Infantry - Fort Benning...2 INFANTRY September-October 2004July-August 2005yield doctrinal manuals...

Infantry

••••• INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S.Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for theinfantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authorsand not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry andinfantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerningeditorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; [email protected]. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. •POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. •USPS Publication No. 370630.

JULY-AUGUST 2005 Volume 94, Number 4

PB 7-05-4

MG BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEYCommandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENOEditor

MICHELLE J. ROWANDeputy Editor

BETTY J. BYRDEditorial Assistant

Soldiers from A Company,3rd Battalion, 141stInfantry Regiment, TexasArmy National Guard,extract woundedpersonnel during a quickreaction force exercisenear Bagram, Afghanistan,June 10, 2005. (Photo bySpecialist Harold Fields)

This medium is approved for officialdissemination of material designed to keepindividuals within the Army knowledgeable ofcurrent and emerging developments withintheir areas of expertise for the purpose ofenhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Peter J. Schoomaker

General, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Distribution: Special

Official:

SANDRA R. RILEYAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 0517103

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FRONT COVER:

BACK COVER:A Soldier from the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute InfantryRegiment from Fort Richardson, Alaska, participates in asimulated night attack on an enemy position during ExerciseTalisman Sabre 2005 in Australia. (Photo by Corporal BernardPearson, Australian Army)

FEATURES30 KINETIC TARGETING IN IRAQ AT THE BATTALION TASK FORCE LEVEL:

FROM TARGET TO DETAINEECaptain Jeremiah Pray

34 MANIPULATING YOUR BATTLE SPACE TO WINDan Smith

37 LESSONS FROM THE PAST: SUCCESSFUL BRITISHCOUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN MALAYA 1948-1960First Lieutenant Thomas E. Willis II

DEPARTMENTS1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE3 INFANTRY LETTERS3 INFANTRY NEWS7 TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER10 RANGER NOTES11 PROFESSIONAL FORUM

11 NCO-FOCUSED AARS: HOW TO MAKE THE UNIT BETTERCommand Sergeant Major Walter E. Rakow

15 WARRIOR ETHOS: SOLDIERS SELFLESSLY COMMITTED TO ARMY, UNIT,FELLOW SOLDIERSMaster Sergeant Nicholas B. Castillo

17 NORTHEAST KOREA - LUKE’S CASTLE - WINTER 1953 — THREE U.S. TANKS ANDAN ROK RIFLE COMPANY IN MOUNTAIN DEFENSENimrod T. Frazer

24 CJTF 635: REGIONAL ASSISTANCE MISSION TO SOLOMON ISLANDS —AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY UNIT’S QUICK RESPONSELieutenant Colonel Chris Field, Australian Army

43 TRAINING NOTES43 THE FIRST ARMY IED TRAINING METHODOLOGY

Colonel Daniel L. ZajacMajor Brian A. BissonnetteCaptain John F. Carson, Jr.

47 THE ROE TACTICAL TRAINING SEMINAR: COMBINING RULES OF ENGAGEMENTAND MARKSMANSHIP WITH JUDGEMENT-BASED TRAININGLieutenant Colonel James C. Larsen

49 OVERHAULING THE PLATOON NIGHT LIVE-FIRE DEFENSE IN IETLieutenant Colonel James C. Larsen

51 BOOK REVIEWS53 SUBSCRIPTION AND CONTACT INFORMATION

MAJOR GENERAL BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEY

FORT BENNING - A TRADITION OF TRAINING

Commandant’sNote

After having been privileged to serve fortwo years as Chief of Infantry, I feel a deep sense of pride in the Soldiers who

live and train at Fort Benning, in the units that havedeployed to join the fight against global extremism,and in the civilian and military workforce that trulymakes Fort Benning the home of the Infantry. Weare a nation and an Army at war, and Fort Benningshows her support for this war in everything we do.We show it in how we train, deploy, and sustain ourwarriors; in the reachback support for deployedunits; in the way we capture, examine, anddisseminate combat experience; and in the way wecare for our loyal, dedicated, family members who await theirSoldiers’ return.

Today’s infantryman is the best trained, best equipped, andbest supported Soldier this great nation has ever fielded, and ourArmy’s successes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and in othertroubled areas of the world have clearly shown that we are on theright track. Army initiatives in the employment of unmannedaerial vehicles; in the fielding of new or improved weapons,vehicles, and other equipment; in our training of marksmen andsnipers; in our training and technological advances in detectingand neutralizing improvised explosive devices and other ongoingprograms have all had a direct, measurable impact on how wefight and win. At the home of the Infantry we train warriors, allthose superb Soldiers who have stepped forward when Americaneeded them, and who have committed themselves to the defenseof our homeland.

In this, my final Commandant’s Note as Chief of Infantry, Iwant to talk about some ongoing initiatives that will continue tobolster the lethality, sustainability, and survivability of the entireforce: combat arms, combat support, and combat service supportalike. First and foremost among these is marksmanship, becauseas our warriors close with the enemy it is our accurate, massedsmall arms fire that will thin his ranks, destroy his will to fight,and break his resistance. Nowhere is this more evident than inthe training we offer for squad designated marksman (SDM). TheSDM program trains Soldiers to engage and consistently hit targetsin the gaps and in terrain not otherwise covered by riflemen, and

July-August 2005 INFANTRY 1

complements the coverage provided by snipers, orwhen the latter are otherwise engaged. The M16and M4 series weapons are both effective out to atleast 500 meters, and SDM takes advantage of thisto train Soldiers to kill the enemy at maximumrange.

The warrior’s individual weapon is his tool intrade, and the warrior must be one with theweapon. To achieve this, we are training Soldiersin reflexive firing techniques and battle drills thatdevelop and reinforce quick, reflexive reactionsagainst an asymmetric, cunning enemy.Marksmanship is clearly the warrior’s edge, and

it is as important to our combat service support Soldiers’ trainingas it is to an infantryman. We train our Soldiers in collective livefire exercises that enable them to deliver massed, accuratefirepower against any adversary. A well-armed, confident,aggressive Soldier will fight his or her way out of an ambush orattack and continue to accomplish the mission, something thathas been demonstrated in after-action reports out of the combatzones. As we continue to infuse the warrior ethos throughout theforce, our enemies have come to realize that they face Americanswho have both the means and the will to destroy them.

The contemporary operational environment is a complex,uncertain, and violent one, and we can only dominate it withleaders such as the superb junior officers and noncommissionedofficers who are the point of the spear in Iraq and Afghanistan.They are confident, competent, flexible, and highly adaptable,traits that can all be developed, trained, and reinforced. We canbest develop and sustain flexibility and adaptability throughdoctrine, professional education, and career management policiesthat encourage adaptability. Our doctrine is sound, and it providesa common language and way of thinking. It also offers a frameworkfor the exercise of initiative and development of the tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that our young leaders aredeveloping and successfully employing across the globe. Otherleaders and units are quickly adapting these same TTPs to thecircumstances in their own environments, and are in turn sharingtheir own experience-based knowledge. The enduring TTPs andlessons learned will in turn take root in the deliberations that

2 INFANTRY September-October 20042 INFANTRY July-August 2005

yield doctrinal manuals and lesson plans. But the doctrinal effortis only one aspect of training adaptable leaders and units.

We are complementing our doctrinal production anddissemination effort with professional education programs toencourage and sustain adaptability in our Soldiers and leaders.We do this by confronting students with as many tactical dilemmasas possible while they are completing resident and nonresidentprofessional development courses. Adaptability has always beendeeply ingrained in the American military tradition, and we mustcontinue to reward innovation, valor, and quick, decisive responsesto the unexpected. The doctrinal and professional education effortsmust continue to be complemented with a diverse pattern ofassignments that exposes Soldiers and their leaders to a broadrange of units, geographic areas, and climates. Through this,they will soon develop the confidence and adaptability to rapidlyacclimate to any operational environment and execute theirassigned missions.

Adaptability arises from knowledge, and observations andcomments from the combat zones have revealed a need for morecomprehensive cultural awareness training and education. Theimmediacy of the present war demands urgency, and the InfantrySchool has already taken steps to meet that requirement. We arelaying the foundation for cultural awareness training in the InfantryCaptains’ Career Course, the Infantry Officer Basic Course, theAdvanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and the BasicNoncommissioned Officer Course. Our near-term effort is focusedon the threat presented by radical Islamic fundamentalism, andour cultural awareness training concentrates on specificgeographical areas of current interest. The 29th Infantry Regimenthas already published country handbooks for 11 regional nationsand has begun disseminating CD’s to units. Infantry Magazinehas been running a cultural awareness feature in every issue sinceJanuary 2005, and will continue to do so. All personnel departingFort Benning, either as part of Benning-based unit deploymentsor through the CONUS Replacement Center, will receive culturalawareness training as well. Cultural awareness will remain anintegral part of the USAIS curriculum because it is too importantto be left to chance, and because we cannot overlook this combatmultiplier.

Those of us committed to the profession of arms see the defenseof our nation, her people, and her institutions as paramount, andnowhere is that noble goal more exemplified than at Fort Benning.The Experimental Force first manned by the 29th InfantryRegiment in the spring of 2004 links doctrine, training, andtechnology in conjunction with the Soldier Battle Lab to evaluatenew weapons; equipment; concepts; organizations; and tactics,techniques, and procedures before they are fielded or implemented.We have addressed and aggressively supported the ArmyTransformation using a full-spectrum approach to overcome adoctrinal deficit that would hamper progress. This includes acomprehensive assessment of the challenges to training thecommanders of our modular brigade combat teams, and we areexamining the changed role of installations as trainers,maintainers, and readiness reporters when one or more of theirunits deploys and others remain at home station.

Indirect fire support remains a top priority for the Infantry as

well. The Infantry Center recognizes that organic fires are anindispensable element of the infantry combined arms team, andinsists that the combination of joint and organic fires will ensurethat infantrymen can always put steel on target when and where itis needed. Infantrymen have never gone into battle withoutsupporting mortars and cannons, and they never will.

The Infantry School has long been recognized for itscontribution to the lethality, survivability, and sustainability ofthe combined arms force, and the Basic Officer Leadership Course(BOLC II) clearly meets those three goals. The course trainslieutenants of all branches in order to develop competent,confident, and adaptable leaders, grounded in warrior tasks, andable to lead Soldiers in the contemporary operational environment.A graduate of BOLC II is trained in both the warrior tasks and thewarrior battle drills, will not accept defeat and will never quit,and demonstrates the characteristics of an Army leader. Wegraduate officers who live the Army Values and embody the warriorethos, and who leave Fort Benning to lead still other warriors inthe fight against global extremism. Tom Brokaw hailed thosewho went forth to defend America in World War II as The GreatGeneration; today the call for America’s warriors has gone outagain, and once more her sons and daughters have stepped forwardto defend our homeland. They are ready to serve, and Fort Benningis proud to receive and train them.

Follow me!

WOJDAKOWSKI ASSUMESDUTIES AS CHIEF OF INFANTRY

Major General Benjamin C. Freakley handedcommand of the U.S. Army Infantry Center over toMajor General Walter Wojdakowski August 12 at FortBenning.

Major General Wojdakowski’s first Commandant’sNote as Chief of Infantry will appear in the September-October issue of Infantry Magazine.

Major General Wojdakowski is a 1972 graduate ofthe U.S. Military Academy at West Point. His mostrecent assignment was as the U.S. Army Europe and7th Army Acting Deputy Commanding General. Healso previously served as the Deputy CommandingGeneral, V Corps, and as the Deputy CommandingGeneral, Combined Task Force Seven, Operation IraqiFreedom, Baghdad, Iraq.

Major General Wojdakowski had also served asthe Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army InfantrySchool from January 1997 until September 1998.

Major General Freakley will next serve as thecommanding general of the 10th Mountain Divisionat Fort Drum, New York.

SARA GREENLEE

ELECTRONIC TABULAR FIRING TABLES ON AKOANDREW E. GRABER

In response to the many requests fromthe arti l lery, infantry and armorcommunities, electronic tabular firingtables (TFTs) are now available online.

The U.S. Army’s Armaments,Research, Development, andEngineering Center’s (ARDEC) FiringTables and Ballistics Division (FTaB)recently announced the availability ofartillery and mortar TFTs online via theArmy Knowledge Online (AKO) FTaBorganizational site KnowledgeCollaboration Center (KCC). The KCCis organized by branch currently withartillery and infantry (mortar) and theaddition of armor and infantry small armsin the near future. Each branch is furtherrefined to weapon system and projectilemaking it easy for Soldiers and Marinesto find the most current, official TFTs

quickly. TFTs found on other websitescannot be guaranteed current.

Access to the KCC is controlled utilizingthe AKO security tool set and querying theindividual requesting subscription to theKCC to determine if mission needswarrant access to the TFTs. Once accessis granted, the individual has access tothe TFTs from around the globe 24 hoursa day for the remainder of the calendar year.At the end of the calendar year, thesubscription is terminated and submission

for a new subscription is required iffurther access in needed.

When new or updated TFTs areavailable announcements will beposted via the AKO system and therespective branch journal publication.Further, the KCC is set up such that,if a new document is added, an update

notification is automatically sent to thesubscriber.

FTaB can be found on AKO by clickingthe site map under Army Organizations andthen the Organizational Sites tab. Expandthe MACOM directory path as shownMACOMS\AMC\RDECOM\ARDEC\AETC\FCST\FTaB. Links to FTaB are alsoon the AKO Fires Knowledge Network andProduct Manager Mortar Web site.

(Andrew E. Graber works in the FiringTables and Ballistics Division, ARDEC.)

INFANTRY LETTERSAn infantryman assigned to the U.S. Army

Marksmanship Unit at Fort Benning can nowbe called a world champion.

Private Joshua M. Richmond of Hillsgrove,Pennsylvania, won the first Gold Medal for theUnited States at the 2005 International ShootingSport Federation World ShotgunChampionships in Junior Men’s Double TrapMay 31. Richmond, 19, also led the USA tothe medal stand for a second time in the JuniorMen’s Team event. Richmond, Matthew Drexler, and Cory Sidorekwon the Team Bronze Medal with a 366 total team performance.

Richmond joined the Army in October and was assigned tothe Army Marksmanship Unit after he completed Basic andInfantry Training at Fort Benning.

For more information on the ISSF World ShotgunChampionships, visit www.issf-shooting.org. For moreinformation on the U.S. Shotgun Team, log on towww.usashooting.org. (Sara Greenlee writes for USA Shooting.)

Infantryman Wins Gold

Richmond

COUNTERINSURGENCY WORK ARECOMMENDED READ

In reply to Lieutenant Colonel Daly’s letter in the March-April 2005 issue, I have a recommendation that I have passedup through my chain of command. A current, very thoroughwork on counterinsurgency is Resisting Rebellion — TheHistory and Politics of Counterinsurgency by Anthony JamesJoes.

As a member of the Professional Development Tiger Teamat my battalion, tasked with recommending additions to theInfantry library, I have done so with the above volume andwould recommend it to anyone seeking a greater understandingand historical perspective of insurgency, counterinsurgency, andworldwide examples and analysis of both successful andunsuccessful counterinsurgency operations throughout history.

— FIRST SERGEANT DAVID R. PORTERA Co., 2nd Bn., 58th Inf. Reg.,

Fort Benning, Georgia


ARMY TESTS NEW EYE PROTECTIONAbout 400 Infantry trainees and cadre

at Fort Benning are testing severaldifferent types of combat eye protectionthat might eventually be issued to allSoldiers.

Colonel Chuck Adams, the senioroptometry consultant for the Army’sOffice of the Surgeon General (OTSG),said the goal is to achieve a “culturechange” from vision correction for someSoldiers, to eye protection for all.

“We’re talking about putting eyewearon half a million Soldiers,” Adams said.“And it’s not so much about whichproduct we choose, but the training.Combat eye protection is embraced fordeployed Soldiers. We need to embraceit for all Soldiers.”

Eye injuries represent almost 16 percentof all injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan sinceMarch 2003, according to statistics from theOffice of the Surgeon General.

As part of the Military Combat EyeProtection Program (MCEPP), the OTSGand the team from PEO-Soldier at FortBelvoir, Virginia, are hoping the Soldiersin B Company, 1st Battalion, 50th InfantryRegiment, and D Company, 1st Battalion,329th Infantry Regiment, will have somegood feedback on three sets of spectacles.

“Eye injuries hit the radar post-1972 andthe Arab-Israeli Wars,” said LieutenantColonel Emery Fehl, chief of optometry atMartin Army Community Hospital and thepost’s MCEPP liaison. In subsequent years,the Army researched and developedspectacles and goggles designed to combata laser threat by blocking certainwavelengths. That, he said, is where theArmy’s current offerings, with theirmultiple lenses, came in. But the eyewearadopted in 1994 and issued in 1998 didn’tpass muster with Soldiers.

Sarah Morgan-Clyborne, who has beenworking the eyewear issues with PEO-Soldierfor about 12 years said the second generationitems, intended to provide spectacles andgoggles that would share lenses, provideballistic protection and support prescriptionlenses, were unsuccessful.

“We did not design a frame that wasacceptable to Soldiers,” Morgan-Clyborne

MELISSA HOUSE

said. “Protection was important, but not amotivating factor.”

The missing factor? “It was a greatproduct,” Adams said, “but it doesn’t looklike an Oakley and doesn’t look cool.”

So the Army entered the formalcontracting process with several commercialvendors, Morgan-Clyborne said, and alsoreceives unsolicited proposals.

“We evaluate (the eyewear) for industrysafety standards and ballistic fragmentationprotection, then rank the products and placethem on an authorized protective eyewearlist,” she said.

Individual commanders can selecteyewear for their unit from that list.

Right now, the ballistic protection pieceis more important than the laser threat, Fehlsaid. Of the 345 eye injuries evacuated fromIraq and Afghanistan after March 2003,three Soldiers are totally blind and 44 havetotal loss of vision in one eye.

But eye injuries aren’t limited to combatoperations. Adams said one of his firstpatients as a young doctor in Germany wasa sergeant with a prosthetic eye because ofan accident on a range.

“We want to protect Soldiers’ vision,”Adams said, and one of the ways to do thatis by issuing CEP to every Soldier.

Fort Benning is the only installationconducting the CEP test, and Fehl saidthe end number of around 400 makes this

Courtesy photo

Privates First Class Matthew Brugeman, left, andMichael Brock move off the range wearing the clearlenses in their new Combat Eye Protection. Brock alsohas prescription inserts.

test more valid.“This is the right place to do this

testing,” Fehl said. On April 8 and 9,the two companies received a mass issueof the first set of CEP, the UVEX XC.Soldiers wore them during field trainingfor two weeks, then critiqued them.

In May, Soldiers from B Co., 1st Bn.,50th Inf. Regt. put the second set — ESSICE 2 spectacles — through the paces onthe range.

One of the company’s drill sergeants,Staff Sergeant Jefferson Negus, said theSoldiers, and some of the cadre, havebeen putting the CEP on every time theydon their Kevlar and equipment.

“The glasses are getting a full set ofabuse,” Negus said. “We’ve hadbreakage, but we haven’t seen a pattern.They seem to be fitting the durability

standard.” He said he felt much moreprotected and the two glasses he’s tried arelight enough not to bother him. Negus, acombat veteran who served with the 101stAirborne Division (Air Assault) in Mosul,said his unit had eye protection, but it was apersonal choice whether or not to wear it.

“That’s what we’re trying to change,”Adams said. “We want to instill the feelingthat something’s missing when they walkoutside (without eyewear). Soldiers arewilling to walk around garrison with a littlebit of blur, but out in the desert, they wantthe best possible vision. They must train asthey fight.”

Training as they fight means Soldierswould be issued CEP, frame of choice andprotective mask inserts for those Soldiersneeding corrective lenses, and CEP forthose without a need. The Army currentlyonly issues S-9 glasses to initial entrySoldiers who need vision correction.

While the CEP will cost between andaverage of $16 to $40 per Soldier, Adamssaid it will be partially offset by no longerissuing the S-9 glasses Soldiers don’t like.

“It’s tough to talk numbers,” Adamssaid. “But the important point is — if youlose one eye, the Army pays a Soldierupwards of $1 million for disability.”

(Melissa House writes for The Bayonetnewspaper at Fort Benning.)

4 INFANTRY July-August 2005

INFANTRY NEWS


2005 DOUGHBOY AWARDRECIPIENTS NAMED

CULTURAL AWARENESSCORNER

Professional RelationshipsThe key to establishing good working

relations with an Arab is to establish a goodpersonal relationship. In professionalsettings, Arabs operate by personal relationsmore than by time constraints, missionrequirements, or professional skills. Initialbusiness meetings are usually social andrarely include objective analysis, pragmaticapplication, or frank exchange. Protocol isemphasized through polite conversation andrefreshments. Business may be addressedat a subsequent meeting or at a dinner.

Criticism, even if offered constructively,can threaten or damage an Arab’s honor andmay be taken as a personal insult.Attempting to protect himself and his honorfrom criticism, an Arab may flatly deny factsor reinterpret them. Westerners shouldobscure any corrective remarks and praisegood points.

(Taken from the Department of Defense’sIraq Country Handbook.)

The Home of the Infantry is proud toannounce that Retired General Gary E.Luck and Retired Sergeant Major of theArmy Julius W. Gates are the honoredrecipients of the 2005 Doughboy Award inrecognition of their many contributions tothe Infantry. Both recipients will receivethe Doughboy Award September 13.

General Luck retired in 1996 after a careerof more than 36 years of service. He servedoverseas tours in Vietnam, Germany, Korea,and Saudi Arabia. He commanded the 2ndInfantry Division, Joint Special OperationsCommand, U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand, XVIII Airborne Corps, and hislast assignment prior to retirement was as theCommander in Chief, United Nations

Command Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea. He is a provenmaster trainer, planner, and a mostdistinguished infantryman.

Gates served as Sergeant Major of theArmy (SMA) from 1987-1991. He servedmultiple overseas tours in Vietnam andGermany. During his tenure as SMA,training remained the Army’s most criticalissue. He assisted with the success of the“Year of Training” and the “Year of theNCO,” and worked on several doctrinalpublications for the force. He was a firmbeliever that a strong NCO corps wascritical for a strong Army. He retired in1991 with over 33 years of distinguishedservice.

The Army is now providing troops with a new tool designed tosave life and limb. The Special Operations Forces TacticalTourniquet (SOFTT), the Army’s newest medical device, is beingissued to Soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Designed for one-handed application, the SOFTT allows aSoldier to apply a tourniquet himself, replacing the Army’s field-expedient method in which Soldiers used a bandage and a stick tostop blood flow from a wound.

The field-expedient method worked, “but the SOFTT is better,”said Sergeant First Class Michael C. Klemowski, serving withthe Multi-National Force-Iraq personnel section.

“Having this issued to Soldiers will cut down on casualtiesbecause it is a time-saving device,” said Klemowski, a formerdrill sergeant. “The less time that is wasted, the better chancethere is of saving someone’s life.”

The entire process of applying the tourniquet, on average, takesunder 15 seconds, according to www.vikingtactics.com.Along with saving time, the new tourniquet is suitable for hard toreach injuries. The SOFTT’s strap can be released completelythrough the web clamp and then re-threaded, allowing forapplication to trapped limbs.

Working on the same principles as all tourniquets, “(TheSOFTT) is used to stop the bleeding from an extremity and toprevent shock,” said Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Brennan, Multi-National Corps-Iraq surgeon cell NCOIC.

The SOFTT has two latches used to secure the metal handle.While only one latch is required for the tourniquet to be effective,the extra latch provides extra securing ability, depending on the

handle’s position after tightening.To apply the tourniquet, one slides it over the limb and pulls the

tail quickly. Once the slack is removed, twist the handle until bleedingis controlled and secure the latch. Finally, to prevent accidentalloosening, tighten the screw on the belt. The SOFTT is used as a lastresort to treat a wound, Brennan said.

“Try to stop the bleeding with a bandage,” Brennan said to aclass of Soldiers learning how to use the new tourniquet. “Afterusing a pressure dressing for five minutes, if the bleeding persists,use the tourniquet.”

Once the tourniquet has been applied, check the pulse on eitherthe hand or foot where the injury is.

“No pulse means the tourniquet is working,” Brennan said.

Army Provides Soldiers With New TourniquetSPECIALIST JEREMY D. CRISP

Specialist Jeremy D. Crisp

Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Brennan applies the Special Operations ForcesTactical Tourniquet to a Soldier during an instructional class in Iraq.

INFANTRY NEWS


Army Unveils Active BCT Stationing PlanAs part of its largest restructuring since World War II, the Army

announced its plan July 27 for stationing its active componentmodular brigade combat teams.

The plan includes new organizations being formed and otherunits being returned from overseas locations. The return of theoverseas units adds up to 50,000 Soldiers and 150,000 familymembers being brought back to bases in the United States.

In the end state, the number of active modular BCTs willincrease from 33 to 43, enhancing the active Army’s combat powerby 30 percent.

The Army selected locations for the modular BCTs based onexisting and potential capacities, available training space, andcurrent locations of similar and supporting units.

While the modular brigade combat teams follow historicdivision and brigade unit naming conventions, these units are of acompletely different design than their predecessors. The essence ofthis transformational design is a new force that can be deployedsingularly or in groups – ready for employment in a variety of designsas self-contained modules over a dispersed area. Essential to thesuccess of this force will be the use of Army’s installations as platformsfrom which to rapidly mobilize and deploy military power.

The Army modular force initiative involves the total redesignof the operational Army into a larger, more powerful, more flexibleand more rapidly deployable force. It moves away from a division-centric structure to one built around the Army’s new modularcombat team.

Additionally, modularity — in combination with rebalancingthe type of units — will significantly reduce the stress on theforce because of a more predictable rotational cycle, coupled withmuch longer dwell times at home station.

This commitment to minimizing the turbulence for Soldiers

and families remains a top priority for the Army senior leadership.To reinforce this commitment, during the stationing of BCTs andrelocation of units, Soldiers will move with their families andfamily moves will not be scheduled until the Soldier redeploys.

Active Brigade Combat Teams Posture:• Fort Benning, Georgia — 1 Brigade Combat Team• Fort Bliss, Texas — 4 Brigade Combat Teams• Fort Bragg, North Carolina — 4 Brigade Combat Teams• Fort Campbell, Kentucky – 4 Brigade Combat Teams• Fort Carson, Colorado – 4 Brigade Combat Teams• Fort Drum, New York – 3 Brigade Combat Teams• Fort Hood, Texas – 5 Brigade Combat Teams• Fort Knox, Kentucky – 1 Brigade Combat Team• Fort Lewis, Washington – 3 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams• Fort Polk, Louisiana – 1 Brigade Combat Team• Fort Richardson, Alaska – 1 Brigade Combat Team• Fort Riley, Kansas – 3 Brigade Combat Teams• Fort Stewart, Georgia – 3 Brigade Combat Teams• Fort Wainwright, Alaska – 1 Stryker Brigade Combat Team• Schofield Barracks, Hawaii – 1 Brigade Combat Team, Stryker

Brigade Combat Team• Fort Irwin (National Training Center), Calif. – 1 Brigade

Combat Team (minus)• Korea – 1 Brigade Combat Team• Germany – 1 Stryker Brigade Combat Team• Italy – 1 Brigade Combat TeamThe number of Soldiers in a BCT varies between 3,500 and

3,900 depending upon whether it is a Light, Heavy or StrykerBCT.

More information on the BCT stationing plan can be foundonline at www.army.mil/modularforces/.

CHERYL BOUJNIDA

Submit Your Articles, Ideas, Comments to INFANTRY

Have you read something in our magazine that you agree or disagree with? Share yourthoughts with the infantry community by writing a letter to the editor. The views presentedin our articles are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Army Infantry

School, Department of the Army, etc. One of our missions it to provide a forum for progressive ideasand create discussion. We are also in need of feature and short articles! Topics can include lessonslearned during a deployment, training exercise, or other event as well as information on organization,weapons, equipment, tactics, techniques or procedures.

A complete Writer’s Guide can be found on our website at https://www.infantry.army.mil/magazine. (Will require AKO login and password.) All of our issues back to 1982 are also posted onthis site.

If you have any questions or concerns, please contact our office through one of the followingmeans:

E-mail — [email protected] — (706) 545-2350/6951 or DSN 835-2350/6951Mail — P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005Office Location — Room 524, Infantry Hall (Building 4), Fort Benning, GA 31905

In October 1999, Army Chief of StaffGeneral Eric Shinseki announced that the Army would develop two

full spectrum, wheeled combat brigadesthat utilized technology gained from ForceXXI units. These two units weresubsequently named Interim BrigadeCombat Teams (IBCT) and were intendedto deploy rapidly due to the smallerfootprint associated with the unit. InitialO&O (operational and organizational)requirements placed on the designers ofthese units were that the organizations wereto be deployable within 96 hours anywherein the world. This lethal, modular forcewould maximize technology with a newtype of agile and adaptive leaders manningthe formation.

The first IBCT O&O specification forthe new Stryker leader was: “ A leaderwho can influence people by providingpurpose, direction, and motivation –while operating in a complex, dynamicenvironment of uncertainty andambiguity to accomplish the mission and


improving the organization.”The new Stryker leader had to be drawn

from existing formations and taught howto think and act differently. Thus, theconcept of Leader Conversion was born.

As each Stryker Brigade Combat Teamgoes through initial transformation,TRADOC provides leader conversionsupport. The importance and meaning ofleader conversion are critical to the successof the entire transformation process.Conversion (the adoption of a new way ofdoing things) should not be confused withdevelopment (the growth of a professionalofficer).

Secretary of the Army Francis Harveyrecently shared his new vision of “Relevantand Ready Land Power in Service to theNation” to an audience of cadets. He saidthe vision is comprised of three pillars:innovative and adaptive leaders who areexperts in the art and science of theprofession of arms, the Modular Force, andthe institutional base of the Army whichdevelops proud and disciplined Soldiers andleaders committed to Army values andliving the Warrior Ethos.

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEYCORNER

LEADER CONVERSION: STRYKER STYLELIEUTENANT COLONEL JAY MACKLIN

MAJOR JEROME SIBAYAN

Even though the Leader ConversionTraining Program (LCTP) has itsgenesis with the Brigade CoordinateCell, which coordinated assistance tothe first three SBCT transformations,the U.S. Army Training and DoctrineCommand’s (TRADOC’s) focusremains unchanged. The LCTP is nowcoordinated by the SBCTTransformation Team (STT) located atthe Infantry Center at Fort Benning.

The STT is composed of a chief(LTC), five majors, and two captainswho are responsible for coordinatingand synchronizing TRADOC’s efforts intransforming non-modular brigades intoStryker Brigade Combat Teams. TheSTT is branched into Doctrine, Training& Organization, and Command,Control, Communications andComputers branches. The STT is alsoa combined arms team with membersably representing the Infantry, Armor,Aviation, Engineer and Signal Corps.

In addition to the STT, there areTRADOC Forward Cells (TFC) co-located with the transforming brigades– coordinating and synchronizing LCTPevents. The TFC is where the TRADOCrubber meets the Forces Command(FORSCOM) road. The STT and TFCsexecute the LCTP in conjunction withthe TRADOC proponent schools andcenters; specifically the Infantry Center,Armor Center, Artillery School & Center;Maneuver Support Center, IntelligenceCenter, Combined Arms SupportCommand, Signal School, and theMedical Department Center & School.

WHO WE ARE …

“Leaders are absolutely key to achieving this vision,” Harveysaid. “For the uncertain 21st century operating environment,we need leaders who are decisive, innovative, adaptive,culturally astute, effective communicators and dedicated tolifelong learning.”

The Army is reorganizing itself to field smaller, more capablebrigade-sized units, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J.Schoomaker said, that can be deployed much more quickly andperform more tasks than legacy forces under the old-styledivision system. The Army’s Stryker-armored-vehicle-equippedBrigade Combat Teams embody this transformational thinking.

At the heart of transformational thinking is the Quality ofFirsts: See First, Understand First, Act First, and FinishDecisively. The Stryker formation is a true system of systemsstructured to enable leaders to thrive in chaotic and uncertainsituations and conditions. Aside from being to able to visualize,describe and direct forces as never before, the underlyingstrength of the Stryker formation is that every Soldier is a leader.It is a Soldier-centric formation capable of capitalizing oninformation technology to defeat the enemy. TRADOC supportsthis development of agile and adaptive leaders.

The Stryker Brigade Leader Conversion Training Programprovides the TRADOC supported framework for leaders at alllevels from brigade commander to squad leader. The LCTPevents:

1) Provide doctrinal based information,2) Are performance based, and3) Focus on building sufficient knowledge to help Stryker

leaders understand and how to employ Stryker Brigade CombatTeam capabilities to include digital enablers.

The LCTP consists of three leader-focused training events:Stryker University, Senior Leaders Course, and Tactical LeadersCourse. Each transforming unit will receive these courses inorder as they progress through transformation, but typicallyprior to any New Equipment Training (NET). Each trainingevent focuses on different leadership levels of the brigade andis usually the unit’s first encounter with Stryker brigadeinformation. Throughout the process, TRADOC instructorsfrom the BOS or proponent institutions maintain the doctrinalhigh ground and generally don’t delve into tactics, techniques,and procedures.

Each event is based on a core curriculum and each course hasa complete course description. SBCT commanders preparing forthe Stryker Brigade LCTP will be able to adjust the focus of theirtraining event by selecting ‘elective’ courses to include in theirLCTP event.

Stryker UniversityStryker University is a three-day information, orientation, and

education event. The program of instruction consists of a series ofboth chain of command and TRADOC SBCT overview classes.University provides an overarching view of what is unique to anSBCT, focusing on doctrine, organization, capabilities andlimitations, logistics, communications, and overarching “how tofight.” Stryker University also provides a venue for the SBCT’ssenior leadership to establish their goals and objectives for thetransforming unit. University may serve as an opportunity for themateriel community to review the material fielding process andfacilities. The target audience for university events is brigade andbattalion commanders and their staffs.


* Welcome by Corps or Division CG (0.5 hr)* Welcome by USAIC CG (0.5 hr)* Welcome by SBCT Commander (0.5 hr)* Transformation Overview (1.5 hr)* Unit Set Fielding (0.5 hr)* Stryker Vehicle Capabilities (0.5 hr)* Nature of War (1.0 hr)* SBCT Overview (3.0 hr)* SBCT Infantry Battalion Overview (3.0 hr)* RSTA Overview (2.0 hr)* SBCT Intel Overview (2.0 hr)* SBCT Fires and Effects (1.0 hr)* SBCT CSS Organization Overview (2.0 hr)* SBCT Maneuver Support Overview (2.0 hr)* Signal Company Overview (2.0 hr)* ABCS Introduction (1.5 hr)* Leader Conversion (1.0 hr)* Battle Command (1.0 hr)

STRYKERUNIVERSITY

* Welcome by TSM Stryker-Bradley (0.5 hr)* Welcome by SBCT Commander (0.5 hr)* SBCT Overview and Discussion (1.5 hr)* SBCT Infantry Battalion and Company Discussion and PE (2.0 hr)* ABCS Overview and Lower TI Discussion (1.0 hr)* FBCB2 Familiarization (3.0 hr)* MCS-L Familiarization (3.0 hr)* Stryker Vehicle Capabilities and Manning Issues (3.0 hr)* SBCT Intel Capabilities, Urban IPB and PE (3.0 hr)* RSTA Squadron and Troop Discussion (1.0 hr)* ISR Planning and Preparation (1.5 hr)* The Reconnaissance Fight and PE (1.0 hr)* Urban Operations TTP (2.0 hr)* Maneuver Support Discussion and PE (2.0 hr)* Information Operations at Battalion and Company with PE (3.0 hr)* Effects Based Operations (1.5 hr)* SBCT CSS Operations at Battalion and Company with PE (2.0 hr)

SENIOR LEADERSCOURSE

TACTICALLEADERSCOURSE

* Welcome by Battalion Commander (0.5 hr)* SBCT Overview (1.0 hr)* SBCT Infantry Battalion Organization and Capabilities (1.0 hr)* Maneuver Support Organization and Capabilities (1.0 hr)* SBCT Intelligence Organization and Capabilities (1.0 hr)* RSTA Organization and Capabilities (1.0 hr)* Fires and Effects Overview to include FA Battalion (2.0 hr)* Brigade Support Battalion Operations (1.0 hr)* Center for Army Leadership (CAL) (4.0 hr)* Center for Enhanced Performance (CEP) (4.0 hr)

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER

Senior Leaders CourseThe Senior Leaders Course is a 10-day course broken into a

Doctrinal Week and a Digital Week. TRADOC-led instructionconsists of a series of briefings, seminars, and performance-oriented training focusing on doctrine, operational lessons learned,and Army Battle Command System (ABCS) integration into themilitary decision-making process (MDMP). The SLC’sculminating exercise is a digital simulation exercise at the MissionSupport Training Facility (MSTF) on Fort Lewis, Washington.The series of digital exercises focus on current operationalenvironment tasks, such as sustainment or cordon & search. Thesedigital exercises enable the students to experience how analog,centralized planning fits together with digital, decentralizedexecution.

SLC supports the SBCT commander’s leader developmentprogram focused on the brigade and battalion staffs. The focus ofthis training is on “how to employ” the SBCT and subordinateorganizations, leveraging its capabilities and organization, whilemitigating limitations. A second, but equally important focus isto provide an understanding of ABCS integration for enhancingthe SBCTs command and control processes.

The target audience for SLC events is brigade and battalioncommanders and command sergeants major, (select) primary staff,and company commanders.

During Doctrinal Week, instructors will incorporate in-classpractical exercises that emphasize doctrinal learning points,provide an analog planning environment, and are directly relatedto the digital PE scenario the students will encounter during thedigital simulation exercise.

Digital Week is the primary venue for the commanders andtheir staffs to learn ‘how to employ’ their units using enablingtechnology. The second week of SLC occurs at the MSTF at FortLewis. The first two days are spent becoming familiar with theABCS and what it can do for the commanders and staffs.

Digital Week wraps up with four digital practical exercisesfocusing on the unit leveraging digital common operating pictureand digital reports to command and control intelligence collection,processing, analysis, and dissemination. The practical exercisesalso emphasize maneuver operations, fires and effects, andsustainment operations. Unit-led after action reviews (AARs) areconducted at the conclusion of each practical exercise.

Tactical Leaders CourseThe Tactical Leaders Course (TLC) is a seven-day event

designed to teach the junior SBCT leadership how the SBCT units(platoon and squad) fight and to provide the battalions’ leadershipan opportunity to demonstrate proficiency in applying basicconcepts of Stryker brigade doctrine to solve tactical problems.TLC supports the SBCT and battalion commanders’ leaderdevelopment program focused on leaders from squad/sectionthrough company level.

The training facilitates the development of tactical SOPs, theunderstanding of commander’s intent, and provides anunderstanding of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures atall small unit echelons. The first two days are TRADOC-led coredoctrinal courses that address Stryker doctrine at the company


level and below. The target audience for TLC events is companycommanders to squad leaders.

Days 3 through 7 focus on courses presented by unit leadershipand supported by tactical decision exercises supported byTRADOC.

Day 3 — Round robin instruction on SBCT infantry squadthrough battalion organization, capabilities, limitations, andemployment considerations presented by unit leadership; tacticaldecision exercise facilitated by TRADOC in a small group format;and company collaborative planning presented by unit leadership.

Day 4 — Company collaborative planning presented by unitNCO leadership; tactical decision exercise on Conduct a TacticalControl Point; and company collaborative planning brief tobattalion and company commanders.

Day 5 — Tactical decision exercise on Conduct a Cordon andSearch and company collaborative planning presented by companyleadership.

Day 6 — Practical exercises or tactical decision making games

Sample Tactical Leaders Course Schedules

based on plans and orders developed during the TacticalLeaders Course and based on the SLC order andvignettes.

Day 7 — Nine-hour simulation exercise in a battlesimulation center, mission support training facility, orCAPEX/JANUS-type training environment. The intentis to execute the battalion operations order (OPORD)developed during the preceding SLC event.

Providing Valuable Training to the ForceThe LCTP provides SBCT commanders with

TRADOC delivered leader conversion events that aredoctrine-based and transformation-focused. As mostSoldiers assigned to transforming SBCTs have little orno experience with Stryker formations, the LCTP is aprime opportunity for Soldiers to begin establishing asolid foundation of knowledge from which to continueto adopt new ways of doing business.

The Leader Conversion Training Program is the idealvenue for unit leaders to begin to take charge of theirown unit’s training. Stryker University, which is taughtby TRADOC instructors, builds the knowledge base forthe entire unit leadership. The Senior Leaders Course,combining doctrinal instruction with scenario-basedexercises, creates an outstanding environment forleaders to learn how to employ the SBCT and itssubordinate units. Finally, the Tactical Leaders Course,taught primarily by unit leaders and supported byTRADOC instructors, helps units assess SOPs and TTPs— building initial unit proficiency.

Relevance to IBCT and HBCT formationsThe Stryker Brigade Leader Conversion Training

Program is easily applicable to the conversion of non-modular unit leaders to other modular formations orUnits of Action. In terms of the three-course format andthe supporting course curriculum, the entire LCTPrequires minimal revision to meet the needs of a UAcommander.

Albert Einstein said that, “Progress is impossiblewithout change, and those who cannot change theirminds cannot change anything.” Leader Conversion isall about changing the way leaders think — startingdown the road of rewiring their brains to solve problemsin new and innovative ways. LCTP is not a destination,but rather the first step in a different direction. AfterTRADOC’s LCTP, leaders at all levels are betterequipped to train their units and to employ their Strykerformations efficiently and effectively.

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER

Lieutenant Colonel Jay Macklin is currently serving as Chiefof the SBCT Transformation Team at Fort Benning. He waspreviously assigned to the 12th Aviation Brigade, V Corps, inGermany.

Major Jerome Sibayan is currently serving as the doctrineofficer of the SBCT Transformation Team. His previousassignments include serving with the 3rd Armored Division and1st Cavalry Division.

RANGER NOTES


New Requirement — As of 8 July 05, all students reportingto Ranger School must bring a copy of their DD93/SGLI and acopy of their ORB (officer record brief) or ERB (enlisted recordbrief).

Questions about Ranger School — Packing lists, graduationdates and other information can be found on the Ranger TrainingBrigade’s website at http://www.benning.army.mil/rtb.

Rangers Induct 19 into Hall of Fame — The Ranger TrainingBrigade inducted 19 Rangers into the Ranger Hall of Fame in aceremony July 13 on Fort Benning.

The following individuals were inducted during this year’sceremony:

1st Lieutenant B.G. BurkettCommand Sergeant Major Frederick Weekley, Jr.General Henry Hugh SheltonColonel Rodney J. Wijas1st Sergeant Tom WilburnChief Warrant Officer Cleveland ValreyCaptain Sidney A. SalomonSergeant Thomas C. RobisonMaster Sergeant Harold L. RinardColonel William T. PalmerCaptain John Francis MurphyCommand Sergeant Major Jesse G. Laye1st Lieutenant Jack L. KnightMajor James V. KimseyColonel John T. KeneallyStaff Sergeant Danny L. JacksColonel Robert L. HowardMajor General David L. GrangeTechnician 4th Grade Ulysses G. Auger

Ranger School now open to CS/CSS Soldiers — The Chiefof Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker has approvedcombat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) Soldierattendance in Ranger School within the combat arms exclusionpolicy. All CS/CSS personnel requesting to go to Ranger Schoolneed to contact their schools NCO and go through HumanResources Command, who manages Ranger School slots.Successful completion of a Pre-Ranger program is essential forCS/CSS success in Ranger School. CS and CSS Soldiers shouldreference the following DA message for attendance standards,online at http://www.benning.army.mil/rtb/


NCO-FOCUSED AARS:COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR WALTER E. RAKOW

HOW TO MAKE THE UNIT BETTER

“The American Soldier is a proud oneand he demands professional competencein his leaders. In battle, he wants to knowthat the job is going to be done right, withno unnecessary casualties. Thenoncommissioned officer wearing thechevron is supposed to be the best Soldierin the platoon and he is supposed to knowhow to perform all the duties expected ofhim. The American Soldier expects hissergeant to be able to teach him how to dohis job. And he expects even more from hisofficers.”

— General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

The Noncommissioned OfficerCorps of the United States Armyis the best in the world. It has

become so because of the professionaldevelopment requirements that the Armyhas established for the NCO Corps. A vitalelement our Army’s organizational andindividual professional developmentsystem with respect to training is theafter action review (AAR) process.Including the AAR process in anytraining program or event is anexcellent way to improve thecompetence and professionalismof an organization and itsSoldiers, especially theorganization’s NCO Corps.Yet, our Army does nothabitually conduct “NCO-focused” AARs duringmany, if any training eventsthat NCOs conduct or inwhich they participate.

With this in mind, the First U.S. Armyrecently integrated NCO-focused afteraction reviews throughout its post-mobilization training programs at its sevenpower projection or power supportplatforms. These focused AARs have beeninvaluable to the hundreds of Reservecomponent units and thousands of NCOsthat have executed First Army’s demanding,rigorous, and theater-focused pre-deployment training regimen. The NCO-focused AAR process helps mobilizing unitsform into cohesive organizations. This isespecially true of those units into which theArmy has cross-leveled a good percentageof deployable manpower just prior to, orsoon after, their arrival at the powerprojection or support platform. Howeveruseful the NCO-focused AAR is for Reservecomponent units executing pre-deploymenttraining, it is a valuable tool that NCOs can

use in any unit and for any mission.Field Manual 7-22.7, The Army

Noncommissioned Officer Guide,paragraph 4-47 states that “after actionreviews are one of the best learning toolswe have ... AARs must be a two-waycommunication between the NCO and theirSoldiers. They are not lectures.” Afteraction reviews that focus on the conductand performance of NCOs during trainingwill ensure that the NCOs are a competentand productive element of a unit’s combatreadiness. From September to December2004, the NCO-focused AAR was part ofthe training regimen that all Reservecomponent units executed as theyconducted pre-deployment activities at FirstU.S. Army’s power projection platform atFort McCoy, Wisconsin. The 2nd Brigade,85th Division (Training Support), theorganization responsible for the conduct ofpre-deployment training at Fort McCoy,

used NCO-focused AARs to hone NCOexecution of their unit’s pre-deployment operations with anemphasis on that unit’s post-mobilization training. We did thiswith the understanding that AARsare not just for units and Soldiers,but as FM 7-22.7 states, leaders usethem to enhance the performanceand conduct of the unit’s primarytrainer — the NCO. Unit-levelAARs are still important, butadding NCO-focused AARs asa systemic and habitualelement of all training eventswill produce better trainers,

PROFESSIONAL FORUMand thus better trained units.

2nd Brigade facilitated three NCO-focused AARs for each unit conducting pre--deployment operations while at FortMcCoy. The first AAR was an exploratorysession of the unit and its own self-assessment of the NCO Corps in that unit.Subsequent AARs built upon the first AAR.The 2nd Brigade’s six command sergeantsmajor served as AAR facilitators, and theyfocused discussion on learning as opposedto “finger-pointing.” This was importantgiven the constant team-building that unitswere experiencing throughout their time attheir home station soon after mobilizingand at Fort McCoy for post-mobilization,pre-deployment training. The first AAR isless an AAR than it is a discussion on thebasic expectations and responsibilities ofNCOs with respect to training. This AARserved as a session in which the unit’sNCOs review and discuss their duties andresponsibilities within the unit. The NCOsand the facilitator also discuss and confirmtheir understanding of the necessaryprofessional relationship that must existbetween the unit’s NCOs and officers. Wedid this because of the perception wesometimes encounter in the Army that thereis “officer business” and “NCO business”and that the responsibilities encompassedin each do not overlap. We teach andreinforce throughout the pre-deploymenttraining the concept of “leader business”with an NCO and officer “focus.” Bycovering this topic the NCOs arecollectively able to affirm as a group theproper relationship between NCOs andofficers and thus avoid any unnecessaryfuture conflict between the two. It is thejunior Soldier who suffers when NCOs andofficers conduct their relationshipsimproperly, and this session helps todissuade this conflict.

Crossing the Line ofDeparture - Establishing theBaseline Expectations of theUnit’s NCOs

The primary duty and responsibility of anNCO is the enforcement of standards and theassurance that all Soldiers in the unit adhereto them — all standards!

Noncommissioned officers must ensureall Soldiers, leaders, and units have

individual, leader, and unit discipline inareas ranging from appearance, behavior,conduct, and training proficiency. A lackof discipline at any of level, individualSoldier to unit, will in most cases eventuallylead to unit failure. A failure to operate atall times within Army standards invitestrouble. Lack of individual, leader, or unitcompetence and confidence can often beovercome by solid discipline. A lack ofdiscipline will always overwhelm even thehighest degree of individual, leader, or unitcompetence and confidence.

During the first NCO AAR, thefacilitator leads the NCOs through adiscussion of the need for all Soldiers,leaders, and units to be experts in the FiveWarrior Skills:

Physical Fitness,Weapons Skills,Medical Skills,Crew Proficiency, andBattle Drills.

Fitness is the ability to perform one’scombat tasks in full combat gear for 72continuous hours with minimal degradationin ability. The facilitator leads thediscussion on weapons skills, reinforcing


the value of these skills in combat and thereason why all Soldiers should qualify asan “expert” on their weapon. The facilitatorand NCOs also discuss the need to executecontinuous weapons training that mitigatesthe degradation of marksmanship skillsover time, a real threat that the unit willface while deployed. The NCOs explore thecritical need for training on medical skills,and establish the training and certificationof as many of the unit’s Soldiers as possibleas combat lifesavers as a key pre-deployment goal. The group talks aboutcrew skills and how to ensure that theindividual and crew-related training mustresult in an expert crew. Lastly, thefacilitator and NCOs discuss the need foreveryone to be well-trained on battle drills,most critically the react to contact battledrill. The group then talks about the processby which they prioritize the level of trainingon additional battle drills. This discussionduring this AAR is tied into the WarriorEthos, the Soldier’s Creed, and the NCOCreed. We do this to ensure they understandthat in order to be good leader of a team,one must also be a good follower.

Being a Soldier means being part of ateam — this attitude is essential for success

U.S. Army photo

Being a Soldier means being part of a team — this attitude is essential for success in battleand is a tenet that the group of NCOs explores during the NCO-focused after action reviews.

in battle and is a tenet that the group ofNCOs explores during the NCO-focusedafter action reviews. Discipline,competence, and confidence are essentialelements of team operations. NCOs serveas the commander’s means to ensureSoldiers are disciplined, competent, andconfident. They do this throughenforcement of standards in conduct,appearance, behavior, and training.Noncommissioned officers train theirSoldiers to be experts in their individualWarrior Skills and small unit collectivetasks. The NCO builds a Warrior Team bydemanding discipline from Soldiers in allof their training.

The actions of noncommissionedofficers are concentrated in the executionphase of any kind of operational plan. NCOparticipation in planning is relevant if andonly if the unit has attained expertise in allindividual and small unit skills necessaryto ensure mission success at the collectivelevel. If a unit has not met theserequirements, then the NCOs’ focus needsto be on the drills and rehearsals that occurconcurrent with planning. Once thecommander issues the plan, the NCOs thenensure that rehearsals take on a morefocused relevance.

Essential elements of a unit’spreparation for combat operations are pre-combat inspections (PCls) and pre-combatchecks (PCCs). NCOs must be ruthless inthe execution of proper PCls and PCCs sothat Soldiers and units have the correctequipment at the right place and time toensure combat success. Operational risk isunnecessarily increased and compoundedif noncommissioned officers do not do thiscorrectly.

During the first NCO-focused AAR, thegroup also discusses in some detail the needfor NCOs to ensure the proper conduct andperformance of good maintenance,especially preventive maintenance checksand services, and how maintenance is keyto preparing for combat. The intent of thispart of the AAR is to ensure that the unit’sNCOs fully understand their duty andresponsibility to have their Soldiers at theright place, at the correct time, in the properuniform, and properly trained and ready toperform their tasks in any operation.

At the end of the first AAR, thefacilitator leads the unit’s NCOs through a

series of slides that highlight lessonslearned by previously deploying andredeployed unit leaders. The focus of theselessons learned is on the most criticalaspects of training that the deployingleaders gleaned from their pre-deploymenttraining. We also survey many redeployingunit leaders to solicit their views on thetasks that were most relevant during theirmission and on which they will focusduring their upcoming post-deploymentannual training plan. The facilitator coversthese lessons with the NCOs to let themknow what their predecessors have saidabout their training. This information helpsthe NCOs better prepare for the pre-deployment training in which they areabout to participate.

The endstate of the initial, baseline NCOAAR at First Army’s mobilization stationsis the assurance that a unit’s NCOs areconditioned for success. By the end of theAAR, they will fully understand theirresponsibilities and duties with respect toperformance and conduct as they vigorouslyexecute their post-mobilization process andprepare to deploy to a combat theater ofoperations.

Azimuth check — the InterimNCO After Action Review

The training support brigade conductsan interim NCO-focused AAR once amobilized unit completes all pre-deployment individual training and its firstcollective training event. The purpose ofthis AAR is to facilitate the NCOs’evaluation of their performance andconduct against the baseline expectationsthey explored in the initial after actionreview. They also conduct a self-assessmentof their current strengths and weaknesses.The training support brigade NCO AARteam facilitates the NCOs’ discussion of

how they are going to maintain theirstrengths. The group fixes responsibility onthose leaders in the NCO Corps who arechiefly responsible for maintaining theirstrengths. The facilitator also leads thegroup to realize their own weak areas, onceagain assigning responsibility to the unit’sleaders who will lead their collectiveimprovement and how they will improvethemselves. The NCOs discuss how theyare doing in the performance of theirWarrior Tasks and how well they are livingand enforcing the Soldier’s Creed duringtheir training. This dialogue serves well toreinforce the inculcation of the Warriorspirit in each noncommissioned officer.

The facilitator limits discussion duringthe interim AAR to one strength and oneweak area upon which all of the NCOs mustagree. This serves to focus the AARdiscussion and prevents the NCOs fromsimply restating “training war stories.” Bythis point the training support brigade hasfacilitated several other AARs focused onspecific training events and there is no needto revisit these lessons in this forum. Theintent of the interim AAR is to focus theNCOs on high value-high payoff lessonslearned to maximize future success intraining and preparation for combatoperations.

The last item the group covers in thisAAR is an improvement plan. Thefacilitator requires the group to identifytheir top three issues they can work toimmediately fix, and how to prioritize therest for improvement later. Thisrequirement provides the NCOs with agame plan that they all must agree on andthat they can begin to immediatelyimplement in their subsequent trainingevents. The group concludes its AAR witha discussion about training for combat. Thegroup revisits the need to conduct alltraining to an exacting standard and underthe most arduous conditions that they canpossibly replicate. This is the goal of everyNCO’s duty to prepare Soldiers for battle.

Seizing the Interim Objective— The Final Post-MobilizationStation After Action Review

The training support brigade facilitatesa third and final AAR at the mobilizationstation upon completion of a unit’s pre-


NCOs must be ruthlessin the execution of proper

PCls and PCCs so thatSoldiers and units havethe correct equipment at

the right place and time toensure combat success.


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Soldier’s skills and its small unit collectivetasks. This portion of the AAR processserves as a key reminder of NCOs’responsibility to constantly hone theirSoldiers’ perishable skills.

The final NCO-focused AAR is only an“interim objective” that the NCOs seize intheir learning process. The reason for thisis obvious — the NCOs will continue tolearn and improve as a group while theyexecute the strategy that they developedduring their three NCO-focused AARs atthe mobilization station. This processserves as a means to pull them together,often a critical need for units that are theresult of significant cross-leveling ofSoldiers and leaders. It provides a forumfor the NCOs to focus on their duties andresponsibilities, and to discuss them as agroup. Only the strongest of unit commandsergeants major or first sergeants wouldthink of the need to assemble their NCOsfor this purpose.

The training support brigade at themobilization station provides this forumand the time on the training schedule thatallows the NCOs to re-explore their duties,identify their strengths and weaknesses,and to develop a strategy to sustain orimprove themselves as a collective corpsof noncommissioned officers. The three

deployment training. This AARencompasses the period from arrival at themobilization station to completion of alltraining. Using the same model as theinterim NCO AAR, the facilitator limitsdiscussion primarily to one group strengthand one area for improvement; all of theNCOs in the unit must agree to theseassessments. As with the interim NCO-focused AAR, the intent of this session isto focus discussion on strengths to sustainand areas to improve. The precious timethat the unit devotes to this AAR is not torekindle training “war stories.” This sessioncontinues the learning process of the unit’sNCO Corps.

The discussion of the final NCO AARbuilds on the previous two sessions. TheNCOs assess their progress against thebaseline expectations that they forgedduring the initial AAR in accordance withthe tenets of the Warrior Ethos and theSoldier’s Creed.

They also determine if they are makingprogress in sustaining their strengths andimproving their weaknesses that theycollectively identified in the interim NCO-focused after action review. As with theinterim NCO-focused AAR, the groupdetermines three specific duties orresponsibilities that it should immediately“fix,” how they will make the corrections,and who will lead this process. Identifyingthese specific areas for sustainment andimprovement provides the NCOs thepurpose and direction they require tosustain their collective strengths andimprove their collective weaknesses.

The facilitator closes the final AAR witha discussion of how the NCOs can get themost value from their training and whattraining they should continue to execute tosustain their combat skills while deployedin their theater of operations. The groupdiscusses the means and mechanisms thatare available to them as they sustain theirtraining while engaged in daily combatoperations. This is a fundamentalresponsibility of the unit’s NCO Corps, yetit is a responsibility that NCOs in forwarddeployed units sometimes overlook as theybecome consumed by the tempo of combatoperations.

However busy the unit becomes, it is theduty and responsibility of the NCO Corpsto sustain the unit’s basic individual

facilitated NCO-focused AARs also providean example of how a unit can continue thisprocess while it is deployed in its theaterof operations. The NCO-focused AAR is atool that all units can use in garrison, intraining, and while deployed. The intentof the NCO AAR is to make the NCO Corpsof a unit better so that the unit is better atwhat it does.

An NCO must know what right looks likeand must prepare. As NCOs we never stoplearning and must seek guidance frommanuals and our leaders to ensure we knowthe standard.

— Command Sergeant Major MarySutherland

FM 7-22.7 - The Army NoncommissionedOfficer Guide

Sergeant Jeremiah Johnson

Command Sergeant Major Walter E. Rakowis currently serving as the brigade commandsergeant major for the 2nd Brigade, 85th Division(Training Support) at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Inhis 29 years of military service, Rakow has servedin every leadership position in the Infantry from rifleteam leader to command sergeant major. Hisprevious assignments include serving with the 5thBattalion, 87th Infantry, Republic of Panama, andthe 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, HunterArmy Airfield, Georgia. Rakow also served at theregimental command sergeant major for the 75thRanger Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia.

The intent of the NCO AAR is to make the NCO Corps of a unit better so that the unit is betterat what it does.

FM 7-0, Training the Force, defines the Warrior Ethos as“…the Soldier’s selfless commitment to the nation,mission, unit, and fellow Soldiers. It is the professional

attitude that inspires every American Soldier. The Warrior Ethosis grounded in refusal to accept failure. It is developed andsustained through discipline, commitment to the Army Values,and pride in the Army’s heritage.”

We can no longer rely on fighting our nation’s wars on a linearbattlefield, where we can easily differentiate between friendly andenemy lines. The enemy’s face has changed, as must our way offighting. The mind-set we must assume in fighting that enemymust also change. We can no longer rely on just our Combat Armsbrethren to defeat the enemy. The unique realities of the modernbattlefield mandate that ALL Soldiers assume the mind-set andtenacity of the infantryman, and should they be called upon, takethe fight to the enemy. Current military operations in OperationsIraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have seen cooks transformedinto SAW gunners during convoy operations and field artillerymenperforming cordon searches throughout the heart of Baghdad. Theyassumed these roles with no complaint, and with little or no formaltraining. The thread common to these Soldiers is their selfless

commitment to the nation, the mission, the unit, and fellowSoldiers. They refuse to accept defeat. This state of mind hasremained prevalent throughout our nation’s 229-year history.

The Warrior Ethos should not be a new concept to anyonepresent today. The NCO Creed, The Ranger’s Creed, Von Steuben’s“Blue Book,” the Code of Conduct, and most recently, the Soldier’sCreed, have all emphasized the heart of what the Warrior Ethosrepresents. These beliefs and convictions have been thecornerstone of our profession of arms since the Army’s birth in1775. The focal point of these remarkable documents focuses ondiscipline, professionalism, and selfless service to our nation andour fellow Soldiers. The Warrior Ethos is merely a synopsis ofwhat these historic documents and credos represent. As seniorNCOs and leaders of Soldiers, it is OUR duty to ensure that weinstill these principles into everything our Soldiers do on a dailybasis. We must ensure that our Soldiers possess the mental andphysical toughness to sustain themselves during the chaos ofcombat. It is our responsibility to teach ALL Soldiers that courageis not the absence of fear, but the ability to control that fear andcontinue on with the mission. All noncommissioned officers must

instill in their Soldiers that integrity and honor

WARRIOR ETHOS:Soldiers Selflessly Committed to Army, Unit, Fellow Soldiers

MASTER SERGEANT NICHOLAS B. CASTILLO


must NEVER be compromised, regardless of the situation in whichthey may find themselves. Without either of these character traits,they will never learn to trust each other in combat. The WarriorEthos, simply stated, is a moral and professional standard that wemust hold our Soldiers accountable to. However, in order to dothis, we must first be able to hold ourselves accountable to thatstandard. Leaders must continuously immerse themselves in thehistory of those who have fought before them and adopt theirleadership qualities into their own styles of leadership. We mustcontinuously be seeking ways to improve the way in which wetake care of our Soldiers. We should ask ourselves, “Are ourSoldiers mentally and physically prepared to endure the rigors ofbattle? Are they proficient in their MOS? Are our Soldiersproficient in basic combat Soldier skills?” The answer to thesequestions rests first and foremost with every Soldier that wearsthe rank of the NCO. The Warrior Ethos must be the daily guidepostthat all NCOs adhere to. As NCOs, we are the vehicle that willprovide the next generation of Soldiers the means to becomeproficient in their chosen profession and survive on the battlefield.

As the deployment rate for all components of the United StatesArmy (Active, Reserve, and National Guard) increases, the depthin which we train our Soldiers has never been more crucial.Sergeant First Class Gallagher, an IET trainer stationed at FortBenning, said, “We don’t have the luxury of time right now. Wegraduate Soldiers, and a short time later they are deploying ...WhenSoldiers arrive in Baghdad and get off the planes and intoHMMWVs, they are immediately thrust into combat operations…They have to go in with a mind-set that they will engage andkill the enemy on their first day in country.”

This is an excellent example of why we must instill the WarriorEthos into our Soldiers NOW. Leaders cannot afford to wait untilarrival in a combat zone to realize that their Soldiers are notprepared to fight. As soon as they step off that airplane, Soldiersmust be confident in their ability to perform their wartime mission,take care of their comrades, and return safely home. The WarriorEthos gives us the ideals that we must teach our Soldiers toaccomplish this.

Failure to teach our Soldiers to survive in combat is not anoption. We are at the crossroads of one of the most critical periodsin the Army’s history. A quote from Sergeant Major of the ArmyKenneth O. Preston’s swearing in ceremony relates closely to thisessay. He said, “Our entire Army is at war and not just theinfantryman or tanker. We are an Army of Warfighters and EVERYSoldier is a rifleman first. I have seen the Warrior Ethos alive andwell in the souls of all our Soldiers, Active, Guard, and Reserve.We must continue to instill the warrior spirit in the souls of allour 1.3 million members.”

We cannot, and MUST NOT, fail in this endeavor.

Master Sergeant Nicholas B. Castillo is currently serving as the trainingNCO for the Army Reserve’s 395th Ordnance Company in Appleton,Wisconsin.

SOLDIER’S CREEDI am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve thepeople of the United States and live the Army Values.

I will always place the mission first.I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained andproficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain

my arms, my equipment and myself.I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemiesof the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.I am an American Soldier.

WARRIOR ETHOS“Embedded in the Soldier’s Creed is the Warrior

Ethos — the very essence of what it means to be aSoldier:

I will always place the mission first.I will never accept defeat.I will never quit.I will never leave a fallen comrade.

The Warrior Ethos describes the frame of mind of theprofessional Soldier. It proclaims the selflesscommitment to the Nation, mission, unit, and fellowSoldiers that all Soldiers espouse. When internalized, itproduces the will to win ...

At its core, the Warrior Ethos is the refusal to acceptfailure and instead overcome all obstacles with honor.The Warrior Ethos moves Soldiers to fight through allconditions to victory, no matter how long it takes andhow much effort is required. Army leaders develop andsustain it through discipline, realistic training,commitment to the Army Values, and pride in the Army’sheritage.”

— Field Manual 1, The U.S. Army

“We are, have been, and willremain a values based institution.

Our values will not change and they are non-negotiable. Our Soldiers are Warriors ofcharacter. They exemplify these values everyday and are the epitome of our Americanspirit. They are the heart of the Army.”

— General Peter J. SchoomakerChief of Staff of the Army

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


Relief

The three M46s crawled into the rocky bed of theshallow Soyang River. It was a cold night. The tanks

had traveled since dawn, taking two stops to refuel and onefor a breakdown. They turned north into the swift current,each one causing a wave that reached almost to the driver’shatch. Mufflers glowed cherry red in the dark and sizzledwhen hit by water. Tank commanders hung on outside theturrets, calling corrections to the right or left. Counting the medic,mechanic and me, we were 17 men.

Moving north in the riverbed we reached the turn off going toHill 812 and Luke’s Castle, a key position defended by a SouthKorean rifle company. An American sergeant signaled us with aflashlight. The convoy turned out of the water to the trail. Aguide was there to lead us to the three Sherman M4s being replacedby our three M46s.

The column moved in the dark up the narrow winding road forabout two miles. The approach to the hill was slick with ice.Sergeant Bill Harbin of C Company, 245th Tank Battalioncommanded the section being relieved. One of Harbin’s threeM4s had inverted grousers that dug into the frozen trail and gottraction. He used it as a tow tank and attached cables to each ofour M46s. It dragged us over the last hump of iced road to the topof Hill 812. Harbin and some of his men had been at Luke’sCastle for 78 days. Four lieutenants had come and gone duringthat time but Sergeant Harbin had sole command at the relief.

The Position

At first light our guys saw a white sheet spread out on the enemy side of the hill. It was a message of welcome to us

from the North Koreans. A ROK (Republic of Korea) soldierinterpreted the oriental characters into English. One round of our90mm destroyed the banner. The North Koreans and we were totry to kill each other until April when we were replaced. Theposition would be lost in June but not by us.

Some of our group had been with B Company a long time. Ihad been there three months. All had experience with the Chinesebut in modest operations. Lieutenant James F. Brady, B Companycommander, explained that the North Koreans on 812 were apt tobe more dangerous. It was our battalion’s first experience against

North Koreans. This hill was the most threatened place on the12th ROK Division’s part of the United Nation’s Main Line ofResistance. It was high ground, important to the control of theregion, and both sides wanted it. The ROKs now in possessionhad replaced U.S. Marines. North Koreans flanked the hill onthree sides. We would see them every day. Their troops were partof the experienced 45th NK Infantry Division, which was in realitythe North Korean Army reorganized after its defeat.

Our tankers had spent all of January training at Dodge Range,the 10th Corps tank facility north of Chunchon. Our vehicleswere in fair shape. The small unit was experienced and had workedtogether long enough for us to know each other. We shot a lot ofgunnery practice at Dodge. On the move to Luke’s Castle wewere confident but anxious. I was a second lieutenant, but wasconsidered experienced.

None of us had seen Luke’s Castle. Lieutenant Brady hadbeen alone when he reconnoitered for the relief. A mustang, Bradyhad served as an enlisted infantryman before being commissionedat OCS. He wrote standing operating procedures for 812 andwent over them with us in detail. Slightly built, he wore steel rimArmy issue glasses and talked through clenched teeth. His briefingwas thorough. Our relationship was professional, not personal. Iwas not to see much of him after we went to the position, whichsuited me fine.

Our mission was to give maximum support to the ROK unitdefending the hill but to depend on ourselves for protection. Wehad authority for target selection. The American officer we sawevery week or so was Major Sowa, KMAG (Korean MilitaryAdvisory Group) adviser to 37th ROK Regiment. He came thereto check on 7th Company but provided me with welcome guidance.

There were about 150 South Korean soldiers on the hill.Captain Yul was in command. A wizened over-age-in grade officer,

NIMROD T. FRAZER

Three U.S. Tanksand ROK RifleCompany in

Mountain Defense

Northeast Korea — Luke’s Castle — Winter 1953Hill 812Luke’sCastle

Courtesy photo

The author and his platoon spent 41 days defending Hill 812 in 1953.


PROFESSIONAL FORUM


Yul told us he had hunted and killedguerillas in the south. His company hadthree rifle platoons and a weapons platoon.He also had an American forward observerfrom a U.S. 105mm howitzer battalion andcould call on a squad of Republic of Koreacombat engineers when he wanted them.The artillery was invaluable, and theengineers were helpful in many ways. Theyimproved firing positions for our tanks bydynamiting out slots in the ridgelines. Itwas the only way to dig into the frozenground.

The forward slope of Hill 812 was strewnwith naked bodies of North Koreans left aftera recent assault. ROKs had stripped the deadand thrown them outside the lines. Coldweather kept them from decomposing.Sergeant Harbin told me his tanks had firedevery round of ammo for the tank’s guns inthat fight and had not withdrawn from theposition. A counterattack by Koreanriflemen saved the day.

Chicken wire was strung over infantrypositions to catch hand grenades before theyexploded in the trenches. ROK soldiersstayed in their fighting positions.

The Set Up

We placed the command tank,number 36, next to ROK

Lieutenant Lee’s weapons platoon. The“poof” of mortar fire was our signal thatsomething was going on. Lee had been tocollege, spoke English and was good aboutkeeping us posted. He would put upparachute flares when tanks wantedbattlefield illumination. I always paid himthe compliment of saluting first. He wassoon greeting me as, “ Friend and Brother.”

The command tank had a field of fire tothe east that included an enemy strong pointrarely occupied by day. It was about fourhundred yards away, down a gentle, openslope. The approach to us from thatposition was well covered by ROK and U.S.fire plans. We watched the outpost formovement and sometimes fired the 90mmand .50 cal. machine gun into it.

We placed another tank on the crest ofthe hill to the immediate front. It had anunobstructed view and was a natural placeto look for targets. The enemy avenue ofapproach from the west was in its field offire. That was where the earlierbreakthrough had taken place and where

the fatal breakthrough came when theposition fell in June. That tank slot had agood view of “The Rock” of Luke’s Castleas well as the steep approaches from theriver to the north. The sheer drop inelevation made assault of our position fromthe north very difficult, though some NorthKoreans were to successfully scale the hillwhen they took the position in June.

Our third tank was placed threehundred yards southwest at an azimuthof about 220 degrees from the commandtank. It was on the southwest finger of812. There was a log bunker for the crewand a ROK rifle squad spread out on eachside of the firing slot. An enemy strongpoint about a thousand yards to the westprovided good target prospects but theposition was not easy to defend. The enemyapproach to it was concealed by thesteepness of the hill. Our men needed tobe in close touch with the covering ROKinfantry and that was not easy to maintain.Language difficulties were always aproblem.

The supply Jeep from B Company wasour lifeblood, bringing up .30 cal. and.50 cal. machine gun ammunition as wellas mail, food, and water. The Jeep wasexposed to enemy observation in placesand sometimes fired on. Periodically, afull tracked armored personnel carrier(APC) with a loud and smoky radialengine would come up with ammo for ourbig guns. The APC was a bigger andhigher priority target than the Jeep. Itsdriver had a handlebar mustache and arisky job. We were to welcome that guycalled “California” many more timesthrough the winter as well as during theJuly fighting at Hill 755.

Neither the APC nor the Jeep could getup to our positions when there was snowand ice in the winter or during the springrains. Then we had to hand carry theammunition, gas, C rations, and drinkingwater up the slippery slopes. A round of90mm weighed about 85 pounds.Excuses were not accepted so everybodyhelped with the exhausting work. We gotthoroughly soaked with sweat on thoseclimbs no matter how cold the weather.

Dusk

Moving around on 812 at night was dangerous, so dusk was a tense

and busy time. Everybody, Koreans andAmericans, stayed jumpy. Guns werechecked as darkness fell. I wore a whitearmband for identification. We never usedflashlights, but our guys did not have to betold about light discipline. Smoking wasnot allowed on the tanks. The GIs were asworried about being mistaken for enemyby Americans as they were of walking intoa North Korean or a trigger-happy ROKsoldier in the dark.

Standing operating procedure called fortanks to be in firing position at dusk. Rangecards had to be updated every night. Somecards held as many as 20 plottedconcentrations, each setting out elevationand deflection at which the guns should beset for specific targets. The cards wereessential for night firing. Enemy avenuesof approach and routes for friendly patrolswere given names and numbers. Someplots were also made for firing close in andaround other tanks in the event we wereoverrun. Range Cards were usually drawnon C ration cartons and were quicklyprepared by good gunners. This work hadto be accurate and the settings on the cardchanged every time the tank was moved.

We had a hot meal and mail call in lateafternoon, going a few at a time to thealways welcome supply Jeep. Spreadingout gave the illusion of safety. The Jeepdriver always brought gossip. He wouldtell about new people, those going home,who was getting rest and recuperationleave, which positions were takingcasualties, and what was happeningthroughout the battalion. After meals eachman observed the Army ritual of washinghis aluminum mess kit in boiling water.

Night

Each tank kept two men in the turretduring darkness. Duty was two

hours on and four off until dawn.Punctuality was enforced. Someoneshowing up 10 minutes late for a change ofwatch could provoke strong words andcreate grudges. From time to time I wouldtake the place of one of the men for all orpart of his watch. It was the best way forme to know what was going on.

Standing procedures called for me tovisit each of the three vehicles all night atirregular times. It was scary work with alot of slipping and sliding over frozen


terrain, but the inspections were essential.On the first round I would examine the range

cards and verify that each vehicle had a five-gallon can of water and extra C rations.Lieutenant Brady had insisted that each tankbe self-contained and provisioned in the eventthe hill was attacked and overrun. Survivalmight depend of it. We sometimes talkedamong ourselves about the possibility of enemyassault.

Heaters never worked and Little Joes(gasoline powered generators for the tanks) andradios were not reliable. SOP called for oneoperable transmitter and two working receiverson each tank. We considered ourselves lucky to even make a netwith the company command post (CP) at the beginning of eachnight. Our equipment was old, and Company B had only one radiorepairman. He worked for the company exec and did not get hisorders from me. All were quick to blame him when radios weredown, which was most of the time. Because telephones werereliable, the commo man was also expected to find and repairbreaks in wire strung on top of the ground. Most of his checkingfor blown out wire was done alone and at night. Everybody bitchedat the poor guy. He must have felt like Job.

Our bunkers were well enough constructed to withstand directhits from big mortars. My CP bunker was hit one day by whatmust have been a 120mm mortar. Several of us were in it. Myears rang for a couple of days, but the bunker held up. Thoughsmall, it held six crude bunks. They made for good sleeping withour rubber air mattresses and down-filled sleeping bags. A big ratonce awakened me by crawling over my face. After that I sleptwith my face to the light of our Coleman lantern which was keptgoing all the time.

It was important to stay as clean as possible. From time totime the APC would bring up a bundle of clean long johns, socks,and canvas combat fatigues to be worn over our regular wool olivedrab pants. There would be much sorting through garmentslooking for a fit. Our filthy clothes were then returned to thecompany for washing by a Korean civilian. Every person wasexpected to shave and wash his feet every day. We kept two five-gallon water cans in each bunker and washed out of a helmet or asmall pan. No one was allowed off the hill to visit a shower pointduring my 40-day stay there.

We had a little CP table for maps, the hand cranked telephone,and a battery-powered portable radio for news and music. It wasthe only recreational radio in the company, and our little unit on812 was complimented by having it. Everybody knew we had thetoughest job. Truck mounted radio stations Gypsy and Ramblerhad smooth talking announcers broadcasting around the clock.The radio was always played quietly and usually only at night.Our bunkers were for safety, sleeping, washing, and warming.Soldiers respected that and spoke in quiet voices. For music welistened to the mournful My Baby is Coming Home and the sillyHow Much is the Doggie in the Window? On 5 March 1953 welearned from the radio that USSR Premier Joseph Stalin had died.All hoped that would speed up the peace talks at Panmunjon but

none believed it. The medic and mechanic took turns all

night on phone watch. In addition to a line tocompany CP, we had a sound poweredtelephone linked into all the ROK positions.Chatter on those lines told us about threats bothreal and perceived.

The Guns

Shooting was dangerous. We expectedsniper fire every time we pulled a tank

into a firing position and often got it.It was always a challenge to improve

gunnery. Aiming mechanisms of the old gunshad a lot of play or looseness in them. Kentucky windage, orcheating on the sight reticle, was necessary in laying the tube.Every gun had a personality, and each gunner had to know howmuch the crosshairs were off. First-round hits were rare.

Earlier in the war, our M46s had belonged to the 6th TankBattalion. Those vehicles were battle worn veterans. Gun Bookentries were hopelessly out of date. Some of our tanks had beenin Task Force Crombez at Chipyong-ni. Tanks played a significantrole there in routing Chinese surrounding the 23rd Regiment ofthe 2nd Division. It was Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgeway’sfirst victory in Korea, and it turned the tide of the war from theChinese to the U.S.

Our job was to shoot North Koreans and we did it every day,sometimes morning and afternoon, and many nights. Targetselection and shooting was hard work and took time. We searchedwith the glasses for movement and patterns of activity beforepulling the tanks up to fire. All weapons were cleaned after eachfiring and the 90mm had to be swabbed. Soldiers who were alreadybone tired, all the time, did that cold, dirty but necessary work.

It was easy to make excuses for not shooting and to put offshooting. When we didn’t shoot, the enemy usually didn’t shoot.If we didn’t shoot, the men didn’t have to clean guns. Life wasnot as dangerous. Executing a tank defense by firepower createdwork, and there was no way to tell a man that shooting was notputting him in greater danger. People bitched about it. We gotcounterfire often. None liked that.

Counterfire

The first soldier killed with us occurred during counterfireafter an exchange I started with Tank 36. He was a likable

Korean, a KATUSA (Korean Augmentation United States Army)working with our artillery. I knew him rather well and losinghim grieved me. It still does.

We shot aggressively and believed we were hurting the NorthKoreans. But they always came back in effective, sometimessurprising, ways. Once, at enormous risk, the North Koreansdeployed a large flat trajectory recoilless rifle very close by. Itwas probably not more than 200 yards west of 36’s firing slot. Ihad checked the area with binoculars but completely missed thecamouflaged emplacement. They shot us just as we began firingin another direction. The tank commander’s hatch and the loader’shatch were open. It was not possible to follow outgoing rounds or

Our job was to shootNorth Koreans and we

did it every day,sometimes morningand afternoon, andmany nights. Target

selection and shootingwas hard work and

took time.


PROFESSIONAL FORUMto accurately sense hits with the hatches shut. I could not tellwhere the enemy fire was coming from. The first rounds to hit usmade a lot of noise but no fragments came into the fightingcompartment. It is a mystery why the North Koreans never usedarmor piercing ammo. With it they would have killed us all thatmorning.

I told the driver to back the tank to a position of hull defilade,in the lee of a knoll in our immediate rear. He gunned the enginebut the tank did not move. The driver told me the left track andsuspension system were disabled. I made a decision to abandonthe tank and told the four crewmembers exactly how we wouldevacuate. The driver and bow gunner would leave through theirescape hatches underneath the tank. The loader, gunner, and Iwould go out the big hatch on top. We would use the same dive onthe lee side as used in the past to dodge snipers. I would go first,immediately after the next round came in. The others were tofollow after other rounds hit. Just like in parachute training atFort Benning, it took less nerve to lead the stick than to follow. Ibailed out OK, hit the ground running and got safely behind theknoll. Everyone got out and joined me. We helplessly watchedthe tank receive a large number of hits. Everything outside thetank was shot up, the 50-caliber machine gun, the sponson boxes,mufflers, and radio antenna, but the tank did not burn.

Battalion maintenance sent up a recovery vehicle to pull thevehicle out and take it away. A couple of days later maintenancereturned with a “brand new rebuilt” M46 from Japan. A dreamcomes true. Everything about it was perfect, down to a gun mountthat had no slack and radios that worked. We used it to put massivefire on the ridge from which the recoilless rifle had caught us.We even spent days bushwhacking snipers with the 90mm gun,sometimes using all of the high explosive (HE) and whitephosphorus (WP) rounds in the ready rack. We worked over everycommo trench and bunker in sight and enemy activity slowed.Then we spent hours with the glasses looking for more distanttargets. The area near the ford, 2,000 yards in front of us, and onthe mountain above it were treeless and target rich. In addition tobunker busting, we often shot enemy soldiers with the 90 as theyran off the mountain (Papa San) and approached the ford.

The North Koreans retaliated by bringing another big gun intoaction. It was at about a 030-degree azimuth (northeast) from Hill812 on a hill beyond the Soyang River. It was a flat trajectoryweapon firing from a bunker. Logs covering the aperture wouldbe removed when firing started and replaced afterwards. We couldnot knock it out.

Close Air Support

Air war was foreign to us but we knew the North Koreans had machine guns capable of bringing down aircraft. The

remains of a U.S. artillery observation plane were lodged in a treenear our position. Shot down by a machine gun, the pilot andobserver had somehow managed to land in the treetop and get outalive. Aside from that wreck we had never seen an airplane inour skies, friendly or otherwise. We took air superiority for granted.

I asked Major Sowa, the KMAG (Korean Military AdvisoryGroup) advisor to 37th Regiment, for an air strike to help withthe troublesome bunker across the Soyang. Word came back that

on the next day we would, indeed, get a strike, but we would haveto mark the targets with WP rounds. No ground controller wasavailable.

Six gull winged U.S. Navy F4Us from the aircraft carrierPhilippine Sea showed up as promised. They circled overhead atabout 6,000 feet while we used Willie Peter (WP) ammunition tomark the principal target and alternates. We did not have radiocommunication with the planes. The planes peeled off one at atime. Each made his dive; shooting machine guns to the point ofreleasing a bomb, then pulling out. North Korean machine gunsrattled at the Navy planes on each pass. Our GIs loved it. Theywere yelling and whooping. I was worried that an F4U would beshot down. The planes made good targets for the NK machineguns we heard firing nearby. The Navy pilots worked for a longtime, releasing one bomb at a time. Some were more aggressivethan others, pulling out of dives only after going well below ourridgeline. Others let their bombs go from higher altitudes. Afterone of the higher drops, a GI yelled, “There goes a married one!”

We were filled with admiration for the flyers, even the carefulones. The bombs tore up the bunker that started all this, hiteverything else we marked, and the flyers left without losinganyone. Our guys joked about how those pilots would get a shotof whiskey on returning to the ship, eat with silver, dine on whitetable cloths, and sleep between sheets on mattresses that night.

Friendly Fire

One night the mail Jeep brought news that an officer whoknew me had joined the battalion. It was 2nd Lieutenant

Sam Steiger. We had been in the same OCS Company at FortKnox. He was assigned to a position on Hill 854. It was east ofus on the opposite side of the Soyang Gang where the river passedfrom North Korea through the Main Line of Resistance to SouthKorea. The position was several thousand yards away.

The very next morning my driver Corporal Fordham and Iwere sitting on the hillside enjoying the good weather. We wereabout 30 yards from tank 36. A big round came screaming in andhit just above us. I told Fordham that it sounded like a 120. Itwas definitely bigger than what we were accustomed to. Anotherround came in after about a minute, hitting just downhill from us.There was a bracket on tank 36. I looked at Corporal Fordhamand said one of us had to move the tank. He said that he would doit if I would let him wait until after the next round came in. I washappy to agree. The next round came in short, with fragmentshitting the tank like rocks hitting a washtub. He sprinted to thetank, started the engine in a split second and gunned backwardsdown the hill. His superior driving saved the tank.

After Fordham put 36 into defilade, the firing shifted to ROKinfantry positions downhill on the east and stopped after a fewmore rounds. I got a phone call from Company CP. Had wereceived any incoming? I said we had and thought it was NorthKorean 120s. An American major that I did not know came upsoon. He said our incoming was friendly fire from Hill 854. Anew officer had misread his map. It was Lieutenant Steiger. Thenext day Steiger came to Luke’s Castle and shook hands all around.He was graceful, humble, and apologetic. Initially relieved fromduty as a platoon leader and assigned to a ration breakdown detail,


Sam was later redeemed by participating in the rescue of tankersfrom 812 when it fell. He was awarded a Silver Star and a PurpleHeart. I attended a welcome home party for him in the fall of1953 at his parent’s apartment in New York City and told his Dadabout the incident. Sam later served several terms in Congress asa representative from Arizona.

Changes in Command

Captain George Patton joined the 140th as commander ofCompany A, replacing Captain Kenneth O. West. One of

Patton’s platoons supported a ROK rifle company west and southof us. He called a meeting of his leadership as well as those fromunits joining the A Company positions. First Lieutenant OrrinSharp, the executive officer of Company B, picked me up in aJeep at Luke’s Castle, and we went to a bunker in the rear for thePatton meeting. I knew Patton from Fort Knox where he hadtaken the advanced course. He and Major JohnEisenhower attended my OCS graduating class’scommissioning ceremony and reception.It was an honor for me to be serving inthe war with the son of one of our nation’sgreat heroes. I was also to serve with himin the summer fighting for Hill 755. Thattime away for the Patton meeting was my onlyabsence from Luke’s Castle between 12February and 31 March.

Major Dumas, formerly executive officer of the140th, became battalion commander. The logisticsand support at 812 were much better than duringour earlier tour on the northwest corner of thePunchbowl. We got the latest model Nylon flakjackets, fur hooded parkas, pile caps for warmth understeel helmets, leather palmed trigger-finger mittensthat came to the elbow, and down-filled canvascovered sleeping bags.

Accident

A disaster of our own making came when fire destroyed everything in one of the bunkers.

A flambeau used for lighting started it. We had oneColeman lantern for our three bunkers and had devised flambeaus,bottles of gasoline with cloth wicks, for lighting in the other two.One got kicked over and the gasoline exploded into fire.

Everybody got out safely but our loss included most sleepingbags and parkas. For several weeks all of us shared the equipmentwe had left. When a man came off watch he gave his parka to hisreplacement before going to the replacement’s bunk and gettinginto that sleeping bag. The close and dirty living was hard ondispositions and dignity. We paid a big price for the kicked overflambeau. A dangerous form of lighting, I should never haveallowed it to be used. We had candles.

Serving with the Koreans

We fell into a comfortable way of working with the ROKsand joked about going native. I wore a camouflage fishnet

over my sandbag helmet cover, just like the ROKs. With a 12th

ROK Division patch sewn to one side and a 37th ROK Regimentpatch on the other, I thought we fit right in. Their soldiers hadhammered the unit crests out of beer cans. Many of us had cometo identify with 7th Company, and we were certainly dependenton them, as they were on us. We all knew many of the ROKofficers and soldiers, knew some Korean words and I met withCaptain Yul in his bunker most days. We helped them in everyway possible. Their wounded usually walked off the hill but ourJeep evacuated ROK soldiers unable to walk, including CaptainYul’s interpreter when he got hit in the buttocks. He left 812laughing as he lay on his stomach on the stretcher on the back ofour supply jeep.

Long Range Ambush Patrol

Good weather never lasted. An especially heavy snow shutdown 7th Company’s regular patrolling, but Captain Yul’s

Regimental Headquarters put out an order for prisoners. A patrolleader and seven men were picked and issued white camouflage

covers to be worn over helmets and clothing. They werebriefed and rehearsed.

We put Tank 36 into firing position and plottedconcentrations along the route to the patrol objective,

an ambush site near an underwater bridge crossingthe Soyang. The patrol leader borrowed my MICarbine, a model that fired full automatic. He

led the men out of our lines in deep snow at darkwith his last man reeling out telephone wire behind.They were gone that night, all day the next day andreturned just before dawn of the second day, in deepsnow all the time. We knew from called in reportsthat they failed to take a prisoner. On returning to

our lines, cold, worn out and dejected, the patrol linedup for debriefing. Captain Yul came out of his bunker.First he slapped the helmet of the officer, and chewedhim out for failing. Then he did the same with eachsoldier. My Korean friend, the weapons platoon leader

Lieutenant Lee, and I stood together and cringed withembarrassment over the incident. It hurt to see Captain Yul beatingup his people, something that would never, ever have happenedwith Americans. Our tankers from B Company were now livingwith another Army with other values.

The Cost of Carelessness

Clear weather brought out lots of enemy. Tank 36 took its72-round basic load into position to fire. I picked the first

target and gave the gunner a command to traverse left. He triedto traverse but got no movement. Corporal Fred Fordham wasin the driver’s seat and looking up saw the trouble through hisopen hatch. A sandbag had been accidentally left on the outsideturret ring, stopping the traverse of the tube. The reach fromthe driver’s seat to the sandbag could not be made withoutFordham’s exposing his body. We were observed in that firingposition and expected sniper fire. Fordham told me he woulddrop out the escape hatch under the driver’s seat, crawlunderneath the tank to the rear, and then crawl to the front of thevehicle on the side toward the sniper. The plan was for him to

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stand up quickly by the driver’s hatch and remove the obstructingsandbag. It seemed reasonable and I approved with the admonitionto be careful.

Fordham crawled through the escape hatch. We waited for afew minutes. Nothing happened; we did not hear a sound. Withoutexposing myself I yelled for Fordham out of the open tankcommander’s hatch. There was no answer. I told the crew that Iwould go out and check on him. Knowing that I was apt to befired on, I crouched on the tank commander’s seat before divingout on the side of the turret away from the sniper, catchinghandholds to break my fall down the side of the tank. I heard thesniper’s rounds pass overhead. Then I crawled around the backof the tank to the other side, the exposed west side. Fordham wasslumped with his head down into the front idler wheel. I calledhim and got no answer. I crawled to where I could reach thecollar of his flak jacket and dragged him out to a rise that shieldedus from the sniper. I thought Corporal Fordham was dead andwas relieved to hear a slight moan. He had taken a shot in theneck that entered in the front and exited in the back.

The medic had a hard time finding a vein. Fordham showedpain every time the needle hit. Someone brought a stretcher.Fortunately a Jeep was on the hill. The trip to the battalion aidstation was about five miles over the rough tank trail. He wassent by ambulance from there to a MASH (Mobile Army SurgicalHospital) hospital at Jade, 10th Corps Headquarters, near Inje,another 20 miles over the dirt main supply route.

Corporal Fordham wrote me later that he was OK after havingbeen unable to speak for a long, frightening time. Hospitalized inJapan, he wrote that he was ready to come back to the platoon. Iwrote back that he had done more than his part and should try toget to the States with that wound. We missed Fordham’s quickcourage and will to work. He was a splendid soldier from upstateNew York. I felt responsible for his having been shot and he barelymissed being killed.

Our soldiers routinely took life-threatening risks. I am veryproud of that, one of the best characteristics of American soldiers,but it was often foolish. All believed that nothing bad wouldhappen to them. It was that way with every man.

Psychological Warfare

Psychological Warfare briefly flourished on our hill. Forseveral clear nights a team of ROKs set up a gasoline

powered generator and loudspeaker to broadcast propaganda acrossthe line. Our ROKs would invite the NKs to surrender, makingpromises of a good life. Some would sing between announcements.Not one of the enemy surrendered. The North Koreans respondedin a day or two by mortaring leaflets for the ROK soldiers on 812.They had narrative messages in Korean with crude, cartoon-likedrawings, some with an ugly, grasping Uncle Sam.

Treachery

We all needed haircuts and as a morale builder, the companysent up a barber to cut hair and give marvelous hot water

shaves. He made several visits before being discovered withdrawings showing of our tank emplacements. I saw the drawings.National Police executed the guy as a North Korean Agent.

Incoming Rounds and Raids

Procedure required a telephone report of incoming rounds.We called in the amount, size, and time of incoming. We

always figured that heavy fire was in preparation for an assault.We got heavy fire from time to time but never got an assault. Webelieved that our regular output of 90mm and machine gun firewas a big factor in discouraging attacks.

Something ugly was always happening on our hill. Just as theArmy had eliminated all-black units, it broke up the all PuertoRican regiment in Korea while we were at 812. The unit originallyserved with distinction, but had become plagued with bug-outs,unauthorized retreats. An infantry private was sent to us whenthe Puerto Ricans were dispersed throughout Eighth Army.Arriving on the chow Jeep, he knew no English. I assigned himto Corporal Michaelson, who commanded the tank on ourdangerous west flank.

The position was raided in a squad-sized attack on the PuertoRican replacement’s first night. North Koreans got to Michaelson’stank with a shaped charge weighing about 20 pounds. They weredriven off, leaving the anti-tank explosive unused on the ground.Michaelson told us that during the fight the new guy lay moaningon the floor of the fighting compartment, doing nothing.Michaelson didn’t appreciate my having assigned the untrainedand confused soldier to him.

PeopleCorporal Michaelson was another of those quiet people in the

Army who could always be counted on to perform well. I reliedheavily on him. On the other hand, I had taken a marginal mastersergeant with us when we went to 812. Because of his rank hewas made TC (tank commander). Even though the senior enlistedman on the hill, he just didn’t work out. He curried favor with themen and overlooked sloppy work. Perhaps I did a poor job ofbringing out his best. In any case, I put the sergeant on the chowJeep one night and sent him back to the company. I told companyto do what they wanted with him and to send me any replacement.I then called the men together and explained that the rankingenlisted man on that hill would be Corporal Michaelson. He wasto be treated as if he were a master sergeant, though his pay andrank were that of corporal. On that hill we all observed militarycourtesy by saluting once a day but none of us wore rank anyhow.I had given Michaelson a brevet promotion, which is givingsomeone the responsibility without giving them the pay or rank,but he was legitimately promoted to sergeant before we left the


Psychological Warfare briefly flourished on ourhill. For several clear nights a team of ROKs set

up a gasoline powered generator andloudspeaker to broadcast propaganda across theline. Our ROKs would invite the NKs to surrender,

making promises of a good life ... The NorthKoreans responded in a day or two by mortaring

leaflets for the ROK soldiers on 812.


hill.We had few visitors to 812.

Our guys, probably out of envyfor those in safer jobs, spoke ofthem derisively as tourists. Awelcome visitor, however, wasChaplain Speiker, a NewEngland Unitarian, who came upto pray and counsel.

Good Times and BadTimes

Our latrine was a woodenammunition box with a

hole knocked in the top. Visitingit and taking down three layersof clothes to squat on the icyhillside could be quite a thrill,especially when a round came in.Someone took a picture of one ofour most popular guys, CorporalEmillio C. Rodriquez, on thatammo box with his pants down.He was the funniest man in theoutfit, always getting a laugh outof every situation. The picturewas passed around after he waskilled when the hill fell. In it hewas laughing as always.

A tanker on 812 never, ever got much sleep or rest. Our dutyschedule never let up. For me it was the responsibility foreverything around the clock. We were constantly shooting,cleaning guns and pulling maintenance on the vehicles. Handcarrying gas and ammo in bad weather and reloading the heavy90mm rounds after shoots was physically and mentally grindingfor all. The pressure was constant. For me the worst of it wasbeing scared by incoming fire and in making the rounds at night.Any of us might have several hours in which to sleep but be sowired we were unable to sleep. Then we might be plagued withsleepiness at a time when going to sleep was out of the question.All were subject to getting to the wit’s end. The men had eachother in ways I could not share.

I was mentally and physically exhausted when a savior arrived.Sergeant Bill Squires, the first sergeant of Company B, did notusually figure into my life. We hardly knew each other, strung outas the company was. He did not answer to platoon leaders. Hisduty was at the company CP, and he answered to the Exec and theCO. We were literally miles apart and seldom spoke on the phone.I had not laid eyes on him since arriving at Luke’s Castle. He hadno responsibility to me nor did I have any to him. That was theArmy way. But Squires showed up on the chow Jeep one eveningand told me to get in the sack and rest. He told me he would runthings for a while. I do not know who told him I needed help orhow he came to that conclusion on his own, but he was there. Ineeded the rest and I completely trusted him with my responsibilityfor 24 hours. I slept all that night and into the morning; then I

heated water and bathed all over, before sleeping some more.

End of the Tour

Spring rains set in. It was cold, wet and muddy. In our misery we continued to faithfully follow the SOPs, made

new range cards every night, kept up the firing, covered infantrypatrols, cleaned weapons, all of it. I continued inspections atnight all around the perimeter and into the shadow of “The Rock”that was between our position and the enemy’s. I knew whichROK trenches and fighting bunkers were vulnerable and closestto the North Koreans. I knew all of Captain Yul’s positions; onsome you could hear enemy voices. Sometimes I threw smallstones into enemy positions to hear them tumble down on theirside of 812. Their soldiers would chatter.

There was always the question of dealing with the next seriousassault on our hill. We believed tanks could make a majorcontribution to the defense of 812. We had done it.

Nimrod T. Frazer entered active duty as a private first class with theAlabama National Guard when it was mobilized in December of 1950.Commissioned a second lieutenant after completing OCS, he volunteered forKorea. He was recognized by the 37th ROK Infantry Regiment for the tour onHill 812 described in this paper. In June of 1953 he was awarded The SilverStar for action at Hill 755. His unit, The 140th Tank Battalion was awarded theU.S. Presidential Unit Citation and the Republic of Korea Presidential UnitCitation.

Courtesy photo

The author, Lieutenant Frazer, (left) and Captain Dougherty stand outside the command post for B Company,140th Tank Battalion in April 1953.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

“May this memorial endure the ravages of time until the wind,rain and tropical storms wear away its face, but never itsmemories.”

Guadalcanal American Memorial, in Honiara, Solomon Islands

In the early hours of 22 December 2004, an AustralianFederal Police Protective Services officer was murdered by sniper fire in Honiara, Guadalcanal, while conducting a

vehicle patrol with the Australian-led Regional Assistance Missionin the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). In response, the 1st Battalion,The Royal Australian Regiment, A Company Ready CompanyGroup (1 RAR RCG), was alerted that same day. Within 18 hoursof the Australian government’s decision to support RAMSI, about100 men, vehicles, and equipment arrived by three RoyalAustralian Air Force C130 aircraft in the Solomon Islands toreinforce the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) portion of RAMSIknown as Operation Anode.

The A Company 1 RAR RCG rapid deployment demonstratedthe inherent utility and flexibility of light infantry by: Rapidly deploying forces into an unfamiliar and complex

environment; Assuming command of a five-nation coalition joint task

force; Working in support of an 11-nation participating police

force (PPF); and Quickly demonstrating the Australian government’s resolve

to support the continued success of RAMSI.This article aims to provide a brief background to

RAMSI and Operation Anode; discuss high readiness asa culture within the Townsville-based Ready DeploymentForce; and describe operations conducted by the 1 RARRCG between 22 December 2004 and 25 January 2005while deployed to the Solomon Islands.

Background to the Regional Assistance Mission inthe Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

The Solomon Islands are located almost 1,900 kilometersnortheast of Australia, and consist of a chain of mountainous

islands and hundreds of coral atolls. The nation stretches almost1,500 kilometers from the northwest, where it borders the PapuaNew Guinea province of Bougainville, to the southwest, where

the Coral Sea meets the Pacific Ocean.The Solomon Islands have an essentially Christian

population of approximately 500,000. English is widelyspoken in the main population centers. The governmentis democratically elected and the country is divided intonine provinces. The main population centers are foundon the island of Guadalcanal, where the capital Honiarais located, and on the island of Malaita. The two key

ethnic groupings, the Guadalcanal people, known as Gwales, andthe Malaitans hail from these islands.

Europeans had visited the Solomon Islands sporadically sincethe 16th century, until Britain assumed a protectorate over theislands in the 1890s.

CJTF 635: Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands

AN AUSTRALIANARMY UNIT’S

QUICK RESPONSELIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRIS FIELD,

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Photos courtesy of the Australian Department of Defence

Privates Chris Harris and Kris Buck from the 1st Battalion, RoyalAustralian Regiment, prepare to go on a patrol through the streets ofHoniara on Christmas Eve 2004 in the Solomon Islands.


I


In May 1942, Admiral Yamamoto hadhoped to bring the United States carrierforce to a decisive battle in the centralPacific, but instead, agreed to support anassault on Port Moresby, New Guinea. Theport would be a launch site for Japan’sthrust into Australia. The United StatesNavy, thanks to American code-breakingefforts, had been warned of the approachingJapanese landing forces, and attacked first.The ensuing Battle of the Coral Sea, on 7and 8 May 1942, marked the first Japanesenaval defeat of the war.

Frustrated in their attempts to capturePort Moresby, and suffering the loss of thelight carrier Shoho and damage to twolarger carriers, the Japanese took a differentapproach to the capture of Port Moresby.Troops were landed on the Solomon Islandsof Guadalcanal and Tulagi to establishairfield and seaplane bases.

The Allies responded to these Japanesemoves and, in what was the firstamphibious operation undertaken by theUnited States forces in World War II, theAmericans landed at Guadalcanal andTulagi in order to commence the six-monthstruggle for a foothold in the SolomonIslands, which was dubbed OperationWatchtower. As a consequence of WorldWar II operations, the prewar SolomonIslands administrative center at Tulagi wasdestroyed, and the capital shifted to Honiara— following the establishment of a largeAmerican base nearby on Guadalcanal.

The Solomon Islands were grantedindependence from Britain in 1978, andremained largely peaceful until significantethnic-based violence erupted in late 1998.The underlying cause of ethnic unrestbetween the Gwales and the Malaitansemerged during World War II when a largenumber of Malaitans moved to the newcapital. Honiara became Malaitandominated and the southern coast ofGuadalcanal, the Weathercoast, became thecultural heartland of the Gwales.Consequently, although Malaitanscomprised only a quarter of the totalSolomon Island population, they dominatedpolitical and ethnic affairs, which led tostrong resentment among the Gwales.

By late 1998, this resentment haderupted into armed conflict as Gwalesmilitants forced approximately 20,000Malaitans from their homes in

Guadalcanal. A rival Malaitan militantforce emerged in early 2000, which raidedpolice armories and staged an armed coupin mid-2000. At that time, Australia andNew Zealand assisted a cease-fire that ledto the signing of the Townsville PeaceAccords, or TPA, in October 2000 and thedeployment of an unarmed InternationalPeace Monitoring Team until June 2002.Although the TPA stemmed high levelviolence, some former militants continuedto operate personal fiefdoms with armedfollowers, and others engaged ininternecine conflict and criminal activity.Notably, the Solomon Islands do not havea defense force, and the Solomon Island’sgovernment relies on the Royal SolomonIslands Police (RSIP) force for law andorder tasks.

In 2003, the RSIP were unable to containrising lawlessness, which was underscoredwhen the former Police Commissioner andNational Peace Councillor, Sir Fred Soaki,was assassinated in February 2003. In July2003, the Solomon Islands Prime Ministerrequested assistance from the AustralianPrime Minister and a ‘strengthenedassistance’ mission was planned.

On 24 July 2003, Coalition Joint TaskForce 635 (CJTF 635) was established inthe Solomon Islands, under the commandof Lieutenant Colonel J.J. Frewen,commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion,The Royal Australian Regiment. CJTF 635

was established as the Australian DefenceForce Operation Anode and was Australia’scommitment to the regional ‘strengthenedassistance’ mission Operation HelpemFren. The overall force of civilians, police,and military was named RAMSI. Thisrepresented a new and unique model ofregional intervention using the fullcomplement of diplomatic, informational,economic, and military assets in acoordinated ‘whole-of-government’approach. The aim of RAMSI was toprevent the Solomon Islands fromdescending into a ‘failed state’ withoutappearing neocolonialist.

At the height of RAMSI, there werenearly 1,800 joint and coalition militarymembers from five nations (Australia, Fiji,Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, andTonga) deployed. Significantly, althoughmilitary members made up the largestcontingent, they were only the supportingagency to the 11-nation PPF.

By December 2004, Operation Anode hadbeen reduced in size, and CJTF 635 consistedof the CJTF headquarters and a platoon ofinfantry soldiers from New Zealand.

High Readiness as a Culturewithin the Townsville-based ReadyDeployment Force

The 1 RAR RCG deployment inDecember 2004, represented the

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


culmination of almost 25 years of training, development,rehearsals, and sweat from thousands of soldiers who have servedin the Townsville-based 3rd Brigade, home of the ADF’s ReadyDeployment Force (RDF). It was the vision of the Australiangovernment, in 1981, when the 3rd Brigade was designated theOperational Deployment Force (the name was changed to ReadyDeployment Force in 1995) that the Australian Army shouldmaintain a high readiness formation. For a quarter of a century,the 3rd Brigade has fostered a culture of high readiness for thebrigade’s soldiers. Such a culture enabled the rapid deploymentof the 1 RAR RCG to the Solomon Islands on 23 December 2004.

High readiness units in the 3rd Brigade must be:Agile in command relationships being able to quickly task

organize in combined arms, joint, or coalition environments;Flexible in deployment options from the land, air, or sea;Highly competent in warfighting skills required in

complex environments from the jungle, the littorals, open country,and the urban battlespace; and

‘Spartan’ in ethos, through training within resourceconstraints, and maintaining combat equipment that is light andair-portable.

These high readiness skills and attributes are maintained andrehearsed through an extensive 3rd Brigade training program thatincludes combined arms, joint, and coalition exercises, as well asjungle, urban, amphibious, air-mobile, and parachute training.Integral to the 3rd Brigade training program is annual trainingwith the Australian Army’s Combat Training Center, CombinedArms Battle Wing and Jungle Training Wing, Tully, which providemission rehearsal exercises for the Ready Battalion Group (RBG).

The RBG, comprises soldiers from all but two of the AustralianArmy’s corps (aviation and educations corps), and is responsiblefor providing two capabilities for the ADF. Firstly, the RBG, at apermanently short notice to move, conducts infantry battaliongroup land operations in order to defeat the enemy in close combat,through maintaining high level proficiencies in complex terrainoperations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and evacuationoperations. Secondly, the RBG provides a sub-element of combatpower, in the form of the Ready Company Group (RCG), at anotice to move that is significantly less than the RBG, again toconduct infantry company group/combat team land operations in

order to defeat the enemy in close combat.The key elements of the RBG/RCG,command and control, combat maneuver,combat service support, and offensive firesupport (Figure 1), are task organizedaccording to missions assigned.

In December 2004, the 1 RARBattalion Group was providing the ADF’sRBG capability, and A Company, 1 RARGroup was providing the core of the RCG.For A Company, 1 RAR RCG to deployto the Solomon Islands within 18 hoursof the Australian government’s decisionto support RAMSI, significant trainingwas required during 2004. This trainingincluded: 1 RAR’s assumption of Ready

Battalion Group status in April 2004; RBG call-out andassessment, Exercise Eveready Blue, August 2004; 3rd Brigadeamphibious and airborne, Exercise Swift Eagle, September 2004;and, the A Company RCG call-out and embarking on HMASKanimbla in early December 2004. The A Company RCGcontinued to train during the Christmas 2004 3rd Brigade reducedtempo period, enabling rapid recall and readiness currency,especially with regards to shooting skills.

High readiness is expensive in terms of maintaining Soldierindividual competencies, fitness, health, family support, andconditions of service. The baseline readiness within the 3rd Brigadeis monitored closely by all elements of the chain of command,from corporal to brigadier, to ensure that the RCG, and the largerRBG, are supported through logistic, resource, and personnelpolicies that ensure these groups are always ready to deploy withindesignated notice to move.

Operations conducted by the 1 RAR RCG between22 December 2004 and 25 January 2005

The mission of the 1 RAR RCG was to provide military securitysupport to the PPF in order to reinforce the maintenance of lawand order in the Solomon Islands.

Three Interrelated PremisesOperations by the 1 RAR RCG in the Solomon Islands between

22 December 2004 and 25 January 2005 were based on threeinterrelated premises:

(1) The existing Operation Anode CJTF 635 was to bereinforced in order to strengthen the ADF’s support to RAMSI;

(2) The security environment in the Solomon Islands was to berapidly and professionally enhanced; and

(3) The 1 RAR RCG deployment was to be effects-based, andmeasures were to be immediately developed in order to assess theimpact the deployment was having in the Solomon Islands.

Premise One: Reinforcement of RAMSIThe three interrelated premises required two comprehensive

actions by the 1 RAR RCG. First, the command and control ofCJTF 635 needed to be firmly arranged to account for a triple

Command & ControlElement

Combat ManeuverElement

Combat ServiceSupport Element

Figure 1 — The Key Elements of the Ready Battalion Group/Ready Company Group

Offensive Fires Element

The key elements of the RBG/RCG: command and control, combat maneuver,combat service support, and offensive fires are task organized according to

missions assigned.

increase of in-theatre troop numbers. Secondly, the 1 RAR RCGrequired the amendment of CJTF 635 procedures with regards to:intelligence targeting and collection; methods of movement andmaneuver throughout the Solomon Islands; logistics arrangementswithin the CJTF and between the CJTF and RAMSI; and,significant enhancements to CJTF force protection.

CJTF 635 had been commanded, prior to the arrival of the 1RAR RCG, by an Australian Army major, who was the CJTFcommander and military adviser to the special coordinator of RAMSI,James Batley. Upon the arrival in the Solomon Islands of thecommanding officer of the 1RAR (CO 1 RAR), a lieutenant colonel,the Australian major assumed the sole role of military adviser toRAMSI, while CO 1 RAR assumed command of CJTF 635.

CJTF 635 has, from the inception of RAMSI, developed asupporting/supported relationship with the participating policeforce, which in addition to Australia was comprised of CookIslands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. In December 2004, the chiefof the PPF was Australian Federal Police Commissioner SandiPeisley. Fortunately, during 2004 1RAR had extensively rehearsedthe operation of supporting/supported command and controlrelationships with the Royal Australian Navy’s Amphibious TaskGroup, during numerous amphibious training exercises. Inessence, supporting/supported command and control relationshipsrequire “special emphasis … to task grouping, economy, andcoordination between parallel chains of command,” according tothe Australian Defence Force doctrine publication OperationsSeries, Amphibious Operations. The 1 RAR RCG quicklyunderstood the requirement to be the supporting element of RAMSIin order to ensure that the PPF produced the most credible effectin the Solomon Islands in the wake of the murder of an Australianpolice officer.

The deputy commander of CJTF 635 was a New Zealand


captain, who remained as the deputy CJTFcommander upon assumption of commandby CO 1 RAR. The CJTF 635 staff whowere serving in the Solomon Islands uponthe arrival of the 1 RAR RCG, continuedto be commanded directly by the NewZealand captain, while being responsive tothe operational requirements of the 1 RARRCG. The CJTF 635 staff includedpersonnel from the Defence Forces of Fiji,New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, andTongan, as well as personnel from theAustralian Army and Royal Australian AirForce.

CJTF 635’s maneuver and securityelement prior to the arrival of the 1 RARRCG was a platoon from 2nd/1st Battalion,The Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment(2/1 RNZIR). This platoon was assignedunder operational control to the 1 RARRCG upon arrival of the 1 RAR RCG inthe Solomon Islands. This commandrelationship provided the 1 RAR RCG

company commander, an Australian Army major, with 12 sections,each of approximately nine men, to support RAMSI operationsthroughout the Solomon Islands. This increase in CJTF 635sections enabled the development of a broad, and immediatelysuccessful, patrolling program in support of RAMSI throughoutthe islands of Malaita and Guadalcanal.

Premise Two: Rapid and Professional Enhancement of theSecurity Environment

With command and control measures in place the 1 RAR RCG,combined with the New Zealand platoon from 2/1 RNZIR,commenced increasing the tempo of patrolling in the SolomonIslands.

This was a corporal’s operation and the 12 section commanders,with their well-trained soldiers, displayed their calmprofessionalism and superb patrolling skills during the 34-daydeployment. It were the corporals from Australia and NewZealand who commanded all of the patrols in support of theRAMSI PPF. The corporals performed more than 300 tasks insupport of the PPF including: foot and mobile patrols;supporting special response and investigative operations;conducting provincial patrols; and providing a quick responseto assist any high value search operations. The corporalsallowed the CJTF to accurately target intelligence and collectionassets. The corporals used their warfighting patrolling skillsin a peace supporting manner in order to dominate the battlespace so that criminal elements in the Solomon Islands eitherwent to ground, or were arrested. The corporals made thelogistics arrangements, which have always been complicated bythe harsh terrain and climate of the Solomon Islands, work everyday, with few complaints, and zero failures. The corporalscontinued to train their soldiers, especially in shooting skills, inorder to maintain the operational edge for the 1 RAR RCG. It

Private Shaun Dwyerfrom the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, conducts a patrolwith a Royal Solomon Islands police officer on December 24, 2004.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


were the corporals who integrated new ADFtechnologies, such as the outstandingPersonal Role Radio into a new, complex,and demanding operating environment. Itwere the corporals who ensured thatprevious failures in CJTF 635 forceprotection methods were not repeated. Thecorporals supported and shepherded theirPPF charges in accordance with the policepatrolling needs in an absolutelyprofessional and faultless manner.

The section commanders of CJTF 635assumed their tasks in support of RAMSIwith gusto. Around 70 percent of the 1 RARRCG had previous operational experience,mostly from East Timor, althoughexperience from Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia,and Northern Ireland was also presentamongst the RCG members. SupportingRAMSI was not a mission for which the 1RAR RCG had specifically trained. On thecontrary, the 1 RAR RCG had trained forcomplex warfighting throughout 2004,particularly warfighting in littoral, jungle,and urban environments. However, thefoundation of the 1 RAR RCG’s success in

the Solomon Islands was based on:Leadership, not only from

personnel with rank, but from every seniorsoldier in the RCG;

Exceptional soldier skills;Comprehensive training and

evaluation in complex environments,particularly the littoral, jungle and urbanbattlespaces;

A culture of high readiness thatallowed soldiers to concentrate onoperations and not be distracted by gettingready for operations; and,

A huge pool of operationalexperience for soldiers from multipletheatres inherent in the RCG, and indeedin the RBG.

The 1 RAR RCG’s exceptionalleadership was not limited to personnelwith rank, but also from every senior soldierin the RCG. This fact is of significancewhen thinking about future war withincomplex environments. Within 1 RAR, theaverage length of service in the Army forPrivate soldiers is five years. That means

the soldiers joined the Australian Army inapproximately mid-2000. In most casessuch soldiers have deployed, with 1 RAR,to East Timor in 2003. Now many have alsodeployed to the Solomon Islands. Mostimportantly, 1 RAR’s soldiers have onlyever served in an Australian Defence Forcethat is constantly deployed on operations.

In between operational deployments,the soldiers have undertaken CombatTraining Centre, Combined Arms BattleWing and Jungle Training Wing, Tully,exercises plus they have participated innumerous military skills competitions,and Company, Battalion, Brigade, andMulti-National Exercises. Suchexperience creates a warfighter who isbattle smart, battle fit, a battle shot, and,a battle leader. Such a warfighter stands,within the high readiness culture of theRBG, ready to deploy in order to seek outand close with the enemy, to kill orcapture him, to seize and hold ground andrepel attack, by day or night, into complexenvironments regardless of season, weather,or terrain.

Premise Three: The 1 RAR RCG deployment as an Effects-Based Operation

Effects-based operations for the 1 RAR RCG and CJTF 635,were supported by a daily Joint Targeting Board (JTB) which wasimplemented by CO 1 RAR upon arrival in the Solomon Islands.The daily JTB fused intelligence gained by the CJTF with PPFintelligence in order to target areas for CJTF/PPF patrolling. Uponarrival of the 1 RAR RCG, every CJTF patrol was in support ofthe PPF, and every CJTF patrol was against targets developed bythe JTB. The CJTF’s 12 sections were not sufficient to allowwasted, or misdirected, patrol efforts. As a result activities suchas “shopping” and “tourist” patrols and patrols not in support ofthe PPF were immediately banned by CO 1 RAR.

The daily JTB allowed CJTF 635 to synchronize operations insupport of the PPF. The PPF campaign plan, following thedeployment of the RCG, was to quickly eliminate the need foradditional military support to RAMSI, and return RAMSI to pre-22 December 2004 levels of force protection. In addition, the PPFhad the longer term goal of turning police operations in theSolomon Islands over to the Royal Solomon Island Police (RSIP)in order to ensure that law and order in the Solomon Islands wascontrolled by the Solomon Island people. The daily JTB allowedCJTF 635 to quickly tailor tactical operations to support PPFcampaign goals. The daily JTB ensured excellent communicationsbetween the PPF tactical operators and the CJTF tactical operators,particularly the police and soldiers on patrol. Special mention isgiven to Superintendent Tony Donne who, as a key member of thedaily JTB, provided an outstanding contribution the success ofthe 1 RAR RCG, and RAMSI, mission.

Most importantly the daily JTB enabled the following tactics,techniques, and procedures to be developed between the PPF andCJTF 635: developing a joint-patrol roster; pairing CJTF 635Section Commanders with PPF Shift Supervisors; aligning theCJTF 635 patrol timings with PPF patrol shifts; supporting allRAMSI patrolling with intelligence assets; and, aligning PPF/CJTF community relations tasks with the operational need.

The daily JTB soon paid dividends with the capture of threesignificant anti-RAMSI personnel in support of the RSIP. Apartfrom the aforementioned results the JTB and the 1 RAR RCGdeveloped other measures of effectiveness (MOE) for the 1 RARRCG in order to assess the impact the deployment was having inthe Solomon Islands in support of RAMSI. These MOE were achallenge for the 1 RAR RCG and the JTB to develop. The existingCJTF 635 was without MOE, and therefore an inaugural set wasdeveloped, using the Joint Military Appreciation Process, andpresented to the Chief of Joint Operations, Vice Admiral R.E.Shalders, on 26 December 2004, less than 48-hours after the arrivalof the RCG in the Solomon Islands.

ConclusionThe A Company 1 RAR, Ready Company Group (RCG),

deployment in support of the Regional Mission to the SolomonIslands, represented a significant achievement for the AustralianDefence Force. The RCG was directed to reinforce Australia’sand the Pacific Region’s efforts, in support of the government ofthe Solomon Islands, and this reinforcement occurred with speed,

The rapid deployment of A Company, 1 RAR, represented a significantachievement for the Australian Defence Force.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field, CSC, is commanding officer of the 1stBattalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, Ready Battalion Group, in Townsville.He joined the Australian Regular Army in 1984 and is a graduate of theAustralian Defence Force Academy; the Royal Military College, Duntroon; theU.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and, the U.S. Marine CorpsSchool of Advanced Warfighting. In late-2002 until June 2003, he served withthe Third U.S. Army/Coalition Forces Land Component Command, as amember of C5-Plans and C35-Future Operations, during the planning andexecution of Operation Iraqi Freedom.


professional acumen, supported by an effects-based campaign plan.As this article is written, RAMSI is continuing as a most successfulregional peacekeeping effort.

A Company, 1 RAR RCG returned to Australia on 25 January2005. 2005 marks two significant milestones for 1 RAR, The BigBlue One. These milestones include 1 RAR’s 60th Birthday, 12October 1945, and 1 RAR’s deployment as the lead Australianinfantry Battalion in Vietnam in June 1965. There is no doubt,that when 1 RAR Soldiers deploy on operations they do so withthe weight of 1 RAR expectations on their shoulders; both fromsoldiers serving and soldiers past. The A Company 1 RAR RCGdeployment to reinforce Operation Anode in the Solomon Islands,once again proved that 1 RAR is the force of choice in operationsthat involve rapid deployment, complex environments, andprofessional execution.

CAPTAIN JEREMIAH PRAY

Kinetic Targeting in Iraq at theBattalion Task Force Level:

FROM TARGET TO DETAINEE

The Iraqi Theater of Operations is a very complex anddiverse environment. As battalion task forces areemployed across the country, each faces unique struggles

with equally unique ways to deal with them. The following areobservations and techniques to kinetically target the enemy that Ihave developed in the last seven months as a battalion task forceS-2 (intelligence officer) in Tikrit, Iraq.

“Targeting” in the broad sense of the word at the battalion taskforce level involves incorporating lethal and nonlethal resourcesand methods to destroy/influence not only the enemy but thecivilian populace with the intended end-state of defeating enemyactivities and denying sanctuary. The task force S-2 plays a keyrole in targeting by analyzing past enemy activities, identifyingtrends, determining enemy intent, and making recommendationsto best target the individuals or events. “Kinetic targeting,”however, is primarily the responsibility of the task force S-2. Thisprocess involves identifying individual targets, creating targetingpackets on them, capturing them, and detaining them. In order todo this process you must understand who the enemy is and whatmotivates him, how his cell network is constructed, how to createa targeting packet, how to plan and coordinate the raid, and whatthe detention process is.

Who Is The Enemy And What Motivates Him?In the Task Force 1-18 area of operations the enemy is defined

in two categories: leaders andactive kinetic fighters.Tikrit, with its strong ties tothe Ba’ath Party, representsthe heart of the formerregime. Located in the SalahAd Din Province (the SunniTriangle), Tikrit has severalformer regime leaders(FRLs) associated with it(Saddam Hussein, Izzat AlDuri [BL#6], andMohammed Al Hadoushi[BL#167] to name a few),and they will naturally comeback to their families andtribes. Saddam Husseinnever left Salah Ad Dinbecause his family and tribeprovided him sanctuary.

Although many of these FRLs do not conduct direct attacks againstCoalition forces, they have the financial means to pay others toconduct attacks, and they also represent Coalition force defiance.

The active kinetic fighters are the vast majority of capturedtargets. These men are made up of the unemployed, uninformed,anti-U.S., recently released detainees, and Islamic fundamentalists.The major motivation for these men to conduct attacks on Coalitionforces is their feeling of denial of basic essential needs; in otherwords, they feel that the existing power or government is notadequately providing for them. Essential needs are defined aspower, water, sewage, and sanitation. Another motivation Iraqishave to join the insurgency is unemployment. The unemploymentrate in the major cities of Iraq, to include Tikrit, has been estimatedat around 50 percent, but this is not unusual. Many of these mendo not seek employment because they have always seemed to getby, but as the free market economy in Iraq grows, so does the needto have money. Those who cannot afford to pay for essential needsand to support their families are potential recruits for enemyleadership to pay to conduct attacks on U.S. forces.

In addition to normal unemployment, just north of Tikrit wasthe headquarters of the Iraqi Republican Guard and the NationalIraqi Armor School. A suburb of Northern Tikrit (Cadasia) grewfrom this military complex to house the many soldiers and officersthat worked there. With the fall of the former regime’s military,many of these men are now unemployed and militarily trained

which makes for adangerous combination.

Islamic fundamentalistsmake up a small group ofthe active kinetic fighters inTikrit. They are typicallyforeign fighters fromcountries like Syria andIran seeking to bring thefight to the Americans inthe name of Muslim“jihad.” These Islamicfundamentalists are morefrequently drawn to placeslike Fallujah and Samarrawhere they feel they havesanctuary. In Tikrit (99.9-percent Sunni Muslim)foreigners “stand out” andhave a difficult time finding

Leve

l of I

mpo

rtanc

e

Leader/ Organizer

Café, Mosque, Business, Safe

House, Leaders-House,

Telephone

Intel Ops Logistics Recruiter

Islamic Fundamentalists Family Former

Military

Unemployed Outsiders

Scout Scout Scout

Action Safe House

IED, VBIED, RPG, Rocket, Mortar, SAF

Action Cell

Figure 1 — Insurgent Cell Role Requirements



sanctuary. The key indicator that foreign fighters are operatingin the area is simply an increase in attacks in places where attackshave not been before. The number of attacks in the area ofoperations will suddenly increase and then suddenly stop.Typically, by the time you receive information that “outsiders”are conducting attacks in your area they have already left.

How Is His Cell Network Constructed?The anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) cell is a group who works together

to plan and conduct independent attacks and operations with theaim of destroying and undermining the current Iraqi governmentsupported by Coalition forces. A doctrinal template of an insurgentcell can logically be constructed because any insurgent cell of thisnature has certain role requirements (see Figure 1). The cell musthave a leader (commonly referred to as the “organizer”) and he isusually, but not always, also the financier. The leader will meetwith up to four individuals at a predetermined location. Thesemeeting places can be: the leader’s house, business, other safehouse, café/restaurant, mosque, or by telephone. The leader mayor may not meet with all of these men at the same time. Thesemen will be the only personnel that deal directly with the cellleader.

These four men represent: intelligence collection, operations,logistics, and recruiting. The intelligence collection representativeis responsible for identifying locations and times of when to bestconduct attacks. He will have a group of observers, “scouts” (verylow level AIF) that may do nothing more than observe and reportwhen Coalition or Iraqi Security Forces pass by. The operationsrepresentative is responsible for planning the attacks and trainingthe attackers. He will either meet directly with the intelligencecollection representative or meet with the cell leader andintelligence person at the same time. The logistics representativeis responsible for providing the weapons and resources for thecell to conduct an attack. He will have access to multiple weaponcaches and dealers. He will deal directly with the financier of thecell to pay for these supplies. The recruiter will also deal directlywith the financier in order to pay for recruits that are financiallymotivated.

The recruiter will target specific types of recruits in specificlocations. He will recruit Islamic fundamentalists at religiousgatherings, like mosques; often a religious leader, such as an Imam,will be the recruiter in this case. He will recruit the unemployedfrom the low-income neighborhoods as they often gather on thecity streets looking for employment. He can recruit former militarythrough a network of their former military associates. Outsiders(foreign fighters) will typically have preestablished lodging to useas a base of operations, possibly the recruiters’ home. The lastsource of recruiting for cell operatives, and possibly the mostcommon, is young members of the immediate family. In the Iraqiculture family loyalty is their greatest security against cell membersproviding information to Coalition forces and ISF.

No matter the source of recruitment, all of the operatives willhave to meet at a predetermined location (safe house) to receivethe mission and collect the necessary supplies. The operationsrepresentative and the recruiter are the only members of the cellrequired to be there with the operatives. From this point theoperatives are able to conduct the attack. The operationsrepresentative may or may not participate in the attack based on

the level of sophistication of the attack and the experience of theoperatives. In Tikrit these cells are typically small (3-6 mangroups) that are family related in some way to one another. It isvery important to note that one person may assume multiple rolesin the cell. The leader may also be responsible for intelligence,operations, logistics, and recruiting. It is possible that the leadermay be responsible for all four duties.

How To Create A Targeting PacketAt battalion task force level, the S-2 will create the majority of

the targeting packets. Occasionally a target will come from“higher,” but these make up only about 10 percent of your totaltargets. This is because no one will understand the area betterthan the task force that owns it; and more importantly, no onedeals with an area’s population more than that task force. Thekey to the targeting process is human intelligence (HUMINT)sources or tactical informants. The overwhelming majority of allplanned raids conducted are driven by human information.

The Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) can be an incredibly usefulresource at the battalion task force level. THTs are not typicallyassigned directly to a battalion task force, but it is at that levelwhere they are most useful. At the battalion task force level theTHT can participate in targeting meetings and the maneuvercompanies can help move them throughout the sector to meet withsources. Often the reports the THT generate are the only evidencethat the task force has on a targeted individual. Maneuver companycommanders know that it is through the THT reports that theyreceive information for future raids.

So, where do HUMINT sources come from? HUMINT sourcesprimarily come from three places: “walk-ins,” detainees, and ISF.Walk-in sources are those individuals who come to the gate of anyforward operating base (FOB) claiming they know something. Thetypical procedure is an intelligence representative will pick them upand question them. These HUMINT sources typically are motivatedby the thought that if they provide useful information to Coalitionforces they will be rewarded either through money or contracts.Occasionally, these sources will provide information that will leaddirectly to a target. Mostly, however, these sources will haveinformation on small munitions caches or potential “bad” individualsbut tend to lack specifics on names, places, and even offenses.

Detainees typically provide better information than “walk-in”sources, but in order to exploit these sources the battalion taskforce must be very proactive. The targeting process does not endafter the detainee is pushed to the detention facility. The taskforce must work directly with the interrogators to help inexplaining the significance of the individual, what informationled to his capture, and what further information you are trying togain from him. The THT can assist and “sit in” on theinterrogations to help direct the line of questioning.

The best and most reliable sources come from the ISF. With agood working relationship of information sharing and providingneeded resources, ISF can provide excellent information forpotential targets. Just as with any aspect of human intelligencethe right personality is the key to collecting information. I arrangeda meeting with my Iraqi National Guard (ING) S-2 counterpart athis workplace where I created a presentation showing the reasonswhy I felt enemy activity was going to increase in the near future(see Figure 2).


I explained to him my commanders’intent of dealing with the increase in enemyactivity through denying sanctuary with anincrease in intelligence driven raids. Iprovided him with a list of task force targetswe had developed that I carefully “vetted”in order to not reveal my sources so theywould be protected. After my INGcounterpart completely understood mycommanders’ intent and understood mydesire to work together with him, hebecame a great asset to the kinetic targetingprocess. By providing targets through hissources and intelligence collectors, the AIFstarted to target him and members of hisS-2 shop. This is a typical problem withIraqis that help Coalition forces, but wewere able to counter it by providing himand other outstanding members of the INGwith 24-hour “bodyguards” provided byING soldiers. In Iraqi culture “bodyguards”are a status symbol and by providing thatto him, he was even more willing to workwith us.

The ING has become so proactive thatnow it is not uncommon for a group of INGto capture a target (of a time sensitivenature) and turn him into us where togetherwe generate the detention paperwork. MyTHT and I meet with the ING S-2 once aweek (in what I call my indigenoustargeting meeting) to share information,refocus targeting, further develop targets,and gather more information on capturedtargets.

Although HUMINT intelligence is theprimary method for collecting targetinginformation, it is not the only means ofcollection. Other collection assets such asSIGINT offer excellent tools and resourcesbut are often so removed from tacticalplanning (division and above asset) thatthey are not utilized effectively. A solutionwe developed to better focus and shareintelligence is the Kinetic TargetingMeeting. This is a meeting held once everyweek with an audience of: Battalion S-2,THT, ODA intelligence representatives,division SIGINT representatives, andoccasionally interrogators from thedetention facility. It is in this forum (ledby the TF S-2) where we discuss recentindicators on our task force high valuetarget (HVT) list, new developing targetinginformation, and target focus for the nextweek. It is also an opportunity to discusstask force operations with the divisionSIGINT representatives so they willunderstand the tactical phases of anoperation and can develop a plan to bestoverwatch the targeted area with signalintercept assets. The information sharedin this meeting can be vetted and used inthe indigenous targeting meeting.Ultimately what is gained in the KineticTargeting Meeting is sharing of intelligencewith all the key intelligence resources inthe battalion task force sector, and it isthrough this open sharing and discussionthat many targets are further developed.

The RaidKinetically, the raid is one of the most

effective task force level operations. Itserves the obvious purpose to capturesuspected enemy personal, but also servesthe purpose to deny enemy sanctuarythrough “information operations” (IO).Even if the intended target is not captured,the IO message that “if you are a bad guyCoalition forces will come and take youfrom your house in the middle of the night”is spread throughout the city. The majorityof raids we conduct are “cordon andknocks” for two reasons:

1) The enemy threat level typicallyindicates that he will not resist; and

2) The intelligence is not always exactand the targeted individual may be a fewhouses to the left or right.

If the wrong house is raided but no harmis done and the occupants are treated withdignity and respect, they will often lead youto the right house. Operationally, raids arethe safest kinetic missions we do in the taskforce. We have never sustained a casualtyand the enemy has never fired a singleround on a raid due to the U.S. dominanceduring limited visibility. Raids, for themost part, are conducted between 0001-0300 (after curfew begins and with enoughtime to be complete before curfew ends).

To conduct a raid you need two things:a target and a location. The target istypically gained through the targetingprocess and during that process you haveto determine the best way to identify hislocation for the raiding element. The threemost common ways to identify a targetlocation (from least to most preferred) are:the source provides a hand drawn map/maprecon, the source obtains the grid with aGPS, and the source leads the raidingelement on a recon or to the raid. Theproblem with hand drawn maps and sourcemap recons is most Iraqis do not often dealwith maps and can not exactly pinpoint thetarget location. Conceptualizing the cityfrom above on a map is very unfamiliar tothem. The FalconView imagery programcan be used to help identify target locationsand can be used when constructingoperational plans. If the source isunwilling to do the recon with the raidingelement, this may be the best informationyou will have, but be prepared to expandyour search and cordon several houses/blocks to the left and right. The hand-heldGPS is a valuable tool in the targeting

Figure 2 — Possible Increases in Insurgent Activity

Captain Jeremiah Pray is an ROTC graduate of San Diego StateUniversity. He has completed IOBC, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger, MIOTC,and MICCC. He has served as a rifle platoon leader, anti-tank platoon leader,and anti-tank company executive officer in the 3rd Battalion, 505th ParachuteInfantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. He currently serves as the TaskForce 1-18 Intelligence Officer in Tikrit, Iraq.

process. If possible the battalion task force should purchase several“easy to use” units for their sources to obtain grids. The onlyproblem with this technique is the source needs to be trained inmanipulating the GPS unit and understand that he needs to be asclose to the target location as possible. He should also obtain adetailed description of the house to assist the raiding element inidentifying the target location. By far, the best way to identifytarget locations is with a source led recon. Obviously, the source’sidentity needs to be protected so he is given a disguise (DCUs,neck gaiter to cover his face, sunglasses, and DCU hat). If thesource is willing to lead you to the target, there is a greater chancethat his information is credible.

The Detention ProcessOnce the target is captured, he will be taken back to the FOB

for the detention processing. To detain an individual his detentionpacket must have a picture of the detainee (preferably taken withany evidence he was captured with), a Coalition ProvisionalAuthority (CPA) form, and three DA Form 2823s “swornstatements” completed by soldiers that participated on the raid (atleast one of which should be a leader). Other items that may beadded to the detention packets include DA Form 4137 (evidence/property custody document) and all the information compiled inhis targeting packet, i.e. THT reports. Once the detainee(s) isbrought back to the FOB the S-2 shop will surge on the paperworkfor the detention packet.

The soldiers who are completing the “sworn statements” needto be very specific in who, what, where, when, and why theycaptured an individual. It helps if, before they start writing, theyagree on the name of the target with the same spelling, whatevidence came from the target house, the grid location, at exactlywhat time the raid was conducted, and what the target is suspectedof doing. This will prevent inconsistencies in the statements.Detainees are pushed as soon as possible (typically within fourhours from capture) to the detention facility. This allows thecapturing unit to continue with their tactical missions. Any furtherquestioning of the detainee can be done through coordination withthe detention facility in a controlled environment.

After a raid (or series of raids) is conducted, it is important togain an assessment of the effects on the insurgents and thecommunity. Often a raid target is focused at a specific individualor enemy event (suspected 21 JUN RPG shooter or suspected 15AUG improvised explosive device maker). If that TTP for attacksstops completely, than there is a good chance the perpetrator wascaptured or someone close enough to the perpetrator was captured(same cell) which has the same effect of stopping that type ofattack. It is important to assess the reaction of the community aswell. If the raid target is completely innocent, the “innocent”members of the community will feel that Coalition forcesindiscriminately target people and detain them for no reason. Thecommunity will begin to look to the insurgency for security. Byengaging the local community leader (sheik) who, after the targetis detained, will often feel more comfortable talking about whator who he was involved with. Sometimes, the sheik will “vouch”for an individual who has been detained. If the evidence on thatdetainee is weak, it may be more beneficial to release him to thesheik. The sheik will then be responsible for the target’s actions.

The Iraqi Theater of Operations is a fluid, constantly changing

environment. The observations and TTPs I have developed workwell for me in my task force in Tikrit, but that is because certainconditions have been set. Our sister ING battalion has growninto a credible and reliable organization, our battalion operatesfrom in the city and not from a distant FOB, and we have accessto certain division assets because we are co-located on the sameFOB. The basic fundamentals of understanding who the enemyis and what motivates him, how his cell network is constructed,how to create a targeting packet, what is required for a raid, andhow to detain a target once he is captured are what the task forceS-2s have to develop. What works here may not work well inother areas, but for task force S-2s preparing to deploy these TTPswill give a good “start point” for preparing for their mission.

Staff Sergeant Klaus Baesu

Specialist Shawn McKenzie of Task Force 1-18 provides security indowntown Tikrit, Iraq, November 1, 2004.


Defensive PostureFor many units the current focus seems to be on

defensive tactics. These units often conduct mountedpatrols depending on material solutions such asarmor to get them safely past the enemy improvisedexplosive device (IED) ambush. This defensiveposture allows the enemy to survive and learn,change tactics, improve explosives, and garner morepopular support with his activities. The solution to theenemy activity is not to just survive the attack. The solutionis to kill or capture the enemy. Killing the enemy not onlystops his actions, it deters future actions and hinders recruitingefforts. It also undermines popular support when the fightersare seen as ineffective.

Presence PatrolsThe phrase “presence patrol” is often used to indicate

a patrol that actually has no mission. Frequently whenI ask for the patrol’s mission I get the response thatit is a “presence patrol.” The patrol has no clearlydefined goal. Soldiers/Marines often realize thisand develop the attitude that they are just ridingaround until they get blown up. Every patrolshould have a mission.

Hesitant to DismountMany units appear hesitant to

dismount Soldiers and end upriding the roads an inordinateamount of time. The roadis a kill zone. Bunchingyour troops in a vehicleand riding the roads justmakes them a high valuetarget for an enemy IEDambush. These rollingpatrols only secure theirimmediate area. As suchthey only secure a piece ofterrain for the eightseconds or so it takes todrive by that location.This allows the enemy

MANIPULATINGYOUR BATTLESPACE TO WIN

DAN SMITH


Specialist Jerry T. Combes

A Soldier with the 2ndBattalion, 503rd Infantry

(Airborne), 173rd AirborneBrigade, pulls security in

Shah Wali Ko, Afghanistan.

a lot of freedom of movement within yourarea of operations (AO). Mobility andfirepower are the main strengths of themounted patrol and are useful tools. Buthaving a dismounted presence is importantif you want to control your AO.Dismounted activities such as patrols,observation posts (OPs), and ambushes willallow you to kill the enemy.

Manipulate Your Battle SpaceThe enemy’s strengths derive from his

ability to hide within the populace. Thisallows him to select the time and place toengage you with his IED and small armsfire (SAF) ambushes. In this way, he avoidsyour superior firepower and controls yourbattle space. You must address hisstrengths with your tactics. Utilize acoordinated effort of overt and covertactivities to manipulate your battle spaceto get the enemy to show up at a time andplace of your choosing so that you can killhim.

Identify the various sites in your AOwhere the enemy frequently chooses to fightyou with IEDs. From this list select thesite that offers your unit the bestcombination of concealment and firingpositions for a “killer team.” Thenconduct overt activities to deny the enemythe other likely IED ambush sites, luringthem into the ambush site where you havecovertly positioned a killer team. Thismethod was recently used by a Marineunit and resulted in the killing of two IEDemplacement teams. This is not a snipermission. Although snipers have the skillsand mind-set for this type operation, anyMarine fire team or Army infantry squadshould be able to work as a killer team. Onnumerous occasions sniper teams have hadan opportunity to engage an IEDinstallation team. The sniper shoots oneman, and the rest jump in the vehicle andget away. You need a killer team with amachine gun in ambush. If you have asniper or designated marksman, he hasone purpose — shoot the driver. If thedriver gets out of the vehicle, you shouldstill shoot him first. You want to preventthe rest of the enemy IED team frombeing able to utilize the vehicle forescape. As soon as the designatedmarksman engages, the machine gunnerand any other riflemen able to do soengage the rest of the enemy IED team.If the enemy runs to the vehicle, then you

also engage the vehicle with gunfire untilthey are all dead or they escape your AO.Your killer teams need to be mutuallysupportive. You need to utilize multiplepositions that are spread out along theenemy’s probable path of travel. (Linearambush in depth) Ideally they shouldhave overlapping fields of view and goodcommunications is a must. If the enemyIED team escapes from the first killerteam, they call ahead to the next positionwith a good vehicle description so thatthe next killer team can identify andengage the vehicle as it comes into theirkill zone.

Be CreativeThe technique of manipulating your

battle space can be utilized at all levels fromplatoon to company level to battalion. Itseems to work best when a whole battalionworks to coordinate their overt and covertactivities to drive the enemy to the killerteams. The enemy is using your whole AOand so should you. The enemy frequentlysets a pattern with his operations that youcan exploit. Be creative! Think hunting.Many units are using OPs and snipers butnot in a coordinated way. If a deer huntergoes into the woods before daylight, takesa stand and waits, he might occasionallybag a buck just through luck. If he scoutsfirst, finds a place the deer like to go andputs his stand there, the odds are muchhigher of a kill. If he puts corn and saltat the place the deer like to go and thenhas his buddies go walk around in theother areas the deer like to go, his oddsof bagging a buck go way up. Do thesame thing to bag the enemy. Check theintel and find a place with a lot of enemyIED activity. Identify good hiding sitesin that area. When possible, infil yourkiller teams before daylight. Thenactively push patrols in the other areas toensure that the enemy goes to the sweet spotyou left for them.

SuccessRecently, I was working with a Marine

battalion. Upon arrival, I briefed the“Manipulate Your Battle Space” conceptwith a liberal dose of deer huntinganalogies. The battalion commanderimmediately grasped the concept andspread the word. They were already usingsniper teams and OPs so they were on theright track. Marine light infantry are

tremendous fighters and possess the skillsand mind-set required. They achievedimmediate results. Over the followingweek, they killed two installer teams of twomen each in the same section of an mainsupply route (MSR) during daylight hours.They also fired up two other installer teamsthat managed to get into their vehicles andget away. The vehicles were later recoveredwith lots of blood but no bodies. Thesekiller teams did not have mutuallysupportive killer teams in place and thatallowed the enemy to escape. In both casesterrain made it difficult to emplace anotherteam in support.

The battalion that was in the AO priorto this unit did not get any kills during theirrotation. This battalion got several in aweek by coordinating their covert and overtactivities. In one instance, the killer teamcould observe a vehicle from their hiddenposition. It was stopped but they wereunable to visually determine what theenemy was doing. Finally, one member ofthe killer team had to move out of cover toget a visual. The IED installers saw theMarine, and in their attempt to disarm theIED and escape they set the IED off insidetheir vehicle, killing both of the occupants.The killer team achieved their objectivewithout firing a shot.

In the second situation, a CombinedAnti-Armor Team (CAAT) platoon movedinto a hide site behind some berms beforedaylight along a four-lane MSR. Four-manfire teams deployed east and west along theMSR to take up hide sites leaving a mainforce in the center. They were overlookinga Tier One IED site. Other elements of thebattalion were patrolling hard in other areasto deny the enemy that terrain. The onlyspot left open was one that they liked touse anyway. At 1330 hrs, the eastern mostkiller team spotted a vehicle that stoppedon the shoulder of the highway. Theemplacement went quickly, and the IEDinstallers jumped back into their vehicle togo. The killer team engaged the front ofthe truck with an M240 machine gun. Thevehicle accelerated, so the machine gunnerengaged the cab, wounding at least one ofthe occupants. We heard the firing at ourmain position in the center. The easternkiller team immediately called on the radiowith a vehicle description. They werelocated about 1,500 meters to our east. Wehad a visual on the truck immediately, andwhen it entered the kill zone it was engaged



successfully, killing both occupants and setting the vehicle on fire,burning the bodies extensively.

It is important to note that the morale of the Soldiers/Marineson the ground goes up when they are actively pursuing the enemy.Even the units patrolling to deny terrain and drive the enemy toanother location were happy because the mission had a purpose.

Other Specific SuggestionsIf you have an IED site that has no good hide sites, use your

overt actions (OPs and patrols) to deny the enemy access to thatlocation. Have your covert team at the next best location in agood hide awaiting the enemies’ arrival.

Use very active overt actions (patrols, traffic control points[TCPs], etc) in two locations with a dead space in the middlewhere you have a covert killer team hidden in ambush. The enemywill often try to take advantage of the dead space in the middle.

Have a mounted patrol move through your covert site. Theenemy often falls in behind a mounted patrol and sets the IED outafter the overt patrol has passed. They assume that they have ablock of safe time just after the patrol has passed. They will movein behind IED sweep operations and hasty TCPs for the samereason.

Have some signs painted in English and Arabic that say“Caution, U.S. Military Crossing Point Ahead.” Find a goodsection of road with IED potential and a good hide site. Emplacea covert killer team in overwatch. Put your signs out and driveacross the main road a couple of times to make tracks. You caneven run patrols across this “military crossing” as long as youhave it under observation. This will present a wonderful spot foran IED emplacement. When the enemy IED team shows up totake advantage of your “stupid mistake,” you are already waitingon them.

Insert two killer teams. Come back later and exfil one leavingone in place. The enemy will think you took the team out and

might show himself. This is especially useful in an area whereyour teams are frequently compromised.

Reverse AmbushI used this technique with my Operational Detachment-Alpha

(ODA) in Afghanistan. The enemy would ambush small units ona regular basis in one area. They utilized one location frequentlysetting a pattern. They did not hang out lying in the sun all day.They would have an outpost watching for U.S. forces that wouldgive them a call when they saw a unit coming. Then the enemyforces would move into place for the ambush. I took a small teamand did a night infil and foot movement to the enemy’s favoriteambush location. I set up in his position and waited. The nextday a section of the team moved through the area on patrol. Whenthe enemy ran to their positions, we were already waiting on them.

If you have to go down a dead end route to a village or town,this forces you to come back out the same way you went in. Theenemy often places IEDs on this route after you go in knowingyou will have to come back out the same way. Emplace covertkiller teams along the route to secure your six and possibly killthe enemy.

The enemy likes to use wrecked vehicles along the main roadsas IED sites. They know that we often come and move thewreckage and they can get a kill. Instead of moving the vehicleimmediately, place a killer team in overwatch and try to kill theenemy. You might even want to move your own wrecked vehicleout to a roadside location with a good hide site in overwatch.

Killing VehiclesI have been through training where we did both driving training

and vehicle kills. I have seen vehicles shot full of holes, all theoil and fluids drained out, and we race them around for well overan hour before the motors finally seize up. The good guys stopimmediately if you fire into the front of the vehicle. The bad guys

do not. The only sure way to stop avehicle with gun fire is to fire 18 inchesbehind the steering wheel.

These are only tactical suggestions.You have to be creative and developtactics that work in your AO. Butremember to utilize both overt andcovert tactics to manipulate your battlespace to gain control. Bait the trap andthey will come. Good hunting!

Specialist Mike Villareal from the 2nd Battalion, 142nd Infantry Regiment, scans the area duringa mission in Nasiriya, Iraq, July 17, 2005.

Staff Sergeant Suzanne M. Day, U.S. Air Force

Dan Smith is a retired Special ForcesNCO, who has spent 31 months deployed toIraq and Afghanistan as either an operationssergeant for an Operational Detachment Alpha(ODA) or as a civilian contractor. Smithcurrently works as part of the Joint IED DefeatTask Force, which is organized by the ArmyG3 at the Pentagon.

At the conclusion of World War II, the world saw a newstruggle emerge between communism and those opposed to it. It spread across much of Asia and into

the British colonial territory of Malaya. The victory achieved bythe British over the communist insurgents in Malaya still standstoday as an exemplary model of effective counterinsurgencytechniques. From 1948 to 1960, the British defeated communistinsurgents in Malaya in order to prevent the spread of communismand maintain control over the civilian population. The Britishaccomplished through effective application of the five fundamentalconditions necessary for successful counterinsurgency operations.

BackgroundPrior to World War II, Great Britain had maintained colonial

control over the Malay Peninsula since the signing of treaties ofprotection with local Malay rulers in 1874. Several of the Malaystates were aggregated in 1896 to form the Federated Malay States,commonly referred to as Malaya. Strategically, the British wereinterested in Malaya because it was one of the world’s largest rawmaterial producing territories, supplying one-third of the world’srubber and tin. Later, Malaya would become strategic as abattleground to keep communism from spreading west towardsthe Indian Ocean. The British maintained dominion over Malayauntil World War II, during which time the Japanese seized andoccupied Malaya.

In 1948, Malaya’s geography made it ideal for a guerrillainsurgency. Approximately the size of Alabama, some 80 percentof the country was covered in dense jungle, largely impenetrableexcept by animal tracks or through man-made paths. Mobilitywas further limited by a 6,000-foot mountain range running northto south down the center of thecountry.

Evolution of the MalayaCommunist Party

In 1945, the British regainedcontrol of Malaya from the Japanese;however, during the course of the war,a new threat to British colonial rulehad arisen. That new threat was theMalaya Communist Party (MCP),which had gained legitimacy fightinga guerilla war against the Japaneseoccupiers. Within 10 days of theJapanese attack, the British colonialgovernment accepted an offer ofassistance from the MCP. The MCP

proceeded to form the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army(MPAJA), which received training and logistical support fromthe British throughout the war. Although the MPAJA showedfew military successes against the Japanese, by the end of the warthey possessed a cadre of experienced guerilla fighters as well asstockpiles of hoarded supplies that the British had supplied tothem during the Japanese occupation. Perhaps their greatest asset,however, were the strong ties the MCP had established with therural Chinese community, particularly the squatters on the junglefringes. The number of Chinese squatters resorting to subsistencefarming on the jungle fringes had risen dramatically during WorldWar II due to fear of the Japanese, food shortages, andunemployment in the urban centers. By 1945, the total number ofsquatters was estimated at 400,000.

Having allied with the MCP during World War II, the Britishinitially granted the MCP legal status in 1945. The MCP usedthis status to prepare its efforts to subvert the Malayan government.From 1945 through 1948, the MCP organized mass strikes,attacked several local planters, infiltrated the Trade Unions, andintimidated officials and laborers. Furthermore, the MCPestablished cells in each Malayan village and wherever possibleconducted Communist indoctrination, cajoling participation byforce where necessary.

By 1947, many of the Malay ethnic Chinese felt disenfranchisedover perceived failure by the British to live up to promises toprovide an easier path to full Malayan citizenship. Subsequently,the MCP accused the British of attempting to exclude them frompower as the British organized the Federation of Malaya in 1947in a plan for the future independence of the Malay states. TheMCP used these perceived slights to call for immediate armed

FIRST LIEUTENANT THOMAS E. WILLIS II

LESSONS FROM THE PASTSuccessful British Counterinsurgency Operations

in Malaya 1948-1960


revolt, and the open insurgency began withthe killing of three British rubber planterson June 18, 1948. Within two days, theBritish had declared the “Emergency.”

During this time, the armed wing of theMCP was called the Anti-British Army;however, in 1949, the MCP changed thename to the Malay Races Liberation Army(MRLA) in an attempt to conjure feelingsof nationalistic sentiment amongst thepopulation. The MCP and the MRLA wereled and dominated by ethnic Chinesecommunists. Support for the MRLA camemostly from approximately 500,000 of the3.12 million ethnic Chinese in Malay atthe time. At the outset of the Emergencyin 1948, ethnic Chinese constituted 39percent of the Malay population, while theremainder of the population consisted of49 percent Malays and 10 percent Indiansand Ceylonese. Apart from the ethnicChinese, the MCP found little enthusiasmfor its goal of replacing the existinggovernment with a communist regime.

MCP Organization and TacticsAt the operational level, the MCP

organization consisted of an elaboratestructure of committees and military units.The Central Committee was the head of theorganization, and subsidiary units weredivided geographically into the RegionalBureaus, State Committees, DistrictCommittees, and Branch Committees. TheBranch Committees were responsible forcontrolling the Min Yuen, or “the Masses,”which had to be organized to supply thelogistical needs of the insurgency. The MinYuen consisted of local ethnic Chinese whovoluntarily or involuntarily supplied theMRLA with food, money, intelligence,recruits, and couriers.

As the military arm of the MCP, theMRLA had a strength of 6,000 to 8,000personnel. This force was divided intoregimental size units of 200 to 400personnel, and in the early stages of theinsurgency, the MRLA generally operatedin detachments of 100 to 200 men. Thissize force was sufficiently large enough tostrike and overwhelm isolated policeoutposts and other outlying static defenses.Additionally, the MRLA also almost alwayshad the element of surprise on its side.

On the tactical level, the MRLA initiallyhad great success against governmentforces and against the infrastructure of thecountry. The MRLA engaged in a full-scale

guerilla insurgency against the British andMalayan authorities, killing a total of 400civilians in the first year, and torturingmany others. Using hideouts in theinaccessible jungle, the MRLA conductedambushes, sabotaged infrastructure,attacked rubber farms, extorted civilians formoney and supplies, and destroyedtransportation in a deliberate terrorcampaign designed to cause the populaceto lose faith in the government. TheMRLA’s terror activities did not extend intothe urban centers with their Malaymajorities, but the rubber plantations, tinmines, smaller villages, and railwaystations quickly became the focal point ofthe conflict.

1948-1950During the first two years of the

Emergency, there was no integratedcounterinsurgency strategy, although thepolice and armed forces were rapidlyenlarged. The British brought in aninfantry battalion from Hong Kong and anadditional brigade from Great Britain.Additionally, a series of regulations cameinto effect that would prove effectivecounterinsurgency tools as the conflictprogressed. One such regulation was theright of the government to detain or deportwithout trial anyone suspected of aiding thecommunists. Other regulations made itpunishable by death to be found inpossession of weapons or supplies intended

for the MRLA guerrillas. Additionally, oneregulation required that the entirepopulation over the age of 12 register withthe local police, who issued identity cardswith photographs. Nevertheless, the Britishofficers from World War II facing this newenemy were unfamiliar with the type ofwarfare in which they were now involved.For instance, they had not seen an enemythat would target “soft targets” or withdrawin the face of fire to jungle retreats.

Into 1949, neither side of the conflicthad made great strides against the other.The MCP was somewhat discouraged thatthe Malayan populace did not embrace itsmessage of revolution, and escalatedgovernment military patrols wereincreasingly placing the MRLA on thedefensive. On the British side, althoughthe communists had been prevented fromseizing and retaining any populationcenters for any significant amount of time,British and Malayan forces were unable toeffectively protect the local population frominfiltration, intimidation, and control by theMCP. There was no one person in chargeof handling the Emergency as a whole, andthus police, military, and civil efforts weredisjointed and uncoordinated instead ofbeing joined under a single effective policy.Command and control overlapping policeand military geographic areas was severelylacking, with no clear division ofresponsibility. The British had also learnedthe frustrating lesson of the futility of

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running search and destroy operations in an effort to overcome alack of actionable intelligence from local sources.

Advent of the Briggs PlanWith the introduction into the conflict of retired army officer

Lieutenant General Harold Briggs in March 1949, the tide wasabout to turn in favor of the British. By June 1950, Briggs haddeveloped a counterinsurgency plan that would become known asthe Briggs Plan. The fundamental theme of the Briggs Plan wasto deny the MRLA access to their principal source of supplies andinformation, which was the civilian population. To accomplishthis goal, Briggs placed new emphasis on the efforts of the policeand reinforced the enforcement and intelligence capabilities ofthe police force particularly in the populated areas. Eventually,the police force was augmented to 75,000 personnel, up from theapproximately 10,000 police in Malaya at the outset of theEmergency. On the military side, the Briggs Plan called for troopsto establish secure bases in the villages. From these bases, themilitary was to conduct patrols within a radius of approximatelyfive hours travel. This caused the dispersion and deterrence ofthe MRLA, which was further exacerbated by the military’ssimultaneous efforts to conduct deep-jungle patrols and air raidswhich further harassed the retreating insurgents, destroyed theircamps, and captured or destroyed their food caches.

A further prong of the Briggs Plan was a policy of “food denial.”Although increased police efforts in the villages denied the MRLAmany of its previous logistical support assets, it proved impossibleto prevent the MRLA from obtaining supplies from the squattersat the jungle’s edge. Often the squatters were forced or intimidatedby the MRLA into providing supplies, information, and recruits.Because of their geographic dispersion, it was logistically notfeasible for the British and Malay authorities to provide securityto those on the outer fringes. To address this problem, Briggsdeveloped a resettlement plan for the squatters.

Under the Briggs Plan resettlement initiative, approximately400,000 squatters on the jungle fringes were forcibly resettledinto approximately 500 villages. This measure not only providedsecurity for the squatters, but, because of the foresight and tactwith which the operation was conducted, it earned the governmentthe loyalty of many squatters who had up to that point been unsureof which side would win the conflict. The government gave eachsquatter family actual ownership of its own parcel of productivefarmland in addition to five months worth of provisions to getstarted. On each parcel of land, the government built a hut frameand left the supplies to finish the walls for each squatter family tofinish constructing themselves, thereby giving the squatters animmediate sense of ownership. To provide security along theperimeter of the villages, government forces installed wireobstacles, and each village saw the introduction of a policepresence. Additionally, the government established potable watersupplies, schools, shops, medical clinics, and eventually electricity.Through efforts such as these, the British earned the support ofthe squatter population and managed to severely reduce theMRLA’s ability to use the squatters as logistical assets. This furtherisolated the insurgents and provided the populace with a degreeof security that was unavailable until then.

Another essential element to the Briggs Plan was the notionthat the civil and military authorities must proceed hand in hand.

Toward this end, Briggs instituted a system of committees, whichincluded the local civil authorities and the local military and policecommanders. These committees were set up at three levels. Inorder of descending geographic breadth, they were the State WarExecutive Committee (SWEC) at the state level, the CircleExecutive War Council (CWEC) at the circle level, and the DistrictWar Executive Council (DWEC) at the district level. The localbrigade commander would represent the army at the SWEC, andthe battalion commander and company commander wouldrepresent the army at the CWEC and DWEC levels, respectively.Elected civilian authorities presided over these meetings, andrepresentatives from the planting community were also invited toattend. At these meetings, decisions were made on how best towin the struggle with the communists both on a military level andin the hearts and minds of the populace. Routinely, these meetingsaddressed such items as food control, resettlement, curfewrestrictions, labor troubles, coordination of police and militaryactions, and other issues. The civilian leaders of the SWECs andDWECs also had the power to prevent security forces from carryingout a proposed mission if the cost in the goodwill of the localpopulace would outweigh the planned military victory.

The Briggs Plan showed early successes as insurgent activitydiminished into late 1950. However, the MCP regrouped andchanged their tactics, which led to a rise in insurgent activity to ahigh point of 606 incidents during June 1951. The insurgents, itwas determined, now were infiltrating the workforces on the estatesand among the remaining squatters and still were successfullyextorting food and supplies. To counter this development, Briggsfurther augmented his food denial program by conductingOperation Starvation. This plan was aimed at cutting off theinsurgents from all food and medical supplies. All areas fromwhich food or supplies could be had were labeled “controlledareas,” and the taking of food and supplies from these areas wasstrictly regulated and enforced. Shopkeepers were required tokeep detailed records of sales receipts, and rice rations weredelivered already cooked, so that it remained edible for only twoto three days after delivery. Additionally, Briggs developed theHome Guard as part of Operation Starvation, which enrolled thelocal populace to aid police patrolling in the effort to defeat theinsurgents logistics and free up the police force.

Despite the continuing effectiveness of the Briggs Plan, theMRLA scored a major psychological victory in October 1951, whenit managed to assassinate the acting British High Commissioner,Sir Henry Gurney. Furthermore, in November 1951, Briggs leftMalaya at the end of his appointment. These events proved apyrrhic victory for the MCP because they brought a new sense ofurgency to the British counterinsurgency efforts. They also broughtto Malaya General Sir Gerald Templer in January of 1952, whowould energetically implement and improve upon the Briggs Plan.

The Time of TemplerTempler’s effectiveness at implementing the Briggs Plan and

improving upon it would prove to mark the beginning of the endfor the MCP insurgency. As one of his first moves, Templer madean official promise of Malayan independence upon elimination ofthe communist threat. This eliminated a platform of communistnationalist propaganda, and no longer could the MCP effectivelyrecruit based on an anti-colonial stance. Templer also emphasized


that the conduct of the counterinsurgencyand the conduct of normal civil governmentaffairs were completely interrelated andwould be handled as one problem under asingle, unified chain of command. Templerstreamlined and integrated the commandand control structure of the police, military,and civil aspects of the government.Additionally, Templer emphasized that theentire Malayan population must play itspart in fighting the communists.

Templer took several steps to furtherincrease the security of the Malayanpopulation. He provided new impetus forthe until-then struggling Home Guardforces by providing one in three of themwith weapons and enlarging their ranks to200,000 by 1954. An all volunteer force,Home Guard citizens reported to the localpolice stations where they were issuedshotguns for the duration of their assignedpatrols. As individuals became thoroughlyscreened, they were trusted to haveshotguns in their homes for immediateaction against infiltrators and for defenseof the village perimeter. Templer mandatedthat, as an entire Home Guard unit proveditself trustworthy, they would becomeresponsible for the security of the entirevillage, thereby relieving the police forcesfor further action. Although consideredrisky at the time, the gambit paid off whenthe Home Guard proved a critical linkbetween the populace and the securityforces, especially as attachments on militarypatrols. This link provided much usefulinformation that allowed security forces toeffectively focus their efforts based on theintelligence provided instead of spendinghours patrolling through the jungle insearch of insurgents. This derivation oflocal intelligence would prove a great forcemultiplier because it was estimated thatnon-intelligence based patrolling required1,800 man-hours of jungle patrols for eachcontact to be had. The Home Guardisolated the MRLA insurgents bothphysically and psychologically in thevillages and rubber plantations and madea concerted effort to stamp out extortionand intimidation. By 1954, 150 newsquatter villages had become responsiblefor their own security.

In addition to the Home Guard, Templeralso began to build up a national Malayarmy with a vision toward eventual Malayaindependence. Templer also maintainedthe pressure on the food supply of the

MRLA, the effectiveness of which wasattested to by captured MRLA soldiers.Police intelligence had also by this timeinfiltrated agents and informants into theMin Yuen, and many communist smugglerswere captured as a result. Additionally,British and Malayan security forces wereat the highest levels of strength yet seen.There were 40,000 British troops in thetheater, along with 40,000 police forces.Through the constant harassment andpursuit of insurgents with whom contacthad been made, the morale of the MCP wasquickly plummeting. Further, the lenienttreatment and offer of employment andfinancial reward to insurgents wishing toswitch sides proved a valuable source ofintelligence. Overall, the increased securityfor the populace and the emphasis on localefforts produced an improvement in theflow of intelligence and information to thesecurity forces.

By March 1952, Templer, however, wasnot yet satisfied with the results and tookseveral additional measures at the locallevel to ensure cooperation with thegovernment as opposed to with thecommunists. For instance, Templer saw toit that security forces enforced strict 22-hour curfews on villages suspected of aidinginsurgents until the populace provided thedesired intelligence. To protect informers,security forces provided a system whereevery citizen was required to fill out ananonymous, confidential information card.Due to the security it provided theinformant, this technique proved veryeffective. Additionally, the security forcesunder Templer conducted extensivepsychological operations against theinsurgents, including the dropping ofleaflets encouraging surrender, thedistribution of some 93 million anti-communist pamphlets, and broadcastsrelating the relative comfort of captivity andworking for the government as opposed tohacking out an existence in the jungle.

Templer took several steps to encourageand facilitate participation in the localgovernment at the grass roots level as well.Although village committees were electedunder the Briggs Plan, they had no financialauthority and served only in an advisoryrole. Templer granted these villagecommittees statutory authority and madethem responsible for collecting rates andlicense fees. The village committees alsowere given the responsibility to oversee theuse of public funds for such localimprovements as schools, medical facilities,and community halls. To further facilitateinvolvement in local governance, Templerinstituted the Civics Course, which broughtcitizens together for one full week’s worthof training on democratic governance. By1954, the government hosted 130 suchcourses. Additionally, in late 1953,Templer introduced the policy of labelingdistricts that had proven themselves to beactively opposed to the communistinsurgents “white areas.” By achieving thissought after award, a district acquiredfreedom from most of the irksomerestrictions imposed by the Briggs Plan onthe remainder of the country, such ascurfews, limited shopping hours, foodcontrol, and prying patrols. To the firstdistrict vested with this honor, Templermade clear that it was now up to the localpopulation to “keep the Communists outand see that they never come back.”

The results of Templer’s tenure wereclearly positive. There was a decrease inthe number of incidents from 6,100 in 1951,to 4,700 in 1952, to only 1,100 in 1953.Further, through constant police andmilitary patrolling, in addition to the othermeasures taken, the insurgents were nowon the defensive. The monthly total ofpolice losses fell from 100 per month in1951 to 20 per month by the middle of1952, never to rise above that figure again.Similarly, the number of civilian deaths atinsurgent hands fell from 90 per month in1951 to 15 per month in 1952, also neverto rise above that figure again.

After Templer left Malaya in 1954, hispolicies and those of Briggs werecontinually enforced with success againstthe insurgents. Although it took until 1960for the Malayan government to officiallydeclare the Emergency ended, victory overthe communist insurgents was clear whenMalaya gained its independence in 1957and saw a new government form without a


The results of Templer’stenure were clearly

positive. There was adecrease in the number of

incidents from 6,100 in1951, to 4,700 in 1952, to

only 1,100 in 1953.

single seat going to a communist orcommunist supporter.

Analysis of Application ofCounterinsurgency Doctrine

The British counterinsurgency againstthe MCP was effective because itsuccessfully established the five conditionsof an effective counterinsurgencycampaign. Under current United StatesArmy doctrine, the five fundamentalconditions necessary for successfulcounterinsurgency operations are asfollows:

1) A secure populace,2) Established local political institutions,3) Contributing local government,4) Neutralizing insurgent capabilities,

and5) Information flow from local

sources.Each of these five conditions contains

some degree of nuance. Under the firstcondition, a secure populace means securityfrom the influence of insurgents initially,moving to a situation where the host nationpopulation is mobilized, armed, and trainedto protect itself. Effective security allowslocal political and administrativeinstitutions to operate freely and localcommerce to flourish.

Under the second prong, establishinglocal political institutions includesestablishing conditions favorable for thedevelopment of host nation governmentalinstitutions, including law enforcement,public information, health care, schools,and public works.

Under the third condition, contributinglocal government is both tangible andpsychological, and local security forcesmust reinforce and be integrated into theplan. This local integration must beconstantly emphasized with the local andhost nation police, civil, and militaryleadership, as well as with the populace atlarge. Psychologically, in order to mitigatethe impact of insurgent propaganda, thepopulace must constantly be reassured thatconditions are improving.Counterinsurgency operations mustestablish conditions that contribute to hostnation and local government effectiveness.

To neutralize insurgent capabilitiesunder the fourth prong, counterinsurgentefforts must work to exploit insurgentgrievances and work with local authoritiesand leaders to resolve issues of local

concern thereby legitimizing governmentalinstitutions.

Under the fifth prong, to fosterinformation flow from local sources,counterinsurgent efforts must facilitate anduse intelligence obtained from local sourcesto gain access to the insurgent’s economicand social base of support, order of battle,tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The British effectively secured thepopulace during the Emergency. Theresettlement of the squatters under theBriggs plan proved to be an effectivesecurity measure. Though it displacedsome 400,000 persons from the life theythen knew, the resettlement eventuallyprovided security to the squatters by placingthem in defensible villages with a securityperimeter. Furthermore, the improvedliving conditions and new propertyownership the squatters enjoyed made it sothe former squatters now had somethingmore to defend. Briggs and Templer bothrightly emphasized the efforts of the HomeGuard, which progressively formed into aviable, trained, and armed local securityforce. This not only bolstered local villagesecurity but security on an operational levelas well due to the fact that security forces,until then posted on static guard duties,were freed to conduct other offensive

operations against the insurgents. Finally,Templer’s implementation of the “whiteareas” proved to be the final successful pushof security from a nationally led effort downto a locally led effort. The Briggs Plan andTempler’s additions to it enabled Malayanlocales to achieve free operation ofcommerce and of local political andadministrative institutions.

During the Emergency, the Britisheffectively established local politicalinstitutions. One of the first prongs of theBriggs Plan was to establish locally electedcouncils, and later, Templer furtherbolstered this local government tool byadding to each council’s legal authorities.These actions gave the local populace astake in their own future, particularly whenTempler gave the local councils authorityto oversee the implementation of publicfunds for community improvements suchas schools, electricity, running water, andhealth care facilities. Further, theintroduction of the “white areas” byTempler accelerated the country towardsvictory over the insurgents. In effect, theBritish had set up a clear reward system toencourage local governments to proactivelyassume the fight against the insurgents.The effectiveness of this plan was clearwhen those areas that won the “white area”


During the Malayan Emergency in 1956, members of Britain’s 25th Regiment Royal Artilleryengage suspected bandit positions from their firebase.

© Crown Copyright/MOD, image from www.photos.mod.ukReproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office

label took pride not only in their newfound freedoms, but also intheir new “status.” Thus, the British established conditionsfavorable for local host nation government institutions.

The British effectively fostered a contributing local government.The SWECs and DWECs Briggs organized provided themechanism for integration of the elected civilian leadership, themilitary and police forces called for by United States Armydoctrine. The British also fostered local government contributionsby empowering the elected civilian leadership to oversee andapprove any military or police actions in their jurisdictions. Thisreal grant of power gave the local governing authorities thenecessary sense of ownership in their own destiny necessary toensure their energetic, proactive contributions to their own welfareand security. Additionally, Briggs and Templer effectivelyemphasized the need for local government to work hard for thepopulace in the continuing effort to win hearts and minds. TheBritish did well to realize that the Malayan populace was lookingnot only at military successes, but also at whether the governmentthey currently lived under was better than what was being offeredby the communists. This emphasis on local government servicewas effective in producing tangible results, in the form of improvedliving standards, and psychological results, in the form of loyaltieswon in the struggle for the hearts and minds of the populace.

The British effectively neutralized insurgent capabilities. Theefforts by Briggs and Templer to eliminate the sources of food, recruits,and supplies for the insurgents proved effective. By forming the newsquatter villages, creating accountability for retailers of food andmedical supplies, and controlling the population’s rice rationing, theBritish effectively began to starve the MRLA troops. Combined withincreased military, police, and Home Guard patrolling, made all themore effective through the use of intelligence from locals, the MRLAwas forced deeper and deeper into the jungle and away from thepopulace. This allowed British psychological operations to exploitinsurgent grievances through offers of food and comfortable livingconditions advertised in pamphlets and fliers. Those insurgentswho surrendered were treated well and then employed to work


First Lieutenant Tom Willis currently serves with C Company, 2ndBattalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Camp Dawson, WestVirginia. He graduated with a bachelor’s degree from the University of Virginia,a Juris Doctor from the University of Oregon School of Law, and a Master’s ofLaw from Georgetown University School of Law. LT Willis received hiscommission via direct appointment by the Governor of the state of West Virginia

against their former comrades, which dealta further blow to the MRLA and MCP.Thus, the British effectively neutralizedinsurgent capabilities on all frontssimultaneously.

The British effectively fosteredinformation flow from local sources. As theBritish learned prior to implementation ofthe Briggs Plan, it took many hundreds,even thousands, of long hours of tediousjungle patrolling to produce the fruit of justone reliable intelligence tip from informedlocal sources. To their credit, the Britishthrough Briggs and Templer, realized thatin order to obtain intelligence from the localpopulace, the populace had to feel securefrom retribution from the violent andundiscriminating insurgents. The Britishdid well then to substantially augment themilitary and police forces in order toconvince the populace that they intendedto win the struggle with the communists.

These forces also helped to provide the security necessary for thefree flow of intelligence to the government. However, it was theHome Guard that provided the most effective conduit toinformation flow from local sources. The Home Guard broughtwith it the double-advantage of increasing security and fosteringintelligence flows, both from the Home Guard citizens themselvesand from the local populace they secured. This movement gainedmomentum throughout application of the Briggs Plan, culminatingin the advent of Templer’s “white areas.” Thus, the insurgent’seconomic and social bases of support were effectively evisceratedwhen information from local sources eliminated their ability tocovertly operate amongst the populace.

ConclusionThe British victory over the communists in Malaya has become

a textbook example of effective counterinsurgent techniques dueto the effective application by the British of the five fundamentalsof a counterinsurgency. Detractors from the British efforts maypoint out that Malaya did not share a border with a hostilecommunist nation and that the insurgents thus were not as wellsupported as those in other world conflicts. Additionally, eventhough the British defeated the communist insurgents in Malaya,the process took over a decade at an enormous cost in lives,manpower, and funds. However, the talent of men like Briggsand Templer cannot be overstated. They derived and applied noveltechniques and methods of battling an elusive and adaptive enemy.As a testament to the efficacy of the British techniques, the methodsfor conducting a counterinsurgency developed by the British inMalaya still serve today as the basis for modern militarycounterinsurgent doctrine.

During the Malayan Emergency in 1956, gunners with Britain’s 25th Regiment Royal Artillerytend to their 25 pounder gun/howitzer on their base camp in Malaya.

© Crown Copyright/MOD, image from www.photos.mod.ukReproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office

“IEDs are the enemy’s precision guidedweapons which allows them to conductviolent attacks at a time and place of theirchoosing.”

– Lieutenant General Russel L. HonoréFirst Army Commanding General

COLONEL DANIEL L. ZAJAC — MAJOR BRIAN A. BISSONNETTE — CAPTAIN JOHN F. CARSON, JR


THE FIRST ARMY IEDTRAINING METHODOLOGY

A ground assault convoy movesalong a dirt road as Soldiers scan the environment around

them, constantly searching for anything outof the ordinary. A Soldier is in the gunner’shatch of the lead vehicle armed with a .50cal machine gun. He is the first to see it, apile of trash with a barely visible blue wire

launchers at the enemy. The Soldier beginsto return fire as his vehicle commander takescharge of the three-vehicle element that madeit out of the ambush. They move off roadand begin to flank the enemy. Soon after, theenemy breaks contact, and the unit begins toreorganize, secure the area, and call up a spotreport to its higher headquarters.

This incident didn’t happen in the desertof Iraq, it happened in the Desoto NationalForest training area of Camp Shelby,Mississippi, where trainers of the 3rdBrigade, 87th Division (Training Support)have perfected the art of theater immersion

protruding from it. He quickly warns hisvehicle commander, but he is too late. Itexplodes less than 15 meters from hisposition. The driver of the vehicleinstinctively speeds up to get out of the killzone. The following two vehicles do thesame and drive through the blast area ofthe improvised explosive device (IED). TheSoldier then hears a second explosionfollowed by small arms fire. He quicklyscans to his rear and sees that a portion ofthe convoy is stopped and firing .50 calmachine guns and MK-19 grenade


Photos by Major Arthur Sharpe

Camp Shelby’s theater-like training area is the perfect setting to conduct realistic, hands-onimprovised explosive device training.

training. Currently, 3rd Brigade Soldiershave trained more than 17,000 Soldiersfrom four Army National Guard brigades,and training for elements of a fifth brigadeis ongoing. Numerous smaller units havebeen trained for deployment during thissame time period.

Theater ImmersionWhen training Soldiers to deal with

IEDs, the number one killer on thebattlefield, theater immersion is extremelyeffective. The purpose of theater immersionis to rapidly build combat-ready formations,manned by battle-proofed Soldiers,inculcated with the Warrior Ethos and ledby competent and confident leaders, whosee first, understand first, and act first. Thetheater immersion training conceptaccomplishes this by placing leaders,Soldiers, and units — as rapidly as possible— into an environment analogous to whatthey will encounter in combat. At theSoldier level, training is tough, realistic,hands-on, and repetitive, designed toprovide Soldiers and small tactical units thetools necessary to respond to any threat theymay encounter on the battlefield. Thistraining environment replicates conditions ina multi-echeloned approach that thrustsformations into a theater analog soon afterarrival at the mobilization station and stressesthe organization from the individual tobrigade level. Essentially, theater immersionis a Combat Training Center (CTC)-likeexperience that replicates conditions intheater, while training individual throughbrigade-level collective tasks.

The most obvious manifestation of theaterimmersion is the physical design of thetraining sites. Camp Shelby currently hasfour fully functional forward operatingbases (FOB) — FOB Hit, FOB Arrowhead,FOB Hurricane Point, and FOB BlueDiamond. These FOBs have the capacityto accommodate at least a battalion-sizedcombat formation. Additionally, fourpopulated villages — Al Jaffah, Trebil, AlAsad, and Al Qaim — are located in thetraining area and two more are beingdeveloped — Safwan and Al Kut. Topopulate these villages, 300 civilians on thebattlefield (COBs) were hired, to include80 Iraqi-Americans or 80 Afghan-Americans (depending on the unit’s futurearea of operations). A highway overpasswas constructed, and local roads were linedwith guardrails. The villages have

mosques, offices for civil authorities,markets, walled residences, tunnelcomplexes, as well as traffic circles andlow-hanging telephone and electric cablesthat are typical of Iraqi and Afghanistanvillages. Camp Shelby’s theater-liketraining area is the perfect setting toconduct realistic, hands-on IED training.

The integration of IEDs into theaterimmersion focuses on a variety of areas toinclude interdicting an IED far in advanceof its use; force protection measures to keepSoldiers protected; cultural immersion toreadily gain valuable intelligence; patternanalysis to identify areas and times of risk;methods to reestablish control and shapethe battlefield; and battle drills to close withand destroy the enemy after an attack islaunched. Theater immersion achieves allof these goals.

Tenants of the Counter-IEDTraining Methodology

The counter-IED training methodologybegins with the First U.S. Army tenants ofcounter-IED operations – Deter, Detect,Defeat, Prevent, and Respond. Thesetenants guide all counter-IED training the3rd Brigade conducts. Additionally,collaboration with other Army agenciesfurther enhances our IED training at CampShelby. The First U.S. Army regularlyshares information with the NationalTraining Center, Joint Readiness TrainingCenter, Joint IED Defeat Task Force(JIEDDTF), U.S. Army Intelligence Centerand School, and U.S. Army EngineerCenter and School. For example, the U.S.

Army Engineer Center’s IED defeat tenants— Predict, Detect, Prevent, Neutralize, andMitigate — are closely related to andcomplement the counter-IED tenantsdeveloped by First U.S. Army. This Army-wide collaborative effort ensures that IEDtraining at Camp Shelby remains relevantand battle-focused.

Deter In order to deter IEDs, it is imperative

that a unit maintains situational awarenessand establishes an aggressive posture.Units are trained to gain the initiative bytargeting the enemy relentlessly throughlethal and nonlethal methods. Duringtraining, units conduct aggressive andirregular combat patrols, both mounted anddismounted. They are trained to conductsurveillance on named areas of interest.Units are trained to establish beneficialrelationships with the local leadership andpopulation by conducting activities such ascivil affair projects, providing medicalassistance, and respecting the local customsand traditions. Force protection is also adeterrence-training objective and isaccomplished by training units to conducteffective route reconnaissance operationscontinuously throughout the trainingmodel. Training on this basic tenantenables the unit to seize the initiative andkeep the enemy off balance.

DetectTraining on the second tenant, detect,

primarily resides in the training of staff andmilitary intelligence elements. Because the

TRAINING NOTES


Soldiers must learn how to react to an IED attack. Constant repetition of battle drills is key.

IED threat is ubiquitous, situational awareness and understandingmust occur in all Soldiers and at all levels. The key to trainingthis tenant resides in IBOS (Intelligence Battlefield OperatingSystem) gunnery (a two-week block of intense Military Intelligencetraining), battalion ARTEPs (Army Training and EvaluationPrograms), and brigade CPXs/MRXs (command post exercises/mission rehearsal exercises). It starts with effective patternanalysis, collection management and aggressive intelligencesurveillance and reconnaissance planning. Pattern analysistraining consists of developing analytical skills in MI Soldiers topredict when and where emplacing of IEDs will occur and howthe enemy will utilize IEDs. Once a unit has effectively conductedtraining on developing enemy patterns, they must create acollection management plan that allows them to focus their limitedassets on detecting IEDs. Detecting IEDs attempts to find theIED prior to it being employed. This includes identifying thebomb makers, the individuals who emplace them, and the cacheswhich hide the components to make IEDs. The next step is todevelop an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)plan to actively pursue IEDs and their makers. During ISRtraining, units are taught that every Soldier is a sensor. This meansthat whenever any unit moves outside of the FOB, they arecollectors and are given pre-briefs highlighting potential indicatorsof intelligence value. They also receive debriefs upon their returnto collect the battlefield information acquired. Units also receivetraining on how to conduct aggressive and unpredictablereconnaissance planning and how to use various intelligencesystems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), signalintelligence (SIGINT) assets, and tactical human intelligence(HUMINT) Teams (THTs). THTs are a key source of intelligencein theater, and they train relentlessly to effectively collectintelligence information from the local populace.

DefeatThe defeat tenant brings technology to the battlefield. While

Soldiers are trained on emerging counter-IED technologies, theyare also taught not to forget that the most effective tool to defeat

IEDs is the American Soldier. Electronic countermeasures (ECM)training is integrated into ground assault convoy training. Leaderslearn to employ ECM systems during movement, and Soldiers arefamiliarized on the operation of ECM systems. However, in orderto defeat IEDs, units must defeat the enemy. Constant trainingon aggressive battle drills is necessary to ensure that Soldiers candestroy the enemy once an IED ambush is initiated.

PreventThe focus of the prevent tenant is to instruct units to vigilantly

maintain situational awareness of their surroundings. Changes inthe environment are indicators of possible IED activity. This isreinforced through the numerous IED events that occur duringtraining. Units are trained to vary convoy times and routes to keepthe enemy off balance. Conducting cordon and search operations isalso a key to preventing IED attacks. Confiscating bomb-makingmaterials before they are turned into IEDs prevents future IED attacks.

RespondThe final tenant is respond, which focuses units on how to

react if an IED attack occurs. Constant repetition on battle drillsis key. Training is structured to instruct Soldiers on the variety ofbattle drills and responses that may be utilized. This ensures thatSoldiers are adaptive, flexible, and thinking. Each IED attack thatis replicated in training requires the unit to respond by executingtheir battle drills. The battle drills are designed to protect the forceand to destroy the enemy when feasible. Training on fire supportplanning and execution is provided to teach how to support a unit incontact. Also, units must have a combat lifesaver capability. Soldiersreceive combat lifesaver training while at Camp Shelby. The unitmust also be capable of conducting casualty evacuation operations,detainee operations, and vehicle recovery operations to save livesand salvage equipment after an IED attack occurs.

Mission Training PlanTo capture the above tenants into a task, condition, and

standards training model, 3rd Brigade, 87thDivision (TS) developed an IED missiontraining plan (MTP) that was adopted by FirstU.S. Army. This MTP is used to augmentvarious training venues to facilitate hands-ontraining as it relates to IEDs. This MTP hasbecome the cornerstone of IED training atCamp Shelby. Furthermore, First United StatesArmy has shared this MTP with numerousother Army agencies to include ForcesCommand, JIEDDTF, and the Engineer Centerand School. This collaborative process hasenabled the various Army agencies involved incounter-IED training to improve their trainingphilosophies.

IED Training Execution“We train Soldiers the way they will fight,

and the standard comes from theater. We areconstantly adjusting our training based oncurrent conditions down range. The theater


Colonel Daniel L. Zajac is currently servingas commander of the 3rd Brigade, 87th Division(Training Support). He is a graduate of the ArmyWar College and Advanced Strategic Arts Program.His previous assignments include serving ascommander of the 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor, 3rdInfantry Division (Mechanized) and executive officerof the 1st Brigade, 3rd ID. Zajac is a 1981 graduateof the U.S. Military Academy.

Major Brian A. Bissonnette is currently servingas an intelligence officer (S2) for the 3rd Brigade,87th Division (TS). He was commissioned in theMilitary Intelligence Corps in 1991 after graduatingfrom Bowling Green State University in Ohio.

Captain John F. Carson, Jr. currently serves asan intelligence officer for the 3rd Brigade, 87th Division(TS). His previous assignments include serving asthe NGIC Operations Officer (LNO) to Multi-NationalCorps-Iraq (III Corps), Baghdad, Iraq.

immersion concept provides the flexibilityto do that in near real time.”

— Colonel Daniel L. ZajacCommander, 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (TS)

Theater immersion IED training startswith all Soldiers receiving classroom trainingbased on their future area of operation. Thistraining focuses on the most recent TTPs inuse by the enemy and lessons learned fromtheater. This develops a situationalunderstanding of the environment in whichthey will be operating. Each Soldier alsoreceives the DA G3 JIEDDTF level I brief,which is given by 3rd Brigade, 87th Division(TS) Soldiers who are DA G3 JIEDDTF levelI/II qualified. Also, the DA G3 JIEDDTFprovides brigade and battalion commandersand staffs level II and level III training thatfocuses on the holistic approach to defeatingIEDs in theater.

Once this baseline of knowledge isestablished, the theater immersion conceptcomes to the forefront. Due to theubiquitous IED threat in theater, there isno single, discrete IED training event atCamp Shelby. IEDs are nested in all eventsranging from land navigation and weaponsqualification to battalion ARTEPs, brigadeCPXs, and brigade MRXs.

For example, during brigade MRXs andbattalion ARTEPs, brigades/battalionsconduct a rigorous field training exerciseinvolving missions such as FOB defense,cordon and search, raids, hostage rescue,and ground assault convoys. Villages, suchas Trebil, Al Qaim, Al Jaffah, and Al Asad,are populated with civilians on thebattlefield, to include Arabic speakers.These COBs perform roles such as mayors,police chiefs, merchants, blacklistedinsurgents, etc. IEDs are emplaced onroutes throughout the training area. Thebrigade/battalion operates in a scenario

with actual patterns of IED emplacementand indirect and direct attacks. OPFORoperates as insurgents, and civilians in thevillages may be pro-Coalition, anti-Coalition or neutral. Blacklisted insurgentsare present and may be detained ifidentified and caught. Village residents aremore willing to provide information oninsurgent attacks, such as IEDs, if the U.S.units treat them with respect and attemptto assist the local population. The successof the brigade/battalion battle staff to applythe tenants of IED defeat is exercisedduring these exercises.

This training method requires units toreact to IEDs in any environment atanytime. It is repetitious and deliberate,which continuously allows units toreinforce lessons from classroom trainingand the continued study of lessons learnedfrom theater. Soldiers not only learn battledrills to counter-IEDs, but they gain acomprehensive understanding of the overallIED threat. This allows Soldiers and theirleaders to understand that different battledrills and counter-IED techniques may bebrought to bear for different circumstances.As a result, thinking, agile, and adaptiveSoldiers are developed. This approach isdesigned to create a training environmentwhere every Soldier encounters a minimumof 30 IED events during post mobilizationtraining. This training techniqueestablishes a mentality in Soldiers that IEDsare the enemy’s precision guided weaponsand can occur at any time and any place.

IED Master GunnersThe final element to IED training at

Camp Shelby is the IED master gunnerconcept. The commander, 3rd Brigade, 87thDivision (TS) has given the role of brigadeIED master gunners to the brigade

intelligence officers. The role of these mastergunners is to ensure recent, relevant enemyIED tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTPs) are incorporated into Camp Shelby’svarious training events. The master gunnersdata-mine NIPRNET and SIPRNET sites totrack new trends in TTPs to insure trainingremains relevant and up to date. They relaythis information to battalion IED mastergunners. The brigade IED master gunnersalso manage the MTP and ensure newlessons learned from theater are incorporatedinto the MTP. The battalion IED mastergunners take this updated intelligence on ourenemy and execute current, relevant, battle-focused IED training. The battalion IEDmaster gunners are also responsible forcoaching, teaching, and mentoring mobilizedunit leaders as they continually train oncounter-IED tactics and techniques.

The 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (TS) hasestablished this theater immersion counter-IED training methodology to create a realisticand interactive environment that trains everySoldier on the most updated enemy IEDTTPs. This provides the best possible trainingto deploying Soldiers in order to defeat theenemy and save lives.

We have a nonnegotiable contract withthe American people to prepare her sonsand daughters for war. We must useimagination and innovation to do thisbetter than we ever have before. We cannot, we will not fail in this task.”

– Lieutenant General Russel L. HonoréFirst Army Commanding General

The Soldiers of the 3rd Brigade, 87thDivision (TS) take the First U.S. Armycommander’s training philosophy to heart,and we will not fail.

TRAINING NOTES


The replacement of sterile,garrison-based, end-of-phasecritical task testing in Basic

Combat Training (BCT) with realistic andrelevant situational training exercises(STX) that contain embedded individualtasks has highlighted an unforeseenproblem — Soldiers are having significantchallenges quickly and accuratelyidentifying threats and knowing when toapply deadly force. While the newly-implemented STX-based traininginitiatives provide Soldiers moreexperience prior to assignment to their unit— a unit most likely deploying or alreadydeployed to combat — they have notnecessarily departed the training base withthe right lessons learned vis-à-vis makingintuitive life or death decisions in the heatof battle. While the new BCT program ofinstruction (POI) includes rules ofengagement (ROE) instruction, advancedrifle marksmanship, and STXs that seek tocombine previous instruction into realisticscenarios, Soldiers in BCT continue tomake inappropriate decisions with regardto threat identification and the applicationof deadly force during the STXs and duringtheir final field training exercise (FTX).

When we began to peel the onion back,we found that many drill sergeants, evenour combat veterans, were misinformed asto use of the ROE and when it’s appropriateto use deadly force. Some of our veteranshad commanders in combat that issuedoverly restricted ROE, while others hadcommanders who were much morereceptive and supportive on the use ofdeadly force. All had problems with tryingto apply complex and wordy ROE in thefraction of a second that tense and rapidlyevolving situations allow. If this is aproblem for our combat-seasoned drillsergeants, then it’s a significant hurdle forthose drill sergeants who have yet to deploy.

Combining Rules of Engagment and MarksmanshipWith Judgment-Based Training

THE ROE TACTICAL TRAINING SEMINAR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES C. LARSEN

And if the cadre is unsure about when it’sokay to kill bad guys, then the Soldierssurely will be. The following problemswere routinely observed during STXs, untilwe fixed the problem with effective cadretraining:

Soldiers unjustifiably engagingcivilians, while others were so hesitant toengage insurgents dressed in civilianclothes that they became casualties;

Soldiers engaging critically woundedinsurgents who posed no further threat;and, perhaps most importantly,

Drill sergeants who lacked therequisite combination of legal knowledgeand tactical skills to facilitate an after actionreview that thoroughly examines why thedecisions were made.

As we have discovered over the past twoyears in our efforts to increase the tacticalproficiency of the drill sergeants (regardlessof their MOS), cadre training was the

answer. Though we did not have theexpertise internally to train the cadre, wefound a team of dedicated andextraordinarily competent professionalscomprised of Judge Advocates (JAs) withcombat, shooting, and special operationsexperience, federal law enforcement agents,local/state law enforcement personnel withextensive special operations (SpecialWeapons and Tactics [SWAT]) backgroundsand experience, Special Operations servicemembers, and civilian self-defenseinstructors, to train the BCT and OneStation Unit Training (OSUT) cadre at FortKnox, Kentucky, on ROE and rules for theuse of force.

What makes this training so unique isthat it is the only structured trainingprogram in the armed services thatcombines ROE instruction with advancedpistol and rifle marksmanship, andjudgment-based training. It begins with

U.S. Army photos

By integrating realistic and relevant situational training exercises into basic combat training,Soldiers are more prepared than ever before to immediately contribute to their units in combat.

TRAINING NOTES


extremely thought-provoking lectures on thetactical and legal applications of the use of forceand use of force law; it then progresses to shoot/no-shoot situations using the engagement skillstrainer, whereby the decisions are moderatedby a tactically knowledgeable JA, and tacticalpistol instruction. Tactically knowledgeableJAs with a background in close quartersshooting and strong shooting skills are essentialto this program. Without this knowledge/skillbase, the legal instruction will take on anacademic and sterile flavor that is unhelpful tounderstanding decision-making in a dynamicclose quarters tactical environment while underthe threat of imminent death.

Building on this training, the team trainsadvanced rifle and pistol marksmanship usinglive ammunition to prepare the students forclose quarters combat. The goal of this live-fire training is twofold:

(1) To bring all students to a skill level thatwill enable them to benefit from the upcoming scenario-basedSimunitions training, while at the same time ensuring safe,competent weapons handling in a close quarters environment; and

(2) To place them in the correct mind-set to achieve themaximum benefit from the scenario-based Simunitions training.Because a Soldier’s mindset changes once live ammunition islocked and loaded into their weapon, moving from a live fire rangeto the Simunitions training helps preserve that mentality, whichexponentially increases the realism of the scenarios.

Once students have mastered marksmanship, they are preparedfor the force-on-force, judgment-based training with Simunitions.Use of the Simunitions allows for realistic shoot/no-shoot decisionsto be made with immediate feedback. The final phase of the

training is team and squad STXs in a shoothouse and on a traffic control point usingSimunitions. JAs facilitate the AAR forall Simunitions training, providing legalopinion on the shooter’s decision as to whento use deadly force. Simply put, this is thebest training I’ve had in 25 years of combatarms service.

Over four, two-and-a-half dayiterations, the team trained nearly 100instructors and drill sergeants, and theresults were immediate. The cadreeducated their peers, and the BCT andOSUT Soldiers are now making far moreappropriate decisions during their STXsand during their final FTX. The ROEinstruction has significantly improved, theAARs have improved, and the Soldiers aremore prepared than ever before to leaveBCT/OSUT to immediately andmeaningfully contribute to their unit incombat.

Lieutenant Colonel James C. Larsen recently served as the battalioncommander of the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry (Basic Combat Training) atFort Knox, Kentucky, and is currently assigned to the J3, Joint SpecialOperations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is a 1986 OCS graduatewho has served in a variety of Ranger, mechanized, and air assault infantryassignments. He is a veteran of operations Just Cause, Enduring Freedom,and Iraqi Freedom; and has deployed in support of operations UpholdDemocracy and Joint Endeavor (SFOR-8).

After training on quick fire techniques with live ammuntion, Soldiers face unpredictable shoot/no shoot situations using Simunitions.

Building on their marksmanship and shoot/no shoot training, Soldiers conduct STXs withSimunitions in a shoot house during traffic control point operations.

If you’re interested in achieving the same positive impact onyour unit, contact the ROE/RUF Tactical Training Seminar CourseDirector, Major Bolgiano (USAF), at [email protected] DSN 243-6464.


OOOOOVERHAULINGVERHAULINGVERHAULINGVERHAULINGVERHAULING THETHETHETHETHE P P P P PLATOONLATOONLATOONLATOONLATOON

NNNNNIGHTIGHTIGHTIGHTIGHT L L L L LIVEIVEIVEIVEIVE-F-F-F-F-FIREIREIREIREIRE D D D D DEFENSEEFENSEEFENSEEFENSEEFENSE INININININ IET IET IET IET IETLIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES C. LARSEN

The Army has made great strides in preparing Soldiersfor combat over the past two years. Using a foundationof 39 core warrior tasks and nine core warrior battle

drills, it recently instituted a new program of instruction (POI)for Basic Combat Training that adds urban and convoy operations,crew-served weapons familiarization, advanced riflemarksmanship, reaction to improvised explosive devices/unexploded ordnance (IED/UO), interaction with news media, andincreased the length of time spent in the field. Gone are the daysof sterile end-of-phase testing, which have been replaced withrealistic and relevant situational training exercises with embeddingcritical individual tasks. Unfortunately, one critical event thatwas in desperate need to be revamped due to the very same lack ofrelevancy and realism, was overlooked — the platoon night live-fire defense from prepared fighting positions. The purpose of thisarticle is to lobby for a low cost change to the recently releasedPOI that enables the same range to be adapted to safely trainSoldiers on core warrior battle drills and tasks under the mostrealistic and relevant conditions — before they deploy to combat.

Though each Army Training Center (ATC) has a slightlydifferent range, the concept is the same and has been since theheight of the Cold War and the advent of pop-up targets: occupya prepared fighting position, engage “advancing” and then“retreating” targets from 300 meters to 25 meters and back to 300meters again. At night, theonly difference is thatparachute flares arelaunched so the Soldiers cansee their targets. Recently,some ATCs have addednoncombatants to the mix oftargetry; however, becauseSoldiers have no nightvision equipment or laseraiming devices, not only canthey not get target feedback,they can’t identify friendfrom foe. The Army isworking quickly to addressthe lack of equipment, butthis won’t solve the problemof relevancy: Soldiers incombat today are rarelyengaging the enemy fromprepared fighting positions.

According to the POI

that was approved by the Commanding General, U.S, ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command on 15 November 2004, theterminal learning objective (TLO) for the platoon defensive livefire during daylight is Employ Mutually Supporting Fires, andthere are four supporting enabling learning objectives (ELOs):

Provide security as part of a perimeter or assembly area;Move tactically from a perimeter to a prepared fighting

position;Engage targets in a nuclear, biological, and chemical

(NBC) environment; andEmploy mutually supporting fires.

The TLO for the night portion is Conduct Night Live-FireDefensive Exercise, and it has one ELO: Participate in nightlive-fire defensive exercise. The poorly worded TLOs and ELOsnotwithstanding, there is little nesting with the 39 core warriortasks and nine core warrior drills. As the Training Support Package(TSP) currently reads, only three core warrior tasks are taught orreinforced, but not one core warrior drill:

Correct malfunctions with assigned weapon;Use visual signaling techniques; andReact to a chemical or biological hazard.

To vastly improve relevancy and realism, and train or reinforcemore of the core warrior tasks and drills, Fort Knox is piloting a

new concept using the existingrange (See Figures 1 and 2),changing the TLO fromEmploy Mutually SupportiveFires to React to Far Ambush(day and night). Under thisconcept, Soldiers areconducting a presence patrolalong a road beginning on anadjacent range with twosquads (section) in a staggeredcolumn — a typical footmarch formation —paralleling the “firing line”with their weapons at the lowready. To mitigate risk, drillsergeants perform as squadleaders, all Soldiers wearImproved Body Armor, livemagazines in theirammunition pouches, but nomagazines are in the weapon.

Courtesy photo

Soldiers in combat today are rarely engaging the enemy from prepared fightingpositions like those used during Basic Combat Training.

TRAINING NOTES


(We will continue to work with Post Safety to gain approval forSoldiers to move in an “amber status” [live ammunition inmagazines, but no round chambered]). Once the lead members ofthe section approach the end of the “road” that has replaced theold prepared fighting positions, grenade simulators in demolitionpits are simultaneously command detonated near the lead and trailSoldiers, thus simulating a blocked ambush. All Soldiersimmediately drop and move to the nearest covered and concealedposition, insert the live magazine, and destroy the threat.

To prevent assaulting through the kill zone, as would be thedrill for reacting to a near ambush, the closest targets to appearinitially are between 50 and 100 meters. Noncombatant targetsare presented in the scenario. Once the threat is destroyed, thesection performs consolidation and reorganization, and continuestheir patrol off of the range. At night, the scenario is the same,but Soldiers wear PVS-7 or PVS-14 Night Vision Devices andtheir rifles are equipped with PAQ-4 or PEQ-2 Laser AimingDevices. Also to mitigate risk and increase Soldier proficiency,following a demonstration at the beginning of the training, eachsection performs a day and night dry rehearsal (no ammunition),a day blank rehearsal prior to conducting its live-fire iterations.Prerequisite training includes advanced rifle marksmanship(engage targets, night-aided) and night tactical movement withnight vision devices. A 220-Soldier company, maximum for theBCT POI, can conduct the day and night dry, blank, and live-fireiterations in about eight hours, which adds no more time to theschedule than what is currently allocated.

Below are the proposed TLOs and ELOs to support this concept:TLO: React to Far Ambush during Daylight

ELO A: Provide security as part of a perimeter.ELO B: Move as a member of a presence patrol.ELO C: Engage targets from a temporary fightingposition, employing mutually supportive fires.

TLO: React to Far Ambush at Night (Aided)ELO A: Provide security as part of a perimeter.ELO B: Move as a member of a presence patrol.ELO C: Engage targets (aided) from a temporary fightingposition, employing mutually supportive fires.

Note: The previous ELO, Engage Targets in an NBC

Environment, can easily be performed during advanced riflemarksmanship training, as it requires only 30 minutes ofinstruction and application.

Using this new concept, Soldiers would train or reinforce sixcore warrior tasks and two core warrior drills:

Correct malfunctions with assigned weapon;Use visual signaling techniques;Engage targets using aiming light AN/PEQ-2;Engage targets using aiming light AN/PAQ-4;React to direct fire (dismounted);Move under direct fire (dismounted);Select temporary fighting position;React to contact; andReact to ambush (blocked).

Fort Knox has successfully conducted three pilots of this newconcept to date, two with cadre and one with BCT Soldiers. It hasproven to be a significantly more realistic and relevant experiencethat can be done safely without increased time. If this concept isapproved by the U.S. Army Infantry Center, the proponent for theBCT POI, the existing bunkers would be bulldozed, producing anunimproved road, and without the need to maintain the preparedfighting positions, range maintenance costs would actually belower than they currently are. More importantly, we would besending Soldiers to combat who are immediately ready to go on adismounted patrol in combat at night, trained on the equipmentthey will use, under the conditions they will fight, and on a taskthat is relevant to the contemporary operating environment.

Lieutenant Colonel James C. Larsen recently served as the battalioncommander of the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry (Basic Combat Training) at FortKnox, Kentucky, and is currently assigned to the J3, Joint Special OperationsCommand at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is a 1986 OCS graduate whohas served in a variety of Ranger, mechanized, and air assault infantryassignments. He is a veteran of operations Just Cause, Enduring Freedom,and Iraqi Freedom; and has deployed in support of operations UpholdDemocracy and Joint Endeavor (SFOR-8).

CL VTWR

BLEACHERS

(Targets Unexposed)

Proposed Section React to Far Ambush (aided)

Direction of Movement

CL VTWR

BLEACHERS

Proposed Section React to Far Ambush (aided)

Note: 25m targets would not appear initiallyTo prevent Soldiers from assaulting per near ambush drill


The U.S. Army: A Complete HistoryEdited by Colonel Raymond K. Blum,Jr., U.S. Army, Retired. Army HistoricalFoundation, Hugh Lauter LevinAssociations, Inc., 2004. 960 pages, $75.Reviewed by Z. Frank Hanner.

In its 960 pages and illustrations, thisbook outlines North American militaryhistory from 1607 until 2004. It is a uniquereference source that offers the reader witha single volume source chronology of datesand events that have not only helped to formour Army but also have created our nation.The volume contains hundreds of black andwhite and color images, vignettes, andbiographical information on importantmilitary leaders and the events theyinfluenced. The book helps the readerunderstand the story of how the U.S. Armyevolved from colonial militia forces formedfor defense of the Thirteen Colonies, andtells how this institution in time becomethe most important catalyst for establishingand sustaining the United States ofAmerica. It is an epic story of the“...embattled farmers...” at Concord Bridgeand our shop keepers and their fellowcitizens banding together to form an armythat would grow to become the mostpowerful land force in the history ofwarfare.

The book includes the work of manycontributors on a wide array of subjects, anda bibliography showing these authors’sources would have been most helpful tohistorians, students of military history, orjust for the history buff wanting to knowmore about our Army’s past. Unfortunately,no such bibliography or footnotes wereincluded. Likewise, no sources are providedas to where the information came from forwriting the chronology. These omissions,along with a number of historical errors,make the book hard to recommend as ascholarly reference source, but as a coffeetable book it is an ideal gift. I can, however,highly recommend it as a source for what

military artwork is available; it has a wealthof excellent works rendered by some of thebest military artists in our country. Becauseof a number of errors on dates andtypographical errors, it is a book that youshould use more for its entertainment valuethan as a definitive source. A great deal ofwork went into creating the book, and it isunfortunate that it is not as the title claimsThe Complete History of the U.S. Army. Itbarely scratches the service of what wouldtake many more volumes to even come closeto having a complete story of one of ournation’s oldest institutions. I was, forexample, surprised that the establishmentof the Infantry School at Columbus,Georgia, in October 1918 was notmentioned in a text that claims to be thecomplete history of the Army.

Beyond Baghdad: Postmodern War andPeace. By Ralph Peters. StackpoleBooks, 2003. 337 Pages, $22.95(Hardcover). Reviewed by CommandSergeant Major James Clifford.

Beyond Baghdad is an anthology ofRalph Peters’ published columns and essaysspanning the period from before September11th until just after major combatoperations in Iraq ceased. Peters is a well-known former Army military intelligenceofficer-turned-writer. His columns are seenin newspapers and magazines across thecountry, and he’s appeared on numeroustelevision news programs. The tenor of hiscolumns is supportive of our goals infighting terrorism and spreading freedom.Although he frequently takes issue withspecific actions of the currentadministration, especially those of DefenseSecretary Donald Rumsfeld, he is rock solidbehind the military.

His columns lecture liberals and theuneducated about the history, tactics, andstrategy of Islamic terrorism. He cuts

through side issues and focuses on thecritical aspects of the global war onterrorism. His previously published essaysreveal his ability to foresee events and hisdepth of understanding of the issues.

Peters takes issue with those whosuggest that we somehow brought theterrorist attacks on ourselves. He educatesreaders on the nature of Islam and theArabic culture, explaining exactly whythese cultures will continue to clash withthe Judeo-Christian Western culture untilthey find a way to overcome their basic fearof women. His premise that Western equaltreatment of women threatens Muslims andArabs so greatly that they can find noresponse other than terrorism will likelyfind opponents. He sees explanationsrooted in perceived economic injustices assimply excuses for what boils down to abackward religion and culture.

His support for our war in Iraq isunshakeable. While pundits werepredicting defeat for our forces prior to thewars in Afghanistan and Iraq, he wasconfident of victory. As others wrung theirhands in despair over every minordevelopment, he kept his eye on theultimate goals, recognizing that in war badthings do happen but defeat only comeswhen one gives up. His one seriouscriticism of the Iraq War is that he feelsthe Defense Secretary has tried to fight thewar on the cheap. He frequently mentionsthat we should have had more troopsdeployed before invading Iraq and claimsthat military commanders’ requests wererebuffed by him. Like all good Soldiershe’s appreciative of airpower, but heunderstands that you can’t win a warwithout a massive ground commitment. Hetakes issue with the massive expenditureof funds to develop aircraft and ships whileground troops suffered comparatively.

Regardless of our activities in thePersian Gulf region and Afghanistan, hesees an even greater challenge looming in

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other locations. Pakistan is of particularconcern to Peters, along with parts of India.He also warns that one day Europe couldreemerge as a reflection of their war pronepast. His message is that while we battleterrorists in the Persian Gulf region, wemust be on the watch and be ready to gowherever the threat takes us.

He doesn’t limit his writing to America’swars; a few of his essays address the unrestin Palestine. He sees the contentionbetweens Palestinians and Israelis as beingan extension of our problems with Islamicterrorists.

Beyond Baghdad closes with an essaypublished in Germany’s FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung. In Au Revoir,Marianne…Aug Wiedersehen, LiliMarleen, he lectures Germans andFrenchmen on the serious mistakes andmiscalculations they’ve made by opposingAmerica in Iraq. Europeans may not getthe message, but Americans reading thisessay will surely gain a new understandingon why President Bush stood up toEuropean pressure and did what he knewwas right in Iraq.

Many of these essays seem negative, butthe overall message of this book is anythingbut. Under each essay is a subtle tone ofoptimism, faith, and admiration for theAmerican Soldier, American citizen, andthe American way of life. Only in readingthese essays consecutively is the readerlikely to pick up on that. His are messagesof deep faith in America and its future,messages that aren’t often found in themedia today. For that reason alone, BeyondBaghdad is highly recommended.

The Chatham House Version and OtherMiddle Eastern Studies by Elie Kedourie.First published by Prager, New York in1970. Paperback edition published in2004 by Ivan R. Dee Publishers, Chicago.488 pages. Reviewed by LieutenantCommander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC,U.S. Navy.

The late Iraqi scholar Elie Kedouriespent a lifetime teaching, explaining, andexpanding our understanding of modernMiddle East political history. Most of hiscareer was spent at the London School ofEconomics, and he began his academiccareer with some controversy. While

pursuing his doctoral studies at Oxford, hisdissertation involved going back into theBritish archives to learn the mistakes ofBritish policies in the Middle East. Hiscentral argument was that the abruptdismantling of the Ottoman Empire leftmillions of Arabs and Muslims vulnerableto self-appointed and despotic leaders. Inthe England of the 1950s, that kind ofexploration and criticism of colonial policywas not tolerated and he withdrew hisdoctoral dissertation from Oxford andpublished it as a book entitled, England andthe Middle East: The Destruction of theOttoman Empire. Not to say Ottomanadministration was not dictatorial, but hedissects British policies for those whograpple with the problems of the region tounderstand how to manage a collapsingstate towards stability and self-governance.Kedourie has edited and published a dozenbooks on the Middle East, but The ChathamHouse Version is perhaps the mostimportant for members of the U.S. militarywanting to expand their understanding ofthe region. Chatham House is a nonprofitBritish center for the study of internationalrelations that was established in 1920 inthe former home of three British PrimeMinisters in London. It mirrors in conceptto the Washington Institute for Near EastPolicy. An ulterior motive for highlightingthis book is to draw attention to ChathamHouse and encourage the potentialexchange of U.S. military and governmentofficials to this organization. The firstpaperback edition of this book waspublished in 2004 and is essential readingfor serious students of Islamic militancyand Middle East affairs.

The first chapter is a rationalization ofhow sedition, treason, and civil war iscommon throughout Middle East history,but only in the current century as peoplefrom the region cope with failures anddefeats has revolution been glorified as partof the political process. He writes thatviolence is beneficent and treason a sacredobligation. Add to this the interposition oftwo doctrines in the Arab world that hasemerged in competition with otherideologies to explain the decline of Islamiccivilization. One is Arab Nationalism andthe second Islamic radicalism. Both, theauthor argues, are subversive tointernational stability. Islamic militancyrecognizes only war or subjugation of the

infidel (to include Muslims that disagreewith their world vision), and ArabNationalism can be seen as the occult ofvictimization and the glorification ofdisplacing blame on colonialism, Israel, theUnited States, the Mongols, and the listfrom history goes on.

The book continues with what was calledin World War I, “The Arab Question.” Thischapter examines infamous figures ofMiddle East policy, such as Sir HenryMcMahon, Sherief Hussein of Mecca, SirReginald Wingate and Lord Cromer. From1915 to 1918 several competing policyissues plagued the great powers of Englandand France. It included the granting of self-rule to Arabs after the defeat of theOttoman-German alliance, independencefor Egypt, the status of the Sudan, debatesof Israel as a Jewish homeland, the nextCaliph after the Ottoman Sultan, and thestatus of the Levant vis-à-vis France.Readers will learn that London hadoverpromised to those who sought answersto these questions. In 1918, the Britishgovernment made a Declaration to the Seven,declaring that London would recognize theindependence of Arab lands liberated fromOttomans by Arabs. What really occurredwas the eviction of Prince Feisal fromDamascus by French forces, in an Alamo-like battle at Maysaloon in 1920. What canbe determined from reading the book, isthat different sectors of the Britishgovernment controlled Middle East policy;they included the War Ministry, the IndiaOffice, the Home Office (in charge of Britishcolonial affairs), the Royal Navy, the BritishHigh Commissioner in Egypt among others.Each not knowing what the otherdepartments or agencies had alreadypromised.

Chapters 5-7 provide an excellentoverview of how the British attempted tomaintain control of Egypt and the SuezCanal. What is important for readers oftoday to glean from these chapters is thatthe father of Egypt’s independencemovement Sa’ad Zaghlul was not anIslamic radical, nor did he use religion tojustify freedom for Egypt. Instead he reliedon arguments of democracy, a constitutionalmonarchy, and a check against absolutecolonial or monarchic power. Zaghlul isan interesting figure in Egyptian historyand is still revered by Egyptians; he rose toPrime Minister, was exiled to Malta, and

returned to a Prime Ministership once againafter fierce public protest.

Another valued chapter in the book if the1923 debates that framed the Egyptianconstitution. The debates center on the roleof the King and the Parliament, the authoralso highlights British meddling that assuredoversight of Egyptian defense and foreignpolicy.

If there is one chapter to read, it is Chapter 7entitled “Egypt and the Caliphate,” a debate thatlasted from 1915 to 1952. At its height in1924 until the death of Egypt’s King Fuad in1936, books and articles were produceddebating the whole concept of the Caliphate.The caliph was the successor to ProphetMohammed and was abolished in 1924 whenKemal Attaturk deposed the Ottoman Sultan.Reestablishing the caliphate is a corejustification of Islamic militants today. Oneof the most important books de-emphasizedin Islamic education and Arab schools is the1925 book Islam and the Foundations ofAuthority by Islamic judge Ali Abdal Raziq.In his book, Abdal Raziq makes a compellinghistorical thesis that as Prophet Muhammaddid not leave clear guidance on how Muslimsshould govern themselves after his death, earlyMuslims resorted to the pre-Islamic form ofgoverning urban centers and that was theselection of a caliph by the different tribes. Inessence, the caliphate is a pre-Islamic conceptof government adopted by Muslims after thedeath of Muhammad and is not a religiousobligation or an ordained form of governmentin the Quran (Islamic book of divinerevelation) or Hadith (prophet’s sayings).This caused a firestorm of debate at the timeand sadly Abdal Raziq was stripped of hisjudicial position. The clerical establishmentin Egypt represented by the Al-Azharinstitution attacked him. King Fuad whocoveted being named the next caliph alsoattacked him. This unconventionalexploration of Islam today would bring AbdalRaziq a death sentence by Islamic militants.A revival of such discussion is necessary inthe struggle to win the ideological aspects ofthe current war on terrorism.

Kedourie continues his essays on discussingthe creation of modern Iraq, pan-Arabism andmuch more. This is an exceptional groupingof 12 essays that is a must read for thoseinvolved in Middle East intelligence analysis,Middle East Foreign Area Officers, and thosecivil affairs personnel working in the region.


Specialist Elizabeth Erste

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Soldiers from the 28th Infantry Division out of Pennsylvania head towards the site of wherea vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated in Bayji, Iraq, January 17, 2005.

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