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Intelligence and UNPeacekeepingHugh Smith

An old United Nations (UN) hand once observed that 'the UN has nointelligence'. Putting aside the deliberate ambiguity of this remark, it iscertainly true that the UN does not collect, process and disseminate intelli-gence in the directed and comprehensive way that major powers do as amatter of course. The UN is reluctant even to use the word 'intelligence',preferring the term 'information' in order to avoid the usual connotations ofsubterfuge and secrecy.' 'Intelligence' also implies the existence ofenemics or, at least, rivals - a suggestion that the UN is naturally anxious toavoid. For these and other reasons that are discussed below, the role of. andneed for, intelligence capabilities in peacekeeping operations is rarelydebated in either UN documents or the public literature.'

Whatever terminology is used. the problem of determining what infor-mation is required, collecting and assessing this information, and

disseminating the resultant intelligence is of growing importance to the UNin it.; pencekep..ping activities. During the Cold War, peacekeeping was, byand largc, a matter of monitoring agreements or stable cease-fires that had

already been negotiated between the contending parties. Apart from theCongo operation (1960-64), peacekeepers were seldom directly involved in

imnilitary action. While the UN would have liked better intelligence in its

peacekeeping activities. it was able to get by with ad hoc and inadequatearrangements. The situation has changed markedly in recent years.

A second generation of peacekeeping operations has emerged in re-sponse to a wide range of difficult problems, particularly internal conflicts

or the breakdown of law and order. 3 Peacekeepers are liable to findthemselves in countries in which no government is in undisputed control,

social order has broken down or is on the point of collapse, hostilities are

actually under way or imminent, and the usc of force against UN personnelis a distinct possibility. In these circumstances, roles such as protectinghumanitarian aid, disarming factions, monitoring fragile cease-fires, pre-ventive deployment and negotiating agreements among reluctant playershave.made the requirement for good and timely intelligence overwhelming.

Hugh Smith is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politico, Univorsity College(UNSW), Australian Defence Force Academy, New South Wales, and was theFounding Director of the Australian Defence Studies Centre at the Academy.

Sutrviuva vol. 36. no. 3. Autumn 1994, pp. 174-92.

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Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping , 175

The need for intelligence is being increasingly felt both by the UN andby states contributing to peacekeeping operations. Particularly in morecomplex and fluid situations, intelligence will be crucial in achieving thegoals of the mission laid down by the UN Security Council. Intelligencemay also be important for the lives and well-being of UN personnel on theground. With more than 200 peacekeepers killed in 1993 alone. the greaterhazards of contemporary peacekeeping have led governments to demandbetter intelligence both prior to making a commitment to an operation andduring its deployment.' The anarchical or near-anarchical situations thathave created this demand for improved intelligence, however, will alsousually make such intelligence more difficult to obtain. keep current anddisseminate effectively.

The UN must come to terms with intelligence. But the problems arenot easily resolved. Traditionally, intelligence has been produced and usedby a particular state for its own purposes. Much of the intelligence isgathered without the consent or even knowledge of the target state. Intelli-gence, too, is normally retained under national control, although it may beshared with friendly governments - up to a point. In the UN, however.intelligence takes on a very different shape. It is gathered not in order to beused against enemies - the UN has no enemies of the kind that nationalintelligence thrives on - but for the purposes of the international commu-nity. It is gathered more openly than national intelligence and is unlikely toremain secure in the medium or long term.

The concept of 'UN intelligence' promises to turn traditional principlcsof intelligence on their heads. Intelligence will have to be based on infor-mation that is collected primarily by overt means, that is. by methods thatdo not threaten the target state or group and do not compromise the integ-rity or impartiality of the UN. It will have to be intelligence that is bydefinition shared among a number of nations and that in most cases willbecome widely known in the short or medium term. And it will have to beintelligence that is directed towards the purposes of the international com-munity. Such a system is unlikely to emerge of its own accord. The UNneeds to establish a clear conception of how it wants intelligence to developin the context of peacekeeping - and perhaps. also, of preventive diplo-macy.

The Need for IntelligenceIntelligence is required at all levels and is needed in both the planning anddeployment of peacekeeping. Strategic intelligence is obviously required tounderstand the political situation between the parties to a conflict prior toUN involvement and, once peacekeepers are deployed, to anticipate thepolitical moves of governments or factions, especially if there is a risk ofviolence." The fundamental importance of political intelligence is self-evident, for the UN is seeking to produce a desired political outcome.


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Information about the economy and society of the country will also bevaluable.

Operational intelligence is required to plan the most effective deploy-ment of resources and to carry out the UN mandate. It will be particularlyimportant in fluid military and political situations. The ability to assess thelevel of armaments, and the movements, strategies, military potential ofand likely threats to peacekeepers by the contending factions is obviouslyvital. The security or insecurity of transport and supplies is also crucial. Inaddition, there. is the vast array of information that military forces need inorder to deploy to and maintain themselves in a given country: terrain;weather; transport routes and their usability; water and electricity supplies;hospital and medical resources; risks from disease; communications facili-ties; and local infrastructure. All of these may affect the viability of themission in general.

Tactical intelligence is needed by troops on the ground to support peace-keeping activities, such as monitoring cease-fires or border areas and toalert personnel to potential dangers. The identification of breaches ofcease-fires, unauthorised troop and weapon movements, the level of demo-bilisation and the existence of weapons caches can be critical to the mainte-nance of peace. Such tactical information is liable to pose difficult politicalproblems for the UN and has the potential to take on strategic significancein delicate situations. The management of intelligence at the tactical level,moreover, can be influential in mailntaining or losing the UN's credibilityamong the parties to the conflict. If intelligence is not deftly handled, it iseasy for the organisation to gain a reputation for being slow to react and forgullibility and political partiality. At the tactical level, too, counter-intelli-gence may be necessary if there are elements hostile to the UN.

Current Deficiencies and Partial RemediesThe existing structure of intelligence in peacekeeping operations is largelyad hoc at both the planning and deployment stages. The UN's inability toconduct adequate advance planning is one of the acknowledged defects ofpeacekeeping and is one of the areas currently being strengthened.6 Some ofthe problems are inherent, such as the suddenness with which some crisesarise, but a central weakness is often the lack of relevant intelligence. Insome instances, the UN is able to send fact-finding missions or reconnais-sance and advance parties (as with the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia(UNAMIC)). but the scope of these missions is usually limited by a lack oftime and resources. More often than not, the UN can provide only minimalinformation to peacekeepers before they are deployed.

Tn some instances, states are able to provide their own contingents withthe necessary intelligence prior to deployment. Some countries will haveextensive knowledge of the area concerned, especially if they have been acolonial power there or are regional ncighbours. More likely, however, thecontributing state will have had little or no connection with the area con-

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cerned. Most participants in peacekeeping operations find themselves oper-ating well outside their area of direct military and political interest. Smalland even middle powers simply cannot maintain accurate and current intel-ligence on every part of the world where they might be called upon to takepart in peacekeeping operations.

On deployment, peacekeeping missions will establish some kind of head-quarters that will have at least rudimentary facilities for receiving andprocessing what is called 'military information'. In most cases, the intelli-gencc function must be built up over a period of time with the personnelthat are available and can be spared from less pressing tasks. Even in majoroperations, such as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), raw informa-tion often had to substitute for intelligence, at least in the early phaseswhen collection plans were lacking and no capacity existed for processingthe data gathered. The mixture of nationalities involved also makes fordifficult communications as well as revealing national differences in oper-ating procedures and significant variations in the level of training andcxpertise. There arc also differences in attitude between the various nation-alities. Some countries will reject the development of an intelligence capac-ity because they do not appreciate its significance, because they consider itinappropriate for the UN, or because they see their role as simply collectingdata without providing analysis.

National contingents, of course, may partly overcome these problems byreceiving intelligence directly from their own governments. Again, theability of countries to do this varies anad difficult situations may arise. Somecontingents may be better supplied with intelligence than others or, moresignificantly. better supplied than the force commander. One UNPROFORcommander, Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar, for example, could not, asan Indian national, receive intelligence from North Atlantic Treaty Organi-sation (NATO) sources. In these circumstances. the principle of exclusiveoperational command by the UN may be undermined and the risk of contin-geits following orders only from their national authorities heightened. 7

The ability of national contingents to collect and process intelligencewithin their area of operations will also vary. Some, perhaps most, willsimply lack the resources, expertise and experience to conduct intelligenceactivities. while some may lack an interest in doing so. A number ofcountries, however, will incorporate an intelligence capacity into a contin-gent as a matter of routine. Their doctrine for national defence may alsofocus on the collection of information and the preparation of intelligence inlow-level conflicts, Australia and Indonesia, for example, have concen-trated on collecting intelligence for low-level conflicts, although for ratherdifferent reasons.

The pooling of intelligence in the course of peacekeeping operations isto be welcomed, but there are limitations. Such dissemination normallyrequires the approval of national headquarters and may require thesanitising of information. A further distinction may be drawn between

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intelligence that can be retained by other states and intelligence that can beshown to, but not retained by. other states." Existing intelligence linksamong NATO countries and between the US and other states have provenparticularly useful in allowing information to be shared among the coun-tries concerned. In practice, too, contingents may use their own discretionin passing on information and informal networks will develop among someof the contingents.

In some circumstances, the force commander may be able to receiveintelligence from a friendly nation that is not available to other nationalcontingents. In the case of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia(UNTAC), for example, the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General JohnSanderson, was no doubt provided with intelligence not only by his owngovernment in Australia, but also by the United States. From the militaryperspective, this is unlikely to cause problems since commanders are fre-quently privy to information that their subordinates are not. The problem is,rather, a political one. As an Australian, General Sanderson could receiveintelligence from the US in a way that, for example, an Indian or a Brazilianforce commander could not. Countries might thus be denied the commandof peacekeeping operations because of their political alignment.

Against this background of partial, ad hoc arrangements. there will beintelligence failures, usually minor, but sometimes disastrous. An examplewas the attempt by US Army Razngers to capture General Aideed in July1993. A carefully planned raid was executed on a suspected hideout, onlyto discover that the building was the office of a UN agency.9 This failure ofintelligonce was due in part to a refusal by US forces to share informationwith the UN. In the subsequent handover to the UN Operation in Somalia(UNOSOM II), by contrast, it was the UN that displayed initial reluctanceto accept intelligence support from the United States, becau'se of the organi-sation's distrust of military intelligence and of US intelligence in particu-lar. I"

In the face of this patchwork of capabilities and ad hoc arrangements, theforce commander must do what he can to hold the intelligence functiontogether. The idea of one state playing the lead role in intelligence has beensuggested, but this is likely to run into the expected political objectionsunless one state is playing the lead role in the mission as a whole. In thecase of UNPROFOR, the establishment of a headquarters was certainlyassisted by a common NATO background, but this is not likely to be afrequent occurrence. In general, an improvement in intelligence capabilitiesis more likely to occur as part of a wider process of professionalising themilitary side of peacekeeping in areas such as planning, logistics, training,communications, and command and control."

An important step in this direction was the creation in 1993 of a Situa-tion Centre at UN headquarters to monitor peacekccping operations. TheCentre gathers and processes information from the field on a continuousand systematic basis. The Centre functions for 24. hours a day and seven

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days a week - a major improvement on the previous arrangements wherebyUN headquarters was accessible to peacekeepers in the field for only fivedays a week from 9 am to 5 pm. With a staff of about 24, the Centremaintains two officers on duty at all times to receive communication.s fromany UN peacekeeping operation."l The Centre produces reports on themajor operations under way that are then forwarded to the UN Secretary-General, via the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, by noon eachday or more frequently as required.

The Centre, however, does more than simply pass on information re-ceived from various missions to the UN Secretariat. The Centre has aresearch and information cell that interprets information received from thefield and combines it with data obtained from a wide variety of othersources. The Centre is not a comprehensive intelligence unit, a commandcentre or a 'war room' (as some US Congressmen call it). It does, however,systematise data and has begun to provide an institutional memory.' 3 TheCentre is also going some way towards meeting the growing demand fromthe UN leadership and from contributing states for intelligence about ongo-ing operations. It is apparent that, once the benefits of timely and accurateintelligence are understood, both national and international decision-mak-ers will tend to seek even more intelligence.

The UN's intelligence efforts in peacekeeping operations have thus beenlimited both in terms of planning and of conducting peacekeeping opera-tions. Some improvements have been made, but the further development ofintelligence capabilities raises a number of important issues that point tomajor constraints and possible inherent limits on what the UN can achieve.

Intelligence and the Impartiality of the UNThe collection of information is a normal part of any operation involvingmilitary personnel. The value of locally gathered intelligence from civildisorders, tenuous cease-fires or armed factions has already been empha-sised. But the collection of information is an activity that is fraught withpolitical difficulties. The principal concern is that the collection of intelli-gence by the UN in the course of peacekeeping - whether it is operatingwithin a state or between states - could be seen as compromising theorganisation's traditional impartiality towards the contending parties.14

It is possible that one or more sides will be reluctant for the UN toacquire information about their activities. One reason for this, of course, isthat a party to a conflict has something to hide. It may wish to conceal thefact that it has breached a cease-fire, has moved troops and weapons incontravention of an existing agreement, has evaded undertakings to demo-bilisc forces or simply wishes to fccd the UN with false information. It hasbeen a common claim in the former Yugoslavia. for example. that attackson civilians have been staged by the victim in order to win internationalsympathy antd lo denigrate the other side. Unless the UN has some idea ofwhat is actually happening on the ground, it will find that its role as an

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impartial monitor may be politically compromised or revealed as incffec-tive.

It is possible, too, that all parties to the conflict will be suspicious of theUN in its gathering of information. Even if one side has scrupulouslyobserved the terms of an agreement, it may still be anxious that informationabout its positions or activities will be leaked from the UN to its opponents.This is not an unreasonable fear. Some contingents in UNPROPOR, forinstance, appear to have provided information, which was acquired throughthe UN, to the side the contingent favoured. The UN, moreover, normallyensures that its signals are non-secure.'1 This caused much anxiety, forexample, for the Israelis during their presence in Lebanon since they fearedthe signals could be intercepted by their opponents. There may also be aconcern that national contingents in a peacekeeping operation could collectinformation for their own purposes - whether for commercial or securityreasons. Everything the UN docs in a particular country, moreover, is liableto be observed and, perhaps, bugged by local factions.

In addition to organisational deficiencies and differences of approach,the means available to the UN to acquire reliable and timely informationwill vary from mission to mission. In .some situations, the mere presence ofobservers and reports from the local population will be extremely useful.The value of patrol forces has also been frequently stressed by experiencedpeacekeepers, 16 Effective patrolling will potentially reduce risks topeacekeepers rather than expose them to danger. The scope for collectinghuman intelligence will, of course, depend on local conditions. In parts ofSomalia, for example, a friendly population, freedom of movement offorces and cooperation from non-governmental organisations provided fa-vourable conditions.' 7 A significant. but by no means total, limitation onthe value of patrols may be the lack of knowledge of the local language.

Techuicial means of collecting information may also be available andappropriate. Where hostilities are under way, the widely taught techniquesof crater analysis may reveal the locations of weapons and the origins ofmunitions employed. In the former Yugoslavia, aerial reconnaissance andmortar-locating radars (Cymbeline) have also proved effective."s Aerialphotography is often an attractive option, having the advantages that it ischeap, simple and - compared to satellite photography - requires littleinterpretation. It is also a capability possessed by over 50 states. 19

There are limits, however, to these techniques. UN personnel may berefused total access to this technology on the grounds, for example, thatthere is a danger from snipers or mines, or that their safety cannot beguaranteed. The technical means of gathering information may suffer notonly from a lack of the relevant resources, but also from inherent problems.Crater analysis, for example, will be less valuable when the same .kinds ofmunitions are used by all sides in a conflict. which is the case. for example,in the former Yugoslavia (where most munitions come from a once-unitednational army) and Cambodia (where some weaponry dated back to the

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Second World War). Mines, too, are eminently difficult to track to theirsource. The use of a rmortar-locating radar near Sarajevo by a Ukrainiandetachment also ran into particular problems when both sides made it anobject of attack and killed eight personnel.

Ideally, of course, clear and agreed rules for the UN to collect informa-tion - whether by human or technical means - will be established. But inpractice, the UN will commonly be faced with numerous problems thatplace it squarely in the political arena: should the UN seek out the requiredinformation more vigorously and thus risk alienating one or more sides to aconflict? Should information collected about one party be made available tothe other, which may happen surreptitiously in any case? Should the UNseek to ensure that information made public does not assist one side or theother? Is it consistent with impartiality for the UN to threaten to publiciseinformation about, say, breaches of a cease-fire? Should the UN everpublicly denounce the offending side by. for example, the release of aerialphotography as in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962? Should the UN admitits incapacity to determine who are the perpetrators of significant breachesof a cease-fire or of blatant attacks on civilians?

The political problems of intelligence become greater the more pro-active the UN's role becomes. The intention may be to inhibit factions fromdeploying forces in prohibited areas or to push an offending party towardscompliance with the terms of an agreement, but there is a risk that the effectwill be to alienate or provoke the party concerned. If the UN is contemplat-ing even more vigorous action, such as air strikes, the political impact willbe even greater and the need for intelligence imperative. Clearly, the pos-session of information is never a neutral fact. It makes the UN a player inthe politics of the country concerned and it leaves the UN more dependentthan ever on intelligence of the highest quality.

It is also important to remember that the UN will not necessarily be ableto act on the information it has and that this, too, may carry politicaldisadvantages. It may be clear to the world, for example, that the UN isaware of terrible events occurring bcforc its very eyes, yet the orgainisationcan only look on impotently. Erskine Childers recounts the bitter words ofone Bosnian who looked up at a UN aircraft and said 'there goes the UN --

monitoring gcnocide'. n In the case of the UN, knowledge also impliesresponsibility.

The Security of UN IntelligenceThe security of UN intelligence - or. more accurately. the lack of security -is a political minefield and underlies some of the problems discussed in theprevious section. Traditionally, intelligence is kept from hostile powers andis confined to those who need to know. Both of these principles are chal-lenged by intelligence in UN operations. It must be assumed that anyinformation provided to the UN will sooner or later become public knowl-edge. There are inevitable political reasons for this release of information.


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A wide range of parties are interested in information relevant to peacekeep-ing. All of these parties - UN military personnel in the field; UN civilianand military staff; states participating in a peacekeeping operation, as manyas 30 or 40 in a single mission; and members of the Security Council, theprincipal decision-making body for peacekeeping - have a claim upon thisinformation. Peacekeeping does not involve security of information in theconvciiional sense.

The fundamental reason for the openness of UN intelligence is the factthat the organisation is international and its personnel are multinational.First, on the political level, states tend to have diverse interests in anypeacekeeping operation. Once states acquire information that can promotetheir own interests, the temptation to exploit this information will bestrong. Second, the loyalty of personnel working directly or indirectly forthe UN will tend to lie, in the last analysis, with their own country. This isnot to deny that many individuals can and do maintain a strong loyalty tothe UN. but the security of information must always be in some doubt.21It issimply impossible to conduct security clearances on UN personnel, a situa-tion which will be exacerbated as more personnel are assigned to intelli-gence tasks and the numbers of civilian staff and private contractors in-crease. Fears that the UN could not keep information secure and that UNstaff had been infiltrated by supporters of Aideed, for example, apparentlycontributed to the failures of communication that led to the fire-fight thatkilled 18 and wounded 78 US soldiers in October 1993.

It can be legitimately asked: whose side are UN intelligence personnelon? The UN Situation Centrc provides an interesting case study. In late1993, the Centre comprised 24 staff, headed by a Canadian civilian with aBelgian Lieutenant-Colonel as deputy. A total of 16 different nationalitieswere represented - from Australia to Zimbabwe, Norway to Pakistan, Jor-dan to Russia. It is to be expected that many of these personnel will beunder instructions to report any significant information that goes throughthe Centre to their national authorities. In the most obvious case, staff wholearn of an impending threat to their country's personnel in a peacekeepingforce could hardly be expected to hold back such information from theirgovernment.

It is worth noting that as far as military personnel are concerned, it is USpolicy to instruct officers assigned to the UN to put the organisation beforetheir country. This is not so much a conversion to internationalism on thepart of the US, but rather the result of a long-term political calculation. TheUS hopes to avoid awakening suspicion of its motives while encouragingother states to contribute intelligence to the UN. The US can also afford toserve the UN first because its own intelligcnce sources and agencies are farmore numerous and effective than those available to the UN. Most coun-tries are not so fortunate.

Another factor contributing to the openness of UN intelligence is thetransparency of peacekeeping operations, which are normally accessible to

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the world's media in a way that national military operations are not. Sincepeacekeeping operations are rarely as dangerous. and hence as inhibiting toreporters, as actual hostilities, peacekeeping operations tend to attract me-dia attention.Lu The UN finds it very difficult to prevent reporters frommoving around an operational area - the result of a lack of authority as wellas a lack of resources - so that the media is often only limited in theiraccess by the unavailability of transport. National contingents, moreover,may actively encourage the media to report on their activities. Peacekeep-ing operations are thus liable to be compromised by, for example, thepremature disclosure of movements, the revelation of problems and limita-tions on UN forces, or the exaggerated reporting of risks and casualtieswith a consequent undermining of moralc.

Despite the many problems in the security of Intelligence, there are twocompensating factors. First, is the short lifespan of much intelligence. Onceit bccomcs widcly known, most intelligence ceases to be sensitive becausethe event has already occurred or relevant action has been taken. Providedthat sources are not compromised, which is generally less of a problem inthe casc of the UN, subsequent disclosure is not necessarily undesirable.Second, is that the insecurity of intelligence is more likely to prove incon-venient than fatal. Most peacekeeping operations, most of the time, do notinvolve the use of force by or against the UN. Nonetheless, it is precisely inthe most dangerous situations that secure intelligence is most needed.

Sources of InformationThe sources of information available to the UN are in principle as diverseas those open to states, although differences naturally exist. It is not ex-pecred, for example, that the UN will make use of spies or agents or resortto bribery and blackmail in its quest for information. Such covert informa-tion gathering is seen as contrary to the ethic of peacekeeping and as abreach of the sovereignty of the targeted nations. It also leaves all parties toa conflict suspicious of what the UN might know or what the UN mightmistakenly believe about them. The subsequent revelation of covert activi-ties would also prove highly embarrassing and counter-productive. None-theless, the UN may receive unsolicited information from all kinds ofsources, including individuals and organisations. In some cases, nationallaws will have been broken by the informants. The UN Special Commissionon Iraq, for example, received secret tip-offs, unsolicited documents andmany other kinds of information about Iraqi weapons capabilities. 3 Suchinformal sources clearly require delicate handling.

The principal sources of intelligence open to the UN, however, areessentially 'above board'. This does not mean that they rely purely on thecooperation of the parties to a conflict, but that the methods of collectionare. overt. Indeed. there are many sources of information that can be turnedinto intelligence for peacekeeping purposes and access to them is perhapsthe least of the difficulties surrounding UN intelligence. Nonetheless, eachsource has its own special characteristics.

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Member-StatesThe UN can call upon any of its over 180 members to provide informationand since the end of the Cold War there are signs that member-states areincreasingly willing to respond. The intelligence-rich members of the UN-notably the US, Britain and France - have become significant participantsin peacekeeping, while Russia has been actively supporting the UN incertain operations. Even if the major powers do not have personnel in aparticular mission, they may well be willing to assist the operation byproviding intelligence. At the same time. the contributions of middle andsmall powers should not be overlooked. There are many areas of the worldthat do not attract much attention from the major powers - Central Africa,for example - where neighbouring countries may be best placed to provideinformation for the UN.

In ncnouraging member-states to contribute intelligence for peacekeep-ing, the UN can take various approaches. One useful stratagem is to play offone state against another. It can be argued that a UN operation should notrely on information provided by only one or two states and that other statesshould ensure that their data are also given to the UN. Another strategy is toestablish permanent channels of communication with member-states. TheSituation Centre, for example, has acquired a computer-based system fortransferring information known as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Sup-port System (JDISS).24 This allows the Centre to talk to databases in othercountries that have the same system. notably the US and one or two NATOcountries. The interchange of information is, of course, closely controlledby each state, but the basis for greater collaboration has thereby beenestablished.

The principal long-term approach must be to accustom states to sharinginformation and to establish confidence in the ability of the UN to useinformation effectively and discreetly. This will be. greatly enhanced bypolitical support at the highest level. In January 1993, for example, Presi-dent Bush set out US policy:

To the. extent prudent, US intelligence today is . . . being used indramatically new ways, such as assisting the international organisationslike the United Nations when called upon in support of crucial peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance and arms control efforts. We willshare information and assets that strengthen peaceful relationships andaid in building confidence. 25

This sort of commitment, which can be maintained even if the US does notsend personnel, is essential to help the UN prise information out of nationalintelligence agencies that are unaccustomed to sharing information withinternational organisations.

The genuine difficulties that exist for member-states in providing infor-mation to an international organisation cannot be ignored, especially anorganisation that docs not have effective security classification procedures

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or security practices. The UN has not needed such procedures and practicesin the past and may, as suggested above, find it impossible to implementthem fully. National agencies are, therefore. likely to retain their naturalconcern with compromising sources, national-security classification re-quirements, sensitivity towards neighbours and allies, third-party restric-tions, information that has been illegally obtained and domestic politicalfactors.^ Giving away hard-won information goes 'against the grain'.

These same organisations, however, are also facing the challenge ofdiminishing resources. A number of governments, especially in the West,have come to see cuts in intelligence as part of the peacc dividend. Oneconsequence may well be less support for the UN. but an alternative re-sponse could be a search for new roles. Support for UN peacekeeping mightprove an attractive budget-enhancing or, at least, budget-protecting optionfor national intelligence organisations.

Open SourcesNational sources of intelligence are not necessarily reliable or appropriatefor the UN's needs. To reduce reliance on member-states, the UN can makeuse of open sources that are becoming increasingly varied and accessible.There are traditional public sources used by journalists, scholars and otherinvestigators - books, journals, magazines, industry publications, govern-ment document.s, legislative reports and records (notably the US Congres-sional Record), commercial registers, such as the Lloyd's Register of Ship-ping, and the data collected by institutions, such as the Stockholm Interna-tional Peace Research Institute and the International Institute for StrategicStudies.

For current information, the most accessible open sources are televisionand radio networks. While CNN, for example, can arouse public concernover humanitarian issues, it is also invaluable in providing continuousinformation on many conflicts around the world and is keenly watched inthe Situation Centre. There are also numerous national and internationalnews services available and it is politic for the UN to subscribe to a widerange of these - if only to allay suspicions that it is reliant on one or twoagencies identified with particular countries.

In recent years. the world information market has grown even wider ascertain governments have sought to make money through the sale of infor-mation. Russia has opened its archives to raise hard currency, while theCentral Intelligence Agency is also de-classifying material for sale. Satel-lite data are also increasingly available. 27 The Situation Centre already buysinformation from the French SPOT satellite, which has a resolution of 25metres. A recent entrant to the satellite data market is Russia. which isreported to be willing to sell imagery with a resolution of two metres. 28

While low-resolution imagery is primarily of background value, the signsare that better-quality imagery will soon become readily available to theUN, as it will to any interested party.

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Other International AgenciesIn principle, the UN lias access to information from a great variety ofinternational agencies and organisations that could be of relevance topeacekeeping. Its own specialised agencies, such as the World HealthOrganisation, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation,the nrternational Labour Organisation, the Food and Agricultive Organisa-tion and the UN Industrial Development Organisation, together with pro-grammes such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, theUnited Nations Development Programmc and the United Nations Environ-ment Programme, all gather information on population, health, economicdevelopment. refugees, educational and scientific programmes, and envi-ronmental issues for their own particular purposes. Outside the UN itselfthere are various international regimes dealing with such matters as nuclearnon-proliferation, the control of chemical and biological weapons and thetransfer of conventional arms and missile technology.

The use by the UN of information acquired by such organisations, how-ever, raises problems of principle and practice. Data are provided by a stateor collected by an agency for the purposes of that agency. Should suchinformation be made available to the UN for peacekeeping operations (orany other purpose for that matter)? There is a risk that the integrity of anagency will be questioned and the flow of information to it compromised ifit supplies information to other organisations - even the UN.

On the other hand, could information gathered by the UN in the course ofpeacekeeping be properly put to other purposes. In some instances, such apurpose may be directly related to the peacekeeping operation, for examplewar-crimes trials arising from a conflict in which the UN has been involvedthrough peacekeeping. This may create a reluctance among states opposedto such trials to supply information to the UN. There is also the concern -manifest in the case of the former Yugoslavia - that the threat of war-crimes trials will cause local military and political leaders to resist anegotiated settlement. Further questions would arise over the transfer ofinformation gained during peacekeeping to other international agencies forentirely unconnected purposes.

UN-Owned SourCesApart from collecting information through its own officials and throughpeacekeeping forces on the ground, the UN can make use of its owntechnical means to gather data. This has already been done on a small scalein some peacekeeping operations in which UN forces have already madeuse of some fairly sophisticated technologies. Night-vision binoculars, forinstance, have been used by peacekeepers in Lebanon, Kuwait and WesternSahara. although they are expensive at over $3,000 each and may be limitedby ground haze. Attention has also been given to the prospect of the UNacquiring advanced technology for information gathering. At the top of therange ot options for new technology are observation and communications

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satellites that would be owned and operated by the UN. These wouldcertainly prove an expensive undertaking and a source of disputes overfunding, the areas to be targeted, access to the data collected and thestaffing of the agency.

There are more down-to-earth, less contentious technologies, however,that have a range of possible uses."9 The Synthetic Aperture Radar, forexample, can be employed to search for weapons caches under a junglecanopy and is potentially useful when peacekeepers have the responsibilityof disarming factions in a civil war. Passive ground sensors can pick upvehicle movement and, in favourable conditions, human activity. Low-altitude drones, which are difficult to detect on radar and pose no risk topilots' lives, could be of particular value when the UN is monitoring acease-fire or contested territory and is constrained in its movements.

Some of these technologies, however, have drawbacks as means of col-.lecting intelligence. Such technologies are liable to be expensive, to suffertechnical limitations and to require skilled operation and interpretation. Tosecure maximum value from technical methods, moreover, the UN wouldneed to develop a body of expertise among its own personnel or gain accessto such expertise from member-nations. Both options pose difficulties.Nonetheless, the attractiveness to the UN of control over its own assets islikely to be high primarily to reduce reliance on information provided bynational governments that may not always be forthcoming. In theory, too.the wider use of such technology could reduce the cost of peacekeeping orallow the UN to use its limited manpower more effectively.30

Technology, of course, will never remove the need for other sources ofintelligence. It cannot provide the political knowledge essential to peace-keeping. It cannot substitute for the operational and tactical intelligencethat can only be obtained by human contact on the ground. Nor will tech-nology fill the gap left by the UN's substantial inability - for practical andetlical reasons - to gather secret information by covert means. As with anyother organisation that makes use of intelligence, the. UN will have tocombine its sources of information as best it can and exploit to the fullthose In which it has an advantage.

Institutionalising UN IntelligenceThe desirability of a coordinated and comprehensive intelligence capabilityin UN peacekeeping operations hardly needs demonstration. The barriers todeveloping such a capability are equally self-evident - the political sensi-tivity of acquiring and exploiting information, the lack of security of infor-mation and problems of access. Nonetheless, certain steps have been takentowards the development of an intelligence capability in some areas. Howfar can this process go? Can UN intelligence for peacekeeping be institu-tionalised?

One important factor will be the natural pressure for the UN to establishits own intelligence system, with its own means of collection, analysis and

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dissemination. It is a trend encouraged by the prospect of reduced relianceon national sources of intelligence and by the potential for the UN to gainaccess to data from other international agencies and to acquire its owninfurmation-gathering technology. The major Western powers appear tosupport such a development - or at least not to oppose it - but this is nodoubt based on the assumption that the West will be able to retain adominant role in any UN intelligence function.

A further pressure for the creation of a UN intelligence system is theattraction of preventive diplomacy, which requires a strong informationbase. This led to the establishment in 1987 of an Office of Research andCollection of Information in order to provide an early warning of conflictsand to suggest options for dealing with them to the UN Secretary-General. 31

The Office was abolished in 1992 following the reorganisation of theDepartment of Political Affairs, but the need for early warning still re-mains. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace, published in 1992,asked mcmber-states Lo 'be ready to provide the information needed foreffective preventive diplomacy'.32 In the following year, the UN Secretary-General pointed out that the UN had set up more fact-finding missions in1992-93 than in any other year." The thirst for information in the field ofpreventive diplomacy may thus provide a continuing basis for intelligencein peacekeeping.

Proposals have been made for the establishment of a permanent intelli-gence unit within the UN. The Australian Foreign Minister, Senator GarethEvans, for example, has suggested that 'a group of professionals fromvarious countries with expertise in intelligence . . . be recruited and ap-proved by the Security Council'. 3 The group, it was suggested, would haveaccess to classified information in order to provide independent advice tothe Council. Several concerns exist about this and similar proposals. Couldmilitary or civilian officials sever their national connections and becomegenuinely independent? Would such impartiality be given credibility bymcmber-states? There are also organisational difficulties. Could the UNprovide adequate training for its staff or keep abreast of current expertise?How would the UN deal with the recurrent problems of recruiting high-quality staff while satisfying demands for national representativeness?

The institutionalisation of UN intelligence also raises questions abouteffectiveness. How efficient would such a bureaucracy be? A large andexpensive organisation might produce little in the way of results, especiallyas far as peacekeeping is concerned. Such an organisation might alsobecome prey to the defects common to intelligence agencies in general,such as rigidity, narrow views of the world or obsessive concern withsecrecy. The organisation might also fall into the temptation of using agentsand other covert menns of information gathering - or be suspected of doingso. Any process of institutionalisation is liable to entrench undesirable aswell as desirable features.

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The task of establishing an effective UN intelligence function might becased by. the development of Information centres based on regional organi-sations. Centres of this kind would gather data on a wide range of topics ofconcern to regional states. In Europe, for example, there are plans toestablish a Western European Union Space Centre to collect and coordinatesatellite data and make it available to member-states.35 The function of thisCentre would be to assist in the monitoring of arms-control agreements,regional crises, environmental change and other agreed purposes, bur therelevance to peacekeeping is apparent. Proposals have also been put for-ward for the European Union to establish an intelligence organisation. 36

In South-east Asia, there has been widespread discussion about confi-dence-building measures and transparency as part of a common effort toimprove mutual security.57 A regional data centre has been mooted and itwould be a logical step forward for the states of the region. Centres of thiskind would avoid the political difficulties entailed in establishing UN-owned agencies in a region, while being able to provide information to theUN for a wide range of purposes. Nonetheless, any agreement between aregional agency and the UN on how and when to provide information wouldentail a delicate balancing of interests.

Prospects and PressuresIt is apparent that any development of UN intelligence will be heavilyshaped by a small group of Western nations. They, almost exclusively, havethe knowledge, experience and global reach that is required. In the UNSituation Centre, for example, 17 of the 24 staff were drawn from WesternEurope, North America and Australia and generally occupied the seniorpositions. Procedures in the Centre are based on Western practice, whileEnglish is spoken and used for all written reports. Any extension of the useof technology in intelligence gathering for the UN, moreover, would onlyreinforce the dominance of Western powers, both practically and symboli-cally.3A

Such developments will serve to emphasise the hegemony of the majorWestern powers - in terms not of military power, but of information.Substantial reliance onl Western intelligence by the UN could well producean adverse reaction from the majority of its members outside the club. It isalready a common complaint among Third-World nations that they providethe majority of peacekeeping personnel, but play relatively little part in thedirection and management of peacekeeping operations. These complaintswill only grow louder if the UN increases its reliance on Western powersfor intelligence. The reality is, however, that it may have little other option.

The development of an intelligence function by the UN, if it is to occur atall, will have to observe thlse and other political constraints. It is not amatter primarily of financial and personnel resources. much less of technol-ogy. Nor will the future of intelligence in UN peacekeeping operations bedetermined by bureaucratic pressures. favourable as they may be, or by the

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growing desire for intelligence by the UN leadership. Nor will the domina-tion of particular powers in itself produce an intelligence capacity. In thefinal analysis, it will be a matter of politics. The principal determinant willbe the role of the UN relative to the interests of its members and thecoimmnitment members are prepared to make to the organisation.

Nonetheless, it might be supposed that intelligence could have a certainlife of its own. States are losing control over the creation and transfer ofinformation, just as they have lost. to some degree. their monopoly over themeans of violence and their ability to regulate national economics. If we areentering the 'information age', greater opportunities may exist in the futurefor the UN to enhance its influence through peacekeeping, and other activi-ties, by controlling and managing intelligence.

AcknowledgmentsThe author is grateful to a numberof military personnel and civilianofficials fuor helpful discussions onthis topic. An earlier version of thispaper was presented at a conferenceon 'litlelligence and Australian Na-tional Security Policy', held at theAustralian Defence Studies Centre,Canberra, 25-26 November 1993.

NotesIntelligence is a 'dirty word' accord-

ing to the International Peace Acad.emy, Peacckeeper's Handbook (NewYork: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 39.'The topic is barely mentioned in theUN Secretary-General's report, Im-proving the Capacity of the UnitedNations for Peace-keeping. A/48/403.14 March 1994. Some discussion iscontained in International PeaceAcademy, Peacekeeper's Handbook.pp. 59-62. 120-21. which note. that'thc intclligence concept' may berequired in certain future operations.' For discussions of the nature ofcontemporary pcacckceping, see JohnMackinlay and Jarat Chopra, A DraftConcept of Second Generation Multi-national Operations 1993 (Providence.RI. Thumas J. Watson Institute forInternational Studies, Brown Univer-

sity, 1993); Cathy Downes, 'Chal-lenges for Smaller Nations in the NewEra of UN and Multinational Opera-tions', in Hugh Smith (ed.), Peace-keeping - Challenges for the Future(Canberra: Australian Defence StudiesCentre. 1993): and 'Demobilisationafter Civil Wars', in IISS, StrategicSurvey 1993-1994 (London: Brassey'sfor the IISS), pp. 25-31.4 For the British position, see Britishreply to the Secretary-Gencral, UnitedNations Peacekeeping (London:HMSO. July 1993), pp. 4 and 7-8.5For an example of timely informationpassed to the UN Special Representa-tive in the United Nations TransitionAssistance Group (Namibia), seeMargaret Thatcher, The DowningStreet Years (London: Harper Collins,1993). pp. 528-29."The report of the UN Secretary-General, Improving the Capacity of theUnited Nations for Peace-keeping, pp.36-37.' On the importance of this principle.see ibid.. pp. 25-27.X See Joint Chiefs of Staff, JointDoctrine for Intelligence Support toOperations (Washington DC; JointPublication 2-0. Joint Staff. 1993). pp.VIII, 1.2.' Ruth Sina, 'Warload Slips ThroughWide Intelligence Net'. The Austral-ian. 7 October 1993. p. 6.

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"' Lieutenant-Colonel David J. Hurlcy,'Operation Solace', Defence ForceJournal (Australia), no. 104, January/February 1994, p. 33." See the report of the UN Sccrctary-General, Improving the Capacity of theUnited Nations for Peace-keeping. pp.28-39.1 2 Staffed initially through the volun-tary secondment of staff by member-states. an establishment of 15 hasrecently been approved. Supplementa-tion by member-states will, therefore,still be needed.13 Mars R. Berdal, 'Fateful rEncounter:The United States and UN Peacoekep-ing', Survival, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring1994, p. 46.'' Mats R. Berdal. Whither UN Peace-keeping?, Adolphi Paper 281 (London:Brassey's for the IISS, 1993), p. 43.15 Ibid., p. 8. See also InternationalPeace Academy, Peacekeeper'sHlandbook, pp. 39 and 120.1' The scope for using patrols to collectinformation is emphasised in Interna-tional Peace Academy, Peacekeeper'sHandbook, pp. 105-14.17Lieutenant-Colonel GeoffreyPeterson. 'Human Intelligence andSomalia - A Cost Effective Winner fora Small Armly'. Defcnce Furce Journal(Australia). no. 104. January/February1994. p. 37.1x 'General Rose: Looking for a Returnto Normality', Jane's Defence Weekly,11I June 1994. p. 5.') Michael Krepon and Jeffrey P.Tracey, "'Open Skies" and UN Peace-keeping'. Survival; vol. 32, no. 3, May/June 1990, pp. 261-62 and 263.20 'The United Nations in the 1990s:Restorin; the Vision', a seminar at thePeace Research Centre. AustralianNational University, 26 August 1993.21The. possibility also exists that UNpersonnel could use information forprivate gain or would be susceptible toblackmail or bribery.

22 On procedures for dealing with themedia, see International Peace Acad-emy, Peacekeeper's Handbook. pp.76-78 and 340-42.2 Remarks by Timothy T. Trevan, inUnited Nations, 'Disarmament- NewRealities: Disarmament, Peace-build-ing and Global Security', excerptsfrom panel discussions at a conferenceheld at the United Nations, New York,20-23 April 1993 (New York: UnitedNations, 1993), p. 262.24 Berdal, 'Fateful Encounter', p. 46.25George Bush, National SecurityStrategy of the United States (Wash-ington DC: White House, January1993), p. 18.26 In Bosnia-Herzegovina. for example.the UN command received no intelli-gence from national sources because ofthe lack of security and the reluctanceof nations to supply intelligence. SeeBrigadier Roderick Cordy-Simpson,'UN Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina', in Smith (ed.), Peace-keeping. p. 106.27 General Lewis Mackenzie indicatedthe potential value of satellite datawhen he remarked that 'Sarajevo criedout for things like satellite imagery'.Cited in Peter Saracino, 'Polemics andPrescriptions', International DefenseReview, vol. 26, no. 5, May 1993, p.370.:* Bhupcndra Jasani, 'Thc Value ofCivilian Satellite Imagery', Jane'sIntelligence Review, vol. 5. no. 5. May1993, p. 235.29 Dctails arc takcn from Krepon andTracey, 'Open Skies'; and William J.Durch, 'Running the Show: Planningand Implementation', in Durch (ed.),The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping(New York: St Martin's Press, 1993),pp. 69-71."3 Krepon and Tracey, 'Open Skies', p.251. This is disputed in a Canadianstudy. See Stephan B. Plemming,Organizational and Military Impacts

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of High-Tech Surveillance and Detec-tion Systems for UN Peacekeeping,Project Report 535 (Ottawa: Opera-tional Research and Analysis Estab-lishment, Department of NationalDefence. 1992), p. 3.31 Gareth Evans, Cooperating forPeace: The Global Agenda for the1990s and Beyond (Sydney: Allen andUtnwin, 1993), p. 65.32 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agendafor Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping(New York: United Nations, 1992), p.14." Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Agenda forPeace - One Year Later'. Orbis . vol.37, no. 3, Summer 1993, p. 325.

34 Evans. Cooperating for Peace, p.163. See also remarks by WilliamColby, former Director of the CentralIntelligence Agency, in Disarmament-New Realities. pp. 254-55.35 Jasani, 'Civilian Satellite Imagery',p. 235.6 Jaap Donath, 'A European Commu-

nity Intelligence Organization',Defense Intelligence Journal, vol. 2,no. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 15-33.'7 Desmond Ball, 'Arms and Affluence:Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region', International Secu-rity, vol. 18, no. 3, Winter 1993/94,pp. 105-12.3' Flemming, Organizational andMilitary Impacts, p. 9.

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