Inter-ethnic Contempt

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Southern Political Science Association

Does Familiarity Breed Contempt? Inter-Ethnic Contact and Support for Illiberal PartiesAuthor(s): Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason WittenbergSource: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Apr., 2009), pp. 414-428Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30218961 .

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DoesFamiliarityreedContempt?nter-EthnicContactndSupportorlliberalarties*Jeffrey.KopsteinniversityfTorontoJason ittenbergniversityfCalifornia,erkeley

Does contact etweenthnicroupsead togreaterupportor iberal arties? esearchn this ebaten theU.S.contextscontaminatedyhighevels fmobilitynd a truncatedarty alette. his aper ddresseshe roblemthroughnexaminationf he 929 nd 1935nationalarliamentarylectionsnCzechoslovakia,heremobilitywas limitednd the pectrumfpartieswas broad.Weemploy cologicalnferencen an original atabase felection nd census esultsor everal housandmunicipalitieso estimatethnic roup upportor iberal ndnonliberalarties cross varietyf ocaldemographiconfigurations.he resultshow hat nterethnicontacthas ndeterminatelectoralffects:ouniformatternf upportor iberal arties xists ither cross r withinethnicroups. heelectoralmpact f ontactepends pon he eculiaritiesf he roup eingtudiednd thenational emographicontext nderwhich ontactccurs.n andof tself ontactetweenthnicroups reedsneithermity or ontempt.

ne key onditionor ustainingemocracysthe ontinuedredominancef iberal em-ocratic arties ithinhe artyystem. hereradical arties ain ufficientass opular upport,hefatefdemocracysbleak.Multiethnicemocraciesreseen sespeciallyulnerableothe olarizingnd ero-sumpolitical ompetitionhat reeds ommunal on-flict,immeringesentments,thnic utbidding,ndincreasedupport or arties spousingthnic atredand antiliberalolitics Chandra2004; Dahl 1971;Horowitz 985).Thepurpose f thispaper s to in-vestigatehe elationshipetween thnic emographyand mass electoral referencesor iberal emocraticand illiberal olitical arties.'Comparativistshostudy hepolitics fethnicvotingend ofocus n hownational ndregional-leveldemographytructureslite thnic ooperationndconflict,ow tshapes heprobabilityfcross thnicalliances,nd evenhowdemographyetermineshe

long-termtabilityfdemocracy.e.g.,Posner 005;Radnitz 004).We acknowledgehe mportanceordemocraticupport f factorsuch s thenumber fsignificantthnic roups,heir verall izerelativeooneanother,nd thepotentialor ross-cuttingleav-ages.Such macrolevelpproaches, owever, eglectthe ocal demographicontextwithinwhichvotersformulateheir lectoral references.ur aim is toanalyzehow thedispersionf ethnicgroups crosslocalitiesbutwithin fixednationaldemographicconfiguration)ffectsmass support or iberal ndilliberal arties. oes familiarityreed ontempt?rare multiethnicocalities he besthope for iberaldemocraticarties?Despite ecades fresearch,cholars till isagreeon why ontact etween roupseads n some casestowardmore eaceful,nclusiveolitics, hilenothercases oward ncreasedmutual ntipathynd lliberalsentiments.here rebasicallywo chools f hought

*Thanks oMichaelDean, DannyHidalgo, nd DusanRadivojevicor esearchssistance,nd to TaekuLee,KenScheve, . StephenVoss,and four nonymouseviewersor omments n earlier rafts. preliminaryersion f thispaperwaspresentedt the 2005meetingsf theAmericanolitical cienceAssociation.We alsobenefittedrom eminars tUC Berkeley,berlin, CLA,Yale,andLiCEP. For researchupportwe thank heNationalCouncilfor urasian nd EastEuropeResearch,heNational cience oundation(SES-0217499), heBerkeleyommittee n Research,nd theSocial Science nd Humanities esearch ouncilof Canada.'By liberaldemocratic artieswe mean thosepartiesdeologicallyommittedo competingorpower using he nstitutionsndproceduresf iberal emocracy.ollowinginz 1976)and Sartori1976),this suallymeans ragmaticartiesf he enter-rightndcenter-left.TheJournal fPolitics,Vol. 71,No. 2,April 009,Pp.414-428A 2009 Southern olitical cienceAssociation doi: 0.1017/S0022381609090367ISSN 0022-3816414

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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT? 415(Allport 954;Forbes 997).Proponentsf the alu-tary ffectsf ethnic roximityrgue hat ntergroupantipathys rooted n individualgnorancef othergroups.n thisview, hegreaterhe evelof contactandcommunicationetween roups,hemore achgroup earns bout theother, nd thegreaterherealizationf hared nterestsndvalues. orDeutsch(1953)such social ommunication" as a necessarycondition or he mergencef a common politicalcommunity"n multiethnictates.Within he U.S.politics esearchraditionontact s seen to lead to-ward a diminution f negative tereotypes,reatermutual olerance,nd increasedocial and politicalcooperatione.g.,Brewer ndMiller 988; iegelmanand Welch1993;Siegelmant al. 1996;Welch andSiegelman000).To the extent hecontact ypoth-esis holds,thenliberaldemocratic arties houldperform ell nethnicallyeterogeneousreas.Proponentsf he o-calledhreatypothesisakethe ppositeack.While ot enyinghe heoreticald-vantagesf ontact,heymphasize owdemographicbalancenfluenceshedegreeowhich negroup er-ceives ther roupss a threat.hreat erception aybe rooted n actualcompetitionverresourcesndjobs or inhazier ears f socialandpolitical ulner-abilityopeoplewho re een o havedifferentaluesandways f ife. ither ay, hepropinquityf thnicgroups s thoughto induce uspicion ndhostilityrather hanmutual tolerance e.g., Blumer1958;Blalock1967;Bobo andHutchings 996).This viewunderlies he consociationalmodel for nterethnicamityndivided ocieties,nwhich olitical tabilityis attained hroughmutually greed egregationfantagonisticroupsand a sharedcommitmentoeffectiveovernmenthrough ower haring t thesupra-communalevel Lijphart 977).To the xtentthethreat ypothesisolds, henparties eeking ocapitalize n intergroupostilityhould find heirgreatestuccess nethnicallyeterogeneousreas.Thetension etween he woviews ies s muchnresearchesignndmethod s tdoes ntheory. uchof hework asfocused n race elationsndpoliticsnthe United tates,where hewideavailabilityf de-tailed urveyndecological atahasfacilitatedophis-ticatedttemptsobridge he heoreticalivide e.g.,Oliver ndWong 003;Stein, ost, ndRinden 000).As troubled s racerelations avebeen ntheUnitedStates,owever,herere wofeaturesf heAmericancontext hat omplicateffortso test hetwo com-peting ypotheses.irst,xtremeevels fresidentialandprofessional obility eanthat t s difficultodeterminehedirectionfcausality.orexample,hecorrelationetweenntergroupontact nd tolerance

may be less a resultof learning han the priordecision ftoleranteople o ive nethnically ixedareas.n the atterase,t s iberalalueshatead ointerethnicontact, ather hanviceversa.To avoidthis onundrum,ome cholars ave hiftedromb-servationalo experimentalesearch, here hevar-iables t work anbemanipulatedn a semicontrolledsettingGlazer2003). Of course,what s gained nmethodologicaligors ost nexternalalidity:ow-ever ealistiche xperiment,t s not t all clearhatthe conclusions ravelverywell back to the realworld.The second roublesomeeature f theU.S. con-text oncernsts runcatedarty olitical alette. hedominance f two iberal emocraticartiesndtheinstitutionalarriers o the success of alternativesmeans hat he U.S. partypectrumoes notreflectwhateverotentialmassconstituenciesxistfor x-clusionaryr antiliberalolitics.nstancesfpoliticalextremismuch sGeorgeWallace's residentialan-didacy nd DavidDuke'svarious ttemptsocapturestateoffice n Louisianado provide mportant p-portunitieso test he threat ypothesisGilesandBruckner993;Voss 1996;Wright 977),buttheseare the xceptionshat rove herule.We simply onot knowwhowouldsupporthypotheticalfricanAmerican,ispanic,r fascistartiesf heU.S.single-member istrictystem,hich iscourageshird-partyentry, ere eplaced ith roportionalepresentation.

ResearchDesignIn this aperwe examinehe olitical onsequencesfethnic roximityhrough detailed xaminationfelectoral ehavior n interwar zechoslovakia. heprincipaldvantagefCzechoslovakias that tpro-vides omeremedyor he wo aforementionedefi-ciencies f the U.S. case.First,lthoughhecountrywasundergoingrbanizationt the ime, he evel fmobilitynCzechoslovakia as far elow hat fthepost-WorldWar I United tates. hegreatwaveofout-migrationo othercountries ad ceased afterWorldWar I, and althoughhecities ontinued oattract ural olk, either he abor northehousingmarkets ere lexiblenough ogivemany he uxuryofchoosingwhere hey ould ive.Mostpeoplewerestuckwhere heywere.Theanalysis ill hereforeelesscontaminatedy he electionffect.Second,nterwarzechoslovakia'slectoralystemfeatured combinationfproportional epresenta-tion ndrelativelyow thresholdsoenter arliament.



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416 JEFFREYS. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERG

Consequently,t enjoyed remarkablyiverserrayofviable olitical arties. he nterwareriodmay ebestknown or uthoritarianism,ut t was a goldenagefor olitical iversity.ascismndcommunismadnotyetbeendiscredited,nd they ompeted long-side nationalist nd liberaldemocratic artiesformass upport.We discuss arious olitical artiesnthefollowingection.Interwar zechoslovakia as two otherfeaturesthatmake tanexcellentenue or his esearch.irst,theresgoodreason oexpect zechoslovakia'sthnicdemographyo be a powerfuleterminantfpoliticalbehavior. he landscomprisingzechoslovakia adbeenmultiethnicor enturies,nd numerous tereo-typesndmutual rejudicesad risen nder absburgrule. he rrogant,xploitativeermanndbackward,clerical lovak adbecome staple fCzech iterature.In the Slovakpopular maginationhe Czechswerehypocriticalrban ophisticates,heHungarians a-tionalist surpers. ungarian iscourse,or tspart,heldSlovaks ndisdain nd suitable or orced ssim-ilationKing2002;Seton-Watson908;Wiskemann1967).The foundingf the new states fterWorldWar gavenew ife o these rejudicesyreshufflingthe thnic ierarchy.zechswhowere nferioro theGermansnthe thnic eckingrderntheHabsburgerabut uperiorn the thnic eckingrder oSlovaks,now ruled n tandemwith heSlovaks verGermansand Hungariansand Jews). his reversal f ethnicfortunesenderednterwarthnic elations articu-larly olatile. lthoughlass ndrural/urbanleavageswerepronouncednCzechoslovakiandthroughoutEast-Centraluropein the interwar eriod,mosthistoriansmaintain hatthedeepest nd most m-portant ivides n these ocietieswere ethnic e.g.,Polonsky1972,Rothschild1974).2Second,Czechoslovakia eldregularlycheduledfree nd fair ational arliamentarylections. e exa-mine wo,n 1929 nd 1935.Theadvantagef hese sthat heyookplaceunder ery ifferentolitical ir-cumstances. hereas he 929 lection ccurredeforetheglobaleconomic risis nd subsequentnterna-tional oliticalurbulence,he 935 lectionook lacewell fterheNazi seizure fpowern Germany,heturn o Stalinismnthe ovietUnion, ndthegeneralauthoritarianurn nEurope s a whole. he dissolu-tion ofdemocracyn neighboringountries,nd inGermanynparticular,mboldenedhe zech, erman,and Slovakfascist lites o shed some of their rior

fealtyo the epublicngeneralnd to amicable thnicrelationsnparticular.y nalyzingoth he1929 nd1935 lections e are abletoseehowchanging eak-level thnic ensions re refractedhroughocal dem-ographic onfigurations.The paperproceeds s follows.We elaboratenmoredetail he lectoralnddemographicontext finterwarzechoslovakiand outline he cologicaln-ference ethods n which uranalysiss based.Ourmainresults omenext,whereweexplore heethnicbasesofparty upportnthe 1929 nd 1935nationalparliamentarylections.We then erformobustnesschecks y reestimatingfewkeyresultswhile on-trollingor evels f ndustrialization.he conclusionfollows.To anticipateurresults, e find hat eitherhecontact orthethreat ypothesisoldsgeneralwaywithin zechoslovakia.ocal thnic emographyoesnotexercise consistentr sustainedmpact itheracross roups rfor given roup ver ime.Generallyspeaking,he hreatypothesisolds or he thnicallydominant zechs ndformerlyuling ungariansnSlovakia: heywere t theirmostpolitically oderatewhenliving n relative ocal isolationfromothernational roups. or theSlovaks, ominallyorulersbut nfact ubordinateo theCzechs, ontactppearsto moderate oliticalbehavior.They provedmostvulnerableo extremistppealswhen heywere on-centratedntheir wn ocalities.venhere, owever,we find hat eligionmaybe a morepowerfuleter-minantof politicalchoice than ethnicity er se.Although eofferlausible xplanationsor ifferentbehavioralesponseso ocal thnic emography,achrequires epartingromny ingle ogicofcontact rthreat. ur resultsuggesthat hebroader iteraturewouldbenefitrom uch departures well.

Parties nd EthnicGroupsInterwarzechoslovakia as,bythe tandardsf theday, soliddemocracy.our national lections c-curred,n1920, 925, 929, nd 1935.Most tudentsfthe ra onsiderhem o be free ndfair,ven f ntheeasternart f he ountryhere as modest mountof administrativeressure ppliedto theminoritypopulation.3zechoslovakia'sroportionalepresen-tation ystemrovided ertileround or reatinglargenumber f class, thnic, nd regionallyasedpoliticalparties, n all more than 50 duringtheAmongcholars f EastEuropethere eems o be little gree-ment nusage f he erms ethnic" r "national" n referenceothemany roupsn theregion.n the emainderf his aperwewilluse both erms. 3This rea, ubcarpathianus, s excluded rom heanalysis.



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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT? 417interwar ra. Understandinghe impactof ethnicbalance nvoting or ntolerantndpolarizingartiesinCzechoslovakiaequires short recis f themainparties nd blocs ofparties f nterestn thispaper.Thefull reakdownfpartiesndparty locscanbeseen nAppendix, available rom he authors. neimportantleavagen interwarzechoslovakoliticsdivided hosepartieswelcominghe creation f ademocratic zechoslovakepublicnd those hat idnot. Because f thehighly roportionaloting ules,stablegovernmentequired hecooperation f thepro-republicanarties, omethingchievedby theleadershipfthefiveargest zechrepublican artiesrunningrom ourgeois-conservativeo socialdem-ocratic n the quasi-corporatistnstitutionf thePitka.4The pro-republicanarties ifferedn im-portant uestions f domestic nd foreign olicy.Whatthey haredwas a commitmento buildingCzechoslovaknation within a liberal democraticCzechoslovaktate.A second important olitical leavagedividedethnic roups. thnicallyased extremistarties p-posed the iberaluniversalismf the Czechoslovakstate ndthe nstitutionsf iberal emocracy,houghsuch hostility id not prevent hesepartiesfromcampaigningor fficenelections.heydidso,andsometimes ith reatkill,romoth he ightnd eftside f he oliticalpectrum. mong thnic ermanstheextremistnd irredentistermanNational arty(DNP) and the GermanNational ocialistWorkersPartyDNSAP), a proto-Nazi rganization,ejectedliberal emocracy,reachedntisemitism,ndvilifiedtheCzechoslovaktate.After 932bothpartiesweresuperceded y hepro-Nazi Sudeten"German artywhose eader, onradHenlein,mergedrom elativeobscuritysa gymnasticsnstructorocapture 5% ofthenational ote n1935, he argesthare f ny artyinCzechoslovakia.5

IncontrastotheGerman xtremeight,he thnicright mong lovakswasprimarilylericaln orienta-tion. trevolvedround hefigurefAndrej linka,Catholic riest,nd hisSlovakPeople'sPartySPP).The mainbone of ontentionor he lovak ight asSlovakia's hare fpowerwithin hecountry. anySlovakshadhopedfor federal zechoslovakia,utthe finalproductmore closelyresembled renchcentralism,modelthat hreatenedheplaceof theCatholic hurchnSlovak ducation ndpublic ife.Czechs ominatedhe ivil ervicetthenationaleveland,alongwith lovakProtestants,ccupied dis-proportionatehareofhighprofile ositionswithinSlovakia tselfJanos 997,Leff 988).The SPP thustraded n resentmentmongSlovaks gainst zechdominationupposedlymasked ytheofficialdeol-ogyof CzechoslovakismFelak 1994).Althoughheprimaryemand f he PP wasforutonomy,ctivistswithinheparty ften ombined hismessagewithvirulentlynti-Semiticndfrequentlynti-HungarianSlovakparticularism.twouldbe an exaggerationoregardhe PP as outrightascist,houghhepresenceof an organized aramilitaryilitiatheRodobranaand, ater, heHlinkaGuard)and openadmirers fMussolini ndHitlerwithintsranks,uggestst easta familyesemblanceJelinek971).6The SPP con-sistentlyeceived hehighest upport fanypartynSlovakia, arnering8% of theSlovak ortion fthenational ote n 1929and30% in 1935.

Class conflictlso existed nd on the xtremeeftwas theCommunistarty f CzechoslovakiaKPC).Like ts isterartiesnotherountries,t mergedftera splitwithhe ocialDemocratsn he ftermathf heRussian evolutionndespoused universal essageof class olidarity.nitiallyomewhatndependentftheSovietparty, y 1929 theparty ad purged tsindependentlementsndfullyolshevized.he ameyear party eader KlementGottwald ould declareopenlynparliamenthathisparty's highestevolu-tionary eadquarterss actuallyMoscow" Oschlies,1979,180).The electoral latformf theKPC calledfor workers' evolution nd a dictatorshipf theproletariat.lthoughheparty asopento allethnicgroups,tenthusiasticallyxploitedthnic rievanceswhen oliticallydvantageous,speciallyf t couldbe-nefit romminorityissatisfactionith ro-republicanparties. heCommunistotehovered round 0%in1929 nd 1935.

4Thepartiesn thePitkawere heAgrarian,he ocialDemocrats,theNational ocialistsa moderateeft arty ased n Bohemiaand Moravia), the Czechoslovak opulists a clericalpartycateringo Catholics),nd theNational emocratsa bourgeoisconservativearty). ollowing uebbert1991),we characterizetheP~tka s quasi-corporatistecause t evolved rom coalitioninto a regularizedonsultative echanism hathammered utagreementsetweenepresentativesf and, abor, ndcapital.nthisway tprevented any ocial ntagonismsrom eing oughtout on theparliamentaryloor. he"quasi" qualifierndicatestremainedmostlynformalnd at various imes ailed o meet.5AsKing 2002, 166)notes, he erm SudetenGerman" idnotcome ntousageuntil he oundingf heCzechoslovaktate ndcame to refero the Germans n thesolidlyGerman-speakingborderlandsn theNorth nd West.Hereafter,e use theterm"Sudeten"without care uotes. 6Mann 2004,26) includes paramilitaryrganizations oneofthekey raits f a fascist arty.



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418 JEFFREYS. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERG

EthnicGroupsWerelyn he 930 ensuso numeratezechoslo-vakia'sthnicroups,hichncludedzechs,lovaks,Germans, ungarians, uthenians,oles,and Jews.Censusesnever erfectlyeflectreality,"s Kertzerand Arel 2002) have shown.The question or nygiven ensuss how arge hedistortionsre.Themostobvious eculiarityf heCzechoslovakensuswas heamalgamationfCzechs ndSlovaksnto necategoryof "Czechoslovaks" orpurposesof enumeration.Apart rom he desire o assert heunity f thenewCzechoslovakation, heprimary otivation asalltoo obvious o observerst the time: f Czechs ndSlovakswere ountedeparately,ermans ould ut-numberlovaks. his uirk f hedatadoesnot ffectthe nalysisecause lmost llCzechs ivednBohemiaandMoravia,whilemost lovaks ivednSlovakia.Some historians averecentlyalled ntoques-tion theaccuracy f bothHabsburg ndCzechoslo-vakcensuses,specially egardinghe numerationfCzechs ndGermansnBohemia nd Moravia.King(2002)andJudson2006)bothdocumenthefluidityof national dentitiesn the lateHabsburg eriod,while or heCzechoslovakeriod ahra 2004, 008)demonstrates ow Czech enumeratorseliberatelyseized pportunitieso maximizehenumberfCzechs.We acknowledgehese rguments,ut do not feeltheynvalidate urassumptionhat he 1930census,writarge ndappropriatelynterpreted,an be takenas an accurate eflectionf thepopulation'sense fits own national dentity.irst, urreading f bothKingand Judson s thatthe case forthepredom-inanceof inguisticr regional ather hannationalidentitiesn the Bohemianands s strongeror heHabsburg eriod han or henewCzechoslovaktateand that he case fornationaldentitiestrengthensduringhe 1920's. econd, othKing 2002, 164-68)and Zahra (2008, 118-25) note that n compari-son with he1921census, he1930 census elied nmore scriptiveriteria fnationality,enderinghesorts fmanipulationsarried ut ntheearly 920smoredifficultoexecute,hough f course ome tilloccurred.Third, lthough edo not have an independentmeasure fnationaldentitygainst hich o check hecensusdata,we do have ome dramaticndirect vi-dence hat n thewhole he ensus s reliable. cross3,718municipalitiesn Bohemia ndMoravia,heresanastounding95 correlationetweenhe1930 ensusdata n the ractionf thnic ermansnd he ote ora German artyn the 1929parliamentarylection.Whateverdentitys beingtapped n thecensus, t

correlates erywell withpreferencesorGermanpolitical artiescross heBohemianands s awhole.Moreover,we arrive t a similar onclusion f weinvestigateowmany reasmight avesignificantlyhigher ermans han hecensus ndicates. o deter-minethiswe counted he number fmunicipalitieswhere hevoteforGerman artieswas 25% or morehigherhan henumber frecorded ermans,ntheassumptionhat"extra"votesfor Germanpartieswouldbe coming romGermanslassifieds Czechsin the ensus. his mountedoonly 3localities,r1.5percent f all communities.hus,althoughheirregularitiesnthe1930 ensus eportedyZahra ndothers xist nd are mportant,heyhouldnotdeterthe seof he atawritarges an ndicator fnationalidentity.

Estimation ethodsOur data are ecological: 930 census data and theactualresults rom he 1929 nd 1935national arli-amentarylections.We collected hese data at thelowest evelat whichthey ould be matched, hemunicipality.nthe aseofPrague,we usemunicipaldistricts,utmost f he bservationsrevillageobec)-level. he results a data etofover15,000ettlementsforwhichwehavematchingthnicnd electoralata.This sroughly0 timesmore ata hanhavehithertobeen usedto address ocal ethno-electoraloliticsninterwarzechoslovakia. ther ocial and economicdata are availableonlyat one administrativeevelabovethemunicipality,heokres district)evel.Wediscuss heokres-levelata furtherelow.Weemploycologicalnferenceoestimaterouppreferencesorpolitical arties.'Ourgoal is to esti-mate hedistributionfvotes cross thnic roupsnsettlementsxhibitingifferentorms f ethnic et-erogeneity.he ssue s best nderstoodisually.able1illustratesheecologicalnferenceroblem orBohe-mia n 1935.We aregiven herow censusdata)andcolumn votesforeach party/bloc) arginals,nd

7No survey ataare available or hisperiod, ut even f therewere,here regoodreasonswhy heymight e unreliable or urpurposes.t s wellknown nsurveyesearchhat espondentsreoften eticentboutexpressing npopular entimentso theirinterviewers.onsequently,urveysfpolitical referencesilltend to underestimatehe actual evelofsupport or xtremistparties.This effectmay be heightened y ethnic differencesbetweenhe nterviewernd therespondent.f course t wouldbebest o havebothkinds fdatato test or onsistencyetweenthe wo,but historical esearchlaces imits n method.



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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT? 419TABLE1 The Ecological InferenceProblem,Bohemia 1935

PoliticalParties/BlocsCommunist Republican Fascist German Nazi Other

Czechs ? ? ? ? ? ? 67%Germans ? ? ? ? ? ? 32%Jews ? ? ? ? ? ? 1%Total 9% 49% 10% 10% 21% 1%

thegoal s to estimatehe nteriorells f he able,the ractionf ach ocial rouphatupport givenparty/bloc.Werelyntwomodes f cologicalnalysis.ne,themethodf ounds,stablisheseterministicimitsonthe ossiblealueshathe uantityf nterestantake n based n the istributionfvotes nd thnicgroups.uch ounds anbereadilyomputedromthedataforny ettlementrfromhemarginalsnTable 1. For example,f67% of thepopulation sCzech, nd the communists eceive nly9% of thevote, henwe know hat heupperboundofCzechsupport or heCommunistswhenall CommunistvotersreCzech) s9/67, rroughly3%. The owerbound s 0.8We will ee that n many asesthebounds themselvesre quitenarrow,ending xtraconfidencehat he results renot a consequence farbitrarytatisticalssumptions.Our second nd primarymode ofanalysis sesstatisticsn oursettlementample o nfer oint sti-mates f he uantitiesf nterest,he nteriorells ftables uch s Table 1.Although ighly opular, heestimationethodnKing1997) s not asilyppli-cable nethnicallyndpoliticallyeterogeneousitua-tionswhere here re more han wonational roupsandparties.We triedGoodman's egressionnd ex-tensions roposed yAchen nd Shively1995) butthey ielded stimateshatwere ften ess than eroor greaterhan100%,which re nonsensicaln thecontext fourproblem.nstead, eemployhenon-linear eastsquares pproximationf the multino-mial-DirichletodelpresentednRosen t al. (2001).Theprincipaldvantagef thismodels that t re-spectshe ogic f hedeterministicounds ndyieldsconsistentstimatesorrbitrarilyargeables. eprovide

some etails f hismodelnAppendixI,available romthe uthors.9In the absence of systematic ata on the actualdegreend naturef ontact etween ational roups,we useproximitys a proxy.We recognizehe risksinherentn thisstrategy. uch like n the UnitedStates,where ifferentthnic roupsmight well nadjoiningreas f own utrarelyver eeone nother,it spossible hat astEuropean ational roupsived"in separateworlds."We offer wopiecesof evidencein defenseof our assumption.First, he bulk of ourobservations revillageswith smallpopulations.Themedianpopulationofour Czechoslovak ettlementssonly434. t isnotso easyto leada separateexistencewhen heres at most nemarket,nepost ffice,ndone chool.econd,ndmoremportantly,he istor-ical iteratureevealsmultilayeredelationsmongnational roups. onsider, or xample, ermansnCzechoslovakia.nsome ortionsfCzechoslovakia,Germansivedargelyn heirwn nd ctuallyeededto have ittle ontactwithCzechs.However,n thecities f Bohemianotonlywas there xtensivendintensiveontact etween zechs ndGermans,uthistoriansavedocumenteduite arefullyhat hesamepeoplefrequently ovedbackand forth etweenthese communal identities. he contact between thetwogroupswas so intensivenmany lacesthatby1930,manyGermanswere n theprocessofbecomingCzechs,a processthatnaturally aised alarmsamongleaders f the German ommunityKing2002, 165-68;Wiskemann 1967, 231-34). Much the same can besaid for theHungarian minority.

ResultsWe beginour analysiswith the 1929 nationalparlia-mentarylections. ur estimatesf the social bases

8We assume fullturnout cross nationalgroups.This is notunreasonable.n1929, he nly ear orwhich ehave he equisitedata, turnout veraged 2% across Bohemian nd Moraviansettlements,nd 90% across lovak ettlements.hese numbersdo not ppreciablyhangef nalysiss restrictedopredominantly(greaterhan95%) Czech,Hungarian, r Slovak settlements.Turnoutwashigh ndremarkablyniformcross thnic roups.9All stimates ere erformedn R 2.2.0with he ode describedinWittenbergndBhaskar2007). SeeWittenbergt al. (2007)for n updated ersion f this oftware.



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420 JEFFREYS. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERGFIGURE Czechoslovakia 929: Social BasesofParty upport

Bohemia,929 Moravia,929Fraction ermans Fraction ermans1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0I I I I I I I I I 0I I I I I I I I IO O___R

cxG. R Ro_, . ..t.-'


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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT? 421andwillhold for ther igures,houghhe dentitiesof thepartiesnd thenational roupsmayvary.Wealso display95% confidencentervals,s verticallines, round stimates or hoseparties eceivingsignificantortion fa group's ote.1lInterpretinghese lots akes omegettingsed o,but t'sworthhe ffort,ecause heymaket uite asyto seewhetherr not heres an effectobeexplained:the latterhe ine, he ess ontactmatters.nFigurethis s most visible n Germanvotingbehavior nBohemiadashedines). upport orG)erman artieswasroughly0% inbothGerman-dominatedettle-mentsthe eftmost) as well s Czech dominated-settlements.upport or he German N)ationalistsandthe R)epublicanCzechoslovak)artiesemainedmiredat under 10%. Part of the stabilityf theGerman ote s rooted n therichpalette f Germanparties, hich llowed ormuch ote witchingithinthebloc. ndeed, woof hemainGerman arties,heSocial Democrats nd theAgrarians,ad served ngovernment,nd had resistedmalgamatingith heirCzechoslovakdeological ounterpartsrimarilye-causethiswouldhaveceded henational uestion otherejectionistarties Wingfield 989,48-75). Anontrivialroportionf G)ermansupportedxtremeGermanN)ationalist arties,speciallynMoravia.AlthoughheGermans emainedargelymmuneto theproximityf heir ational ivals,he ame an-notbe said for heCzechs,where heupward lopinglines ndicatingupport or R)epublican artiesnMoraviaandtoamuch esser xtent ohemia) howsthatCzechpreferenceor uchparties ecreased iththe ncreasedresencef Germans. lthoughverallCzechsupport ftheseparties emains uitehigh,theres nonetheless oderate vidence or he hreathypothesis:s Czechsmovefromlocal)majorityo

minority,hey ravitateowardhe C)ommunistsnBohemia nd G)erman artiesnMoravia.12Thingsremore omplicatednthe lovak alf fthe epublic.or he lovaks here ould ppear obeclear upport or he contact ypothesis.heyweremuchmoreikelyovote or linka's P)opulist lovakPeople'sPartywhen heywere n the ocalmajority;as their roportionf a given ettlementalls, heybecomemore ikelyo votefor R)epublican arties.Unlike nBohemia ndMoravia, owever,his indingmaybemaskingmportantonfessionalffects.lin-ka's SPP was ledbya diverse roupofconservativeCatholic lerics, any fwhomwere eeplyntisemi-tic andopposed o socialmodernization,hich heyfearedwould significantlyeduce the role of theChurch n education, amily,nd cultural ife.Theparty'slear atholicppeal einforcedhe aliencefconfessionalleavagemong lovaks,significantin-ority f whomwereProtestant.linka ttemptedobridgehis ivide y mphasizinglovak ppressionytheHungarians,nd ater y heCzechs.Atthe utsetof heRepublic,lovaks adbeen ed obelieve hat hestatewould ontainignificantlementsffederalism,whennfactts tructureuchmore pproximatedheFrench nitarymodel.The SPP pitchedtsmessagedirectlyt this ource fresentmentmongSlovaksandpreached autonomy" ven t the"priceoftherepublic"Felak1994,54). The campaignmessagewasreallyhat f "catch-all rotest arty" ith ro-grammatictatements,ometimes utuallyxclusiveones, imed t a diverse ange fsocialgroups.His-torianstress broad ocioeconomicasefor he PP,from oorly ducated mall own raders,mallhold-ingfarmers,o theunderemployedrunemployableurban ntelligentsiaHoensch1979, 17-18).In fact, heconfessionalleavage mong lovakswas electorallytark. o show thiswe estimate o-manCatholic nd Protestantupport orpartiesnethnicallyomogeneousgreaterhan99%) Slovaksettlements. hereas65% (A .1%) of Catholicssupported linka ndonly30% (A .1%) (R)epubli-can parties, ver94% (+ .1%) of Protestants ent(R)epublican. rotestantslearly referredheir ta-tusas favorednterlocutorsith heir zechcorulersin a federal tate to an uncertain tatusunder aclerical, atholic-dominated,ore ullyutonomousSlovakregime Mamatey nd Luia 1973,78; Roths-child1974,120).Unfortunatelyt is notpossible oobtain eparatestimatesorCatholic ndProtestantSlovaks n nonhomogeneousettlements. e caninferhat evels fSlovak upport or R)epublicanandHlinka's P)opulistsnevenly plit ndmajoritySlovak reas epresentn averagefdisparateatholic

"We report ootstrappedercentileonfidencentervals asedon 500bootstrapeplications.ue to imited ariance nd henceuncertainesults,n most aseswedo notgeneratestimatesf agroup's oting ehaviorwhen hatgroup s lessthan20% of asettlement'sopulation.12Czechupport or hecommunistsn German reaswas notnecessarilyvote or thnicntoleranceut twas logical esponseto a perceivedthnic hreat. he Communistarty epresentedsmall ut mportantonethnic,etlliberalart f he ublic pherewhere ermansndCzechs omingled.thnicallyntolerantzechsshould ave upportedhe zech ascistsroneof he ightf enterbourgeoisCzech"parties--partieshatwere nany asewillingoworkwithmoderateermanartiesngovernment.he nomaloussupportorG)erman artiesmergesromistrictsuch sHlucin,wherehe ocalMoravians,hohadundergonesemi-Germaniza-tion,had been forced o registers Czech in the census.SeeWiskemann1967,231-34).Unfortunatelyt is notpossible opurge he ensus ataof hese alselydentifiedzechs ecausewelack he equisiteisaggregatedata n theserregularities.



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422 JEFFREYS. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERGand Protestantreferences.hat he confessionale-sults ell s s that t east sfar ssupportorHlinkasconcerned,hekey dentityor oliticalehaviors notethnic,utreligious.ForHungarians hethreat ypothesiseemstohold.Asthey ofromocalmajorityo ocalminority,theirupportorR)epublican arties alls romoug-hly 0%tonear ero.Atthe ame ime, heirupportforC)ommunistndespeciallyE)thnic arties ises.ForHungarians,hen,he C)ommunistsnd E)thnicpartiesrepresentedwo differentesponses o theSlovak hreat. oth ypes fparties ctivelyupportedculturalnd inguisticightsorHungarians,ut the(C)ommunists id so as partof a universalistndcosmopolitanmessagewithin heCzechoslovaktate,whereas he (E)thnicparties oughtnational elf-determinationorHungariansndgreaterutonomyfor therminorityroups.13

1935Let us turn now to the 1935 electionresults. ncontrast ith he 1929election, hich ccurrednacontext f relativemity mongethnic roups, he1935vote ookplace fterherise fHitler ndStalinhad emboldened xtremist zechoslovak oliticalentrepreneurs.zech Fascists ow received ver7%of thevote.KonradHenleinhad assumedeadershipoftheGerman xtreme ight nd had establishedNazi Sudeten erman artyhatwonover 5%of hevote,becomingby far the largestGermanparty.Hlinka's lovakpopulists adbegun o advocate nindependentlovak staterather hanmerely uto-nomywithin zechoslovakia. urpredictions thatthe increased ethnification"f politics t the na-tional evelshould ncrease upport or the threathypothesist the ocal level.Germans nd Slovaks,previously erelyissatisfieditizens f heRepublic,nowcouldbe seenbyotherssposing threato theRepublic's ery xistence.hiscouldverywelldrivefearfulzechs ndHungariansnto hehands f heirown extremists.Figure displays hesocialbases ofbloc/partysupportn1935,na setofpanels hat sanalogous oFigure1. There re twokeyfeaturesfthisfigure.First, omparing igures1 and 2, the change n

overallGerman lectoral referencess clearly isiblein theBohemia ndMoravia anels,wherehe N)aziSudetenGermanParty,whosepredecessor artiesobtained tmost ne-thirdftheGerman ote,nowgrabs ver 0%of hat ote.This ame t the xpenseof the moremoderateG)ermanparties, hich tillreceived large ortion fthevote, utnotnearlyslarge s in 1929.Theincreasingadicalizationf theSlovakProt-estantss notportrayednthe Slovakpanel,but thenumbers eveal heir rowingreferenceorHlinka's'autonomist'P)opulists:heirupportorheR)epu-blicans ropped rom4% to 73% + .1%),while heir"autonomist" linka upportncreased romnilto13%(+ 1%).Protestantstill verwhelminglyavoredliberal arties,uteven heir esistanceasbreaking.Slovak Catholicsupportfor the (P)opulistsand(R)epublicansemainedemarkablyteadytaround65% and5%,respectively.he rise ffascismmongGermansn Bohemia nd Moravia nd the ontinuedstrengthf he P)opulist lovak eople'spartyntheSlovak eartlandidnotpushCzechsnto he rms ftheir wn extremists.herewas a slight ptick nsupport orCzech F)ascistparties, ut itwas only4-8%,and sbarely isible n thepanels.Second, urpredictionegardinghe onsequen-ces of ncreased ational-levelthnic ensions or ocalperceptionf hreatsgenerallyotborne ut. ndeed,exceptinghe ppearancendpopularityfHenlein's(N)azi SudetenGerman arty,he mostremarkablefeature fFigure is how little t differs rom he1929 outcome n terms f Czech,Hungarian,ndSlovakvoting ehavior. here s a smallbut notice-able trendforthe (N)azis in Bohemia: the lessGermanswereexposedto Czechs, hemore ikelytheywere osupporthe N)azi party. his sentirelyconsistentwith the contacthypothesis. lthoughmany iberalGerman oterswere uspicious f theCzechoslovaktate, hey lso recognizedhat theirlivelihoods ere oundupwith emocraticractices(Kirnik 002, 37).Such entimentsouldhavebeenparticularlytrong mongGermanswho dwelledamongand interacted ith heirCzechco-citizens,leading o ess upportor he N)azis n these reas.'4Although he 1935 electoral ampaignwas quiteacrimonioussee,for xample, ampbell 003;Kelly1995, 122; Wingfield 989, 126), there is little

13Theshiftfrom C)ommunists o (E)thnic partiesamongHungariansiving s a localminoritys noteworthy.ur hunchis that he C)ommunists evoted ittle fforto organizingnthese reasbecause heywere ominatedySlovaks rGermans,groups hathad evinced ittle ympathyorcommunism lse-where n Czechoslovakia.

14Byontrast,hedevastatingconomic ownturnnthehighlyindustrialized ermanmajority reas of Northern ohemiaduring hegreatdepression-a stapleof thehistoriographyfthe1930s-mayhaveproduced deeper enseofethnic hreatand thesubsequent iscernablyigherevelofsupport or heNazis n these ommunities.



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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT? 423FIGURE Czechoslovakia 935:Social Bases ofParty upport

Bohemia, 935 Moravia,935Fraction ermans Fraction ermans1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0C o I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Io -- Czechs o - - Czechs- -- Germans -- Germans

, -------R a"RR

COOC06 ...-.N . 6c N. .S G-----G--------A - G---:3 - : ' AOr cu ' Or A

I3 _ :30.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0Fraction zechs Fractionzechs

Slovakia, 935Fractionungarians1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 00 I I I I I I I I I Ioo - Slovaksm -- Huns

2. _

C C

c3 E. . .F- - EA, E- l

2 0

d

:_oo-,9 o I I I i I I i I I I0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0Fractionlovaks

Key or artiesR=RepublicanCzechoslovak)C=CommunistN=NaziGerman)G=GermanP=PopulistsHlinka)F=Nat ems nd ascistsE=Ethnicin. on-German

evidencehat levatedupportor he udeten ermanPartywithinmorehomogenouslyerman reaswasprimarily consequence fcoercion. hepartywaskeen omaintaints egal tatus midpressureor tsdissolution.hisdid notpreventggressiveampaign-ingand evenaltercationst itsrallies, ut it wouldhave precludedarge-scalere-electionntimidation.Accordingo Mamatey lectionday itself passedwithoutncident"1973, 153).

DiscussionThusfarwe havefoundmixed esultsor he elation-ship between ocal ethnicdemographynd masselectoralreferences.or Czechs ndHungariansuroutcomes reconsistent,nthewhole,with he hreathypothesis:achgroup's upportor iberal artiessatitsmaximumwhen t dwells s the ocal majority.Slovaks, ycontrast,ppear o benefit rom ontact:theyre t theireast iberalwhen heyre nthe ocal

majority.erman olitical ehaviors argelymmuneto thepresencefCzechs.Theseheterogenousutcomes re ntriguingutunexpected. o check hereliabilityfourfindingswe nowpresent ome results singthemethod fbounds. Recall that the boundscan be computeddeterministically,ithoutny tatisticalssumptions.Thus, o the xtenthey regenerallyonsistent ithFigures and2,we can be more onfidenthat urestimates re not epiphenomenal f questionablestatistical ssumptions. or reasons of space wepresentummaryoundsonlyfor omeof our moreprominentesults.Others reavailablentheonlineAppendixII). Figure has four anels, achofwhichillustrateshe verageower ndupperboundsforgroup's upport f a particulararty r bloc.Thus,theupper-leftaneldisplays verage pper nd owerbounds solid ines)ofCzech upport orRepublicanpartiesn Moravia n 1929 acrosssettlements ithvarying roportionsfCzechs.We can see that heaverage pperbound on Czechsupport fRepub-lican parties n Moravia s approximately0% in



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424 JEFFREYS. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERGFIGURE Deterministic oundsAcrossLevelsofEthnicHeterogeneity

MORAVIA 929 , SLOVAKIA1929a,0n0X. A) a

0 AI--0.., t,_ I I I

gorn 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 o 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0Fractionzechs Fractionlovaks

~,BOHEMIA 1935 ,, BOHEMIA 1935o a0 o 0" ocoo .

"1A rA 0 "1ono I d-

0.

o 8 o

N d, d-aOr

Ao I I I I I I1 I I ! I Io 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 o 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0F CF

Fraction zechs FractionGermans

settlementshat re30% Czech the eft-mostashedverticaline).To generatehese esultswe use localweightedolynomial egressionLOESS) to fit urvesto the verage alues f theupper nd ower oundsacross alues nthehorizontalxis, ndthen splineto smooth hecurves.The bounds n Figure are consistent ith hecorrespondingindingsn Figures and 2. Consideragainthe op eft anelofFigure , inparticularhebounds whereCzechs live as a minority.3) andwhere hey re a securemajority.9), indicated ydashed erticalines. hefact hat heresvirtuallyooverlap etween he two ndicateshatregardlessfwhere hetruevalues iewithin ach set ofbounds,theslopebetween hemwill be positive, s in thecorrespondinganelofFigure .A similar ituationholds for heupper-rightanelofFigure , whichdisplays he bounds of Slovak upport orHlinka's(P)opulistsn1929.Thenonoverlapf he wo ets fbounds is consistentwith Slovak preferencesor(P)opulist parties n Slovak-dominatedreas, asnoted nFigure . Thebottom-leftanelofFigureshows hat urearlier stimate f owCzech upport

for (C)ommunistswas no fluke: xcept n over-whelminglyerman reas theboundsvirtuallyic-tate ingle igit upport.n a similar ein heboundsof German upport orHenlein'sNazi partylowerright anel)arecompatible ith hepoint stimatesfrom igure .Thus far ur results avebeenpresented ithoutconditioningn other actorsecause heoryells sthat nterethnicontacthouldmatter. owever,lassconflictlsoexisted,ndtheres ome verlap etweenclass nd ethnic leavages.n theBohemianands hebourgeoisiewas disproportionatelyerman nd inSlovakia twasdisproportionatelyewish;ungarianswereoverrepresentedmong arge andowners;ndSlovaks onstitutedhebulkofthepeasantry. hatappears s conflictetween ungariansndSlovaks rCzechs nd Germans ouldactually avemore o dowith conomic ensions hanwith thnicompetitionper e. s ethnicityproxy or conomic nterest?We now conditionomeof thekeyfindingsnone socioeconomic actor:mploymentn industryandmanufacturing.e choose his ecauseCzecho-slovakia xhibitedramatic egional ariationn its



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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT? 425degree f ndustrialization.ignificantarts f Bohe-miaand Moraviawere s developeds anyregionnother ndustrializedountries, hereas ther reasand much f lovakiaweremainlygricultural.ore-over,historiansf East-Centraluropehaveshownthat ndustrialmploymentloselyracks ther oci-oeconomicndictors uch as literacy,onsumption,and urbanizatione.g., Berendand Rinki 1974).Industrialmployments thus n excellentndicatorfor congeriesf factors esides thnic ontact hatmightnfluencehevote.Unfortunatelyhe economicdata are availableonly t one administrativenit bove hemunicipal-ity, he udicialokres or thepolitical kres n thecase ofSlovakia).Althoughhisyields ver 00units,there re insufficientata to reproducell the esti-mateswhilefully ontrollingorrelevant conomicconditions.nstead, e focus none ofourmost ro-minent esults: he rise n Slovak P)opulistprefer-ences s they ecome he ocalmajorityn 1935.Wecreated ubsamplesfmunicipalitiesased on whe-ther hedistrictshatcontain hese ettlementsreaboveorbelow the median evelofemploymentnindustrynd manufacturing.cross ll districtsnSlovakia,approximately9% of those employedworked n the ndustrialndmanufacturingectors.We thenreestimatedeyresultsn eachsubsample.In particular, e estimated lovak upport or hosepartieshat nterests in areaswhere achgroupwasa clearminoritybetween 0 and40% of thepopu-lation)and in thosewhere hey onstituted clearmajoritygreaterhan80% ofthe ocalpopulation).Our unconditionedesultswill be robust f thereremains similar radientn preferencesor iberaldemocratic artieswithin oth the industrial ndnonindustrialubsamples.Slovak upport or hemajorpartiesnd blocs nSlovakia representedn Table2,with hetoptworows of estimates esignatingampleswithout heeconomiccovariate for reference),he next twodesignatinghehighmanufacturingample greaterthan19%ofemployment),nd the ast wothe ow-manufacturingample lessthan19%). In each case95% confidencentervalsre isted nsquarebracketsbeside achestimate.15he one caveat s thatustas

when we estimated he unconditionedffects, ewere not able to factor n the effects oth ofconfessionnd degree f contact.We willcontinueto use ethnicdentity,tbeing nderstoodhat lovaksupport orHlinka epresentsisparate atholic ndProtestantehavior.Table 2 presentsheseestimates, hichclearlyconfirmhe nconditionedffectsromigure . First,support or R)epublican artiesthefirst olumn fnumbers) emains ighern minoritylovak ocal-ities han nmajoritynes, egardlessfwhetherheyare located n industrial r nonindustrialistricts.Thisresult emains venwhenpreferenceor thnicpartiesin this ase theHungarian-Germanlliance)is taken nto ccount.Contactwith therminoritiescausesSlovaks o votemore iberal egardlessf howone classifiesheHungarian-Germanlliance,ndinboth ndustrialndagriculturalreas.Second, henature f theSlovak esponseo theincreasingresenceftheir thnic ivals epends nthe ocioeconomicontextnwhichontact ccurs. osee his,onsider lovak otingehavior hereheyrein theminority10-40% Slovaks). n industrializedregionshey referheCommunists18%) toHlinka(11%),whereasn ess ndustrializedreas heymuchprefer linka 21%) to theCommunists8%). Thesuperior ommunist erformancen industrializedareasundoubtedlyeflectsreaterrganizationale-sources, ut they tillperformedwice as well in

minoritylovak ommunities18%) than nmajoritySlovak nes 9%). This uggestshat heCommunistsmay lsohave ucceeded ncapitalizingnthe hreatSlovaks erceivedrom heirmorenumerous ungar-ianneighbors,ven f he pecificommunistolutionto his hreat idnot elyn the xclusionaryepertoireofethnicallyntolerantarties.16

ConclusionDoes familiarityreed ontempt?urprimaryon-clusion s that n and of itself,hepolitical onse-quencesofcontact reindeterminate.irst, here sno uniform attern crossethnicgroups.By andlargeforCzechs and to a lesser xtentHungarianscontactwith ther roups asdeleteriousffects.orSlovakspropinquity ithHungarianss associated15In fewcases thepointestimate rom he full ample iesslightlyutside he95% confidencentervals computed romtheposteriorf thebootstrapped eplications.he difference,however, everhas substantiveignificance. e acknowledgethese nstances yextendingheconfidencenterval o includethefull ample stimatendreportinghat nd of t n talics. nall cases we roundoff o the nearestnteger.n manynstancesthe ntervalsreso small hat othendpointsf the ntervalrethe ame number.

16We an similarnalysisf he herise n Czechpreferenceor(R)epublican partiesas theybecome the local majoritynMoravia n 1929. t suggestshatthe observation f increasedcommunist ote mongCzechs s the ocalproportionfCzechsfalls s primarily phenomenon estrictedo more ndustrialareas.Theresults reavailable rom he uthors.



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426 JEFFREYS. KOPSTEIN AND JASON WITTENBERGTABLE2 Slovakia 935: Local Ethnic alance nd theSlovakVote n Industrial ndAgriculturalistricts.95 percent onfidencentervals re in brackets eside each estimateSampleType Republican Ethnic Rep+Ethnic Communist HlinkaNo Econ Controls10-40% Slovaks 58 [57,74] 10 [1,11] 68 13 [2,16] 17 [15,18]80-100% 43 [42,43] 1 [1,1] 44 8 [7,8] 47 [47,48]High Manuf/Industry10-40%Slovaks 58 [53,80] 10 [2,15] 68 18 [3,22] 11 [8, 11]80-100% 40 [39,40] 0 [0,1] 40 9 [8,9] 48 [48,48]LowManuf/Industry10-40%Slovaks 58 [58,74] 10 [2,10] 68 8 [2,11] 21 [15,21]80-100% 47 [46,47] 2 [1,2] 49 4 [4,4] 47 [46,47]

withgreaterolerance, hileGermans eem mper-vious to the presenceof their Czech neighbors.Second, he mpact fethnic emographys notcon-sistent ithin thnic roups. orCzechs heperceivedGerman hreats primarilyn industrial henom-enon,whereas or lovaks he ndustrialnvironmentdoes not significantlylter he benefits f contact.The ethnicallyharged tmospheref 1935slightlydiminishesheearlier egativeonsequencesf con-tact orCzechs ndHungarians,ut argelyreservesthepositive ffectsorSlovaks nd neutral nesforGermans.Thesecontradictoryindingsre discordant iththe iterature,hevastmajorityfwhich indsontactto havepositive ffects.ettigrewndTropp 2006,767)note hat keyimitationf ontact esearch asbeen itssingle-mindedocuson circumstanceshatfacilitateeneficialontact. hey uggesthat cholarsought nstead o devotegreater nergyo inhibitoryfactors. akentogether,ur disparate esults hedlight n at east wopotential eterminants.he firstis nationaldemography.ne mighthave expectedsimilaritiesetween ermanndHungarian oliticalbehavior. oth were former ominant ationalitieswho were unwilling nd unhappyminoritiesnCzechoslovakia. et theGermans rovedfarmoreimmune ocontact han heHungarians.he differ-encemay ie in their umbers. ermans onstitutedroughly ne-quarterf theCzechoslovakopulationand nearly ne-third f Bohemia, demographicweight hatsupported broad rangeof politicalparties nd economic nfluence hatmayhave re-ducedfearsfCzechpolitical omination. his ouldexplain heir olitical isregardor hepresence fCzechs.TheHungarians, ycontrast,onstitutedessthan5% of Czechoslovakiandonly round17% ofSlovakia,making he Slovaks fargreaterotentialthreat o them han heCzechswere o theGermans.

The second actors national-levelthnic olitics,which oes not ppear o exertmuch nfluence.hisis a remarkable inding iventhe volume of inkspilled n thedangers f ethnic utbiddingnd theimportancef amicablepeak-levelthnic elations.Asnoted arlier,y1935GermanyndHungary ereagitatingver moreopenlyfor territorialevision,andeach, longwith heSovietUnion,wassupport-ing "their"partieswithin he Czechoslovak artysystem. ven the most isolated of Czechoslovakcitizens ould nothave enteredhevoting ooth n1935 unaware f thesteadydeteriorationn inter-ethnic elationsndthe hreat osedto therepublic.Yet none of thisfundamentallyltered he ogicofcontact s it existedn 1929, ven f t did slightlyreduce the magnitude f some effects. ermansupport id shift nmasse o Henlein's udetenNaziparty, ut even thosegainsoccurredmore or lessequally n homogeneouslyerman nd mixedGer-man-Czech ettlements.ur results reathe ew ifeintotheold adagethat llpoliticss local.A thirdmplicationf ourfindingsoncerns herelationshipetween hedegree f contact nd thenature f hehypothesizedutcome. lose nspectionofFigures and 2 reveals otential onmonotoniceffects,ith n inflectionoint ccurringnroughlyevenly alanced ettlements40-60% Czech/Slovak).Such behavior ppears o characterizeerman up-portfor G)ermanand (N)azi parties,Hungariansupport or he (C)ommunistsnd Slovak upportfor R)epublican artiesn 1929; nd Czechsupportfor the (C)ommunistsand Slovak supportfor(R)epublicansnd (P)opulistsn 1935. Thispatternis based on relativelyewdatapoints nd requiresfurthernvestigation,ut there regood theoreticalreasonsforbelievinghatevenly ivided ocalitiesmight e different.or example, ncertaintyboutwhich ind fparty ill merge oliticallyictorious,



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DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT? 427and the likelihood hatauthoritys likely o shiftagain n thefuture,might ncourage ll groups osupportmore iberal arties. his is in contrastoareas in which a group is a small minority roverwhelminglyajority.n theformerase extrem-istvoting oses little hreat o therulingmajoritygroup,whereasn the atter hemajorityan voteextremistithout ear fretaliationytheminority.This logicmaybe morepertinento local than tonational lections,utnonethelessothGermans ndSlovaksthough otCzechs) reattheirmost iberalin evenly alanced ettlements.We concludewith n implicationor ontempo-rary thnic olitics.Althoughommunism nd fas-cism re no longer ignificantlectoralhreats,therkinds of racist nd xenophobicpartiesremain afixturef democraticolitics.Our findingserve sa reminderhat iberal aithnthenecessarilyenignpolitics f multiethnicocalitiesmaybe misplaced.Timewilltell, or xample,whetherhe reconstruc-tion fBosnia longmultiethnicineswill ncreaserdecrease the propensityf Croats, Muslims, ndSerbs o supportlliberal arties.Muchdepends ntheparticularitiesnd local demographic istribu-tions f thegroupsn question.We leave for utureresearch he vexing questionof why contact sbeneficial or omegroups utnot others.ManuscriptubmittedJuly007Manuscriptcceptedor ublication0 November008

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Jeffrey. Kopsteinsprofessorfpoliticalcience,UniversityfToronto, oronto, N,M5S 3K7.JasonWittenbergs assistantrofessorfpoliticalscience,UniversityfCalifornia,erkeley, erkeley,CA 94720.

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