S.R.—who had come to Moscow to attend the First

NOTES422

Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. and had been invited toattend the Tenth All-Russian Congress as guests of honour.The Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets discussed the fol-lowing: report of the All-Russian Central Executive Committeeand the Council of People’s Commissars on the republic’shome and foreign policy; report on the state of industry; reportof the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (summary ofwork done to improve peasant farming); report of the People’sCommissariat of Education; report of the People’s Commissar-iat of Finance; proposal of the treaty Soviet republics on thecreation of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On De-cember 26, J. V. Stalin delivered a report on uniting the So-viet republics. The resolution moved by him was adoptedunanimously. After J. V. Stalin had delivered his report, therepresentatives of the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armeniaand Byelorussia addressed the congress and on behalf of theirrespective peoples welcomed the union of the Soviet republicsinto a single union state—the U.S.S.R. p. 148

47This refers to the negotiations of the Soviet Government withthe British industrialist Urquhart for the conclusion of a con-cession agreement for the exploitation of mineral deposits inthe Urals and in Kazakhstan. The draft agreement was rejectedby the Council of People’s Commissars on October 6, 1922,owing to the extortionate terms demanded by Urquhart, andalso to the British Conservative Government’s hostile policy to-wards Soviet Russia. The Soviet Government’s refusal to con-clude an agreement with Urquhart served the bourgeois pressas a pretext for intensifying its anti-Soviet campaign. p. 151

48The Lausanne Conference (November 20, 1922 to July 24,1923) was called on the initiative of France, Great Britainand Italy to discuss the Near Eastern question (conclusionof a peace treaty between Greece and Turkey, delimitationof Turkey’s frontiers, adoption of a convention governing theStraits, etc.). In addition to the above-mentioned countries,the following were represented: Japan, Rumania, Yugoslavia,Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey (representatives of the United

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NOTES 423

States were present as observers). Soviet Russia was invitedto the conference only for the discussion of the question of theStraits (the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles). At the conference,in the Commission on the Straits, the Soviet delegation opposedthe proposal that the Straits be open for warships both duringpeace and war, and submitted its own proposal that the Straitsbe completely closed to the warships of all powers exceptTurkey. This proposal was rejected by the commission. p. 151

49The First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. took place inMoscow on December 30, 1922. There were present 1,727 del-egates from the R.S.F.S.R., 364 from the Ukrainian S.S.R.,91 from the Transcaucasian Federation and 33 from the Byelo-russian S.S.R. The congress discussed J. V. Stalin’s reporton the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,i t ratified the Declaration and the Treaty of Union on theFormation of the U.S.S.R., and elected the Central ExecutiveCommittee of the U.S.S.R. p. 159

50The Conference of Plenipotentiary Delegations of the R.S.F.S.R.,the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Byelorussian S.S.R. and of the Trans-caucasian S.F.S.R. took place on December 29, 1922. Theconference examined and adopted the Declaration and theTreaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-publics. J. V. Stalin made a report to the conference on the or-der of proceedings at the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.The conference instructed J. V. Stalin to deliver at the con-gress the report on the formation of the U.S.S.R. In the morn-ing of December 30, the plenipotentiary delegations signedthe Declara t ion and the Trea ty on the Format ion of theU.S.S.R. p. 162

51J. V. Stalin’s article “Concerning the Question of the Strategyand Tactics of the Russian Communists “ was published on March14, 1923, in Pravda, No. 56, which was devoted to the 25thanniversary of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), andalso in Petrogradskaya Pravda, Nos. 57, 58 and 59, of March 14,15 and 16, 1923 and in the magazine Kommunisticheskaya

NOTES424

Revolutsia, No. 7 (46), of April 1, 1923. Later, a part of thisarticle, under the heading: “The October Revolution and theStrategy of the Russian Communists” was published in the book:Stalin, The October Revolution, Moscow 1932. p. 163

52The Sverdlov University—the Workers’ and Peasants’ Com-munist University named after Y. M. Sverdlov.

In 1918, on the initiative of Y. M. Sverdlov, the All-Rus-sian Central Executive Committee organised short-term coursesfor agitators and propagandists. In January 1919, these courseswere renamed the School for Soviet Work. By a decision adopt-ed at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), the school wasmade the basis for setting up the Central School for Soviet andParty Work. In the latter half of 1919 this school was trans-formed into the Sverdlov Workers’ and Peasants! CommunistUniversity. p. 163

53The “Emancipation of Labour” group—the first Russian Marx-ist group, formed in Geneva, in 1883, by G. V. Plekhanov.(Concerning the activities of this group and the historical roleit played, see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow1952, pp. 23-34.) p. 174

54During the mass political demonstration in Petrograd on April20-21, 1917, a group of members of the Petrograd Committeeof the Bolshevik Party (Bagdatyev and others), despite the Cen-tral Committee’s instructions that the demonstration was tobe a peaceful one, put forward the slogan of the immediate over-throw of the Provisional Government. The Central Committeecondemned the action of these “Left” adventurers (seeV. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 181-82).

p. 175

55V. I. Lenin, Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the DemocraticRevolution (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 9, pp. 1-119). p. 178

56The “Contact Committee,” consisting of Chkheidze, Steklov,Sukhanov, Filippovsky and Skobelev (and later Chernov and

NOTES 425

Tsereteli), was set up by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolu-tionary Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Work-ers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies on March 7, 1917, for the purposeof establishing contact with the Provisional Government, of“influencing” it and of “supervising” its activities. Actually,the “Contact Committee” helped to carry out the ProvisionalGovernment’s bourgeois policy and tried to restrain the massesof the workers from waging a revolutionary struggle to transferall power to the Soviets. The “Contact Committee” existeduntil May 1917, when representatives of the Mensheviks andSocialist-Revolutionaries actually entered the ProvisionalGovernment. p. 179

57V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Rev-olution” (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7). p. 180

58The draft of the theses on the national question for the TwelfthParty Congress was discussed at a Plenum of the Central Com-mittee of the R.C.P.(B.) on February 21, 1923. A commissionheaded by J. V. Stalin was set up to make the final draft. OnMarch 22, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of theR.C.P. (B.) examined and endorsed the theses, and on March 24they were published in Pravda, No. 65. p. 184

59Smyena Vekh (Change of Landmarks)—a bourgeois politicaltrend that arose in 1921 among the Russian whiteguard émigrésabroad. It was headed by a group consisting of N. Ustryalov,Y. Kluchnikov, and others, who published the magazine SmyenaVekh (at first a symposium was published with this title): TheSmyena-Vekhist ideology expressed the views of that sectionof the bourgeoisie which had abandoned the open armed strug-gle against the Soviet Government. They considered that withthe adoption of the New Economic Policy the Soviet systemwould gradually change into bourgeois democracy. p. 190

60See the resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on “TheImmediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question” in “Reso-lutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferencesand Central Committee Plenums,” Part I, 1941, p. 386. p. 191

NOTES426

61The Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) was held on April17-25, 1923. This was the first congress since the October Social-ist Revolution that V. I. Lenin was unable to attend. The con-gress discussed the reports of the Central Committee, of theCentral Control Commission and of the Russian delegation in theExecutive Committee of the Comintern, and also reports on:indus t ry, na t iona l fac tors in Par ty and s ta te a ffa i r staxation policy in the countryside, delimitation of administra-tive areas, etc. In its decisions the congress took into accountall the directives given by V. I. Lenin in his last articles andletters. The congress summed up the results of the two yearsof the New Economic Policy and gave a determined rebuffto Trotsky, Bukharin and their adherents, who interpreted theN.E.P. as a retreat from the socialist position. The congress devot-ed great attention to the organisational and national questions.At the evening sitting on April 17, J. V. Stalin delivered theCentral Committee’s organisational report. In the resolution itadopted on this report, the congress endorsed Lenin’s plan forthe reorganisation of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectionand the Central Control Commission, and noted an improvementin the organisational apparatus of the Central Committee and inall organisational activities. J. V. Stalin’s report on “NationalFactors in Party and State Affairs” was heard on April 23.The debate on this report continued during April 23 and 24, andfurther discussion was referred to the committee on the nationalquestion that was set up by the congress, and which conductedits proceedings under the direct guidance of J. V. Stalin. OnApril 25, the congress passed the resolution submitted by thecommittee. This resolution was based on J. V. Stalin’s theses. Thecongress exposed the nationalist deviators and called on theParty resolutely to combat the deviat ions on the national question—Great-Russian chauvinism and local bourgeoisna t iona l i sm. (Concern ing the Twel f th Congress o f theR.C.P.(B.), see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course ,Moscow 1952, pp. 403-06. For the resolutions of the congresssee “Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses,Conferences and Central Committee Plenums,” Part I, 1941,pp. 472-524.) p. 197

NOTES 427

62Izvestia of the Central Committee of the Russian CommunistParty (B.)—an information bulletin, founded by decision ofthe Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), which appeared fromMay 28, 1919 to October 10, 1929 (the first twenty issues ap-peared as supplements to Pravda). Gradually it changed from aninformation bulletin to a central Party magazine, and in 1929it began to appear as the magazine Partiinoye Stroyitelstvo(Party A f fa i rs ) . The “Repor t o f the Cent ra l Commit teeof the R.C.P. to the Twelfth Party Congress” was published inIzvestia of the Central Committee, No. 4 (52), April 1923.

p. 199

63J. V. Stalin is referring to V. I. Lenin’s articles “How WeShould Reorganise the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection”and “Better Fewer, But Better” (see Works , 4th Russ. ed.,Vol. 33, pp. 440-60). p. 209

64J. V. Stalin is referring to the pamphlet The Commanders ofOur Industry (Based on the Data of the Registration and Distri-bution Department of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.),Moscow 1923. p. 214

65The All-Russian Congress of Rank-and-File Members of theSocialist-Revolutionary Party was held in Moscow on March18-20, 1923. The congress admitted that the Socialist-Revolu-tionary Party had definitely disintegrated, and declared that itsleading bodies in emigration had no right to speak in the nameof a non-existent Party. p. 225

66The Discussion Sheet was published as a supplement to Pravdabefore the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) under the heading“Pre-Congress Discussion Sheet.” Five issues appeared in all,four before the congress and one while the congress was insession (Pravda, Nos. 46, 65, 75, 82 and 86, of March 1 and 24and April 5, 15 and 20, 1923). p. 227

67J. V. Stalin is referring to the anti-Party group known as the“Democratic Centralism” group (see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.),Short Course, Moscow 1952, pp. 370, 390). p. 229

NOTES428

68This refers to the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference ofthe R.S.D.L.P.(B.) which took place on April 24-29, 1917.At this conference J. V. Stalin delivered a report on the na-tional question. The resolution on this report was drafted byV. I. Lenin. (For the resolutions of the congress see “Resolu-tions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferencesand Central Committee Plenums,” Part I, 1941, pp. 225-39.)

p. 237

69Sotsialistichesky Vestnik (Socialist Courier)—organ of the Men-shevik whiteguard émigrés, founded by Martov in February1921. Until March 1933 it was published in Berlin, from May 1933to June 1940 in Paris, and later in America. It is the mouth-piece of the most reactionary imperialist circles. p. 262

70The Basmach movement—a counter-revolutionary nationalistmovement in Central Asia (Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm)in 1918-24. Headed by beys and mullahs, it took the form ofopen political banditry. Its aim was to sever the Central Asianrepublics from Soviet Russia and to restore the rule of the ex-ploiting classes. It was actively supported by the British impe-rialists, who were endeavouring to transform Central Asia intotheir colony. p. 265

71See V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, p. 406. p. 271

72V. I. Lenin, The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, p. 136).

p. 274

73Bednota (The Poor)—a daily newspaper, organ of the CentralCommittee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), published from March 1918to January 1931. p. 288

74V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 5, pp. 10-11). p. 289

NOTES 429

75The Four th Conference of the Centra l Commit tee of theR.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Workers of the National Republicsand Regions was convened on J. V. Stalin’s initiative and tookplace in Moscow on June 9-12, 1923. In addition to the membersand candidate members of the Centra l Commit tee of theR.C.P.(B.), there were present 58 representatives of the nation-al republics and regions. The chief item on the agenda wasJ. V. Stalin’s report on “Practical Measures for Implementingthe Resolution on the National Question Adopted by the TwelfthParty Congress.” Representat ives of twenty Party organi-sations of the national republics and regions reported on thesituation in the localities. The conference also examined theCentral Control Commission’s report on the anti-Party and anti-Soviet activities of Sultan-Galiyev. (For the resolutions passedby this conference see “Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.)Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums,”Part 1, 1941, pp. 525-30.) p. 297

76The draft platform on the national question was written byJ. V. Stalin at the end of May 1923 in connection with thepreparations for the Fourth Conference, and it was endorsedby the Pol i t ical Bureau of the Central Commit tee of theR.C.P.(B.) on June 4. The Draft was adopted by the conferenceas the resolution on J. V. Stalin’s report on “Practical Measuresfor Implementing the Resolution on the National QuestionAdopted by the Twelfth Party Congress.” p. 299

77This refers to the commission appointed by the Plenum ofthe Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on February 24, 1923,to draw up practical proposals concerning the formation ofthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The commission washeaded by J. V. Stalin and contained representatives of theParty organisations of all the Union Republics. It directedthe drafting of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. p. 333

78This refers to the commission appointed by the Presidiumof the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. to draftthe Constitution of the U.S.S.R. It consisted of twenty-five

NOTES430

representatives of the Union Republics. J. V. Stalin was a mem-ber from the R.S.F.S.R. The plenary sittings of the commis-sion, at which the draft Consti tut ion was discussed, tookplace on June 8-16, 1923. p. 343

79J. V. Stalin is here quoting Karl Marx’s letter to FrederickEngels of April 16, 1856 as given in the book: Karl Marx andFreder ick Engels , Let ters , Moscow 1922 (see Karl Marxand Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow 1951,p. 412). p. 351

80The First All-Russian Congress of Working Women and Peas-ant Women took place in Moscow on November 16-21, 1918,and was attended by 1,147 women delegates. On November 19,V. I. Lenin addressed the Gongress. The congress expressedthe wish that the Party Committees should set up special de-partments for work among women. After the congress, by adecision of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), the PartyCommittees set up Commissions for Agitation and PropagandaAmong Women, and the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)set up a Central Commission to direct this work. p. 356

81This refers to the commission set up in conformity with the de-cision of the Political Bureau and of the Plenum of the CentralCommittee of the R.C.P.(B.) which took place on September23-25, 1923. p. 362

82This resolution was adopted at a joint meeting of the Polit-ical Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) andof the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, held onDecember 5, 1923, and was published in Pravda, No. 278, ofDecember 7, 1923. p. 382

83This refers to the joint plenum of the Central Committee and theCentral Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.), held on Octo-ber 25-27, 1923, in conjunction with representatives of tenParty organisations. (For the resolution adopted by this Ple-num, see “Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses,

NOTES 431

Conferences and Central Committee Plenums,” Part I, 1941,pp. 531-32.) p. 382

84This refers to an anonymous platform issued just before theTwelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) by an underground counter-revolutionary organisation which called itself the “Workers’Group.” (This group was formed in Moscow, in 1923, by Myas-nikov and Kuznetsov, who had been expelled from the Party.It had few members, and it was dissolved in the autumn of1923.) p. 388

85J. V. Stalin is here referring to the “Report of the Central Com-mittee of the R.C.P. to the Twelfth Party Congress,” pub-lished in the bulletin Izvestia of the Central Committee of theR.C.P.(B.), No. 4 (52), April 1923. p. 400

86Communist—a daily newspaper, organ of the Central Commit-tee and of the Baku Committee of the Azerbaijanian Commu-nist Party (Bolsheviks), published in the Azerbaijanian lan-guage. The first number was issued illegally by the Bolshevikorganisation in’Azerbaijan on August 29, 1919, after which thepaper was suppressed by the Mussavat government. Publica-tion was resumed on April 30, 1920, after the establishmentof Soviet power in Azerbaijan. J. V. Stalin’s greetings werepublished in the Azerbaijanian language in the newspaperCommunist on December 29, 1923, and in the Russian languagein the newspaper Bakinsky Rabochy (Baku Worker) , onDecember 30, 1923, and Zarya Vostoka (Dawn of the East),on January 3, 1924. p. 402

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(1 9 2 1 - 1 9 2 3)

1 9 2 1

January 1-2 J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the Con-ference of Communists of the Tyurk Peoplesof the R.S.F.S.R.; he delivers a speech at theopening of the conference and makes the reporton the organisational question.

January 5 J. V. Stalin writes the article “Our Disagree-ments,” published in Pravda, No. 12, of Janu-ary 19, 1921.

January 14 J . V. S ta l in makes a repor t on the cur ren ts i tua t ion a t a meet ing in the thea t re of theFirst Naval Coast Defence Detachment (Petro-grad).

January 17 J. V. Stalin speaks at an enlarged session ofthe Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) onthe ro le of the t rade unions in indus t ry, inopposition to the theses proposed by Trotskyand Bukharin, and in support of the Leninist“Platform of the Ten.”

January 18 J. V. Stalin speaks at the enlarged session ofthe Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) inopposi t ion to the proposal to t ransform theregular army into a militia, and in support ofthe proposal to s trengthen the regular army.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 433

January 19 J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Councilof Nationalities of the People’s Commissariatfor the Affairs of Nationalities and is electedto the commission set up to draft the regula-tions governing the Council.

February 5 J. V. Stalin’s theses on “The Immediate Tasksof the Party in the National Question” are dis-cussed a t a meet ing of the Pol i t ica l Bureauof the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) ;a commiss ion headed by V. I . Len in andJ . V. S ta l in i s appoin ted to make the f ina ldraft of the theses.

February 7 J . V. S ta l in and V. I . Lenin , wi th the o thermembers of the commission, edit the theses onthe nat ional quest ion to be submit ted to theTenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

February 10 J. V. Stalin’s theses on “The Immediate Tasksof the Par ty in the Nat iona l Ques t ion” a republished in Pravda, No. 29.

February 12 J. V. Stalin has an interview with representa-tives of the Daghestan A.S.S.R.

February 15 J. V. Stalin sends a telegram to G. K. Orjoni-kidze, in Baku, containing the directives of theCent ra l Commit tee of the R.C.P. (B. ) to theRevolutionary Military Council of the EleventhArmy, and asking for daily reports on the courseof events in the Caucasus.

February 16 J. V. Stalin sends an enquiry to G. K. Orjoni-k idze about the s ta te of a ffa i rs in Georgia ,Armenia and Azerbaijan.

February 28 J. V. Stalin writes a note to V. I. Lenin on theneed to defend Batum against the Turks.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE434

March 3 J. V. Stalin sends by direct wire V. I. Lenin’sgreetings and directives to the Georgian Com-munists.

March 5 J. V. Stalin makes a report to a meeting of theCouncil of Nationalities of the People’s Com-missar ia t fo r the Affa i r s o f Nat iona l i t i eson the results of the work of the commissionappointed to draft the Statute of the Councilof Nationalities.

March 8-16 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the TenthCongress of the R.C.P.(B.).

March 8 The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) electsJ . V. S ta l in a member of the congresspresidium.

March 9 J. V. Stalin takes part in the negotiations be-tween the Soviet Government and a Turkishdelegation.

March 10 J. V. Stalin makes the report on “The Imme-diate Tasks of the Party in the National Ques-tion” at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

March 13 V. I. Lenin writes a note to J. V. Stalin propos-ing that delegates at the Tenth Congress of theR.C.P.(B.) be sent to take part in the suppres-sion of the Kronstadt mutiny.

March 14 The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) electsJ. V. Stalin a member of the Central Committeeof the R.C.P.(B.).

March 15 J . V. Sta l in makes a s ta tement a t the TenthCongress of the R.C.P.(B.) on behalf of thecommission appointed to draft the resolutionon the national question.


March 16 The Plenum of the Central Committee of theR.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin a member of thePol i t i ca l Bureau and of the Organisa t iona lBureau of the Central Committee of the Party.

March J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. I. Lenin aboutthe plan for the electrification of Russia.

April 16 J. V. Stalin sends V. I. Lenin his observationson the draft. regulations governing the CentralFuel Administration.

April 19 J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Councilof People’s Commissars and is elected a memberof the commission appointed to draft a decisionon extending the powers of the Azerbaijanian OilCommittee.

April 22 J . V. Stal in submits to the Presidium of theAll-Russian Central Executive Committee thedraft of a proposal by the People’s Commissar-iat for the Affairs of Nationalities on the for-mation of a Komi Autonomous Region.

April 25 At a meeting of lhe Council of Nationalit iesof the People’s Commissariat for the Affairs ofNationalities, J. V. Stalin reports on the amend-ments made by the Presidium of the All-Rus-sian Central Executive Committee to the “Stat-ute of the Council of Nationalities,” and takespart in the discussion on the question of form-ing the Komi Autonomous Region.

May 2 J. V. Stalin writes the article “Concerning thePresentation of the National Question,” pub-lished in Pravda, No. 98, of May 8, 1921.

May 5 J . V. Stal in makes a s ta tement to a meet ingof the Collegium of the People’s Commissariat


for the Affairs of Nationalities on a draft de-cree making it obligatory for all People’s Com-missariats to submit to the People’s Commissar-iat for the Affairs of National i t ies proposedlaws and decisions affecting different nation-alities.

May 10 J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Councilof People’s Commissars on the question of thelocal departments of the Workers’ and Peasants’Inspection.

May 16 J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Colle-gium of the People’s Commissariat for the Af-fairs of Nationalities. The Collegium decidesto convene a congress of Yakut working peopleto d i scuss the ques t ion of forming a YakutAutonomous Region.

May 16-25 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the com-mission appointed by the Central Committee ofthe R.C.P.(B.) to prepare for and conduct theFourth All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions.

May 18 J. V. Stalin, on the instructions of the CentralCommittee of the R.C.P.(B.), speaks at a meet-ing of the Communist group at the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in oppositionto a resolution proposed by the anarcho-syndi-calist group on the report of the Presidium ofthe All-Russian Central Council of Trade Un-ions to the congress.

May 19 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the com-mission appointed by a plenary session of theCentral Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to investi-gate Tomsky’s anti-Party conduct at the FourthAll-Russian Congress of Trade Unions.


End of May J . V. Sta l in goes to Nalchik to take a cure .

June 12 J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Fourth Con-gress of Soviets of the Kabardinian territory.

June 17 J. V. Stal in telegraphs greetings to the FirstCongress of Highland Women.

End of June J. V. Stalin leaves Nalchik for Tifl is to takepart in the work of a plenary session of the Cau-casian Bureau of the Central Committee of theR.C.P.(B.).

July 2-7 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the ple-nary session of the Caucasian Bureau of theCentral Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

July 4 V. I. Lenin telegraphs G. K. Orjonikidze en-quiring why J. V. Stalin’s vacation was inter-rupted, and asking to be sent the opinion ofthe doctors on Stalin’s state of health.

July 6 J. V. Stalin makes a report at a general meetingof the Tiflis Party organisation on “The Imme-dia te Tasks of Communism in Georg ia andTranscaucasia.” The report was published inthe newspaper Pravda Gruzii, No. 108, of July13, 1921.

July 7, 8, 14 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Ple-num of the Central Committee of the C.P.(B.)of Georgia. On his proposal, the Plenum dis-cusses the policy of the Communist Party ofGeorgia as regards restoring the national econ-omy and strengthening the Soviet power.

July 25 V. I. Lenin enquires of G. K. Orjonikidze aboutthe number of days J . V. S ta l in ’s vaca t ion


was in ter rupted, and asks for the name and

address of the doctor treating J. V. Stalin.

August 8 J. V. Stalin leaves Nalchik for Moscow.

August 18 V. I. Lenin orders the State Planning Commis-sion to render J. V. Stalin assistance in obtain-ing information on all economic affairs, par-ticularly on the gold-mining industry and onthe Baku oil industry.

August 22 The Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) placesJ . V. Sta l in in genera l charge of the Agi ta-tion and Propaganda Department of the Cen-tral Committee.

August 28 J . V. Sta l in’s ar t ic le “The Par ty Before andAfter Taking Power” is published in Pravda,No. 190.

September 6-8 J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of thecommission appointed by the Central Commit-tee of the R.C.P.(B.) to improve the work ofthe central administration of the railways.

September 22 At a meeting of the Presidium of the All-Rus-sian Central Executive Committee, J. V. Stalinis elected a member of the commission on thequestion of the division of land between theHighland population (Chechens) and the Cos-sacks.

September 27 J. V. Stalin receives V. I. Lenin’s letter “Con-cerning the Question of the Tasks of the Work-ers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, Their Interpre-tation and Execution,” and writes V. I. Lenina “Reply on Inspection.”


November 3 At a meeting of the Presidium of the All-Rus-sian Central Executive Committee, J. V. Stalinis elected to the commission appointed to makepreparations for the Ninth All-Russian Congressof Soviets.

November 5 J. V. Stalin’s article “The October Revolutionand the National Policy of the Russian Commu-nis t s” i s publ i shed in the newspaper ZhiznNats ionalnos te i (Li fe o f the Nat ional i t i es ) ,No. 24 (122).

November 13 J. V. Stal in del ivers a lecture at the club ofthe Krasnaya Presnya District Party Committeeon “The Political Strategy and Tactics of theCommunis ts and the New Economic Pol icy.

November 17 J. V. Stal in takes part in the meeting of thePresidium of the All-Russian Central ExecutiveCommit tee which examines the ques t ion ofagricultural communes, artels and societies forthe joint cultivation of the land.

November 18 The Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) ap-points J. V. Stalin as one of the editors of itsorgan, Vestnik Agitatsii i Propagandy (Bulletinof Agitation and Propaganda).

November 28 J. V. Stalin receives from V. I. Lenin the draftof a proposal for the formation of a federationof Transcaucas ian republ ics , and wri tes h isobservat ions on i t and an amendment to i t .V. I. Lenin accepts the amendment.

November 29 The Political Bureau of the Central Committeeof the R.C.P.(B.) adopts the resolut ion pro-posed by V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin on the fed-eration of the Transcaucasian republics.


December 18 J. V. Stalin’s article “The Prospects” is pub-lished in Pravda, No. 286.

December 20 J. V. Stalin and the other members of the Coun-cil of People’s Commissars sign the draft of theCouncil’s decision on the plan for the electri-fication of the R.S.F.S.R.

December 23 The Ninth Al l -Russ ian Congress of Sovie tselects J. V. Stalin to its presidium.

December 28 The Ninth Al l -Russ ian Congress of Sovie tselects J . V. Stalin a member of the All-Rus-sian Central Executive Committee.

December 29 The First Session of the All-Russian CentralExecut ive Commit tee , Nin th Convoca t ion ,elects J . V. Stal in a member of the Presidi-um of the All-Russian C.R.C. and appoints himPeople’s Commissar for the Affairs of Nation-alities and People’s Commissar of the Workers’and Peasants’ Inspection.

December J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of thecommission of the Central Committee of theR.C.P.(B.) on work in the countryside.

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January 9 J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Colle-gium of the People’s Commissariat for the Af-fairs of Nationalities and speaks on the questionof forming a Karachayevo-Cherkess Region.

January 14 J. V. Stalin sends V. M. Molotov the draft ofa circular letter to be sent by the Central Com-mi t tee o f the R.C.P. (B. ) to the Communis tParty of Turkestan.


January 16 At a meet ing of the Pol i t ical Bureau of theCent ra l Commit tee of the R.C.P. (B. ) ,J. V. Stalin proposes that a conference of Chair-men of the Central Executive Committees ofthe independent republics be called to discussthe question of joint representation at the GenoaConference.

January 21 J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Colle-gium of the People’s Commissariat of the Work-ers’ and Peasants’ Inspection and speaks onthe question of revising the budget for 1922.

January 27 J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of theSecond Extraordinary Session of the All-Rus-sian Central Executive Committee, Ninth Con-vocation, which discusses the question of send-ing a delegation to the Genoa Conference.

January 28 J. V. Stalin speaks at the inaugural meeting ofthe “Society of Old Bolsheviks” on the rulesof the society.

J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Colle-gium of the People’s Commissariat of the Work-ers’ and Peasants’ Inspection and speaks onthe question of drawing up instructions con-cern ing the regula t ions for reg iona l agen tsof this Commissariat.

February 14 J. V. Stalin and A. D. Tsyurupa receive a groupof professors representing higher technical edu-cational institutions.

February 22 J . V. S ta l in wr i tes to the Georg ian Com-munists urging the necessity of taking practicalmeasures to carry out V. I. Lenin’s instructionto strengthen the Georgian Red Army.


February 28 J. V. Stalin receives a message from V. I. Leninrequesting that the People’s Commissariat ofthe Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspect ion drawup a scheme of control of private associationsand enterprises by the Workers’ and Peasants’Inspection.

March 21 J. V. Stalin receives a letter from V. I. Leninpropos ing tha t members o f the s ta ff o f thePeople’s Commissar ia t of the Workers’ andPeasants’ Inspection be called in to assist thestaff of the Council of People’s Commissarsin verifying the execution of decisions.

March 27- J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of theApril 2 Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)

March 27 The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) electsJ. V. Stalin a member of its presidium.

March 28 The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) electsJ . V. Stal in a member of the commission toinvestigate the case of “The 22” (the former“Workers’ Opposition” group).

March 29-30 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the com-mission appointed by the Eleventh Congressof the R.C.P. (B. ) to inves t iga te the case of“The 22” (the former “Workers’ Opposit ion”group)

March 31 The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) electsJ. V. Stalin a member of the commission appoint-ed to make the final draft of the resolution onthe Party’s financial policy.

April 2 The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) electsJ. V. Stalin a member of the Central Committeeof the Party.


April 3 The Plenum of the Central Committee of theR.C.P. (B. ) , on the proposa l o f V. I . Len in ,e lec ts J . V. Sta l in Genera l Secre tary of theCentral Committee of the Party.

April 28 J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. I. Lenin pro-posing changes in the system of supplying thepeasants with seed.

May 4 J . V. S ta l in wr i tes the a r t i c le “The TenthAnniversary of Pravda (Reminiscences),” pub-lished in Pravda, No. 98, May 5, 1922.

May 5 J. V. Stalin’s greetings to Pravda on its tenthanniversary are published in Pravda , No. 98.

May 12-17 J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of thecommission appointed by the Central Commit-tee of the R.C.P.(B.) to draw up regulat ionsgoverning the re la t ions between the centra lorgans of the Ukra in ian S .S .R. and of theR.S.F.S.R.

May 19 A le t te r o f the Cent ra l Commit tee of theR.C.P.(B.) to the Executive Committee of theCominte rn concern ing un i ted f ron t t ac t ics ,signed by J. V. Stalin, is published in Prav-da, No. 110.

June 7 J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of theSecond Enla rged P lenum of the Execut iveCommittee of the Comintern.

June 15 The le t te r o f the Cent ra l Commit tee of theR.C.P.(B.) to the Communists of the KirghizRepublic, signed by J. V. Stalin, is publishedin the magazine Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 12(147).


July 9 Pravda , No. 151, publishes the letter—signedby J. V. Stalin—of the Central Committee ofthe R.C.P. (B. ) to a l l Gubernia Commit tees ,Regional Commit tees and Nat ional and Re-g iona l Bureaux of the Cent ra l Commit teeon carrying out the campaign to col lect thetax in kind.

July 13 J. V. Stalin visits V. I. Lenin in Gorki.

July 14 J. V. Stalin sends a telegram to G. K. Orjoni-kidze about the state of health of V. I. Lenin.

August 3 J. V. Stalin presides at a meeting of the Organ-i sa t iona l Commiss ion of the P lenum of theCentral Commit tee of the R.C.P.(B.) , whichdiscussed matters concerning the Twelfth PartyConference.

August 4-7 J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of theTwelfth All-Russian Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).

August 4 The Twelfth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) electsJ. V. Stalin to its presidium.

August 5 V. I. Lenin summons J. V. Stalin to Gorki andasks him to convey his greetings to the TwelfthAl l -Russ ian Par ty Conference . J . V. S ta l inconveys V. I. Lenin’s greetings at the eveningsitting of the conference.

August 11 The Central Committee of the Party appointsa commission, headed by J. V. Stalin, to pre-pare for the Plenum of the Central Committee ofthe R.C.P. (B.) the ques t ion of the re la t ionsbetween the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R.,the Byelorussian S.S.R. and the Transcauca-sian Federation.


September 15 J. V. Stalin writes his impressions of his visitto V. I. Lenin in Gorki.

September 23-21 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the com-mission appointed by the Central Committeeof the R.C.P.(B.) on the question of the rela-t ions be tween the R.S .F.S .R, the Ukra in ianS.S.R., the Byelorussian S.S.R. and the Trans-caucasian Federation.

September 27 J. V. Stalin discusses with V. I. Lenin the ques-t ion of un i t ing the Sovie t republ ics in to aunion state.

October 6 J. V. Stalin delivers a report at the Plenum ofthe Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on therelations between the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrain-ian S .S .R. , the Byeloruss ian S .S .R. andthe Transcaucasian Federation. The Plenum ap-points a commission, headed by J. V. Stalin,to d i rec t the prepara t ions for the un ion ofthe Soviet republics into a single union state.

October 16 J. V. Stalin informs the Central Committee ofthe Communist Party of Georgia of the decisionadopted by the Plenum of the Central Commit-tee of the R.C.P.(B.) on retaining the Trans-caucasian Federation and unit ing i t with theR.S .F.S .R. and the Ukra in ian and Byelo-russian Republics in a Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics.

October 30 The Central Committee of the Party appointsJ. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Fourth Con-gress of the Comintern.

November 5 J . V. S ta l in’s gree t ings to Pet rograd on theoccasion of the fifth anniversary of the October


Revolu t ion a re publ i shed in the newspaperPetrogradskaya Pravda, No. 251.

November 18 J. V. Stalin’s interview with a Pravda corre-spondent on the question of the union of theindependent na t ional republ ics i s publ ishedin Pravda, No. 261.

November 21-28 Under J . V. S ta l in’s d i rec t ion , the commis-sion appointed by the Plenum of the CentralCommit tee of the R.C.P.(B.) draws up “TheFundumenta l Po in t s o f the Cons t i tu t ion ofthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”

November 30 J. V. Stalin delivers a report on the Union ofRepublics at a meeting of the Political Bureauof the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) .On J. V. Stalin’s report, the Political Bureauendorses “The Fundamental Points of the Con-stitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-publics.”

December 5 At a meeting of the commission appointed bythe Plenum of the Central Committee of theR.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin is elected to the sub-commission for drafting the text of the Consti-tution of the Union of Republics and the Dec-laration.

Between Decem- J. V. Stal in wri tes the draft “Declarat ion onber 5 and 16 the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics.”

December 16 The commission appointed by lhe Plenum ofthe Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), pre-s ided over by J . V. S ta l in , adopts the draf tTreaty on the Formation of the U.S.S.R., andthe draft Declaration submitted by J. V. Stalin.


December 18 J. V. Stalin delivers a report to the Plenum ofthe Centra l Commit tee of the R.C.P.(B.) onthe draft Treaty of Union to be concluded bythe Sovie t republ ics . The P lenum appoin tsa commission, headed by J. V. Stalin, to makepreparations for the First Congress of Soviets ofthe U.S.S.R.

December 20 J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the com-miss ion appointed to make prepara t ions forthe First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.

December 23-27 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the TenthAll-Russian Congress of Soviets.

December 23 The Tenth Al l -Russ ian Congress of Sovie tselects J. V. Stalin to its presidium.

December 26 J. V. Stalin delivers a report at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the questionof uniting the Soviet republics.

J. V. Stalin addresses a meeting of the Commu-nist group at the Tenth All-Russian Congressof Soviets on the question of forming the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics.

December 27 The Tenth Al l -Russ ian Congress of Sovie tselects J. V. Stalin a member of the All-RussianCentral Executive Committee and a delegateof the R.S.F.S.R. to the First Congress of So-viets of the U.S.S.R.

December 28 The First Session of the All-Russian CentralExecut ive Commit tee , Tenth Convoca t ion ,e lec t s J . V. S ta l in to the Pres id ium of theAll-Russian C.E.C. and appoints him People’sCommissar for the Affairs of Nationalities.


December 29 J. V. Stalin makes a statement to the Confer-ence of P len ipo ten t ia ry Delega t ions of theR.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Transcau-casian Federation and the Byelorussian S.S.R.on the order of the proceedings of the FirstCongress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. The con-ference instructs J. V. Stalin to deliver a reportto the Congress on the formation of the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics.

December 30 The First Congress of Soviets of the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics elects J. V. Stalinto its presidium.

J. V. Stalin delivers a report to the First Con-gress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Social-ist Republics on the formation of the U.S.S.R.The congress e lec t s J . V. S ta l in a memberof the Cent ra l Execut ive Commit tee of theU.S.S.R.

J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the First Ses-s ion of the Central Execut ive Committee ofthe U.S.S.R., First Convocation, and is electeda member of the Presidium of the C.E.C.

December 31 J. V. Stal in’s New Year wishes for 1923 arepublished in Izvestia, No. 1.

1 9 2 3

January 2 J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of thecommission appointed by the Commissariat forthe Affa i r s o f Nat iona l i t i es to examine thequestion of forming a Buryat-Mongolian A.S.S.R.

January 10 The Presidium of the Central Executive Com-mittee of the U.S.S.R. elects J. V. Stalin to the

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commission appointed to draw up a plan oforganisation of the People’s Commissariats ofthe U.S.S.R.

January 23 J. V. Stalin delivers a lecture at the SverdlovCommunist University on “The Party’s Strat-egy and Tactics.”

February 4 J. V. Stalin submits to the Political Bureau ofthe Cent ra l Commit tee of the R.C.P. (B. ) aproposal that a second chamber be formed in theCentral Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.,to be an organ representing the interests of allthe peoples of the U.S.S.R.

February 21-2 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Ple-num of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

February 21 A plenary session of the Central Committee ofthe R.C.P. (B.) d iscusses J . V. Sta l in’s draf ttheses on the national question for the TwelfthPar ty Congress . A commiss ion headed byJ . V. S ta l in i s appoin ted to make the f ina ldraft of the theses.

The Plenum of the Central Committee of theR.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the commissionto make the final draft of the Central Commit-tee’s theses on the organisational question forthe Twelfth Party Congress.

February 24 The Plenum of the Central Committee of theR.C.P.(B ) appoints a commission, headed byJ. V. Stalin, to direct the drafting of the Con-stitution of the U.S.S.R.

March 11-12 On the instructions of the Political Bureau ofthe Cent ra l Commit tee of the R.C.P. (B. ) ,


J. V. Stalin telegraphs all the Gubernia Com-mittees, Regional Committees, Central Commit-tees of national Communist Parties and mem-bers of the Central Committee informing themof the state of health of V. I. Lenin.

March 14 J. V. Stalin’s article “Concerning the Questionof the Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Com-munists” is published in Pravda, No. 56, whichis devoted to the twenty-fifth anniversary ofthe R.C.P.(B.).

March 22 J . V. Sta l in submits to the Pol i t ica l Bureauof the Cent ra l Commit tee of the R.C.P. (B. )theses on the national question for the TwelfthParty Congress. The Political Bureau decidesto publ i sh them as theses approved by theCentral Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

March 24 J. V. Stalin’s theses “National Factors in Partyand State Affai rs” are publ ished in Pravda ,No. 65.

April 3 The Tenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conferenceelects J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the TwelfthCongress of the R.C.P.(B.).

April 17-23 J . V. S ta l in t akes par t in the work of theTwelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

April 17 The Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) electsJ. V. Stalin to its presidium.

J. V. Stalin delivers the Central Committee’sorganisational report at the Twelfth Congressof the R.C.P.(B.).

April 19 J . V. Sta l in repl ies to the d iscuss ion a t theTwel f th Congress o f the R.C.P. (B. ) on theCentral Committee’s organisational report.


April 23 J. V. Stalin reports at the Twelfth Congress ofthe R.C.P.(B.) on “National Factors in Partyand State Affairs.”

April 24 The Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) electsJ. V. Stal in to the Central Committee of theParty.

April 25 J. V. Stalin directs the work of the committeeon the national question of the Twelfth Con-gress of the R.C.P.(B.) and speaks in that com-mittee on questions connected with the Consti-tution of the U.S.S.R.

J . V. Sta l in repl ies to the d iscuss ion a t theTwelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on the re-port on “National Factors in Party and StateAffairs.”

April 26 A plenary session of the Central Committee ofthe R.C.P. (B. ) e lec ts J . V. S ta l in a memberof the Political Bureau and of the Organisation-al Bureau and a representative on the CentralControl Commission, and appoints him Gener-al Secretary of the Central Committee of theParty.

May 6 J. V. Stalin’s article “The Press as a CollectiveOrganiser” i s publ ished in Pravda , No. 99 .

May 10 J. V. Stalin’s art icle “Confusion Worse Con-founded. . . ” is published in Pravda, No. 102.

May 24 The Political Bureau of the Central Committeeof the R.C.P.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin a rep-resentative of the R.S.F.S.R. on the enlargedcommission of the Presidium of the CentralExecutive Committee of the U.S.S.R. for draft-ing the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.


May-June J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the en-larged commission of the Presidium of the Cen-tral Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. fordrafting the Constitution.

June 4 J . V. Stal in makes a s ta tement a t a meet ingof the Political Bureau of the Central Committeeof the R.C.P.(B.) on the preparations for theFourth Conference of the Central Committee ofthe R.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Workers ofthe National Republics and Regions. The Politi-cal Bureau endorses the draft platform on thena t iona l ques t ion proposed by J . V. S ta l in .

June 9-12 J . V. S ta l in d i rec t s the work of the Four thConference of the Central Committee of theR.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Workers of theNational Republics and Regions.

June 10 At the Fourth Conference of the Central Com-mittee of the R.C.P.(B.) With Responsible Work-ers of the Nat ional Republ ics and Regions ,J . V. Stal in del ivers a speech on the Rightsand “Lefts” in the national republics and re-gions, and a report on the practical measures forimplementing the resolut ion on the nat ionalquestion adopted by the Twelfth Congress ofthe R.C.P.(B.).

June 12 J . V. Stal in repl ies to the discussion on hisreport to the Fourth Conference of the CentralCommittee of the R.C.P.(B.) With ResponsibleWorkers of the National Republics and Regions.

June 14 At a meeting of the enlarged commission ofthe Presidium of the Central Executive Commit-tee of the U.S.S.R. for drafting the Constitu-t ion of the U.S.S.R. , J . V. Sta l in speaks onthe principle of common citizenship through-out the U.S.S.R.


June 22-23 J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Ple-num of the Central Control Commission of theR.C.P.(B.).

June 26 J. V. Stalin delivers a report on the Constitu-tion of the U.S.S.R. to the Plenum of the Cen-tral Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

July 8 Pravda , No. 151, publishes the appeal of theCentral Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) , s ignedby J. V. Stalin, requesting that all notes, let-ters, memoranda and other documents writtenby V. I . Lenin be sent to the Lenin Insti tutethat is being organised in Moscow.

July 14 Pravda, No. 156, publishes the appeal “To AllPeoples and Governments o f the Wor ld ,”signed by J. V. Stalin and the other membersof the Presidium of the Central Executive Com-mittee, issued in connection with the ratifica-tion of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. by theC.E.C.

September 23-25 J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum ofthe Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

October 25-27 J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint Plenumof the Central Committee and the Central Con-t ro l Commiss ion of the R.C.P. (B. ) , he ld inconjunction with representatives of ten Partyorganisations.

November 7 J. V. Stalin’s article “The October Revolutionand the Question of the Middle Strata” is pub-lished in Pravda, No. 253.

November 10 J. V. Stalin writes the article “The Fifth Anni-versary of the First Congress of Working Women


and Peasant Women,” published in the mag-az ine Komnunis tka (Woman Communis t ) ,No. 11, November 1923.

November 17 J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at a meeting atthe Mil i tary Academy, held to celebrate thefourth anniversary of the Cavalry Army.

December 2 J. V. Stalin delivers a report on “The Party’sTasks” at an enlarged meeting of the KrasnayaPresnya District Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

Before J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the sub-December 2 commission of the Central Committee of the

R.C.P.(B.) for drafting the resolution on Par-ty a ffa i r s . The reso lu t ion was adopted a t ajo in t sess ion of the Pol i t ica l Bureau of theR.C.P.(B.) and the Presidium of the CentralControl Commission on December 5, and pub-lished in Pravda, No. 278, December 7.

December 15 Pravda , No. 285, publishes J. V. Stalin’s arti-cle “The Discussion, Rafai l , the Art icles byPreobrazhensky and Sapronov, and Trotsky’sLetter,” and the statement of the Central Com-mittee of the R.C.P.(B.), signed by J. V. Stalin,to all the organisations of the R.C.P.(B.) con-cerning the discussion on the internal situationin the Party.

December 28 J. V. Stal in’s art icle “A Necessary Comment(Concerning Rafail)” is published in Pravda,No. 294.

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J. Stalin Works, Vol. 5Volume 5 contains works of J. V. Stalin written in the years 1921-23. The...

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