INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER … Lists/Week 25 February...

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Aleksandar Vasiljevic revised statement.doc/amp/`h 1

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA

WITNESS STATEMENT – ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVI]

Organisation and activities by the JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/ Security

Administration

1. My name is Aleksandar Vasiljevic, I was born on 8 July 1938 in the village of

Vitkovac, in the Kraljevo municipality, Serbia. In 2001 I retired with the rank of

General-lieutenant colonel, after having resumed service in the Army of Yugoslavia

from 27 April 1999. I was an active officer of JNA from 1961 until 8 March 1992,

when I retired early with the rank of General-Major in the position of Chief of

Security of the Federal Secretary for National Defence (SSNO). I finished all my

military schooling in the JNA, and I have spent almost all my life in military service

in the duties of the JNA security, except from the period 1988-1990 when I was the

commander of the 4th Motorised Division in Sarajevo. I held the post of Chief of the

JNA Security Service from 15 June 1991 until 8 May 1992, and was directly

subordinate to the Federal Secretary for National Defence (SSNO).

2. In addition to this service, there was also a service in the JNA, the intelligence

service of the General Staff, which was operating along the same principles as the

security organ. The intelligence service was subordinated to the Chief of the General

Staff of the SSNO. The intelligence service was under the General Staff and had its

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centres on the territory of Yugoslavia. It had its intelligence centres in the republics

according to operational interests, mostly from where it was easy to organise

intelligence activities related to foreign factors which could have been consequential

for the security of Yugoslavia.

3. Simply put, those were intelligence centres that were dealing with potential

agressors abroad, while the security service in the army was intended for the counter-

intelligence protection of the army – the internal intelligence component. In other

words, these are two separate services, two completely separate services. We are

working at the domestic level, protecting the army in the country, while the

intelligence service has to create an agency abroad to gather information about a

potential aggressor of Yugoslavia.

4. The Chief of the intelligence service in the G[ /General Staff/ at the time was

Vuleta VULETI]. The Counter-intelligence Service /KOS/ is the official security

service of the JNA. I was the Chief of the Security Administration. In the Military

Districts there are security departments that are subordinated to the Security

Administration according to technical counter-intelligence jobs, while in practice they

were subordinated to the commanders of the Military Districts, just as I was

subordinated to the Federal Secretary for National Defence.

5. In technical terms, the task of the security organ viewed as a whole was to provide

counter-intelligence protection of the JNA. So, we were responsible for the security of

the armed forces, both as regards the activities of the foreign and domestic enemies

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directed against the JNA or within the JNA. Therefore, it a foreigner was revealed to

be gathering information about the army, then the relevant military security service

was in charge of the operative processing and implementation of that case. If a

civilian citizen of the then SFRY /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ was

conducting enemy activities against the army, the military security would be in charge

of processing his or her case. In other words, not the State Security Service, because

he or she is a civilian. This is only the case for enemy activities against the army.

6. If through our work we discover that a civilian or foreigner is a threat to the

security of the SFRY and not the army, this information is passed on to the State

Security Service who would then be in charge of it. We could and we did directly

contact the republican State Security Services, also providing information to the

federal State Security, although the problem with the federal MUP /Ministry of the

Interior/ was that it did not have any jurisdiction over the republican and provincial

State Security (DB) Services. So, they had a large degree of autonomy, and that is

why there the myth was created about the omnipotence of the military service because

it knew what was happening both in Kumanovo (Macedonia) or in Postojna

(Slovenia), or in other words, on the entire territory of the SFRY, while the federal

MUP could not have that, but only to the extent that Slovenia or Macedonia would

inform it about a problem they had, and because they had retreated to their republican

and provincial frameworks. The federal DB had more a task of coordinating mutual

activities.

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Enemy activities against the constitutional order of the SFRY and the JNA

7. In 1990, a gathering was organised in the premises of the Security Institute in

Banjica, in Belgrade, which was attended by the heads of the republican and

provincial services. This gathering was organised by the federal MUP, which was

headed by GRA^ANIN. The heads of the republican DBs were present, as well as the

military service. So, these federal gatherings of the counter-intelligence organisation

were always attended by us from the army for coordination purposes, because it is a

common activity, there are common goals, and they are only divided up into territorial

and real responsibilities, the army, the Republic, etc.

8. The first work sector of my service was the uncovering of foreign intelligence

services, intelligence activity against the JAN and in the army.

9. The second task was to uncover the activities of the "Yugoslav enemy

emigration", which was the official term, in other words, the extremist part of these

emigrants that was also directed towards the members of the JNA or within the JNA.

There were attempts by soldiers who came for their military service, young men who

came from abroad, members of extremist emigrant groups, and some of them came

into the country with terrorist tasks.

10. The republican State Security Service was in charge of uncovering activities of

enemy emigrants abroad, preventing organised groups that are infiltrated into the

country, like the group in 1972 that was infiltrated on Rado{, 19 of them from

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Australia, then placing explosives, demolishing buildings, sabotage, etc.

11. The third work sector was the uncovering of enemy activities within the JNA,

among members of the JNA. My service dealt, first and foremost, with uncovering

organised, illegal enemy activities in the JNA. And in late 1980, when I was the Chief

of Security in Sarajevo, we uncovered the first illegal group of Albanian separatists in

the JNA. This organisation already had developed cells and branches on the territory

of Kosovo and throughout all of Yugoslavia. They came for their military service to

the JNA and there they had excellent conditions to strengthen the organisation on the

ground. If somebody was in \akovica his domain was \akovica. He then had access to

Albanians who worked as confectionists in Slovenia and Macedonia, that is to say,

they had excellent conditions to extend the organisation by recruiting soldiers in the

JNA. By 1988, 216 illegal groups were discovered in the JNA with over a thousand

and some organised members. These included attempts to sabotage equipment, at the

Mostar airport an attempt to blow up planes on the runway, tanks in Osijek etc. So,

the first organised group that was working against the security of the JNA was an

Albanian group.

12. After that, between 1982 and 1983, a Croatian separatist group was uncovered,

that had also tried to establish its illegal cells in the JNA. Some years later, in 1985,

Slovenian separatist groups also began with exposure in the JNA based on illegal

principles.

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13. Advocating and organising terrorist activities not only at home but also in the JNA

was particularly characteristic for the activities of the extremist part of the Croatian

emigrants. In 1979, soldier Marijo JONJI] from the Imotski area was discovered in the

Sarajevo barracks. He had been recruited by the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood

in Germany to carry out an assassination of a man who was suspected to have killed

the terrorist Bruno BU[I] in Paris. Bruno BU[I] was one of the organisers of terrorist

operations in Yugoslavia, and he was killed on 1 October 1978 in Paris. This emigrant

organisation of which BU[I] was a member, had a special monetary fund that was

collected with the oath that if a member of their organisation was killed, within one

year, the perpetrator had to be found and killed.

14. In Visoko near Sarajevo there is the Seminary of the Catholic Church, which was

mostly attended by boys from Western Herzegovina. Within the framework of the

Seminary they had already set up an illegal group that was dealing with the printing

and distribution of enemy leaflets. Since the Seminary was separated from the

barracks in Visoko only by a wire fence, Marijo JONJI] connected with them and they

planned operations together both in the barracks and in Western Herzegovina. The

members of this group were arrested and tried in 1980.

15. In 1984 we uncovered the activities of an Albanian separatist organisation, which

was setting up an illegal committee in the JNA by recruiting several Albanian

officers. The men who was at the top of this military Committee was Major D`afer

JA[ARI, and together with him there were Naim MLJOKU, Ramadan GA[I, Bislim

ZIRAPI and others, who later, after their pardon in 1990, would join the terrorist KLA

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and take up important command positions. Furthermore, this illegal organisation was

established abroad in 1982 when all Albanian separatist organisations at the time

joined forces, and they had a large number of members throughout Yugoslavia.

16. Albanian illegal groups in the JNA tried to carry out several terrorist operations,

including poisoning the food for soldiers and officers, like the group of soldier Mujo

NAZMIJA in Mostar, who committed suicide after being discovered. By poisoning

the food, this illegal group wanted to mark the anniversary of the Albanian

demonstrations in Pri{tina on 11 March 1982.

17. The illegal groups of Albanian soldiers that were established tried to obtain large

amounts of weapons and explosives by stealing from the unit or military depots.

However, on 3 September 1987, one illegal group in the Para}in garrison succeeded

in carrying out a terrorist attack against its fellow soldiers firing at them in two

dormitories while they were asleep. On that occasion they killed four and injured five

soldiers, and after that, the assassin Azis KELJMENDI committed suicide, and the

rest of the group was arrested and convicted to long-term sentences.

18. As regards the link between foreign and domestic enemies, Western security

systems knew about emigrant groups that were on the territory of Western countries

and gave them operative coverage. The largest part of extremist sabotage groups was

in Germany.

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19. In 1990, parties with mostly nationalist prefixes became legal. People who were

on special registers as needing to be arrested because of crimes they had committed

against Yugoslavia, entered Croatia. So, extremists, who were part of extremist

groups of Ustasha emigrants legally entered Croatia and became part of state organs.

For instance, in the Croatian MUP, the Deputy Minister was Perica JURI], in the

Ministry of Defence Gojko [U[AK and others although they were well known Ustasha

emigrants.

Activities of foreign intelligence service in the SFRY

20. Intelligence services conduct the policy of their states. The state apparatus uses

this service to achieve some of its political goals and interests. Therefore, no service

acts independently, and it has something that has been drawn up and it did not come

up with something to do, but it is funded by the state, established by the state that

creates the conditions for its work and sets its tasks.

21. When we speak about the role of foreign services, they had the task, above all, to

have a very good knowledge of the political, economic, military and social situation in

the country they were targeting, and for this purpose they applied legal means of

gathering information through the media, through bilateral relations, and so forth, but

also through illegal activities, through intelligence work that could be very

compromising if uncovered. All these services were creating and establishing their

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agencies in Yugoslavia, with the goal of having insiders at the highest possible levels,

if possible at the very state and military top.

22. The Yugoslavia counter-intelligence groups and military services and the State

Security Service uncovered a significant number of foreign agencies. Some cases

were resolved, I would say, diplomatically, but most agents were re-recruited and

became so-called double agents. There is almost no service that was not active in the

SFRY. Every country around us, from Albania, which was creating its agency in

Kosovo, to Bulgaria, Hungary and other countries.

23. In 1988 we arrested a group around Janez JAN[A, the then Prime Minister of

Slovenia, which was stealing military documents through a non-commissioned officer

of the JNA. In 1990 Alija IZETBEGOVI] was released from prison, who was serving

his prison sentence in Fo~a, and he was serving his sentence with Captain Naim

MALJOKU, the earlier mentioned officer from the illegal Albanian Irredentism

Committee. Also released from a Slovenian prison was Nurif RIZVANOVI], who had

been tried for espionage for two foreign intelligence services with a few other

members of the JNA. After his release from prison, RIZVANOVI] hooked up with the

Patriotic League in the Srebrenica area and took part in delivering weapons. Foreign

services were continuously active and relying on separatist groups and dissatisfied

people, and among these dissatisfied people they found their contacts and insiders.

And that went on for a very long time.

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24. During the seventies, and especially in the eighties, the activities of the foreign

factor, which was following events in Yugoslavia with particular interest, were

intensified. Following Tito's death, nationalism of all types spread, as well as

separatist tendencies in some republics. Among the republics, Slovenia was the flag

bearer of this, while Kosovo was permanently advocating this option. The Albanian

intelligence service were creating and controlling illegal organisations, working on

unifying Kosovo and Albania, so they sent their professors to Pri{tina University,

their intelligence officers, Colonels who I know by first and last names, etc.

25. So, after Tito's death, there is a rise of nationalist tensions, and this is identified by

the foreign services that were active in the SFRY, gathering intelligence information

about various segments of society, while at the same time, they worked on

intensifying these nationalist problems. Austria and Germany supported the

independence of Croatia. Hungary was interested in Vojvodina, which it never

relinquished, i.e. it renounced it only publicly. So, these countries were reinforcing

their positions, supporting separatist movements in the SFRY and intensifying

contacts with the leaders of these movements.

26. Although in 1989, Marko VESELICA was the dominant figure as a leader in

Croatia, the foreign services came to the conclusion that TUÐMAN was far more

suitable than him, because VESELICA was a philosopher and TUÐMAN was a

soldier with a cutting edge. The foreign services decided to focus on contacts with

TUÐMAN and slowly distance Marko VESELICA. So, in 1989, at a meeting in Graz

or Klagenfurt, the conclusion was reached that there should be a different attitude

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towards VESELICA, i.e. that TUÐMAN should be accepted.

27. One of the better known foreign service analyses on the scenario that was

expected in the SFRY, i.e. on the causes of the future break-up and preparations for

the break-up of the SFRY following Tito's death, was the case in Uppsala in 1979.

The American analyst Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI came to the conclusion that socialism

as a system would not be defeated on a class basis but only on an ethnic basis, and

that was where the emphasis ought to lie when provoking inter-ethnic conflicts that

would lead to the break-up not only of these countries, but also of the socialist order,

which proved to be true.

28. Of course, these services did not make a decision, "let's bring down Yugoslavia,

from today on we're going to bring it down". However, they knew the situation very

well, and as relations in country between some leaderships or individual political

elites were getting worse, they exposed themselves by giving advice and support, and

this support also went by diplomatic means.

29. For instance, when my service filmed the Croatian Minister of Defence Martin

[PEGELJ illegally organising the arming of the Croatian MUP and TO /Territorial

Defence/ and planning the killing of JNA officers, a meeting was held on 25 January

1991 at the SFRY Presidency, where TUÐMAN committed Croatia, which had been

protecting [PEGELJ until then, to hand him over to the military judicial organs. But

already on 26 January 1991, his advisor LETICA convinced TUÐMAN that he must

not admit that [PEGELJ committed a crime, because he was protecting the interests of

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Croatia, and he must not hand him over. One day later, on 27 January 1991,

TUÐMAN consulted the Austrian statesman VRANITZKY on this issue, who advised

him not to give in. Despite the irrefutable proof – the film of [PEGELJ – TUÐMAN

changed course, decided to protect [PEGELJ and publicly stated that the

HDZ /Croatia Democratic Union/ did not arm itself.

30. The army is not in charge of following the political top. It is responsible for the

military top. The State Security Services of the republics are in charge of issues

relating to the political leadership of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, etc.

However, through the cooperation of our military service with the leaders of the

republican State Security Services, we obtained significant information.

31. For instance, through my contact at the time with a key man in the Slovenian DB

Service, I obtained information about some 40 people in high political positions in

Slovenia having been recruited or maintaining contact with foreign service agents.

The Slovenian State Security documented many of these contacts in the country and

abroad and the receipt of money for the information provided. There were also such

contacts with people at a very high political level.

32. So, the policy of the Western powers that took part in the process of the

disintegration of the SFRY through their services was, among other things, to

participate in raising tensions by supporting certain people in the former SFRY, who

in this way and with this help even ended up in high-ranking positions. The foreign

services used so-called rat channels to help reinforce this elite that was pursuing a

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policy with which they agreed. The West did not want to have a strong Yugoslavia

with a population of 22 million in this region in that period, with the fourth strongest

army in Europe, but they preferred a division into these partial part like at the time of

World War II when they had divided up the area according to their interests.

EVENTS IN SLOVENIA

33. The Slovenes were the ones to detonate the bomb that blew up Yugoslavia. I have

already said that we had these incidents of Slovenian nationalism, and even attempts

at finding and constituting groups of like-minded intellectuals after their military

service who would form some sort of political core, and the policy was – to become

independent. So, what started with the Slovenes, from the Cesna affair and advocating

the notion of Slovenia's exploitation by the undeveloped parts of Yugoslavia, which

we in the JNA first recorded in 1985.

34. Before that we did not have any problems with Slovenian soldiers, but from 1985

the Slovenes are starting to bring down Yugoslavia in an intelligent way. They

nullified around forty federal regulations and laws that they were not happy with, and

they did all of this through the Assembly, through deputies, through a public

campaign, etc. The JNA became the main target because objectively, as a Yugoslav

force in Slovenia, it represented a threat to these interests of the Slovenian people who

had plans to become independent after Tito's death.

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35. The Slovenes did not establish paramilitary groups, but they decided to take over

the Territorial Defence. Then they chased out General HO^EVAR, who was the

Commander of the Republican Territorial Defence Staff, or rather, JAN[A threw him

out of the premises; they proclaimed their Territorial Defence and obstructed the

return of the weapons of the Territorial Defence. In 12 of their municipalities, the

Slovenes did not return weapons of the Territorial Defence to the depots under the

control of the JNA. So by 1991, Slovenia had 36,000 armed men of their TO. Later

they would display their flags and suspend the federal customs service and the federal

border police, and finally achieve independence.

36. Unlike the Albanians, who worked through illegal groups, through which they

also built up their armed power, and who did all this in secrecy, the Slovenes put the

independence issue out loud and clear through their Assembly and other organs as a

matter of principle. Then, at the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party

in January 1990 they came out with clear demands saying what they wanted. They did

not want the Central Committee anymore that would command them. They wanted to

be an independent party, have their league of communist, and these activities also

triggered activities in other republics.

37. In the late 1980s and early 1990s a multi-party system was established. The Berlin

Wall came down. There was an armed rebellion and uprising in Romania. The

syndrome of the fall of socialism that went hand in hand with a change of policy

introduced by GORBACHEV, and the acceptance of methods showing that a regime

could be brought down on the street even with guns, as was the case in Bucharest,

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expedited the processes in our country that were the result of this.

38. From 1988 until the first half of July 1990, I did not work in the Security Service,

but I was the Commander of a division in Sarajevo. After that, from the position of

Division Commander, I was brought to the JNA Security Administration.

EVENTS IN CROATIA

39. In February 1990, the inaugural party conference of the Croatian Democratic

Union was held in the Lisinski Hall in Zagreb. But /monitoring/ what was going on in

the HDZ at the time was the job of the Croatian State Security Service and the federal

MUP. Nevertheless, at the time it was the first time that people appeared who were on

our wanted notices as extremist emigrants who had come to Croatia at the time where

they were presented as patriots. In May 1990, the HDZ prepared a draft of a

projection of its forces. So, already then the HDZ had its orientation and a clear goal

that the independence of Croatia would not be achieved by peaceful means. It had to

be pursued in armed clashes and a war, and Croatia would have to prepare for this

period.

40. In my interview with the ICTY Prosecution I presented information on how large

the armed forces were supposed to be – land forces, air force, navy, etc, but this was

probably not of so much interest to them.

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41. In May 1990, so two months after the establishment of the party, the HDZ already

had an option to prepare for war. According to our information, i.e. information of the

armed force, already in June 1990, they started with secret recruitment of their future

army, in the form of a national guard, as they called it. The backbone for this choice

of formation were the local boards of the HDZ and the Catholic clergy on the ground

that found dedicated, loyal members of the HDZ, even those who were not formally

members of the HDZ, but who were for an independent Croatia, and they started their

choice.

42. On 17 July 1990, we discovered two busses from Slavonski Brod by accident with

drunken men carrying flags and singing Ustasha songs, who had gone on a rampage

entering the MUP Training Centre in Zagreb. So, on 17 July 1990, we had concrete

information that people are being recruited and selected on the ground to create,

practically, an illegal army – a paramilitary. We then checked who these people were

and found over 200 people who had been convicted for grave robbery, murder,

looting, etc. So, these people are scum.

43. On around 25 July 1990, we passed this information on to the Administration, and

it was published with a question mark – "Croatia is establishing a guard?".

Immediately after that the HDZ announced a competition for law enforcement

officers. In other words, the creation of an illegal paramilitary organisation was then

covered by a MUP competition, and this scum was then portrayed as future law

enforcement officers.

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44. However, the regulations that covered that competition, and according to the

regulation that existed, it should have been only people who had completed their

military service, who were supposed to be accepted to a position in the MUP,

furthermore people who were not older than 25, and people without a criminal record

and not under investigation.

45. In any case, the new Croatian authorities took on these new people as law

enforcement officers and set up five centres where they trained them and dressed

them, armed them, and that then became the reserve police force that they activated.

The Croatian authorities several times increased the earlier peace-time contingent of

the MUP. Every republic had its criteria on how many members of the MUP there

were supposed to be for every inhabitant. In Croatia the number of MUP members

was several times larger than the proportional number.

46. Members of the Croatian MUP started checking the movement of JNA vehicles,

they were positioned in the vicinity of military structures and barracks, they noted

down who passed through, who did not, etc. In fact, from the very beginning of the

HDZ coming to power, Croatia decided to opt for national independence at any price,

unlike the way the Slovenes did it.

47. In August 1990, the Croatian MUP took a decision to change the official insignia

at police stations and to display the checkerboard. So, instead of the state flag of the

Republic of Croatia with the five-pointed star, a new flag with the checkerboard was

put up. Furthermore, the five-pointed star was removed, uniforms changed, and the

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official coat of arms once again became that infamous checkerboard. The Serbs in the

Krajina reacted to that and did not accept to change their insignia because they

reminded them of the Ustasha past. The Krajina Serbs came to Belgrade and had talks

with Petar GRA^ANIN, the Chief of the Federal MUP. 40 policemen from the

Krajina signed protest letters not accepting the imposition of Ustasha insignia and that

is when the first obstructions occurred in the police structures at the Knin police

station.

48. On 19 August 1990, the Croatian forces sent their helicopters into action and

launched an operation to break up the Serbian police protests. At the same time,

tension run high in the public about the changes to the Croatian constitution, reducing

the Serbs' status of a constituent people in Croatia.

49. In Krajina, the SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/ was established, headed by Jovo

RA[KOVI], who organised the Serbs and warned that there is a danger of a new

massacre against the Serbian people like in the Second World War. The Serbs in

Croatia did not immediately organise themselves politically in a party when the HDZ

was established, but only when changes started by the Croatian authorities on the

ground, and also when there were clear signs that the constitution of Croatia would be

changed and the Serbs downgraded in a constitutional sense.

50. In August and September 1990 the "cleansing" ensued, when a large number or

Serbs were removed from positions in state bodies, above all in the MUP, the State

Security, the Croatian Ministry of Defence, and moved as surplus, while in fact this

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was an ethnic cleansing of the staff in these organisations.

51. Also, this is the beginning of police stations being established in places where

they had never before existed in all these 50 years, i.e. new police stations were

established only in places where the Serbs were in the majority. For instance, in

Kijevo, a police station was established that never before existed there, and there the

Serbs reacted to this move by the Croatian authorities and set up barricades to prevent

the establishment of the station. Through the mountain, the Croats infiltrated a group

that was carrying the new board, and they entered Kijevo and established the police

station. These were all objectively irritating factors. About 24 such police stations

were created, but they were not created in an area where mostly Croats lived, but in

fact in marginal areas in the vicinity of Serbian villages and areas.

52. At the same time, some police stations were disarmed that were mostly in Serbian

settlements. There were examples of groups of Croatian law enforcement officers

arriving at night by truck, visiting their Serbian counterparts, coming to have a coffee

or drink or refreshments, and then disarming them and collecting the weapons

belonging to the reserve force of the police. So, weapons belonging to the reserve

force of the police were massively and fraudulently pulled out from these stations

where mostly Serbs lived. Because of all of these operations, MARTI] sacked and

chased away the Croatian policemen and handed their weapons to the Serbs.

53. In early October 1990, we in the military service discovered the illegal import of

weapons from Hungary for armed formations – paramilitary illegal formations of the

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HDZ. In addition, law enforcement officers who had completed a course of two or

three months put on their uniforms, wore rifles, helmets, and practically became a part

of the Croatian Republican army. In this first round, the Croatian authorities imported

20,000 guns.

54. On 2 December 1990, Veljko KADIJEVI], the then Minister of Defence of the

SFRY, went public with what we had discovered, talks about paramilitary formations

throughout Yugoslavia, but particular focus is on Croatia, although these weapons had

already been found in Slovenia, and then weapons in Kosovo, which had come from

Bulgaria. So, throughout Yugoslavia there were huge numbers of illegal weapons.

55. With our agents, my service entered the very top of the Croatian leadership, all the

way to the then Minister of Defence, Martin [PEGELJ, who had infinite faith in a

Captain who had been in my service. So he supplied us with information about the

import of weapons and the creation of Croatian paramilitary formations, who the

people were and what their goals were, and we received all that as a recording.

56. On 3 December 1990, according to our plan, I began with arrests. The arrests were

supposed to be carried out in the areas of Zagreb, Virovitica, \akovo, Osijek, in Split,

Dalmatia, etc., practically all over Croatia. These were arrests of around 40

individuals for whom we had solid documentation, both material and other types, that

they had received illegal weapons. We also knew 700 individuals by name, and that

this and this individual had a rifles number this and this, which he keeps here in the

morning and there in the afternoon. So, we had all the information. In other words,

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KADIVJEVI] first came out on 2 December 1990 and gave an interview to Miroslav

LAZANSKI from the paper Danas.

57. However, when I was supposed to launch the operation with the name [tit /Shield/

and we were supposed to arrest the individuals who had taken part in the illegal

arming, I was called back to Belgrade on 3 December 1990. There I was told that the

decision had been changed, that the army would not do this alone, but that it would do

that pursuant to a decision of the Presidency of the SFRY.

58. So, on 3 December 1990, I was called back to Belgrade from Kutina, a plane was

sent to pick me up, and I arrived at the meeting. "How are you Aca", KADIJEVI]

asked me. At the time I was still a Colonel. I said, "Everything is going according to

plan, some groups of policemen have already left for Virovitica." KADIJEVI] then

asked what we knew about the arming of the Serbs in Croatia. I told him that we knew

they had 600 hunting carbines that they obtained through Simo DUBAJI], they had

103 automatic rifles from the police station and three hand-held launchers, but I told

him, "Comrade General, in the Golo Brdo local commune near Virovitica, the HDZ is

distributing 20 automatic rifles with 150 bullets; the man managed to distribute 16,

but nobody wants to take the other four, and he wrote down their names and said, 'The

time will come when you will be held accountable for not taking any weapons.'" At

the time, hunting carbines without snipers were going for 5,700,000 dinars, and with

snipers for 6,300,000. KADIJEVI] was quiet. I told him, "Comrade General, a scared

Serbian farmer in Knin has to sell two cows to buy one carbine." And KADIJEVI]

said to me, "Get out!" and threw me out. When he calmed down, KADIJEVI] told his

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adjutant, "Have VASILJEVI] come in", and I came in. KADIJEVI]: "Colonel, don't

you give us political lessons here. We are all better at this than you are. You go back

to Knin tomorrow, take a plane to Zadar, and via helicopter to Knin. You have seven

days to document the arming of the Serbs." I replied, "Comrade General, and these

teams (for the arrest in connection with the Croatian illegal arming)?" KADIJEVI]:

"Tell them that it has been suspended."

59. The Chief of Security in the Knin Corps, TOLIMIR, and his people gathered

documents and in these documents there was a statement by a Serb who also

described the paramilitary organisation of the Serbs. They had their three barricades.

TOLIMIR had suggested to me that we should call MARTI] to clear things up with

him. MARTI] arrived wearing the military cap of Tito. I told MARTI] what all we

knew and we threatened him that if he did not take any steps we were planning to

arrest both BABI] and MARTI], and everybody who had a paramilitary formation. So,

I told MARTI], "We know about this. If you don't return these weapons when the

order on the return of weapons comes out, you will be arrested, just like everybody

else. Return the weapons!" MARTI] replied, " Colonel, comrade, and what if they

attack me tomorrow?" I replied the, "You would have been attacked by now, had the

army not been here. The army is guarding the peace in this area. Get rid of the

barricades, return the weapons, the army will guarantee your safety." He said, "Is that

so?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Here's my hand", and we shook hands. That was on 4

December 1990.

Draft translation


60. I got back, by helicopter, then by plane, and I arrived at around 2000 hours at the

SSNO in Belgrade. There I met again with the staff. KADIJEVI] said, "Sit down", I

sat down and heard that they were debating some other things. "You didn't go to

Knin." I then gave him the details, and he said to me, "He'll screw you over." I

replied, "He won't, Comrade General." "OK", KADIJEVI] said and continued. "We

decided here not to do this alone (to continue with Operation [tit), but rather we'll do

it via the Presidency. You go to the Administration, write this bulletin about all of this

to the Presidency of the SFRY." And that was the point when I dissolved three teams

that I had for the arrest of the Croatian organisers of illegal weapons, in Vinkovci one

team from the First Military District, in Split from the Military Naval District, and a

team from Zagreb, which covered Zagreb and Virovitica.

61. The information was sent to the President of the SFRY Presidency, Borisav

JOVI], on 12 December 1990, and he sent the incriminating material on to the other

members of the Presidency, including the Croatian member, Stipe MESI]. Then, this

item of the agenda was postponed for the next meeting, which was scheduled for 9

January 1991, because the member from Macedonia, TUPURKOVSKI, was not

present at the meeting.

62. I insisted that they do not reveal the man who was providing us the information

about the illegal arming of the Croatian authorities, because he would get killed.

However, JOVI] distributed the information to all the members of the Presidency, and

when I found out about that, I immediately got into my car and drove to Lipik to find

the Captain to tell him that his name had not been mentioned, and that if he was

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arrested he should not admit to anything.

63. As a result of all of this, the Croatian authorities for the first time found out that

the JNA knew all along what they were doing illegally. There was panic, and then

they came up with a Solomonic solution: the weapons they had distributed to the HDZ

and the paramilitary would not be returned, but rather they decided to print MUP

reserve force IDs, and everybody who got a rifle as a member of the HDZ was given a

reserve police officer ID. We found out about that too and documented that 54,000

IDs were printed and distributed.

64. On 9 January 1991 an order was finally issued promising a pardon to all people

who return their weapons, and in order to prevent any unrest in the country a ten day

deadline is given to return illegal weapons. This information was already largely

known in the public, and at that point the Serbs in Croatia found out that the Croats

had been importing weapons and arming themselves, which upset the Serbian people.

At that point, the Serbs started organising and arming themselves. Captain Dragan

came to Knin and established the Knind`as, etc.

65. On 19 January 1991, the ten-day deadline for the return of illegal weapons

expired, and then Stipe MESI] called Borisav JOVI] and told him, "We'll return it, but

we didn't manage, give us another 48 hours." JOVI] extended the deadline for 48

hours, but in these 48 hours the Croatian authorities mobilised all armed HDZ

contingents and blocked our JNA barracks in Virovitica, and kidnapped ten soldiers

who had gone for a medical check-up in the morning and were coming back to the

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barracks. However, the army reacted and managed to negotiate the release of the

soldiers.

66. The Serbs in Croatia ultimately did organise themselves militarily, but this was in

direct response to the Croatian arming, shooting in villages and cities, raiding Serbian

police stations, which were disarmed through deception, and all of this in the vicinity

of Serbian areas.

67. On 12 March 1991, at a session of the SFRY Presidency, the plan of the SSNO

was not adopted to introduce emergency measures throughout the country, disarm all

paramilitary formations, suspend the work of the parties for six months, in order to

calm down the situation, and after that there should have been general elections for

people to decide who should live with whom and how. Present were the members of

the Presidency, except DRNOV[EK from Slovenia. Four members voted for

emergency measures, and three against.

68. The Serbian representative should have said, "The time is this, we don't have time

to wait for DRNOV[EK, he was invited, I know there should be five votes when the

full Presidency is in session, but we don't have time to wait. KADIJEVI], a majority

of 4 against 3 decided that the JNA take these measures." JOVI] did not do that.

69. JOVI] called DRNOV[EK, although he knew it would be four against four. That

was when JOVI] handed in his resignation because no decision was reached. My

opinion is that JOVI] did not want to make the move he could have with the four

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votes against three, which was for the army to take over the country.

70. KADIJEVI] was smart and he did not want the army to take that decision alone,

without a decision from the Presidency, but not because the General Staff was made

up of Serbs, Slovenes and Croats, and we were not united. The entire General Staff,

the entire army stood as one. The army did not burst at the ethnic seams. It did not

even burst until 1992.

71. Considering that the decision to disarm the paramilitary formations in Croatia fell

through, the Serbian leadership decided to support the Serbs in Croatia because the

Croatian authorities had already largely armed themselves. From August 1990, the

Serbian DB was monitoring the situation in Croatia.

Incidents in Pakrac and Plitvice

Pakrac

72. Before these events, the Serbs in the Krajina had proclaimed the Autonomous

District of the Knin Krajina, and then autonomous districts were also proclaimed in

Slavonia and Srem. The SDS council in Pakrac took a decision to recognise the

jurisdiction of the new Serbian Krajina and wanted to proclaim their own district, and

the took a decision to remove the checkerboard from the police station, disarm the 12

Croatian policemen, who were told, "Go to your homes, you don't belong here

anymore", and after that they distributed the weapons to Serbian reservists.

Draft translation


73. On 1 March 1991, the Croatian MUP raided Pakrac for the first time and moved

like a real army in three columns on separate axes. There were 615 of them and they

had four APC. So, they entered Pakrac and set up road blocks. Those Serbs who were

armed fled to one hill called Kavarija, and the Croatian MUP started searching the

streets and houses. That time, some Serbs fled to Gradi{ka.

74. At the time, I worked in the military remand prison in Zagreb, where we held

those who had been arrested for illegal arming and where trials were about to begin.

The Serbs who fled from Pakrac reported the Croatian MUP had stormed the church

in Pakrac, locked up the Serbs there and killed the priest.

75. MILO[EVI] called KADIJEVI] and asked him what was going on. KADIJEVI]

asked KOL[EK, the Commander of the Military District, who also did not know, but

he sent a unit from Bjelovar to see what was going on. The connection was lost, and

KADIJEVI] called Marko NEGOVANOVI] to ask what was going on, but he also did

not know. So then NEGOVANOVI] called me and found me in the military remand

prison in Zagreb. I also said I did not know what was going on.

76. I got into the car and took along Colonel Bo{ko KELE^EVI], with whom I left for

Pakrac to see what was going on. On the access route to Pakrac there was an anti-tank

barrier pulled across the road. Since I had a loudspeaker on the car, I switched on the

rotation to scare them and I shouted out "Remove, remove", and the Croatian MUP

moved the anti-tank barriers and we entered Pakrac. Pakrac looked like it was under

occupation. Ten soldiers each were moving in columns like armed soldiers, there were

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Serbs who were pressed against a wall, legs spread wide, and they were being

searched. The place was teeming with Croatian MUP.

77. I parked the car on the side where the Parish Court /@upski Dvor/ was, while on

the other side of this little square there was the police station. I looked and saw a

chain that had been removed on the church door bolt, and that is why I saw that there

was somebody inside. I saw police helmets showing behind the church fence and I

saw that policemen were there. I also had the police channel turned on and I was

listening to what they were saying. And they said, "A military Ascona entered," and

that was Stjepan MARKA^, who is now in The Hague, and he used to be the

Commander of the Special Unit. He said, "Just monitor, nothing /else/. I then drove to

the hill by car, and at that moment I did not know if there were any Serbs there or not.

I took the binoculars out and saw a light machine-gun and two men from the MUP in

the church bell tower. And I came to the conclusion that they had climbed the bell

tower as a high point from where they were controlling Pakrac, while the ones down

there were preventing anybody from coming into the town. I went to the local hospital

just to be on the safe side, to see if there had been any dead. The people in the hospital

were scared, but there were no dead.

78. This is when I left Pakrac and went towards Virovitica, to a peak from where I

could reach the military repeater station in Kozara. There I got in touch with KOL[EK

on the phone, and in order to be accurate, I passed on to the Commander that it was a

typical police raid. After that I went back to Pakrac, where there was not a soul

anymore. But I noticed some MUP officers waving at us to stop and take cover. I got

Draft translation


outside the police station and saw that it was riddled with bullets, the door was

broken, and I saw two bloody tunics on the stairs.

79. Inside the police station it was teeming with police. MARKA^ pulled me to the

side and said, "Take cover." I had already become a General. So, MARKA^ said to

me, "Comrade General, take cover, the Chetniks are shooting from the hill." I said,

"Was anybody wounded?" MARKA^ replied, "I have two wounded policemen, one is

seriously wounded." I said, "Do you need me to call a helicopter", and he said,

"Thank you, Comrade General, they've been taken care of. But thank you."

80. I then went back to the hospital to check if there were any dead there, and near the

hospital I saw a tank column – three tanks, some trucks and 3-4 APCs. I approached

them, two soldiers on guard were strolling past the tanks. I asked them, "What are you

doing", and they replied, "We're securing." "Why don't you come over here", and I

took them to a gate-house outside the hospital and said, "This little house is your

cover and from here you will prevent anybody from approaching you with hand-held

launcher and firing at the tank." I asked them what their names were and told them,

"You two – a Serb and a Croat – you are protecting Yugoslavia." After that I called

NEGOVANOVI] to tell him what happened.

81. While I was in Pakrac, the Croatian authorities had already issued a warrant for

my death. When I left the police station in Pakrac, I went back to the column, at

exactly 1930 hours, the news had started, a courier came from the column and said,

"The MUP fired on some soldiers", on that Serb and Croat. Fortunately, they were not

Draft translation


injured. That was the first time that the army had been shot at after 1972 in Radu{a,

when the Commander of a Military Police company was killed, and the first time

since the Yugoslavia existed, that the MUP, in this case the Croatian MUP, shot at the

army.

82. At the time, also around 40 Serbs were arrested by the Croatian MUP and brought

to the MUP in Bjelovar. During the night, an emergency session of the Presidency

was held, and it was decided that the army would step in and separate the warring

parties. That was also the period when I had an argument with Stipe MESI]. We were

really principled in the army at the time, we were a buffer army, and we stood behind

each other.

Plitvice

83. As regards the events in Plitvice, I do not have that much information, and what I

know is that there was a problem because the Croatian MUP was raiding police

stations and they captured the station in Plitvice. Then Milan BABI] mobilised the

Serbs to go and chase them out of the police station, which was mostly Serbian.

General RA[ETA personally managed to prevent the Serbs, who had organised

themselves and were marching from neighbouring villages towards the police station

to attack the MUP officers, and they tried to break through the cordon that was laid by

the army. However, two Croatian policemen were killed in an ambush. The army

managed to separate the warring parties and stayed in the area until September 1991.

Draft translation


84. So the order of events in Croatia was the following: the Croats first armed

themselves, both illegally and with large amounts. As early as in mid-1990 they had

created their illegal army, which they later renamed to law enforcement officers

because they were uncovered. All that time they were arming their HDZ illegally, and

advocated the killing of JNA and Serbs on their doorsteps, butchering them without

asking if it was a woman or a child. All of this was irrefutably recorded even by

television cameras. On the footage that my service made there is no other information

that we later received when my service arrested the conspirators and interviewed

them. They were preparing concrete to cement pits where they were supposed to

throw the Serbs that were killed in order to prevent their being found. The Croatian

authorities had prepared everything to create a Serbian camp. When this information

became public, they caused a general uprising and revolt among the Serbs.

85. The state of the SFRY was unable to prevent these events because it had to order

the army to disarm all these formations and arrest all rebels. The Serbs in Croatia,

therefore, had no other choice but to organise themselves in order to protect

themselves.

The relationship of the JNA towards the Serbs in Croatia

86. In the course of 1990, the JNA did not have a protective attitude towards the Serbs

in Croatia. The JNA had its orientation to which it was committed, and it practically

transformed into a buffer army to prevent clashes between the two ethnic groups. So,

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it was not about protecting the Serbs if the Serbs were attacking Croats. A typical

example were the events in Pakrac. I was in Pakrac at the time, where we stood as a

buffer zone between the two sides.

87. In the first half of 1991, the head of the Italian intelligence service, General

RAMPONI, paid us a visit. At the time he had a distorted picture of the events, which

was the result of intense propaganda from Croatia in addition to numerous contacts

with Western powers. It was the time when TUÐMAN was writing letters to BUSH

dramatising the situation by saying that the "Army is ravaging democracy" etc., and

when General RAMPONI came to visit he was convinced that the army had gone out

and covered everything there in Croatia. I told him exactly how many soldiers there

were, and that was approximately some four battalions throughout Yugoslavia. And

he did not believe it. I told him, "We'll take a helicopter, take me to any point you

want to go, for which you claim that there is the JNA." And after the visit he called

DE MICHELIS, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and explained to him what the

actual situation was. We were in Dobanovci where he said that the situation on the

ground is a completely different situation. The army was objectively put between the

two armed ethnic groups.

88. Back then, on the Serbian side we did not have a paramilitary organisation, staffs,

special killing units, lists of Croats to be killed, in other words, that did not exist on

the Serbian side in 1990, and later in Bosnia, I do not know about it either. There were

armed Serbs, but these were all minor situations. Unlike the Croatian authorities,

where there was a paramilitary organisation, staffs, special killing units, lists of Serbs

Draft translation


to be killed, etc.

The relationship of the JNA towards the Serbs in Croatia

89. In the second half of 1990, we had a situation in Western Herzegovina, which is

mostly populated by Croats, a picture and situation as if this was not Bosnia and

Herzegovina, but Croatia. I went there myself. In late 1990 I went through Western

Herzegovina, which was entirely decorated with HDZ symbols, the checkerboard,

with Yugoslav and republican flags of Bosnia and Herzegovina taken down, although

they were still valid at the time. That was a situation of general euphoria in that area

that they would join Croatia.

90. Then we discovered a transport of two trucks with weapons that were being sent

from Lu~ko to ^apljina, to the area of ^apljina and Metkovi}. Therefore, at the time

we had a nationalist euphoric HDZ rampage in Western Herzegovina and an rebellion

by the Croats who claimed that they were no longer within Bosnia and Herzegovina,

which the BH leadership accepted, I would say, tolerantly and passively.

91. Later they killed our first military personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when I

reacted with Alija IZETBEGOVI] and explained what the situation was like in

Western Herzegovina, and he said to me, "Well, Aca, not even in Tito's time was

Western Herzegovina a part of Bosnia." So, he had completely come to terms with the

fact that he could not stop these developments there.

Draft translation


92. So, the service had obtained information about cases of laying explosives, killing

and kidnapping of military personnel in Western Herzegovina, the HDZ rampage

there, and then at the session of the federal Council for the Protection of the

Constitutional Order where we discussed the situation in the country and where we

presented the situation in Western Herzegovina, it was proposed to have Alija

IZETBEGOVI] send a public protest note to Franjo TUÐMAN to leave Western

Herzegovina in peace and not get Bosnia involved in the war. At the time, weapons

were also transported from Metkovi} via the Bosnian municipality of Neum to

Dubrovnik and the armed HDZ formations that were infiltrated into Dubrovnik where

there had never been any military. But IZETBEGOVI] refused to do that.

93. In that period, the President of the HDZ for Bosnia and Herzegovina was Stjepan

KLJUJI]. We had two meetings with him on 15 October 1991 and 24 December 1991.

KLJUJI] was representing the interests of the HDZ, and the choice of the HDZ was an

independent Herzegovina as a part of Croatia. During 1990, my service of the JNA

had its people in the Croatian MUP. They were derogatorily called "labradors".

94. Croatia tried to get Bosnia and Macedonia involved in the war at all cost, and the

advisor for this military organisation and establishing cooperation from Croatia was

Ragib MERD@ANI]. Ragib MERD@ANI] used to be an operative of the State

Security in Rijeka, after that, at the time he was TUÐMAN's high-ranking official in

the Croatian MUP, and he was known incognito as a man from Croatia who serves for

the coordination of activities between Croatia and Bosnia /as printed/. For the same

reason, Dalibor BROZOVI] was sent to Macedonia, to Skopje. MERD@ANI] even

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had his code in Sarajevo and he had a radio station.

95. You will recall that on 27 June 1991 the conflict in Slovenia began. On 30 June

1991 we intercepted a conversation between TUÐMAN and Alija IZETBEGOVI] by

radio monitoring in which TUÐMAN asked Alija IZETBEGOVI] to have Bosnia be

active, to help Slovenia, and that he call on the members of the JNA from Bosnia and

Herzegovina who are serving their military service or are within a JNA formation, to

distance themselves from the JNA and to obstruct its participation in these operations

because that was not their war, etc. Alija IZETBEGOVI] responded, "I'm following

the situation, I believe the time is not right yet." This recording was made by the

federal organs who were monitoring the area through so-called electronic

reconnaissance, and this conversation was intercepted. I was given this by one of the

federal organs.

96. At that time, there was still no war in Croatia. In my assessment, the war in

Croatia started on 15 September 1991, when the Croatian forces launched general

attacks against JNA buildings. The HDZ even tried to get Kosovo involved in the war.

In his memoirs, [PEGELJ described the pressure that was put on RUGOVA. They

were offering him weapons, and he was wavering whether to take it or not. They also

put pressure on Fikret ABDI], who was also offered weapons from that period when

the HDZ was being armed in Croatia.

Monitoring of the JNA by the HDZ

Draft translation


97. In the second half of 1990, the HDZ was massively monitoring the JNA, from the

moment when they gathered those unprofessional, often times drunk people and

dressed them in uniforms through the local HDZ boards and the Catholic church.

During the course that they took they learned to shoot with live ammunition, but they

did not learn about the rights and authorities of the MUP and the use of the baton,

force and police tasks. They immediately started training them as if they were the

army. Since they had so many of them, they established checkpoints on several rings

in Croatia. In other words, as early 1990, they already had sand bags near Slavonski

Brod, complete uniforms with helmets, bunkers, etc. They stopped me when I was

travelling with military licence plates. And I had to go through there, so I stopped.

When I stopped, I opened my window, and the Croatian policeman asked me whether

I had any weapons. I cut him off saying that he did not have any authority to search

me, and this was the end of our verbal clash. The point was that from Slavonski Brod

the HDZ and the MUP already had three rings where they controlled the movement

and traffic. That operation was called Je` /Hedgehog/. My service was monitoring this

operation very carefully too. So, the Croatian MUP was permanently checking traffic,

for instance 5 military vehicles, one Campagnola, 4 TAMs, empty, at this and this

time, there and there. So, this was all about monitoring military traffic.

The attempt at arresting Martin [PEGELJ

98. My service uncovered some coded Croatian communication. The code sign for

stand-by measures was "Windy, windy", and going over into action was "Cold, cold".

Draft translation


The countersign was "Winter is coming, there'll be snow."

99. On 28 January 1991, I received a task from the SSNO to go and meet

BOLJKOVAC in accordance with the decisions by the Presidency of the SFRY from

25 January, in order to agree on joint action for the implementation of the tasks

regarding the trial before the Military Court in Zagreb, which was ongoing. Together

with Bo{ko KELE^EVI], we went to the Tu{kanjac Centre of the Special Units in

official uniforms, unarmed, but I was carrying a recording device. The Croatian MUP

made a cordon of 12 MUP officers along the path where we passed, and I said to

BOLJKOVAC, "What is this bluff?", to which he responded, "But no, that's a cordon

of honour." Then I told him, "Yes, to show that you have these American rifles, and

not just Kalashnikovs."

100. Following a lengthy conversation, we finally sat down at a round table, and I

noticed that there were four extra plates. I asked BOLJKOVAC if we were waiting for

someone. He responded that we were not waiting for anybody. During the evening the

phone rang, and the head of the Croatian DB PERKOVI] picked up and said, "Yes,

hello. OK, OK", and he hung up. PERKOVI] added that Bjelovar reported that they

had some problems. During a previous meeting I had agreed with PERKOVI] that his

service would arrest Ivan BELANI, in whose house weapons were illegally

distributed, and that he be brought in to the barracks in Virovitica, where we would

conduct an interview and take further measures. They sent their DB operatives to that

village where BELANI was, and there 20 armed HDZ men arrested the DB operatives

thinking that they were from the KOS /Counter-intelligence Service/ of the JNA who

Draft translation


had come to arrest them. The armed HDZ men took the operatives of the Croatian DB

to the MUP in Virovitica. That was what had been referred to as problems.

101. At that moment, [PEGELJ and the Deputy for Material Supplies @eljko

TOMLJENOVI] entered the room where we were. They were all people whom we

had recorded during Operation [tit. At the time, there was no arrest warrant out for

[PEGELJ because he had received a court summons to appear on that and that day to

give a statement. [PEGELJ then turned to me and said, "So you are VASILJEVI]?",

and I responded, "I am." Then he asked me, "What's up in our beautiful Belgrade?",

and I told him, "Well, it's cold. This morning we had 25 below zero. I saw that some

sixty people were admitted to the traumatology department." "What do you know, so

it's cold in Belgrade too?", [PEGELJ added. I said, "It's cold in Belgrade, but it's not

cold-cold", referring to the coded communication of the Croatian forces. [PEGELJ

reacted to that saying, "Ah, you know that too?", and I replied, "I know about windy,

windy, too", and I continued, "Mr [PEGELJ, had I known that you would be here

tonight, I wouldn't have come here." He replied to me, "What is it, am I contagious?",

and I told him, "You're not contagious, but I'm just saying, I wouldn't have come here

had I known that you'd be here." "Hear, hear, another KUKANJAC in the army",

[PEGELJ commented. KUKANJAC had given an interview saying "There's no

Croatian wallet in the Croatian pocket", because [PEGELJ was saying that the Croats

would become independent. [PEGELJ then turned to me once again and said, "OK, I

see I'm not wanted here. VASILJEVI], you can tell KADIJEVI] that I'm prepared to

talk, return all the weapons, and we can deal with all this in a deliberative way." I

replied to him saying I was not his courier and that he knew how to reach General

Draft translation


KADIJEVI] and pass on what he wanted. "All right", [PEGELJ said, got up and left.

102. The same moment I sent a dispatch to Belgrade. From Belgrade I received a

response to speak with [PEGELJ the next day and try to arrest him. The next day,

[PEGELJ called KELEÊVI], and we recorded the conversation. KELEÊVI]

suggested to him to meet at the JNA Centre, and [PEGELJ replied to him, "Oh no,

thank you very much, OK, VASILJEVI] can come here to see me." KELEÊVI]

replied to that, "Well, it's not appropriate for the General to come and see you in the

Ministry in this situation, let's do it somewhere neutral." "All right, OK, wherever you

want", [PEGELJ said. And the decision was made to go to Srebrenjak, an excursion

destination in Zagreb.

103. I immediately arranged to have the police set up an ambush up there to arrest

[PEGELJ. I had also prepared TORBETAR to tell [PEGELJ, in case he changed his

mind and did not want to come, "Well, VASILJEVI] was also in a hurry, they called

him back to Belgrade, so he isn't here, he left for Belgrade earlier, about an hour or

two ago." And that is what actually happened. We received information that "The

Minister said he had a session of the government", and the message he left for

VASILJEVI] was that "When the army disarms these Chetniks in Knin, that's when

we'll sit down and talk." And from that moment on we started to hunt [PEGELJ to

arrest him, and later I learned from his memoirs that TUÐMAN had hidden him in

Austria.

The blockade of JNA buildings by Croatian forces

Draft translation


104. The blockades of military buildings began in January 1991, when the

disarming order was issued and the Croatian authorities did not return the weapons.

To be precise, they had returned 427 rifles in total, and only 11 Kalashnikovs from a

total of 20,000 they had imported, and from an additional 30,000 – 40,000 that they

had in the legal formations in the MUP. From that time, following an order from

[PEGELJ, i.e. from 19 January 1991, which we also recorded, the Croatian armed

forces started a general blockade of military buildings and were prepared to open fire

if there was a movement of units. These were tasks issued by [PEGELJ, and they

included that nobody, no officer, courier, or anybody, was allowed to leave the

barracks.

105. We arrested the group we were monitoring in Virovitica. Staff Sergeant

KOVA^ and Sergeant 1st Class [ABARI] had the task of raiding the barracks, to call

the Brigade Commander, Colonel FILIPOVI], and to order him to hand over the keys

of the depot and to withdraw the guards. If FILIPOVI] did not comply, they had

orders to call the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel VLADNJAR, and they were

supposed to say, "We'll kill VLADNJAR if you don't order the hand over of the keys

to the barracks and the withdrawal of the guards." The order was that if it was not

accepted, VLADNJAR should be killed, and they were supposed to switch to attack.

106. So, in Virovitica, on 21 January 1991, when the extended deadline of 48 hours

for the return of illegally procured weapons had expired on the Croatian leadership,

the Croatian forces blocked the barracks in the second half of the night, and in the

Draft translation


morning they stopped 10 young soldiers who were going for a medical check-up to

Zagreb and made them go back to the barracks.

107. The duty officer was a Croat, Captain 1st Class Damir PREPEK. He took a

guard with him and went to see who was stopping the army. In the meantime, the

Croats had run off. At the time there were 600 involved in the blockade of Virovitica.

They confessed that later to me when I spoke to some of them in the prison in Zagreb.

108. After that, another session of the Presidency was held, where a decision was

taken to reduce the measures of combat readiness, because at the time the army was in

the barracks with its officers, and at the same time, the Croatian MUP was supposed

to disband its reserve force. After that a team of the Federal MUP arrived to check the

weapons in the police stations. The team of the Federal MUP concluded that, for

instance in Bjelovar, so and so many official IDs had been issued, but that the

wherabouts of 300 IDs was completely unknown. Nobody in the Croatian leadership

was able to give a response. Furthermore, some of the weapons were returned, but not

all of them, and still some 30% of the reserve force of the Croatian MUP went home

and took their weapons with them.

109. However, the general blockade that was ordered and carried out according to

the plan of the Croatian leadership continued on 15 September 1991. There is a tape

that an amateur in Bjelovar recorded from the water tower on 29 September 1991 in

the morning from 0600 hours until the evening at around 2100 hours. The Croats

locked up the officers and soldiers and brought them to a gym, and there is also a

Draft translation


recording of a dead body of my Captain, Dragi{a JOVANOVI], the security officer in

Bjelovar, who was stripped down to a shirt and killed with a bullet in the head, and

one Croats is kicking his head and saying, "You won't do anything anymore,

moustache, you motherfucking Chetnik."

110. So, on 15 September 1991, the general attacks against the barracks started, and

during the attack on the Command of the Air Force Corps in Zagreb, the Croats

obtained the documentation of the security organ, which was not destroyed, although I

had ordered that everything be destroyed. However, because of the betrayal of one

officer, the documentation was handed over to non-commissioned officer RAKARI],

with whom he was working, and who had already decided to join the HDZ. In this

way, the Croats obtained the records of our agents in their MUP. So from that 15

September 1991 they obtained the names of our agents whom they followed and

intercepted, and for one month they were processing them, and this was code named

Labrador.

111. Then the Croats arrested some of our people and kept them in prison for two

or three months. Three of them were immediately released, while the others were held

until a mutual prisoner release was arranged by both sides, which also included the

man who in May 1991 was strangling a Macedonian JNA soldier on a Military Police

APC in Split on a packed square.

EVENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Draft translation


Military organisation of the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/

112. In July 1991, we received first reports about the SDA military organisation in the

Doboj sector. Military training had started and trustworthy SDA members were sent

for military training to Croatia. At the same time, I had information about 100 armed

men in @ivinice municipality, 80 in Srebrenica, etc. I had specific information about

the number of men who attended two-month training in Croatia from four

municipalities. According to this information, a total number of about 1,500 SDA

members underwent military training in Croatia.

113. The person in charge was the SDA President of Novo Sarajevo municipality, that

is, he organised the admission of a large number of SDA members who attended

military courses in Sarajevo. They received food, accommodation and a daily

allowance of 500 dinars for every day of training. This means that SDA members,

who themselves underwent the training in Croatia, were now holding trainings. I also

received information that Serbs were beginning to arm themselves in some villages

and in the Fo~a area.

114. However, the Security Administration did not start the processing yet and we did

not launch an operative action because I did not have any hard facts. I had information

about indications of an armed group here and an armed group there, but I do not

receive updated information.

Draft translation


115. I received preliminary reports about the existence of a military core at the SDA

headquarters in Sarajevo, which is the backbone of the forming of the Patriotic

League, sometime in mid-September 1991. The information came from a well-

informed, high-ranking SDA official. Upon learning this and trying to obtain more

information, he told me: “Go on, continue napping while your officers are forming an

army in the SDA.” I said to him “Hold on, what is this about?” and he replied:

“Listen, I have information about three or four officers who either left the army or

have been demobilised. They are Muslims, but I have no other details. All I know are

their aliases: Halil, Adnan and Kemo. These are the aliases of the three men who I

know are in the SDA headquarters.”

116. Halil was Sefer HALILOVI] and, it was later established, Kemo was Meho

Karisik, lieutenant colonel of the JNA.This means that we learned their identities

later, but the processing and the first specific information was registered in early

December 1991 because we obtained very specific information about the organisation

and received papers from a man who was in a paramilitary organisation. From him we

got the organisational order of the Patriotic League of the People, then there were

documents for secret command of troops according to which the army is in the centre

of these attacks and we realise that it is a copy of the operation previously

implemented by the Croats in Operation [tit /Shield/ and the events with [PEGELJ,

which involved blocking of army barracks, taking servicemen and their family

members as hostages and so on.

Draft translation


117. The organisation of the Patriotic League was based on the regional division of

Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time. The Main Staff of the Patriotic League was in

Sarajevo, at the SDA headquarters, and there were nine regional staffs in BH. What is

interesting is that there were staffs for territories outside BH, that is, a staff for

Kosovo and for Sand`ak. In other words, there were Patriotic League staffs for the

organisation of Muslims, not only in the territory of BH, but also in the territory of

Sebia and a part of Montenegro.

118. We obtained information about the existence of SDA military staffs outside BH

through a man who took part in meetings which were attended by SDA officials from

Sarajevo and from the regions. That is how we found out about what was going on in

other areas and how the Patriotic League functioned.

119. The SDA established a typical military organisation. It is significantly different

from the armed formations of the Serbs because the Muslims already had a command,

which is a copy of a regular military command with a commander, chief of staff and

chiefs of combat arms and services. They had people in charge of the PVO /anti-

aircraft defence/, logistics, technical, quartermaster, medical and transport /services/.

Thus, it was a copy of the existing military organisation of the JNA /Yugoslav

People’s Army/ or the legal territorial defence. Also, the Patriotic League had a

military staff and a political staff at every level. The political staffs comprise ranking

officials and senior SDA officials from the republican to the municipal level. They

create the policy and decide on the use of military formations, while the military staffs

only execute the decisions of the political staffs. Everything is implemented along all

Draft translation


levels of structure from Sarajevo to the municipality, for example, to @ivinice.

Within the regional staffs, there are sabotage detachments. I treated them as sabotage

and terrorist detachments because they carried out terrorist actions.

120. The decision to activate these special formations which were armed the best, who

were handpicked and well-trained, was taken by the political staff at the highest level.

Therefore, a commander could not use his sabotage detachment or his special

sabotage unit for an operation unless he received verification from the political staff in

Sarajevo and the man in the Patriotic League military staff in Sarajevo whose name

was Atif Šaronji� (pseudonym Emir). Due to the aforementioned organisation

principle, Vahid KARAVELI], who became the commander of the regional staff for

northeast Bosnia, as a seasoned soldier rebelled at a meeting about who had the right

to use his unit without asking him and without his knowledge.

121. Units of the Patriotic League blocked roads and JNA facilities and this was all

directed from Sarajevo. According to information obtained by my service, the key

figures in the political staff of the Patriotic League were Ejup GANI], Hasan

�engi�, Mahmut�ehaji� and Omer BEHMEN. The key figures in the military

staff were Sefer HALILOVI], Meho Karišik, Mustafa Hajrulahovi�, Atif

Šaronji� as well as others who played minor roles.

Financing of the SDA military organisation, the Patriotic League

Draft translation


122. After Croatia became independent, money bills had to be retrieved from the

former republics which changed their currency. The money bills were supposed to be

retrieved from the former republics and taken to the central bank since a new dinar

had been issued which became the new currency. The people were given 15 days to

exchange all the money bills in their possession, but since there were very many

money bills in circulation, it could not be done quickly and the deadline was extended

for another month. So, there was a large amount of money bills in circulation. Since

Croatia did not want to return the old dinars to the federal bank, they remained there.

The Muslims reached an agreement with the Croats to take over the old dinars from

them and find a way to cover the paper trail within the extended one month deadline

for the exchange of money bills and convert them into a valid currency. This is how

the SDA came into possession of truckloads of money. From a completely different

source, I received confirmation about money being sent from Croatia to Bosnia,

through connections in Hungary. What happened after? People with connections in

Yugoslavia and in Belgrade received half the amount to legalise the money and

convert it into a valid currency. For example under the agreement, if the exchanged

amount was 300 million old dinars, the person would give the SDA 150 million.

Therefore, half of the money was spent to grease the wheels, given to the people who

were supposed to legalise, by leaving a paper trail that it belonged to such-and-such a

company from such-and-such a place.

123. In February January 1992, during an inspection at the gate-house, the JNA

military police in the Ra{ka garrison found a trunk full of old money bills in the trunk

of a Mercedes belonging to Lieutenant Ferid MUJKANOVI], a deserter from

Draft translation


Slovenia who is originally from the village of Mao~e near Br~ko and who was at the

time already the head of the SDA military crisis staff for the Br~ko area. He intended

to ask his former colleague, with whom he served in Slovenia, if he had connections

to exchange the money. He was arrested by the military police and during a

conversation at the time, he told us how the SDA was getting the money and what it

was being used for. After the old money bills were converted into valid money, the

SDA bought German Marks in Kosovo and that coincided with the first inflationary

shock for the dinar, which skyrocketed to 13:1, although it had been stabilised by

Ante MARKOVI] who pegged it to the German Mark at a ratio of 7:1. Overall it was

approximately 1140 million old dinars, which Mujkanovic exchanged for one million

marks. From the total exchanged money, the SDA headquarters procured weapons for

2,5 million marks that were stocked in Visoko under the jurisdiction of the General

Staff PL.

124. The SDA used the money to buy weapons from the Croats who were emptying

out their territorial defence depots and seizing weapons from the JNA army barracks.

The SDA is now armed with M48 rifles, Thompson automatic rifles, mines and

explosives and Croatia has become the main illegal supplier of arms to the SDA. For

example, the Patriotic League in the Zvornik area received weapons in this manner

from the Slavonski Brod ZNG /National Guards Corps/ and through the charity

organisation Merhamet in Zagreb

Implementing the SDA military plans

Draft translation


125. In early July 1991, preparations are underway in the Doboj area to establish

Muslim units as per directives received from the SDA headquarters in Sarajevo.

Doboj Municipality President Mustafa ALI^I] worked on this. The Commander of the

Od`ak TO /Territorial Defence/ Staff already completed a course in Zagreb for the

purpose of making a defence plan, preparing for secession and joining Croatia

because the Croats always had their eye on the territory of the Bosnian Posavina. That

same month, i.e. July 1991, a source from the Novo Sarajevo security organ disclosed

information that Radovan KARAD@I] issued an order at a meeting of the SDS

/Serbian Democratic Party/ board that Serbs should refrain from making provocations

and that they should not provide the Muslims and Croats with an excuse to attack.

126. During July 1991, a group was formed in Vi{egrad with the task to raid the army

depot and seize weapons. The group was armed with Thompson automatic rifles and

led by Alija [ABOVI], the Vice-President of Vi{egrad Municipality. After that, we

received information about an SDA sabotage group in the Rogatica area, headed by

reserve lieutenant Salih ]ERKO. An identical sabotage group was formed in the Fo~a

area. A number of SDA members from @ivinice, Bratunac, Vlasenica and Srebrenica

underwent two-month training in Croatia. According to our information, the SDA sent

about 1,500 persons from Bosnia to Croatia for military training. The SDA formed its

crisis staffs in August 1991.

127. On 14 and 15 August 1991, 1,000 Thompson automatic rifles were transferred

from the MUP depot in Sarajevo to Biha} and Zijad KATI], from the Biha} MUP,

distributed them to trustworthy members of the SDA, meaning there was considerable

Draft translation


transport of weapons. The central depot of weapons belonging to the MUP reserve

forces was located in Rakovica village, near Sarajevo. Asim DAUTPA[I], an official

of the MUP from Sarajevo, obtained weapons from Kranj (Slovenia) which are

distributed along the SDA line.

128. As of August 1991, Alija IZETBEGOVI] issued directives along the SDA line to

obstruct the mobilisation of JNA units and sending of recruits to discharge their

compulsory military service in the JNA at all levels, starting from the municipalities.

For this purpose, military records kept by the municipal secretariats for national

defence were removed and in some places they were even destroyed. Certain

secretariats for national defence in municipalities were broken into and military

records were set on fire, for example, in Grada~ac municipality. When military organs

took measures to take the military records from the municipalities and prevent them

from being destroyed, special formations of the Patriotic League staged ambushes and

attacks on the military organs. This happened in Kalesija, on the Tuzla – Zvornik

road, when officers and soldiers were disarmed and the military records were seized.

129. In early September 1991, the SDA started staging armed operations. The

Srebrenik Secretariat for national defence was broken into and the military records

and files were set on fire. A similar attempt was made at the Secretariat for national

defence in Grada~ac municipality, which was thwarted by a military police patrol.

Armed SDA members opened fire and wounded two Serbs who were on their way out

of [ehovi}i. To prevent an escalation of the conflict, an appeal was made along the

lines of the SDS to mollify the situation and for Serbs not to retaliate. At the time, the

Draft translation


Serbs were still passive although we have information that they too had weapons in

their possession, but pursuant to instructions from Radovan KARAD@I], they were

steering clear from provocations.

130. I met Alija DELIMUSTAFI] on 1 September 1991 in Han Pijesak via General

GRA^ANIN. On that occasion, we agreed to preserve the BH MUP and

DELIMUSTAFI] was not supposed to allow what was happening in Croatia, where

the MUP had become the army with three times as many policemen as the peacetime

MUP. It was then that DELIMUSTAFI] said to me: “Oh Aca, I’d love to do that but

how can I be sure if I don’t know what people are doing behind my back.” At the

time, the Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP had a large reserve police force and the

overall structure of the MUP, social self-protection and territorial defence totalled

115,000 men. I told him: “You must accept the jurisdiction of the Federal MUP and

then the Federal MUP will send inspectors to all parts of BH to check the

transformation of the MUP, whether a replacement of the former, so-called 1st

category staff who are reliable, reputable men with military training, etc. is being

effected. After that, a team of 70 inspectors from the Federal MUP went to the

regions, to all regions of the MUP to check its functioning.

131. In his book Lukava strategija /Cunning Strategy/, Sefer HALILOVI] said that he

reported to IZETBEGOVI] in September 1991 and showed him maps which

HALILOVI] made in the Patriotic League military staff. On that occasion,

IZETBEGOVI] said to HALILOVI]: “Oh, Sefer, 50,000 Muslims must be mobilised,”

Draft translation


and HALILOVI] replied: “Mr President, you got it wrong, not 50,000 but 150,000

must be mobilised.”

132. I would like to recall that the war in Croatia started on 15 September 1991, all

the army barracks from Vara`din onwards were blocked and attacked, as well as the

Naval District, the military port of Lora, Zadar, [ibenik, Split. There is a general

blockade of military facilities and JNA units everywhere. The Croats used Metkovi}

and Bosnian territory, the municipality of Neum, to bring armed formations to

Dubrovnik where there were no army forces. Alija DELIMUSTAFI] and the President

of Neum municipality begged the JNA to do something to stop the Croats from

passing through Bosnia, to avoid Bosnia being dragged into the war. There is

Dubrovnik which is armed, Metkovi}, the blocked naval district and a war raging in

all parts of Croatia. As a result of these operations, a large number of officers and

soldiers, nearly 2,700, were captured, scores were killed and hundreds of JNA

members were injured.

133. As a result of the developments, the military leadership on 19 September 1991

decided to mobilize parts of the 2nd Corps in Podgorica and the 37th Corps in U`ice

and these formations, legal parts of JNA units, were to take over the hinterland of the

naval district through eastern Herzegovina, as far as the left bank of the Neretva river,

secure the Mostar military airport and be on stand-by for further operations to lift the

blockade of the garrison and units of the Naval District.

Draft translation


134. This was the famous, alleged “incursion of Chetniks from Serbia into sovereign

Bosnia and Herzegovina” as the SDA and the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/

described it. At a session of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, Minister of

Defence Jerko DOKO immediately called for a general mobilisation in Bosnia and

Herzegovina as a reply to the “incursion of Serbs and Montenegrins who are

occupying Bosnia” and to put pressure on the army barracks and seize weapons of the

Territorial Defence which were kept in the army barracks.

135. Alija DELIMUSTAFI] mollified the situation by giving assurances that the army

was just doing its job and carrying out its tasks, that it was not disturbing the people

or anyone else and that the army should not be prevented from executing its activities

which had nothing to do with Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to mollify the

situation, he proposed mobilising the police reserve if necessary as it is in charge of

securing public law and order, etc. That was when the MUP reserve police forces

were mobilised, on 19 September 1991.

136. Therefore, there were no volunteers from Serbia – legal JNA units arrived

pursuant to a decision of the Presidency of the SFRY, which was still in existence.

There were no incidents, involving reservists who were attacking Muslims. However,

according to SDA directives from Sarajevo, an attempt was made to put the people in

the army’s way by blocking the bridge in Vi{egrad to prevent the passage of units of

the JNA 37th Crops. This failed and the JNA units managed to reach the left bank of

the Neretva.

Draft translation


137. A JNA convoy from Montenegro was intercepted in Stolac and was attacked. As

a result, two or three JNA soldiers were killed by armed members of the HOS

/Croatian Armed Forces/. The Croatian forces also laid a trap for a JNA military unit

in the Dubrovnik hinterland, killing between 10 and 12 soldiers and officers. This was

the beginning of the blockade of Dubrovnik, the HOS launched an attack on Mostar

and ^apljina and so on.

138. Alija IZETBEGOVI] said that the Muslims would not get involved and that the

Muslims who were in the army should leave, but, in general, he was obstructing the

mobilisation of existing JNA units in Bosnia. As a result of the obstruction of the

mobilisation and the ensuing shortage of troops, the JNA had to bring parts of two

corps from Serbia and Montenegro, not because of Bosnia but because of the

difficulties of the JNA units in Croatia.

139. The Serbs issued an appeal for everyone to respond to the JNA call and join the

JNA units and a large number of Serbs volunteered, without being called up, to fill the

JNA ranks because the Muslims left.

140. On 20 September 1991, Bruno STOJI], who was a chief in the Bosnia and

Herzegovina Republican MUP, got hold of weapons – recoilless cannon and hand-

held launchers – for paramilitary units of the HDZ in the ^apljina and Stolac sector.

141. In October 1991, we embarked upon a specific activity with the BH MUP to

establish joint checkpoints on all roads and to secure five bridges across the Drina and

Draft translation


the bridge across the Sava near Gunja, towards Br~ko. These bridges led from Serbia

to Bosnia since it was very important from the military aspect to keep open roads

between the rest of Yugoslavia – Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, where there

were JNA units – and the Knin Krajina, where a war was raging and where we had

our units. These 39 checkpoints, which remained operational, postponed the war in

Bosnia by six months.

142. However, we could not establish joint checkpoints with the BH MUP in Croatian

parts of Herzegovina because they killed a policeman on the bridge in âpljina and

they had already blocked the weapons depots Gabela and Tasov~i}i near âpljina. All

this had been linked up by 20 September 1991 as Jerko DOKO was directly in contact

with [PEGELJ who instructed him to use Croats in BH to block the JNA army

barracks.

143. In early October 1991, there were a number of cases of roads being blocked in

the Mostar area and western Herzegovina, positions being consolidated for the

activities of armed groups, provoking persons securing military facilities in Ba~evi}i

and Tasov~i}i and heavy weapons and anti-aircraft weapons appeared in the Li{tica

area in western Herzegovina, where the HDZ was very well-armed. Back in 1990 we

uncovered a route along which two trucks with weapons had been sent from Rakitje to

âpljina.

Draft translation


144. The HDZ is predominant in the Derventa area where it formed a fully-armed

company with 60 sniper rifles, 98 automatic rifles and six 120 mm mortars. The unit

commander was Ilija GLAVA[.

145. The Serbs organised military training for volunteers in ^ajni~e and the SDA did

the same in Miljevina, forming an armed company, ready to attack the military depot

in Miljevina.

146. Along the lines of the SDA headquarters in Sarajevo, a letter was sent to the

SDA boards to select trustworthy and reliable members to be sent to Sarajevo for

military training, with paid bed and board and a 500-dinar daily allowance for each

day of training. Sefer HALILOVI], the President of the Novo Sarajevo SDA, was

appointed as the coordinator.

147. In late September – early October 1991, Hasan ^ENGI], Omer BEHMEN and

Osman BEKONS used the Merhamet charitable society as an umbrella for

paramilitary organisation of its members. The SDA crisis staffs at all levels had men

from Merhamet in the military organisation. That is how Fazli� Munevera from

Merhamet was authorised by the PL to procure weapons in Zagreb for Tuzla

region. Companies were formed through the Islamic Religious Community

(IRC) and Merhamet specifically to launder money for buying illegal weapons;

most notable of these was the company Spred. The PL meetings were usally

held in the commitee rooms of the IRC.

Draft translation


148. Sulejman VRANJ, a JNA captain who used to serve in Derventa, against whom

disciplinary measures had been taken and who had been expelled from the army, was

in charge of the establishment and organisational structure of the Patriotic League. A

relative of his, with the same last name of VRANJ, was a ranking official in the SDA

and Sulejman became the head personnel officer in the BH Army along that line.

Therefore, the SDA completed its organisation at the municipal level and started

organising the districts, which means that it was making a regional establishment.

149. On 19 November 1991, we had a joint meeting in Mili}i with General

GRA^ANIN and top officials of the BH MUP, attended by both Serbs and Muslims,

i.e. there was the Federal MUP, the Republican MUP and we, from the military

service, and a summary was made about the results the inspection teams and the

situation on the ground. An analysis of the effects of the work of the 39 checkpoints

revealed that a total of 8,000 pieces of illegal weapons from all three sides had been

seized. It is interesting that a team of federal MUPs established that in three centres

of the State Security Service (SDB), according to the Serbian extremists in the

process, there were registered 27 Serb and 9 Croat/Muslim extremist organisations,

while there was no process concerning Muslim paramilitary organisations.

150. A report was made about everything we documented and received about the

SDA military organisation to the SFRY Presidency, which some called the rump

Presidency because its work did not include representatives from Slovenia, Croatia

and others. However, the army held and maintained the position that, regardless of its

composition, as the other members had not been prohibited from participating, we

Draft translation


considered it as the legal supreme commander. Neither DRNOV[EK nor MESI] were

prohibited or prevented from taking part in the work of the Presidency. The army

must have a supreme commander and we recognised the four members as the supreme

command. Thus, a full report on the military organisation of the SDA was submitted

to the SFRY Presidency.

151. In mid-December 1991, in operative action Ma~ /Sword/, my service learned

from me about the illegal military organisation and the arming of the SDA and

obtained important information about the SDA paramilitary units throughout Bosnia

and Herzegovina, and weapons were also distributed on 20 and 21 December 1991 to

units of the Patriotic League in Kladanj and in charge of the distribution was Elvir

[ARI], the Chief of the MUP.

152. On 24 December 1991, a meeting of the military leadership and the BH

Presidency in Sarajevo decided that the BH MUP and the military service should

exchange information in their possession and make a plan to disarm all paramilitary

and armed groups in BH. That same evening, shots were fired through the window of

my younger daughter’s room in my flat in Sarajevo, where my family was located.

However, as the flat was on the fourth floor, the bullet had an ascending trajectory and

passed through the window pane and hit the upper part of a shelf unit. The probable

reason why shots were fired at my flat that evening was that I came with a team from

the SSNO /Federal Ministry of the Defence/ to Sarajevo and this was reported by the

media.

Draft translation


153. On 19 January 1992, pursuant to tasks received at the 24 December 1991 session

of the BH Presidency, we held a joint meeting at the BH MUP to make plans to

disarm all paramilitary formations. The meeting was attended on behalf of the

Administration by General TUMANOV, myself and a representative from Sarajevo,

the Sarajevo Corps Security Chief Colonel Petar SIMOVI], and representing the BH

MUP leadership were Alija DELIMUSTAFI], Avdo HEBIB, Bruno STOJI], Vitomir

@EPINI], Momo MANDI] and the Chief of the DB /State Security/, Branko KVESI],

a Croat.

154. At the meeting, I presented the information obtained through our work on

uncovering the Patriotic League, the quantity of weapons that came, how it came, i.e.,

I set out the indicators of what had been analysed at the meeting in Mili}i on 19

November 1991 in connection with the thousands pieces of weapons that had been

seized. However, Bruno STOJI] responded and made a scene, saying that the army

had nothing to say about the Chetniks and it was only talking about what the Croats

were doing in Herzegovina. He was interrupted by KVESI] from the DB and there

was a small conflict which was terminated by DELIMUSTAFI] who addressed

STOJI] with the following words: “You are no longer down in ^apljina, rise above the

municipal level you were at. We are here in the presence of respected generals from

the SSNO and I do not allow this.” DELIMUSTAFI] mollified the situation but this

was the first conflict which accused us of hushing up information about the arming of

Serbs.

Draft translation


155. All information about the illegal arming of all sides and about the weapons

seized at checkpoints was presented, regardless of ethnicity. However, we did not

present facts about the military organisation of the Serbs because it was still non-

existent both in the form and the manner in which it was done by the SDA. In early

1992, the Serbs did not have a military staff, they did not have persons making plans,

they had not made a structure of the units and they did not issue orders to attack JNA

units. I had no such information.

156. Also, objectively speaking, the Serbian side in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not

against us, unlike the situation in Croatia. People in Croatia were manipulated and

they turned against the JNA because this was in the interests of the HDZ. As a result

of this, the HDZ said that we were Chetniks, commies and so on, and we were up

against mass resistance everywhere. We were supported by the Serbs in the sense that

people responded to the call-up and the mobilisation, they reported for compulsory

military service, they did not block the JNA army barracks and did not attack JNA

members and their families.

157. After the meeting on 19 January 1992, the paramilitary units were neither

disarmed nor disbanded because there was no political will by any of the leaders to

publicly issue a call to his people to lay down their weapons. My service wrote a

report to the SFRY Presidency about the situation and proposed that the Presidency

declare a state of emergency. However, after the report was read by four members of

the Presidency, it was returned to General Blagoje AD@I] without an opinion about

the measures proposed in the report.

Draft translation


158. That was the second time that I had discovered and had in my possession all

information about the paramilitary formations, but I could not do anything about it. It

was up to me to make the decision. AD@I] told me: “What can I do about it? As you

see, they didn’t write anything. What can I do about it now?” I replied: “Can I meet

with IZETBEGOVI] and show him the documentation about the SDA military

organisation and the cassettes from the meetings and rub them in his face.” He

approved.

159. On 5 February 1992, I came for a meeting with Alija IZETBEGOVI] and the

only other person at the meeting was Alija DELIMUSTAFI] because it was he who

told IZETBEGOVI] that I wanted to talk with him. I presented the information to

IZETBEGOVI] that we uncovered the SDA paramilitary organisation, which as a

structure covered the whole territory, that their activity focused on how to deal with

the JNA and that they were already trying to block military units and roads.

IZEBEGOVI] replied that he had no knowledge about it and that he did not believe it,

adding: “Oh, Aca, someone must have slipped this to you, someone who does not

mean well to the people in Bosnia.”

160. I then took out a copy of the organisational order and showed it to him.

IZETBEGOVI] read it and said: “Well, I see nothing questionable here. It might as

well be a type of organisation aimed at protecting the Muslims, if someone were to

attack them.” I then took out a document on the secret command of troops and

showed him the activities pertaining to the blocking of army barracks, attacking army

Draft translation


staff, destroying tanks and so on, where it was clear that it was all aimed against the

JNA. IZETBEGOVI] still insisted that someone had slipped this to me, refusing to

acknowledge the organisation order or the order for action as being authentic,

insisting that someone had slipped it to me and that I had been naïve and swallowed it.

At that point, I opened my bag with the cassette and said to IZETBEGOVI]: “Mr

President, after watching this cassette, will you be able to look me in the eyes.”

IZETBEGOVI] probably thought that depicted on the tape was a local [PEGELJ-type

individual, but the tape contained footage from one of those illegal regional meetings

where we had operative positions.

161. IZETBEGOVI] replied: “All right, all right, Aca, I didn’t know about that.”

Once again he was lying. I told him: “We will go public with this and show them

what you did and how your man, with the pseudonym Adnan, sold weapons in the

Doboj area, buying M48 rifles for 100 German Marks and selling them for 1,100

Gemeran Marks in such-and-such village, and that 400,000 German Marks have been

spent so far for the construction of a petrol station between Gra~anica and Grada~ac,

and so on.” IZETBEGOVI] replied: “Let me check all that and if there is any truth in

it, I will not permit attacks against the army in Bosnia.” He then said that the

reservists who came to Bosnia were causing trouble and that they should be

withdrawn. He said, we are willing to secure the airports, both in Tuzla and in Mostar,

together by our police and the TO, etc.

162. I asked IZETBEGOVI]: “Why don’t you talk to MILO[EVI], why don’t you talk

to the Serbian leadership about preserving Yugoslavia? Why are you letting others

Draft translation


drag you in?” I was thinking about Croatia. IZETBEGOVI] replied: “Well, Aca,

people here don’t want to go with Serbia,” and with my reply I wanted to turn his

attention to the following fact: “As far as I know, you would be the first president of

the new state because Macedonia would choose to stay in Yugoslavia if Bosnia were

to stay.” However, IZETBEGOVI] refused to communicate with MILO[EVI], the

Serbian leadership or to preserve Yugoslavia but he did promise that, as long as it was

up to him, there would be no attacks on the army in Bosnia.

163. The cassette I showed IZETBEGOVI] contained footage from a regional meeting

which the SDA held on 10 January 1992 in a village near the Dubrave military

airport, near Tuzla, where the first review of their troops was supposed to be held.

Other footage made by my service was from similar meetings and consultations held

in January and February 1992, particularly the central conference with the Patriotic

League leadership from Sarajevo held in a village in the Zenica area.

164. Thus, at a meeting with me on 5 February 1992 Alija IZETBEGOVI] denied

having any knowledge about the Patriotic League although he had meetings with

HALILOVI] in September 1991 who reported to him, showed him maps and they

discussed the mobilisation of Muslims in BH. Alija IZETBEGOVI] was at the top of

the SDA military and political organisation and nothing could have been done without

his knowledge and such an organisation could not have been formed without his

knowledge.

Draft translation


164-A. Only two days after my contact and conversation with Izetbegovi�, on 7

and 8 February 1992, the military consultation was held with leaders of the

Patriotic League and the Regional Military Staff commanders at the home of

Hašim Kadri� in village Mehuri� near Travnika. At the meeting, besides

Sefer Halilovi�, Meho Karišik-Kemo spoke, and in front of the Main Staff PL

pointed out that the priority was for the members of the PL to influence the

Muslim population to respond to calls for the upcoming referendum, which

was essential for independence and sovereignty in Bosnia and Herzegovia.

He suggested they bring the elderly and infirm in their cars to the polls, and

for all members of the PL to come to the poll placees to ensure peace and

order. Munib Bisi� from MO BH made an assessment of the politiacl and

security situation in BH. The next day Hasan �engi� and Atif Šaronji� –

Emir, who was in charge at the Staff PL for the organization of the special

sabotage terrorist groups, came to the consultation. Hasan �engi� made a

political assessement of the security situation in the BH in front of the SDA

headquarters, indicating the fateful day ahead in which it will be decided

whether to preserve the independence and sovereiginity of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Afterwards he destributed the new PL emblem, brought from

Sarajevo.

164-B. Commanders of all Regional Staff reported about the situation in the

units, and then the tasks and activities were diveded in compliance. The

working map of the Main Staff with the deployment forces was presented. It

was conculded that PL BH had organised about 70,000 armed members in

lines of detachments and brigades. At the end, the Directive for defence of the

Draft translation


sovereignity of BH was announced, which would later be advanced and finally

presided on the 25 February 1992 and submitted to the Regional Staff PL.

164-C. It is interesting that in the Directive the forces of disintegration of the

BH – the SDS, JNA and extreme parts of the HDZ - are treated as enemy

forces. At the beginning of the combat with the forces of disintegration it was

planned to call people from Sandzak, Kosovo and Macedonia (Republic of

Serbia) to unify with the PL of BiH and immediatly start combat operations in

its territory, because of the connection of the enemy forces and the weakning

of their attackes. Otherwise, the effects of PL development were in stages and

the tasks divided in order to block the direction of Banja Luka, East

Herzegovina and Drina river that leads to the territory of Bosnia, and to

invade and occupy warehouses and barracks of the JNA. This was in order to

ahieve the main goal; to break down, destroy and expel the enemy forces from

their territories.

165. After my meeting with IZETBEGOVI] of 5 February 1992, there was a radical

turn in the situation in Bosnia and in March 1992, Serbian wedding guest GARDOVI]

was killed in Sarajevo, the first barricades were erected, where close to Vrbanje

bridge Serb was killed and on Kosevsko Hill a girl was killed who was also Serbian.

From the SDA headquarters in Sarajevo, a PL command line order was forwarded to

all Staffs of the PL in the field to activate the barricade in accordance with decisions

from the consultation in Mehuri�i. Then Muslims in Patriotic League uniforms,

with emblems and berets, etc. started making public appearances. To intimidate

Draft translation


Muslim people, rumours were launched that the barricades were set up in Sarajevo by

Chetniks and Arkans people from Serbia, and in Gracanica the members of the PL

fired rifle grenades and mortar shells on Muslims houses then claimed it was done by

Chetniks from Ozren.

166. Following the killing of Serbian wedding guest GARDOVI] on 1 and 2 Mach

1992, the situation in Sarajevo changed radically. We received intelligence

information about barricades being erected and the SDS issued an ultimatum with the

following demands: to cease all activities and campaigns towards the declaration of

independence and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina until a solution satisfactory

to all three constituent peoples is reached; to immediately resume the conference on

the transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its democratic legal system and

order; to immediately cease the media campaign according to which the declaration of

sovereignty of Bosnia and Hezegovina was a fait accompli, i.e. to ensure objective

informing until the completion of the conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina; to carry

out a personnel transformation of the BH MUP within 24 hours, in keeping with

agreements reached following the republican elections; to immediately arrest the

perpetrators of the heinous crime outside the Serbian church in Ba{~ar{ija, to divide

up the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the purpose of objective informing and to

discontinue all Jutel broadcasts on Sarajevo television. My service received

information about the barricades being erected, specifying that 12 were held by Serbs,

three by the SDA and two by the HDZ. DELIMUSTAFI] and my security organ

visited the barricades and initiated their lifting.

Draft translation


167. However, the barricades reappeared on 3 March 1992. General KUKANJAC

called KARAD@I] and IZETBEGOVI] to mollify the situation and they shook hands

on television and the situation improved. However, after that the Green berets opened

fire on a military police patrol in Sarajevo and targeted the army barracks in Lukavica.

Armed Green berets are walking around in the city, entering flats of military

servicemen and searching for weapons.

168. On 9 March 1992, armed members of the Patriotic League stopped and disarmed

a military patrol comprising one officer and six soldiers near Gra~anica, on the Tuzla

– Doboj road. On 12 March 1992, there was an incident near Kalesija – shots were

fired at a MUP patrol in which one policeman was killed and one was injured. The

SDA completely blocked the road to Zvornik. The SDA erected barricades at seven

locations and skirmishes between Serbs and Muslims practically began in the Kalesija

area, in @ivinice municipality, where the SDA regional staff and Vahid KARAVELI]

are located.

169. On 23 March 1992, about 200 Muslims from Bijelo Polje came to the Vi{egrad

area in JNA uniforms. However, upon reaching Dobrun village, they and the men

from those 200 who stayed in Vi{egrad replaced their JNA uniforms with camouflage

uniforms and the green berets of the Patriotic League. After that, Serbian families fled

Dobrun village and able-bodied Serbian men organised defence. The commander of

the Green berets was Safet, a doctor from Vi{egrad, who openly issued threats to the

Serbs saying they would be liquidated on 6 April 1992, when Bosnia and Herzegovina

became an independent country.

Draft translation


170. On 26 and 27 March 1992, Serbian civilians were massacred in Sijekovac

village. Military formations of the HDZ and the SDA from the village, which is in

Slavonski Brod municipality, killed the members of three families: four members of

the ZE^EVI] family, three members of the BA^I] family and Vida RADANOVI].

About 80 refugees from the village found shelter in the redeployment area of the JNA

unit, in Zbori{te village. About 70 Serbian houses in the village were torched.

The armed conflict in Bijeljina

171. The armed conflict in Bijeljina broke out on 1 April 1992. Operations which

started during the night of 31 March and 1 April 1992 continued throughout the day;

barricades were erected; Serbs in the surrounding villages were just starting to get

organised and preparing to attack Bijeljina. The following conclusions were adopted

at a meeting of the leaders of the SDS and the SDA which was attended by

representatives of the MUP and the JNA: that the SDS and the SDA leaders should

address the people so as to mollify the situation, the barricades should be lifted

immediately, the people to stay off the streets and return to their homes; to introduce a

curfew between 2000 hours and 0500 hours; to introduce mixed patrols in the town

and to prevent Serbs from surrounding villages from coming to Bijeljina. However, at

about 1900 hours, the fighting was still going on in the vicinity of the army barracks.

Chetniks from Bu~ila village turned the barrels of their mortars on the army barracks.

Armed members of the Patriotic League were on the grain elevator and the Serbs were

preparing to neutralise them.

Draft translation


172. I received intelligence from a source at the security organ, Lieutenant Ferid

MUJKANOVI] who smuggled old dinar money bills and who was arrested by the

military police in Ra{ka. He was the head of the SDA military staff for Br~ko. The

Patriotic League of the People was organised at the municipal level in Bijeljina and

Br~ko, and in all other settlements in northeast Bosnia, as testified by Vahid

KARAVELI].

173. However, at the time in question, there were also armed Serbs in Bijeljina. They

were led by a man called Mirko BLAGOJEVI]. At the time, there were constant

bickering between the Serbs and Muslims. I am not sure whether it was the Serbs who

first attacked the Muslims in their café or the other way around. Nevertheless, there

was the first serious clash – a bomb was thrown at cafés where Serbs and Muslims

gathered and this marked the beginning of the fighting in Bijeljina.

174. That was when Arkan with his armed formations came to Badovinci, a village

located across from Janja and Bijeljina, and they waited there for the conflict in

Bijeljina to break out. With the first armed skirmishes between Serbs and Muslim in

Bijeljina, Arkanovci /Arkan’s men/ burst into Bijeljina.

175. The JNA had a brigade in Bijeljina, which mainly mobilised men from the area

and surrounding villages. I had a security organ there who informed me that the JNA

initiated the establishment of joint patrols with the MUP because of large-scale

clashes and shooting in the streets. These joint patrols were supposed to establish

Draft translation


order in the town. However, the MUP expressed fear, saying it was not allowed to do

that and the army abandoned the plan because it did not want to go alone to resolve a

problem involving civilians. I have no knowledge that Radovan Karadzic had any

involvement in causing these incidents and in composition of Arkan.

176. That was when the army barracks were blocked by the Serbs and Arkan’s men,

threatening to attack the JNA if it were to interfere in the conflict. Under the

circumstances, a lieutenant who was a Croat asked the army barracks commander if

he could leave and go home because he did not want to be involved. The commander

approved and the military police escorted him outside. However, he was killed by

armed Serbs or Arkan’s men right outside the army barracks and the fighting

continued throughout the day. According to information from the security organ,

around 52 or 53 men had been killed in the fighting so far. Also, the Muslims hanged

a Serb who worked in the town hospital, who might have been a member of the SDS.

About 50 men were killed in the fighting on the first day. It was mainly Arkan’s men

who were fighting, although Serbs from surrounding villages also joined the fighting

to help the struggle of Serbs in Bijeljina, which was practically initiated by Arkan.

177. Our problem in the JNA was that in command of the Tuzla Corps was a man

who was incompetent to command a corps. Arkan made a speech before him in front

of the brigade, upon entering the army barracks, calling on the Serbs to leave the army

and join his formations. The Corps Commander failed to react and a large number of

reservists in fact distanced themselves from the army and, taking their weapons,

crossed over to the side of the Serbs. Some of them went home and the JNA was in

Draft translation


fact only left with a military police company which was intact. The local brigade thus

practically fell apart because of Arkan’s speech, while the corps commander stood

there like a sissy and said nothing. The corps commander died soon after the incident,

as he was already suffering from cancer at the time, but he could have become famous

had he ordered the military police to arrest Arkan, regardless of the consequences, all

the more so since he did not have much time left. That is how the fighting in Bijeljna

ended.

Planned attacks by the SDA paramilitary formations in April 1992

178. I recall that the JNA and the MUP were securing five bridges across the Drina

and the Sava and the road to Krajina. They are guarded mainly by members of the

military police as well as military police reserve mobilised to secure the bridges.

Thus, these were legal units of the JNA and the MUP.

179. On 5 April 1992, Warrant Officer 2nd Class Mihajlo STANOJEVI] set off from

Tuzla to the Zvornik area in a vehicle of the military police with armed soldiers on

board, to pay the daily allowance to soldiers. He took the shortest road to Zvornik via

Kalesija. On his return trip from Zvornik, he was told that the Muslims blocked the

road around Kalesija, somewhere near the Dubrave airport, and that they were not

letting the army pass.

180. Warrant Officer 2nd Class STANOJEVI] decided to take the roundabout route via

Sapna village, to Ugljevik and Tuzla and thus avoid the blocked road. In Sapna

Draft translation


village, they were disarmed by the Muslims, i.e. by a unit of the Patriotic League, the

warrant officer 2nd class was killed, reserve /?sergeants/ Zoran KOJI] and Boro MI]I]

and four other soldiers were injured, and the vehicles and weapons were seized. As a

result, Warrant Officer 2nd Class STANOJEVI] was the first serviceman who was

killed in Bosnia. At the same time in Sarajevo, Green Berets invaded the military

housing supposedly looking for weapons. They began looting Serbian shops, initiating

armed combat between the Pl and Serbian TO.

181. On 6 April 1992, the Green berets raided flats in a search for weapons in

Sarajevo. The SDA leadership tries to complete the mobilisation of its formations and

is putting pressure on General KUKANJAC to turn over weapons of the territorial

defence. On the same day, 6 April 1992, there is a new incident when the premises of

the SDS in the Holiday Inn Hotel were raided. There were a number of people there at

the time, working on the archives. According to our information, the firing positions

of the Muslim paramilitary formations at the Secondary Technical School near the

Holiday Inn were held by Juka PRAZINA. These positions were behind the /?mass of

people/ facing in the direction the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, across

from the Holiday Inn.

182. From there they opened fire at the people, wounding one or two, and after that,

they spread misinformation that the Chetniks were opening fire from the Holiday Inn.

At the same time, a special unit of the Bosnia Herzegovina MUP, led by Mirza

JAMAKOVI], whose members were dressed in workers’ overalls, was on stand-by.

They burst into the premises of the SDS at the Holiday Inn, capturing four or five

Draft translation


persons who were packing things at the time, and declared that the Chetniks had fired

at the people. This was a planned operation to radicalise the situation, to be used as an

excuse to take over the BH territorial defence headquarters.

183. The Green berets first raided the Bosnia and Hezegovina Territorial Defence

headquarters on 7 April 1992, seizing weapons from officers who were there. They

took six automatic rifles.

184. Then, on 9 April 1992, Colonel Hasan EFENDI] organised a raid on the

Republican headquarters of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Territorial Defence, as the

new commander of the Republican Territorial Defence Staff, Colonel [IBER as his

deputy, Franjo PLE]A[ as the Logistics Assistant, KARI] as the Political Assistant,

Colonel DIVJAK as the Assistant for Training, in the presence of Jerko DOKO and

Colonel Rifat BILAJAC, demanding its staff to sign loyalty to the new authorities and

the new leadership.

185. Thus, these men raided the territorial defence headquarters on 9 April 1992 and

expelled the old leadership. Hasan EFENDI] was appointed Commander of the

Territorial Defence Staff and he brought his assistants with him. Hasan EFENDI] was

the Chief of Artillery in Tuzla when I was the Chief of Security in the division. He is

a man full of complexes, whose family was killed by the Chetniks in 1942 in Fo~a.

He grew up as a WWII orphan, but in the 1970s he learned that he had a brother who

had also been in orphanages. As a young 2nd lieutenant he was sent to serve in Ohrid

Draft translation


where he had a relationship with a middle-aged teacher. He also had sexual relations

with his foster mother.

186. Three days after the raid, on 14 April 1992, the SDA leadership ordered a

general mobilisation of the territorial defence. The order envisages the process to play

out in three stages. According to EFENDI]’s order, the first stage involved blocking

all JNA army barracks and military facilities, ensuring that nothing leaves. In the next

30-day stage – which is the standard military speak – general attacks were to be

mounted, the Chetniks disarmed and so on. It was pursuant to this order that the

Muslims killed Warrant Officer 2nd Class STANOJEVI] and on 19 April 1992arrested

Ranko KULJANIN, a member of the security organ in Konjic.

187. 18 April 1992 the Green Berets get into the warehouse Pretis in Vogosca with

five trucks and loaded missile systems and other combat equipment. Having learned

of it the Serbian TO units responded and in correlated showdown resulting in dead

and wounded on both sides. At about 1600 hours on 20 April 1992, two soldiers

went for a drink to the Bilijar café in Sarajevo, near the military district command,

and for no apparent reason, members of the Green berets open fire at them. One was

killed on the spot while the other died at the military hospital.

188. On 22 April 1992, eight soldiers from a personnel carrier were captured in

Sarajevo’s Dobrinja suburb, in the direction of Lukavica, by members of the Muslim

TO /Territorial Defence/. The commander of the unit was Ferid MUJAZINOVI], from

the Ru`a Halivukovi} local commune. The captured soldiers were taken to the

Draft translation


Sarajevo Police Club, in the city centre, for processing and were executed shortly after

that. When we launched an investigation into the crime, the conclusion we reached

was that they were kidnapped by a man called SENDAREVI] from [vrakino Selo, and

the captured soldiers were from units of the 49th Motorised Brigade.

A statement was issued to the effect that the execution of soldiers by the TO had been

reported by citizens, but there were no official comments. Hasan EFENDI] and Jerko

DOKO said a month later that the soldiers had been released home and that their fate

remained unknown.

189. On 26 April, the manager of the military depot near Fo~a, Major KURTOVI],

took in about 200 Muslim refugees some of whom were armed. After taking them in,

the major and the soldiers guarding the depot were disarmed the armed group. Upon

learning about what happened at the depot, an armed group of Serbs attacked the

facility and disarmed the attackers.

190. At about 1300 hours on 27 April 1992, members of the @ivinice Muslim

territorial defence disarmed soldiers taking food to the guards in the Ljuba~a depot at

a barricade. The Commander of the Military Police at the airport, an /ethnic/ Albanian

lieutenant, Miftari Refik, tried to intervene and the Muslims killed him and wounded

three soldiers at the barricade. After that, the army was organised by the JNA security

organ at Tuzla airport who went straight to the @ivinice municipal assembly, which

also housed KARAVELI]’s headquarters, arrested KARAVELI] and three other

persons and transferred them under orders to Sremska Mitrovica where they made a

statement which was taped by the JNA organs.

Draft translation


191. In the evening hours on 28 April 1992, twelve Chetniks under the command of

Dragan KEROVI] and Milovan PEROVI] encircled a unit of the JNA 17th Corps in

Vukosavci village, demanding that the unit return to Serbia and leave their weapons

and equipment. They seized nine hand-grenades and 500 7.62-mm bullets. KEROVI]

moves around freely in the area and communicates with an officer at the 17th Corps

command who is being processed for connections with Serbian extremists. What is

going on? As it turned out, Serbian extremists also started making trouble to the army.

192. On 26 April 1992, Blagoje AD@I] and Branko KOSTI] had talks with Alija

IZETBEGOVI] in Skoplje. I spoke with IZETBEGOVI] on 25 April 1992 about his

upcoming visit to Skoplje, where an agreement was reached about the status of the

JNA in the coming period, in view of the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina had

declared independence and that the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ was to be

proclaimed on 27 April 1992. The army, as a former federal institution, remained in

Bosnia and its status had to be resolved. An agreement was reached in Skoplje to split

up the army as follows: officers from Bosnia and Herzegovina who so to stay in BH

would be allowed to stay there; those who were not from Bosnia and Herzegovina

would be pulled out by 19 May 1992; weapons of the Bosnia and Herzegovina

Territorial Defence would stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina because it paid for it and

armed it, while weapons and equipment belonging to the JNA would be discussed at a

separate meeting which would be organised subsequently with the teams of expert, as

was done with the Macedonians in Skoplje, and an agreement would be reached as to

Draft translation


what would be left behind, what would be given to the Serbs and what would be given

to the Muslims, and what the army would not give to anyone, but keep for itself.

193. However, on 27 April 1992, the BH Presidency adopted a decision on the

withdrawal of JNA units from BH and two days later, on 29 April 1992, Jerko DOKO

and Hasan EFENDI] issued an order on commencing combat operations of all armed

formations of the BH MO /Ministry of Defence/ and TO against the JNA and

preventing its pullout from BH with weapons and equipment.

194. There was talk about keeping the military industry as ZINVOJ – the Association

of the Yugoslav Weapons and Military Equipment Industry – since the republics were

unable to produce quality combat systems each one on its own. Thus, in May 1992, a

meeting of the teams of experts was supposed to be held as to what would remain,

what would be given to whom and what the army would take with it.

195. On 2 May 1992, IZETBEGOVI] went to Lisbon. The army had left long ago,

having learned its lesson in Croatia, to avoid being blocked. Thus, the army had

already relocated most of the 2nd Army District command from Sarajevo, leaving

behind a small command with KUKANJAC. By small, I mean about 200 men.

Furniture, valuables, photographs, paintings and so on were being removed from the

Army Club and this had been going on for days, both from the Army Command and

from Sarajevo, everything was proceeding without a problem.

Draft translation


196. Then, at 1200 hours on 2 May 1992, when IZETBEGOVI] had already left for

Lisbon, the Green berets attacked the JNA Army Club. The JNA Army Club is a

civilian institution in the city centre with no military potential whatsoever. General

KUKANJAC heard that shots had been fired and that there were casualties among the

soldiers. The army returned fire and KUKANJAC ordered Colonel [UPUT, the

military police commander who came to Sarajevo from Zagreb, whose men were at

lunch at the time, to send a military police unit, a platoon, to the JNA Army Club and

see what was going on.

197. The military police platoon set off to the JNA Army Club, but the Green berets

block [UPUT, opening fire and destroying an armoured personnel carrier and its crew,

capturing a whole military police unit. At that time, Alija IZETBEGOVI] was in the

air, on his way back from Lisbon. The question remains: why did the SDA attack the

army, the JNA Army Club, knowing that it would escalate into a large-scale conflict,

at a time when IZETBEGOVI] had already taken off from the airport in peace? If we

wanted to arrest IZETBEGOVI], we would have done that before his plane took off

from Sarajevo airport. Therefore, they started the conflict when he was supposed to

land. It did not suit someone that Alija IZETBEGOVI] should return to Sarajevo, the

plan was that he turn the airplane around and land in Madrid or somewhere else. The

SDA started the war in Sarajevo just when IZETBEGOVI] was supposed to return,

after he had reached an agreement with the army.

198. I knew that IZETBEGOVI] was very unreliable, constantly changing his mind.

In my opinion, there was an extreme wing which was dissatisfied with the vacillation

Draft translation


and Alija IZETBEGOVI]’s acceptance of agreements reached with the JNA at the

meetings. This extreme wing started the conflict on 2 May 1992, but in spite of that

IZETBEGOVI] decided to land in Sarajevo and hats off to him for that. He was

detained at the airport because his security did not come to pick him up and that was

why he was taken to the Lukavica army barracks.

199. On 3 May 1992, it was agreed that the army leave the military district command

and that the JNA release Alija IZETBEGOVI] to go to the Presidency. The JNA

convoy set off, under guarantees of the international community and with the approval

of Alija IZETBEGOVI], as he personally came to the army command and left the

Army Command together with the JNA convoy.

200. However, the rear of the convoy was intercepted and came under attack. There

are recordings of radio communications, with instructions to attack immediately, that

no one can leave except KUKANJAC. This was Ejup GANI], but those in charge

were Zaim BACKOVI] aka Zagi, who was the commander of the Green berets for

Stari Grad municipality, Emir [VRAKI] and others. On that occasion, one of my

security officers, Bo{ko MIHAJLOVI], was killed, while Colonel KATALINA was

seriously injured. He survived but lost his left arm. The soldiers were made to lie face

down on the asphalt while the Green berets executed them as they lay there unarmed.

Arrest of the @ute Ose /Yellow Wasps/

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201. Members of the Serbian paramilitary unit @ute Ose were arrested for the crimes

they committed. The Republika Srpska military security arrested the @ute Ose and

turned them over to the Bijeljina MUP. The @ute Ose were not arrested for stealing

cars, but for killings.

MUP

202. The Chief of State Security is the key position in the MUP and the Chief of State

Security in socialist times and later on was more influential and more powerful than

ministers who came and went because he remained at his post. The State Security

Service was taken over by the Croats. Alija DELIMUSTAFI] from the SDA was the

Minister of the Interior. However, the State Security Department was the one doing

the wire-tapping, processing, working illegally and so on. The Deputy Minister of the

Interior for Public Security was Vito @EPINI].

203. Secret wire-tapping and conversation interceptions had to be authorised by law

under special circumstances before they could be put into action. The procedure was

as follows: pursuant to preliminary and preventive information about someone being

engaged in enemy activity, the Chief of the State Security Service proposed

introducing operative processing as a measure which incorporates several secret

methods with the purpose of contesting or proving the initial thesis about a person

being an enemy of the state. Thus, under the law, proposals to launch processing were

submitted by Branko KVESI] and the decision was verified and taken by the Minister

of the Interior.

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204. There was a relocated wiretapping centre in Hrasnica. It was an unauthorised,

parallel centre which was relocated from the official centre located in the state

security. There was a clash among the Muslims later about the killing of Ugljen, who

was the Chief of DB /State Security/ for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994. In any case,

measures had to be taken against a person being wiretapped and approval was needed

to initiate such measures against a someone.

205. As far as the Muslim leadership in the MUP is concerned, I know that Avdo

HEBIB expressed extremist views at meetings. Of the members from the Muslim

leadership, he was in charge of the police. In the hierarchy, he was ranked below Vito

@EPINI], who was the assistant for public security. I asked Alija DELIMUSTAFI] to

dismiss Avdo HEBIB, as he was an extremist. DELIMUSTAFI] agreed and dismissed

him but asked that I name an honest and reliable Muslim /?as his replacement/. In

consultation with General GRA^ANIN, I proposed Major Sead REKI], the

Commander of the Military Police Battalion when I was the Chief of Security in

Sarajevo, who was at the /Command/ Staff Academy at the time. He then left the

army and was temporarily employed at the Federal MUP. The Federal MUP assigned

him to the Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP and he came to the Bosnia and Herzegovina

MUP to take up Avdo HEBIB’s post. This was in early 1992.

Relations between the JNA and the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

206. Relations between the Serbs and the JNA were complex. The JNA was the

Yugoslav army and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted to stay in Yugoslavia.

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Thus, the interests of the Serbs and the JNA dovetailed. Second, the Serbian people

did not attack the JNA, did not block the army barracks, was not hostile towards the

JNA. Third, the Serbs did not break the law on mobilisation.

207. When the war in BH broke out, there were instances that local Serbian

commanders in BH requested weapons or equipment from the JNA. As a result,

Blagoje AD@I] issued an order that local commanders in BH could not decide what

the JNA would give to whom, but that such requests should be sent to a higher

instance which would decide what the Serbs should be given. There were instances of

the JNA giving weapons and equipment to Serbs in BH after the war broke out.

208. However, we were in a position of not having a loyal BH territorial defence since

the TO from the period of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia had been a

component of the armed forces which was supposed to act with the JNA. As opposed

to such a TO, there was the TO formed, i.e. usurped by the Muslims, which was used

to form the paramilitary line of the SDA. The newly-elected staff of the new TO was

loyal to the new SDA policy and they were practically making their own, illegal and

parallel territorial defence which was proclaimed and verified on 9 April 1992, when

Hasan EFENDI] raided the TO premises and expelled the hitherto commander.

209. Since there were /?numerous and planned/ attacks on JNA members and it was

regarded as the enemy by the SDA, we in the JNA helped the territorial defence staffs

which were close to our positions so as to secure our rear in order to avoid being

encircled by the HDZ and SDA paramilitary formations. The assistance provided to

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Serbian parts of the TO was not liberal and wanton, in the sense that the JNA opened

its depots and armed the Serbs.

210. Undoubtedly there were illegal /smuggling/ channels which we tried to break,

such as the ones near Bile}a and Gacko. Also, two trucks with a large quantity of

heavy weapons were seized at the bypass around Sarajevo which were intercepted and

blocked by the Muslims. The trucks were loaded with weapons and equipment which

had been pulled out from Slovenia, which was being redeployed and which was

supposed to be stored in military depots in Kalinovik. The army signed contracts and

engaged companies to transport and pull out weapons from Slovenia. One of the

companies transporting the weapons previously transported bananas and this was the

reason for the incident around Sarajevo, when Alija DELIMUSTAFI] went into a fit,

saying: “Well, that’s how you do it!” I replied: “No, these are weapons, let the

weapons through because they are being sent to the depot in Kalinovik,” and the

weapons were from Slovenia.

211. Another point, why were JNA units from Zagreb being transferred to Bosnia?

According to the VANCE plan, Krajina was being demilitarised, a TO was being

formed there and only a TO and police could exist. The TO was being moved to the

depots, to the reserve, and this was supervised by international peace-keepers. At the

time, a large quantity of JNA weapons and equipment was given to establish a full

and very strong Serbian TO which would be under lock and key, while the police

which would remain operative was armed. According to the plan, the JNA was a

guarantor of peace and it was supposed to be based in Bosnia to intervene and protect

Draft translation


the Serbs by carrying out surprise attacks against the Croats if they violated the

agreement. That is another parameter for the reinforcement of units in Bosnia.

212. Also, cooperation between the army and the Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP was

supported by the Serbs, and Biljana PLAV[I], as a member of the Presidency, at

sessions held on 24 December 1991 and 15 October 1991, praised and upheld this

cooperation in establishing checkpoints to control the territory and for disarming.

213. Thus, in 1991 and until 1992 and the forming of the FRY, there was no reason

for the JNA to change its role because it was against the disintegration of the country.

Also, the JNA could have at any moment been ordered to defend the constitutional

order, security and territory of the country and it adhered to its logic of deployment

throughout the territory of the SFRY, including BH. Pulling out JNA weapons and

equipment from “hostile” environments, involving obstacles and attacks, to Serbian-

inhabited areas was not an indirect way to arm the Serbs. The JNA did this for reasons

of securing the weapons and equipment because the JNA was aware that it would not

be attacked only in areas where Serbs were the majority population. Also, all nations

had been asked to send recruits and reservists to the JNA, but only the Serbs

complied. Because they relied on the JNA, the Serbs did not have their own military

organisation and were always willing to respond to a mobilisation.

214. Decisions on the use of the Territorial Defence, as the second component of the

armed forces, were taken by the Supreme Command, just like the JNA. Until 1989,

TO weapons were mainly stored in police stations and in the municipalities. However,

Draft translation


with the aggravation of the political situation in the country, it was decided to place

all weapons in Yugoslavia under control and most weapons were moved to the army

barracks and army depots.

215. Some weapons, which had been in enterprises, had not been moved and were left

in the enterprises. However, enterprises had small units, the size of platoon. In the

system of social self-protection, weapons from the TO brigades and detachments in

enterprises, had been moved. This was the problem Jerko DOKO had when he wanted

to raise the Territorial Defence but there were no weapons. He wanted to deal with the

situation by attacking army barracks and seizing the weapons there.

216. Only the Presidency could take the decision to use the army to resolve internal

problems and only if the MUP was unable to control the scope of such clashes. For

example, the MUP was unable to restore law and order in Belgrade on 9 March 1991

and the Presidency decided to use the army to impose order. Therefore, the army was

not envisaged to be used for the resolution of internal conflicts but it could be used for

these purposes if so ordered by the Presidency in case of threats to the constitutional

order, law and order and so on.

217. About the ethnic structure of the JNA: the Air Force commander was a Croat,

Zvonko JURIJEVI], and 51% of the pilots, that is, over 1,300 pilots, were not Serbs or

Montenegrins, they were either Croats, Slovenes, Albanians or others. It is not true

that the JNA was a Serbian army. In Serbia, I was accused of cooperating with the

Muslims and distributing weapons to them, which is not true.

Draft translation


218. It is the case that there was a JNA warehouse (as mentioned in 1D00055) which

was attacked by Muslim forces on 5 May 1992. Of the 33 soldiers captured by

Muslim forces, 23 were then taken by the KOS. 10 soldiers, and their commanders,

remained with the Muslim forces. One of two brothers (Vukojica and Vukota Ceha)

was killed and the other was taken captive and taken to the military prison in

Ljuboski. On 8 May 1992, I tried to remove the captured brother from the prison.

219. The document 1D00065, which was shown to me, is probably based on the

decision of the TO from 28 April 1992 to block the military objects of the JNA. I

knew that this order existed.

220. On 22 April 1992, Alija Izetbegovic and General Adzic had a meeting in Skoplje

regarding the JNA’s withdrawal from BiH. The document 1D00057, which was

shown to me, contains the opposite of what was decided at meeting in Skoplje. At that

meeting, it was primarily decided that the weapons of the TO of BiH would stay in

BiH upon the JNA’s withdrawn. There was no discussion of blockades of JNA

military objects. With regards to what the JNA would leave in BiH and what it would

take to SRJ, it was agreed that military and civilian authorities would meet to discuss

the issue in May 1992.

221. Document 1D00065 corresponds with my knowledge at the time as to how the

Patriot League organised itself and expanded. It can been seen from this document

that the Patriot League appropriated some of their weapons from the Serbian people.

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222. Document 1D00077, which I was shown, states that there were no weapons

whatsoever in Foca. This is not true. According to information obtained from a

regional staff meeting of the Patriotic League in Foca, Hodzic Mehdan Senad had

5,000 weapons distributed to members of the Patriotic League in Foca. According to

the same source, Hodzic Mehdan Senad was also supposed to deliver 10,000 weapons

to Sandzak, However, they could also have been intended for Foca; it is impossible to

say with certainty their destination.

223. I was shown document 1D00107. Regarding this letter, it is not true that Sefer

Halilovic applied himself with total commitment to the defence of BiH, as he says he

did. After his education at the Command Staff Academy, Sefer Halilovic tried,

through the security organs in the 2nd military area, to avoid assignment in the war

zone and be posted instead to Sarajevo. On 17 September 1991 Sefer Halilovic

presented his suspicious of the officer of the organ of security, Miju Knezevica. Miju

Knezevica in turn kept Sefer Halilovic in line because Halilovic had failed to file

reports to his higher command. Likewise, it is not true that on 3 May Sefer Halilovic

attempted to prevent a coup and liberated Ejup Ganic from house arrest, because at

this time Ejup Ganic was not under house arrest. However, it is true that on 9 April

1992, Halilovic refused to assemble the Patriotic League in which he was a superior in

order to subordinate it to the command of the staff of the TO of BiH until 15 April

1992.

Draft translation


224. I was shown document 1D01270, on which I recognised the signature of General

Kukanjca. It is true that on 18 april 1992 there was an attack by the Green Berets on

an industrial military warehouse (Pretis). There was fighting between Serb TO and the

Green Berets, in which some soldiers died and some were wounded.

225. Documents 1D03920 and 1D 03921 accurately show the situation in the zone of

responsibility, to the best of my knowledge. Documents 1D21054 and 1D20184

demonstrate my struggle to maintain unity between the republics and avoid conflict.

Documents 1D20137 and 1D21027 were draft and signed by me, and I confirm that

their contents are truthful; the graphics accurately depict the organisation of the

SSNO.

226. Regarding document 65# 06617 – the “Minutes from the conversation between

the presidency of SRBiH and the State Secretary for People’s Defence and his

associates” – this meeting was not conducted in agreement with the JNA. I attended a

meeting between the military and Presidency of BiH on 24 December 1991 (see

document 65# 00980). At this meeting, I have no memory of discussing this

document. This document should have been made public and I do not know that any

military authority signed it.

WITNESS CONFIRMATION

I confirm that I have provided the information in this statement according to the best

of my knowledge and recollection. I provide the statement voluntarily, and I am aware

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that it may be used before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia.

Date Signature

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER … Lists/Week 25 February...

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