UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations

Presentation to Folke Bernadotte Thursday, 2 April 2009

Claire Bamber, Peacekeeping Situation Centre, DPKO

Bond in a blue beret?

Not exactly…

Total deployment in September 2008: 111,60088,754 uniformed personnel and 20,690 civilians

From 119 countries

DPKO HQ supportBudget for 01 July 2008 – 30 June 2009: Near $USD 7.1 billion1,000+ HQ staff supporting 100,000+ in the field

DPKO Directive on JOC DPKO Directive on JOC and JMAC was approved and JMAC was approved by USG DPKO on 1 July by USG DPKO on 1 July 2006 upon the advice of 2006 upon the advice of the DPKO Senior the DPKO Senior Management Team.Management Team.

Issued to all DPKO-led Issued to all DPKO-led missions on 12 July 2006.missions on 12 July 2006.

New DirectiveNew Directive

Objectives of the JMAC approach are three-fold:Objectives of the JMAC approach are three-fold:

Support integrated mission management.Support integrated mission management.

Support mission security. Support mission security.

Support informed decision-making across all Support informed decision-making across all components.components.

Not a decision-making bodyNot a decision-making body and does not replace and does not replace existing management or command structures at any existing management or command structures at any level. level.

It It supportssupports decision-making, operations decision-making, operations management and mission security.management and mission security.

The JMAC ApproachThe JMAC Approach

CASE STUDY: MINUSTAH

The Capstone Doctrine:

“A PKO must continuously analyse its operating environment to detect and forestall any wavering of consent… and must have the political and analytical skills… to manage situations where there is an absence or breakdown of local consent.”

Information provided by locals helped the UN in making arrests.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE:

Working with the HNP

An opportunity and a challenge…

Imagery intelligence

Aerial imagery allowed MINUSTAH to produce useful maps, identify weapons storage sites, hiding places for victims of kidnapping, the rebel leaders’ bases and to map out dozens of potential sniper positions.

Success… despite the lack of signals intelligence

“MINUSTAH’s JMAC established the gold standard for intelligence support for planning and execution of operations mounted to defend and enforce the mandate.”

United Institute of Peace Report 2008

CASE STUDY: MONUC

MONUC’s JMAC: about military operations… and much more.

Stabilisation Plan for Eastern DRC – a JMAC plan

Transformed access to and by the local population.

UNOPS: building roads a kilometre at a time.

UN agencies and others benefitted from the more secure environment.

No SIGINT but…

Local staff have access to humint that international staff might otherwise lack.

JMAC: The Challenges

• Lack of clarity of concept• Lack of buy-in by Mission leadership• Competition and duplication with

mission political affairs, civil affairs, military operations and intelligence and security

• Poor staff choices• Inadequate mission direction

Questions & Comments?