Intended Decision MPTA v MPWMD (M123512) 03-17-15

8/9/2019 Intended Decision MPTA v MPWMD (M123512) 03-17-15

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fiLE

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY

OF

MONT R Y

M R 17 2 15

Monterey Peninsula Taxpayers' Association,

a California corporation, Ronald J Pasquinelli,

Thomas

J

Rowley Jr. and Richards

J

Heuer, III,

Petitioners/Plaintiffs

v

Board

of

Directors

of

the Monterey Peninsula

Water Management District and the Monterey

Peninsula Water Management District

Respondents/Defendants

TERI8A

A

1 1 1 ~ 1

CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

K Ha DEPUTY

• ILSOPl

Case No. M123512

Intended Decision

This matter came on for court trial on February 23, 2015. Margaret

L

Thurn appeared on

behalf

of

Petitioners/Plaintiffs. Michael

G

Colantuono and David

J

Rudderman appeared

on

behalf

of

Respondents/Defendants. The matter was argued and taken under submission. This

intended decision shall suffice as a statement of decision as to all matters contained herein. (Cal.

Rules

of

Court, rule 3.1590(c)(l).)

Petitioners/Plaintiffs Monterey Peninsula Taxpayers' Association, Ronald J Pasquinelli,

Thomas

J

Rowley Jr. and Richards J Heuer, III ( Petitioners ) brought this case against

Respondents the Board

of

Directors

of

the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District and

the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District ( Respondents and/or the District )

to

challenge actions related to the District's passage

of

Ordinance No. 152 (the Ordinance. ) The

Ordinance imposes an annual charge on certain property within the District to support the

District's water supply projects (the Charge. ) Petitioners objected to the Ordinance prior

to

its

passage. However, the public failed to submit sufficient protest ballots to block the Ordinance

under the procedures set forth in Proposition 218. Consequently, Petitioners circulated a petition

RECEIVED M R

17

Z 15


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seeking placement of a referendum to repeal Section Four of the Ordinance (the Petition. )

Respondents refused to place the proposed referendum (the Referendum ) on the ballot,

alleging that the Peti tion and Referendum suffered from fatal deficiencies. Petitioners now seek

a writ of mandate and declaratory relief 1) that Respondents refusal to place the Referendum on

the ballot exceeded their powers; 2) that Ordinance No. 152 violates the Dist rict' s enabling law;

and 3) that Ordinance No. 152 violates the California Constitution.

ackground

The District is a public agency created by special law in 1977 to conserve[ e] and

augment[] the supplies of water by integrated management

of

ground and surface water supplies,

for control and conservation

of

storm and wastewater, and for promotion of the reuse and

reclamation

of

water. (Wat. Code. Appen. § 118-2.) The Legislature observed that water

service in the area is principally supplied by California American Water Company ( CAW ), a

privately owned water supplier which does not have the facilities nor the ability to perform

functions which are normally performed by public agencies Ibid.) Thus, the District was

created to carry out such functions which can only be effectively performed by government,

including, but not l imited to, management and regulation of the use, reuse, reclamation,

conservation

of water

and

bond financing of public works projects. Ibid.)

For nearly 20 years, the District's primary revenue source was obtained via a user fee

imposed by the District and collected by CAW on its customer bills. In 2011, the California

Public Utilities Commission ( CPUC ) suspended CAW s collection

of

the user fee. (Pet. Ex.

Y, at P418, § 3.) To make up the resulting revenue shortfall, the District developed the Charge.

The Charge is imposed on all parcels connected to

CAW s

water distribution system. Subareas

of

the district not connected to the CAW system, such as the Bishop, Hidden Hills, Ambler, and


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On July 26, 2012, the signed Petition was delivered to the District. (Pet. Ex. CB.) On

August 30, 2012, the Monterey County Registrar

of

Voters certified the Petition, verifying all

signatures in their entirety, and finding that the Petition contained 4,136 valid signatures, of

which only 3,824 were necessary to qualify the Referendum for the ballot. (Pet. Ex. CE.)

On September

17

2012, at a meeting

of

the Board, Respondents' General Manager David

Stoldt reported that the Petition had received enough signatures to qualify the Referendum for

the ballot. Mr. Stoldt listed five options he believed Respondents had as to how to address the

Petition and proposed Referendum. Mr. Stoldt also offered five legal arguments, provided

by

outside counsel, against the validity of both the Petition and the Referendum. The Board

concluded that both the Petition and the Referendum were invalid and that, accordingly, it was

not under a duty to place the Referendum on the ballot. (Pet. Ex. CG.)

On June 13, 2013, Petitioners filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate seeking a writ

compelling the District to submit the Referendum to voters. On May 23, 2014, Petitioners

amended the Petition to add a cause

of

action seeking declaratory relief that the Ordinance

exceeds the District 's authority. Petitioners now seek a writ compelling the District to submit the

Referendum to the voters, or, alternatively, declaratory relief that the Ordinance is invalid.

vidence Submitted

Requests

for

Judicial Notice

As to Petitioners' requests for judicial notice, the court declines to take Judicial Notice

of

pages 1-17 22-26 29 37 41-43 59 and 69-78 ofPetitioners' Exhibit A to Petitioners'

5


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44 (as to the last paragraph only), 50, 59, 61, 64 (as to the first paragraph only), and 65.

4

Petitioners' remaining evidentiary objections are overruled.

Respondents' evidentiary objections are sustained as to numbers: 2, 6,

10, 21, 27, 30, 32,

38 and 41.

5

Respondents' remaining evidentiary objections are overruled.

Legal Standards Governing Traditional Mandamus nd eclaratory Relief

Petitioners seek issuance

of

a traditional writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure

section 1085. Code

of

Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a) provides, inter alia, that

[a] writ

of

mandate

may

be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or

person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty

resulting from an office, trust, or station . To obtain a writ

of

mandate, Petitioners must

show (1) no 'plain, speedy, and adequate ' alternative remedy exists (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086);

(2) a clear, present, ... ministerial duty on the part of the respondent'; and (3) a correlative

'clear, present, and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty.' [Citations.]

A ministerial duty is an obligation to perform a specific act in a manner prescribed by law

whenever a given state of facts exists, without regard to any personal judgment as to the

propriety ofthe act. [Citation.] People v Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 339-340.) t is

4

Petitioners' objections are granted on the following bases: Objections

5 18:

Secondary

evidence. Objections 28, 34, 36, 44: Speculation, lack

of

foundation. Objections 42, 50:

Improper lay opinion. Objection 4: Lack

of

personal knowledge, lack of foundation, and

hearsay. Objection 10: Improper lay opinion, speculation, and secondary evidence. Objection

35: Improper lay opinion, lack of foundation. Objection 59: Lack of personal knowledge,

improper lay opinion, and hearsay. Objection 61: Lack offoundation. Objection 64: Lack of

foundation, hearsay. Objection 65: Lack of authentication.

5

Respondents' objections are granted on the following bases: Objections 2, 6, 10, 38:

Secondary evidence. Objections 27, 30,

32,41:

Lack of personal knowledge, improper lay

opinion. Objection 21: Lack of authentication.


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well settled that a writ of mandate is available to compel placement of a referendum on the

ballot. (Geiger

v

Board o Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 835.)

Petitioners also seek declaratory relief that the Ordinance is invalid under both the

District's enabling law and the California Constitution. A declaratory judgment action requires

an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective partie.s. (Code

Civ. Proc., § 1060.) [The] controversy must be of a character

which

admits of specific and

conclusive relief

by judgment

within the field of udicial determination, as distinguished from an

advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts. (Monahan v Department o

Water Power (1941) 48

Cal.App.2d

746, 751.) And, while ordinances

are

inherently proper

subjects of declaratory relief, yet a declaratory judgment may

not

be rendered in respect to them

in disregard of the customary limitations upon the granting of such relief. ( d.) Here, there is

no dispute that an actual controversy exists regarding an ordinance already in effect.

Accordingly, the standards for obtaining declaratory relief

have

been satisfied.

Discussion

I. The District May Only Refuse to Place a Referendum on the Ballot

if

the Petition

Violates Technical Requirements; it Lacks Authority to do so on Substantive

Grounds

Petitioners argue that the Referendum qualified for the bal lot and otherwise satisfied the

statutory requirements of Elections Code section 914

7

Consequently, Petitioners reason, the

District was under a legal obligation under Elections Code sec tions 9144 and 9145 to either

repeal the Ordinance or submit the Referendum to voters.

The right of referendum is one of the most precious rights of our democratic process.

[Citation.] (Citizens

or

Responsible Behavior

v

Superior Court (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1013,

1022.) Nevertheless,

if the

court is convinced, at any time, that a measure is fatally flawed

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no purpose

is

served by submitting it to the voters.

( d.

at pp. 1022-1023.) Respect for the right

o

referendum does not require the useless expenditure

o

money and creation

o

emotional

community divisions concerning a measure which is for any reason legally invalid.

(Id.

at

p.

1023.)

Respondents argue that the Referendum and Petition are invalid on four grounds:

1

that

the Referendum would exceed the referendum power; 2) that Proposition 218 does not change

this;

3

that the Petition would mislead voters; and 4); that the Referendum would violate the

rights

o

District contractors.

t

is possible that one or more

o

these arguments may suffice

to

invalidate either the Petition or the Referendum. However, i t is clear that the District only had

the authority

to

make a unilateral determination as to the technical, not substantive, validity

o

the Referendum and Petition.

The courts have uniformly condemned local governments when these legislative bodies

have refused to place duly qualified initiatives on the ballot. [Citations.]

Save Stanislaus Area

Farm Economy

v.

Board o Supervisors

(1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 141, 148.) Indeed, [g]iven

compliance with the formal requirements for submitting an initiative, the registrar must place it

on the ballot unless he is directed to do otherwise by a court on a compelling showing that a

proper case has been established for interfering with the initiative

power.

Farley v Healey

(1967) 67 Cal.2d 325, 327.) The same analysis has been applied to referenda:

t is not [a city clerk's] function to determine whether a proposed [referendum]

will be valid i enacted These questions may involve difficult legal issues

that only a court can determine. The right to propose [referendum] measures

cannot properly be impeded by a decision

o

a ministerial officer, even

i

supported by the advice o the city attorney, that the subject is not appropriate for

submission to the voters. Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 564, fn.2

quoting Farley, supra, 67

Cal.2d at p. 327).)

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In response, the District argues that it has a duty to examine referenda before placing

them before voters, citing to, inter alia, deBottari

v

City Council (1985)

171

Cal.App.3d 1204,

1213. The district's selective reading ignores the plain language

of deBottari,

which

distinguished preelection nonjudicial review from preelection judicial review, and concluded that

the relevant governmental entity had a mandatory duty either to repeal the challenged

ordinances or to submit the ordinance to referendum unless 'directed to do otherwise by a court

on a compelling showing that a proper case has been established for interfering with the

[referendum] power. ' ( d. at p. 1204 (quoting Farley, supra, 67 Cal.2d at

p

327).) A local

government is not empowered to refuse to place a duly certified initiative on the ballot.

What should a local government do

if

it believes an initiative measure is unlawful and should not

be presented

to

the voters? A governmental body, or any person or entity with standing, may file

a petition for writ of mandate, seeking a court order removing the initiative measure from the

ballot. [Citation.] But such entity or person may not unilaterally decide to prevent a duly

qualified initiative from being presented to the electorate.

(Save Stanislaus, supra,

13

Cal.App.4th at

p

49l

However, this analysis does not apply to technical deficiencies in a referendum petition,

which

do

not require an elections official to make quasi-judicial evaluations

of

a petition's

validity. (Lin v City o Pleasanton (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 408, 420.) In certifying a

referendum petition, a clerk's duty is limited to the ministerial function of determining whether

the procedural requirements have been met. [Citation.]

(Ibid.)

Thus,

if

Respondents can show

6

Even an improper refusal may be retroactively validated by a judicial declaration that

the measure should not be submitted to the voters. (Citizens for Responsible Behavior

v

Superior Court

(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1021.)

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that the Petition failed to meet procedural requirements, such would be a valid ground for

refusing

to

place the Referendum on the ballot.

t

is to this question that we now turn.

II The Referendum Petition Violated the Elections Code

The ministerial duty to examine a petition for technical deficiencies includes

a

determination

of

whether the petition includes the

'text'

of

the ordinance challenged.

[Citation.]

I

d. Technical deficiencies in referendum petitions do not invalidate those petitions

so

long as they are in 'substantial compliance' with statutory and constitutional requirements.

[Citation.]

(Assembly v Deukmejian

(1982) 30 Cal.3d 638, 652.) However, where a petition

fails to furnish the information required by the statute, i.e., the text or language

of

the

challenged law, that petition is not in substantial compliance with statutory or constitutional

requirements.

(Billig v Voges

(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 962, 968.)

Elections Code section 9147, subdivision (b) provides that [e]ach section

of

the

referendum petition shall contain the title and text

of

the ordinance or the portion

of

the

ordinance which is the subject

of

the referendum. The purpose

of

this requirement is to

provide sufficient information

so

that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether

to

sign

the petition and to avoid confusion.

(Mervyn s v Reyes

(1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 93,

99;

Billig, supra,

223 Cal.App.3d at

p

967 [the requirement stems from the need to fully inform[]

[the prospective signor]

of

the substance

of

the challenged measure. ]) Critically, the text

of

the ordinance includes the words

of

the ordinance itself and documents that are physically

attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference.

(Lin, supra,

176 Cal.App.4th at p. 417.)

Thus, in

Chase v Brooks

(1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 657, a city council enacted a zoning

ordinance which reclassified property described in an attached exhibit. The referendum petition

at issue failed to include the exhibit, which described the property affected by the ordinance. The

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court concluded that the failure to include the exhibit as part of the referendum petition was fatal

because the petition was required to contain the entire text of the ordinance or the portion

thereof which is the subject of the referendum. ( d. at pp . 662-663.) Similarly, in

Billig, supra,

223 Cal.App.3d at p. 964, the court upheld the rejection of a referendum petition which omitted a

portion

of

the text of the ordinance and two exhibits which comprise[d] the major portion of the

ordinance. And, in Nelson v. Carlson (1993)

17

Cal.App.4th 732, 739-740, the court found that

a referendum petition challenging a land use plan violated the text requirement because it failed

to include a copy of the general plan that was both attached to the resolution and expressly

incorporated by reference.

Here, Respondents concede that it is possible to referend part of a law, but argue that

Petitioners' attempt to referend only Section Four amounts to a referendum on the entire

Ordinance. Consequently, the fact that the Petition failed to provide the text

of

the entire

Ordinance to voters meant that voters were not adequately informed

as

to the effects

of

the

Referendum. In addition, Respondents argue that, at minimum, the Petition should have

included the text of Section Five and District Law section 326, subdivision (g), both expressly

referred to in Section Four. Petitioners respond that the Petition met all legal requirements by

including the title and text of Section Four, the only challenged portion of the Ordinance.

Petitioners are incorrect. The text

of

an ordinance has consistently been held to include

documents expressly incorporated by reference into a challenged ordinance.

Lin, supra,

176

Cal.App.4th at p 420;

Billig, supra,

223 Cal.App.3d at p 962.) This rule properly limits the

function

of

an elections official to the ministerial function

of

determining whether the

procedural requirements have been met which should consist only

of

'the straightforward

comparison of the submitted petition with the statutory requirements for petitions' that is

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authorized by law. (/d. at p. 421 (quoting

lliance for a Better Downtown Millbrae

v

Wade

(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 123, 133).)

Petitioners challenge only one section of the Ordinance, but that section explicitly

incorporates another section, Section Five, as well as District

Law

section 326, subdivision (g).

Section Four specifically provides that the amount

of

the Charge shal l be calculated as set forth

in Section 5 of this ordinance. Petitioners argue both that Section Five is irrelevant and that

Respondents fail to explain why Section Five would make the Referendum clearer to voters.

These arguments are meritless; Section Five is relevant because it is incorporated by reference

into Section Four. Moreover, Section Five's contents are critical to a

voter's

decision whether to

sign the Petition. The amount of the Charge and the method by which the Charge is calculated

are key pieces of information that a voter would need to determine the effect the Charge would

have upon that voter. The same is true

of

District Law section 326, subdivision (g), cited in

Section Four, both as authority for the District's ability to set penalties for nonpayment of the

Charge, and for the authorized rate of any such penalty. At minimum, then, Petitioners were

required to include the text of Section Five and District

Law

section 326, subdivision (g), both

expressly incorporated into Section Four, to satisfy Elections Code section 9147, subdivision (b).

Further, the court agrees that the Petition mislead voters more generally. There is no

dispute that a portion

of

an ordinance can

be

referended. (Elec.

Code§

9147, subd. (b).)

Nevertheless, where an ordinance clearly pertains to a single subject, failing to provide voters

with the context in which the portion of the ordinance to be referended exists will often deceive

voters. Here, the Ordinance's sole purpose was to impose the Charge. Every other section in the

Ordinance besides Section Four provides key information which either clarifies or affects the

Charge. The Ordinance includes 22 findings of fact, explains the District's purpose in enacting

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the Ordinance, provides a formula for calculating the Charge, establishes an administrative

review and appeal procedure, authorizes a Citizen's Oversight Panel, and declares both an

effective and sunset date. (Resp. Ex. 144.) All ofthis information would be integral to a voter's

decision whether to sign a petition to referend Section Four of the Ordinance.

Finally, we disagree with Respondents that material included with the petition referring

to the Charge as a water tax violated Elections Code section 18600. That law applies when

there are uncontested, objectively verifiable evidence ofuntruth[s].

San Francisco Forty-

Niners

v

Nishioka

(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 637, 649.) The question ofwhetherthe Charge is a tax

or a charge is far from simple. t requires significant analysis; an opinion on this issue cannot

fairly be likened to uncontested, objectively verifiable evidence ofuntruth[s]. Ibid.)

III. The Water Supply Charge is uthorized by the Enabling Law

Petitioners argue next that the Ordinance violates the District's enabling law, both

because that law does not authorize the Charge, and because the Ordinance pays for projects for

which voter approval was required but never obtained. Both inquiries require this Court to

interpret the District's enabling law.

The fundamental task in construing a statute is to ascertain the Legislature's intent so

as to effectuate the purpose ofthe statute. Smith

v

Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83.)

The first step in accomplishing this task is to examine the statutory language and give it a plain

and commonsense meaning. People v Verduzco (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1414.) That

reasonable and common sense interpretation must be consistent with the apparent purpose

and intention

of

the Legislature. f possible, [the court] will give significance to the plain

The issue is not, as Petitioners frame it, that Petitioners were required to inform signers of

the impact of the Referendum, but rather, that Petitioners were prohibited from

misleading

signers as to the impact of the Referendum.

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meaning of every word, phrase, and sentence

of

a statute in pursuance of the legislative purpose,

harmonizing the various parts

of

an enactment by considering each particular clause or section in

the context of the statutory framework

as

a whole while considering the context, object, and

history

ofthe

legislation, as well as public policy and contemporaneous construction in [an]

attempt to arrive at a construction that

is

practical rather than technical in nature. [Citations.]

In re Rochelle B

(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1216.)

f

course, [t]he literal meaning

ofthe

words

of

a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to manifest

purposes that, in the light

of

the statute's legislative history, appear from its provisions

considered

as

a whole.

Silver v Brown

(1966)

63

Cal.2d 841, 845.)

Moreover, both the statute and its statutory scheme must be construed as a whole.

The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence

Lakin v.

Watkins Associated Industries

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 649.) [T]he words of a statute [must

be

construed] in context, harmoniz[ing] the various parts

of

an enactment by considering the

provision at issue in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.

Cummins, Inc. v

Superior Court

(2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487.)] Statutory interpretation requires the court

to

harmonize its various parts

if

possible, reconciling them in the manner that best carries out the

overriding purpose of the legislation. [Citation.]

Elsner v Uveges

(2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 933.)

Additionally, statements

of

the intent

of

the enacting body contained in a preamble, while not

conclusive, are entitled to consideration. [Citations.]

People

v

Canty

(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266,

1280.)

Only when the language of a statute generates more than one reasonable interpretation

and neither the plain language

of

a statute nor canons

of

construction resolve the matter, may the

court look to extrinsic aids such

as

legislative history and public policy.

People v. Woodhead

5


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(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007, citations omitted.) Finally, if neither the plain language nor the

legislative history reveals the meaning

of

the statute, the court must apply reason, practicality,

and common sense to the language at hand with the goal of making the text

of

the statute

workable and reasonable, and with consideration of the consequences flowing from a given

statutory interpretation. ( d., citations omitted).

A.

The Enabling Law Authorizes the Charge

The Legislature created the District to address what it believed to be a need for

integrated management

of

water supply in the Monterey Peninsula, finding that:

The major water supply for this area is derived from the Carmel River basin and

the major uses lie outside that basin. The adopted central coast basin plan divides

the management

of

the several basins, resulting in division, waste, and shortage

of

water resources The water service is principally supplied by [CAW]

which does not have the facilities nor the ability to perform functions which are

normally performed by public agencies, including the ability to raise sufficient

capital for necessary public works, contract with, or provide necessary assurances

to, federal and state agencies for financing of water projects and supplying of

water, and the regulation

of

the distribution

of

water developed within or brought

into such service area. (Wat. Code. Appen. § 118-2.)

Consequently, the Legislature created the District to carry out such functions which only can be

effectively performed by government, including, but not limited to, management and regulation

of the use, reuse, reclamation, conservation

of

water and bond financing

of

public works

projects.

( d.) ore

generally, the District was created to serve the people

of

the Monterey

Peninsula efficiently, to prevent waste or unreasonable use

of

water supplies, to promote the

control and treatment of storm water and wastewater, and to conserve and foster the scenic

values, environmental quality, and native vegetation and fish and wildlife and recreation in the

Monterey Peninsula and the Carmel River basin

( d.)

To accomplish its purposes, the District may exercise the powers which are expressly

granted by [the enabling] law, together with such powers as are reasonably implied from such

6


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express powers and necessary and proper to carry out the objects and purposes of the district.

I

.

at

§

118-30 1.) The District is empowered to by resolution or ordinance fix and collect

rates and charges for the providing or the availability of any service it is authorized to provide or

make available or for the sale, lease, or other disposition ofwater or other product of its works or

operations.

Id.

at § 118-308.) The District is also authorized to fix, revise, and collect rates

and charges for the services, facilities, or water furnished by it. (/d. at § 118-326, subd. (b).)

More generally, the District shall have the power as limited in [the enabling] law to do any and

every lawful act necessary in order that sufficient water may be available for any present or

future beneficial use or

uses

of

the lands

or

inhabitants within the district

Id.

at

§

118-

325.)

Petitioners argue that these powers do not authorize the District to implement the Charge.

Petitioners argue that 1) the District may only impose a charge for water or service furnished by

it; 2) water and water service are furnished by CAW, not the District; and 3) that the District's

services benefit CAW rather than taxpayers. None of these arguments are persuasive.

8

B

The District Provides Water Service

Petitioners repeatedly argue that the District does not supply water service because it

does not actually deliver water, instead wholesaling water to

CAW

which ultimately furnishes

8

Petitioners also argue that that the enabling law does not authorize fees or charges to

pay for general operating expenses. Petitioners provide no authority for this assertion. In

fact, this claim is directly contradicted by the enabling law, which provides that the District

shall have the power as limited in [the enabling] law to do any and every lawful act

necessary in order that sufficient water may be available for any present

or

future beneficial

use or uses of the lands or inhabitants within the district ( d.

at§

118-325.) In any

event, the Charge does not fund general operating expenses. The Ordinance expressly

provides that [p ]roceeds of the charge imposed by this Ordinance may only be used to fund

District water supply activities. (Pet. Ex

BX

at P0810, italics added.)

17


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the water to its customers. This narrow definition

of

water service is not supported by relevant

authority, however.

In Griffith

v.

Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 586,

595, the court addressed the validity

of

a groundwater augmentation charge imposed by the

Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency to cover the costs

of

purchasing supplemental water

and

of

providing supplemental water service, a service which included the planning, design,

construction, and operation

of

facilities designed to provide supplemental water. The Griffith

court affirmed this charge, finding that, the entity that produces, stores, supplies, treats, or

distributes water necessarily provides water service. ld.)

The District is such an entity. The mere fact that the water the District provides is

ultimately delivered by CAW does not affect the District's status as either a supplier

of

water or

as

a water service. Indeed, the Legislature's purpose in establishing the District was to address

the limitations of a system in which a privately owned water supplier does not have the

facilities nor the ability to perform functions which are normally performed by public agencies

. . (Wat. Code. Appen.

§

118-2.) The Legislature therefore found it necessary to create the

District

to

serve these governmental functions, effecting a clear and explicit division of labor

between CAW and the District. Ibid.)

Moreover, the Legislature plainly intended the District to protect the continued viability

of

the area's water supply. Thus, the District was granted the power as limited in [the enabling]

law to do any and every lawful act necessary in order that sufficient water may be available for

any present or future beneficial use or uses

of

the lands

or

inhabitants within the district

( d. at§ 118-325.) The projects funded by the Charge are specifically intended to ensure the

availability of sufficient water to the District inhabitants. Further, the District's powers include

8


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fixing and collecting rates and charges for the providing or the availability

of

any service it

is

authorized to provide or make available or for the sale, lease, or other disposition

of

water or

other product

of

its works or operations

( d.

at§

118-306.)

f

by service, the Legislature

did not mean water service, it is difficult to imagine what service the District could possibly

be intended to provide. Indeed, legislative history shows that [a] principal objective

of

the

district would be to wholesale water supplies developed by the district to the existing private

water purveyor. (Resp. Request for Judicial Notice, Ex.

1

at p. LIS

- 5.)

[T]he words

of

a statute [must be construed] in context, harmoniz[ing] the various

parts

of

an enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context

of

the statutory

framework as a whole.

Cummins, Inc., supra,

36 Ca1.4th at

p

487.) Statutory interpretation

must be directed at ensuring that the overriding purpose

of

the legislation is carried out.

Elsner, supra,

34 Ca1.4th at

p

933, internal citation omitted.) Petitioners ' logic,

if

accepted,

would violate these canons by undermining the very purpose

of

the District, rendering it

incapable

of

achieving the very goals for which it was created. Such a construction

of

the

enabling law defies legislative intent, and hence, must be rejected.

C. The District was Not Required to Obtain Voter Approval for Projects That

Benefit the District as a Whole

The enabling law authorizes the District to use the revenue from any authorized rates and

charges to pursue works and projects. The term works is defined expansively

to

include,

without limitation, dams and damsites, reservoirs and reservoir sites, and all conduits and other

facilities useful in the control, collection, conservation, storage, reclamation, treatment, disposal,

diversion, and transmission

of

water, the collection, treatment, reclamation, or disposal

of

sewage, waste, or storm waters, and all land, property, franchises, easements, rights-of-way, and

privileges necessary or useful to operate, maintain, repair, or replace any

ofthe

foregoing. ( d.

19


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at § 118-14.) The term projects is not defined by the law, but it can reasonably be inferred that

projects include, at minimum, programs to construct, operate, and maintain these works.

The enabling law provides that the District must determine which works or projects

to

carry out and must determine whether a work or project is

1

[f]or the common benefit

of

the

district as a whole; 2 [f]or the benefit ofparticipating zones ; or 3) [f]or the benefit

of

a single

zone.

( d.

at § 118-452.) The term zone is defined as any area designated within the district

created in order to finance, construct, acquire, reconstruct, maintain, operate, extend, repair or

otherwise improve any work or improvement of common benefit to such area

The enabling law prescribes a detailed set

of

procedures by which certain works and

projects may be evaluated and voted upon by the public. As to these works or projects, the

enabling law requires the District to adopt a resolution fixing a time and place for a public

hearing

( d.

t§ 118-453), to reject works or projects that either receive a majority protest from

affected property owners or are defeated in an election

( d. t§§

118-455, 118-74), and provides

mandatory ballot language for use in such an election.

( d.

at § 118-4 73.)

However, the above process only applies to works or projects for single zones, and joint

works or projects for participating zones

( d.

t§ 118-453.) The projects funded by

revenue from the Charge are for the benefit

of

the District as a whole. (Pet. Ex. BJ at P0721,

~ 2 1 .

Accordingly, Respondents argue that no voter approval was required to institute these

projects. Respondents reason that the public hearing, protest, and voting requirements were

intended to protect individual zones from being saddled with potentially expensive projects

without being consulted. By contrast, as to projects that benefit the District as a whole,

Respondents argue, the Legislature trusted the District to proceed without the need for voter

oversight. Petitioners argue that voter intent was

to

require a districtwide vote on any project the

20


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District sought to implement, and that the way to effectuate this intent is to consider the District

as a whole to

be

a single zone, the largest possible zone within the District. Neither point has

merit.

9

1. The Plain Language of the Enabling Law Provides That Elections

are Only Required to Approve Projects That Benefit a Portion

of

the District Rather Than the District as a Whole

The enabling law requires the District to determine which works or projects to carry out

and to label each such work or project as being: 1 [f]or the common benefit ofthe district as a

whole; 2 [f]or the benefit of participating zones ; or 3 [f]or the benefit of a single zone. Jd.

at§

118-452.) The very next section, however, authorizes the District's board to institute works

or projects for single zones, and joint works or projects for participating zones, for the financing,

construction, maintaining, operating, extending, repairing, or otherwise improving any work or

improvement of common benefit to the zone or participating zones.

( d.

at § 118-453.) Similar

language is employed in other related sections. For example, the law provides that a work or

project shall be terminated whenever, prior to the conclusion of the hearing, a written protest

is filed with the board against the proposed work or project which is signed by a majority in

number of the holders of title to real property within such zone or within any o he

participating zones for which such work or project was initiated, or by the holders of title to a

majority ofthe assessed valuation

ofthe

real property

( d.

at§

118-455, italics added.)

9

The resolution

of

this issue does not control whether the Ordinance violates the enabling

law. Petitioners' challenge is not to the projects funded by the Charge but to the validity

of

the

Ordinance itself. The Ordinance does not stand or fall on whether the projects funded by the

revenue derived from the Charge comply with the District's enabling law. And, while ASR and

GWR are specifically identified by the District as projects funded by the Charge, the District

identifies other projects funded by the Charge, such as a desalinization plant, which Petitioners

do not allege violate the enabling law. Thus, even if ASR and WR were held to violate the

enabling law, the Ordinance itself would be unaffected. Because declaratory relief is requested,

however, and because the validity of the projects is arguably relevant to Petitioners'

constitutional claim, the court will address this issue.

21


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Correspondingly, the election must be held in the zone or participating zones on the question

of

proceeding with the work or project Only registered voters

within the zone or participating

zones

shall

be

entitled to vote at such election.

( d.

at§ 118-471, italics added.) Finally, the

ballot for any such election must ask: Shall the proposed work or project for Zones No.

in the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District be approved?

( d. at§

118-473.)

The enabling law's provision regarding votes for emergency projects not only does not

undermine this reading, it supports it. That provision calls for the same procedure described

above for notifying the public and holding an election, except that the election shall be

conducted in

the entire portion o he district

benefited by the emergency improvement.

( d.

at

§ 118-333, italics added.) In other words, an emergency justifies forgoing the establishment

of

zones for a particular project or work to expedite that project or work being completed, but

voting itself remains restricted to the portion

of

the district that would benefit by the

improvement. Even in the case of an emergency, then, an election

is

only required when a

project affects less than the entire District.

In sum, the enabling

law s

text belies Petitioners' contention that elections are required

for projects which benefit the entire District. And, because the enabling law is unambiguous on

this point, it

is

unnecessary to look to legislative history for further guidance.

Woodland, supra,

225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1007-1008.)

11

The District

as

a Whole is not a Subdivision of the District

Petitioners also argue that the enabling law only expressly empowers the District's Board

to institute projects for single zones or participating zones. Accordingly, Petitioners reason,

either the law does not authorize the District to institute projects that benefit the District as a

whole or the entire District may be considered a zone. The court is not persuaded.

22


23/33

Petitioners' argument is predicated on the conclusion that the District's power to

implement projects is exclusively authorized by section 453

of

the enabling law. This is not the

case. That authority is conferred

by

section 325

of

the enabling law, which authorizes the

District "as limited in [the enabling] law

to

do any and every lawful act necessary in order that

sufficient water may be available for any present or future beneficial use or uses of

( d.

at

§ 118-325, italics added.) The purpose

of

section 453 is not to confer power on the District to

institute projects, but rather, to provide specific limitations on the District's authority, which, by

their terms, apply only to projects the District seeks to implement for the benefit of less than the

entire District. For any such project, the District must adopt the necessary resolution, hold a

public hearing, terminate such a project

if

sufficient written protest ofproperty owners is

presented, and hold an election in the zone(s) affected by the particular work or project.

( d.

at

§§ 118-453, 118-455, 118-473, 118-474.) No such limitations apply to the District's power to

carry out projects for the District

as a whole;

such projects are expressly contemplated by the

enabling law.

( d.

at

§

118-452.)

Second, there is no merit to the suggestion that the entire District is a zone. The

enabling law defines a zone as any area within the district created in order to finance, construct .

. . or otherwise improve any work or improvement

of

common benefit to such area

( d. at

§ 118-18.) This definition plainly distinguishes the entirety ofthe District from a portion of the

District. If the Legislature intended the District as a whole to constitute a zone, it could have

added language such as

or

the entire District after within the district or omitted the within

the district language entirely. The Legislature could also have expressly stated that projects

benefitting the entire District were subject to the public hearing, protest, and elections procedures

set forth in the enabling law. The enabling law does not contain such language and, indeed,

3


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expressly distinguishes projects [f]or the common benefit of the district as a whole from

projects for the benefit

of

less than the entire District. (Id

t§

118-452.)

Further, Respondents are correct that Petitioners' interpretation would frustrate the

District's legislative mandate for integrated management

of

Monterey Peninsula water supplies.

(Id

t§

118-2.) The enabling law authorizes the city council of any city including territory in a

proposed zone to exercise a veto power over such territory. (Id

t§

118-433.) Thus,

ifthe

District were a zone, any city in the District could opt-out

of

District-wide projects, precluding

the District from fulfilling its legislative mandate.

In short, adopting Petitioners' suggested construction would require this Court to read

language into the statute which would not conform

to

either that statute or to the intent of the

statutory scheme as a whole. The court declines the invitation to so revise the enabling law.

1

IV. The Water Supply harge Does not Violate the alifornia onstitution

Finally, Petitioners argue that the Ordinance violates article XIII D, section 6

subdivisions (b) and (c)

of

the California Constitution, passed in 1996 as Proposition 218.

Proposition 218 was passed to plug certain perceived loopholes in Proposition 13.

[Citations.] Specifically,

by

increasing assessments, fees, and charges, local governments tried

to raise revenues without triggering the voter approval requirements in Proposition 13.

(Silicon

Valley Taxpayers Assn. v. Garner (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 402, 405-406].) Proposition 218

was designed to: constrain local governments' ability to impose assessments; place extensive

1

Because the court concludes that the District

as

a whole

is

not a zone, the court rejects

Petitioners argument that reimbursement of pre-project costs with Ordinance 152 before a

project is approved

by

the voters violates District Law section 118-434. That section

concerns the conditions under which the District's board may advance general funds

of

the

district to accomplish

the purposes

of

zone formed in accordance with Section 431 or 476 .

. . . ( d. at § 118-434, italics added.) Since the projects at issue concern the District as a

whole rather than one

or

more zones, section 434 is inapplicable.

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requirements on local governments charging assessments; shift the burden o demonstrating

assessments' legality to local government; make it easier for taxpayers to win lawsuits; and limit

the methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their consent.

Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass

n,

Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority

(2008)

44

Cal.4th 431, 448.) Proposition 218 placed numerous restraints on the ability

o

public agencies

to

impose assessments, fees, and charges. The constitutional amendments resulting from

passage

o

Proposition 218 shall

be

liberally construed to effectuate [Proposition 218'

s]

purposes

o

limiting local government revenue and enhancing taxpayer consent. (Jd. at p 438

(citation omitted).)

t

is the District's burden to demonstrate compliance with Proposition 218.

(Cal. Const., art. XIII D,

§

6, subd. (b)(5).)

Article XIII D, subdivision (b) sets specific requirements for the imposition

o

a fee or

charge. Petitioners contend that the Ordinance violates several

o

these provisions. Before

addressing these substantive arguments, however, the court must address the argument that

Petitioners' constitutional arguments are waived for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

A

Petitioners' Claims are Not Barred by the Exhaustion Doctrine

Respondents are correct that Petitioners never raised their Proposition 218 arguments

below. Nevertheless, all

o

the Proposition 218 arguments at issue were both raised by

community members and considered by the District below. (See, e.g., Pet. Ex. 91 at D980-

D990.) There would be little to be gained by requiring the exact members

o

the public who

raised Proposition 218 objections to be the same parties bringing this action. (Cf. State Water

Resources Control Bd. Cases

(2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 791-791 (in the CEQA context, the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied

i

the alleged grounds were presented by any person

during the public comment period ) Because public, as opposed to private, concerns are

at

25


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issue, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied by the relevant issues being both raised and

considered below.

B. The Ordinance Satisfies the California Constitution

The Court now turns to the substance

of

Petitioners' claim that the Ordinance violates

several provisions

of

article XIII

D

subdivisions (b) and (c). The provisions invoked include:

that revenues derived from the Charge shall not exceed the funds required to provide the

property related service (subd. (b)(l)); that the amount of the Charge imposed on a parcel as an

incident

of

property ownership shall not exceed the proportional cost

of

the service attributable

to

the parcel (subd. (b)(3)); that the Charge may only be imposed for a service actually used

by, or immediately available to, the owner ofth property in question (subd. (b)(4)); and that no

charge may

be

imposed for general governmental services where the service is available

to

the public at large in substantially the same manner as it is

to

property owners. (subd. (b)(5).)

Finally, article XIII D, subdivision (c) requires voter approval for any property related fee or

charge with the exception of charges imposed for sewer, water, and refuse collection services .

. . . Petitioners contend that the Ordinance violates all of these provisions. The court will

address each provision in turn.

(a) Subdivision (b)(l)

Petitioners argue that the Ordinance generates revenues which exceed the funds required

to provide the property related service since it authorizes the use of proceeds from the Charge for

water supply services, project capital costs, up to 15% for general unallocated administrative

overhead, and to fund a reserve to meet the cash-flow needs of the District. (Pet. Ex.

BX

at

P0810.) Petitioners argue that the fact that the charge may pay for more than

just

a 'service'

indicates the charge exceeds the cost to provide that service. Additionally, Petitioners claim

26


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that the reserve funded by the Charge may be used for any cash-flow need o the District because

the Ordinance does not place any restrictions on the expenditure o these excess funds.

Petitioners' arguments lack merit. Subdivision (b)(l) requires only that the revenues

derived from the fee or charge not exceed the funds required to provide the property related

service. The property related service here is water supply service. Contrary to Petitioners'

narrow construction, water supply service is not limited to discrete events. Instead, the term

contemplates consistent, reliable service. Hence, the funds required to provide this service

necessarily include overhead, capital acquisition costs, and the availability o a reserve fund for

unexpected events. The District does not generate water supply from thin air. The costs

o

generating that water supply necessarily include personnel costs and the facilities required to

support that personnel. Correspondingly, capital acquisition and operational costs are direct

costs necessary for both ASR and GWR. (Pet. Ex BX at

P081

0); Howard Jarvis Taxpayers

Assn. v City ofRoseville (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637, 647-648) [The cost

o

providing a service

includes all the required costs o providing service, short-term and long-term, including

operation, maintenance, financial, and capital expenditures. The key is that the revenues derived

from the fee or charge are required to provide the service, and may be used only for the

service. ]) Similarly, maintenance

o

a reserve fund ensures the continued operation o the

District's water supply projects, and hence, o water service.

As to the reserve fund in particular, the plain language

o

the Ordinance refutes

Petitioners' claim that the Ordinance does not place any restrictions on the expenditure o these

funds. The Ordinance expressly provides that [p ]roceeds o the charge imposed by this

Ordinance may only be used to fund District water supply activities. (Pet. Ex BX at P081 0

italics added.) Further, Petitioners' note that the Ordinance authorizes the use o the reserve to

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meet the cash-flow needs of the District but omit the remainder of the quote, which

contextualizes this phrase. The full phrase reads that proceeds of the charge may be used for

reserves to meet the cash-flow needs of the District and to otherwise provide or the cost to

provide services

or

which the charge

is

imposed."

( d.,

italics added.) No fair reading of this

passage supports Petitioners' claim that the proposed reserve may be used for general, as

opposed to water-supply related, purposes.

In sum, water supply activities necessarily include the items described in Section Three

of the Ordinance, including administrative overhead and a reserve fund. Thus, the revenue

derived from the Charge does not exceed the funds required to provide the property related

service, and the Ordinance satisfies subdivision (b) 1 ).

(b) Subdivision (b )(3)

Petitioners next argue that the amount

ofthe

Charge exceeds the proportional cost of the

service attributable to each affected parcel, in violation of subdivision (b )(3). Petitioners note

that, although the Charge does not apply to the Bishop, Hidden Hills, Ambler and Toro sub

units, the Charge will pay for projects which benefit both the entire District and water users

outside the district such as the City of Seaside, which will benefit by the increased water levels in

its aquifer that SR and GWR will generate. This argument is specious. There is nothing in

subdivision (b )(3) which prevents third parties from benefitting from projects paid for by the

revenues derived from the Charge. That subdivision only requires that parcels that are charged

not pay more than the cost to serve them. (Cf. Dahms v Downtown Pomona Property (2009)

174 Cal.App.4th 708, 719.)

Moreover, the Charge is calculated based on a hybrid fee structure which accounts both

for the water consumption used by each affected parcel (to account for use) and by the size of the

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meter (to account for costs which exist irrespective ofuse). (Resp. Ex. 58 at D815, Pet. Ex. BX

at P0811-P0812.) Petitioners have failed to show that the District's calculation methodology is

either unreasonable or inconsistent with subdivision (b)(3). And, while this formula does not

result in an exact match between usage and the charge, such exactness is not required,

[a]pportionment is not a determination that lends itself to precise calculation. [Citation.]

Grifjith, supra,

220 Cal.App.4th at p. 601.) Proposition 218 proportionality

'is

measured

collectively, considering all rate payors' [Citation] ; a parcel-by-parcel proportionality

analysis is not required. Ibid.) The Charge therefore satisfies subdivision (b)(3).

(c) Subdivision (b)( 4)

Petitioners further argue that the Charge violates article XIII D, section 6, subdivision

(b)(4), which provides that [n]o fee or charge may be imposed for a service unless that service

is actually used by, or immediately available to, the owner

of

the property in question. Fees or

charges based on potential or future use of a service are not permitted Petitioners claim

that the District has not provided any service

t

the parcel subject to the [Charge] and that a

property owner has no ability to terminate the services provided in exchange for the [Charge].

However, Petitioners fail to provide authority for the proposition that either condition is a

prerequisite

of

the Charge. Instead, Petitioners repeatedly argue that the District does not supply

water service because it does not actually deliver water, but instead, wholesales water to

CAW, which ultimately delivers that water to consumers. As discussed,

supra,

the definition

of

water service is not as narrow as Petitioners insist. Indeed, it is even broader in the context

of

Proposition 218.

Government Code section 53750, contained in the Proposition 218 Omnibus

Implementation Act, contains definitions to be applied [f]or purposes

of

Article XIII C and

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Article XIII D The definition of water, i.e. any system of public improvements

intended to provide for the production, storage, supply, treatment,

or

distribution of water from

any source, applies to the District. (Govt. Code § 53750, subd. (m).)

Thus,

the entity that

produces, stores, supplies, treats,

or

distributes water necessarily provides water service.

Griffith, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 595.)

The Distr ict 's projects are intended to provide supplemental water supply. The mere

fact that the water provided is ultimately delivered by CAW does not affect the District's status

as a water supplier. The purpose

of

the District was to address the limitations of CAW, a

privately owned water supplier which does not have the facilities

nor

the ability to perform

functions which are normally performed by public agencies (Wat. Code. Appen. § 118-2.)

The Legislature plainly intended a division oflabor between

CAW

and the District. Ibid.) In

light of the water problems in the Monterey Peninsula area, the development

of

supplemental

water supply is especially urgent.

Ibid.)

In Griffith, the Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency imposed a groundwater

augmentation charge to cover the costs of both purchasing supplemental water and providing

supplemental water service, a service which included the planning, design, construction, and

operation of facilities designed to provide supplemental water. Griffith, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th

at p 595.) The Griffith court affirmed this charge, finding that the costs of purchasing,

capturing, storing, and distribution supplemental water did not violate subdivision (b)(4).

Since one cannot rationally purchase supplemental water without identifying and determining

one's needs, identifying and determining future supplemental water projects is part of

defendant's present-day water service. ( d. at p. 602.)

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~ i m i l a r l y the District's efforts to provide supplemental water supply are aimed at

ensuring a consistent, reliable water service for those within its jurisdiction, a task which CAW

is incapable o accomplishing, and one which the District was expressly created to achieve.

(Wat. Code. Appen. § 118-325.) Accordingly, the Ordinance satisfies subdivision (b)(4).

(d) Subdivision (b )(5)

Subdivision (b)(5) prohibits charges for general governmental services including, but

not limited to police, fire, ambulance or library services, where the service is available to the

public at large in substantially the same manner as it is to property owners. The Ordinance does

not violate this subdivision. The Charge is imposed only on those who receive the water service

funded by its revenues; sub-units not connected to the water system are explicitly excluded from

the Charge. (Pet. Ex. BX P0810.) And, because the Charge is only imposed on [t]he owner o

each parcel o real property connected to the main CAW water distribution system, many

members o the public, such as owners

o

property not connected to that system, property

lessees, and community visitors, are not subject to the Charge. Ibid.) In short, the services

funded by the Charge are not general governmental services akin to police, fire, ambulance or

library services, and accordingly, the Ordinance does not violate subdivision (b)(5).

(e) Subdivision (c)

Finally, subdivision (c) requires voter approval for property related fees or charges unless

those fees or charges are for sewer, water, and refuse collection services. Here, Petitioners

repeat the argument that water service necessarily entails the delivery or production o water.

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As explained, supra both statutory and decisional authority refutes this claim and hence, the

District was not required to obtain voter approval to impose the Charge.

Disposition

Petitioners' requested relief is denied. Respondents' counsel is to prepare an

appropriate order consistent with this ruling, present it

to

opposing counsel for approval as

to

form, and return it to this court for signature.

Dated: March 17, 2015

EFREN N IGLESI

EFREN N. IGLESIA

Judge

o

the Superior Court

11

Because the court concludes that the Ordinance does not violate either the District's

enabling law or the state Constitution, it is unnecessary to address Respondents' laches

argument. Nevertheless, the evidence supporting this argument is strong. A writ was

available to Petitioners as soon as Respondents announced the decision not to place the

Referendum on the ballot. Yet Petitioners failed to act for nine months. Respondents

reasonably and detrimentally relied on Petitioners' failure to timely bring suit, waiting seven

months after rejecting Petitioners ' referendum to obtain the 4 million Rabobank loan, and

committed significant additional funds with expected charge revenue in the months

thereafter. Even i Petitioners had been successful on the merits then, laches would bar their

claims. (See

San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v City o.fMoreno Valley

(1996)

44

Cal.App.4th 593, 605.) Moreover, because the Referendum Petition was improper, the

contracts that Petitioners entered into, such as the Rabobank loan, were valid. Invalidating

the ordinance at this late stage would abrogate these agreements, effectively eviscerating

third parties' contract rights in violation

o

article

I

section 9

o

the California Constitution.

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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

(Code

o

Civil Procedure Section 1013a)

I do hereby .certify that I am employed in the County of Monterey. I am over the age of

eighteen years and not a party to the within stated cause. I placed true and correct

copies of the

Intended Decision

for collection and mailing this date following our

ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the Court s practices for collection

and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is

placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited

in

the ordinary course of business with

the United States Postal Services in Salinas, California, in a sealed envelope with

postage fully prepaid. The names and addresses o each person to whom notice was

mailed

is

as follows:

Margaret Thurn

PO Box 99

Pebble Beach, CA. 93953

David Ruderman

11364 Pleasant Valley Rd.

Penn Valley, CA. 95946-9000

David Laredo

Delay Laredo

606 Forest Ave.

Pacific Grove, CA.

9395

Date: March 17 2015

TERESA A RISI, Clerk

o

the Superior Court,

_dr t , < q L/ _ _ _ ,

Deputy Clerk

Intended Decision MPTA v MPWMD (M123512) 03-17-15

Documents

Transcript of Intended Decision MPTA v MPWMD (M123512) 03-17-15