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Australian Government

Australian Customs andBorder Protection Service

IntelligenceIntegrity and Professional Standards

Australian Customs and Border Protection ServiceCustoms House, Level 1

5 Constitution AvenueCanberra, ACT 2600

Phone: +61 2 6275 6340FAX: +61 2 6275 6328

IPS Reference: 2010/296ACLEI CIN235

A/G DIRECTOR OPERATIONSINTEGRITY AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - ALLEGATION OF CORRUPT CUSTOMS AND BORDERPROTECTION OFFICERS AT THE NSW PORT FACILITIES

Purpose

1. To provide you with an assessment of the information received from a person known to theAustralian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs and Border Protection) CommercialCompliance section. He had previously been employed as a

Background

2. On 26 October 2010, the informant, an employee of ' advised that hehad been approached by two Middle Eastern males who said they were trying to get a containerreleased and would pay $150,000 to get it done. When questioned by the informant, the twoMiddle Eastern males advised that the container carried an illegal consignment of tobacco.

3. One of the two Middle Eastern males advised that he knew a Customs and BorderProtection officer who had provided assistance previously. This officer was named . Nofurther details were provided. (It is worthy of note that there have been several instances where thename ' has been offered upfront and apparently without any fear of compromise or fear of theconsequences by persons in similar circumstances. It is difficult to comprehend the motivation forproviding such detail so early in an attempt to 'recruit' support into a criminal activity).

4. On 19 January 2011, this matter was referred to the Australian Commission for LawEnforcement Integrity (ACLEI) who advised that they had assessed the matter and in accordancewith the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 s. 26(1)(b)(iii) referred it to Customsand Border Protection to investigate. ACLEI however require a copy of the final report.

Research

5. The informant was spoken to by Customs and Border Protection officers from thecommercial section to obtain further information particularly regarding the container and anexpected tobacco importation. No further useful information was obtained. Discussions betweenthese officers and Integrity and Professional Standards staff suggested that further interviews withthis informant were unlikely to elicit any information of substance.

6. Commercial Compliance and Investigations NSW were unable to locate a container thatcould be associated with this tobacco importation. No information to further identify the MiddleEastern males was located.

7. The informant was interviewed by Integrity and Professional Standards staff on 23 June2011 to see if any further contact had been attempted or made by the two Middle Eastern males.

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The complainant was unable to provide any further details or to add anything to his previouscomments.

8. This matter has been held in abeyance pending the resolution of several matters that may have been associated due to the ' link. As these matters have now

been resolved and returned for Customs and Border Protection administrative action, this mattercan now be finalised.

Assessment

9. There has been insufficient information located to positively identify a Customs and BorderProtection officer and nothing has been provided by the informant. There may, however, besufficient information to retain this allegation as a watching brief as further information may beforthcoming. This matter has the potential to link into current ongoing intelligence and investigationmatters.

10. This matter was identified as a notifiable incident and as such, it was reported to the ACLEI.A copy of this report has been provided to ACLEI in accordance with the Law Enforcement IntegrityCommissioner Act 2006.

Recommendation

11. It is recommended that this file be closed and held as a watching brief for intelligencepurposes.

Assistant Director IntelligenceIntegrity and Professional Standards

30 July 2012

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Intelligence Integrity and Professional Standards

Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Customs House, Level 1

5 Constitution Avenue Canberra, ACT 2600

Phone: +61 2 6275 6340 FAX: +61 2 6275 6328

IPS Reference: 2011/047

Australian Government

„ Australian Customs and Border Protection Service

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DIRECTOR CORRUPTION PREVENTION AND DETECTION INTEGRITY AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT — ALLEGATION THAT A FEMALE CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICER IS PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO A SYNDICATE INVOLVED IN THE IMPORTATION OF COCAINE INTO SYDNEY

Purpose

1. To provide you with an assessment of information provided to Integrity and Professional Standards (I&PS) alleging that a criminal identity involved in a conspiracy to import 100kg of cocaine into Sydney has indicated they know a Customs and Border Protection officer. The criminal identity claims this officer can help to get the container through the x-ray.

Background

2. Joint Organised Crime Group (JOCG) is a referral received on 15 October 2010 in relation to the conspiracy to import 100kg of cocaine from China by a Sydney based syndicate. The principle persons of interest have significant

and have been identified as members of the and Middle Eastern organised crime groups.

3. In December 2010, information received by the JOCG suggested that former and his associate had been introduced to the conspiracy.

4. In January 2011, further information was received by the JOCG that knows and can utilise a female Customs and Border Protection officer who can help to get the container through the x-ray.

5. On 15 February 2011, l&PS held a conversation with Customs and Border officer is attached as an to the JOCG. stated although

specific references were initially made by and that they know and can utilise a female Customs and Border Protection officer who can help to get the container through the x-ray, the reference to the officer became less frequent and eventually was not mentioned again.

6. stated the JOCG analysed for both and .

7. analysis of the used by revealed he had no contact with any persons that could be linked to Customs and Border Protection officers. Due to lack of evidence stated that the investigation had been deactivated by the JOCG.

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Assessment

8. Enquiries have established:

a. Detailed for has shown no connection to any Customs and Border Protection officer;

b. Interrogation of the has shown is not recorded;

c. Research of address as recorded in and through has revealed nil adverse holdings;

d. Systematic examination of personnel records has shown no commonality between address and that of any Customs and Border Protection officer; and

e. Association between a Customs and Border Protection officer and Audits and analysis of were carried out to identify patterns of behaviour that may indicate inappropriate or corrupt practices.

9. There is no evidence to substantiate claims of having a Customs and Border Protection officer willing to assist the syndicate.

Recommendation

10. In relation to the allegations it is recommended that this file be closed and a copy of this report held as a watch copy for Intelligence purposes only.

11. This matter was identified as a notifiable incident and as such, it was reported to the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI). A copy of this report has been provided to ACLEI in accordance with the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006.

12. A copy of this report also be provided to the AFP Commander as per the direction from ACLEI.

Senior Investigator Integrity and Professional Standards

27 July 2012

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Assessme t Australian Customs and Border Pr

Cus reet

IC 3008

e: +61 3 92448003 ax: +61 3 92448068

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Australian Government

Australian Customs and Border Protection Service

l&PS Reference: 2011/132

A/g DIRECTOR OPERATIONS

ASSESSMENT REPORT— ALLEGATION AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION SERVICE OFFICERS ARE FACILITATING THE IMPORTATION OF METHAMPHETAMINES FROM INDONESIA

Purpose

1. This report is to advise you of the outcome of an Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs and Border Protection) Integrity and Professional Standards (I&PS) assessment in relation to information received from an anonymous caller advising that unnamed Customs and Border Protection officers located in Western Australia are assisting in the importation of narcotics through Perth airport.

Background

2. On 25 May 2011, l&PS received information from Customs Western Australia Police Liaison Officer in relation to a Western Australia Police Crimestoppers Information Report The Information Report stated on 29 April 2011, an anonymous caller contacted the Crimestoppers hotline and supplied the following information:

a. A male from Tasmania who was the of the caller, had advised he had purchased "ice" from a group of five Australian women who regularly import "ice" from Indonesia into Australia in the lining of suitcases or strapped to their bodies;

b. These women do not travel together;

c. That Customs and Border Protection officers at Perth Airport were also involved in the trafficking, and this was how the drugs got into the country undetected; and

d. The importations had been occurring for several years and these females are the "biggest suppliers in Australia and the drugs are circulated everywhere".

Assessment

3. On 26 May 2011, l&PS Intelligence requested a copy of the Western Australia Police Crimestoppers Information Report from the Police Liaison Officer.

4. On 30 May 2011, l&PS Intelligence received a copy of the Crimestoppers Information Report which detailed additional information;

a. The caller's had also met an Australian male named , who lived in , who was a supplier

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of "drugs". The caller did not know if " was linked to the female Ice traffickers;

b. The caller had reported the alleged drug trafficking due to concerns with drugs "ruining the younger generation"; and

c. would call back if she received any further information in relation to names of the females, dates and Customs and Border Protection officers involved.

5. On 13 July 2011, l&PS was advised by Director, Intelligence and Targeting, Western Australia that Customs and Border Protection were not involved in any current operations in relation to methamphetamine importation from Indonesia.

6. l&PS has received no further information regarding this allegation.

7. This matter was identified as a notifiable incident and as such, it was reported to the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) on 28 July 2011.

8. No further assessment or research was conducted by l&PS once the incident was referred to ACLEI as required by the the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006.

9. On 6 January 2012, Assistant Director Intelligence advised that ACLEI had advised they were taking no further action in relation to this investigation, and an outcome report was required.

10. l&PS received no further information and avenues of enquiry were exhausted to progress this matter.

11. On 17 August 2011, was created referring to the information contained in the

Crimestoppers report in relation to the alleged female drug couriers.

12. An additional , was created in relation to the information about for distribution to Victoria Police. Victoria Police had no further information that could assist with these enquiries.

Conclusions

13. In the initial allegation, no Customs and Border Protection officers alleged to being implicated in the importation were identified by the anonymous caller.

14. The information given by the caller is very general, was received by on a second-hand basis and did not contain any specific details in relation to names of passengers involved, specific time periods, or identifying flight details.

15. The information in relation to from is generalised, and there is no suggestion this person is connected with the alleged female drug traffickers, or any imported illicit substance.

16. To date there has been no detection of a significant amphetamine importation that would appear to be linked to the information supplied by the caller.

17. No intelligence is currently available to identify Customs and Border Protection officers involved in an importation of narcotics in Perth.

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Recommendations

18. It is recommended that this matter be referred to l&PS Intelligence and be placed on a Watching Brief.

19. If further information is received the matter will be reassessed.

20. If you have any questions regarding this matter please contact

24 September 2012

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Australian CovcrnmenlAustralian Customs andBorder Protect ion Son ice

Intelligence. ii

ri Constitutor AvenueCant»fM /

Phone. .61262756340FAX .61? 6275 6328

IPS Reference 2012/075

A/g OPERATIONS DIRECTORINTEGRITY AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

)

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - ALLEGATION THAT A CUSTOMS AND BORDERPROTECTION OFFICER IS PROVIDING ASSISTANCE IN THE IMPORTATION OF NARCOTICS

Purpose

1. To provide you with an assessment of information provided to Integrity and ProfessionalStandards (I&PS) alleging that an alleged importer and distributor of narcotics knows a Customsand Border Protection (C&BP) officer who assists in the importation of narcotics.

Background

2. On 16 February 2012, information was received on the New South Wales Police (NSWP)Crimes Stoppers website from an anonymous source alleging that

, had recently provided a port officer with a container code seeking assistance inthe importation of a major drug shipment.

3. On 26 February 2012, similar information was received on the Customs Watch websitefrom an anonymous source alleging that had a scanning machine used by Customsand Border Protection in Australia and was bribing a Customs and Border Protection officer towhom he was supplying container codes. The anonymous informant also supplied flights details for

stating he would be carrying 'lots of jewellery and cash' being the proceeds of drugsales.

4. On 2 April 2012, NSWP Crime Stoppers received information that coutd bereturning to . The report suggested had beenorganising drug shipments from .

5. On 18 April 2012, NSWP received two information reports alleging involvement in criminal activity.

Investigation

6. is extensively recorded within the in relation to allegations of his involvement in various criminal activities.

These activities include

has been the subject of by Customs and BorderProtection:

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a. On 20 December 2008, was departing was the subject of an which located

, was given a warning by the AFP;

b. On 28 February 2011, arrived in . was subject to a Customs and Border Protection examination which did not

locate anything of interest;

c. On 12 January 2012, arrived in . was the subject of and was selected by Customs and Border

Protection for an examination which did not locate anything of interest. The regarding this examination noted:

i. behaviour was 'uncooperative and defensive';

ii. demanded to see where the Customs Act permitted examinationof his mobile telephone;

iii. understood what the meant; and

iv. knew a person that previously was employed by Customs andBorder Protection some eight years ago but had left due to poor pay.

was unwilling to provide the officers name.

d. On 21 January 2012, arrived in . was subject to a Customs and Border Protection examination which did not

locate anything of interest;

e. On 6 February 2012, arrived in . was the subject of an AFP alert. was subject to a Customs and

Border Protection examination which did not locate anything of interest;

f. On 26 February 2012, was departing . As a result of anonymous information received by Customs Watch

was selected for an examination, which did not locate anything of interest.

g. On 10 April 2012, arrived in . was the subject of an and selected by Customs and Border

Protection for examination which did not locate anything of interest.

8. The interrogation of through thehas failed to identify any Customs and Border Protection officer travelling in the company of

.

9. Research by I&PS has identified has connections to a number of businesses.No link could be established between these businesses with any Customs and Border Protectionofficer.

10. Subsequent examination of the of thesebusinesses has been unable to identify importations associated with .

11. .

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12. Consideration was given to conducting an examination of ) of however as no apparent link to a Customs and Border Protection officer was identify,

in accordance with accessing of these records could not be deemed as "reasonably necessary".

13. Enquires have been unable to establish any further details regarding the ex-Customs andBorder Protection officer claims to know.

Conclusion

14. Enquiries have established:

a. is a person of interest to a number of Law Enforcement Agencies includingthe AFP, NSWP and Customs and Border Protection;

b. has been subject to rigorous examination by Customs and BorderProtection on seven occasions, including the examination of baggage, documentationand electronic devices in his possession and on one occasion the

and

c. Research by Customs and Border Protection has identified businesses with which has a connection. No cargo importations have been identified associated with

these businesses.

15. At this time, there has been no link made between and Customs and BorderProtection officers. There is no evidence to substantiate the anonymous claims that isbeing assisted in any criminal activity by a Customs and Border Protection officer.

Recommendation

16. The allegation is not substantiated and it is recommended that this file be closed and acopy of this report held as a Watching Brief for intelligence purposes only.

17. This matter was identified as a notifiable incident and as such, it was reported to theAustralian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI). A copy of this report to be providedto ACLEI in accordance with the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006.

18. A copy of this report also is provided to the AFP Commander , as per thedirection from ACLEI.

19. If you have any questions regarding this assessment please contact

InvestigatorIntegrity and Professional Standards

17 October 2012

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Aush·a lian Customs and Border Protection Senice

I&PS Referer~ce· 2012/100

AJg DIRECTOR OPERATIONS

Assessment Report. A~·~ ar C..'Killllo .1M :>:Ydtll ?rOIIlC2<\, ~ t.

61;,rros '"Q.ose "''~ 4 101 0l~Trot>eSU"tt '1.-.JIT'P \IIC JliCS

PI>Q 'e ~I:, '•244l!l~;. f a.r. ~1 J ~2441:1Wi

ASSESSMENT REPORT - ALLEGATION THAT AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION SERVICE OFFICERS ARE ASSISTING IN THE IMPORTATION OF DRUGS

Purpos e

1 This report is to adv1se you of the outcome of an Australian Customs and Border Protect1on Serv1ce (Customs and Border Protection) lntegnty and Professtonal Standards (I&PS} assessment in relation to the allegation that Customs and Border Protection officers are assist1ng a Qantas Airways flight steward with the importation of methamphetamine

Background

2 On 21 March 2012, an article appeared in 'The Age' newspaper ent1tled ·Qantas steward accused of Importing 'ice' worth $260,000", authored by Steve Butcher. The article related lo the arrest and charges being laid against a Qantas Airways fl ight steward. , where he is believed to have imported approximately 250 grams of the methamphetamine or commonly known as "ice"

3. The article stated that·

a . was arrested 1n possession of the methamphetamine on 16 March 2012, while arriving at his home address after returning as crew on a Qantas flight from the United States of Amenca (USA); and

b was charged with nine offences. including two of Importation and one of trafficking a commercial quantity of methamphetamine.

4 The article further stated that in oppos1ng bail. of the Victoria Police Oivis1onal Response Unit had stated that:

may know people in customs and other "areas of airports" that made 11 easy for him to bring drugs into Australia.·

5 further stated that 17 year career w1th Qantas had included numerous long-haul flights and he had developed "connections" 1n

the airhne Industry.

Asses sment

6 . This matter was identified as a notifiable incident and as such. on 21 March 2012. 1t was reported to the Australian Comm1ssion for law Enforcement lntegnty (ACLEI) in accordance w1th the Law Enforcement Integrity Comm1ss1oner (LEIC) Act 2006.

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7 As th1s allegation was referred directly to ACLEI no Carriage or Authority letters were d1stnbuted

8 On 21 March 2012. Assistant Director Intelligence I&PS. . ema1led of the Victoria Police Ethical Standards Department (ESD) in relat1on to comment that may be connected w1th Customs and Border Protection officers.

9 In h1s response email. stated

a. He had contacted and asked him if there was any substance to the remark that he made during bail application;

b. advised that it was a "throw away line". based purely on supposition or an assumption and not on fact;

c He made the remark to the Magistrate advistng that tf was released on bail, there was the possibility that he could continue committing further offences; and

d stated that in a bail application, thts type of argument is often used by prosecutors. to try and influence the Magistrate not to release the defendant.

10 A search of the name in the produced dated from namtng as the Person of Interest (POl ):

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11 The IR's contained no information alleg1ng that there was any Involvement by Customs and Border Protection officers.

12. Customs and Border Protection Manager, Passenger and Trade Facilitation. . adv1sed that airline crew are subject to the same baggage search

cnteria as passengers , which are conducted as the result of an These searches are also recorded in the

13 An examination was made of entries in . The results of the examination produced in the name of from the period of

14. A review of the was conducted and found there was no consistent repetition of any one Customs and Border Protection officer in the 'Initiating Officer' field.

.

15. Of the containing name only , correlate with theIR's naming . The

was not the same in these two entries.

16

17 On 13 August 2012, the lntegnty Commissioner adv1sed. pursuant to Schedule 5. section 19 or the LEIC Act, that the allegation be referred to Customs and Border Protection for investigation without management or oversight. The Integrity Commissioner requested that at the completion of the investigation. a final report be provided to him.

18 No further information has been received by I&PS in relation to this allegation.

Discussion

19 admitted that his remark was a "throw away line. based purely on supposition or an assumption and not on facr that is often used by prosecutors in an attempt to influence a Magistrate not to grant bail to a defendant

20. did not elaborate on the airline industry connections· he referred to during his opposition to bail.

21 . There were no specific allegations made that had colluded w1th Customs and Border Protection on this or any other occasion to effect the 1mportat1on of methamphetamine or any other prohibited import

22. has not made any statement implicating Customs and Border Protection officers 1n h1s Importations.

23. There was no mformation recorded in the reports to suggest any unusual repet1t1on of attending Customs and Border Protection off1cers who conducted the searches and tests on and his luggage or who completed the reports

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24 A review of possible travelling companions for did not Identify any persons of interest

Conclusions

25. The remarks made by were not based on any evidence, but were made in an attempt to oppose release on ball.

26 No Customs and Border Protection officers have been 1dent1f1ed by , media or Victoria Police as assisting , the Qantas Airways flight steward. to 1mport methamphetamine.

27 There is no ev1dence in the that suggests Customs and Border Protection officers assisted entry into Australia .

28. There is no evidence to suggest that Customs and Border Protection off1cers are ass1st1ng with the importation of methamphetamine.

Recommendations

29 It is recommended that:

a National Manager I&PS:

1. Provide a copy of this report to the Integrity Commissioner to comply with his request; and

11 Provide a copy of this report to National Dtrector Passengers

30. If you have any questions regarding th1s assessment please contact

Senior Investigator Integrity and Professional Standards

10 October 2012

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Australian Government

Australian Customs andBorder Protection Service

IntelligenceIntegrity and Professional Standards

Australian Customs and Border Protection ServiceCustoms House, Level 1

5 Constitution AvenueCanberra, ACT 2600

Phone:FAX:

+61 2 6275 6340+61 2 6275 6328

IPS Reference: 2012/227ACLEI CIN 12/276

A/G DIRECTOR OPERATIONSINTEGRITY AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - ALLEGATION OF CORRUPT CUSTOMS AND BORDERPROTECTION OFFICERS AT THE WATERFORNT

Purpose

1. To provide you with an assessment of the information received from a number of sourcesrelating to a container en-route from Singapore to Melbourne via Sydney. This information initiallyalleged that this container was being used to illegally import tobacco.

Background

2. In June 2012, information was received that a container was being shipped from Singaporeto Melbourne via Sydney and would contain a shipment of illegal tobacco. This information waslater upgraded to the container would contain a large amount of military assault rifles, guns andammunition and also that it may have contained drugs.

3. Further information was then received that an Australian Customs and Border ProtectionService (Customs and Border Protection) Officer was involved and would help the container

. For the Customs and BorderProtection Officer would be paid $250,000. This information also changed at a later date indicatingthat it would be a Customs Broker that would clear the container.

4. On 19 June 2012, this matter was referred to the Australian Commission for LawEnforcement Integrity (ACLEI) who advised that they had assessed the matter and in accordancewith the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 s. 26(1) (b) (Hi) referred it to Customsand Border Protection to investigate. ACLEI however require a copy of the final report.

Research

5. The container was

. It wasfound to contain only counterfeit Chinese brand tobacco.

6. As there was a profusion of information regarding this container, it was believed that thiswa

.

7.

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8. No information has been forth coming to identify that a Customs and Border ProtectionOfficer or a Customs Broker were involved in this import.

9. This matter had been held in abeyance pending the decision of ACLEI as to theirinvestigation, their decision was that the investigation be returned for Customs and BorderProtection action, this matter can now be finalised.

Assessment

10. There has been no information located to suggest any involvement by a Customs andBorder Protection officer. This information will be retained, however, as a watching brief as furtherinformation may be forthcoming.

11. This matter was identified as a notifiable incident and as such, it was reported to the ACLEI.A copy of this report has been provided to ACLEI in accordance with the Law Enforcement IntegrityCommissioner Act 2006.

Recommendation

12. It is recommended that this file be closed and held as a watching brief for intelligencepurposes.

Senior Intelligence AnalystIntegrity and Professional Standards

13 August 2012

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