INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Presidentialism, Parties, and Legislatures

WEEKLY READING

• Smith, Democracy, chs. 5-6

• Modern Latin America, ch. 6 (Andes)

INTRO: CHILEAN ELECTIONS

• Round One (12/13/09)– Sebastián Piñera (Alianza por Chile) 44.06– Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación) 29.60– Marco Enríquez-Ominami (Independent) 20.14– Jorge Arrate (Juntos Podemos Más) 6.21

• Round Two (01/17/10)– Piñera (Alianza) 51.61– Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación) 48.39

BACKGROUND

• 1970 election:– Salvador Allende 36.6– Jorge Alessandri 35.3– Radomiro Tomic 28.1

• 1964 election:– Eduardo Frei Montalva 56.1– Salvador Allende 38.9– Julio Durán 5.0

OUTLINE

1. Democratic challenges: survival and consolidation

2. Presidentialism or parliamentarism?

3. Proposals for reform

4. The legislative arena

5. The plight of political parties

6. Sources of disenchantment

DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGES

• Survival and consolidation of democracy

• Avoidance of the past (and military coups)

• Questions: Would institutional changes help? Did prior crises result from institutional problems? And could they be repaired?

THE “NEW INSTITUTIONALISM”

• Individuals seek to maximize gain

• Institutions (rules) shape incentives

• And can therefore determine behavior

• Ergo, institutional design can affect the collective behavior of political actors

PRESIDENTIALISM OR PARLIAMENTARISM?

• Presidentialism:Head of government (president) is directly electedFixed term in officeCannot be removed by legislature (except through

impeachment)Selects cabinet ministersHead of government is also head of stateSeparation of legislative-executive powers

• Parliamentarism:Voters elect MPs MPs select head of government (PM)MPs approve cabinet appointmentsPM (and cabinet officers) dependent on

continuing confidence of parliamentHead of government (PM) is not head of stateFusion of legislative-executive powers

PRO-PARLIAMENTARY ARGUMENTS

• Avoid “temporal rigidity,” so crises of government would not become crises of regime

• Avoid polarization from zero-sum game

• Avoid paralyzing deadlock

• Thus superior durability of parliamentary regimes

PRO-PRESIDENTIALIST ARGUMENTS

• Clarity of fixed time horizon

• Checks and balances

• Democratic election of head of government

• Not the cause of immobilism (PR the cause)

• Empirical findings result from “selection bias”

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

• Brazil

• Argentina

• Chile

• Why not?– Insistence on election of chief executive– Advent of polling, reduction of uncertainty– Low esteem for congress, parties– Politics of nostalgia

ENGINEERING PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS

• Electing presidents:Plurality vs. MRO [reflections on Chile, 1970-2010]MRO a “magic bullet”Reelection or not?

• Power domains:Constitutional or partisan?Bureaucracy, judiciary, militaryDecree authority

THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA

• Electoral Systems:SMDs and two-party politicsPR and multi-party politicsEffects of district magnitudeClosed-list vs. open-list ballotsThe problem of term limits

• Institutional Performance:Essentially “reactive” legislaturesRemoving presidents?

LEVELS OF POPULAR TRUST(1996-2007)

• Church ~ 70%

• Armed Forces ~ 50%

• Media (TV+print) ~ 40%

• Congress ~ 30%

• Parties ~ 20%

THE PLIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES

• Diversity of party systems

• Levels of popular confidence

Figure 6-1. Average Number of Political Parties: Selected Countries, 1940-77 and 1978-2000

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Venezuela

Uruguay

Peru

Ecuador

Costa Rica

Colombia

Chile

Brazil

Bolivia

Argentina

Number of Parties1978-2000

1944-1977

Counting Political Parties:

N = 1 / (Σ pi2)

Where pi is the proportion of votes earned by the i-th party (or, alternatively, the proportion of seats in the legislature)

Figure 6-3. Levels of Confidence in Political Parties, 1996 and 2000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Venezuela

Uruguay

Peru

Paraguay

Mexico

Ecuador

Colombia

Chile

Central America

Bolivia

Brazil

Argentina

Percentage responding "a lot" or "some" confidence

1996

2000

THE POLITICS OF DISENCHANTMENT

• Weakness of representative institutions + judiciary branch (i.e., rule of law)

• Constraints on modern-day democracy• Inadequate policy performance • Tendency toward “delegative” or “illiberal”

democracy• Thus 55% would support authoritarian

government if it could improve economic situation (2004)

AND THE RISE OF THE LEFT

• Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998)

• Lula, Brazil (2002)

• Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005)…

• Reliance on democratic elections

• Vote as popular protest

• Possibilities of winning

• Challenge of governing