Informe Derecho al Manejo Transparente de los Recursos. Versión Ingles

www.transparencia.org.ve

REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS ON THE OCCASION OF THE EVALUATION OF THE 3RD PERIODIC REPORT ON VENEZUELA IN THE 55TH SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. JUNE 2015

MAY 2015


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Executive Summary

1. The following report was prepared by Transparency Venezuela for your consideration in the evaluation of the 3rd Periodic Report of the Venezuelan Government in 55th Session of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to be held in Geneva on June 2nd and 3rd, 2015.

2. The content of these reports reviews the articles 2, 10, 11 and 12 of the Covenant in what concerns the

impact of corruption on the enjoyment of social rights recognized in those articles, matter of great importance for understanding deficiencies and inefficiencies of policies and programs to which the Venezuelan government has allocated a large sum of public funds in the last decade, during one of the periods of higher oil revenues received by the country. These programs are called Social Missions.

3. The impact and damage of corruption in the development and enjoyment of ESCR may void

extraordinary and well-intentioned efforts of states, when execution is not accompanied by institutions and transparent and effective practices, affecting the availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability of ESCR. Corruption can not only mean the violation of human rights in individual cases, but it can also become a structural obstacle to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights.

4. A review was held of the States Third Report and the States responses to the list of issues prepared by

the Committee to determine if a corrupt practice violates or not a human right of the Covenant based on the obligations of each right, and the possible link between the corrupt behavior and the violation of a human right breach of an obligation- paying attention to two types of causal links: (1) corrupt practices that directly violate a human right, and (2) corrupt practices that lead to human rights violations, but that, in themselves, do not violate a right.

5. The development of rights in Venezuela is marked by a context of widespread and deep corruption,

fulfilling all the perverse elements of the formula: concentration of power/monopoly + discretion + impunity (accountability + opacity + control systems). No wonder that in Venezuela there is such a high perception of corruption and that the country is in the last ten places of Transparency Internationals Corruptions Perception Index with a score of 19/100.

6. With obvious areas of discretion and arbitrariness, large-scale investment in Missions and social

programs can lead to the pursuit of obvious personal and/or political benefits, that we call corruption risks. The lack of standards, systems, procedures and responsible to prevent, restrict and punish these abuses, result in impunity for breach and violation of rights.

7. In Venezuela there are rights that are not guaranteed which basically show a context of opacity and

discretion that is having a direct impact on the enjoyment and exercise of these rights. This statement is based on the lack of real anti-corruption policies; high discretion in high government decisions; absolute control over different levels of the government, control over acts of authority or State Capture; corruption risks in some programs or Social Missions whose poor outcome and increased poverty are incompatible with the amount of resources invested; lack of planning that leads to discretionary management of resources; little or no verifiable public information or high quality accountability; arbitrariness and lack of criteria in admission or beneficiaries selection; political use and political control of electoral programs, nonexistence of complaints mechanisms and safe complaints.


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8. Given the above situation, we request the Committee to urge the Venezuelan State:

a) Compliance with the constitutional rule of election of judges of the Supreme Court, the Comptroller General

of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic and the Ombudsman to ensure their autonomy and independence.

b) Perform competitions for admission to public service based on capability and merit, as required by the Constitution, and that the evaluation and promotion are carried out according to performance; and to move forward urgently towards the appointment of permanent positions of 80 % of the judges who are now in provisional status.

c) To adopt and implement anti-corruption standards: Law for Access to Public Information, Law on the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest; Whistleblower Protection Law, all based on the principles of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the present Covenant. And finally urgent progress on eliminating regulations that limit or reduce the free access to public information.

d) Reform of the Public Procurement Law eliminating exclusions and reducing exceptions to open tendering procedures.

e) Implement budget transparency practices and expenditure planning, based on goals and indicators. f) Develop and publish with a matter of urgency, complete, verifiable and clear information on the

development of ESCR and in particular of the Social Missions, with the purpose of eliminating areas of discretion and arbitrariness that can lead to the pursuit for personal and/or political benefits. Publish all the contracts established within the Missions.

g) Constant publication of updated reports, indexes and financial statistics by the National Budget Office, Treasury Office, National Public Accounting Office and the Central Bank of Venezuela.

h) It is important to recommend the Venezuelan State to review and eliminate loopholes and contradictions that allow the Supreme Court to make decisions against the right of access to public information and transparency.

i) Publish an updated list of beneficiaries of all the Missions and social programs with enough information to perform verifications and social control.

j) Keep interests and political/partisan organizations outside the decision-making process and execution of programs and Missions.

k) Cease the persecution against defenders, human rights organizations and citizen oversight of independent civil society, implementing the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders

Transparency Venezuela May 2015.


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INTRODUCTION

9. The following report was prepared by Transparency Venezuela for your consideration in the evaluation of the 3rd periodic report of the Venezuelan government in 55th session of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to be held in Geneva, June 2nd and 3rd 2015.

10. The content of these reports reviews the articles 2, 10, 11 and 12 of the Covenant in what concerns the

impact of corruption on the enjoyment of social rights recognized in those articles, matter of great importance for understanding deficiencies and inefficiencies of policies and programs, called Social Missions, to which the Venezuelan government has allocated a large sum of public funds in the last decade, during one of the periods of higher oil revenues received by the country.

11. While the concepts of human rights and corruption have been widely addressed by various disciplines

for decades, the same cannot be said with respect to the connection between corrupt practices and the enjoyment of such rights. In the year 2003, The Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations published the first document that connects corruption and human rights1. Since then, there have been several conferences where such a connection has been discussed within the UN2.

12. The human rights perspective emphasizes the damage that corruption causes in the compliance of the

States obligations to ensure rights of people3. From this perspective, corruption can not only mean the violation of human rights in individual cases, but can also become a structural obstacle to the exercise and enjoyment of those rights Therefore, it is no longer a matter just of state funds, to become a matter of rights and their enforcement.

13. From another perspective, to establish the relationship between corruption and human rights requires

us to explore the confluence between the agendas of the anti-corruption movement and the human rights movement. Both agendas have the potential to impact on the other: while the fight against corruption can have a positive effect in the enjoyment and exercise of human rights, the promotion of human rights reduces the opportunities of corruption.4

14. We know today that all rights imply obligations of respect, protection and realization5. In turn, its

implementation requires, depending of context, a greater or lesser extent of public investment. In many cases this a large scale investment and therefore areas of discretion and arbitrariness that can lead to the pursuit of personal and / or political benefits are evident. The Grand Corruption, that is, one that occurs at the highest levels of the government, affects the availability, accessibility, acceptability and

1 The Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations. Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Corruption and its impact on the enjoyment of human rights , particularly economic , social and cultural rights. Working document presented by Mrs. Christy Mbonu in accordance with decision 2002/106 of the Subcommittee. May 14th, 2003. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/18. 2 One of the last was the Round Table on the Negative Consequences of Corruption on the Enjoyment of Human Rights organized by the Council of Human Rights in March 2013. 3 Council of Human Rights. Summary Report about the Round Table on the Negative Consequences of Corruption on the Enjoyment of Human Rights. April 18th, 2013. A/HRC/23/26, p. 4. 4 Ibdem, p. 5. 5 ESCR Commitee. General Observation N 3. The nature of the obligations of States parties (Paragraph 1 of article 2 of the Covenant). Fifth Session. E/1991/23


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adaptability of the ESCR6. This, therefore, (i) diverts resources for the progressive realization of ESCR, which may even involve a violation of the prohibition of regression;(ii) affects the principle of maximum use of available resources; and (iii) discourages investment and international aid7. This structural form of corruption is often based on forms of State Capture by any economic or political group. This is precisely the situation that concerns us in the case of the situation of the ESCR in Venezuela, and the challenge we want to raise with the Committee of Human Rights in the evaluation of the Third Report of the Bolivarian State of Venezuela.

15. The space for discussion of the Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) is suitable as a few for this

exercise. The execution of ESCR implies provisions that involve a significant amount of resources for the creation, maintenance and development of services aimed at covering these rights. Therefore it is necessary to develop a series of projects and to sign a great amount of contracts that provide opportunities for corruption. When this occurs, what is at stake is the availability of resources to meet certain minimum that the State is obliged to provide without discrimination of any kind.

16. Moreover, the Committee has expressed its interest in the implementation and results of anti-

corruption policies within the framework of execution of ESCR, including within the information that the State must deliver: Please provide information on the implementation of anti - corruption law and the measures actually taken by the state to fight corruption. Please accompany information about the number of allegations of corruption that have emerged during the past five years, investigations undertaken, and the percentage of such complaints that ended in conviction, as well as the protection given to those who report cases of corruption.8

17. The invitation we extend this CESCR is to have an open broad view of corruption, including not only the

idea of direct monetary benefits, but to adopt an organizational vision with political impact as proposed by Robert Klitgaard, who defines corruption with the following equation: C (corruption) = M (monopoly) + D (discretion) - A (accountability)9. This perspective, rather than defining the characteristics of corrupt behavior, points to organizational factors that influence their emergence, maintenance and justification.10

18. A review of the States Third Report and the States responses to the list of issues prepared by the

Committee was held, to determine if a corrupt practice violates or not a human right of the Covenant based on the obligations of each right, and the possible link between the corrupt behavior and the violation of a human right breach of an obligation paying attention to two types of causal links: (1) corrupt practices that directly violate a human right, and (2) corrupt practices that lead to human rights violations, but that, in themselves, do not violate a right.

6 For an explanation of these four standards and how they could help the fight against corruption, refer to ICHRP. Corruption and Human Rights: Making the Connection, op. cit., p. 55. 7 IACHR. Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay, 2001. Chapter II, G. para. 48. Citations omitted. 8 List of issues concerning the Third Periodic Report of Venezuela, to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 9 KLITGAARD, R. Controlling Corruption. La Paz, Editorial Quipus, 1990 10 Unit Nations Program for Development (UNDP) considers two additional determinants that operate as a counterweight to monopoly and discretion : integrity and transparency. The equation would be: Corruption = (monopoly power + discretion) - (Accountability + transparency + integrity).UNDP. Anti-corruption. Practice Note. UNDP, 2004. p. 2 (online) http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/AC_PN_English.pdf


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19. Since February 10th 2015 in Venezuela we have three official exchange rates, we highlight the gap between each one of these rates and between them and the rate operating in the parallel market. Said exchange rates are valued in 6,30 Bs/$, 12 Bs/$ and 199 Bs/$ and this mechanism must be considered when comparing amounts. All of the amounts expressed in dollars contained in this inform where calculated using the smaller rate in order to hold a conservative position since -according to the government- most of the economic activity operates under that rate, however it is mandatory to explain the entire scheme for this comity to consider

CONTEXT

20. Social Missions started in the year 2003, facing an acute political conflict, as expressed by President Hugo Chvez on November 12, 200411:

You must remember that, as a result of the coup and all that wearing out process, the impossibility of governing that reached high levels, the economic crisis, and our own mistakes, there was a time when we were even o maybe below in the polls. An international polling organization that a friend of mine recommended came to Venezuela in the middle of 2003 and stayed here for 2 months. They came to Miraflores Presidential Palace and gave me the bombshell: Mr.President, if the referendum was held today, you would lose. I remember that for me that news was a bombshell, because you know that many people wont tell you things but the nuance (). So thats when we started working with the Missions. We designed the first one here and then I asked Fidel Castro for help. I told him: Look, I have this idea, to attack underneath with full force, and he answered: Yes I know something about that. You have all my support. And hundreds of doctors started arriving, airlifts, airplanes come, airplanes go to find resources. The economy improved () and an avalanche of people came upon us,() and all of us started to work, () all the team from PDVSA, Frente Francisco de Miranda, we formed a political command, we adjusted it a bit more, and then we began to climb in the polls again, and polls do not fail, () its politics, not magic, and see how we got here.12

21. The missions were held first in the Cuba- Venezuela Cooperation Agreement signed in 200013 and in the

support of community organizations. The Missions later became part of the 10 Strategic Objectives of the National Plan and they were extraordinary and temporary programs of the Presidency to meet social needs. In the year 2014, President Nicols Maduro went further, making the missions the central axis of the "universalization of social rights in the country, through the Organic Law for Missions, Large Missions and Micro-missions, approved by Presidential Decree14

11 Source: Meeting of High Level Government. Presidents Interventions of November 12, 2004. el da 12 de noviembre de 2004. Theatre of the Military Academy of Venezuela . http://www.aporrea.org/audio/2004/12/intervencin_del_presidente__en_la_reunin_de_alto__nivel__viernes_12_nov_04.pdf 12 Source: Meeting of High Level Government. Presidents Interventions of November 12, 2004. el da 12 de noviembre de 2004. Theatre of the Military Academy of Venezuela . http://www.aporrea.org/audio/2004/12/intervencin_del_presidente__en_la_reunin_de_alto__nivel__viernes_12_nov_04.pdf 13 http://www.embajadacuba.com.ve/cuba-venezuela/convenio-colaboracion/ 14 Decreto nmero 1.394 publicado en la Gaceta Oficial de la Repblica Bolivariana de Venezuela de fecha 19 noviembre de 2014


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Since 2004 the Venezuelan State is receiving considerable resources over any historical reference, thanks to the rising price of oil on the international market

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Price of ($/barrel) 28,27 37,01 50,46 60,19 67,47 86,81 56,92 71,97 101,06 103,42 99,87 88,42

22. The problem of corruption in the country worsens as a consequence of the discretionary management of extraordinary funds that come from the difference between estimated and actual prices of oil that even exceeded 50%, generated parafiscal funds with billionaire amounts without control by relevant government agencies, and protected by the reform of the Law of the Central Bank of Venezuela, of July 20th 2005, and later by the Presidential Decree with range, value and force of law establishing the Special Contribution for Extraordinary Prices and Exorbitant Prices in the International Hydrocarbons Market, approved April 15th, 2008.

23. By 2015 there are 25 missions/National Social programs, with allocated resources for its implementation

in the 2015 budget law. Missions

Gran Misin Vivienda Venezuela (Great Housing Mission)

En Amor Mayor (For the underprivileged retired and elderly)

Misin Alimentacin (Feeding) School Feeding Program

Misin Barrio Adentro (Inside the Neighborhood) Misin Ribas (Highschool Education) Misin Sucre (College Education)

Misin Madres del Barrio Josefa Joaquina Snchez (Transform mothers into community leaders)

Misin Negra Hiplita (Attention of the homeless) Student Bus Fare Grant

Misin Samuel Robinson (Education-University) Misin Identidad (provides national identity cards to facilitate access to the social services provided by the

other Missions) Misin Nio Jess (Attention of pregnant women)

Misin Nevado (animal rights) Misin Milagro (Provides surgeries for people with

eye problems)


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Misin Che Guevara* (Now part of Misin Saber y Trabajo) (Promotes education in productive activities) Misin Cultura (Promotion of Venezuelan culture)

Misin Hijos de Venezuela (Attention of families with children under 18 or with disabilities)

Misin Barrio Adentro Deportivo (Promotes sporting activities)

Misin Dr. Jos Gregorio Hernndez (Attention of people with disabilities)

Misin Hbitat (Construction of new housing units) Gran Misin A Toda Vida Venezuela (Fights insecurity

in the country) Misin Piar (Integral Plan of Sustainable Development

for Mining Communities) Misin Nios y Nias del Barrio (Attention of

homeless children) Hogares y Multihogares de Cuidado Diario (Help mothers turn their homes into daycares, thus

promoting their employment)

24. These programs received between 2013 and 2015 through federal budget and budgetary modifications a grand total of Bs 248.935 million distributed like this:

Social programs resources through federal budget and budgetary modifications

(Pdvsa, Fonden and other sources contributions are not contemplated)

2013 2014 2015 Bs. 72.988 Million Bs. 100.933 Million Bs. 75.014 Million

25. On the other hand, PDVSA Annual Informs, report a total of US$ 54.016 million worth in contributions to

these and other programs until 2013, equivalent to Bs. 340.301 million using the smaller of the official exchange rates fixed by the government for the calculation.

26. Poor accountability of the National Executive Branch on the destination, use and effectiveness of these

resources, before public bodies and the Venezuelan population, allows its discretionary use.

27. As evidence, by the date of this report there is no information on how many resources do this parallel funds have, given that the last official information on the National Development Fund (FONDEN), the fund considered the most important, is the 201015 report, and the intervention of the Minister of Energy and Petroleum and President of PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez who announced that up until August 2013, FONDEN had received US$ 115.218 million just in one of the parallel funds.

15 http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.sp/design/readmenuprinc.tpl.html&newsid_temas=107


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28. The development of rights in Venezuela is marked by a context of widespread and deep corruption, fulfilling all the perverse elements of the formula: concentration of power/monopoly + discretion + impunity (accountability + opacity + control systems).

29. In recent years, enormous resources were received and managed with distribution criteria but

unplanned and uncontrolled. The budget and debt law suffers so many variations throughout the year that it doubled the spending in 2014 because of additional credits. But nor the National Treasury Office, the National Budget Office or related Ministries have published reports of expenditures since December 2010.

30. The fight against corruption has been the slogan of the government repeatedly in moments of political tension, but has not resulted in transparency practices in any of the institutions of the national government; on the contrary it has served to increase the power of control of the Executive, like the case of the creation by Presidential Decree of the National Anticorruption Body, dependent of the President, with a secret team and actions. The Reports of the Comptroller General of the Republic point out important deficiencies in several national government levels and sectors, but this are not addressed despite their importance, like the case of the purchase of expired medicines. This scenario is compounded by the long list of allegations of relevant cases, that impacted the public opinion, and that the institutions refused to investigate. No wonder that in Venezuela there is such a high perception of corruption and that the country is in the last ten places of Transparency Internationals Corruptions Perception Index.

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

2.66 2.50 2.77 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

2.3 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9

Source: Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International www.transparency.org.ve ARTICLE 2.1 TAKE STEPS TO THE MAXIMUM RESOURCES AVAILABLE 4. Please provide information on the implementation of the anti - corruption law and the measures actually taken by the state to fight corruption. Please accompany information about the number of allegations of corruption that have emerged during the past five years, investigations undertaken, and the percentage of such complaints that ended in conviction, as well as the protection given to those who report cases of corruption.

31. The Venezuelan state has a pending amendment to the law against corruption that adapts the current law to the Covenant. On November 19th, 2014, by Presidential Decree the Law against Corruption16 was amended with only three new articles, leaving on file in the National Assembly, the draft of a

16 Gazette no. 6.155 November 19th, 2014. http://noticias.seniat.gob.ve/images/gacetas/Gaceta%20N%C2%BA%206155.pdf


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comprehensive reform that was widely consulted by the Comptroller Committee of the National Legislature in 2011.17

32. In November 2014, through another Presidential Decree published in Official Gazette No. 6,156, the

National Anti-Corruption Body is created, that depends on the Presidency of the Republic, supplanting the functions of the Attorney Generals Office and formalizes the secret of their research and management tasks, because even their members are secret. 18

33. Official data about the number of complaints, investigations and convictions are poor and incomplete.

The Attorney Generals Office has not informed in their reports19 of the number of convictions of investigated cases, and the Comptroller presents only and overview of cases received20, without any details of the information:

Attorney Generals Office Allegations of Corruption

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Receipts 2.530 8.907 8.283 7.856 12.319 Allegations 1.210 2.212 2.313 2.163 2.326 Sentence n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d Source: Annual Reports Attorney Generals Office.

34. In Venezuela there are rights that are not guaranteed which basically show a context of opacity and discretion that is having a direct impact on the enjoyment and exercise of these rights. This State Capture, in our context, is characterized by absolute control of the different levels of possible control of acts of authority. A power that is exercised without counterweights in the executive and legislative branches, a judicial power controlled by the political power, the absence of independent and impartial public institutions that can control the authorities and persecution of civil society sectors seeking to exercise this control.

Capture Mechanisms

35. A. Resources Reduction for Formal Control Bodies The National Executive Branch manages up to 80% of the national budget and 100% of the parallel funds of which there is no available information. However, each year fewer resources are allocated in real terms to the control bodies: National Assembly (Legislative Power); Comptroller General of the Republic; Attorney General and Judicial Power.

2014 Budget by institution with additional credits

Executive 933.703 82,0%

Legislative 2.797 0,2% Judicial Power 15.456 1,4%

17http://www.aporrea.org/contraloria/a166240.html 18 http://transparencia.org.ve/la-corrupcion-no-se-acabara-con-un-decreto-arbitrario-que-limitara-aun-mas-la-transparencia/ 19 http://www.ministeriopublico.gob.ve/web/guest/informe-anual 20 http://www.cgr.gob.ve/site_informes_management.php?Cod=026


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Comptroller General

1.063 0,1%

Attorney General

7.019 0,6%

Others 178.035 15,6% Total 1.138.073 100,0%

36. B. The discretionary control over public resources: In Venezuela two processes were generated of high risk of corruption and illegal businesses, of multimillionaire amounts: i. parallel funds ii. Exchange control

37. Parallel Funds Venezuelan oil exports account for 90 % of the income received by the country in foreign currency, according to the Minister of Planning and Finance, Jorge Giordani, in 2010. Of these, Venezuela received in 16 years a total of US $ 814.056 million from oil exports.21. However, the government has been setting a "conservative" price for the barrel of oil to estimate revenues -with which the national public budget is calculated each year- below the expected price in international markets, thus receiving extraordinary income for double the budget for public spending. These resources are managed through several extra budgetary funds, without transparent accountability. Regarding this practice, the Chairman of the Finance Committee of the National Assembly, Ricardo Sanguino, said in 200822 :

We are conservative in budget formulation. If the situation improves because revenues increase and oil prices rise, we have the additional credits. In the event that no additional oil revenues are obtained next year, Venezuela has billionaire funds to face any contingency arising from the international financial crisis.

38. This table shows the difference between the estimated price in budget laws and the actual price at

which the Venezuelan barrel is sold in the international oil market. It is the income generated by this differential that feeds the parafiscal funds.

21 Central Bank of Venezuela www.bcv.gob.ve 22 http://www.eluniversal.com/2008/10/16/imp_eco_art_presupuesto-2009-con_1096014


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39. From these "exorbitant" resources, an amount of parallel funds were established that received from 2004 to 2014, US $ 178,200 million, according to Ecoanaltica, an economic consulting firm.23

40. The implementation of parallel funds as a mechanism of State Capture is evident in the case of the

health sector where the executed budget exceeds the allocated budget from 87% in 2010 and 187% in 2014. All these resources are managed discretionally, favoring projects under a criterion that only the National Executive knows.

Allocated and Executed Budget 2010-2013 of the Ministry of Health / Millions of Bs.

Years Allocated

Budget (1)

Executed

Budget (2) Variation %

2010 9.332 17.478 87

2011 15.459 30.313 96

2012 19.452 28.457 46

2013 24.581 50.901 104

2014 30.042 86.169(4) 187

Source: (1) Budget Laws24; (2) National Budget Office. (3) Estimated to December 2014.

41. This practice, applied in particular to the health sector, may violate the constitutional right to health whenever hiring criteria for hospital construction and purchase of supplies are granted based on political clientelism.

42. Exchange Control The exchange control implemented by the Venezuelan government since 2003, apart

from other problems that come from the lack of economic freedom, has created a cumbersome bureaucracy that allocates resources in foreign currency at preferential rates with high discretion, with three official exchange rates: 6.3; 12 and 199 bolivars per dollar, and a dollar at a free rate that in May 2015 is in 277Bs/$. An outstanding case is the disappearance of US $20,000 million that were assigned to shell companies, over which no one is still responsible. The president of the Standing Committee on Finance of the National Assembly Ricardo Sanguino, of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) said about this case: () a scam was made to the country using imports to obtain preferential currency. We estimate that there were 20 billion dollars. This created an imbalance because more money came out than what we were entering, and this generated situations somewhat, not of imbalance but of no

23 www.ecoanalitica.com 24 2013 Budget Law 2013. [on line]


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strength in our reserves. In addition to such irregularities, the exchange control has negatively impacted the quality of life of Venezuelans, reflected in the deterioration of real wages and levels of poverty.

43. ESCR execution requires the purchase of goods and services, but to supply them providers require

access to foreign currency both to produce them locally -to import supplies- as for imports. In recent years the allocation of foreign exchange has become more irregular and restricted, causing shortages in basic supplies for the fulfillment of rights.

44. C. Laws limiting free access to public information The Venezuelan State has approved a long list of

opaque rules. Opacity assigns privileges to individuals or groups with access to public information and with the power to keep it private. For the exercise of ESCR it is essential to have unrestricted access to the data on design, creation, responsibilities, resources, implementation, results, indicators, and other information on the programs to ensure the availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability of the ESCR. In a report prepared by Transparency Venezuela, It is Legal but Unfair25 60 rules were found that violate or limit the rights of access to public information of a total of 475 laws, decrees and agreements, since the adoption of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela until October 2014. Venezuela does not have a law on access to information which constitutes a major loophole, limiting the possibility of learning about the implementation of the ESCR.

45. D. Contracting without controls Missions and social programs require, for their execution, public

procurement and acquisition of goods and services. Tenders or open contracts are processes that reduce the possibility of abuse and corruption in the allocation of contracts or purchase of goods and services, for effective management, seeking to fully utilize the resources in social programs effectively. However, the 2008 Procurement Law26 and subsequent reforms of 2009, 2010 and 2014 eliminated tenders for many of the social programs while approving new exceptions, empowering the President of the Republic to change conditions in the selection of contractors in a wide range, and a major exclusion:

Article 4: Exclusions. Excluded from the application of this Decree with Rank, Value and Force of Law, are contracts for the execution of works, acquisitions of goods and provision of services, which are under the compliance with international agreements of cooperation between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and other States, including contracting with joint ventures within the framework of these agreements. 27

46. This law allows direct contracting in the context of social programs, and is therefore a great opportunity for corruption because it allows the recruitment of companies that are willing to pay bribes or be extorted, hire relatives, friends, co-parties, political or economic allies, ignoring the necessary efficiency of the resources directed to the fulfillment of ESCR and the possibility of loss of resources purchasing poor quality products, premiums, breach of quality and deadlines. This results in failure to meet targets, generates expectations among the population and generated obligations under the Covenant. Examples: expired medicines, unfinished hospitals for years, unfinished or poorly finished housing, etc.

25 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Es-Legal-Pero-Injusto-04.11.14.pdf 26 http://www.bcv.org.ve/c1/pdf/leycontrata08.pdf 27 idem


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47. The National Executive controls the allocation of contracts with high discretion, guaranteed by the law, and thereby directs who benefits and who is excluded.

48. E. Capture of the Justice: The Supreme Court has taken decisions contrary to the principle of

transparency, the right of access to public information, accountability, and ESCR, among which we mention:

49. The Constitutional Court declared inadmissible an action of Protection of Collective and Diffuse Interests to publish names of companies related with acts of corruption produced through National Commission of Foreign Exchange Administration (CADIVI) by which, in the words of the President of the Commission of Finance and Economic Development of the Venezuelan Parliament, Deputy Ricardo Sanguino28 () a scam was made to the country using imports to obtain preferential currency. We estimate that there were 20 billion dollars. This created an imbalance because it came out more than we were entering, and this generated situations somewhat, not of imbalance but of no strength in our reserves.29

50. ii. The Constitutional Court limits the right of access to public information, through which it established as a binding criterion that in absence of an explicit law and to safeguard the limits of the exercise of the fundamental right to information is necessary: i) that the applicant of the information expressly states the reasons or purposes (which violates the principle that prohibits the demonstration of legitimate interest,) ii) that the extent of the information requested is proportional to the use and the intended use of the requested information (which violates the principle of not justifying the request for information.)

51. iii. The Administrative Chamber

agreed by sentence N01264 of October 22, 200830, the legal authority granted by way of delegation of the Plenary to the Judicial Committee of the Supreme Court to appoint and remove the provisional judges discretionally even when there is no constitutional or legal basis for it. Moreover this sentence produces a flagrant affectation of the judicial independence because it legitimates the possibility of separating from office those officials by "simple removal" without the necessary procedures and without giving them the right to defense.

52. From an analysis made to the sentences of the Supreme Court in the period 2005-2013 it is evident that

only 7% of total claims on public authorities control were upheld. The Statist vision of the Judiciary

28 http://www.panorama.com.ve/politicayeconomia/Sanguino-Mediante--Cadivi-estafaron-al-pais-con-20-mil-millones-de-dolares-20140916-0083.html 29 http://historico.tsj.gob.ve/decisiones/scon/julio/166911-860-17714-2014-13-1165.HTML 30 http://historico.tsj.gob.ve/decisiones/spa/noviembre/01140-111110-2010-2008-0520.HTML


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leaves defenseless citizens, and highlights the capture by the "Power" as opposed to the rights of citizens.

53. F. Threats Against Civil Society Organizations Venezuelan state has criminalized the work of human rights defenders and their representatives. In 2014 and 2015 mentions, insults, threats, defamation to civil society by senior officials, most of them through state media have increased, among others by Diosdado Cabello, President of the Venezuelan Parliament, Vice President of the ruling party (PSUV), Army Captain31 and host of Con el Mazo Dando (Striking with a sledgehammer) "broadcasted in the state channel Venezolana de Television32

54. In this space, Deputy Cabello has used the resources of the Venezuelan State to delegitimize, among

others, the work of defenders Humberto Prado of the Venezuelan Prison Observatory, Marino Alvarado and Rafael Uzctegui of the Venezuelan Program of Education-Action in Human Rights (Provea), Carlos Correa of the NGO Espacio Pblico (Public Space), Marco Ponce of the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict, Roco San Miguel of the NGO Control Ciudadano (Citizens' Oversight), Carlos Nieto from Una Ventana para la Libertad (A Window for Freedom) and Mercedes De Freitas from Transparency Venezuela. ANNEX !.

G. The National Ejecutive had been the bigger legislator.

Source: Es Legal pero injusto. www.transparencia.org.ve

31 http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/131227/maduro-ascendio-a-diosdado-cabello-a-capitan-del-ejercito 32 http://www.vtv.gob.ve/

Enabling Legislation approved by the National Congress Decrees Laws of Opacity


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55. 2. Lack of Planning in the Public Budget on Social Issues and a Lack of Information on their Implementation In the past five years, resource allocation for social programs does not respond to a real planning that consider studies, analysis of needs and accomplishment of goals that, as a State, want to be achieved.

1st Law: 6 months. since april 26 of 1999 to october 25 of 1999 56 1 2nd Law: 12 months. Since november 13 of 2000 to november 12 of 2001

51 0

3rd Law: 18 months. Since february 1st of 2007 to july 31st of 2008 69 4 4th Law: 18 months. Since december 17 of 2010 to june 16 of 2012 71 4 5th Law: 12 months. Since november 19 of 2013 to november 18 of 2014 4 2 TOTAL 251 11


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Examples of lack of planning can be seen in the allocation of similar amounts every year for various programs. It is important to remember that the 2014 inflation has an official estimate of 68.5 % Programs 2014 2015 Implementation of strategies for the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, asthma , chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and strengthening blood bank services

Bs. 599 million Bs. 599 million

Comprehensive care for people with disabilities.

Bs. 11 million Bs. 11 million

School Feeding Program. Bs. 5.094 million Bs. 5.584 million Source: 2014 and 2015 Budget Law. 56. The lack of planning is also evident in the continued approval of additional funds during the year as a

regular practice, which in some cases multiplies the amount that was approved in the budget law. This is the case of:

Mission 2014 Budget Law 2014 with additional credits Misin Alimentacin (Feeding) Bs. 1.417 million Bs. 27.602 million Misin Barrio Adentro (Inside the Neighborhood)

Bs. 3.907 million Bs. 5.588 million

Source: 2014 Budget Law + Official Gazette

57. We warn about the level of impact of falling oil prices on public spending in Venezuela (up to 50% now covered with extraordinary credits of parallel funds) leaving Venezuelans in severe financial distress and a situation of catastrophic proportions in social matters.

58. Information on public performance is a regular policy, especially since December 2010, when the publication of regular reports from the National Treasury Office ceased and there was no more information about expenditure execution.

59. The Central Bank of Venezuela has not presented any reports to the National Assembly, and has not

submitted statistics on the performance of the economy for more than two years.

ARTICLE 2. 2. NON-DISCRIMINATION In light of the information provided by the State (E / C.12 / VEN / 3, paragraph 276), please indicate whether a comprehensive law prohibiting all forms of discrimination exists. Also provide information on the role and functions of the institutions and levels of the government established to protect the rights enshrined in the Covenant and how they are coordinating among themselves. Please provide more information on concrete measures taken to combat discrimination against indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, refugees, persons with HIV/AIDS in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.


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60. One of the most obvious elements in these cases of systemic corruption is the lack of a serious public policy for the research of obvious and critical corruption cases.33 Impunity is essential as part of the policy of opacity, allowing corruption and impacting the enjoyment and exercise of rights for political reasons. In the case of Venezuela, it is in this scenario that frequently occur situations of discrimination for political reasons, which are expressly prohibited by the Covenant (Article 2, Paragraph 2.)

61. As reference, we mention the Transparency Venezuela report, " Mission Impunity,"34 which aims to

expose possible corrupt individuals and demand justice in the country, through the dissemination of research cases of corruption that shocked the Venezuelan community:

62. i. Corruption Without Remedies35, 400.000 kilos of medicines expired between 2.010 y 2.014 and were not distributed to hospitals around the country; ii) El Guiso del PAE (The School Feeding Program Fraude)36 a report from de Comptroller General revealed in 2013 that the School Feedind Program (PAE) managed by the Ministry of Education, operated without the minimum fiscal controls; iii) Judiciary Corruption: Impunity lives in Lebrun City37, impunity walks around a land acquired by Supreme Court of Justice at a cost of over 78 million Venezuelan Bolivars38, located in one of the capitals neighborhoods near Petare; iv) What Happened with CADIVI?39 President Nicolas Maduro said that he would establish a presidential commission to investigate how the system of exchange control has been violated in Venezuela since 2003. This means that the highest level of the State recognizes that corruption nested $ 25 billion, estimated by the former Minister of Planning, in deliveries of preferential currency; v) De PDVAL a Pudreval40 From 2007 and 2008 there have been irregularities in the purchase of food by the State, specifically since Petrleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) took the reins of the so called "food sovereignty." In 2010 alone, 170 thousand tons of rotten or expired food showed up, from which there is no investigation.

63. We emphasize the refusal to investigate allegations sua sponte of the Public Officials responsible for preventing, investigating and punishing actions against public ethics and administrative morals. Specifically, the General Public Prosecutor Luisa Ortega Diaz (2007- ) on several occasions reiterated her refusal to investigate acts of corruption denounced publicly:

64. Case: President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court Judge Eladio Aponte Aponte: He offered

detailed statements of government ties with drug traffickers and operations held in Venezuela, led by then Defense Minister Henry Rangel Silva, General Cliver Alcal Chief of Army of the Fourth Armored Division and Diosdado Cabello, current President of the National Assembly41. In this regard, Prosecutor Ortega said: The statements given by Eladio Aponte Aponte to a media outlet, we assume that outside

33 C. Nash, et. Al. Corruption and Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights . Human Rights Centre University of Chile 2014. Chap. 2. 34 http://transparencia.org.ve/impunidad/ 35 transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Medicamentos-Lissette-Cardona.pdf 36 transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/PAE-Jes%C3%BAs-Yajure.pdf 37 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Ciudad-Lebr%C3%BAn-JF-Alonso.pdf 38 Alrededor de 12 millones de dlares a una tasa de 6,30 bolvares por dlar 39 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Cadivi-David-Gonzalez.pdf 40 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/PDVAL-Fernando-Tineo.pdf 41 http://www.lanacion.com.ve/internacional/acusa-de-narcotrafico-a-funcionarios-venezolanos-el-exmagistrado-del-tsj-eladio-aponte-en-la-dea/


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the country, are not sufficient to initiate an investigation in Venezuela. Complaints in Venezuela should be formulated according to the procedure established in the Code of Criminal Procedure. This person, Aponte, in any case has to come to the country to formulate his complaints. 42

65. Case: Former Planning Minister Jorge Giordani: Through a letter to the nation broadcasted by several

media outlets43 he expressed the deviation in the management of the national oil company (PDVSA) and the Central Bank of Venezuela, as well as the excessive spending and existing disorder within the current government; in view of this the Prosecutor said: "There is no formal investigation about this case ... because a complaint should not be made through a letter or through the press, but to the authorities responsible for receiving complaints.44

66. Case: Lieutenant Colonel Leamsy Salazar: He denounced Diosdado Cabello to the DEA in Washington, for

drug trafficking. The Prosecutor expressed the following: I do not start investigations by what appears in the media or social media. That would be a legal uncertainty for the whole country. Complaints cannot be anonymous because then anyone can denounce anything.45

67. Similarly, we must reiterate the discrimination in respect of employment for political motivations that

have taken place in Venezuela, according to the Human Rights Center of the Andrs Bello Catholic University46 (UCAB)47. We note that in 2014 the Minister of Housing and Habitat Ricardo Molina, threatened48 to fire the officials assigned to the institution To all the staff members that work for our institutions but whose political views are different from ours, zero tolerance, I do not accept anyone coming here to speak ill of the revolution, no one comes here to speak ill of Commander Chavez. I do not accept fascist party militants. If anyone wants to be militant of the Poder Popular party (Popular Will) () you have to resign, and if you dont, I will fire you myself. And he added: I dont care at all, and I say this with absolute clarity, I dont care at all what the labor regulations say. Later the minister said that his remarks had been taken out of context and that it was a "warm call" to workers.49

68. Currently, another case of discrimination in respect of employment for political motivations is the

mandatory collection 50 of signatures demanding the repeal of the decree that punished seven government officials assigned to public bodies of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Allegations involve senior officials from different institutions obliged to sign "without exceptions. This obligation was sent to officials by written communication as was used by the Tascon or Maisanta51 lists.

69. In addition to impunity, in the case of the Missions, the lack of clear and known criteria for the selection of beneficiaries to be admitted or not to the programs, create opportunities for the people that have the power to include them in those programs to demand payment, compensation, commissions or political allegiance .

42 http://eltiempo.com.ve/venezuela/investigacion/ministerio-publico-descarta-investigar-denuncias-de-aponte/51100 43 http://www.panorama.com.ve/contenidos/2014/06/18/noticia_0087.html 44 http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/140627/FiscalaFiscala-no-investiga-las-denuncias-hechas-por-giordani-en-su-carta 45 http://www.el-nacional.com/politica/investigaran-Cabello-denuncias-medios_0_565143704.html 46 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/430/92/PDF/G1343092.pdf?OpenElement 47 http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/VEN/INT_CCPR_ICO_VEN_17846_S.pdf 48 http://www.elmundo.com.ve/multimedia/videos/ministro-molina-amenaza-con-despedir-a-empleados-o.aspx 49 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uo16ABM_-Mo 50 transparencia.org.ve/transparencia-venezuela-alerta-de-la-grave-situacion-de-presion-sobre-funcionarios-publicos/ 51 http://www.laverdad.com/politica/72513-despiden-a-dos-trabajadores-de-corpozulia-por-negarse-a-firmar.html


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ARTICLES 10 AND 11 Mission Children of Venezuela and School Feeding Program 13. Please provide information of the available social support services for families, in particular for the families of disadvantaged and marginalized groups and if support services are provided for childcare.

70. This is a particularly important paragraph because it is related to the situation of children in Venezuela, the special duty that the state has to protect their rights and the strict control that the supervisory bodies must perform on the effectiveness of the measures.

71. At this point we want to draw the attention of the Committee on the Mission Children of Venezuela.

This policy similar to conditional economic transfer programsconsists in the allocation of financial aid to families in extreme poverty, with a household income below the minimum wage (currently 5,622.48 bolivars) with children under 18, family members with disabilities or pregnant women. According to recent studies, this program hasnt had positive results because poverty has increased in Venezuela from 2007 to 2014 by 20,4%.

72. Our concern, from the transparency of the program point of view, is that the involved organizations do

not publish reports with data about the Mission, its achievements and impact making it impossible for its social control52 and to avoid a discriminatory application of it53.

73. In relation to the School Feeding Program (PAE)54 aimed at supplying a daily varied, balanced and

quality nutrition to the students by delivering a menu adapted to the nutritional requirements,55 it is insufficient to meet the necessary minimum to guarantee the right enshrined in art. 10.3 of the ICESCR. According to PAEs budget, they would currently be investing 6.35 Venezuelan bolivars per day per child served to provide a balanced diet, but according to the Centre for Documentation and Social Analysis of the Venezuelan Federation of Teachers the average cost of a workers lunch in 2015 remains around 371.01 Venezuelan bolivars, figure that exceeds more than 58 times what is spent on each child under the School Feeding Program.

74. If any Mission is essential, it is the one that guarantees a minimum of daily nutrition to the children of

the country. The program has been showing serious weaknesses for the past six years, and the measures taken, such as the creation of the National Corporation for School Feeding56 deepen the dependence and discretionary control concentration information and decisions with greater opacity. The problem in Venezuela is not only the lack of budget for the PAE but also the lack of priority and redirection of the spending to the PAE. This is not only an insufficient measure, which does not allow minimum satisfaction of requirements for "possible protection and assistance to the family (art. 10.1 of the Covenant) and an

52It is particularly serious that there is no database of beneficiaries to provide the criteria for managing the system output of beneficiaries who exceed the extremely poor situation or extremely poor families whose children come of age, or beneficiaries who for some reason no longer require the support of the mission. . http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/InformeHijos2.pdf 53 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Misiones-Transparentes-N%C2%B011-Gran-Misi%C3%B3n-Hijas-e-Hijos-de-Venezuela1.pdf 54 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/pae.png 55 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Misiones-Transparentes-No.-7-Programa-de-Alimentaci%C3%B3n-Escolar.pdf 56 http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/noticias/ciudad/parroquias/oficializan-creacion-de-la-corporacion-nacional-de.aspx


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adequate standard of living (art. 11.1 of the Covenant), but also it is a policy for which has not been given enough information to enable effective control, which is giving basis for a discriminatory application.

ARTICLE 11 RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING 16. Please provide updated disaggregated statistical data, by age, sex, ethnic or national origin, rural and urban areas, on the situation of poverty in the State party. Also, please provide information regarding the results of the implementation of measures to fight against poverty, and particularly of the 2007-2013 Socio-Economic Development Plan, if theres a method for assessing such measures, and how the State party intends to ensure its long-term sustainability.

75. The following chart has official information from the National Institute for Statistics with the number of poor people and extremely poor people from 1998 to 2013. In 2014 the public information is the study carried out by three of the most prestigious universities of the country (Andrs Bello Catholic University -UCAB, Simn Bolvar University- USB, Central University of Venezuela-UCV)

Poor households in 2014, 48

Source: Up to 2013, National Institute for Statistics

2014: Data extracted from the study Living Conditions in Venezuela Survey 2014: UCV, USB y UCAB.57

17. Please provide further information about the implementation of the Great Housing Mission Venezuela, and how has it helped to reduce the persistent housing deficit. Also, please provide information about the adopted measures regarding social housing, its accessibility to disadvantage and marginalized families, particularly in rural and deprived urban areas. Additionally, report on measures taken in relation to forced evictions of people living in informal settlements.

57 Available: http://www.rectorado.usb.ve/vida/sites/default/files/pobreza.pdf

Poverty 1998 2003 2007 2010 2013 2014*

% Poor people 46 55 28 27 28 48,4

% Extremely poor people

27 30 20 20 18 23,6

% Non-extreme poor people

19 25 8 7 10 24,8


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76. HOUSING MISSION Between 1999 and 2010, the Ministry of Peoples Power for Public Works and

Housing was changed ten (10) times. In 2011, the State created the Great Housing Mission which aims to solve the housing problem in the country with the construction of 3 million homes nationwide in eight years, which in principle would be awarded, in some cases donated to low-income families, and others depending on the socioeconomic status of the family, would pay them in a long term, with low interest and a comfortable installment plan.58

77. 1. Little information and a lot of Propaganda. As expressed in art. 11, paragraph 1 of the Covenant "adequate housing" is a right enshrined as well as "continuous improvement of living conditions." Regarding the policy of the Housing Mission, we find a recurring problem in all missions, which is the lack of clear and specific information and a lot of propaganda that show numbers that avoid details and generate a misconception of the results of the program. The three most obvious are:

78. Lack of clarity between built and delivered households: Propaganda states that in four years 700,000 homes were delivered. Without data that allow a formal verification, investigations from national universities, the Construction Chamber, the Real Estate Chamber, Caracas Metropolitan Mayors Office and Transparency Venezuela claim that about 40% werent new housing construction but home repairs, replacement of very low quality houses for better ones, and delivery of construction materials.

79. Lack of clarity regarding ownership: The delivery of housing is not protected by the right to property,

and the award is made for its enjoyment, but not for its disposal. There is no property registration for the award. The delivery of the house is made through a provisional certificate, acknowledging the recipient the exclusive and free use and enjoyment of the housing, being its disposal conditioned (with no set date) to the further formalization of the ownership document by National Bank of Housing and Habitat(BANAVIH)59, which it is the organization responsible for notarization and collection of homes built as part of the Great Housing Mission Venezuela, defining the price and designing a financing scheme applicable to each family.60

80. The award is a gift from the countrys President:61 From this vision is structured the dissemination of

the program that reaches the walls of all the buildings where President Chavezs signature is painted. This propaganda undermines the quality of Housing Mission as a social state program that seeks to overcome structural weaknesses to overcome situations of vulnerability. By contrast, political control and dependence mechanisms of the ruling party are designed in order to receive and maintain housing, limiting property rights of citizens on housing and generating an uncertain situation for beneficiaries, that in no way guarantees the right to property. In this regard, Transparency Venezuela filed a formal complaint with the Comptroller General of the Republic entrenched in the Law against Corruption that

58 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Misiones-Transparentes-GMVV.pdf 59 http://www.banavih.gob.ve/index.php/protocolizacion 60 Resolution No. 033 of the Ministry of Popular Power for Housing and Habitat published in Official Gazette 39865 of 15 February 2012. Documents from which there is no information or statistics. 61 On behalf of President Chavez | Carlos Mata Figueroa delivers a house to the follower 3 million of @chavezcandanga.http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/regiones/carlos-mata-figueroa-entrega-vivienda-a-seguidora-3-millones-chavezcandanga/print/ http://nortedigital.mx/le-pega-con-un-mango-a-maduro-y-le-regalan-una-casa/


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in its Article 13 states the prohibition to "allocate the use of public assets or resources that integrate the public patrimony to favor parties or political projects( ... ).62

81. 2. Risks of Corruption in Contracting: As the largest percentage of construction projects were allocated

through international agreements to companies from China, Russia, Belarus, Spain , Brazil, Iran , Turkey and Portugal, no tenders were made, and contracts are classified as privileged protected by contractual confidentiality clauses, process that was legalized by the Procurement Law enacted in 2008 with subsequent amendments in 2009, 2010 and 2014 that have allowed greater exclusions to the mechanisms of selection of contractors and contracting processes of the State.63

82. 3. Risks of Corruption in Execution of Public Resources to Ensure Rights: It is impossible to monitor the

management of the resources allocated to this Mission; being that many entities are involved without a clear central leadership and they are not accountable for the resources allocated to the Mission. In addition, the way the program is organized implies that for every 100 Venezuelan bolivars assigned to missions, 53 Venezuelan bolivars64 are destined to build houses, which are divided between Ministry of Housing and Habitat, Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, Ministry of the Revolutionary Transformation of the Great Caracas, Vice-presidency of the Republic, Ministry of Basic Industry and Mines, Ministry of the Environment and Ministry of Defense, all entities whose function is not subject of housing construction. Besides these, in the 2015 Budget many other public bodies have resources to build housing, such as Caracas Metro, Corporacin Venezolana de Guayana, (CVG), Ministry for Communes, and Ministry for Indigenous Peoples, which makes it impossible to keep track of the money.

83. The amounts destined to the Great Housing Mission have been extraordinary, but unable to verify

whether they were all used and in what were they used because of the lack of information.

84. The following chart shows the resources for housing construction from the National Budget, additional credits, and Simn Bolvar Fund for the National Reconstruction.

Source: Budget Law, Official Gazettes, PDVSA management reports

62 http://transparencia.org.ve/transparencia-venezuela-denuncio-proselitismo-politico-en-espacios-publicos/ 63 Public Procurement Act . Official Gazette No. 38,895 of March 25, 2008 http://www.bcv.org.ve/c1/pdf/leycontrata08.pdf 64 How the Missions money is spent in Venezuela ? Newsletters. Transparency Venezuela. http://us5.campaign-archive1.com/?u=0d9cbe65d39349c8679081442&id=4ed6155bbe


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85. The information of years 2014 and 2015 of the contribution made by PDVSA to Simon Bolivar Fund for National Reconstruction is not available because so far the state oil company has not presented its 2014 Management Report,

86. Every policy of social benefits must be effective and efficient. This is why the lack of study and planning

is also another problem that generates excessive and unnecessary costs in this Housing Mission. No studies are carried out about electricity, water, gas, telephone, transport in areas where urban planning is done or one or more buildings are constructed for hundreds and perhaps more than a thousand families. For example, in a big development for 1,300 families located in Miranda State, the construction of a school is not planned.65 In other cases, complaints have been made about the deterioration of these buildings, cracks in their structures, failure in electrical and potable water services, among others. An emblematic case is the construction of the urban complex Nueva Caracas (New Caracas), located in Caracas, which was awarded to 48 families in September 2013, but only one month later the structure that was built with Spanish technology, started to crack and leak. [1]

87. Also, 20 families living in El Morro neighborhood located in Miranda State reported in March 2013, that

eight months after occupying the houses, they began to crack and sink.66 Annex 2

88. According to official figures announced by the national government in its several news websites, 700,000 homes have been delivered by April 2015, which means the construction of 26,584 homes from January to April 2015, having the goal of 400,000 for this year.

Source: 2015 Annual Speech to the Nation by the President of the Republic.

65 The institutional map of the Great Housing Mission Venezuela: or of the lack of transparency and its consequences. Electronic Newsletters. Transparency Venezuela. http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Misiones-Transparentes-GMVV.pdf#page=16 66 http://www.eluniversal.com/caracas/121013/se-agrieta-el-sueno-de-la-vivienda-digna-en-edificio-de-catia http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/noticias/ciudad/parroquias/video-y-fotos-se-agrieta-edificio-de-gmmv-en-petar.aspx


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89. Regarding the monitoring possibilities, the Government has never presented a list of the houses built

with their precise location so it can be verified if the information disseminated through media outlets is real.67 Neither the Comptroller General of the Republic in its management reports of the last five years refers to having those lists, despite being legally required to verify the accounting information of public power apparatus of the State. There is not even a single list of beneficiaries, at least publicly known that has been disclosed by the different bodies and agencies involved in the housing construction.

90. The lack of transparency generates risks of corruption in the social programs which should ensure the

ESCR. One case is the lack of known selection criteria and award process to beneficiaries. In the Housing Mission case, the award does not respond to known, clear and balanced criteria. With a census of potential beneficiaries of 3,700,000 families and a delivery of 700,000 according to official data until April 2015, the selection is highly complex and requires complete transparency to avoid privileges and abuses, and thus ensure that the beneficiaries are the families most in need.

91. As this Committee can appreciate, this is a public policy that does not meet with certain minimums in

order to satisfy the rights enshrined in art.11 of the Covenant, this is, a broad vision of the right to housing and its environment.68Public policy suffers from an obvious lack of research and planning. No supervision and accountability is possible because no results have been presented by the authorities.

18. Please provide information about the measures taken to ensure the access to an amount of water that is sufficient and safe for personal and domestic use. Please also provide information about the system used to control the quality of the water. PUBLIC SERVICES AND THE RIGHT TO WATER

92. Today it is not possible to speak of minimum health conditions without access to water.69 Hence, it is important to question the effectiveness of public service programs related to water access. Although according to official figures the State has been able to meet the Millenium Development Goals on access to drinking water,70 the reality is that the service is provided under poor conditions of quantity, quality and continuity throughout the national territory. Water management in the country is handled with secrecy, refusing access to information to citizens. Wastewater treatment plants in the country are in advanced state of deterioration, increasing pollution of water bodies, as recognized by the Comptroller General of the Republic in its special report of 2010.71

67 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Misiones-Transparentes-N%C2%BA10-Gran-Misi%C3%B3n-Vivienda-Venezuela.pdf 68 DESC Committee. General Comment No. 4. The right to adequate housing (paragraph 1 of article 11 of the Covenant) . 1991 Sixth session . E/1992/23 69 Water is a limited natural resource and a public good essential for life and health. The human right to water is indispensable for a living and is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights. " ESCR Committee . General Comment 15. The right to water (articles 11 and 12) , E / C.12 / 2002/ 11, paragraph 1 70 http://transparencia.org.ve/proacceso-exige-transparencia-en-la-gestion-publica-del-agua-en-venezuela/ 71 file:///C:/Users/Transparencia1/Contacts/Downloads/INFORME_CUENCAS.pdf 78


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93. If the Covenant guarantees every person the right () of an adequate standard of living for them and their families () and a continuous improvement of living conditions, one cannot help but notice that the policy of access to water in Venezuela is not allowing to fulfill the normative mandate of art.11 paragraph 1 of the Covenant. Without access to water in terms of quality, quantity and continuity, there is no possible adequate level of living.

94. Although official figures show more than 85 % coverage in the treatment of wastewater72 in urban

populations, the reality is that the vast majority of the wastewater plants in the country are in an advanced state of deterioration and therefore do not perform verification processes with due efficiency, thus increasing pollution of the water bodies that they are supposed to protect, as was recognized by the Comptroller General of the Republic in its 201073 special report and evidenced in the microbiological testing of tap water, dated September 26, 2011, by the Centre for Applied Microbiological Research at the University of Carabobo.74

95. Legal actions before the Supreme Court and municipal courts75 that have been undertaken by the free

access to public information on the quality of drinking water and sanitation, have been dismissed by the judiciary, violating the human right of citizens to know, to have a healthy environment and the right to health.

96. Several environment organizations of the civil society, like Movement for Quality of Water Foundation,

have submitted for the past 5 years, scientific and technological evidence that show how the population of the Aragua, Carabobo and Cojedes states have been receiving water that does not meet the existing Health Standards of Drinking Water Quality, proving that the supply has high levels of concentration of chemicals (including aluminum) well above the current standard, and the presence of bacteria and parasites in the water supplied for public consumption. Several medical and professional toxicology organizations have warned of the medium and long term effects of water intake in these conditions, on the health of the population served.

97. Moreover, without access to comprehensive, unified, accessible and clear information on public policies

of public services, it is not possible to control them. Thus, an area of opacity opens that allows forms of discretion and political use of public resources by allocating them discretionally.

19. Please provide information of the results of the implementation of the Food Safety Plan. Provide further information about the situation of alleged shortages and in some cases scarcity of food and basic goods that have occurred in the State party, as well as about the measures taken to fight the shortage and those to prevent a similar situation from happening again.

72 Correo del Orinoco http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/salud-publica/venezuela-supero-metas-milenio-relacion-acceso-agua-potable/ 73 Special report: Environmental problems and ecological relationships deterioration in the most important river basin in each federal entity " Source: http://www.cgr.gob.ve/site_informes_special.php?Cod=028 74 Diario El Carabobeo: http://el-carabobeno.com/impreso/articulo/11837/estudio-determin-en-2011-presencia-de-cianobacterias-en-el-agua-de-valencia 75 Supreme Court of Justice Fuente: http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/mayo/433-6513-2013-12-0340.html y http://carabobo.tsj.gov.ve/DECISIONES/2013/OCTUBRE/727-21-8507-8507.HTML


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98. Despite the several measures taken by the Venezuelan state such as wage increases, creation of a food bonus, creation of state-owned food companies network, laws that regulate prices and profits and a greater control over the granting of foreign currency for food import, shortages have increased 56%.76

99. The fractional increase in the minimum wage by the National Executive reached 72% for the period

2014-2015 However the Center for Documentation and Social Analysis of the Venezuelan Federation of Teachers (CENDAS) in its February 201577 report, refers to a 122.1 % increase in food prices, for the same period, which means that 3.5 minimum wages are required to acquire the food basket .

100. The existing shortages of several products has led to take measures to enable citizens to acquire those items like the allocation of days for shopping according to the numbers of the personal identity card, the amount of products they can buy and through fingerprint readers78.

101. The Central Bank of Venezuela79 hasnt published the scarcity index since March 2014, time when food shortages were increased.

102. Work tables implemented by the Venezuelan state with the food production sectors of the country in

201480, did not produce solutions to the lack of food in the country. Thus, from scarcity we have gone to shortages.

ARTICLE 12 RIGHT TO PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH 21. Please provide information regarding the availability and accessibility of the health services in the State party and the results of the implementation of the Misin Barrio Adentro (Inside the Neighborhood Mission). Please inform about the adopted measures taken by the State to ensure that hospital infrastructure is adequate, that health centers have the provision of medical supplies and enough and adequate medicines, including the supply of retroviral medication. MISSION BARRIO ADENTRO AND HEALTH SYSTEM.

103. In this policy we find once again the constant change of Ministers. Since 2003, 12 Health Ministers have directed de Mission Barrio Adentro, three military members among them. In fact, while Colonel Jess Mara Mantilla directed the Mission, there was the "silence of epidemiological information which consisted of not informing citizens about public health in the country81. Again in November 2014 the publication of the Bulletin was suspended, adding more 5 months without epidemiological information to date of submission of this report to the Committee. We emphasize that the periods of "silence" coincided with outbreaks of dengue, Chikungunya, malaria, in such quantities that it was evident that epidemic alarm was required, and some local governments did take steps in view of outbreaks to fumigate the cities.

76 www.datanalisis.com 77 http://informe21.com/cendas/canasta-basica-familiar-de-marzo-subio-a-bs-3512445 78 http://www.el-nacional.com/economia/Unidad-Vision-Venezuela-desabastecimiento-alarmante_0_553144759.html 79 http://www.el-nacional.com/economia/Gobierno-publica-meses-cifras-inflacion_0_538146359.html 80 http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/150414/sectores-de-alimentos-exigen-medidas-para-evitar-mas-escasez 81 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Misiones-Transparentes-N%C2%BA13-Misi%C3%B3n-Barrio-Adentro_.pdf


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104. Since May 1rst 2015, six months have passed since the State last issued epidemiologic information. The Weekly Epidemiological Bulletin has not been published in the Ministry of Popular Power for Health website since November 1rst, 2014. In March of this year, Doctors for Health, a network of resident doctors working in public hospitals around the country, reported the results of a survey conducted in 130 public hospitals in 19 states, which showed that 44% of operating rooms were not operational, and that 94% of the laboratories have malfunctions or lack of reagents.82

105. The hospital crisis is such that by August 19, 2014, the Venezuelan Association of Hospitals and

Clinics requested the declaration of humanitarian emergency in the health sector, given the worsening scarcity and irregular supply of inputs, medicines, surgical and medical equipment and their spare parts, putting lives and patient prognosis at risk.83

106. On August 20th of the same year, Gabriela Ramrez the Ombudswoman for that date, assured

that there is a constant dialogue with the Ministry of Health to address the shortage of medicines and medical supplies and called absolutely disproportionate the request of the Venezuelan Association of Hospitals and Clinics (AVCH) and other groups. At the same time she acknowledged "some flaws in the provision of medical supplies.84

107. The fault is such that the Venezuelan Medical Federation reported on May 3, 2015 that to date "at least 12,830 doctors have resigned from their duties in public hospitals, of which 7,330 are leaving the country because of the difficult hospital situation. Other 2,500 health professionals from the private sector are already part of the group that is leaving the country. They sum 10,300 doctors that have gone abroad.85

108. Regarding the information published about the Mission Barrio Adentro, there are inconsistencies between the several sources that provide such information, which makes it almost impossible to have an accurate assessment of the impact of the Mission86 and therefore a citizen control over how to implement the policy, scope of beneficiaries, standards of care, among other vital elements for evaluation is not possible.

82 http://www.el-nacional.com/sociedad/crisis-sistema-salud-Venezuela_0_619138261.html 83 http://avch.org.ve/declaracion-de-emergencia-humanitaria-en-el-sector-salud/ 84 http://www.elmundo.com.ve/noticias/actualidad/politica/defensora-cree--desproporcionada--declarar-emergen.aspx 85 http://www.2001.com.ve/en-la-agenda/96244/fmv--mas-de-10-mil-medicos-se-han-ido-de-venezuela-.html 86 http://transparencia.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/InformeBarrio1.pdf


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INE: National Institute of Statistics SISOV: Venezuela Integrated System of Social Indicators of the Ministry of the Popular Power of Planning MPPS: Ministry of Popular Power for Health

109. As this Committee can appreciate, the policy is linked to the obligation of the State to take measures to "ensure the full realization of this right... necessary to reduce stillbirths and infant mortality and for the healthy development of children. (art. 12.2.a) This is a regulation that imposes a demanding standard of effectiveness for the State, that in the conditions under which Mission Barrio Adentro program has been developing cannot be adequately enforced, because an evaluation is not possible given the inconsistency between reporting sources.

110. In its report, to illustrate the situation, the General Comptroller of the Republic observed

irregularities in the Contract for the supply and installation of the main network of Medicinal Gases in the Childrens Hospital Dr. Jos Manuel de los Rios, both in the way it was carried out "without the guarantees required under Article 38 of the LOCGRSNCF 87and the time of execution and completion88.

111. Case: Specialized Hospitals. President Chvez announced in 2007 the construction of 6 facilities

that would be built simultaneously. While the opening of these facilities was postponed on several occasions, a significant amount of resources was invested for its implementation and completion.

112. Although officially only an additional credit for construction was approved, there have been various funding announcements by two of the governments major parafiscal funds according to research published by the website RunRunes in 201289. This research shows the vast amount of resources from different sources that have been allocated in works that today remain stagnant. The following tables list the resources directed to the execution of these works:

87 Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the National Fiscal Control System 88 Management Reports : Comptroller General of the Republic , 2013. Available at: http://www.cgr.gob.ve/site_informes_management.php?Cod=026 89 http://runrun.es/investigacion/elefantesrojos/


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Hospital: Location Millions of Bs

Adult Cardiology Center: Montalbn Caracas 187,6 National Cancer Center: Guarenas Oncology 308,5

Maternal-Child Hospital: San Fernando Apure 193,5

Nephrology/Urology Hospital: Gurico 161,2

Gastroenterology and Oncology Hospital: El Viga 217,1 Toxicology and Oncology Hospital: Barinas 204,5

Total 1272,4

Other funding Millions of US $ Bandes through Chinese Venezuelan joint

fund (2012) 141 Fonden 187,2 Fonden 149,9 Fonden 223,8 Total 701,9

113. The Comptroller General's Office informed in its 2011 and 2012 reports about irregularities committed by Cuban and Venezuelan officials in activities of import, storage and distribution of medicines from the Cuba - Venezuela Agreement without due regard for their expiration dates.90 In 2013, NGOs PROVEA, Espacio Pblico (Public Space), Accin Solidaria (Solidarity Action) and Transparency Venezuela filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of Health (MPPS) for having omitted information about these irregularities and requested competent bodies investigations and sanctions on those responsible. The 2013 Comptrollers report91, for the third time, found irregularities in 9 contracts, signed between 2012 and the first semester of 2013, that referred to the acquisition of medicines, medical and surgical equipment amounting to 2,798.5 million Venezuelan bolivars destined to the Mission Barrio Adentro and its receipt, storage and distribution was in charge of the Autonomous Service of Pharmaceutical Elaborations (SEFAR.)

114. The irregularities found by the Comptroller General of the Republic showed planning issues re

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