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Infantry

••••• INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S.Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for theinfantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authorsand not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry andinfantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerningeditorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; [email protected] • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. •POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. •USPS Publication No. 370630.

MARCH-JUNE 2009 Volume 98, Number 2

PB 7-09-4

MG MICHAEL FERRITERCommandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENOEditor

MICHELLE J. ROWANDeputy Editor

MEREDITH DALZELLEditorial Assistant

Soldiers with the 4th BrigadeCombat Team (Airborne), 25thInfantry Division scan acourtyard during a patrol near acombat outpost in Afghanistan1 May. (Photo by SGTChristopher T. Sneed)

This medium is approved for officialdissemination of material designed to keepindividuals within the Army knowledgeable ofcurrent and emerging developments withintheir areas of expertise for the purpose ofenhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Distribution: Special

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 0918106

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FRONT COVER:

BACK COVER:A Soldier with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1stInfantry Division scans the area as night begins tofall during a patrol in the Kunar province ofAfghanistan 10 April. (Photo by SSG DavidHopkins)

FEATURES26 THE BATTLE OF FALLUJAH, NOVEMBER 2004

CPT Daniel Kilgore33 INSURGENT ATTACK IN RAMADI: PLATOON LEADER RECOUNTS

URBAN ENGAGEMENTCPT Edward Clark III

37 JANABI VILLAGE: VICTORY IN AN AL-QAIDA STRONGHOLDSGT Jason G. George and CPT Michael H. Starz

DEPARTMENTS1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE2 INFANTRY NEWS4 PROFESSIONAL FORUM

4 HUMAN TERRAIN SUPPORT FOR CURRENT OPERATIONSCPT Nathan K. Finney

7 THINKING BEYOND THE FIRST MILE: A LOOK AT INTERPRETERS ONCOMBAT LOGISTICS PATROLS1LT David E. LeivaSGT J. Saad

11 AGI IN SOUTHERN IRAQCPT William Harryman, CPT Mark Hayes, MAJ Rey Soliz

14 EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTS OF JIHAD PART II: THE LATE 19THAND 20TH CENTURIESCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN

19 PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS FOR BCT COMMANDERSMG (Retired) David C. RalstonPatrecia Slayden Hollis

24 THE BATTLE OF MONTERREY: URBAN OPERATIONS DURING THEMEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR

44 TRAINING NOTES44 TRAINING ADAPTIVE LEADERS FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS:

AN OUTCOMES-BASED APPROACHCOL Michael A. Coss

49 BCST: THE ARMY’S PREMIER BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEMS TASKTRAINERMAJ Michael Spears

51 BOOK REVIEWS53 SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

MG MICHAEL FERRITER

Commandant’s Note

This is a challenging and an exciting time for all of us atFort Benning, and I look forward to serving as your Chiefof Infantry as we train Soldiers and leaders to fight and

win the global war on terrorism. The Maneuver Center ofExcellence is becoming reality, and we look forward to once againtraining tankers and infantrymen side by side as General GeorgePatton did here on the eve of World War II, where they were to faceand overcome challenges they could hardly have imagined.

Today’s urban operations (UO) include some of the greatestchallenges that Soldiers can face. And urban combat, a sub-set ofUO, can be the costliest of missions in terms of lives, materiel andother resources such as the sheer time it takes to dislodge adetermined enemy from his lair. When we add the implications ofurban stability and support operations and urban sustainment, weface a significantly more complex challenge. The lessons ofStalingrad, Aachen, Najaf, and Fallujah attest to the collateraldamage that ensues from urban combat, but this does not mean thatwe must avoid going after an enemy who goes to ground in built-up areas. The urban fight, like the conditions of any battlefield,will continue to be won by capably trained, led, motivated, andsupported Soldiers. In this Commandant’s Note I want to give anexample of an early urban operation in our own military history,discuss some of the objectives of our enemy in the global war onterrorism (GWOT), and highlight unique aspects of the urban fightand our present doctrinal initiatives aimed at revising Field Manual3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. Therevisions will better align the manual with FM 3.06, UrbanOperations, and we will announce its publication in InfantryMagazine and will publish an article on the new manual in ourbranch magazine as well.

The U.S. Army’s first major urban combat took place during theMexican War at the Battle of Monterrey, in September 1846. Thecity was defended by a numerically superior force of Mexicaninfantry and cavalry. General Zachary Taylor’s 6,200 men tookadvantage of cover and maneuver to defeat a force of over 7,000regulars, cavalry, and militia. Avoiding street movement anddeploying infantrymen on rooftops to cover one another, theysystematically cleared the city house by house. Soldiers used time-fused artillery shells thrown through windows and placed againstwalls as breaching charges. The capture of Monterrey was due inlarge part to the agile, adaptive leaders and men under Taylor’scommand. His team succeeded because they understood the enemy,his tactics, and his objectives, just as we strive to understand theobjectives of the enemies we face in the GWOT.

One objective of today’s enemy is dominance of information

URBAN OPERATIONS:TRAINING TO MEET THE CHALLENGE

March-June 2009 INFANTRY 1

operations. He seeks to inflictand publicize politicallyunacceptable losses on U.S. andCoalition forces. He alsomisrepresents his own collateraldamage to persons and facilitiesas having been caused by us.Another of our enemy’s goals is to offset our technologicaladvantage by acquiring more sophisticated weapons, munitions,and equipment or by evolving ways to degrade our own capabilities.He does this to compel Coalition forces to either realign prioritiesor commit assets to meet the new threat. Another of his tactics is toattempt to step up the operating tempo. We saw this tactic duringthe Communists’ 1968 Tet offensive across South Vietnam. Theintended result of such a surge in military activity is to force anopponent to divide his forces to meet new threats, to draw againstreserves of combat power and materiel, or to destroy morale.Today’s enemy is resourceful, innovative, and ruthless, but we areinside his decision cycle anticipating many of his moves, and areinflicting serious losses on him. Today we commit considerableresources to urban stability and civil support operations as weunderstand, shape, engage, consolidate, and transition within theurban operational framework. We recognize that understandingthe complexity of the urban landscape, its terrain, its society, andthe infrastructure which sustains it and the need to operate overextended time have replaced the use of massed forces.

At the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS), we exposeSoldiers and their leaders to new information drawn from productsof the Center for Army Lessons Learned, from the shared experienceof students coming out of theater, from the latest USAIS doctrinalpublications, and from guest speakers with broad subject matterexpertise. We must ensure that Soldiers and leaders go to war withthe latest tactics, techniques, and procedures, and that our doctrinalliterature is state of the art as well.

The Army is currently testing a process to facilitate the creationand sharing of knowledge via a wiki environment. This which willallow near real time, real world feedback from real lessons learned.I invite you to review the Army TTP wiki sites at https://wiki.kc.us.army.mil/wiki/Portal: Army_Doctrine.

We recognize that urban operations are tough and comprise manyaspects in addition to combat, but today we are successfully engagedin full-spectrum operations in the urban setting, and we must captureand share what we have learned. We need your input, and Iencourage you to share your thoughts and experiences throughInfantry. Follow me!

2 INFANTRY March-June 2009

WEAPON, EQUIPMENT FEEDBACK NEEDED

PEO SOLDIER STRATEGICCOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

The U.S. Army’s Program ExecutiveOffice (PEO) Soldier has launched an

Internet-based survey system to support itsmission to aggressively incorporate Soldierfeedback into everything it does.

More than 30 surveys, announced onAKO and available to Soldiers through alink on the PEO Soldier Web site —peosoldier.army.mil — are designed to giveSoldiers a forum to communicate theirthoughts and suggestions up the chain ofcommand. The surveys cover everything fromclothing and individual equipment — gloves,goggles, and battering rams — to individualand crew served weapons such as the M4

carbine and the M110 sniper system.As the Army continues its efforts to

employ the Soldier-as-a-System concept,Soldier feedback is critical. Soldier-as-a-System calls for everything a Soldier wearsand carries to be streamlined, integrated, andeffective. While the Army’s skilledlaboratories, research centers, andcontractors develop and modernize the nextgeneration of equipment for the battlefield,everything comes down to what the men andwomen on the ground actually need, use,and accept as beneficial. Web-basedsurveys have already proven to be a directand effective way to shine a spotlight onthat essential point of view.

An earlier version of the online surveysystem was used to gather commentsregarding the new Army Service Uniform.PEO Soldier received more than 80,000responses to this survey alone. Convertingsuch extensive feedback into actionablechanges is no simple task. As BG Mark

Brown, PEO Soldier, noted, “We had expertsfrom Operational Forces Interface Group(OFIG) do the mathematical and statisticalanalyses of the responses so that we couldcategorize the feedback that we received tosupport good decisions.”

“In meeting battlefield requirements, wefind that there is rarely a silver bullet thatwill take care of all existing uniform orequipment requirements,” said Brown. “Itis an integrated process, and we manage theSoldier as a system to get there.” As long astechnology improves to create morelightweight, efficient, unobtrusive solutionsto the challenges every Soldier faces, PEOSoldier will find ways to integrate theseproducts to improve Soldier capabilities,save Soldiers’ lives, and improve Soldiers’quality of life.

Soldier surveys are just one of manymethods PEO Soldier employs toconsistently and innovatively provide thebest for the best.

Surveys a Forum forSoldiers to Share

Thoughts, Suggestions

Kristin Molinaro

NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUMPREPARES TO OPEN 19 JUNE

The grand opening of the new NationalInfantry Museum and Soldier Center at

Patriot Park is set for 19 June. The festivitieswill begin at 9:30 a.m. with a graduation ceremonyand follow with a ribbon-cutting ceremony at 11a.m.

The museum is located off of Fort BenningRoad at 1775 Legacy Way, approximately twomiles south of Victory Drive and outside theaccess control points of Fort Benning. Themuseum is open 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Mondaythrough Saturday and 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. Sunday.The World War II Street, Imax Theater, SoldierStore gift shop and Fife and Drum restaurantare already open to the public. Admission to themuseum is free.

For more information, check out www.nationalinfantrymuseum.com.

SUICIDE PREVENTION:


Considerable media attention is being given to the latestreports of the number of suicides within the Army. This

article is the first of a series of articles on suicide awareness andsuicide prevention education.

The statistics for the number of confirmed suicides of activeduty Soldiers for 2008 are staggering. The media is full of stories;an Army Times headline stated “The Army is Killing Itself.” TheArmy reported a record 128 confirmed suicides and 15 additionalcases under investigation for 2008. Early reports for January 2009suggest that more Soldiers committed suicide than died in combat.In 2007 the number of confirmed suicides was 115. Ten years ago,the number of confirmed suicides in the Army was 58. Approximatelyfive Soldiers made some form of suicide gesture every day within2008. The number of suicides in the Army has generally followedthe average numbers within the civilian population, but the 2008figures for the Army have risen above the national average for thefirst time since the Vietnam War. One Soldier lost to suicide is tragicand is one too many.

Suicide occurs among all groups of people — not just amongSoldiers, not just among the unsuccessful or troubled, not justamong those who consider themselves to have been marginalized.The thought of suicide can occur to any one of us or to any one ofthose whom we care about or to anyone with whom we work, givena set of conditions conducive to thoughts of desperate action.

What causes an individual to commit suicide? What leads anindividual to think that the only answer is to end his/her life? Thereasons are likely as varied as the individuals who have committedsuicide. Completed suicides do not occur just among overstresseddeployed Soldiers or those who have a deployment history. Suicidesare occurring among Soldiers who have no deployment history.Suicides also occur among those whom we think would never considerending their own lives. Generally speaking, relationship issues arehigh on the list of contributing factors. Loss of employment, finances,unusual stress, medications, and alcohol may also be factors. Youmay be thinking — and rightly so — that people deal with these thingsall the time and do not attempt or complete suicide. This is true.There is no exact and predictable formula that indicates who willand who will not attempt to commit suicide in any given situation.

What about the families and friends who are left behind? Suicidedeeply affects those who are left behind on many levels. There isthe emotional trauma as well as practical issues of daily living thatwe must address. And, significantly, there are ongoing issues thatmay never find resolution.

Soldiers and civilian employees have probably already takenpart in a suicide awareness/intervention class as part of a programto begin to address the issue of rising suicide rates. The period of15 February through 15 March was designated as an Armywide“stand down” for suicide-prevention training. From 15 Marchthrough 15 July, there will be a chain teaching effort for ongoing

CHAPLAIN (MAJ) TAMMIE CREWS

sustainment training, services, and support in order to address theissues of suicide at all levels of our organization. The training willfocus on three areas: suicide prevention awareness, suicideintervention actions, and post grief bereavement support. Theemphasis will be on training to recognize signs of potentially suicidalbehavior, understand the risks of suicide, intervention strategies,and knowing how to refer individuals for follow-on support andcare. The training will also focus on building resiliency in our workforce in the face of the increased demands placed on it in light ofthe prolonged global war on terrorism. We must remind ourworkforce at all levels that it is okay to ask for help during times ofdistress and personal crisis, and leadership must be committed todecreasing any stigma associated with seeking such help.

The Army takes suicide prevention seriously and will doeverything possible to minimize potential risks, not only duringthis current emphasis, but on a daily basis in the way we conductbusiness. Suicide prevention is a leadership responsibility, andcan easily be built into procedures such as those dealing withdiscipline, deployment, and training.

Avenues of assistance: The counseling center (chaplain andemployee assistance program services), National Suicide PreventionLifeline — (800) 273-TALK (8255), or www.suicidepreventionlifeline.org/Veterans/Default.aspx; National Suicide Hotline — (800)SUICIDE (784-2433); Military One Source — (800) 342-9647 orwww.militaryonesource.com; Wounded Soldier and Family Hotline— (800) 984-8532.

(Chaplain [MAJ] Tammie Crews is the post chaplain atTobyhanna Army Depot, Pa.)

The Challenge and the Way

In the article “The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the21st Century,” which appeared in the September-October 2006 edition of Military Review, the authors (Dr. Jacob Kipp,

Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, and CPT Don Smith) described the needfor “giving brigade commanders an organic capability to helpunderstand and deal with ‘human terrain’— the social, ethnographic,cultural, economic, and political elements of the people among whom aforce is operating.” For over a year Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) havebeen addressing that need in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The teams have supported brigades in numerous ways, includingidentifying local populations’ needs and perceptions from the“grass-roots” perspective; engaging influential political, military,business, tribal, religious and other cultural leaders to cultivatecredible local, provincial and national governing institutions; andidentifying the formal and informal centers of gravity and externalinfluences on the local populations through social network analysis.

Operations Attal and Sham Shad, which were conducted in thePaktika province of Afghanistan from November to December 2007,were two of the first fully integrated operations to include a HumanTerrain Team. The team successfully engaged and interviewed thelocal populations to map tribal dynamics, determine effects ofcoalition forces’ (CF) operations, conduct market assessments, andidentify the population’s views on governance. This allowed theteam to acquire a more robust and integrated socio-cultural, political,and economic awareness of the brigade’s area of responsibility inorder to provide coalition forces with operationally relevantinformation related to the human terrain, improving the commander’sunderstanding of the local populations.

Through field research, the HTT was able to support thecommander and his staff by identifying developmental, governance,and security issues within the province. Development within theprovince was in a questionable state, with the local populationperceiving that the severe joblessness was due to the governmentnot fulfilling its duty to provide local jobs. Local leaders voicedtheir concerns that, without jobs, their people were susceptible totaking money and support from adversarial elements. Additionally,households were relying on remittances from distant family membersand loans. As noted on an HTT report from Operation Sham Shad,“money earned through work abroad is sent back to families as

HUMAN TERRAINSUPPORT FOR

CURRENT OPERATIONSCPT NATHAN K. FINNEY

remittances through the money transfer system (locally referred toas hawala), [which] is used to sustain families.” Through appliedsocial science methods, the team determined that a rapid priceinflation of staples was straining this hawala system. Accordingto the report, analysis by the HTT determined that the price increasewas the “primary determinant of whether the local situation wasimproving or deteriorating; and whether the current government isgood or bad.” The team also discovered that the perception of thelocal government was linked to the price of staples. This analysisof the local populace’s needs was then incorporated into the unit’splanning and local operations, enhancing the development in theprovince and stabilizing the area.

The team was also successful in identifying the local populations’perceptions and interactions with local governance. The HTT’sanalysis discovered that locals viewed “good” government as onethat consults with elders, incorporating the local tribal structureinto government decisions. The team’s interactions among thelocal populace provided the following insights: “All respondentsstressed qualities of listening, consulting with elders, fairness,equity, reciprocity, and bringing the government, tribes and peopletogether.” Prior to operations in the area, both Afghan officials andcoalition forces held strong perceptions that Paktika province wasan isolated, insular area. Once on the ground, the HTT discoveredthat a portion of the district was actually highly transnational,possessing world views that included concepts of governmentthat came from the Arab peninsula and Afghanistan’s neighboring


Dr. Christopher Dixon

Human Terrain Teams identify local populations’ needs and perceptionsfrom a grass-roots perspective.

countries. In some areas, this generallyyounger, transnational population of thosewho left Afghanistan primarily for work wasviewed as the powerbrokers of an areabased on wealth, rather than age or familystatus amongst the tribes. This analysisled the HTT to recommend to the BCTcommander a different method of interactingwith the local populace; one that did notcenter on the common assumption that thecenter of power is based on the elder tribalmembers of the area.

The HTT was also able to highlight thenegative synergistic effects of predatorylocal government practices on the districtpopulation. The effects of this “bad”governance led to the collapse of a districtshura and a feeling among a segment of thepopulace that only the Taliban could protectthem. One elder had reported, “People weretired of the Taliban because they beat them.Now, if this government [also] beats them,what should the people do?” The HTTrevealed to the BCT staff a case study thatTaliban fighters in the area affected some ofthe population, but the effects of bad localgovernance affected all of the population.Ultimately, Afghans view the shura as thecenter of decision making, and the provincialand national governments need to take into

account this model. This research analysiswas a key planning factor for the brigade tosupport the need for provincial governmentofficials to strengthen the ties to the localpopulace by meeting their securityconcerns. This improved interaction by theprovincial government reduced the localpopulace’s support of the Taliban.

The HTT best displayed this type ofcultural analysis in Yousef Kheyl District,where the team was able to assist the brigadein coordinating humanitarian assistancedistribution in a more equitable manner. TheHTT discovered the problem with thedistribution process by interfacing with thelocal population during Operation Attal.The HTT recommended that the brigadedistribute the supplies through the districtsub-governor (DSG). This new system wasbased on the tribal elders supplying a list ofvillage families in the greatest need ofsupport to the DSG, who would then providethe distribution information to the brigadethrough the Provincial ReconstructionTeam. This system was more successfulthan the previous system by ensuringequitable distribution based on tribalconsensus, rather than a less legitimate,western manner. It also provided the brigadewith accountability of distributed items.

Lastly, this manner of humanitarianassistance distribution brought the localpopulation to the government and aided indeveloping legitimacy for the DSG.

Finally, the team was able to address localperceptions on security. The localperception was that there was a directcorrelation between the ability of thecoalition forces to provide protection for thelocal leaders and their capability to protectthe general population. According to theOperation Sham Shad HTT report, this viewstemmed from the fact that “since 2004,Paktika has been the site of numerousattacks on Afghan civilians, includingelectoral workers, tribal elders, religiousscholars and professionals. A number ofprominent tribal elders were assassinatedbetween 2005 and 2007, most notably thehead of the Sharan tribal shura, a prominentSharan tribal member, and the head of theKushamond tribal shura.” Theseassassinations led to many effects identifiedby the local populace. These includedgovernment officials leaving the province,the local population unwilling to work for orwith the government, collapse of the tribalshura and anger at the assassinations. Infact, the report also noted, “One of the moreprofound effects both described andobserved was elder self-censorship and fearof talking openly to both the CF and also toother senior shura members.”

The integration of this human terraininformation gathered in the field by theHuman Terrain Team provided the brigade’scommon operating picture an added culturalperspective. Thus cultural perspectivepositively influenced the planning anddecision-making processes of the unit.

In Sadr City, Iraq, a Human Terrain Teamprovided extensive support to brigadesduring local key leader and governanceengagements. The activities of identifying,prioritizing and interacting with influentialpolitical, military, tribal, business andreligious leaders fit perfectly within theHuman Terrain Team’s scope as researchersand facilitators of the socio-cultural aspectsof the operational area. HTT analysis of keyleader engagements were based on the localculture, which assisted the brigade indistinguishing individuals on the basis oftribal and religious affiliation, in contrast towestern measures of influence based onoccupation, wealth, fame, or success.


SSG Michael L. Casteel

A Soldier with the 4th Brigade Combat Team’s Human Terrain Team drinks tea with the heads ofthe local schools during a mission in Nani, Afghanistan.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

The primary focus of the HTT in Sadr City has been theengagement of tribal support councils, neighborhood/districtcouncils and Government of Iraq leaders to assist the brigade ininfluencing the community into supporting the local and nationalIraqi governments. This improved the equal distribution of goodgovernance and government services to the local populace, whichincreased government services and provided a more equitabledistribution of those services to the local populace. A key factor inthis success was HTT efforts in the certification of tribal supportcouncils and their integration into the governance of Sadr City.The end-state of this model was a protocol of neighborhood/districtcouncil meetings where the executive branch of the Government ofIraq interfaced and engaged with the neighborhood/district councilrepresentatives. This cultivated long-term opportunities forreconciliation of disputing factions and helped build credible local,provincial, and national governing institutions.

One HTT technique that greatly contributed to the brigade’ssuccess in Sadr City was a tiered and nested engagement planwithin the brigade that engaged the appropriate level powerstructure with the appropriate coalition leader. An example of thiswas the team’s idea and support in hosting iftar dinners duringRamadan which incorporated political, tribal, and religious leaders,furthering operational goals and demonstrating the brigade’ssupport of local cultural/religious traditions.

Examples of an HTT’s extensive and successful support of abrigade’s reconciliation and security efforts occurred in Zarafaniyaand Tisaa Nissan. The team there had been successful in assistingthe brigade in realizing the need for a balanced approach to lethaland non-lethal operations in this area of Baghdad. To support thenon-lethal effects desired by the brigade, the team made use ofnon-traditional methods to develop a systematic key leader influencestrategy, assisted the Civil Affairs units in prioritizing projects tosupport that strategy, identified and leveraged the current andhistorical owners of real estate, and supported the brigade’s creationof a reconciliation and security co-op individually and betweenSunni and Shi’a populations. The key to all of these tasks wasaccurate identification of the formal and informal centers of gravityand external influences on both Zafaraniya and Tisaa Nissan. Thisprocess was successful in influencing the Zarafaniya and TisaaNissan populations to support the local Iraqi government.

The team began by identifying the key leaders in the brigade’sarea of operations through council meetings and interviews of thelocal population. These events allowed the team to start to piecetogether a social network analysis of leaders and their constituentsin the area by “study[ing]…social structure to analyze the patternsof ties linking its members…to understand properties of the social,economic, or political structural environment and how thesestructural properties influence observed characteristics andassociations related to the characteristics.” By engaging bothcoalition-perceived power brokers (council members) and previouslyunidentified leaders (discovered through discussions with the localpopulation), the team zeroed in on the true key influencers. Oncethey had identified these leaders and understood their personalities,they were able to develop an engagement strategy. Theseengagements, held outside of current council meetings, assistedthe brigade in building invaluable relationships which enabled them

CPT Nathan K. Finney is an Armor officer currently assigned to theCombined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He hasserved as a tank platoon leader, company executive officer, battalion S-1,human terrain team cultural research manager, human terrain systemtraining officer and doctrine development team leader. He holds abachelor’s degree in Anthropology from the University of Arizona and iscurrently enrolled in the Public Administration and Policy Masters Programat the University of Kansas.


to address local concerns and needs. This needs analysis allowedthe Civil Affairs unit to focus the brigade’s limited resources onprojects that provided the most positive effect on the community.This process of identifying the community’s highest priority needsand working these projects with local leaders was a key factor inthe brigade’s success.

One of the key issues identified by the HTT through this fieldresearch was to identify real estate ownership. Due to the recentviolence and forced removal of both Sunni and Shi’a personnel inthe area, rightful ownership of land and the return of displacedpersonnel was the key factor in developing a reconciliation strategy.The HTT was invaluable to the units in the field by identifyingmajor land owners and how the brigade supported the legal processin determining the rightful owners. An example of this was theBouniya Farm issue. Jaysh al-Mahdi had forced the rightful ownerout and was using this large estate as a cache site and a stagingpoint for operations. The recapture of the estate (through the legalprocess in Karada and enforced by Iraqi Army/coalition forces)and its redevelopment has helped cement a pro-Government of Iraq(GoI) presence, boosted the economy by stimulating agriculture inthe area, and increased the legitimacy of both GoI and the legalprocess in east Baghdad.

The identification of the key power brokers, use of reconstructionprojects for appropriate effects, and recapture and redevelopmentof lands led to a more amenable environment and improved securityand reconciliation. In Zafaraniya and Tisaa Nissan, the key toreconciliation of Sunnis with the current majority Shi’a was increasedsecurity, primarily from Jaysh al-Mahdi and other Shi’a militias.The security plan was developed with the assistance of the HTT,which was different from the “Awakening” process seen elsewhere inthe country. Instead of bringing primarily tribal Sunni personnel into apseudo-security force, the unit’s security plan focused on theimplementation of the current laws which eliminated any notion ofsectarianism or tribalism. This plan allowed estate owners to take partin securing their own personal property. In addition, the security planlinked the neighborhood councils to the Iraqi Army and police leadersto form a security council. The benefits of this plan were they improvedlocal stability, enforced local rule of law, secured rightful real estateownership, and legitimized the Government of Iraq. The security planhad secondary effects of economic activity and investment in localgoods (specifically agricultural).

The three examples described above keenly display the humanterrain system’s dedication to training and deploying Human TerrainTeams to assist combat brigades. This support has taken manyforms and used different methodological constructs, leveragingthe socio-cultural aspects of the brigade area of operations andcreating a clearer picture of the human terrain for both thecommander and his staff.

THINKING BEYOND THE FIRST MILE:1LT DAVID E. LEIVA

SGT J. SAAD

A Look at Interpreters on Combat Logistics Patrols

In his 2003 book Applied Economics,renowned Stanford University economist Thomas Sowell concludes

that politicians habitually fail to look beyondthe immediate effects of their economicpolicies to the long-term repercussions.

“Most thinking stops at stage one,”Sowell writes. “Many of the ‘unintendedconsequences’ of policies and programswould have been foreseeable from theoutset if the process had been analyzed interms of the desirability of the goals theyproclaim.”

This essay is not about economics orpolitics. It is about an asset that is slowlytrickling into Army units in theater —translator aides — known simply by theirmilitary occupational specialty, 09L. Thisarticle is also about the apparent disconnectthat exists between the strategic level andthe operational level — the most criticalpiece of the puzzle — where this asset isemployed.

More succinctly, here’s one example ofhow we used our linguist outside of full-spectrum operations, outside any realguidelines, and how necessary it was tothink beyond stage one in order to do so.

When SGT J.Saad (name abbreviated foroperational security concerns) walked intothe motor pool of Bravo Company, 3rdBattalion, 116th Infantry at Al Asad Air Base,Iraq, in 2007, it seemed like a prayer had beenanswered.

Tasked with providing convoy securitythroughout Al Anbar Province, a 30,000-square-mile-area west of Ramadi thatborders Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, ourNational Guard light infantry unit wouldhave the same unfettered access to thearsenal of our active duty counterparts.

The impact was immediate. Saad, aNational Guard Soldier, quickly put togethera cultural briefing, specifically tailored toMulti National Force – West, that had asense of freshness and authenticityunmatched in previous presentations. It’s

important to note that not only was he fluentin Arabic, but he held a doctorate in Americangovernment and public policy and was aformer college professor. As expected, hispresentation skills were impressive.

Unfortunately, unlike other Armyweapons, SGT Saad did not come with aninstruction manual on how to be usedduring combat logistics patrols (CLPs). Ifthe unit were tasked with developingrelationships with local sheiks, imams orpoliticians, his role would be obvious. Thequestion left – what now?

Even in 2002, forward-thinking officers,such as MAJ Paul Schmitt, were posing thesame question without satisfactory answers.

“Small unit commanders and leaders inan engagement area are often the ones mostin need of interpreters, but also often theones who have the least idea of how to usethem properly,” Schmitt wrote for InfantryMagazine while assigned to the Departmentof Foreign Languages at the U.S. MilitaryAcademy.

Clearly, it was time to think beyond stage

one. With few exceptions, the evidenceprovided is anecdotal. A forensic look at thisarticle might reveal fatal flaws in the logicand conclusion. If nothing else, though,perhaps this field research will offer anotherview. That said, here’s what we learned.

Interpreters: The Public FaceConvoy security, once the sole realm of

military police, has quickly fallen into thehands of infantry units, albeit, active orNational Guard. One only needed to look atAl Anbar Province to find such examples.Bravo Company replaced a mechanizedinfantry company of the 1st InfantryDivision. Also, a battalion of the 82ndAirborne Division conducted convoymovements from Jordan. Both are proof, atleast for the time being, that this missionisn’t strictly for the combat support units orthe National Guard.

The pragmatic approach would be toplace Saad in every convoy, essentiallymaking him the busiest Soldier in thecompany. But with different squads leaving

PFC Sarah De Boise

A Soldier and his interpreter speak with an Iraqi security guard during a mission in Mosul.



PROFESSIONAL FORUM

at all times of the day throughoutthe week, picking the best missionwould have been a matter ofopinion, not science. Among thequestions:

* Should he go on longmissions through some of Iraq’snamed areas of interest or Tier 1hot spots?

* Would it be better for him togo into locations where there wasa likelihood of stops in urban areasor where interaction with Iraqipolice and Army was mostprobable?

* Do we base it on the mostrecent intelligence?

* What exactly should be thecriteria?

We didn’t have a good answer.One thing was for sure, though: Ifwe had seven linguists or translators, it would be a no-brainer toattach one to each squad.

“Interpreters are the public face of the counterinsurgency effortto the local population; on their words hinges success or failure,”wrote LTC John Nagl in the foreword to Instructions for AmericanServicemen in Iraq during World War II. “It is far easier to defeatan insurgency with words than with machine guns.”

Nagl, then commander of the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at FortRiley, Kan., understands firsthand the importance of thiscommodity. Among the leading visionaries to help “move theArmy out of its comfort zone,” he authored several books beforerecently retiring, including Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife:Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam andcontributed to the Army’s recently released CounterinsurgencyField Manual 3-24.

As a Category II linguist, SGT Saad is a U.S. citizen with asecret clearance. Brigade commands, by doctrine, should haveaccess to 10 to 15 of these linguists.

Here, however, is where the idealism and reality fail to meet.There are 450 heritage speakers in the military today with anadditional 150 Soldiers in the pipeline, according to David S.C. Chu,Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

The reasons for such a low figure, which amounts to onetranslator aide for every 1,100 Soldiers in theater, are rather simple.Contrasting that number to the total in the armed forces is evenmore startling. Why so?

First, the program is still in its infancy, launched in 2003 to recruitindividuals from the Arabic, Dari and Pashto communities to servein the Individual Ready Reserve and be prepared to deploy to Iraqor Afghanistan.

Second, the war on terrorism has only taken place within the lastseven years.

Third, and more tellingly, the Defense Department, at its ownadmittance, has had a tough time recruiting and retaining theseskilled personnel.

The demand for linguists hasexceeded the supply, and themilitary has been unwilling orunable to compete with otherfederal agencies or lucrative privatecontractors.

In 2005, the Army offered a$10,000 bonus for these “heritagespeakers” to enlist for eight years.In 2001, the most recent yearavailable, the U.S. GovernmentAccountability Office issued areport that reviewed the shortfallsof foreign languages in four federalagencies, including the DefenseDepartment. The DoD failed meethalf of its Arabic translator andinterpreter positions available.

Times have changed, though. InSenate testimony in 2007, GailMcGinn, Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Plans and the agency’s senior language authority,said the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides $67million this fiscal year for initiatives to strengthen and expandthe language program. Separately, the QDR provides $50 millionover a five-year period from 2007 to 2011 to further expand the 09Lprogram.

In 2006, the Army judged the program so successful that 09Lwas turned into a permanent MOS with a career path that extendedto sergeant major.

Language Skills = Warfighting SkillsMichael Dominguez, principal deputy under secretary of Defense

for personnel and readiness, told a Senate committee in 2007 thatbeing able to speak to the populace was essentially the only meansof prevailing in stability, security, transition and reconstructionoperations.

“We must be able to communicate effectively with and gain thesupport of the local population within the regions in which weoperate,” Dominguez said. “We responded to this shift in thedemands of war fighting with a shift in strategy. Language andregional expertise had to be recognized as critical war-fighting.”

Yet, until January 2006, the Command and General Staff School,which produces the service’s future senior leadership, did not haveany language course requirement, according to a story publishedin Congressional Quarterly.

Still, seven years after the start of Operation Enduring Freedomand Iraqi Freedom, the most technologically advanced Army in theworld is still reduced to graphic training aids and sign language.Even the free Rosetta Stone program available to all Soldiers and agenerous language bonus have not been enough to entice Soldiersto commit themselves to learning a foreign language.

The Big FiveUnable to figure out the best use of our linguist almost led Saad

to learning a skill McGinn and Dominguez probably never had in

Figure 1

mind. But Saad left the headquartersplatoon for a line platoon before he couldreceive a bus license to shuttle Soldiersback and forth.

Saad went out on several CLPs afterreceiving a license to drive the M1117Armored Security Vehicle, M1083 Gun Truckand M1151 High-Mobility MultipurposeWheel Vehicle. Completing the missionsgave the squad he was assigned to thecomfort of knowing they would have theability to de-escalate any issue on the road.But it did very little for the other squads.

That’s when the idea of duplicationbecame more than a concept. To accomplishmore with less, several sergeants and I cameup with good practical ways of making Saadmore effective. We called it “The Big 5.”

1. Scenario-driven Arabic languageskills

Driven by the experiences of NCOs wholed the majority of convoys, sevensituations were gleaned where an interpreterwould have been invaluable. Saaddeveloped a series of simple phrases thatcould help Soldiers communicate with Iraqicivilians and authorities.

Of course, similar products are readilyavailable, but they use the shotgunapproach. And saying “erfah eedeeyek,”which means hands up, is no way to winfriends. Particularly when all you need is aninattentive driver to move his vehicle.

Our vehicle, usually an M1117 ArmoredSecurity Vehicle, was not the best means ofcommunicating with people on the road. Butmany of them were equipped with publicaddress systems which provided the addedbenefit of being able to communicate withsome safety measures built in. See Figure 2for situations and phrases that wereidentified.

2.Practice Pronunciation and Self-StudyIn a November 2008 statement before the

House Armed Services Committee,Subcommittee on Oversight andInvestigations, McGinn stated that all threeService Academies have “enhanced theirforeign language study programs todevelop or enhance pre-accession languageand cultural knowledge. They expandedstudy abroad, summer immersion andforeign academy exchange opportunities;and added instructor staff for strategiclanguages.”

And while physical training remains an

Road Block1. Hello — Salam Alaykum2. We need to move your car —Sanuharik Sayaratuk3. Go there — Ezhab hunak4. Sit down — Ejlis5. Can you start your car — TadoorSayaratuk6. We will call for help — Sanatasilbilmusa-ada7. Move — Itharak8. Hurry Up — Bisur-ahh9. You will not be harmed — Marah-ina theekum10. Goodbye — Ma as salama

Iraqi Army/Iraqi Police Checkpoint1. Move your Vehicle, Please — Rajaa-an, harik sayaratuk2. Turn off your lights — Etfi aldaww3. Wait here until convoy pass —Intazir huna leekay namur4. Don’t point guns at us — Khayiritijah slahak5. What is the road’s name — Ma Esmhaza altareek6. Good morning — Sabah Alkhayar7. Give us some space — EbtaedKaleelan8. Goodbye — Ma as salama

Following Too Closely1. Stay far away — Ebka Baeedan2. Don’t get too close — La tataqarab3. Turn lights off/down — Etfee alnour/watee alnour4. Move to the right —Taharak lil-yameen5. Move to the left — Taharak lil-yassar6. Stop your car — Waqeef sayaratuk7. Turn lights on — Dawee alnour8. Speed up — Taharak beesur-ahh

Lost Convoy1. Show us this road — Dulana alaaltareeq2. Take us to — Khuzna ila3. What is the name of this place — Maesmu haza almakan

Figure 2

4. We need your help — Nureedalmussahada5. Thank you — Shukran6. What town is this — Shou esm halbalda

Military Accident1. We are sorry — Ahhsifeen2. Don’t worry — La taqlaq3. You will be paid — Sayudfa-ou lak4. Take this paper to nearest post —Khuz hazeh alwaraqa leeaqrab5. We have a medic — Maanamudhamid6. Be quiet— Sukoot7. Goodbye — Ma as salama

IED Explosion1. Stay away — Ebta-eedoo2. Go home — Ezhaboo lilbayt3. Get on your stomach — Enbateehoo4. Nobody move — La tataharakoo5. We don’t want to shoot anyone —Lan narmee ahad bilrassass6. Follow my hand sign — Etbaou esharat yadi7. No one is to use a phone — Latastamelou alhatif8. Who can speak English — Meenyatakalam alengleezy9. Danger — Khatar10. Evacuate the area — Ekhloo ilmantaqa

General Directives1. Good Morning — Sabaah El Khayr2. How are you — Shlonek3. Thank you for your help — Shukranleemusa atek4. My name is ___ — Esmee ___5. Stop — Qif6. Hands up — Erfa ayadeek7. We come in peace — Jeenabeesalam8. This is an emergency — Halattawareh9. Water — Maya10. Drink — Eshrab

integral part of basic training, languagetraining is not. Considering the bonusespaid to those who enter the Army with thatskill, it might be an inexpensive tool to putinto practice, an idea that attracted theattention of at least one Congressman.

Last year, Rep. Vic Snyder, chairman ofthe House Armed Services Committee’s

panel on Oversight and Investigations,suggested to colleagues that the Marines’boot camp was the appropriate place tobegin language training.

“In the Marine Corps, every Marine is arifleman and a big part of boot camp islearning to shoot,” said Snyder, a Marineveteran of the Vietnam War. “That’s just


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

1LT David Leiva is a National Guard infantry officer. A former award-winning journalist in the Washington, D.C. area, Leiva is now a graduatestudent working a on a master’s in urban and regional planning.

SGT J. Saad, a National Guard Soldier, is bilingual in English andArabic and a certified translator by DoD through the 09L program. Heholds a bachelor’s degree in political science, master’s degree in publicadministration and Ph.D in American government/public policy.

ingrained in you, and you know that’s important. Discipline isimportant, honor is important, shooting a rifle is important. If wethink this (foreign language proficiency) is important, then why nothave that be from the get-go, from day one?”

The added benefit of slowly filling the funnel of potentiallinguists within the ranks using a systematic approach might yieldonly a handful out of thousands. More importantly, it would costthe Army very little.

At Al Asad, good fortune met opportunity, even if it took a littleprodding. Saad became an instructor at the inaugural CombatLogistics Patrol Academy run by the 507th Corps Support Group(Airborne), a subordinate unit of 18th Airborne Corps. For a fewhours, he taught incoming Soldiers simple phrases. Due to timeconstraints, a planned lane training scenario, where the Soldierscould practice the language, did not occur. That didn’t dampen thepossibilities though.

But what would they do with it afterward? Would their leadershiprequire them to keep the provided “cheat sheet” in their vehicles tobe used as needed, like the first-aid pouch?

3. Deciphering Arabic Writing and Intelligence GatheringThis was surprisingly the easiest task we could have thought

of. Every time a Soldier went out on the road, it was an opportunityto gather intelligence. With the use of a camera, still shots or videogave almost “real time” data. Particularly, when the intelligence wasspray painted on a building or on a 32-square-foot piece of plywoodin Arabic. Unfortunately, the insurgent doesn’t necessarily use redpaint to indicate warnings.

How difficult would it be to have the convoy commander turn indigital photos of Arabic writing to the intelligence section eachtime he reported to the operations center? If a linguist was stationedthere, he could quickly scan the writings and inform whether thewritings were cautions to locals or third country nationals ofimprovised explosive devices or pending attack. This techniquewould have been invaluable and falls quite in line with “every Soldieris a sensor.” Most importantly, the multiplier effect of theinterpreter’s skill was magnified.

Its application would have been quite simple as well. Over SIPR(Secret Internet Protocol Router), the photos could be sent tovarious commands with grid coordinates. We were not successfulin having this done at the company level, but it worked extremelywell for my platoon.

4. Region-specific Cultural AwarenessThere’s probably no harder job in the Army than to fake

authenticity or expertise, particularly when no one buys it. Thatwas the impossible task of the trainers who were tasked withexplaining culturally significant acts and customs. But the Soldierswere neither Arab, spoke the language, nor served in the AO wewere being sent.

With little trouble, Saad came to our unit with a PowerPoint thatwas specifically tailored for MNF-W. Over the course of thedeployment, he proved to be very valuable in chatting with othertranslators, namely, the civilians and those working with SpecialOperations Forces. This culture is no different than ours: Familiaritybreeds friendships. It also led to a better inkling as to what was thebest method of negotiating certain areas.

When Saad gave his presentation to the CLP Academy, it was

legitimate. For the first time, some Soldiers and instructors said,someone who “knew what they’re talking about” was leading thediscussion.

5. Combat Logistics PatrolsOf all of the means of using the 09L, the actual convoy is the

easiest part. In fact, it’s simply a matter of picking the routes wherehe might be of most use. As stated previously, there isn’t muchscience here. It merely depends on how busy the command wantsits translator to be. The obvious answer would be to keep him verybusy. But this comes with a warning. Unlike civilians who are beingpaid handsomely, 09L Soldiers are still American Soldiers. We wouldnever consider disproportionately overusing or overworking anyone service member, so why here?

When he went out, we used SGT Saad as a driver, but he wasalso trained to man the .50 cal. In fact, he was an expert marksmanon the M4, something few others were. In the scenarios listedearlier, he handled all of them, which is how the list was drafted. Butevery time he was out with one squad, that meant six other squadshad no access.

ConclusionHere is another point to consider, one that forces the

operational leader to think in strategic terms. As noted earlier,the military has had a difficult time recruiting from the ranks ofmen and women with Arabic and other uncommon backgrounds.The suspicion of the military and other social reasons probablyplay the biggest hurdles to enticing these “heritage speakers.”

So, I wondered how the recruiting effort would be hurt hadSaad been killed or injured. While this is an unfortunate part ofthe profession, I wondered how much this would set back thebig picture in his neighborhood — the very one the Army isspending millions to lure.

As of this writing, the operations in Iraq seem to be waningdown, which begs the question as to whether this article comes“too little, too late.” If history teaches us anything, we cannotlearn enough from the experiences of those who went before us.

Having searched long and wide for a “best practices” withthe use of translators in combat logistics patrols, it proved difficultto locate. So, hopefully this essay has done its job and left somethingfor others to ponder maybe with other conflicts or languages.Perhaps even moved us beyond stage one.

The added benefit of slowly filling the funnel of potentiallinguists within the ranks using a systematic approach

might yield only a handful out of thousands. Moreimportantly, it would cost the Army very little.


The importance of effective air ground integration (AGI)has grown significantly, and now commanders at all levelshave access to an aerial view of the battlefield. However,

when used inappropriately, air assets can become distracters ratherthan enablers, or they can be wasted in a task not appropriate totheir current abilities. Effectively integrating and synchronizingunmanned aerial systems (UAS), rotary wing (RW), close air support(CAS), and a plethora of other Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance (ISR) platforms in support of the ground schemeof maneuver remains a constant challenge. This article will look atthe current operational success as a result of effective AGI as partof the tactical scheme of maneuver, and will highlight ongoingchallenges from the ground commander’s point of view.

Operational EnvironmentUpon entrance to the Iraqi theater in June 2008, the 4th Brigade

Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division found itself the battlespaceowner of three provinces in southern Iraq (Maysan, Dhi Qar,and Muthanna). These provinces cover an area of approximately80,000 squared kilometers, roughly the size of South Carolina.They contain only a few population centers, with a majority ofthe population living in sparse rural villages and minimalinfrastructure in all three provinces. These three provinces were“PIC” provinces, meaning that they were under Provincial Iraqi

AGI AGI AGI AGI AGI INININININ S S S S SOUTHERNOUTHERNOUTHERNOUTHERNOUTHERN I I I I IRAQRAQRAQRAQRAQCPT WILLIAM HARRYMAN

CPT MARK HAYESMAJ REY SOLIZ


Control and not being directly governed and secured by coalitionforces. The security situation in Maysan province was vastlydifferent than in Dhi Qar and Muthanna. Intelligence indicatedthat insurgents had freedom of maneuver in the province andwere using it both as a safe haven and as a weaponstransshipment point. At the time of our rest-in-place(RIP)/transfer of authority (TOA) in July, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalrywas already in position in Maysan and actively supporting the10th Iraqi Army Division in cordon and search operations focusedin the capital of the province, Amarah. Clearing operationscontinued throughout July and August, while the 1st Battalion,9th Cavalry was quickly relocated from Scania to Maysan and giventhe mission of countering the weapon smuggling occurring in theremote areas of the province.

Maysan province is the province furthest east and shares itsborder with Iran. Maneuver was especially impeded in this southeastregion of our battlespace due to the presence of swamps,waterways, and other larger bodies of water, which provided food,transportation, and a livelihood through smuggling legal and illegalgoods for the various tribes in the area. Many locations werecompletely inaccessible by ground movement.

Iraqi Army troops and Soldiers with the 4th Brigade Combat Team,1st Cavalry Division stage for an air assault mission 30 August 2008.

SPC Lester Colley


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

AGI in 4/1 CAV OperationsTo overcome the terrain and intelligence

challenges in our battle space, 4/1 CAV useda combination of several differentintelligence tools to create an operationalcapability to interdict smuggling. Groundmovement target indicator (GMTI) data fromJoint Surveillance and Target Attack RadarSystem (JSTARS) aircraft providedinformation on possible smuggling routesin the province. This pattern analysisinformation allowed smuggling named areasof interest (NAIs) to be identified andprioritized for UAS coverage. Whilemonitoring these NAIs, real-time GMTI datawas used to cross-cue the Predator UASonto activity for evaluation. The Predatorcoverage was a huge advantage over otherISR enablers. This communications relaypackage enabled the battalion tacticaloperations center (TOC) to maintaincommand and control over unitsencompassing a much largercommunications range.

Prior to their arrival in the province, 1-9CAV trained several border teams on specificcounter-smuggling tactics. If suspiciousactivity was identified through ISR anddeemed to be probable smuggling, twopossible courses of action were available:

* If nearby patrols were in position tointercept the activity, they were vectoredonto the potential smuggling activity

through constant communication back tothe TOC, which was in direct communicationwith the Predator operators.

* However, if terrain prevented groundinterception, the border teams were alsotrained on aerial insertion tactics and wouldset up traffic control points (TCPs) thatinterdicted the movement of the suspectedsmuggling operation.

These air-inserted snap TCPs gave the1-9 CAV commander a very mobile force thatcould overcome the terrain restrictions inthe province. This force was alsoaugmented by a JTAC (Joint Terminal AttackControl) team and two JFOs (Joint ForwardObserver). This was created specifically inorder to support an intelligence-driveninterception of hostile movement.

Executing AGIThe 1-9 CAV first employed its ability to

tactically interface with overhead UASsupport during a sniper attack on a forwardoperating base in September 2008. Guardson the FOB heard one round of small armsfire but were unable to locate the shooter.Predator assets were quickly retasked andpicked up three individuals moving quicklytowards a four-door truck. Using acommunications relay package, two patrolsenroute to the FOB were contacted andgiven the mission to intercept the truck. ThePredator operator talked directly to the two

patrol leaders, and this allowed the patrolsto intercept and stop the vehicle and securethe individuals. The 1-9 CAV’s hard workon integrating their enablers paid off.Operation Boyne, which also occurred inSeptember 2008, executed four separatetraffic control points (TCPs) as part of acounter-smuggling interdiction plan. Humanintelligence collection team (HCT) sourcereporting corroborated other intelligencethat indicated that the Jaysh al MahdiSpecial Group was moving 20-30 trainees byfoot across the border from Iran into Maysanprovince. The reporting gave the vicinityof where the border crossing would takeplace, as well as the village where theywould link up with vehicles at night. Around2030, movement was detected in the vicinityof the crossing point, and when cross-cuedto Predator coverage, approximately 10individuals were seen on full-motion video(FMV) crossing the border on foot. Soldierswith the 1-9 CAV proceeded to establish ascreen line of four TCPs to interdict vehiculartraffic moving farther into the province. Aquick reaction force was maintained at thebattalion TAC. Routes that couldn’t becovered by ground forces were identifiedand an ISR plan had to be quicklyreworked to include assets that were beingfed into the operation, including PredatorUAS, Warrior UAS, and a pair of AH-64Ds.All of these assets were being controlledby various individuals to include platoonleaders, JFOs, JTACs, and S2 analysts. Asthe night continued and ISR assets ranout of flight time or were redirected, animmediate CAS request allowed theoperation to continue past the expectedend point with support from a pair of F-16s. During the operation, 15 vehicleswere stopped and searched, and alloccupants were screened using HandheldInteragency Identity Detection Equipment(HIIDE), but no evidence of lethalsmuggling or our targeted individuals wasfound. What was found was a non-lethalsmuggling network. While not asuccessful lethal counter-smugglingoperation, it was a good example of AGI asa combat multiplier. The effective use ofthe various air assets allowed a Cavalrytroop to cover a vast area in near real time.

In this scenario, the Predator played adual role by providing positive ID andFMV of the target and its location, as well

SSG Brendan Stephens

Soldiers with the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment maneuver over a stretch of marshland in theMaysan province of Iraq 23 January 2009.


CPT William Harryman is the commander of Headquarters andHeadquarters Company, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division.He previously served as a PATRIOT Tactical Director in Germany. He is a2003 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y.

CPT Mark Hayes is currently serving as the 4/1 CAV BCT deputychief of operations (night). Prior to the current deployment he served asthe brigade aviation officer for 4/1 CAV. He deployed with 4th InfantryDivision to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2006 as an AH-64D platoon leader.He was commissioned in 2004 through the ROTC program at CedarvilleUniversity, Ohio.

MAJ Rey Soliz is currently serving as the 4/1 CAV BCT chief ofoperations. His prior assignments include the serving as the senior ADobserver/controller at the Joint Readiness and Training Center at FortPolk, La., and as a PATRIOT battery commander. He was commissioned inSeptember 1998 after graduating from Officer Candidate School.

as providing relayed communicationsdirectly to the remote units. Thesuccessful execution of operations ofthis type significantly reduced theenemy’s freedom of maneuver andability to conduct smuggling oflethal aid for insurgents in our areaof operations.

Current ISR Issues:Optimization

Aerial ISR platforms, whetherUAS platforms, close air support orair weapon teams, are essentialresources in this environment.Intelligence sections can use theseassets to confirm or deny activity atan NAI, identify suspicious activity,and establish patterns of life onpotential targets. Groundcommanders desire thereconnaissance and situationalawareness these assets bring to thetable for current operations. Thuswe are faced with an optimizationproblem, distributing the preciousflight time for each asset against multiple objectives across thebattlefield.

These assets must be synchronized as part of an overarchingintelligence plan that coordinates closely with current operationsand the ground scheme of maneuver. Allocating an ISR asset on aninflexible target deck that is not linked to other intelligence sources,or that doesn’t have the flexibility to adjust to time sensitive targets,is liable to leave the asset burning holes in the sky and producingFMV of a lack of activity on the ground. The end result of this isthat troops on the ground are unsupported.

The complexity of the problem should quickly become apparent;competing demands can surface at any time during this process aswell as during operations. Without objective standards to prioritizeallocation, a common behavior that emerges is to attempt to addressevery situation as it arises. While having your current operationsofficer playing the military equivalent of “whack-a-mole” withmultimillion dollar aircraft may work in cases where we haveoverwhelming superiority, it is not the hallmark of the military. Italso doesn’t work when you have more NAIs than ISR assetsavailable, or when your area of operations is significantly largeenough that the unproductive flight time between successivelocations becomes a drain on resources.

The way ahead is to increase the capabilities of our enablersfor ground units. Several months ago, a modification to a UASincluded a communications relay package, giving every BCTthe ability to coordinate operations in real-time at ranges thatweren’t previously possible. Other capabilities also need to bepushed out into the hands of ground commanders, includingadditional sensor packages such as movement or thermal, taggingcapabilities, or ID capabilities.

The deficiencies in current UAS design should also be noted.The Raven UAS system could be an excellent tool in the companycommander’s hands, but usage levels remain low.

ConclusionWhile there are some shortcomings in today’s ISR assets, these

can be overcome with clear ISR asset priorities and unit initiative.Simply getting the proper ISR asset in support of a unit is not thecomplete story. Proper implementation of these airframes capabilitiesis the missing piece. Much of the success of a single BCT in such alarge AO boils down to one simple factor: training. Having gonethrough two Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and variousAGI leader professional development (LPDs) prior to deployment,effective AGI has resulted in a CF presence and response capabilityanywhere in the AO.

1LT Joanne Cotton

Soldiers assigned to the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division move to an unmanned aerial systemlaunch and recovery site on their forward operating base in Iraq.

This review essay will highlight the 2008 Arabic book byDr. Maher al-Charif entitled Evolution of the Conceptof Jihad in Islamic Thought. The book — an intellectual

exploration of the concept of jihad — was published through MadaPublishing Company in Damascus, Syria. Although Dr. Charif’sbook covers the period from Prophet Muhammad to the present,this article will discuss the 19th and 20th century influences on themeaning of the term jihad, and how modern political theories likenationalism, national liberation ideology, colonial resistancemovements, and the definition of what constitutes an Islamicgovernment altered and steered some on a course towards Islamistpolitical movements, then to radicalization, and violent militantIslamist ideology. Deconstructing al-Qaida ideology can only bedone by Islamic argumentation, and Charif offers a book that tracesnot only the history of militant Islamist ideology but also the peoplewho attempted to counter them along the way. This book washighlighted in the al-Jazeera Web site book review section andrepresents a 2008 Arabic book of significance to U.S. forces. SuchArabic works matter in the 21st century, as the adversary we faceuses fragments of Islam and a narrow group of radical theoreticiansto weave an ideology that justifies not only their agenda but theviolence needed to accomplish this vision. Part I of the evolutionof the concepts of jihad, which covers the 7th century through thelate 13th century, can be found in the January-February 2009 issueof Infantry.

Colonial Resistance Movements and NationalLiberation Ideology and Jihad

In the 19th century, jihad (as warfare) merged with nationalliberation movements, and regrettably the term jihad as war foundromanticism and resonance in the case of Abdel-Kader of Algeriaresisting French occupation, Ahmed Urabi of Egypt resisting Britishcontrol, and the Sanussis of Libya resisting the Italians. The termsjihad, national liberation and resistance became part of commonArabic discourse in the Middle East and impacted Islamic thinkingon the term jihad.

Jamal al-Din Afghani (d. 1892) influenced the Egyptianintelligentsia such as Muhammad Abdu, the Grand Mufti of Cairo,and Saad Zaghlul, the Egyptian Nationalist hero and popular PrimeMinister of Egypt. Afghani saw in constitutionalism the means ofrestricting powers of Muslim despots as well as colonialists. Hecombined national liberation ideology with Islam as a means of

THE EVOLUTION OF THECONCEPT OF JIHAD PART II:

CDR YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, USN

If we are truly to understand our adversary and posture our commanders to make effective decisions more

rapidly than the enemy is able, we must acquire empathy — adeep understanding of their ideology. Such an understandingwill help us on many levels. First, it will educate us on thenuances and differences between militant Islamist ideology,Islamist political theory, and the wider discourse of Islamictheology that offers spiritual sustenance to 1.3 billion people.Secondly, only by pausing and thinking like the adversarycan we reduce surprise as well as begin to shape plausibletheories to predict behavior and actions. Finally, the mostimportant lesson to learn is how militant Islamist groups likeal-Qaida manipulate and reinterpret Islamic theology andhistory to justify their acts of violence. This demands patienceand continuous study. The fight against terrorism requires along-term commitment, and we have a responsibility to educateAmerica’s current and future leaders from the tactical to thestrategic levels.

Commander Aboul-Enein has for years taught, written, andhelped us explore works by Arab authors, some written byterrorists, and others written by those who fight terrorism. In2008, he came to me holding a new Arabic book by Syrianhistorian Dr. Maher Charif that discusses how the term “jihad”had multiple and competing meanings, interpretations, andmore importantly, how the origins of jihad evolved in Islamicthought. It reveals the narrow way al-Qaida has defined theterm, and highlights not only the ideologues that radicalizedthe term jihad, but clerical counter-weights to theirargumentation. Ayman al-Zawahiri says that half of this war ismedia; meaning this is a war of ideas, interpretations, andcompeting meanings. Dr. Charif’s book is a step towardsunderstanding how militant Islamist ideology can be underminedusing diverse and competing Islamic argumentation. In closing,as a former infantryman and longtime reader of Infantry, I wouldlike to recognize the U.S. Army’s Infantry Magazine, which hasprovided a forum for Commander Aboul-Enein’s passion tohighlight Arabic works of military significance. We mustanalyze and dissect these works with the same zeal as Russianworks were avidly studied during the Cold War. I look forwardto the debate this essay will generate.

— Mr. Ed MornstonDirector, Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

THE LATE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES


ultimately reunifying Islamic lands. Afghanipresents a double-edged sword for his anti-colonial stance, and for advocating Islamas a religion requiring rational and freethought to inspire genuine belief. Amonghis most enduring legacies was his fightingblind imitation and his revival of the Islamicpractice of ijtihad (analytic reasoning).Afghani preached that the success of Islamwas not a result of the sword and cites thepeaceful spread of Islam in Yemen. He alsopoints out that the early Islamic conquestsof the Levant and Egypt numbered no morethan 40,000 troops. On the issue of jihad,he said that dawa (evangelism) takesprecedence over the sword. His discipleMuhammad Abdu (d. 1905) reformed andmodernized Egypt’s education curriculum,adding more modern sciences and westernmethods to the syllabus. Abdu is a modernmilitant Islamist’s worst nightmare, whoused Quranic argumentation to underminethe narrow views on jihad. As Grand Muftiof Cairo, he was versed in Islamic texts, butcorresponded with Leo Tolstoy, visitedBritish philosopher Robert Spencer, andattended lectures at Oxford. He argued thatjihad was defensive only, and uses verse256 of al-Baqara (the Calf) in the Quran, “letthere be no compulsion in matters ofreligion,” and verse 99 of Yunus (Jonah) inthe Quran, “will you despise those whobelieve differently?” and finally verse 142of al-Imran that advocates that only Godknows the martyrs among us. He arguedthat jihad as warfare was fard kifaya (anoptional obligation), and the shaheed meansnot only martyr but also witness uponpeople and their injustices. The Englishterm “martyr,” is derived from the Greekmartos, which means “to witness.” Abdualso argued that the Arabic term jizya wasnot a subjugation tax levied upon non-Muslims but one levied for the maintenanceof society, and that both the Persians andChristian Byzantines had taxed all theirsubjects. Muslims continued the practiceto sustain Muslim forces and maintain order.

Judge Ali Abdel-Razaq Countersthe Notion of the Caliphate as theOnly Form of Government

One of Abdu’s most famous discipleswas Islamic Judge Ali Abdel-Razaq, who waseducated in al-Azhar, Sorbonne in Paris, andOxford’s schools of Economics and Political

Science. In his book al-Islam wa Usool al-Hukm (Islam and the Essence ofGovernance), he made the central argumentthat the caliphate was a political traditionnot ordained in the Quran or the Hadith(Muhammad’s sayings). Abdel-Razaqbelieved that the mechanics of government,whether parliament or democracy, werecompletely left to Muslims. Written in 1925,a year after the abolishment of the Ottomancaliphate, he went back to the sources andwrote that the caliphate was a politicaltradition no more and no less and that theinstitution was never tied to the survival ofIslam as a religion. He asked the hypotheticalquestion, “Was Prophet Muhammad a kingor prophet?” Muhammad’s main missionas outlined in the Quran was that of prophet,and every action was designed to advancehis prophecy. Prophet Muhammad hadwhat Abdel-Razaq called, “hukumahnabawiyah,” or prophetic governance thatwas inspired by God and can never berecreated. He cautions readers about mixingMuhammad’s prophecy with his oversightof Medina and eventually all of Arabia, asevery act of the prophet was taken toadvance the prophecy given to him by God.It is vital to amplify aspects of Afghani,Abdu, and Abdel-Razaq’s writings in the21st century to effectively counter militantIslamist ideology, which makes

reestablishing the caliphate an obligationrequired of every Muslim.

Rashid Rida: The IdeologicalInspiration for Radical IslamistThought

Rashid Rida (d. 1935) countered SheikhAbdel-Razaq and began an intellectualrevolution that altered views on jihad,placed it on a negative trajectory, andinspired Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood andPakistan’s Jamiat Islami. Born in 1865, inthe Lebanese village of Qalmaan, nearTripoli, he was raised in a religious familyand attended religious schools. Whilestudying radical Islamists, Rida assessedthe psychological and philosophicalcharacteristics of the militant ideology. Ridabegan to fully embrace radicalism followingthe 1911 Italian invasion of Libya and theincreasing secularism of the Ottoman Empire.The Libyan invasion by Italy laid bare “TheEastern Question,” or how to stem the tideof European colonialism of Muslim lands byRussia, France, and Great Britain. He sawthe Balkan Wars of former Ottomandominions and the independence of Greeceas a new crusader war. Rida wanted torestore the caliphate and impose shariah law(Islamic law) to stop the “crusaders.” RashidRida led the attack against reformist Muslimclerics like Sheikh Ali Abdel-Razaq, and in1927 established Jamaa al-Shuban al-Muslimeen in Egypt — the Muslim youthgroup charged with enforcing morality andevangelizing Rida’s Islamic ideals. Rida’swork left an indelible mark on Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian MuslimBrotherhood (founded in 1928), the firstIslamist political party, and Abu Ala al-Mawdudi in Pakistan (founder of Jamiat al-Islami — Islamic Group founded in 1941).Through Rida and such ideologicaldisciples as Banna and Mawdudi, adevelopment known as Islam siyasi harakior Islamist political movement emerged fromthe late 1920s onward. This politicizedmovement changed the dynamics of jihad,further narrowing its definition in publicdiscourse to one of confrontation andviolence. Rida was instrumental inunleashing Islam siyasi (Islamist politics)or Islam haraki (Islamist movement). Rida,Banna, and Mawdudi did not make thedistinction between defensive andoffensive jihad and advocated a philosophy


http://en.wikipedia.org

Muhammad Abdu, a disciple of Jamal al-DinAfghani, used Quranic argumentation toundermine the narrow views on jihad.

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that God accepts no other faiths except Islam. Militant Islamistswould give jihad a reductionist meaning, thereby simplifiying theconcept of Islam itself into a formula of an unending fight untiljudgement day.

Sheikh Thalabi: Countering this Radicalization of theConcept of Jihad

Tunisian cleric Abdul-Aziz Thalabi (d. 1944) was influenced byAbdu and traveled throughout the Middle East and Europe in 1931.He postulated that Islam came to bring humankind together, andthat is why it recognizes the People of the Book (Jews andChristians) and urges that Muslims not attempt to enter intoevangelizing the faith with them except with pure intentions (Quran,Ankabut Chapter, verse 46). Thalabi reviews the Quran and findsthat the words for tolerance and forgiveness appear in 36 of theQuran’s 114 chapters and in 125 of its verses. He was troubled bythe conversion of the Quran into a book that encourages radicalism,and encouraged clerics to object to this misuse, saying that suchinterpretations represent “Afkar Daiyiiqah,” or narrow mindedness.He discusses the 70 war verses in the Quran, saying that the asbabal-nuzul (exegesis or reasons for revelation) needed to beconsidered. Thalabi wrote that these sword verses represented adefensive war of survival against the Meccans and that the Quranwarns that although violence is sanctioned, not to transgress(Baqara, verse 19). He takes a wider notion of jihad than militantIslamists, highlighting jihad al-nafs (personal moral struggle that isthe greater jihad) versus jihad al-adu (warfare against an enemythat is the lesser jihad) and cites the Quran to bolster hisargumentation (Luqman, verse 15). Although this observation canbe debated, he also makes the argument that the concept of jihad asholy war was borrowed from the crusades, as Muslims before thecrusades delineated between qital (killing in warfare) and jihad(struggle). Thalabi also discusses the complexities of the termshaheed (martyr) arguing that it has two main meanings, that ofmartyr and that of witness. He postulated that the emphasis onwitness to God’s justice and laws had been diluted in favor of theconcept of martyrdom attained through sacrificing one’s life. Ofnote, despite Thalabi’s explorations of the concepts of jihad andmartyrdom, he did participate in the 1936 Great Palestinian Revoltwith Hajj Amin al-Husseini, viewing the British mandate on Palestineand increased Jewish immigration as a defensive sanctioned jihad(war). Why does this matter? For every clerical quotation al-Qaidaproduces in their audios and videos, this can be countered withclerical quotations from the same and older periods that are morepragmatic and rational. This will add to the cacophony of competingvoices, sound bites and slogans, creating a more challenging mediaenvironment for militant Islamist groups.

Hassan al-Banna: The Momentum of RadicallyDefining Jihad

Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (TheMuslim Brotherhood), was born in the village of Mahmudiah, northof Cairo in 1906. While in middle school, he established JamiahAkhlaq al-Adabiyah, the Morals and Behavior Group, to enforceIslamic morals as based on the stringent Hasafiyah Sufi Order. Heparticipated in Egyptian nationalist protests and agitation, and in

1923 entered Dar al-Uloom College, graduating in 1927. A year laterhe was assigned as a teacher along the Suez Canal city of Ismailiyah.He founded the Society of Muslim Brothers as a social group to aidthe impoverished of Ismailiyah, but his vision, as he stated, was toestablish, “a pious generation that understands Islam correctly, an[Islam] that is religion and state, piety and jihad (as warfare), and ashariah (Islamic law) the regulates the lives of all people.” Hebegan with his own mosque called Dar al-Ikhwan, an Islamic school,and also formed an Islamic school for girls. By 1932, he hadfranchised his operation in several towns and cities in Egypt beforemoving to Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood attempted to turn itssocial movement into a political movement, but they becamefrustrated by the government and other political competitors likethe Young Egyptians with their fascist Green Shirts. Of note, theMuslim Brotherhood sent fighters to the 1936 Palestinian Revolt,the 1948 Imami Coup in Yemen, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Thenumber of guerillas sent by the brotherhood increased with eachsuccessive campaign. By the first Arab-Israeli War, between 5,000-7,000 Muslim Brotherhood volunteers joined the Egyptian Army.The brotherhood also harassed British forces occupying Egypt’sSuez Canal Zone. The Egyptian government straddled the linebetween encouraging harassment of British forces and participationin the Arab-Israeli War with concerns about brotherhoodinterference in an internal Yemeni royalist coup.

From a modernist ideological front, 1920s and 1930s Egyptexperienced a proliferation of schools modeled after modern westerncurriculums. In addition, Egypt began adopting the legal codesand institutions of the French Civil Code. This marginalized villageclerics and triggered the birth of a grass roots religious industry tohandle legal questions, resolve disputes, and meeting educationalrequirements according to Islamic law. Modernization, materialism,and secularism became sound bites and ideas to fear and led thosemarginalized clergy to declare apostasy and call for violence. Thesefears were combined in the language of agitation as many questionedwhether European civilization had brought Muslims modernism ora return to colonialism. Banna applied a narrow view of the Quranto argue that jihad (as warfare) was an obligation no different fromprayer and fasting. Banna, however, could not get around Baqaraverse 190, about not transgressing in jihad (as warfare) andprohibited the killing of women, children, and the elderly who werenoncombatants. Of note, Banna’s organization did not follow thisinjunction and drifted towards justifying violence against all thosewho rejected Prophet Muhammad’s prophecy and message. Bannaattempted to marginalize sayings of Prophet Muhammad that drewa distinction between the lesser jihad (warfare) and greater jihad(leading an individual moral life), saying it was a weak hadith(saying). He dismantled and watered down the efficacy of the


For every clerical quotation al-Qaida produces intheir audios and videos, this can be countered withclerical quotations from the same and older periodsthat are more pragmatic and rational. This will addto the cacophony of competing voices, sound bitesand slogans, creating a more challenging mediaenvironment for militant Islamist groups.

complex meanings and views of jihad,making new revisionist ideologies, such asjihad having three stages. Banna’s threestages of jihad were emotional, then mental,and finally the physical sacrifice. Thisrevisionist view of the term jihad can bestbe described in a single quote by Banna,“Oh Brothers! The community that perfectsthe manufacture of death knows how to diehonorably, God will lavish them in this lifeand the hereafter.” Banna’s MuslimBrotherhood assassinated Egyptian PrimeMinister Nokrashi Pasha and Judge al-Khizindar, who declared the group illegal.In 1949, Banna was gunned down by Egypt’ssecret security.

Abu al’aa Al-Mawdudi: His Visionof an Islamic Government andRadical Islamist Philosophy

Considered one of the founders ofPakistan, Abu al’aa al-Mawdudi was bornin 1903. He began his career as a journalistin 1920. In 1923, Mawdudi published hisown magazine and by 1941 he establishedhis own Islamist political party. He wasjailed by British colonial authorities buteventually created a model Islamic society,the village of Dar Salam (Abode of Peace) inEast Punjab. He advocated the concept ofan Islamic constitution and the need for aseparate nation (Pakistan) for India’sMuslims. When India was partitioned,Mawdudi continued to agitate for a modelIslamic society in Pakistan. In 1953 he wassentenced to death, but his sentence wascommuted, and he was finally released fromprison in 1955. In 1964 he was re-arrestedand then re-released. His political party,Jamiat al-Islami, was banned. Mawdudidied in 1974 but left a copious amount ofmaterial on Islamic governance thatcontinues to inspire adversaries of theUnited States in Pakistan. In his book,Nizam al Hayaa fee al-Islam (TheOrganization of Life in Islam), he postulatedthat an Islamic political system is based onthree principles:

* Tawheed — Governance of God alone.The concept of mixing Tawheed (absolutemonotheism) with governance by God aloneis known as hakimiyah (literally thesovereignty of God). Mawdudi took theconcept of Tawheed, and postulated thatsharing governance with God, a position hefelt secularism advocated, is apostasy.

* Risala — The mechanism by whichGod’s revelations reach mankind throughthe Prophet Muhammad.

* Khilafa — The caliphate that appliesthese revelations and reduces them into theShariah (Islamic Law).

In an Islamic government, according toMawdudi, the emir is aided in peace and warby a Shura (Consultative) Council. In hisbook, Nazariyah al-Islam wal Hidaya (TheIslamic Viewpoint and Internal Peace), heexplored his theories of hakimiyah(sovereignty belonging only to God and notman) further by applying verse 40, whichsays that sovereignty is to God alone andcommands that we do not worship [anyother gods] except Him. However, this is inthe context of Prophet Joseph’sconfrontation with Pharaoh. InsteadMawdudi used this verse to justify the ruleof God, appropriating the interpretation ofwhat that means to himself and his followers.He wrote of a society that delineatedbetween those who believe in Islamicprinciples and those who do not. Mawdudialso advocated the need for a Muslimvanguard. In his book Nahu ThawraSalmiyah (Towards a Correct Revolution),Mawdudi wrote about the need for a piousgroup of those who believe in the Islamicview of philosophy, practice it daily, andoperate with total commitment. Mawdudifelt that an Islamic revolution could nothappen without popular support and thewaging of perpetual j ihad againstjahiliyah ( ignorance) of thought,behavior, psychology, and education.Although Mawdudi inspired many militantIslamist groups, readers should also notehow his books defined jihad in a morecomplex way than al-Qaida, or even thegroup he founded — Jamiat al-Islami —does today. Militant Islamists do this byfocusing only on selected Mawdudi worksthat defined jihad (warfare) as anindividual obligation no different fromprayer and fasting, and that the killing ofthousands to wipe away apostasy andilhad (turning away from God) is worth it.He did restrict jihad by holding the viewthat assaulting or killing women, children,and the elderly noncombatants isforbidden. For Mawdudi, jihad (althoughwarfare) was how he viewed all of Islam,which is revolutionary ideology designedto re-order the entire globe, so humankind

can join the party of God. He writes thatthe delineation of offensive and defensivejihad applies only to wars of nationalliberation, giving his modernist opinionand adding it to thousands of years ofother opinions on the notion of jihad.

Sayyid Qutb: Western andIslamist Radical PhilosophiesCollide and Weaved into MilitantIslamist Thought of the 20th and 21stCenturies

Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) represents oneof the most important ideologues ofIslamist militant thought. It is impossibleto understand Ayman al-Zawhairi, UsamaBin Laden, al-Qaida, and many othermilitants without reading Qutb’s work.Although his book Milestones Along theRoad is considered his political manifesto,only reading his mammoth 15-volume Inthe Shade of the Quran is necessary for adeeper understanding of Qutb and histheories. Dr. Charif does an excellent jobdeconstructing this complex,contradictory and radical figure. Born in1906 from a family of farmers in the villageof Qaha in Upper Egypt, Qutb’s ownpersonal intellectual journey was anextraordinary one in the context of radicalIslamist theoreticians. Being the first inhis family to finish university in Cairo, heachieved minor fame for poetry, shortromance stories, and literary criticism.However, the pull of nationalist and anti-colonial politics drew him towardsprotests. The 1942 Sir Miles LampsonIncident, whereby the British dictated aPrime Minister and cabinet to Egypt’sKing Farouk, led Qutb to transform hiswritings towards criticizing Egypt’smonarchy and control of Britain over thecountry’s internal affairs. In 1942, Qutbjoined the Wafd Political Party, being partof the Vanguard of Wafdists. Charif’sbook recounts that Qutb grew frustratedwith the Wafd Party and joined theSaadists from 1943 to 1945, continuing toagitate for Egyptian nationalism. He hadexperienced all this before Qutb departedfor his two-year fellowship in the UnitedStates in 1948. Qutb radicalized duringthe period from 1942 to 1950, and afterreturning from the United States, heveered towards the Islamist politics of theMuslim Brotherhood and became editor


of their newspaper in 1951. Qutb remained in Nasser’s prisonsfrom 1954 to 1964, being released for just under a year beforereturning to jail in 1965 and finally going to the gallows in 1966.He wrote a total of 32 books, and most of his writings were doneunder the abhorrent conditions of Nasser’s prisons. He isconsidered the most important philosopher of militant Islamisttheory.

Qutbist theory is quite complex to cover in this expose, butamong his central tenants is that Islam signifies the rebirth ofhuman existence and empowers humankind. Since Ataturkabolished the caliphate in 1924, ending the political institutionin place since the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD,Muslims separated religion from state and re-entered into a stageof jahiliyah (ignorance) — a state in which shariah (Islamiclaw) is no longer the law of the land and where God does notreign supreme. Islamic society regressed into a state of jahiliyahthat attacks the sovereignty of God. This notion of jahiliyahwas borrowed by Qutb from Mawdudi. Qutb’s remedy was torestore uluhiyah (reign of God) and undermine hakimiyah (therule of man). Like Mawdudi, whom Qutb corresponded with,they agreed for the need of what Qutb calls Taliah Usbah — avanguard to rid society of jahiliyah (ignorance) by clinging tothe hakimiyah (rule) of God. He advocated that this vanguardwould create a pious society isolated from the corrupt generalsociety. Qutb differed from the founder of the MuslimBrotherhood Hassan al-Banna, who sought to address the deficitin Egyptian society religiosity through evangelism and socialwork. The core of Qutb’s modernist revision of Islam is his claimthat the religion can address and rid humanity from the ills ofindustrial barbarism, culture that is bankrupt of values and thetrap of communism.

Like the 14th century radical Islamist cleric Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1327), Qutb clung to the literal word of God called “harfiyah alna’ss.” He accused reformist clerics like Muhammad Abduh ofmaking the Quranic word fit the understanding of the humanmind, and this in Qutb’s opinion was a dangerous path thatcorrupted Islam with innovation. He believed the human mindmust conform to God’s will. “Shall the Quran be polluted by ahuman mind rife with lust, ill-intentions, ignorance, and themultiple views of the mind?” “This,” Qutb espoused, “has onlyone ending, fawdah (chaos).” Qutb believed a vanguard ofpure believers must be created amidst the ignorance that hasplagued the globe.

On the issue of People of the Book, Qutb considered Islamthe only valid religion ordained by God and uses the Quranverse 85 of al-Imran to justify his view. This is not balanced byverses that call for tolerance of those considered People of theBook. Qutb spoke out against the interfaith dialogue. Qutbwrites that the concept of tasamuh (forgiveness) applied topersonal dealings only and not society as a whole.

Qutb’s Modernist Commentary on JihadQutb viewed jihad as fighting for God alone and not for

personal gain. He reinterpreted jihad as fighting againstnationalism, racism and reduced the concept to a perpetual jihad

to spread God’s word throughout the globe. He opines thatjihad can be reduced to three goals: (1) ridding Muslims ofdivisions; (2) guaranteeing the freedom to spread the faith; and(3) establishing an Islamic system on earth, as this alone ensuresfreedom of man towards his fellow man. Qutb uses a modernistinterpretation to marginalize the verse “let there be no compulsionin matters of religion,” by saying that those who use this verseto advocate differences between a defensive and offensive jihad,confuse compulsion in aqeedah (Islamic practice) and the needto destroy the materialist system that worships material goodsand prevents the worship of God. Qutb uses modernist nationalliberation rhetoric to say that Islam is not just orthodoxy, but ageneral declaration for the liberation of man from material orworldly slavery. The goal, according to Qutb, is to wipe awaythis slavery which then allows mankind the freedom of choice inreligious (read Islamic) practice. He then isolates all otherMuslims who disagree with his views by saying that only thosewho move in the name of Islam and undertake jihad (fighting)truly understand Islam, and those who do not join (the jihad)can never understand. As if to make sense of his own life andlong incarceration, Qutb advocated jihad as the best form ofworship, and that man gives himself and his worldly goods toGod for a larger reward (in the hereafter).

ConclusionIt is important to immerse ourselves in the opinions and

language of Islamist radical theorists who inspire militantIslamists. We must be cognizant that Qutb, Mawdudi, and Ridaall postulated radical opinions on jihad based on modernistinterpretations that were impacted by 20th century events. Theseopinions are by no means Islamic orthodoxy or the final word onwhat constitutes jihad, an Islamic state, or a good Muslim.Theorists like Qutb must be deconstructed, and their writingsexposed as an amalgamation of fragments of modern westernphilosophy and fragments of Islam weaved into a militantideology. Books like Charif’s represent an important contributionto highlighting the diverse views and the use of Islamicargumentation to undermine militant Islamist theory, ideology,and sound bites. Such Arabic works must be dissected,discussed and taught in our war colleges, as the adversaryexploits individuals with a sense of religion and not knowledgeof religion to recruit fighters and elicit financial support. Al-Qaida’s center of gravity is their ideology. The first step is todeconstruct this ideology and expose it as selective fragmentsof Islam designed to exploit the religion and justify violencethat achieves a political outcome.


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CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein is a senior advisor on militant Islamisttheory at the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism. Hehas lectured on militant Islamist ideology to deploying units across theUnited States and at war colleges. CDR Aboul-Enein wishes to thankLCDR Andrew Bertrand, Medical Service Corps, USN, who is currentlystudying at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, for his edits. Healso appreciates the John T. Hughes Library for providing a quiet place toread, reflect, and write this essay.

The objective of U.S. military kinetic operations always has been todefeat the enemy while minimizing risks to friendly forces, casualtiesamong the innocent population, and undesired collateral damage. Today,

more than any era in the past, we have technologies to achieve that objectiveacross the spectrum of conflict. Even successful stability and nation-buildingoperations have brief spikes of intensity, calling for rapid, pinpoint lethality.

Force commanders require, and have asked for, precision indirect-firecapabilities, and the field artillery is committed to providing these capabilities —tactical precision-guided munitions (PGMs), which allow commanders to turndefeat into victory, save lives, and minimize collateral damage.

In his survey of corps, division, and brigade combat team (BCT) commanders,MG Peter M. Vangjel, chief of Field Artillery and commanding general of Fort Sill,Okla., reported that maneuver commanders’ fire support priority was precision.The field artillery has been working diligently to answer the call.

The commander of ground forces in the highly successful surge in Iraq during2007, then LTG Raymond T. Odierno, commander, Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), endorsed the effectiveness of the relatively new 155mm Excalibur and guidedmultiple-launch rocket system (GMLRS) unitary PGMs, “…they were extremelyeffective. In fact, GMLRS and Excalibur were my brigade commanders’ weaponsof choice.”

MG (RETIRED) DAVID C. RALSTONPATRECIA SLAYDEN HOLLIS

A Soldier fires an Excalibur roundfrom the M777A2 during a

mission in Afghanistan.SGT Henry Selzer

PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS FOR BCT COMMANDERS



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We have entered a remarkable era of all-weather, all-terrain precision effects,available to maneuver commanders 24/7,with Excalibur, GMLRS unitary, and the near-future nonline-of-sight launch system(NLOS-LS) precision attack missile (PAM),projected to be fielded in FY12.

Six Meters and ClosingIndirect-fire PGMs are proving to be more

accurate than the 10 meters required of aPGM. Excalibur and GMLRS test results andcombat records of their impacts cataloguetheir accuracy to within a six-meter radiusof intended targets, bringing us closer thanever to the ideal “one-round, one-hit”capability.

As the enemy was being cleared out ofBaghdad during the 2007 surge, many rannorth to Baqubah in the MultinationalDivision-North (MND-N) area of operations.MAJ Jack E. Vantress, S3, 5th Battalion, 20thInfantry (5-20 IN), the lead task force duringOperation Arrowhead Ripper in Baqubah,discussed in an e-mail, on 17 December2007, Excalibur’s precision and how the taskforce achieved its desired effects on a two-story building. “We fired two rounds nearlysimultaneously… Excalibur’s accuracy wassuch that the second round entered thebuilding at the same point of impact as thefirst, thereby achieving the desiredpenetration to the first floor.”

Employed in conjunction with other jointfirepower assets, Excalibur gives the enemyno way out. In July 2007, two Excaliburrounds were fired on a house containing topal-Qaida leader Abu Jurah and 14 otherinsurgents in Arab Jabour, south ofBaghdad. An AH-64 Apache helicopterattacked a vehicle, and as insurgents fledfrom the rubble, an F-16 dropped two 500-pound bombs to destroy a house three ofthe fleeing insurgents had entered. Theenemy never had a chance.

COL David B. Haight, commander of the3rd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, recentlydeployed his brigade to Afghanistan.Before he deployed, he ensured his firesbattalion had the capability to fire Excalibur.“In June 2008, I went to the Fires Conferenceat Fort Sill and received a briefing onExcalibur’s global positioning systemaccuracy. With Excalibur’s pinpointaccuracy, I can put one round into the badguys’ exact location and take them out while

causing minimum collateral damage andsafeguarding the Afghan populace.Excalibur was exactly what we needed.

“We had identified an operational needfor Excalibur, so we made the case forM777A2s in the brigade to fire the round —M777s are not organic to IBCTs [infantryBCTs]. FORSCOM [Forces Command]approved the request for the capability andresourced us with 12 M777 howitzers, whichour 4-25 FAR [4th Battalion, 25th FieldArtillery Regiment] quickly trained andcertified on. The M777 has the addedadvantage of being lighter than the M198and is very mobile; we can move it aroundthe Afghan battlefield, sling-loaded under ahelicopter to fire Excalibur.”

Excalibur has become a joint andcombined effort as both the U.S. Marinesand Canadians are using it in theater. InSeptember 2005, 3rd Battalion, 13th FieldArtillery (FA), 214th FA Brigade, firedGMLRS in support of MNC-I for the firsttime in combat during Operation RestoringRights at Tal Afar and the next day duringOperation Sayaid in the Al Anbar Province.In Tal Afar, eight GMLRS destroyed twoinsurgent strongholds and killed 48insurgents from 50 kilometers away. In theAl Abnar Province, six rockets destroyed abridge frequently used by insurgents.

COL Kenneth J. Lull, former commander,169th Fires Brigade, Colorado ArmyNational Guard, and the Force FAHeadquarters, MND-N, 25th InfantryDivision, Iraq, reported experiences withGMLRS during Operation ArrowheadRipper. “We shot more than 100 GMLRS insupport of 3-2 SBCT [3rd Stryker BCT, 2ndInfantry Division, attached to the 25thInfantry Division] in a two- to three-weekperiod — a magnificent round.”

Aided by unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs), combat observation lasing teams(COLTs), forward observers (FOs), jointterminal attack controllers (JTACs), andother detection assets, precision strikesuite-special operations forces (PSS-SOF)software can be used to locate the targetprecisely enough to fire PGMs quickly. PSS-SOF has been incorporated into forwardobserver software (FOS) and rapidlydetermines three-dimensional gridcoordinates accurately enough to employPGMs against time-sensitive targets (TSTs)or targets in support of troops in contact.

MAJ Vantress commented in an e-mail,dated 17 December 2008, on the impactPGMs and PSS-SOF had on his task forceoperations during Operation ArrowheadRipper, “For both PGMs, our biggest combatmultiplier was PSS-SOF. Used incombination with UAVs and FOS, we cutdown the delivery time immensely. Weloaded PSS-SOF in all our fire support Strykervariants to allow the forward fire supportteams to quickly gain fidelity from theirobservers. Simply put, GMLRS and Excaliburwere our weapons of choice in the closeurban fight. They saved countless lives…while allowing us to maintain themomentum.”

This speaks not only to precision, butalso to responsiveness.

Precision is the “coin of the realm” at theBCT and below. With Excalibur organic toBCTs, PGM allows small unit commandersto gain overmatch and a decisive advantage.In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), MLRS orhigh-mobility artillery rocket system(HIMARS) “packages” have supportedBCTs with GMLRS — also veryresponsively.

Minimum Collateral DamagePrecision munitions mean more than just

accuracy of impact and effects on theintended target; PGMs provide preciseeffects with minimum collateral damage inthe target areas. Commanders can safelyemploy Excalibur, GMLRS, and, beginningin FY12, PAM, in appropriate circumstances,close to troops in contact for immediate firemissions. These munitions reduce troopstandoff distances, giving commandersoptions such as entering a building to collecttime-sensitive intelligence just seconds afterthe building is engaged.

COL Lull, in an e-mail dated 18 November2008, shared his experiences with employingExcalibur in Iraq, “We fired 17 Excaliburrounds for the 3-2 SBCT when it clearedBaqubah of insurgents in intense combatduring Operation Arrowhead Ripper. Inone mission, we fired Excalibur on aknown enemy safe house. Although it didnot level the building, it killed everyonein the building without harming childrenwho were playing outside in front of thehouse next door about 30 yards away.Excalibur is an incredible round. I calledMNC-I and asked for every Excalibur

round I could get my hands on.”In his e-mail dated 16 December 2008, BG Stephen J. Townsend,

commander, 3-2 SBCT, Operation Arrowhead Ripper, discussedemploying GMLRS to detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs)in Baqubah. The alternative was to uncover and destroy the deep-buried IEDs (DBIEDs) or houseborne IEDs (HBIEDs) withsuccessive shots manually emplaced by an explosive ordnancedisposal (EOD) team: “Our pre-assault intel proved quite accurate— that we faced up to 175 DBIEDs and also booby- trapped houses,or HBIEDs, in Baqubah. By the time we were done, we had recordedmore than 200 emplaced IEDs inside the city and about 41 riggedhouses.

“We were desperate for a solution to the problem of DBIEDs —al-Qaeda had dug in an overlapping network of DBIEDs, theequivalent of a deliberate interlocking minefield in depth. Bottomline: GMLRS worked by neutralizing known and suspected DBIEDsand allowed us to maintain the momentum of our attack with minimum

exposure to our force and minimum collateral damage to the Iraqiinfrastructure.”

COL Bruce P. Antonia, former commander, Task Force (TF) 5-20IN, and his Sykes’ Regulars fought in Baqubah three months beforethe remainder of 3-2 SBCT joined them in June 2008 for the finalassault to clear the city. In an e-mail dated 17 December 2008, hedescribed his ability to shoot GMLRS faster than he could air-dropa bomb on HBIEDs, and the level of comfort they developed withGMLRS’ accuracy and effectiveness, “We were in the midst ofclearing a neighborhood when one of my companies came upon aconfirmed HBIED. I was on the ground with the companycommander when he requested GMLRS to attack the HBIED.Because there was direct-fire contact with the enemy, and I wasextremely confident in my commanders and all my FSOs [fire supportofficers], I immediately agreed to the request. After they called inthe fire mission, I asked the company commander exactly where thetarget was — it was two houses to the west of the one we were

standing in. The testament to GMLRS isthat we called it in on a target 50 metersfrom our own location with greatconfidence.”

The United Kingdom (UK) hasmodified 12 of its M270 MLRS launchersto employ GMLRS unitary in Afghanistan.In the past year, the UK has fired morethan 300 GMLRS rockets in Afghanistanwith the same 98 percent reliability as U.S.missions enjoy.

Coming Soon: Moving TargetAttack

In 2012, PGMs will be organic to BCTs,which will add a long-needed capability,PAM, to attack moving targets — a globalfirst.

This U.S. Army-Navy all-terrain, 24/7missile has an effective range from 500meters to 40 kilometers. Each of the 15missiles per PAM container-launch unit(CLU) has an explosive shaped-chargewarhead for armored targets withfragmentation for soft targets. PAM isdesigned to attack armored and lightlyarmored moving and stationary vehicles,small boats, and some bunkers withpinpoint accuracy. Causing minimumcollateral damage, it can be employed inurban/complex terrain less than 110 metersfrom friendly forces.

PAM’s dual-mode seeker, the semi-active laser (SAL) and infrared (IR) heatseeker, can be used separately or inunison for precision target engagementafter its GPS navigation has guided themissile to the target area.

Networked and platform-independent,

XM982 Excalibur — This is the first GPS-guided, inertial measurement unit (IMU)-aidedweapon that can be fired from 155mm platforms, including the M109A6 Paladin, the M777A2towed howitzer, and the Future Combat Systems Non-Line-of-Site Cannon (FY17).

Excalibur is an extended-range (7.5 to 24 kilometers) unitary round that is all-weather, 24/7,and all-terrain that has been fired in testing and combat with an accuracy of within a six-meterradius of the target.

Excalibur has two special force-protection features: the round only arms itself when within30 meters of its aimpoint — extra safety for rounds in close support of troops; and the round hasa built-in test that exercises in flight. If it detects a problem, it goes into fail-safe mode and fliesto a preplanned alternate ballistic impact point (BIP), but does not detonate.

Its 50-pound warhead has a highly concentrated and predictable fragmentation pattern,optimizing it for urban operations and minimizing collateral damage, allowing it to be employed,within 170 meters of friendly troops in combat. Its nonballistic flight trajectory, which terminatesin a near-vertical attack angle, along with its precision, produces concentrated lethality to theequivalent of the M107 high-explosive (HE) round.

Its primary target sets are softer targets, artillery and mortar crews, vehicles, and commandposts, although Excalibur has been employed successfully against other targets in support ofcoalition forces. In CENTCOM, Excalibur has been effective against improvised explosive devices,safe houses, mortar crews, footbridges, and other targets.

SPC Derek Miller

Soldiers with the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division load an Excaliburround into an M777 during a mission in Baghdad in April 2008.



PROFESSIONAL FORUM

PAM is a smart missile. It can acquirespecific types of targets in flight and attackthem, including moving targets. A missileflies along a nonballistic route to the targetto avoid crowded airspace, receiving targetlocation updates while in flight. Each missiletransmits a picture of the target back to thecontrol cell just prior to impact.

NLOS-LS completed nine tests in 2008,which have demonstrated its design andperformance parameters. During November2008, at White Sands Missile Range, N.M.,PAM used its digital SAL seeker to score adirect hit against a T-72 tank from a range ofnine kilometers; two days later, PAMdemonstrated its SAL and IR seekers foranother direct hit on a T-72, this time from19 kilometers away.

The U.S. Army is considering an airdefense application for this munition, whichhas tested very well. The variant would fillthe requirement to destroy low- and slow-moving UAV and rotary wing threats,protecting the future combat system (FCS)BCT, the future brigade combat team (FBCT),during counterinsurgency operations. Nocurrent organic capability protects thebrigade from these threats.

The Current FightThese PGMs are designed to provide

commanders the flexibility to manage theprecision effects to achieve desired results.Excalibur has a 50-pound warhead andGMLRS unitary has a 200-pound warhead,which can be employed against largertargets, yet both can be employed in closesupport of friendly troops. Note: PAM willhave a 12-pound warhead and will also beemployable in close support of troops.

Indirect-fire PGMs allow commanders toattack an enemy mortar crew setting up indowntown Kabul with Excalibur, producingminimum collateral damage, or destroy a two-story duplex with GMLRS unitary, leavinghalf of the duplex standing. To increaseprecision strike flexibility, the field artilleryis developing “scalable lethality:” a futureGMLRS “dial-an-effect” capability.

Commanders have the ability to fireExcalibur from as close as 7.5 kilometers andGMLRS from as far away as 70-pluskilometers. The U.S. Marines in Iraq firstgave GMLRS its now-famous title, “70-kilometer sniper rifle.” With the fielding ofPAM, the missile can be fired from as close

as 500 meters from its target.Enhancements to Excalibur due in FY10

extend the round’s range to 35 kilometers oncurrent firing platforms. When PAM comesinto the inventory in FY12, commanders willhave the ability to precisely attack movingtargets from 40 kilometers away.

In the past two years, two operationalneeds statements from U.S. CentralCommand (CENTCOM) commanders calledfor a 120mm mortar PGM in theater, anotherprecision strike option to fill a gap. A mortarPGM would be highly mobile, organic tomaneuver battalions (therefore responsive),and reduce the system-to-target range whilestill maintaining a maximum range thatensures munition versatility.

Recently, an infantry brigade combatteam (IBCT) fires battalion was tailored withattached M777A2s to provide a capability todeliver PGMs in Afghanistan. Thisorganization, for the first time, provides theIBCT commander with the ability to deliverprecision munitions without waiting on anexternal asset to deliver long-range precision.

LTC Michael P. Gabel, commander, 4-25FAR, 10th Mountain Division, deployed toAfghanistan in late 2008. In an e-mail dated9 December 2008, he wrote about tailoringhis field artillery battalion to fire Excalibur,“My third BCT was in OEF [OperationEnduring Freedom] VI and VII. It was thefirst brigade in Afghanistan to have itsrotation extended to 16 months. The goodnews is we brought back a lot of lessons;for example, the importance of range andfirepower in that mountainous terrain.

“During OEF VI and VII, the artillery hadto fire its M119 [105mm] howitzers at highangle with maximum charge to get the rangerequired by the terrain. So for our 2009rotation, we requested and got 12 [155mm]M777A2s — not only to increase our rangeand firepower, but also to improve ourprecision and limit collateral damage in urbanoperations with the Excalibur round.

“We reorganized into a multicapablebattalion with 12 triple sevens and kept fourM119s for air assault operations. (I turnedHHB into an M119 platoon.) We shot 15,000rounds under this organization inpreparation for deployment. I think thismulticapable FA battalion organization maybe the way to go — it gives maneuvercommanders options. We’ll know better afterwe have been in Afghanistan for awhile.”

These PGMs are not only all weather, butalso all terrain, and effective in urban,complex, mountainous, or open terrain.Because of their near-vertical angle of attack,these weapons optimize lethality andminimize collateral damage. Reducedcollateral damage permits their use andability to deliver the desired effect withinthe rules of engagement (ROE) in some ofthe most complex terrain.

With Excalibur’s non-ballistic trajectory,it is not limited to clear fields of fire or tied togun-target lines — it can be fired up to 300millimeters off the line, and will maneuver tohit whatever target the maneuvercommander wants to hit.

U.S. Army and Air Force commandsystems can be automated to deconflictairspace faster and more accurately thanbefore. The advanced FA tactical datasystem (AFATDS) now shares informationthrough the battlefield coordinationdetachment (BCD) to Air Force systems toprovide airspace information, enabling rapidcoordination to deconflict flight routes inthe vicinity of a PGM trajectory.

The lower the level of the tactical PGM’srelease authority, the faster its fires arecleared. When clearance and control ofExcalibur is delegated down to the task forcecommander, “it is more responsive than CAS[close air support] or attack aviation,” statedLTC Stephen J. Maranian, in an e-mail dated11 November 2008, whose attached M777A2battery (from 3rd Battalion, 321st FA, 18thFires Brigade) fired Excalibur. Maraniancommanded 4th Battalion, 319th AirborneFA Regiment, 173rd Airborne BCT (ABCT),Afghanistan, from the summer of 2007 untilJuly 2008.

COL Charles A. Preysler, recentcommander of the 173rd ABCT inAfghanistan, said “[Excalibur] worked asadvertised. …Once we understood the timerequired to fire the round, it became clearwe needed to get permissions andauthorities down to the battalion level.”

Because the risk of collateral damageassociated with these PGMs is smaller,PGMs, such as Excalibur and GMLRS, allowthe commander to delegate release authorityfor entire categories of targets down thechain of command.

For large-scale precision, U.S. Air ForcePGMs are brought to commanders by theirFSO. In addition to the FA suite of PGMs,

commanders have the option of air-delivered PGMs, such as thesmall-diameter bomb (SDB), with a 250-pound warhead, and the jointdirect attack munition (JDAM), with options for 500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound warheads. These weapons are precise in their destruction oflarger infrastructure or concentrations of enemy forces. The only aerial-delivered munition that equals the limited collateral damage estimates(CDEs) of Excalibur, GMLRS unitary, or PAM is the Hellfire missile.

Excalibur Lessons LearnedWhile GMLRS has been in the inventory and well appreciated

for several years, Excalibur is relatively new and often unfamiliar toBCT commanders. In his e-mail of 11 November 2008, LTC Maranianfurther discussed several lessons he learned about Excalibur inAfghanistan, which have been echoed by other FA commanders,“We need to educate our maneuver counterparts that Excalibur isnot Copperhead. Copperhead has left some ‘scar tissue’ withmaneuver battalion commanders from their days as companycommanders as they remember the cumbersome nature of that oldPGM. Further, the default is that commanders want to fire twoExcalibur rounds in case one fails. Needless to say, the task forceFSOs and FSCOORDs [fire support coordinators] need to coachtheir maneuver commanders that while there are times when morethan one Excalibur should be employed to achieve the desiredeffects, the reliability of this round far exceeds that of Copperhead,and we do not need to default to firing more than one round. Ourexperience was that Excalibur has an accuracy of within six metersof the target. With the right target selection standards anddelegation of release authority to the task force level, Excalibur canprovide reliable first-round accuracy for troops in contact whencollateral damage must be minimized.”

Other critical lessons, such as intelligence and precise targetlocation, are paramount for employing PGMs effectively. Commandersmust have the intelligence that the target is high-payoff and locate thetarget precisely or the PGM will attack a no-value target or the wronglocation precisely. It is also important to know what Excalibur will andwill not do — it will not level most buildings, but can destroy roomsinside a building while causing very little collateral damage. This

munition is effective against softer targets.Today, Excalibur and GMLRS provide BCT commanders all-

weather, day and night responsive, precision strike capabilities onplanned and unplanned targets in all terrain — PGMs that areorganic to a brigade or readily available in the ground force. In thenear-future, PAM will bring an additional precision strike capability— attack moving targets — to the BCT. Together, they providecommanders precision effects and range options and reducecollateral damage and logistics burden.

The field artillery continues to work on future precision indirectfire as voiced by the current Chief of FA, Major General Vangjel,“As your fire supporters, we are totally committed to giving youthe precision strike capabilities you need — we won’t let you down.”

MG (Retired) David C. Ralston served as the chief of field artilleryand commanding general of Fort Sill, Okla., from August 2005 to September2007 when he retired. During his tenure as chief of field artillery, heaccelerated the fielding of guided multiple-launch rocket system (GMLRS)unitary and Excalibur in CENTCOM after combat commanders issued urgentneeds statements for the munitions. He also served as director, ForceManagement, G3, the Pentagon, Washington, DC; assistant chief of stafffor operations in Kosovo; and commander, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery,Fort Hood, Texas. He earned an M.A. from Central Michigan Universityand was an Army senior service fellow at Harvard University. Currently,he is director of government liaison with Stanley Associates, and a partnerin TDRS Consulting in Lawton, Okla.

Patrecia Slayden Hollis, until her retirement in late 2007, served asthe editor of Field Artillery for 20 years and as the first editor of Fires.She has interviewed more than 80 senior U.S. and international militaryleaders, one of her most recent with (then) LTG Raymond T. Odierno,commander, Multinational Corps-Iraq, “2007 Surge of Ground Forces inIraq — Risks, Challenges, and Successes,” published in the March-April2008 Fires. In 2006, she won the six-state Katie Award and statue fromthe Dallas Press Club for her interview with USMC LTG John F. Sattler,commander of U.S. and coalition forces during the “Second Battle ofFallujah — Urban Operations in a New Kind of War,” published in theMarch-April 2006 Field Artillery, among other writing awards. She holdsan M.A. from George Washington University.

The authors extend their gratitude to the Fort Sill Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) Capabilities Managers (TCMs) for Cannon andRockets and Missiles for their excellent support in writing this article.

M31 GMLRS unitary — Fired by the M270A1MLRS launcher and the M142 HIMARS, GMLRSunitary has been highly successful in Iraq andAfghanistan. It has a 200-pound preformedfragmentation warhead and a range of from 15 to70 kilometers. To date, more than 1,000 IMU-guided,GPS-aided GMLRS have been fired in Iraq andAfghanistan since its initial limited 2005 fielding inIraq. Many of these rockets were fired safely withimpact within 200 meters of friendly troops.

Its original primary target sets are self-propelled and towed howitzers, logistics sites,command posts, and radars and other non-armored targets. In CENTCOM, it has beenemployed effectively in congested urbanenvironments against concrete buildings orstructures, intersections, deep-buried IEDs, andhouse-borne IEDs. The launcher parks, lays, aims,and fires the rockets in as fast as five-secondsalvos, automatically programming each rocket toits coordinate.

SGT Andrew D. Pendracki, USMC

Marines from the 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines fire a Guided Multiple-Launch RocketSystem from a High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System in Iraq.


When picturing urban operations,tanks, large cities, and tightquarters may come to mind. Although

urban operations are prevalent in modern warfare,the U.S. Army actually received a glimpse ofoperations in this type of environment 163 yearsago during the Mexican War.

The battle of Monterrey, which occurred 19-24September 1846 gave U.S. forces a taste of cityfighting and allowed them to develop tactics whichwould be used in future conflicts.

General Zachary Taylor, the future 12thPresident of the United States, led an Army of6,000 Soldiers on a trek to Monterrey, starting inMatamoros in June 1846. Accompanied by TexasRangers, the group used the Rio Grande for partof the journey with most of the infantry “sent toCamargo via steamers, while the artillery anddragoons traveled overland,” wrote Stephen A.Carney, in his U.S. Army Center for Military Historybrochure Gateway South, The Campaign forMonterrey. In all, it took three months for the U.S.forces to reach Monterrey.

“The city of Monterrey was a veritable fortress.Its buildings were made of stone, with flat-toppedroofs and straight streets, making each house astrongpoint,” stated John S.D. Eisenhower in hisbook So Far From God. In addition, the city hadnumerous fortifications at critical points aroundtown. The largest was “an uncompleted cathedral, known to theAmericans as the Citadel or the Black Fort because of its dark,thirty-foot-high stone walls ...,” wrote Carney, who also noted thatit could hold 400 Mexican soldiers and about 30 guns. In all, Carneyestimated that more than 7,300 Mexicans manned positions aroundthe city.

When they reached the outskirts of the city, the Army was splitinto two sections: General William Worth would lead half into thewestern sector of Monterrey, and General Taylor would lead therest into the eastern sector.

Worth’s forces were the first to be engaged as they clashedwith the Mexican cavalry in the western end of the city on 21September. Some of the American forces took up a defensiveposition behind a fence, which proved to be a winning tactic inthe battle. Worth’s men defeated the 200-men Mexican cavalry in

THE BATTLE OF MONTERREY

only 20 minutes and went on to take Federation Hill with fewcasualties.

Things didn’t go as easily for Taylor’s group on the easternfront that day. In order to reach the city from that side, the Americanshad to cross about 500 yards of open ground where they would beexposed to artillery from the Citadel and another fortification, LaTeneria (tannery).

“In one concerted effort, the regiments rushed across the levelground toward the city. Exposed to artillery fire the entire time, theybroke into smaller groups to avoid taking heavy casualties,” wroteCarney. “Once inside the city, the units became further isolatedand lost all semblance of cohesion.”

The city’s narrow streets were difficult to navigate, and Mexicaninfantrymen fired down at the Americans from notches cut into thebuildings’ flat roofs. Hearing the gunfire, Taylor sent in more

Urban OperationsDuring the

Mexican War

Gateway South - The Campaign for Monterrey, U.S. Army Center of Military History


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

reinforcements, and the U.S. forces wereable to clear La Teneria.

The next day, Worth’s forces continuedpushing into the city and clearedIndependence Hill and Obispado (Bishop’sPalace) while Taylor’s forces rested andplanned their next attack, according toCarney.

On 23 September, house-to-housesweeps of Monterrey started. Using lessons


learned from thefirst day of fighting,the Soldiersavoided the streetsand maneuveredthrough thehouses.

“Using picksand crowbars, themen would beatholes in thecommon walls andtoss six-poundshells, with fusesset, into the nextbuilding,” wroteEisenhower. “The

explosion would wipe out what Mexicantroops were on the bottom floor ... andthe troops would then rush up the stepsto the rooftop.”

Although it took a lot of time to cleareach building this way, the tactic workedwell, according to Carney, and Mexicansoldiers retreated towards the city’s centralplaza. Mexican General Pedro de Ampudiathen realized he had no escape route and

Chris Hudgison, an editorial intern withInfantry Magazine from Columbus State Universityin Columbus, Ga., contributed to this article.

Gateway South - The Campaign for Monterrey, U.S. Army Center of Military History

National Archives Prints and Photographs Division

began proposing terms for a surrender.In the three days of fighting, casualties

on both sides were high; the U.S. forceslost an estimated 120 killed, 368 wounded,and 43 missing while the Mexicans had367 killed and wounded.

Despite the high casualties, the battlewas a great success for the U.S. Army,according to Carney.

“For the third time in four months, ithad faced a numerically superior enemyfighting from well-established defensivepositions, only to emerge victorious,” hewrote. “The battle at Monterrey alsoprovided practical experience in urbancombat. As the war progressed, moreoperations would occur in heavily populatedareas. The need to avoid street by streetadvances and instead to burrow throughthe walls of buildings would becomeprinciples that U.S. forces would resort toagain later in this and future conflicts.”

A painting depicts the fighting that occurred on the third day of the battle.

As a platoon leader in A Company, Task Force 2-7 Cavalry, I participatedin the battle of Fallujah in November 2004. My story encompasses the triumph, tragedy, and cumulative effects of this battle on the 35 Soldiers

of 1st Platoon.Fallujah became a breeding ground for the growing insurgency in the fall of

2003, its streets consistently taking the lives of the Soldiers and Marines whoventured in. Following the massacre of four contractors in March 2004, a majoroperation was ordered to quell this insurgent stronghold. This, however, did notgo through due to the well laid defenses of the insurgent opposition. Over thecourse of the following eight months, Fallujah turned into the safe haven, housingnotable figures such as Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi and many of his commanders.After the USMC’s success in the Battle of An-Najaf against Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Armyin August 2004, notably due to select 1st Cavalry Division task forces, it was anatural result for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to specifically ask for 2-7 CAVin the assault into Fallujah in November 2004.

Alpha Company, 2-7 CAV had the highest of morale following its success in theBattle of Najaf, resulting in numerous awards for valor. I stepped into AlphaCompany at the end of the battle, following two platoon leaders’ dismissals. Havingto reestablish the validity of an officer in the Soldiers’ minds, as well as fight thedaily fight, did not prove as easy as the vignettes from my Military Science classes.As I gained the trust of the NCOs and Soldiers over the ensuing three months, wesaw our battalion moving towards the realization that we would be soon assaultingFallujah. All I had known previously of the city were stories that had filtered backto me while at Fort Benning of four Blackwater contractors being mutilated andhung on a bridge in the city. I had no idea that a few months later I would be amongthe first Americans to stand on that bridge since that fateful event.

The first rumors about Operation Phantom Fury started reaching us towardsthe end of September 2004. We were doing our daily 14-hour plus patrols aroundthe rural Taji area. The next thing we knew, our battalion went to fire Bradleygunnery, and my Soldiers were starting to talk about the possibility of anotherbattle. My most memorable time during our week at gunnery was talking withabout 10 of my Soldiers. Looking back, my tone of anticipation to fulfill my childhooddreams of combat was ridiculous to this audience of veterans of the recent conflictin Najaf. One of my squad leaders came up to me later, and we had a gooddiscussion about our Soldiers’ reactions to my high level of eagerness. All ofthose Soldiers knew they would have to fight; that boyhood luster of war thatthese 19 year olds felt when they first arrived in country was replaced with a deepunderstanding of the moral, mental, and physical risks that combat held.

BBBBBAAAAATTLETTLETTLETTLETTLE OFOFOFOFOFFFFFFALLALLALLALLALLUJUJUJUJUJAHAHAHAHAH

November 2004CPT DANIEL KILGORE


Soldiers with A Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, move tactically as they enterand clear an objective during combat operations in Fallujah 9 November 2004.Photos by SFC Johancharles Van Boers

After gunnery, we continued ourpatrolling for a short time as our orderschanged multiple times and the timeline totravel to Camp Fallujah moved left and right.Soon we received our official warning orderas well as a few new Soldiers including anew platoon sergeant, who hit the groundrunning. He helped me and the squadleaders get a great handle on all ourrequirements and assignments of keypositions. He put together all the neededlogistics and operational requirements forthe upcoming battle within days of takingover. This took so much of a burden off me.If he hadn’t been there, I would have beenbogged down with this along with theplanning the company leadership wasconducting.

The initial intelligence reports wereceived about the enemy situation inFallujah were quite overwhelming. Anestimated 3,000 anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) weresaid to be operating in the city. This numberincluded multitudes of foreign fighters,disloyal Iraqi Security Forces, well-trainedfighters from around Iraq, anddisenfranchised local Iraqis who were justtired of the occupation. We expected theenemy to use complex ambushes usingdebris for obstacles in combination withimprovised explosive devices (IEDs) anddirect fire ambushes. The risk was also highfor well-trained snipers to be operating inFallujah like the unit had seen in Najaf.

My company’s mission was for TeamApache (the initial main effort) to attack todestroy enemy forces in zone to a majorroute within the city to enable the attack ofTask Force 3/1. Team Cougar, the tankcompany to the east, would also attack southto protect our flank. Subsequently, TeamApache would attack to seize our mainobjective, and then Team Cougar wouldattack to another objective to facilitate thedestruction of the enemy by RegimentalCombat Team-1 (RCT-1). The rules ofengagement (ROE) briefed by the chain ofcommand were to engage anything in thecity that appeared to be a threat. This ROEallowed the troops in the fight to use theirown discretion, freeing Soldiers from anyhesitancy in engaging targets (it wouldprove to be very beneficial, as theinsurgents were unafraid to fake surrenderor death, and then attempt to kill thoseSoldiers or Marines nearest them).

We arrived in Camp Fallujah on 3November and knew we would have to wait

a while before we began our upcomingoperation. The ensuing days were againfilled with a constantly changing timelineas to when we were to enter the city. Wefilled the days with platoon and individualequipment preparation, close quarterscombat (CQC) flow drills, and further missionplanning. My company commander issuedthe PLs the final order, and we all were soonlocked down from outside communicationas D-day was set for 8 November.

From the imagery my commander gaveme, I had trouble visualizing the narrow,winding streets around the cemetery in thenorth of the city through which my platoonwas to maneuver. Thankfully, our S-2obtained UAV footage of our entire route aswell as our first objective. This footagehighlighted the difficulty we would face inmaneuvering through the streets in thenorthern sector of the city.

The insurgents only attacked onceduring our time in the camp. They fired arocket from just on the other side of thecamp walls, and it exploded right near oneof our cement bunkers. It was unfortunatethat a Soldier happened to be sleeping in it,probably the safest place he could havebeen, when a small piece of shrapnel flewinto the bunker and killed him.

On 7 November, Task Force 2-7 movedfrom Camp Fallujah to our tactical assemblyarea just a few kilometers north of Fallujah.We staged our vehicles in a company coiland waited while targets within the city were

serviced with indirect fire and close airsupport. At this time, we started receivingattachments: some Special Operationssnipers, our joint tactical air controllers(JTACs), and embedded media personnel.We waited for at least 16 hours here,watching hundreds of explosions, as the AirForce and artillery batteries destroyedpossible strongholds and vehicle-borneIEDs.

Once the Marines from TF 3-1 breachedthe minefield in the vicinity of the trainstation just north of the city, our assaultcommenced. Once we were to our respectivenorth-south avenues of approach, weturned south and moved along our routes.Unfortunately, 1st Platoon was tasked withmoving along a route circumventing thecemetery and winding through a tightneighborhood. With the destroyed vehiclesand scattered debris as well as narrow,winding streets, it took us at least an hourto move less than a kilometer in our Bradleyfighting vehicles (BFV). I ended up leadingour formation because of the trouble theother vehicles had with the navigation inthis restrictive urban terrain. While waitingfor my Bravo Section to catch up to us, Iwas scanning through my BFV’sCommander’s Independent Viewer andspotted a three-man RPG team 75 metersaway attempting to maneuver on my section.Our thermal sights and 25mm HE roundsquickly ended the threat, the company’s firstcontact with the enemy in Fallujah.


A Bradley fighting vehicle from A Company, 2-7 Cavalry, provides cover for dismounted Soldiersand fires at insurgents during combat operations in Fallujah 9 November 2004.

Our vehicles finally made it to our first objective with minimalcontact and pushed on to our primary objective. On our way to it,our CO stopped us at a major intersection, as we had to wait foranother unit to get into its position. During this six-hour wait, asthe sun rose, the enemy came out in droves. At least eight differentRPG teams began firing from all around our positions, and we startedthe game of cat and mouse — our BFVs firing as they ran betweenthe alleyways and roof tops.

Our primary objective was a school and, as a result, had an openplay yard surrounded by open hallways with doors of theclassrooms facing the inside. The battalion S-2 templated that thisschool-complex would be a command and control center for theenemy. As a result, we were expecting a knock-down-drag out,door-to-door fight. Instead the insurgents had retrograded, andagain we faced almost no resistance. The only contact at our primaryobjective was when one of my SAW gunners spotted twoinsurgents on a rooftop of the objective and quickly killed them.(The photo on page 26 was taken just before this moment.)

When we finished clearing the schoolhouse, we still had twomore buildings on our objective to clear; however, we were unableto move to them because of a big wall that separated the mainschool from the other buildings. Luckily, a tank from our sisterplatoon was on the other side and crashed a hole through it so wecould pass. After clearing the last building, again with no contact,we set up a quick defense, orienting our fires south, and the majorityof the platoon quickly went into priorities of work and went tosleep. It was difficult for us to try to stay awake after 36hours of continuous operations.

Alpha Company’s 2nd Platoon found one insurgent inits last building on the objective. This large open-air buildingheld more than 80 rounds of 82mm mortar rounds, explosivemaking materials, and multiple RPGs. Just outside thebuilding, 2nd Platoon found a fairly new BMW. Upon furtherinspection from the outside of the vehicle, the Soldiersdiscovered the doors were lined with wires on the inside.When we had our attached USMC combat engineers inspectit, they found more than 200 pounds of explosives in thetrunk. Although there was no resistance on the objective,we realized then that the building was definitely used at onepoint as an insurgent facilitation and cache site.

Once the company’s defense was set, we started to receiveaccurate mortar fire every 10-20 minutes. One round evenpenetrated the roof of the building we were in and lodged inthe cement floor unexploded. Half my platoon wouldprobably have been killed if it had exploded.

Shortly thereafter, my battalion commander and S-3 cameto our objective to gain a view of the situation on the ground.I met up with them and escorted them to my companycommander’s vehicle, which we had positioned in the centerof the objective a couple hundred meters away from a largewater tower (which we soon determined was an enemy targetreference point). With them came embedded mediapersonnel, and I was immediately snatched for a quickinterview at the side of my commander’s vehicle. Only a fewsentences into the discussion, a mortar round landed 30meters in front of me with the reporter in between me and theexplosion. This was another close call; the reporter caughtthe shrapnel from the blast, shielding me from any harm.

After he was treated and evacuated out of the city, I focused onsurveying the platoon’s and company’s positions. I went to thetwo-story building located at the southeast of the objective. I metup there with the JTACs and snipers who had set up their positions.They were conducting counter-sniper operations, but they keptcomplaining about their fields of fire being disrupted by the largetrees in a park to our south. I spoke with the NCO in charge, and wespotted a building two blocks to the east that was three storieshigh. We were currently in the periphery of the city, and there werenot many buildings that were over two stories. This building wouldafford them excellent visibility and fields of fire to the south.

I went back to my company commander, and we talked abouthow this could give us some more stand-off from the insurgentswho loved to maneuver in close during dawn and dusk. He told meto take my Soldiers and clear the building. The snipers and combatcontrollers could ride in the BFVs up to the building. I maneuveredwith two squads dismounted, with our BFVs in support, then clearedthe building’s three floors. When we were finished I called back tomy platoon sergeant, and he started loading up the snipers totransport them. When they were loading up, an RPG impacted nearthem injuring one of the snipers and a Marine captain who was anLNO with our TF. Both had to be evacuated due to their injuries.

Once the rest of the snipers and combat controllers came to thebuilding, they prepared their positions while we defended thebottom floor. We stayed there the rest of the night, listening totheir sniper rifles engaging targets.


Soldiers with A Company, 2-7 Cavalry maneuver to their objective during combatoperations in Fallujah 9 November 2004.

Early the next morning, we moved out from our objective as wehad completed the battle handover to the Marines from Task Force3/1. We drove back to our task force assembly area, refueled, andrefit ourselves for our follow-on mission. Our CO, in the meantime,received our new order. For the next mission, we pushed furthersouth up to right behind where Comanche Company was and headedwest. We cleared these main routes and cleared the two main bridgesconnecting the city across the Euphrates. We brought with usnumerous Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Soldiers and aSpecial Operations representative to reconnoiter for IEDs emplacedalong these bridges.

We encountered a small contingent of enemy fighters while wewere in the middle of inspecting the “Brooklyn Bridge,” the nowinfamous bridge where the Blackwater employees’ mangled bodieswere hung after they were dragged through the streets of Fallujahjust months before. With two of our squads and a Bradley section,we quickly neutralized the enemy. We then headed south to the“George Washington Bridge.” Here, 1st Platoon again inspectedfor possible IEDs. Our company then set up an area defense in twotall buildings adjacent to the bridge to settle down for the night andget some rest.

“It is the secret of the guerrilla force that, to be successful, theymust hold the initiative, attack selected targets at a time of theirown choosing and avoid battle when the odds are against them.”

— Sir Robert Thompson, Malaya, 1966

Our next mission was to come back to a main north-southrunning route and continue the push south. We spent the next 30hours sitting on this road while Comanche Company, in front of us,was pushing further south as well. After sitting in our vehicles fora few hours more (having been ordered not to dismount), weconducted survivability drills and moved around to avoid beingdecisively engaged. However, this soon became insignificant asthe insurgents easily maneuvered on us, firing mortar rounds andnumerous RPG rounds from narrow alleyways and windows.

Early the next morning, we pushed further south, and as our leadplatoon turned west again, we found ourselves in the middle of acomplex ambush with intersecting fields of fire. My platoonsergeant’s BFV was hit in thedriver’s side, with thedriverj u s tnarrowlyescaping the round thatflew a few inchesunderneath him and into theengine block. All the while,every vehicle in my platoonstarted to engage multiple targets asthey kept presenting themselves in alleyways andin windows. Meanwhile, as my CO’s vehicle turned,an insurgent fired an RPG into the rear of his BFV. Hehad two JTACs and our attached PSYOPs team in the troopcompartment. The round went through an interpreter (killinghim instantly), tore through the team leader’s left arm, andflew underneath my CO’s feet in the turret, all while sprayingspall and shrapnel into everyone in the vehicle. All we heard

over the radio was “5 this is 6, I’m hit.” I quickly scanned aheadand saw where his vehicle was and watched for anyone to react. Isaw the driver pop out of his hatch and open the troop door andstumble back at the sight. My section of BFVs moved around hisvehicle and dismounted two squads for security as we began topull the casualties out.

The CO’s driver was pulling out the most seriously injured whenmy medic and another Soldier arrived and began to triage and movethem, all while hundreds of rounds were being exchanged with theenemy all around them. It is a miracle no one else was wounded aswe transported the casualties in the middle of the enemy’s kill zone.If we hadn’t had both our rifle squads on the ground engagingtargets and also the BFV sections firing their 25mm HE in support,we would have certainly had many more casualties. Once we movedthe casualties into a BFV, we evacuated them to a linkup point withthe battalion’s medic section.

Because my platoon sergeant’s BFV was barely running and theCO’s vehicle was also severely damaged, the battalion had us moveback to the TF assembly area. Here, we refitted and refueled again,and within a few hours, we were back in the city waiting for thecompany ahead of us to conduct another movement to contact.We then moved only one to two blocks in 24 hours.

The next morning, after seeing insurgents dodging in and out ofalleyways and trading fire with them all night, I had had enough.Although the previous guidance was not to dismount, the currentsituation with our large BFVs being static made the decision todismount a clear one. The worst thing a mechanized unit can do isbe static in an urban environment (even doing survivability drills,we were still relatively in the same location, as it is hard to hide aBradley in the middle of a four-lane road). One of my section leaderscalled me and said he saw insurgents running back and forth froma car parked in an alley, and it looked like they had a cache inside it.I requested that we dismount and received permission from the XO


A Soldier with 2-7 Cavalry keeps an eye out for insurgentsduring combat operations in Fallujah.

who was filling in for our CO at the time. Wewere parked next to a mosque from wherewe had received fire throughout the night,and I decided to start clearing buildingsbeginning with the house next to it. We setup a support by fire with my Bradley section,dismounted, and cleared the house. Herewe found three sleeping, military-aged maleswith IED-making materials. We quicklydetained them and sent them out to myplatoon sergeant. We then moved into andcleared the mosque. From the second floor,we spotted the car that my section leaderhad reported earlier and fired 40mm roundsinto it. Multiple secondary explosionsoccurred and hundreds of rounds cookedoff from the resulting fire. It was such alarge amount of explosions that my platoonsergeant, who couldn’t see us due to a wallin front of the mosque, called me on the netand asked how many insurgents we were incontact with.

The platoon continued our clearance ofbuildings heading back north. We wentthrough two more buildings and found moreinsurgents, all of them sleeping with theirweapons and equipment stashed in hidingpositions. The last house we cleared as aplatoon should have been a foreshadowingto us as we captured two middle-aged men,one of whom was frantically making a phonecall on his cellular phone. Within minutes,my platoon sergeant, still on the main road,called me on the net and said he had aninsurgent running into a small house on theeast side of the road. He said to send asquad, and he would take it to where he couldoverwatch its clearance of the building. Ihad two squads handling over 20 detaineesin total and sent my 3rd Squad.

Third Squad cleared thefirst building and, for reasonsunknown, decided to keepmoving east along a side road,clearing more houses withoutsupport from the BFVs and notkeeping radio contact withthem. I next heard a largebarrage of fire and thenreceived the call from thesquad leader over the net,yelling for help. I took my 2ndSquad, and we ran as fast aswe could to where we heardthe fire. As we ran up to theside street, my BFV turned infront of us and pulled up tofour Soldiers lying in themiddle of the street.

Third Squad had gone intothe third house down thestreet. The first room was anopen kitchen with a doorwayleading into the rest of thehouse. The Alpha team leaderentered this doorway,throwing a grenade into theroom first. The next thing heknew, there were at least eightinsurgents who opened firewith their automatic AK-47s and kicked hisgrenade back at him. He only got a fewrounds off by the time he was cut down bytheir fire through the thin walls and hit byhis own grenade. Although taking tworounds in the arm and serious leg injuries,the TL continued firing from lying in thedoorway. Another Soldier pulled him fromthe doorway and started to pull him out ofthe house into the courtyard. As he was

pulling his TL into thestreet, this Soldier wasshot by a sniper whowas in a two-storybuilding across thestreet. Meanwhile,another Soldier movedtoward the side of thehouse and threw agrenade at 10 insurgentswho were reinforcingfrom the rear of thebuilding. With thisgrenade and fire from hisrifle, he neutralized thereinforcements. He cameback to the front of thehouse and, with the

M249 gunner, placed suppressive fire intothe house’s doorways so the rest of theirsquad could retrograde from theoverwhelming fire of the enemy.

As the rest of the squad moved out intothe street and into the adjacent house’swalled courtyard, the M249 gunner tookthree rounds from the enemy snipers thatwere located in the building across thestreet. The specialist dragged him intothe street where the two other woundedSoldiers were lying. Having just beenwounded by an insurgent grenade himself,he then lay down next to his fellowbrothers and opened fire. He firedmagazine after magazine (taking them fromhis fallen comrades as he ran out) and allhis M203 grenades into the building withthe snipers across the street. As I ran upto the situation, seeing my Soldiers in acrossfire, I immediately had 2nd Squadopen fire into the building with the snipers.It was interesting to see that some Soldiersdid not immediately take action, as they wereso shocked to see many of their comradeswounded ahead of them. The squad leaderand I had to yell at a few Soldiers to getthem to take action.


SPC Jose Velez prepares to enter and clear an objective duringcombat operations in Fallujah 9 November 2004.

A view from the gunner’s site in a Bradley fighting vehicle as Soldierswith 2-7 Cavalry navigate the streets of Fallujah 9 November 2004.

My Bradley gunner, who was parked adjacent to all of this,could not gain communications with us via FM. He opened hishatch and came out on to the turret silhouetting himself on a nine-foot-high Bradley in the middle of the fight. I shouted at him wherethe threat was in the building across the street from us, and he fellback into his hatch and opened fire with his 25mm cannon. WithM203 grenades, 2nd Squad’s fire and the BFV’s 25mm HE rounds,we quickly neutralized the enemy threat in the building across thestreet. As we started to carry our wounded for evacuation, wereceived rifle fire and grenades from the original house and sustainedtwo more casualties. Two of us threw grenades and returned fireagain, but I determined that we could not gain enough fire superioritywith only five Soldiers left unharmed; we needed to evacuate allour casualties (numbering eight now). We then started loading ourcasualties into the back of my BFV. Once we piled them and mymedic into the Bradley, we retrograded back down the street as ourtank platoon’s lead tank rolled in to demolish the buildings with its120mm rounds.

While reconsolidating back in the house with our detainees, Igot a call that there were seven people exiting the back of the housewhere my squad had been ambushed. We ran back, hoping for alittle retribution, but these young men (the youngest beingaround 13 years old) were waving a large white sheet to surrender.We immediately gestured and yelled at them to strip off their clothes(suicide bombers had already killed Marines in other parts of thecity) and then detained them. My platoon then took all the detaineesthat we had not sent up to the holding area (now numbering over20) and brought them into the mosque. We waited here until ourBFVs returned from the casualty evacuation and then took thedetainees to the makeshift holding facility the Marines hadestablished. This is when my Bradley gunner told me we had lostthe M249 gunner, SPC Jose Velez. For some reason, this didn’treally hit me for a long time; maybe it was because I had thoughtwe had possibly lost a few more Soldiers or because I knew thefight wasn’t over yet and could easily get much worse.


At the time this article waswritten, CPT Daniel Kilgorewas attending the ManeuverCaptains Career Course atFort Benning, Ga. He iscurrently assigned to the 7thSpecial Forces Group(Airborne).

After this firefight, the battalion pushed Comanche Company,the TF reserve, forward of our company’s position, and weestablished a strongpoint in a house on a major intersection. Fromhere, we ran satellite patrols in and around the area, searchingbuildings and guarding the area to the rear of our TF’s lead elements.After having been in the lead, receiving many casualties, and thenbeing pulled back to the duty of rear guard, my Soldiers’ moraledropped dramatically. We ended the battle with this mission andthus began the long road to recovery for our Soldiers who hadbeen injured, physically and mentally.

Over the next five months of our deployment, my Soldiers hadserious bouts of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. I had read aboutthe symptoms (severe depression, insomnia, and lack of motivation)prior to being deployed but was shocked to see them in real life.Through counseling with our battalion chaplain and consultingwith psychologists, my Soldiers would take months to recover (andsome continue to deal with PTSD after facing additionaldeployments).

At the end of the Battle of Fallujah, the members of 1st Platoonearned, in total, two Silver Stars, three Bronze Stars with ‘V’ device,four Army Commendation Medals with ‘V’ device, and nine PurpleHearts. CNN, the History Channel, and three major publicationstold about the tenacity of 1st Platoon’s men.

Key Lessons:1. Infantry fighting vehicles and tanks are unbelievably effective

in urban terrain at penetrating defenses and gaining a footholddeep in enemy-held terrain. However, due to the three-dimensionalterrain of the urban environment, it is paramount to keep the vehiclesconstantly mobile and have dismounted infantry. They can thenmutually support each other. Otherwise, the enemy will easilymaneuver using the terrain to their advantage to destroy thevehicles.

2. With dismounted infantry and vehicles in support in urbanoperations, it is extremely important to have good communications

between the two. This willmaximize firepower, preventfratricide, and reduce theprobability of one of thetwo being ambushed.

3. After a unit loses aSoldier or sustains manycasualties, it is important tolet them grieve, but not forlong. Too much time cancause Soldiers to dwell ontheir losses and lose focusduring combat operations.

Soldiers from A Company, 2-7 Cavalry, prepare to enter and clear an objective in Fallujah November 9, 2004.

IIIIINSURGENTNSURGENTNSURGENTNSURGENTNSURGENT A A A A ATTACKTTACKTTACKTTACKTTACK INININININ R R R R RAMADIAMADIAMADIAMADIAMADI


CPT EDWARD CLARK III

Platoon Leader Recounts Urban Engagement

On 15 December 2006, a single shot rang out from the rubbled buildings in southwest Ramadi, and a youngSoldier crumpled to the ground. This sniper attack was

just one of the many attacks that took place in this area of operations,and in that sense, may seem insignificant. However, it had atremendous impact on my platoon. The incident is illustrative ofthe type of engagements typical of guerilla, urban, or insurgencywarfare and demonstrates some of the problems inherent in fightingin such an environment. It also illustrates some strengths andweaknesses of my platoon on that particular day.

I was the platoon leader of 1st Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion,26th Infantry Regiment, and we were detached from our parentcompany and assigned to Team Bulldog (B Company, 1st Battalion,37th Armor), which was about 11 months into a 15-month tourwhen we arrived. We lived on a combat outpost (COP) that was acluster of homes that had been seized and transformed into a baseof operations three months before our arrival. Our days here were ahaze of endless area clearances, movements to contact, and sit-and-wait ambushes highlighted by almost daily attacks on our COP.

At this point, we had not made any of the significant intelligenceor public relations breakthroughs that would follow in only a fewmonths with what would become known as the Awakening. (The

Awakening was a movement in the Al Anbar province, led by localsheiks, that would transform Ramadi almost overnight from anintense war zone to a model of progress and cooperation.) We hadfound no strong allies in the community; we were operating in aninformational vacuum. We knew that there was a city surroundingus and that there were people in that city who wanted to kill us. Wedid not know whether the majority of the people we talked witheach day were our attackers, were protecting our attackers, or werejust too scared or too ignorant to stand up to them. It was into thisenvironment that my platoon walked out each day, hoping to find acache or an informant or just someone who believed that we weretrying to help.

Ramadi, which is almost entirely made up of Sunni Muslims, wassaid to be the most dangerous town in Iraq. As both the Iraqi Armyand the residents themselves would tell us, those who lived inRamadi did not suffer under Saddam Hussein. Many lived in

A Soldier with B Company, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment,provides security during a mission in Selegh, Iraq.

SGT Jeffrey Alexander


mansions with every modern conveniencebut now had no electricity, heat in the winter,or running water. Trying to convince themthat we were there to help them was difficult.They associated the decline in their standardof living with the coalition invasion and,more recently, the development of COPs,which were usually homes that had beenseized but then rented to the U.S. Army rightin the middle of their neighborhoods. Theseoutposts naturally drew fire from insurgents,who were perfectly happy to see our usuallyheavy-handed response, which by the timemy platoon arrived, had reduced almostevery building within 100 meters of the COPto rubble.

Most of our patrols were censusmissions. We entered houses, tookphotographs of the residents to add to ourdatabase, searched for evidence ofinsurgent activity, and usually foundnothing. In December, our COP was beingattacked regularly, and we were frequentlyfinding or hitting IEDs as well. We were not,however, being decisively engaged as wewalked the streets. We attributed this to theinsurgents’ reluctance to hit us when theyknew we were in a position to maneuveragainst them. We varied our routes andpatrol times as much as possible within oursmall area of operations. We moved quickly,and we used smoke and armored vehiclesto cover our movements. In short, weremained aggressive.

We had been shot at on patrol severaltimes, but it was never accurate or sustainedfire. On 15 December, my platoon wasengaged for the first time in a well-plannedattack by a determined enemy. We werereturning from a patrol conducted only afew blocks east of our COP. The day beforean Iraqi Army soldier and a U.S. Soldier fromanother platoon had been shot whileemplacing wire on our outer perimeter. Wewere attempting to track down anyinformation on the shooter by visiting thehomes around the point where we deducedthe shot had come. As usual, the localsclaimed ignorance, but my interpreter wasable to get several children to tell us thatthe sniper had let the neighborhood knowthat he was going to attack and to stay offthe streets. They also gave us a descriptionof the sniper and his comrades. We hadcollected all the information I thought wewere going to get and began the walk backhome.

We walked back with 3rd Squad in the

lead, 2nd Squad in the center and 1st Squadtrailing. The Bradleys were one block to thesouth. Ideally, I would have had one of themto the north side and one to the south, orboth on our street, but the rubble andpotential for IEDs made it difficult and riskyfor vehicles to move to our north. The leadelements of my platoon had begun to crossa no-man’s land of wire, concrete barriersand rubble that separated our COP from theneighbors. Our middle and trail elementswere walking west to east along a residentialstreet that, because of its proximity to theCOP, was only about half inhabited. Therewas no one in the street, which given theinformation we had just received from thechildren made us a little nervous. Someoneremarked over the radio that it seemedespecially quiet. I answered back that Ithought something was about to happen andsaid, “Keep your rifles up and make sureyou throw plenty of smoke when youcross.” It was less than 30 seconds laterthat it happened.

Our area was almost entirely residential,comprised mainly of one or two storyconcrete and stucco homes. Except for theexcessive trash, bullet holes and six-footconcrete walls, it could have been anyneighborhood in America. We came backusing a different street than the one we usedon the way out. Near the COP, there was aone-block-long area that had beencompletely demolished by air strikes. Therewas, in addition to the rubble, a smatteringof large concrete barriers to prevent easyshots into the COP. I never liked that area,but in an attempt to switch up entrancepoints as much as possible, I would use itoccasionally. We usually broke into a jog aswe crossed and used plenty of smoke.

We were moving east in two columns oneach side of the road. I had two Bradleysout that day, which were moving around ourperimeter covering our movement. I gave theorder for one of the Bradleys and our lead

element to throw out some smoke. Just asour lead element began to pass through ourwire, a Soldier was shot passing throughthe smoke screen. It was a single shot, andI, just a few feet ahead of him, initiallythought he had tripped and accidentallydischarged his M249. Then, we began toreceive more gunfire and we realized we wereunder attack.

We were in a terrible position. We hadbegun to weave through the concertina wire,rubble and concrete barriers that surroundedour outpost. This cut us off from ourBradleys, making it impossible for them tocome directly to us to load our casualty.Worse, we were between the enemy and ourBradleys, which rendered their 25mmcannons useless.

As adrenaline kicked in, time sloweddown and for what seemed like minutes —but was probably a couple of seconds — Iwatched my platoon react in textbookfashion. It was as if we were back in Germanyrehearsing our battle drills. If battle drillsbecome a reflex, Soldiers will execute themin combat. Not only does this keep themalive during the first few seconds of contact,I believe it suppresses or replaces fear andtimidity which may otherwise occur; thismomentum then continues throughout thebattle. I found that for most people, just asin athletics, nervousness or fear only lastsa second or two if they are activelyparticipating. I have heard of studies thatsay only a small percentage of combatantsattempt to engage the enemy when underfire. I can’t speak to the entire history ofarmed conflict, but from what I saw on thatday and on the subsequent days wefought in Ramadi, I have to disagree. MySoldiers returned fire in such deafeningmass that, were it not for the rock fragmentsflying from the ground, I would have hadno idea we were still under fire. As it was,I could not see the enemy and had to relyon the points and shots of the men aroundme to deduce their location. In an urbanenvironment, when fighting a smallguerrilla force, it is difficult to discern thedirection of contact, and the attackusually does not last long enough foranyone to pinpoint it. One of the things Ilater came to realize is that every Soldierwants to be the one who saw and killed theenemy. I do not think it is conscious, butespecially among younger Soldiers, there isa tendency to misinterpret the sights andsounds of the battlefield. This may

As adrenaline kicked in, timeslowed down and for whatseemed like minutes — but wasprobably a couple of seconds — Iwatched my platoon react intextbook fashion. It was as if wewere back in Germany rehearsingour battle drills. If battle drillsbecome a reflex, Soldiers willexecute them in combat.


exaggerate their own perceived exposure to danger or their centralityin the conflict. This not only makes it difficult to discern realitywhen listening to a bunch of Soldiers tell war stories, it makes itdifficult for the leader to filter this out and get a grasp of the truesituation while he is on the ground (especially as he tries to suppresssome of those same tendencies himself).

There were several acts of heroism that day, as Soldiers riskedtheir lives to protect and move the wounded Soldier to relativesafety. Almost as soon as he hit the ground, the Soldier behind himemptied his own magazine, ran to the wounded Soldier’s side, pickedup his SAW, and emptied all of its rounds in the direction of thecontact. He then, without regard for his own safety, covered himwith his own body and tried to move him to cover. He was soonassisted by our medic and a few more of his squad mates.

I screamed over the ICOM radio to give orders to my Bradleycommanders. They could only make out bits and pieces but knewwhat was going on and what they had to do. They had to maneuverand come back around to get in front of us. They popped smokecanisters to help conceal us from the enemy and began theirmovement.

As the Bradleys arrived, one of the gunners said that he couldidentify an enemy position, and the gunners began peppering thatposition. Our COP’s quick reaction force was on the scene withinminutes and were also engaging targets. One of my Bradleys movedto the wounded Soldier’s position, and his squad loaded him inback.

A tank from the quick reaction force (QRF) was blocking theBradley’s only exit, and because of the noise and other radio chatter,

no one could get the message across to the tank’s crew. Finally, Ihad to run over, wave him down, and signal to him to get out of theway.

As the lead elements of my platoon reacted to the contact, therear of our line, which was still a block behind, was attacked by twomen in a car with an assault rifle. The Soldiers reacted quicklythough and killed the attackers.

As is typical of guerrillas in this type of environment, the enemydid not attempt to stand and fight once we gained fire superiority.The QRF vehicles, under the control of our company commander,were able to seal off their retreat and kill three as they tried to flee.Two more were killed as they tried to drop explosives off the back ofa moped. The Iraqi Police brought in a few more that night whowere being treated at the hospital for wounds sustained in thisaction. Since this was the only engagement in the area that day, wewere able to confirm their involvement in the attack.

At the company commander’s order, I moved my Soldiers intothe safety of the COP once the enemy had been sufficientlysuppressed and were being pursued by our armored vehicles.We wanted to stay out and tear through every house withinsmall arms range, but it would have been the wrong move. In filmand during training where there is no real danger, dismountsalways maneuver on the enemy and kill him where he stands.We learned that most of the time, this is not a practical approachin an urban area. It is difficult to maneuver on an enemy thatSoldiers can not pinpoint, and it serves no purpose to haveSoldiers storm into the fray when a Bradley or tank can destroythe enemy. As our commander constantly, and correctly, reminded

us, it was rarely worthrisking the l ives ofdismounted Soldiers tochase after a fleeing enemy.

Our medic had jumped inthe back of the Bradley thatwas evacuating ourwounded Soldier. He brokehis hand and received anenormous gash on his headwhen the Bradley took asharp turn but stillcontinued working on theSoldier until the rampdropped at the medicalstation. The woundedSoldier was given the bestcare possible by our medic,but his wound was tooserious. We learned of hisdeath within an hour, andour lives were changedforever.

When I spoke with thefallen Soldier’s parents thenext day, and later whenthey visited our unit inGermany, they wanted toknow if their son hadsuffered and if had we killedSoldiers from the 1st Armored Division patrol Ramadi in August 2006.

TSgt Jeremy T. Lock, USAF


the men who killed him. They didn’t ask if their son’s death couldhave been avoided. I do not know what I would have told them. Iask myself that question every day.

In the days and months following the attack, I realized that weall had different memories of what happened on the battlefield.The “fog of war” was more intense than I had experienced beforeand was more than I had imagined it would be. I am not sure thatany two of us agreed on the exact direction of the attack ornumber of attackers. This is not abnormal; there were very fewengagements during our tour in which we had a clear idea of the

distance, direction, or depth of our enemy.Several weeks after this attack, we found asniper position on the rooftop of anabandoned building with perfect line of sightto the spot where the Soldier had been shot.There is no way to know for sure if it was theposition used, but the angles match. To myknowledge, that particular house was neverengaged. Whether or not we were shootingat all of the correct buildings, the violencewith which we reacted to the contact surelycaused the enemy to withdraw. The battledrills, which my Soldiers had rehearsed sincethey joined the Army and we had practicedtogether, saved lives when the bullets beganto fly (on that day and in the days to come).The bravery, initiative, and quick thinkingof individual Soldiers made it possible tofight in an ever-changing environment.

When bullets start flying, there is atendency for everyone to try and jump onthe radio at once. Add the noise of thegunfire, which can drown out the voice ofthe sender or overwhelm the ears of thereceiver, and the normal problems that occurwith electronic equipment, and it can be nextto impossible to get a message across inbattle. On top of a strictly enforced andrehearsed radio SOP, leaders at all levelshave to consciously attempt to filter out theexcitement and emotion and communicateclearly and concisely. This is something wedid not do properly. Until that day, despiteall of my live-fire training and previousexperiences, I did not have any idea the extentto which communications can be degraded inthat type of situation.

I often replay the scenes of that day in mymind. What could I have done differently?What will I do differently in the future? Whatwas done right? I should have had my Bradleysin a different position ... I should have hadsystems in place to reduce radio traffic ... Ishould have had more smoke ...

The reality of combat is that a leader willnever get it 100-percent right. He has to do thebest he can with the skills that he has and hopethat his mistakes do not cost the lives of those

around him. Then, he must honestly evaluate the decisions hemade, the weaknesses inherent in his unit, and the realities of combatand devise ways to mitigate the danger.

At the time this article was written, CPT Edward Clark III was astudent in the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. Heserved as an infantry platoon leader in B Company, 1st Battalion, 26thInfantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division. He currently serves as the assistantS3 with the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade CombatTeam, 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colo.

SGT Gary Witte

A team leader with B Company, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, studies a map during amission in Ramadi 4 February 2007.

VICTORY IN AN AL-QAIDA STRONGHOLDSGT JASON G. GEORGECPT MICHAEL H. STARZ

From November 2007 to April2008, the military transitionteam (MiTT) from C Company, 3rd

Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment (3rdBrigade Combat Team, 101st AirborneDivision) and the 1st Battalion, 23rd Brigade,17th Iraqi Army Division successfully appliedthe clear-hold-build counterinsurgencyapproach to achieve victory in southernBaghdad’s former insurgent stronghold ofJanabi Village.

Located at the pre-Flood civilization ofSippar (or Sepharvaim as referenced in theBible), the Janabi tribe served as hosts andoperatives for al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) for thefirst five years of Operation Iraqi Freedom.Helping earn the regional moniker “Triangleof Death,” the Yusifiyah corner of the trianglecaused some of the worst bloodshed forcoalition forces in the war.

Our Deceptively Simple MissionOur mission was to reconcile Janabi

Village; however, the path to that goal wasfraught with hazards. By increasingoperational duration, recognizing thelimitations of U.S. forces and working towarda host-nation solution from the onset, ourcombined units first reconciled and thenbuilt a lasting solution for Janabi Village.

Our Complex EnemySeveral factors significantly contributed

to fomenting insurgency in the Janabi Villagearea. A contributing cause for instability ofthe region was the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority’s summary disbanding of the IraqiArmy and the simultaneous Baathist purge.This, in conjunction with an epidemic ofmisunderstanding regarding counter-insurgency in the U.S. military, primed theregion for turmoil. The Janabi Village area,as part of the greater Yusifiyah area, was aregion in which mid-level officers inSaddam’s favor retired. Baathistparticipation in local government wasstrong, and the Baathist purge caused thecollapse of civil administration in the area.During this period of turmoil, many localsadopted the title of sheikh either byhereditary right or by status in thecommunity, and these individuals attemptedto fill the vacuum caused by the collapse ofthe administration. These self-appointedleaders had little positive effect and provedsusceptible to insurgent recruitment. Thepopulation became dissatisfied with theliberating coalition because of the failure ofessential services, and pro-insurgentsentiments developed as a result.

The 2006 rape and murder of a 14-year-old girl, along with the execution of herfamily and the burning of their home by U.S.Soldiers in the nearby village of Hayy al-Thobat proved to be a major catalystallowing fundamentalist radical forces ofAQI and subsequently Jaysh al-MahdiSh’ia extremists to dominate the region.While the rape-murder had initially beenattributed to local anti-Iraqi forces by theneighbors who had responded to the fire,the news that it had in fact been perpetratedby Americans solidified the Janabi tribalallegiance to AQI in Iraq, enabling the

establishment of a full-fledged trainingfacility in the ruins of ancient Sippar andthe village.

AQI-affiliated forces, discovering theexisting but rudimentary homegrowninsurgent network, capitalized on theirknowledge and materiel resources whileproviding funding, recruiting, andinformation operations assets. The local AQIleadership felt comfortable establishingthemselves southeast of Janabi Village inthe towns of Sa’id Abdullah and Sobahiya.To the southwest, the insurgentsestablished the village of Shubayshen as aholding area for incoming foreign fightersprior to their assignment to insurgent cellsin Baghdad proper. These villages, inconjunction with the Sa’id AbdullahCorridor leading east to Mahmudiyah,formed an essential part of the southern beltof the AQI logistical chain transportingmateriel and personnel into Baghdad proper.

Readily available munitions, foreign andlocal fighters, active tribal support for theinsurgency, negative image of U.S. forcesdue to the acts of a few rogue Soldiers andnational dissatisfaction with the liberationformed a volatile mix. This ultimately resultedin two missing/captured Soldier incidents.Admittedly, the situation was far morecomplex. The impassioned response of bothAmerican and Iraqi forces and the locals tothe incidents further escalated the situation.

The concrete affiliation of the SunniJanabi tribe with AQI resulted in theexpulsion of a portion of the Sh’ia Anbaritribe that lived in the hamlet of Abu Habbaimmediately to the north of the Sippar ruins.Escalating sectarian and tribal tensionsultimately climaxed when impassionedJanabis expelled Anbaris from their homesin 2005, smashing glass and destroyingproperty in a scene akin to the NaziKristallnacht pogrom in November 1938;however, the Janabi incident was on asignificantly smaller scale. This, combinedwith the affiliation of the Anbari tribe to

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A Soldier with the 3rd Battalion, 187th InfantryRegiment provides security during a missionnear Qwesat, Iraq, November 25, 2007.TSgt Adrian Cadiz, USAF

Jaysh al-Mahdi, created a schism between the two tribes coloredby open conflict and mutual harassment. The schism grew wider aslocal Sh’ia migrated to Jaysh al-Mahdi-dominated downtownYusifiyah, displacing Sunnis to outlying rural areas. This exacerbatedthe already dire situation with sectarian issues.

Dangerous TerrainThe Janabi tribe effectively isolated itself and the training facility

by emplacing a thick defensive ring of improvised explosive devices(IEDs) around the village. The improvised minefield made maneuverby friendly forces virtually impossible without heavy Engineer andExplosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) assets to clear roads, orassurances of safety by local leaders along with the physicalpresence of a guide through the net. This proved an effectivedeterrent to coalition and Iraqi operations in the area, leaving air-assault clearance operations as the tactical option with the mostacceptable level of risk. Unfortunately, the institutionalmonomaniacal focus on closing with and destroying the enemyresulted in many clearance-only operations leaving no positivelasting effect on the battlespace by failing to progress to the laterphases.

Friendly State of AffairsAs the war progressed, the air assault clearance operation became

an end instead of a means. Operational planning did not consideranything beyond first order effects. Significant assets werecommitted to operations, exposing Soldiers to risk with no realgains in territory or influence. U.S. forces incorrectly consideredthe fleeting terror instilled in the population by incoming helicopters,along with the ensuing harassment during a search for persons ofinterest, to have a lasting deterrent effect. Unfortunately, whenused in an isolated manner, the air assault clearance operation servedto dehumanize coalition forces and foment unrest among thepopulation. Occasionally, high value individuals would be detainedor caches would be recovered because of an operation; however,on the average, the payoff was not worth the investment. Soldiersacross the Army fundamentally misunderstood and deridedcounterinsurgency and stability and support operations. Thesetheater-wide trends characterized operations in Janabi Village aswell as other areas.

Time and Civil ConsiderationsWe desired speedy resolution of the Janabi problem; however,

we were willing to be patient and let the situation evolve. Attemptingto resolve the situation too rapidly prevents desired effects fromtaking hold. Civil considerations would prove to be an importantfactor that we would focus on in the build phase; however, learningto navigate the human terrain proved essential.

Act 1 – Our Naïve ApproachDuring the October relief-in-place and in early November, Charlie

Company (also called Choppin’ Charlie), 3-187 and 1/23/17 IAconducted three raids into Janabi Village and received enemycontact twice. Each time resulted in finding only a handful of malesin the area. The combined forces could only safely enter the villageon foot from an Iraqi Army battle position due to the mounted anddismounted IEDs suspected to block key avenues of approach.The handful of military age males living in the village indicated the

enemy’s inability to conduct significant offensive operations. Iftrue, this created an opportunity to conduct an extended operationto attempt to do more than simply clear the village. The Iraqi Armycommander informed us that he would not risk stationing apermanent element of Iraqi soldiers in and around the village. Thisnecessitated an unorthodox approach to the tactical problem ofhow to hold the ground once cleared.

We affixed the mantra “not just another air assault” to theoperation that would soon be named Operation Iron Crazyhorse.We knew that continued raids in the style of the air assault clearancewould not effect a permanent solution in Janabi Village, and thatcomplete isolation of the village would never occur due to theability of insurgents to blend into the populace. The larger area ofYusifiyah would never be secure with the dagger of the Janabi tribeat its throat just a kilometer south of the Sh’ia urban area ofdowntown Yusifiyah.

The challenge remained as to who would hold the ground if theIraqi Army refused. Our first answer came instinctively — send us.We will just do it ourselves with or without our partners. TheRakkasans pride themselves as an organization willing to do thetoughest of missions without a second thought. However, we mustresist the temptation to follow this course of action incounterinsurgency operations. The notion that an Americanpresence would solve a historic tactical problem should not gaincredence in the course of action development phase of the militarydecision-making process. Despite the apparent ease and logic ofthe solution from the American perspective, a counterinsurgencyis often counterintuitive. T.E. Lawrence’s driving imperative to letthe Arabs do it their own way meant that Iraqis had to be the onesto secure Janabi Village. The other element was the Iraqi Police, a50-man Sh’ia group that performed only a fraction of its requiredduties. However, the Military Police platoon that served as theirPolice Transition Team (PTT) had recently completed a portion of arecruiting drive in the areas undergoing reconciliation.

We selected 30 of the best Iraqi Police recruits, ostensibly toprepare for a training exercise. These Sunni recruits wouldtemporarily hold the ground with checkpoints hastily emplaced bythe forward support company of 3-187 Infantry. The plan called forU.S. and Iraqi infantry forces to clear the ground with an air assaultwhile Alpha Company, 3rd Special Troops Battalion engineerscleared the routes. Our expectation was that these police recruitswould be able to hold the ground for 36-48 hours while Choppin’encouraged local leaders to emerge from hiding and join thereconciliation movement. We even held out for the possibility thatthe Iraqi Army commander would recant and decide to place hisown forces at the checkpoints. If the checkpoints held, we wouldcontinue clearing the route with the engineers and reinforcing eachcheckpoint with force protection assets.

After establishing the basic maneuver plan for the clearancephase of the village, Choppin’ developed a four-day plan to initiatethe reconciliation between the Janabi and their many enemies. Ifone spoke the word “Janabi” in the Yusifiyah marketplace,schoolchildren would draw their hand across their throat to connotethe murderous nature of the tribe. Although we understood thecomplexity of any progress in reconciliation, we sought to gaugethe effects across tribal, government and Iraqi Army lines. Wesecured tentative buy-in from governmental leaders, who committedin theory to visiting the village once safe. The Iraqi Army and local


tribes, especially the Anbari tribe, scoffedat the possibility of reconciliation in thedays leading up to the operation. For theJanabi, we needed to find the tribal leaders,whose names we knew from intelligencereporting. Unlike all of the other tribes, theJanabi leaders had no contact with othertribal leaders, Iraqi government officials,Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, or coalition forces.We would need to entice them to emerge.

The MiTT medical officer would conducta combined medical engagement (CME) with$30,000 of medical supplies and medicationin the village on the second day of theoperation. We knew the certainty ofsignificant enemy contact and the distinctpossibility of friendly casualties, but wewould have to continue with thereconciliation gestures. Each Soldier wouldhave to suppress any emotions or personalfeelings about providing aid to peopleactively trying to kill him. If successful, weplanned to bring local Nahia governmentleaders and a veterinarian to the village onthe fourth day of the operation todemonstrate the advantages of reconciling.

Key to success would be every Soldier’spersonal understanding of the operation’spurpose and end state. The tone establishedduring the conduct of each raid mustindicate respect for the populace. Buildingmutual respect and dispelling the popularperception of Americans as the root of allevil would be crucial to the reconciliationeffort. At the Soldier level, this requiredrestraint in searching houses andinteracting with males undergoing tacticalquestioning.

Unfortunately, we had difficultyconvincing the Iraqi Army to commit tosupporting anything beyond the clearancephase. In what would become routine, theIraqi Army commander took a vacation onthe eve of the operation. Although highlyregarded as a strict and effective commanderby both Sunni and Sh’ia tribes and by Iraqiand coalition forces, the Iraqi commanderwould not commit to reconciling with JanabiVillage for an additional six months. Hissubordinates included a small butcompetent collection of officers to includefour aggressive maneuver companycommanders and a brilliant battalionoperations officer. Their efforts producedintelligence, and they detained severalJanabi insurgents despite their inability tocontribute to the reconciliation process untilso ordered.

The question of which force (U.S. orhost-nation) has the lead is fundamental toevery operation, discussion, and resourcein a counterinsurgency. U.S. and Iraqi forcesmust come to a mutual understanding priorto initiating any action beyond closed doors.Experience taught us that a subtle nuanceto this issue is to expect the force in the leadto change multiple times during an event.Overall responsibility comes from who isdriving the action. If it is American, then theAmericans with few exceptions need to takethe overall lead. If it is an Iraqi Armydirective, then the opposite applies.However, the shifting lead allows bothfriendly forces to take advantage of theirrespective talents, equipment, andorganization. A night operation with poorillumination might require coalition forcesto take the lead in the navigation to theobjective phase, but a canal crossing on thefinal approach may dictate an Iraqi leadduring the actual assault due to their lighterequipment load. Furthermore, a casualtytaken during initial entry could cause theother force to assume the lead. In contrastto the rest of Choppin’s battlespace, we knewfrom the onset that coalition forces wouldbe in the overall lead in Janabi Village untilthe IA committed to the reconciliation.

The maneuver plan for Crazyhorse Icalled for a platoon air assault with IraqiArmy soldiers to the northeast and east ofthe village. This allowed the combined forceto circumvent the defensive perimeter ofIEDs. Simultaneously, another platoonMiTT would stage vehicles at the Iraqi battleposition (BP) and infiltrate the village

through fields while carefully staying offtrails or paths. The engineers, known asTask Force Iron Claw (TFIC), would use aBP to launch their route clearance of thehard surface and dirt perimeter roads withthe ground assault convoy (GAC) closebehind.

The fighting on Day 1 of the operationwas intense but nothing more thanexpected. The first IED detonated againstthe follow-on mounted forces at a little after0500, and TFIC conducted a controlleddetonation of the last IED of Day 1 around2330 hours. However, the only significantenemy contact occurred at 0953 when thePTT, IPs, and IP recruits received severalsmall arms rounds from the man later knownas “the Janabi Sniper.” The sniper’s firstround struck an Iraqi policeman in the head,killing him. Choppin’ elements moved to thesite and led the pursuit of the two-man AQIsniper team along with a handful of MPs,IPs, and recruits.

The sniper attack precipitated the failureof the operation’s goals. Although severalIP recruits joined in the counterattackagainst the sniper, they ultimately decidedthat no amount of money or prospects of afuture job with the Iraqi Police were worththe risk of staying in Janabi Village. Withoutthe Iraqi recruits, police, or army committedto securing key routes into the village andafter the discovery of activated IEDsbetween our forces, we decided to suspendthe planned four days of continuouspresence. Unfazed by the enemy contact,on the second day we conducted thecombined medical engagement with the


SPC Luke Thornberry

Women and children from Janabi Village wait in line to receive humanitarian aid.

women and children that remained in the village. We passed ourmessage of commitment to reconciling the people of Janabi Villagethroughout the day as the doctors treated the people. Soldierspassed out vast quantities of humanitarian aid to the families of thehusbands and fathers that had tried so diligently to kill us the daybefore.

Little enemy contact occurred on Day 2. It is rare for coalitionforces to return immediately after encountering significant enemycontact on air assault clearance operation. The enemy, used to longintervals between U.S. incursions, took the time to refit and wasunprepared for the uncharacteristic return of U.S. forces. Weassessed that Janabi Village was not yet ready for reconciliation —largely because AQI still psychologically dominated the villageand aggressively intimidated the surrounding area. We immediatelybegan preparing for Crazyhorse II. The enemy did as well.

One of the principles of COIN is to constantly reinvent yourselfand modify your patterns if not the actual techniques themselves.Everything about Operation Crazyhorse II would have to lookdifferent to the enemy to create confusion and avoid beingtemplated. There are only so many ways to invade a village. Theuse of a portable footbridge to create our own insertion point wasone such technique. The bridge would play a vital role in ourfreedom of maneuver into the village from the north. The purposeof Operation Crazyhorse II remained the same as before — find theJanabi leadership and begin the reconciliation movement essentialto the eventual hold phase. The lead element would emplace thebridge and use it to infiltrate the village. A supporting platoonwould similarly infiltrate from a BP, but TFIC and the GAC wouldinitiate clearance along a previously unused route from the north.The plan called for a larger two-platoon air assault to interdictexpected insurgents fleeing out of the area shortly after the enemyreacted to the ground forces.

The Iraqi Army commander gave us mixed responses in his levelof commitment to the operation. During one discussion, he wouldcommit to permanent battle positions in the village, but the nextengagement would garner a more ambiguous response. In our finalmeeting before the operation, we sensed a new commitment. Theconditions appeared to be set, and we had more confidence in thepossibility of holding the village once cleared. We would hold itwith the Iraqi Army and rotate coalition platoons as we increasedthe force protection at each of the four planned checkpoints.

During Day 1 of the operation, TFIC encountered seven IEDs,three of which detonated causing one medical evacuation and twodamaged vehicles. We discovered a fresh torture site and asignificant cache in a partially destroyed portion of the al-Qaidatraining facility. We also found an IED factory at a potato warehouseowned by a recently killed insurgent leader and prosecuted smallarms engagements. The Iraqi colonel surprisingly returned andbrought an Iraqi media crew to a BP, which was as close as hewould get to the village. To our disappointment, he informed usthat he misunderstood our goal and would not be placing anyforces in the village after the operation. In his defense, there werelegitimate force protection reasons for not garrisoning forces in thevillage. Furthermore, the conspicuous absence of the tribal leaderswas an insult to his authority as commander of the region. Othertribes, even during the deadliest of periods in the war, maintainedsome form of contact with coalition and Iraqi forces.

A remarkable event occurred on the second day as we began

another CME in the heart of Janabi Village. A Janabi sub-sheikhapproached our element overwatching the footbridge. He introducedhimself and indicated a desire to begin reconciling. Concurrentwith the CME, the sub-sheikh assembled a collection of 53 men toundergo biometric testing. Confident that we had achieved as muchas possible, we pulled back all forces from the village. We did notquite understand how to proceed, but we knew that the environmenthad changed. We decided to let the situation develop and plan nomore raids or even patrols into the village until the situationdeveloped further.

Act 2 – Return of the JanabiAfter Crazyhorse II, a group composed of displaced Janabi tribal

members met with intelligence assets at a forward operating base inBaghdad regarding the possibility of American support for theirreturn. Although dismissed by the local unit as irrelevant becausethe issue did not directly affect their battlespace, this group utilizedthe rival Haraj family of the Ghariri tribe to make first contact withour company. After the Haraj set up a meeting at a patrol base, theleaders of the Janabi group provided coalition forces with a list of50 displaced heads of families committed to reconciliation. Many ofthe individuals on the list had positive association with AQI in Iraq.

We began conducting patrols throughout the Janabi tribal areasto engage locals in what was effectively door-to-door diplomacy.


Courtesy photos

Members of the Janabi tribe await registration by the Iraqi Army at an IAcompound. The hole in the roof was thought to have come from a mortarfired by the Janabi while they were working with AQI.

This approach provided those engaged with a senseof investment in the operation and familiarized theskeptical populace with U.S. forces. Subsequentmeetings with the Janabi reconciliation leaders,beginning February 9, 2008, involved representativesfrom the Iraqi Army Intelligence Command,participation from Choppin’, representatives from theal-Baloosh sub-tribe of the Anbari, and the Janabiand Haraj leaders. We observed the initialconstruction of defensive checkpoints along the northside of the Janabi Run Canal on 12 February 2008,because locals had fears of foreign fighter retaliationafter the tribe-initiated reconciliation.

As the negotiations with the displaced Janabicontinued, we planned Operation False Prophet, amultidisciplinary operation intended to have the effectof increasing popular support for coalition forceswhile simultaneously marginalizing individualsproviding active support to enemy forces. Weachieved these preparatory effects on the battlefield by fusingaviation, indirect fire support, information operations, intelligence,and psychological operations. We kicked the operation off on 15February 2008. Simultaneously, the first meeting with village leadersoccurred at Patrol Base Yusifiyah in the Iraqi colonel’s office. Thisserved to awe the leaders as well as allow the locals to form theirown opinions without negative influence. We drove the messagehome that we were committed to reconciling Janabi Village. We hadthe means to do so by force if necessary, but we strongly preferredto work through them.

The operation bluntly informed the populace of the Janabi Villagearea via audio broadcast of the eventual and permanent push thatwe would be making into the village without providing anyinformation on the date of such an intrusion. This deliberate butcounterintuitive violation of conventional wisdom served toprepare the populace psychologically for upcoming change in theirvillage. UH-60 helicopters dropped leaflets over the village; however,due to cumbersome administrative regulations, it was infeasible tohave the leaflet designs custom tailored to the target population.Despite this, feedback collected later indicated that the pamphletswere effective.

In order to evoke feelings of shock and awe among thepopulation, we utilized our organic indirect fire support assets.Carefully planned high-explosive fire missions and Lighthorse ScoutWeapons Teams contributed to this effort as well, providing terraindenial fires, overwatch, and reconnaissance. F/A-18 Super Hornetfighter aircraft provided demonstrations of air power over the JanabiVillage area. By executing low-altitude, high-speed flyovers, the airassets forced all local activity to a halt as the locals fixated on theunfamiliar rushing noise followed by a streak in the sky. Followingthe flybys, the locals discussed the nature of the flying machine.Several fledgling Janabi Sons of Iraq were convinced that the fighterswere in fact a new American helicopter. We made no effort to clarifythe situation.

While fundamentally simple in overarching concept, executionof the operation required significant amounts of coordination todraw together disparate assets that rarely worked together. Incontrast to the common air assault operation, we executed theoperation with as many assets as we could resource. Ultimately, the

combined effects of False Prophet captivated and positivelyinfluenced the population. These effects proved to be critical to theultimate success of the hold phase in Janabi Village.

Over the course of the next several meetings, the list of Janabisto repatriate grew to approximately 300. The timing of the formationof the Janabi group combined with the serendipitous personnelstrength led to the dubbing of the group as the “300” after theiconic film depiction of the battle of Thermopylae. Initially appliedto the group in jest, the moniker stuck. Intelligence personnelresearched the backgrounds of all 300 individuals. Discussionswith the Iraqi Army resulted in a decision to watch but notimmediately detain individuals identified as affiliated with or in closeassociation to the AQI organization. This strategy facilitated thesupervised return of all 300 without scaring off persons of interestand was in line with reconciliation. As with all reconciliation effortsin the region, the amnesty specifically would not forgive murder ormanslaughter. Liability for previous insurgent activity resulting inthe death of a civilian by any mechanism would continue. Weobserved displaced families beginning to return to the area as earlyas 16 February 2008, just one day after Operation False Prophet.

No real inter-tribal healing occurred until 17 February 2008, whenwe engineered a meeting of influential members of both the SunniJanabi and Sh’ia Anbari tribes along the no-man’s land of the JanabiRun Canal. While initially the tribes were antagonistic, eventuallysomeone broke the ice under the watchful eye of the American andIraqi troops securing the area, and members of both tribes ultimatelyended up embracing and raising a Sh’ia Ashura flag together. Thiscritical step towards inter-tribal reconciliation set the tone for lateroperations in Janabi Village.

Shortly thereafter with the forces of the 300, we executedOperation Crazyhorse III. The first day of the operation consistedprimarily of the biometric inprocessing of the 300, combined with aroute clearance by TFIC. Notably, TFIC interrogated multiplesuspicious sites while only finding one IED, which had had itsdetonator moved so that forces moving along the road could nottrigger it. Prior to the operation, the forces of the 300 had unearthedthe majority of the devices and transported them to the east.Members of the 300 turned in some devices and caches to U.S. andIraqi forces. It was clear to both U.S. and Iraqi forces that the Janabi


C Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment orchestrated a historic meeting betweenJanabi and Anbari tribes on 17 February 2008.

had disarmed the village. The IA’s 4thCompany commander commented on theabundance of males in the village,describing it as a shocking contrast to thewomen and children that he had becomeaccustomed to seeing in the village.Regrettably, IA commander called hissubordinate commanders ordering them towithdraw a mere two hours after the start ofthe operation. This action left us in thevillage alone. The on-scene commander wasextremely embarrassed and ashamed whenhe informed us of his orders to withdraw.

We pressed on, and the second day ofthe operation was more complex. Biometricinprocessing continued, while members ofthe 300 who had already been processedkept order. Lighthorse Scout WeaponsTeams overflew the site, dropping candywhile simultaneously making a show offorce. One local remarked, “Yesterday, yourhelicopters shot rockets at us. Today, theydropped candy for our children. We like thecandy.” The U.S. medics conducted a U.S.-only medical engagement, treating more than300 locals. We distributed humanitarian aid,and Janabi leaders hosted a luncheon at thehome of the Imam. The Imam was widelyknown for his anti-government rhetoricdisseminated during his sermons. The daywrapped up with a 300 member leading usto a dismantled house-borne IED and severalother explosive devices previously removedfrom the road.

The loss of Iraqi Army support forcedthe cancellation of the construction phaseof the operation. The concept of theoperation included the construction ofseveral battle positions along the lines ofcommunication surrounding the village;however, the inability to execute this phasenecessitated Operation Crazyhorse IV. Toensure Iraqi Army commitment to the nextoperation, our brigade commander engagedthe IA brigade commander. This engagementresulted in IA brigade commander attachinghis own troops to man checkpoints insupport of the next iteration.

On 15 March 2008, Zero Day of OperationCrazyhorse IV, 1/23/17 IA brought themajority of the 300 to Patrol Base Yusifiyahin order to document them and initiate theGovernment of Iraq reconciliationpaperwork. This process went smoothlyunder the control of the Iraqi Army. The actof bringing the 300 to the patrol base forcedcriminals to face the specter of detention.Despite the biometric inprocessingconducted during Operation Crazyhorse III,none of the 300 had legally reconciled. Theleap of faith required in trusting that Iraqiforces would not arrest them demonstratedtheir personal commitment to reconciliation.The 300 leadership largely facilitated this,facing a colossal effort in coordinating theevent. In Janabi Village, an informant fromthe 300 led us to five cache and IEDlocations in the ancient ruins of Sippar.


Day one involved TFIC conducting routeclearance and the construction of two battlepositions. The placement and design of thebattle positions were a collaborative effortbetween the 300, the Iraqi Army, andcoalition forces. This marked the first timeIA commander actually visited the villageone kilometer from the patrol base. Thefollowing day continued with much of thesame, and both days passed withoutsignificant incident. The third day built uponthe previous two by continuingdevelopment of the battle positions andengaging the Anbari tribe about repatriation.The Anbari indicated interest in re-inhabiting their shattered homes; however,they wanted to ensure that the securitysituation had indeed stabilized and thatintertribal friction would be minimal.

Act 3 – Maintaining ForwardMomentum

With the hold phase essentially completeyet ongoing, we rapidly began to move intothe build phase. On 24 March, the TaskForce 3-187 IN civil-military operationsofficer coordinated for agents from ReliefInternational to visit the decimated Anbarihamlet in Abu Habba. Unfortunately, due tothe lack of inhabitants and a broken promiseon the part of the sheikh to disseminateinformation, few Anbari were present toreceive the patrol. The tribe later tookresponsibility for the error. Therepresentatives briefly listened to the Anbaritales of woe; however, they decided thatthe conditions were not right to beginconflict mediation. Despite this mishap, thepatrol demonstrated our commitment to andsupport for reconciliation andreconstruction. Following this, we launcheda project to reopen the Janabi School,continued to develop relationships with thepopulation, and continued to facilitatesectarian healing through reconstruction ofthe Sa’id Abdullah Shrine, a Sh’ia holy sitedestroyed by AQI in 2005.

RetrospectiveOur resolution of the Janabi question

flipped the existing paradigm on its head bywinning local support and holding the areawith allied partisans first, then buildingcheckpoints for host nation military assetsto secure the ground further. This is incontrast to the general method of clearing,leaving U.S. forces in sector, buildingcheckpoints for host-nation forces, and then

Leaders from C/3-187, 1/23/17 IA and the Janabi 300 conduct the initial planning of checkpoints.

Authors’ Note: The men of Choppin’ Charlie merely stood on theshoulders of the valiant U.S. and Iraqi Soldiers that bought each Yusifiyahbattle position with blood and fire. We have the deepest respect andadmiration for these units that created the conditions for the eventual

victory. We remain humbledby their sacrif ices andbravery and wish that theycould have tasted the historicsuccess in the finalOperation Iron Crazyhorse.

SGT Jason George iscurrently serving as theIntelligence NCO for CCompany, 3rd Battalion, 187thInfantry. He has deployedtwice in support of OperationIraqi Freedom and is currentlyworking towards a bachelor’sdegree. His previousassignments include a varietyof small-unit leadershippositions with Choppin’Charlie.

CPT Michael Starz iscurrently serving as thecommander for C/3-187 IN.He has deployed twice insupport of Operation IraqiFreedom. His previousassignments include servingas a rifle and mortar platoonleader, executive officer, G3operations battle captain andassistant S3.


attempting to win the support of the population. We committed toreconciling a tribe considered a lost cause, and by persistentlytrying new approaches to the situation, we learned enough todevelop a resolution. Our experience in Janabi Village taught usthat persistence in achieving our long-term goal, understandingthe dynamics of the situation, using conventional assets inunconventional ways, and using small units to engage the populaceregularly proved essential.

At the close of each operation, we immediately injected thelessons learned into the mission planning cycle for the ensuingoperation. Each built upon the other, and we executed them as thehuman terrain presented favorable conditions. The three-hour airassault has its place as a disruption tool; however, it has limitedlong-term effects regardless of its size. Although our early operationsfailed to achieve our intended end-state, every operation was anattempt to execute all three phases of clear-hold-build. We learnedthat the phases need not be sequential, but can deliberately overlapin support of one coherent end-state.

Progress gained within the scope of one phase contributes tothe success of the others, and planners must consider interweavingall three “threads” into each operation. All too often, U.S. focus isexclusively on clearance, leaving hold and build for later operations.This prevents the realization of a lasting solution becausesubsequent hold and build operations receive less attention thanthe familiar clear phase. Clearance operations fit clearly into thedoctrinal missions of combat arms forces; however, both historicallyand likely in the future, these same forces are required to conductcounterinsurgency operations. It is necessary to recognize whenthe mission has evolved beyond simple clearance, and reconcilethe mission with COIN doctrine.

Our approach had both pros and cons; however, given themanner in which events unfolded this approach required the leastAmerican manipulation. U.S. combat arms forces only begrudginglyuse diplomatic methods of accomplishing goals; however, a native

solution to a native problem is the most effective, if not necessarilythe easiest or most logical by Western standards. Furthermore,taking a diplomatic and reconciliatory route takes time to produceresults. Americans are all too willing to move in and take an area byforce. Large-scale operations, while impressive on paper, in and ofthemselves have limited positive effect on the battlefield. Yet forceprotection requirements, risk-aversion, and desire for creaturecomforts combine to restrict the effectiveness of American forcesin holding territory. Therefore, a locally based solution is essential.

The local population has a vested self-interest in their ownsecurity and prosperity. When the epiphany that resistance iscounter to those interests occurs to the populace, friendly forcesmay then hold ground with marginal active resistance. However, ifthe population is not prepared to receive the forces, they willperceive the invasion of their territory by friendly forces as aviolation of those interests. Proper assessment and management ofpopular opinion is essential to the success of the hold phase, and“build-style” operations significantly contribute to this.

President Theodore Roosevelt once quoted a West Africanproverb: “Tread softly but carry a big stick; you will go far.” Whilehe was commenting on foreign policy, the comment directly appliesto the execution of counterinsurgency operations. Focusing onsecuring the population (hold) and winning their support (build),instead of focusing on capturing insurgents (clear), allows for localemotional investment in the solution. Fundamental to accomplishingthis is the use of the partnership with host-nation forces, andengagement and collaboration with indigenous leaders. As we learned,U.S. forces need to continually re-evaluate their position, shed theirpreconceived notions, truly accept and engage their host-nationpartners, and value patience and flexibility above all else.

Soldiers from C/3-187 and 1/23/17 IA lead Anbari tribal members in a reconnaissance of their destroyed homes.

“The operational environment, threat,and Army operational concepts havechanged. The Army must be a full spectrumcapable force. Therefore, Soldiers andleaders need to adapt to new concepts andthink about how the Army can train morewisely, efficiently, and effectively.”

— Draft FM 7-0, June 2008

The Army links its operationalconcept to its training doctrine byapplying the tenets of battle and

mission command to the training process.Employing these tenets to develop andexecute training as we would combat orsupport operations allows us to train as wefight. This training methodology developsSoldiers, leaders and units to conduct fullspectrum operations in an era of persistentconflict, but requires from trainers a newmindset and training aim point. Fort Benningand others in the Initial Entry Training (IET)community have used the mindset and aimpoint to develop outcomes-based trainingthat provides these adaptive Soldiers andleaders, yet many of our institutionalprocesses continue to impede our effortsand we must reform these processes if weare to optimize our training outcomes.

During the Cold War, we faced a singlethreat and our mindset focused ondeveloping selected Soldier, leader and unitcompetencies to defeat it. Our focus wason major combat operations as we believedthese task capabilities were easilytransferable to achieve success in lowintensity combat or peacekeeping missions.In the IET community centralizedmanagement valued efficiency andthroughput and feared failure at lower levels.This created a virtual assembly line ofdirected inputs per each program ofinstruction (POI) designed to produce a

TRAINING ADAPTIVE LEADERS FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS:

AN OUTCOMES-BASED APPROACHCOL MICHAEL A. COSS


Soldier, tank crewman, or fire team member.As a result, our training methodologybecame process driven vice outcomeoriented. This stifled initiative among IETleaders, stagnated the POI and instructionaltechniques, limited resource changes andempowered managers who have no trainingresponsibilities.

Today, the threats and requirements aredifferent. Those same Soldiers and crewsare now required to think on their own andcannot rely on detailed staff planning orcontinuous leader supervision at multiplelevels during task execution. The oldprocess discouraged Soldiers and leadersfrom thinking and precluded them fromdemonstrating initiative, but to triangulatethe requirements of today’s full spectrumoperations they must know how to think,and not what to think, and they must learnto demonstrate initiative at every level. Thismust occur in training or we cannot sustainit in combat where they are no longer justtank crewmen or fire team members, but alsoambassadors on patrol each day chargedwith making instant life or death decisions,some with strategic consequences.

Our mindset has to change to empowersubordinates to take appropriate actions inthis environment, and our aim point mustshift commensurately so that we preparethem for the proper tasks and transitionsthey face as they conduct full spectrumoperations during this era of persistentconflict. Battle and mission commandprovide the means to achieve this byrequiring commanders to understand whatoutcome the training needs to accomplishbefore visualizing, describing or directinghow to conduct it. They must know and beresponsible for the outcome and need theflexibility to determine how to best achieveit.

Our combat-experienced leaders at FortBenning are well aware of the requirementto think and act independently using battleand mission command in combat, so wehave empowered them to develop andconduct training using these tools. Thebasic combat training proponent recognizedthe value of this approach and developed aholistic set of outcomes every Soldier mustpossess upon graduation. These outcomes,along with specific performance measures,help leaders plan, prepare, execute, andassess training and have been approved foruse across the U.S. Army AccessionsCommand.

IET OutcomesEvery Soldier:* Is a proud member of the team

possessing the character and commitmentto live the Army Values and Warrior Ethos.

* Is confident, adaptable, mentally agile,and accountable for own actions.

* Is physically, mentally, spiritually, andemotionally ready to fight as a groundcombatant.

* Is a master of critical combat skills andproficient in basic Soldier skills in allenvironments.

* Is self-disciplined, willing, and anadaptive thinker, capable of solvingproblems commensurate with position andexperience.

These characteristics and critical combatskills are what Soldiers require to succeedin combat. These outcomes guidecommanders, empowered by the tenets ofbattle and mission command authority, indeveloping and executing training. Theyunderstand, visualize and then describe theoutcome they seek in accordance with battlecommand. They direct, lead and assessusing the authority and flexibility provided


Photos by Cheryl Rodewig, The Bayonet

Basic trainees at Fort Benning, Ga., move from compound to compoundduring a field exercise known as the Final 48.

by mission command. Our training structures must support this orwe cannot provide the Army with the Soldiers and leaders requiredin this era of persistent conflict.

Previously POIs had us measuring how many hours of landnavigation a Soldier received instead of measuring how well henavigates. Using the outcomes-based approach to training, wefocus on the latter until the Soldier knows and understands thewhy behind the task so he can execute without supervision. Hemust know why to employ the individual low crawl movementtechnique on his own in certain combat situations vice having tobe told to do so. Outcomes-based training achieves this and fostersinitiative in our leaders who develop and execute the training. Theoutcomes and leader initiatives have revolutionized our training.

Areas of Innovation in the IET CommunityThe IET community implemented this outcomes-based approach

last year led by Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) at Fort

Benning. It soon spread to our other IET brigades due to its successand the mission command philosophy at Fort Benning. Byempowering leaders to be responsible for training outcomes, theyrevamped POIs, instructional venues and techniques, and supportstructures. This improved training realism and support on the onehand and training instruction and leader development on the other.Applying battle and mission command to develop the properoutcomes in training has fostered the following key initiatives.

Range Realism — Over 90 percent of our drill sergeants havecombat experience and wanted our training and ranges to replicatethe environment the Soldiers would face in combat. We improvedour buddy team live-fire ranges, convoy live-fire ranges and militaryoperations in urban terrain (MOUT) facilities to meet theirexpectations. To add realism we replaced the sandbag “moguls”with realistic battlefield clutter like cars, barricades, rubble and walls.We added gated courtyards and shoot houses to make thesimulation even more real for the Soldiers.

Drill sergeants no longer directed the individual and buddy teammovements on live-fire exercises (LFXs), but allowed Soldiers theopportunity to select and demonstrate the proper movementtechniques and firing positions as they advanced through thebattlefield. Soldiers on the convoy LFX were required to react to animprovised explosive device (IED) and assault an objective. Theyhad to select appropriate cover and move properly in the urbanenvironment. MOUT and field training exercises (FTXs) matchedthe complex environments they would face in combat, including anIED lane that featured the latest array of enemy tactics and friendlyavoidance and defeat mechanisms.

Tactical Realism — We further enhanced IET training by linkingrange improvements to the tactical processes we employ on thebattlefield. All training events became opportunities to operate in asimulated combat environment. At the inception of basic combattraining, company commanders provided the Soldiers a five-paragraph operations order that described the skills they wouldneed to defeat the enemy on the realistic ranges we had created.Subsequently we issued the Soldiers their individual weapons andbegan making them accountable for the weapon and their actions.

During training we provided them regular intelligence updatesas they transitioned from phase to phase. The training intensityand complexities increased as the notional enemy grew closer toour forward operating base. Training events became combatmissions that began with an operations order and required pre-combat checks and inspections, subordinate operations orders andback briefs, rehearsals, execution, and a quality after action review(AAR). We conducted each event with as much tactical focus aspossible to increase the realism of the simulation and the retentionof the material. Finally, we deployed to a tactical training base tocounter the enemy’s advance into our area and conducted fullspectrum operations to defeat him.

Cultural Awareness Training — In addition to the tacticaltraining, we instituted cultural awareness training using battle labswith computer work stations designed to immerse Soldiers rapidlyinto the environment they will face in combat. The training consistsof threat and cultural awareness, situational awareness, actionableintelligence, IED training, and combat patrolling.

The computers run software modules that place the Soldiers in a


TRAINING NOTES

A basic trainee at Fort Benning scans the area before exiting a building.

virtual environment where they learn toidentify commander’s critical informationrequirements (CCIR), report and react tothreats including IEDs, conduct greetingsor tactical questioning, and take otherappropriate action. Each Soldier and leadergains a foundation of knowledge regardingMiddle Eastern history and culture andlanguage. Soldiers learn 20 common phrasesand greetings and recognition of Arabicnumerals to detect suspicious license plates.They refine their reporting and patrollingtechniques during FTXs. All of this trainingenhances their skills and improves theirability to act, react, and respondappropriately in the operating environment.

Marksmanship Training — Weimplemented new marksmanship instructionto better prepare Soldiers to effectivelyoperate their weapons in combat. Battlefieldconditions require confident, competent,and accountable Soldiers and leaders whocan think and solve problems, but wefound most of our NCOs and officersthemselves were not confident orcompetent with the weapons. To improvetheir skills, the Asymmetric Warfare Groupprovided instructors who taught us tofocus on why the system worked aparticular way and how to master it. Thenew program now rests on leaders whotruly know the material, operate with fewer

restrictions, and want to teach their Soldiers.Soldiers learn why things work and how

to apply the fundamentals to differentsituations. Training incorporates conditionsand lessons from current combatoperations, begins in a relaxed environmentand consists of guided discovery soSoldiers work things out for themselves. Weincrease the difficulty and stress as theyprogress and require Soldiers to combinethinking and decision making with shooting.The marksmanship instruction now buildsindividual accountability, discipline, safety,and problem solving; and the methodologyhas been applied to other training tasks toimprove them.

New Combat Qualification Tables — Weare also developing new combatqualification tables to better replicate theactions Soldiers are required to perform incombat. The new standards require Soldiersto engage targets in series and some targetswill not “die” unless hit multiple times.Which targets require multiple hits will varyper iteration, so Soldiers can no longermemorize the sequencing of the qualificationtables. The test will also require multiplefiring positions, magazine changes, forcedmalfunctions, distances that match combatconditions, and decision making by theSoldiers.

Pilot tests of the new qualification table

have only increased scores slightly, but lesstangible gains are significant. These includeincreased confidence with weaponsapplications in tactical scenarios, moreprecision in every engagement, very fewengagements of “don’t shoot” targets suchas civilians on the battlefield, andwidespread use of initiative and judgmentin positioning and movement. Our safetyrecord has improved significantly withSoldiers committing far fewer dangerousactions involving fratricide or negligentdischarges.

Training Resources — To resource ourcommanders we funded the rangeimprovements, placed night observationdevices and close combat optics in the handsof the Soldiers, and exposed them to realisticconditions while wearing the Camelbakhydration system and Interceptor bodyarmor. We also increased realism by usingquality simunitions such as the CloseCombat Mission Capability Kit (CCMCK).This unit training munitions systemprovides Soldiers a realistic simulation inclose quarters battle and blank firesituations to reduce stoppage andmalfunctions. We introduced simulationslike the laser marksmanship training systemand VICE trainers to rapidly improve theirshooting and patrolling capabilities.

Nutrition — If you want Soldiers to trainlike professionals and perform likechampions, then you have to fuel them sothey can perform at their best. At FortBenning we treat every Soldier like an athleteand feed him appropriately. This enablesthem to lose weight properly and increasestrength regularly. In an agreement with theArmy Nutrition Center, Fort Benningattached the military nutritionist from thepost hospital to the IET reception battalion.This allowed us to proactively impact allSoldiers by providing them nutritiontraining, revising menus in the diningfacilities (DFACs), and providingsustainment training.

This instruction provided basiceducation on the food groups and propernutrition techniques required to maximizefitness. In our DFACs we removed friedfoods, replaced white with wheat bread,replaced pork-sausage and pork-bacon withturkey, and cut up the fruit to make it moreaccessible to Soldiers who are rushed. Wealso added dark greens to our salads to


Commanders and other leaders are accountablefor producing training outcomes, so we must empowerthem to use their initiative to plan, resource andconduct the training in a decentralized manner.

increase iron consumption, replaced soft drinks with sports drinksand calcium-enriched fruit juices, and eliminated whole milk byserving skim. A marking system warned Soldiers on which foodswere high in fats and guided them to those high in protein andcomplex carbohydrates. We provided an evening snack and anotherprior to morning physical training to improve rest and performance.Soldiers lost more weight and waistline, increased their energy levelsand PT scores by nearly 100 percent, and reduced illnesses whileimproving their lifestyle habits.

Training Instruction — These initiatives have developed ourdrill sergeants to be more effective trainers and leaders. This iscritical as most are going back to combat soon and must be fullyprepared to assume leadership duties upon arrival. We conductedcadre training and certification to prepare them by coveringadministrative tasks such as range and rappel tower certificationand tactical tasks like battle drills, combat lifesaver, combatives,and marksmanship training. This made the leaders more preparedto provide appropriate instruction to the Soldiers, made theinstruction more relevant, and better prepared the Soldiers andleaders for combat.

We now have Soldiers and leaders who have experienced therealism they will face in combat. They are more familiar with theculture and language, can effectively operate their weapons withconfidence and accountability, have demonstrated competenceagainst a realistic combat qualification standard, are resourced better,and eat properly. We also have leaders who know how to train.These program revisions have been a huge success, yet institutionalinertia hinders our efforts.

Institutional ResponsesFort Benning empowered its leaders with battle and mission

command authority to train Soldiers who will perform more effectivelyupon deployment. Regrettably, many of TRADOC’s trainingprocesses have not kept pace with their needs and instead rely onoutmoded POIs and training support packages (TSPs) written yearsago. These told our leaders what and how long to train usingspecific resources, believing that would still produce a well-trainedSoldier for today’s conflict. Many of the tasks do not match combatrequirements as our leaders perceive them today; but deviationsfrom this script remain centrally managed by those who lackresponsibility for the outcome but retain the authority to directtraining of less than optimal relevance. Our processes for changingthis are slow and cumbersome, often making it more tempting toignore them than to address the problem.

This out-of-touch system is deeply entrenched among mid-leveltraining and resource managers, some still fighting and training forthe last war. The processes still in place provide them the set metricsthey need to direct and budget training. This enables them to allocateresources efficiently and plan and program effectively. These resourcemanagers are comfortable and find difficulty in planning, programming,or resourcing the outcomes-based initiatives, as they vary toodramatically among commanders and units.

Fort Benning battled these processes and succeeded inneutralizing many of them by removing POI and range constraintson leaders. We provided commanders license to modify POIs thatare inconsistent with our required outcomes. We rewrote those

requiring change and substituted lesson plans for the cumbersomeTSPs. We submitted these changes last year, but are still awaitingtheir approval. Likewise, just over a year ago our range regulationsstill required drill sergeants to use cleaning rods to clear Soldiers’weapons coming on and off our ranges. These same regulationsrequired Soldiers to carry weapons oriented up and down range,yet in combat they had no such procedures or constraints. It iscurious we would use them in training, especially since the averageadvanced individual training (AIT) graduate sees combat less thanthree months after graduation.

When we tried to change these we were initially admonished tonot confuse training with combat, but combat is exactly what trainingmust replicate to achieve the outcomes we require. We cannotallow rules developed in a different era to continue to impede thedevelopment our Soldiers and leaders require now during the globalwar on terrorism. Our warriors must face complex situations intraining and be made accountable for their actions now.

The same holds true for our leaders, yet many of our processesprevent them from achieving the same level of confidence andaccountability. For example, the IET marksmanship POI calls for setamounts of ammunition per Soldier per period of instruction. If aleader wants to vary the amount, the institution is not afforded theflexibility to accommodate that. These types of impediments preventus from properly developing our leaders to manage training andtraining resources, limit their initiative, and will erode the quality ofour leaders and Soldier skills if not corrected. The battlefield requireswell-trained and properly prepared Soldiers and leaders, and ourtraining processes and rule-laden procedures are failing both.

Recommended ChangesWe need to follow our new doctrine and shift our mindset and

training aim point by fully implementing the outcomes-basedapproach to develop the Soldiers and leaders we require inconducting full spectrum operations. Commanders and other leadersare accountable for producing in training those outcomes that willyield success in combat, so we must empower them to use theirinitiative to plan, resource and conduct the training in a decentralizedmanner. We should do away with structures and processes thatimpede this by taking the following actions.

Allow Trainers to Exercise Battle and Mission Command —We must empower our leaders to plan and execute outcomes-basedtraining using the tenets of battle and mission command authority.This will improve the training and develop the leaders. Battlecommand requires leaders to understand the intended outcomes asthey visualize training alternatives; mission command empowersthem to make choices and direct and lead consistent with the intent.Using these to develop and execute training decentralizes executionconsistent with combat conditions and helps develop agile leadersand organizations at every level.

Training time is limited, so conducting multi-echelon training in


TRAINING NOTES

COL Michael A. Coss commands the192nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Ga. Hepreviously served as the CJ3 of Combined JointTask Force-76 in Afghanistan during OperationEnduring Freedom and as G-3 for 10th MountainDivision (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, New York.He commanded 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry duringOperation Joint Forge and served on the JointStaff as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffplanner during Operation Allied Force.

A basic trainee at Fort Benning pulls securityfrom a second floor balcony during an urbanoperations training exercise.

this manner makes perfect sense, but wecannot accomplish this using the centrallymanaged training processes currently inexistence. We have seen the vastimprovements the outcomes-basedapproach provides to training and leaderdevelopment; we must continue to apply itusing the tenets of battle and missioncommand.

Restructure POIs and ApprovalProcesses — We must restructure our POIsto reflect the outcomes-based approach totraining. These outcomes will become broad,centralized statements of intent. We mustreplace the cumbersome, centrally managedbureaucracy that now approves all trainingchanges with more mission-orientedcommand authority at all levels. This willdecentralize the execution of intent andbuild the initiative and leader skills werequire. We must have a POI and lessonplan approval process that is flexible andresponsive to the pace and initiative ofsubordinate commanders. Instead ofproviding them a rigid set of inputs to followin training we must foster their developmentby empowering them to do the same thingsin training that we expect of them in combat– namely to think on their own and meet theintent within resource constraints.

Each ATC should be empowered to meetoutcomes as they determine, andresponsible commanders can back briefUSAAC to ensure that they remain withinthe intent. The refined POIs and lessonplans we developed at Fort Benning havemore than helped us meet the outcomes weidentified as necessary. Withoutimplementing such methods we risk losinga generation of leaders who know what ittakes to win in combat. These leaders arenow responsible for training the nextgeneration of Soldiers and leaders to beflexible, agile, and fully prepared to meet theconflict requirements of full spectrumoperations. If we fail to empower them byusing outcomes to guide training, the impactwill be irrevocably detrimental to our Armyand maybe to our Nation.

Enable Flexible Resourcing —Outcomes-based training requires a moreflexible resourcing system. Currently theTRADOC resourcing system is still centrallymanaged and insufficiently responsive tothe decentralized requirements for battle andmission command oriented trainers to

develop and implement outcomes-basedtraining at all of our training bases. We musttrain as we will fight, yet our centrallymanaged resource process hampers ourefforts to achieve this. We must train tosustain, yet our equipment needs must beaggregated and validated at higher echelons.We need the resources now, not in sixmonths when our well-intentioned but riskadverse resource managers may finallyprovide them.

We must enable flexible and responsiveresourcing to meet our training initiatives.These begin with resource managers whomove away from measuring every hour oftraining or bullet fired to mission commandresource sets that finally afford subordinatecommanders the flexibility they require toexperiment and innovate. There is risk inthis process, but it can be managed throughcareful application of the reasonableresource training parameters ourcommanders already employ whenconducting combat missions. They canaccomplish the outcome by using a lessonplan that has its own resourcing parameters,not those directed by a centralizedmanagement that lacks responsibility for theoutcome.

Realign Responsibility and Authority tothe Commanders — In operational unitscommanders train their units. They are

responsible for the training and areaccountable for the outcome or readinessof the unit. In TRADOC the training is notso complex that we must alter this alignmentof responsibility and authority. We do notneed committees of experts to develop theplans or train our Soldiers while we hold ourdrill sergeants accountable for the resultsat graduation. We must empower our cadreto plan, prepare and execute the trainingIAW the outcomes-based mindset and aimpoint set forth in our training doctrine, andthey will deliver the results that we — andthe Army — need. We have alreadyimplemented this change at Fort Benning,and our growing list of initiatives validatesits utility.

ConclusionThe Army has made significant strides

in improving our operations and trainingdoctrine. The training doctrine is derivedfrom our operations and requires a newmindset and training aim point. Initiativesundertaken at Fort Benning in the IETcommunity achieve the requirements ourdoctrine requires by using outcomes-basedtraining to provide combatant commandersthe Soldiers and leaders they need to winon a battlefield that demands full spectrumcapabilities. We must eliminate thoseinstitutional processes that limitcommanders from exercising battle andmission command in outcomes-basedtraining, or we will fail to produce theconfident, competent and accountableSoldiers and leaders that today’s full-spectrum operations demand. We mustallow trainers to exercise battle and missioncommand authority, restructure our POIsand the processes that control them, providemore flexible resourcing, and realignresponsibility and authority. If we do, wecan deliver the outcomes commandersrequire when conducting full spectrumoperations in this era of persistent conflict.

The introduction of various complex digital Army BattleCommand Systems (ABCS) across the Army over the pastseveral years has been accompanied by the creation of

complicated, and often costly, simulations programs and specializedapplications to stimulate the ABCS boxes. Units required a trainingcapability to exercise and sustain ABCS skills to ensure userproficiency and employment of the entire ABCS network. Currentsimulation programs, such as the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS)and the Joint Combat and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) serve veryuseful purposes for major training exercises, but require highoverhead for small unit training purposes. Some of this overheadincludes external support and extensive lead time for coordination.

As a result of unit requests for ABCS simulation assistance, theNational Simulation Center (NSC) initially developed a low-overhead software application, which is now known as the BattleCommand Staff Trainer (BCST). Since its creation, the NSCworked with numerous agencies and program managers totransition BCST and ensure mutual capability refinement. TheProduct Director, Common Services (PD CS), under direction ofProgram Manager Battle Command (PM BC), now hasresponsibility to continue development of the BCST. TRADOCCapability Manager-Battle Command (TCM-BC) is responsiblefor requirements generation and oversight.

BCST enables units to conduct battle staff training on ABCScommand and control systems via internal resources with minimalsetup, time and effort; and facilitates collective and individual stafftraining (sustainment and refresher) for specific sections or entirestaffs, from battalion through ASCC levels. Significant trainingopportunities afforded by BCST include: maintain and improvehighly perishable ABCS skills, train new battle staff personnel, applystaff coordination drills, battle rhythm development and train-upfor exercises/events. This software also provides an ability tostimulate the battle staff reactions to friendly and enemy events, as

BCST: The Army’s Premier BattleCommand Systems Task TrainerMAJ MICHAEL R. SPEARS


well as planned master scenario events list (MSEL) injects to initiatestaff reactions. BCST should only be used on training networks,never on real-world operational networks — the risk of mixedBCST simulated and real-world operational events is too great!

BCST is a training program that operates on standard personalcomputer systems with Microsoft Windows XP and is applicableto both Active and Reserve Component units, as well as BattleCommand Training Centers (BCTCs). This software application,however, is not hardware or computer, a substitute for ABCS, nor areplacement for CBS, JCATS or other constructive trainingsimulations. These systems, like BCST, were born of necessity andserve a very useful purpose for larger-scale training exercises.

Currently, BCST is provided to Army units through Unit SetFielding (USF) beginning in December 2008 or via the BCST AKOdownload site. Based on the approved USF schedule for activeand Reserve/National Guard units, the software fielding and NewEquipment Training (NET) dates are synchronized with the unit’sinput. The computer discs issued during NET include the actualBCST program, as well as a reference disc that have training supportpackages (TSPs) with specific scenarios. Units that have recentlycompleted USF and ABCS NET may download the BCST programand TSPs from AKO: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/kc/10244567(AKO users will request access to this site from the BCST POCslisted at the end of the article).

Prior to BCST NET, units should receive all ABCS equipmentand complete NET for those systems. During BCST NET, selectpersonnel from the S3/G3 and S6/G6 will receive instruction on howto connect the BCST into the ABCS network, BCST operator training,and exercise scenario skills. Additionally BCTCs and Centers ofExcellence will receive the BCST program and NET based on deliverycoordination. A tiered support apparatus will provide support tounits for assistance with the BCST program to resolve identifiedissues.

BCST has tremendous potential for any Army battle staff,especially for brigade and battalion levels. BCST provides: a flexibletraining medium to maintain operator proficiency on their respectivesystems; flexible training employment; no unit cost and greatresources for quality collective training.

Questions and comments may be directed to: TRADOCCapability Manager, ATTN: C2 Branch (BCST), 806 Harrison Drive,Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2326; MAJ Michael Spears,michael.r.spears @us.army.mil, (913)684-4505 or Gregory Eddy,[email protected], (913) 684-4597 of TCM- BC.

Day three of the MRX (mission rehearsal exercise) in the 1stBrigade Combat Team (BCT) tactical operations center (TOC):The battle captain remains focused on the CPOF (CommandPost of the Future) in front of him as battalion events continueto populate his “BCT Events” effort from simulated, subordinatebattalions. The Fire Support Cell shouts out, “Acquisition!AO Mustangs!” based on the AFATDS (Advanced FieldArtillery Tactical Data System) display, which immediatelycauses the brigade staff to execute its indirect fire battle drill.In the White Cell room, a “puckster” continues to provideevent injects (events and reports) from his Battle CommandStaff Trainer (BCST) computer into the brigade ABCSnetwork…

MAJ Michael Spears is currently serving as the TRADOC CapabilityManager - Battle Command, Command and Control Branch, at FortLeavenworth, Kan.


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“In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have towin it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, wecan send our men out there as advisors, but they have to win it.”

— President Kennedy, 2 September 1963

TRAINING NOTES

The Cold War: A Military History. ByRobert Crowley, ed. New York: RandomHouse, 2005, 461 pages, $27.95. Reviewedby CSM (Retired) James Clifford.

This is an anthology of essays coveringour longest war, the Cold War. Edited byRobert Crowley, the founding editor ofMHQ: The Quarterly Journal of MilitaryHistory and editor of three previousanthologies about the Civil War and the twoWorld Wars and author of several originalbooks including the popular “What If?”series, it contains 27 essays. Of the selectedessays, all but four previously appeared inMHQ. Those four are excerpts from books.The line-up of authors is a who’s who ofhistorians such as Simon Winchester, DavidMcCullough, Dennis Showalter, VictorDavid Hanson, and Williamson Murray.

These essays cover the entire 33-yearspan of the Cold War from the earliest daysin the late 1940s to the last gasps of theSoviet empire. In between they examine thewars in Korea and Vietnam, Cuba, aerialreconnaissance, and Berlin. They can betaken in their totality or as individualselections as the needs or interests of thereader dictates. Each is written within thecontext of the struggle to defeat theworldwide threat of communism in theaftermath of World War II withoutexpanding the Cold War into a World War.

The importance of this book is itsreference to the larger strategic issues. Abook of essays on the military actions alonewould serve no purpose other than theentertainment and education of the reader.While these goals alone are usuallyadequate, in this case it would not havebeen. As it is assembled, readers aredrawn into an examination of how theseevents were not isolated incidents but partof a strategy on the part of the SovietUnion and the United States to face eachother, sometimes by proxy. To trulyunderstand this period in American historyone must be able to tie all these eventstogether in context rather than view themin a vacuum. Through this book readerswill be able to make the necessary


connections. But to what end?One may be tempted to look upon the

Cold War as a historical period with little tooffer us today. To fall for that would be aserious mistake. If anything, this bookshows us that America operates on the worldstage and that we must take a larger view toevery event. It teaches us to put eventsinto a worldwide perspective, to thinktactically, operationally and strategically.Today’s challenges of Islamicfundamentalist terrorism, increasingpressures on fossil fuel energy sources, theincreasing economic might of China, andRussian attempts to reestablish itself as aworld superpower are themes that must beaddressed strategically.

Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in theGulf War. By BG Robert H. Scales, Jr.Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006, 435pages, $9.95. Reviewed by BG (Retired)Curtis H. O’Sullivan.

The victory may have seemed certain,but there were doubts — then and later —whether it was complete in several respects.In the unseemly haste to achieve a MadisonAvenue type of slogan with a hundred-hours ground war, things were left dangling.The opportunity to wipe out the RepublicanGuard had passed. The hopes of the Shiitesin southern Iraq were raised only to becruelly dashed. There were those whothought Saddam could and should havebeen removed, although there is doubt thefull coalition would have supported that.Events 12 years later also raise the questionof whether Baghdad could have beencontrolled if seized. However, this work isnot intended to cover the broad issues ofpolicy. The focus is on the operational andtactical levels of war. Political and diplomaticdecision making are mentioned only to setthe stage.

The groundwork is laid by the forging ofthe post-Vietnam Army, which did makecertain whatever victory that was achievedin Kuwait and Iraq. The story unfolds with

Desert Shield, planning an offensive,shaping the battlefield, and the climax ofthe attack — “the Great Wheel.” Itculminates with restoring calm after the“Storm.” Each chapter leads off with apersonal vignette, which enlivens thenarrative. The 70 black and whitephotographs help as well, but some are abit dark. Not enough maps is a frequentcrit icism but is not the case here.Although there is a minimum of militaryjargon, I found the glossary handy.

BG Scales, who is president/commandant of my alma mater — the ArmyWar College — is well qualified to bedirector and one of the principal authorsof this study project.

There are other works that give adifferent and/or broader perspective onthis conflict, but this book — within itsintended scope — is outstanding. It iswell researched and readable. Perhapsmost important, it gives insights into ourconduct of future wars.

The Road to Disunion (Two Volumes)By William W. Freehling. First volumesubtitled Secessionists at Bay: 1776-1854and the second volume SecessionistsTriumphant. First volume published in1991 and the second volume published in2007 by Oxford University Press, UK.Reviewed by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein,USN.

William Freehling is an award-winninghistorian and author, whose book Preludeto Civil War: The Nullification Controversyin South Carolina, 1816-1839 (OxfordUniversity Press, paperback 1992) won theprestigious Bancroft Award, typicallyconsidered the highest prize for bookspublished on or about the Civil War.Professor Freehling teaches at theUniversity of Kentucky and for the past threedecades sought to understand a singlecentral question: why were the southernstates on a path to disunion? This singlequestion led to three decades of reflection,


BOOK REVIEWS TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE

Quiz courtesy of Chris Timmers

(Answers on next page)

research, and scholarship resulting inthis two-volume history, the secondof which was completed in 2007. Thisis a significant contribution to thepolitical and social history of theantebellum South, and is essential togaining a deeper understanding of theAmerican Civil War. This book isrecommended for those who havealready spent time studying Civil Warbattles. Readers will understand thenuances of the debate over slaveryand secession among the Confederatestates. For instance, there wereSouthern leaders who wanted tophase out slavery gradually; otherreactionaries wanted to keep the vileinstitution intact. Virginiansunderstood and reflected on ThomasJefferson’s views of slavery as a curse,and that God’s justice cannot sleepforever. This attitude would be intotal contradiction to the powerfulSenator John C. Calhoun from SouthCarolina, who considered slavery ablessing. The first volume exploresdifferences in the debate over slavery,which the author considers the centralcorrosive issue of which all otherarguments, such as state’s rights, arebased. The complexity of the debateover slavery from 1776 to 1854corroded such wider issues aswhether America could spreaddespotism or democracy as moreterritories and states came under thejurisdiction of the United States?Readers will learn of how the GagRule was imposed as a means to stopthe national debate on slavery, a rulethat only served to highlight withclarity the immorality of theinstitution. The Gag Rule, alsoknown as the Pickney Resolution,was passed in the House but failedin the Senate in 1836. The firstvolume continues by delving intothe mechanics of the MissouriCompromise, the Annexation ofTexas, and ends with the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. The centralfocus of these pieces of legislationis the corrosiveness of racialpolitics, and readers gain insightinto the unwillingness of states suchas South Carolina to compromise

1. This French victory early in the war deniedGermany the knockout punch it needed to defeatFrance and resulted in four years of trench warfare:a) First Marne c) Ypresb) Soissons d) Paschendaele

2. Place these battles in chronological order:a) Soissons c) 2nd Marneb) The Brusilov Offensive d) Verdun

3. The size of a U.S. infantry division in WWI wasroughly:a) 5,000 men d) 20,000 menb) 10,000 men e) 28,000 menc) 15,000 men

4. First use of poison gas by Germany on theWestern Front was at:a) 2nd Battle of Ypres c) 1st Battle of Marneb) Sommes d) Belleau Wood

5. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk resulted in a separatepeace between the Central Powers and:a) Russia c) Romaniab) Poland d) Hungary

6. This system of defensive barriers extended, bywar’s end, from the North Sea to the foothills ofthe Alps:a) Minefields c) Trenchesb) Bunkers d) Barbed wire barriers

7. What brought the U.S. into the First World War?a) German sinking of the Lusitaniab) Alleged German atrocities in Belgiumc) The Zimmermann telegramd) Diplomatic pressure from France and the UK

8. The U.S. President during America’s entireinvolvement in WWI was:a) William McKinleyb) Teddy Rooseveltc) William Jennings Bryand) Woodrow Wilson

9. The two German generals whose leadershipproved so successful in initial campaigns on theeastern front were:a) Hindenburg and Ludendorffb) Ludendorff and von Moltkec) Von Moltke and Kesselringd) Rommel and Hindenburg

10. Which of the following battles was not foughtin WWI?a) Verdun d) Brusilov Offensiveb) Belleau Wood e) Tannenbergc) Falaise Pocket

with Virginia over the issue. Thedivisiveness that would impact theConfederate states as they foughtUnion forces in the American CivilWar is apparent.

The second volume discusses theneed to reconcile unlimitedslaveholder power with limitedrepublican power. South CarolinaGovernor James Hammond took upthe mantle of defending slaverybeyond the argument of a necessaryevil, by using scripture and variousarguments that only seemed toexacerbate the exploitive nature ofthe institution. The book traces theevolution of Stephen A. Douglas,the Illinois senator and presidentialcandidate who ran against AbrahamLincoln. Chapters explore in detailthe first beginnings of what wouldbe the American Civil War, such asthe 1854 skirmishes between pro andanti-slavery militia. This was notmade easier by the Supreme Courtdecision of the Dred Scott case thatruled that any person of Africanancestry could not claim citizenshipin 1857. The institution was tearingthe nation apart, with seminal eventslike John Brown’s 1859 raid, in whichhe sought a violent solution toabolishing slavery. The rise ofAbraham Lincoln, and his famouscampaign speeches on how slaveryis tearing at the national fabric of theUnited States, with his famous“House Divided Speech.” Theauthor takes us on a narrativejourney that ends with the firing ofthe first shots at Fort Sumter in April1861. From these two volumes,readers can gain a deeperunderstanding of the American CivilWar as it unfolds and the decisionsmade by both Union andConfederate leaders. Anunderstanding of American historyis incomplete without reading aboutthe Civil War, which although atragedy, made the United States astronger nation. One may disagreewith Freehling on some points, butthere is no doubt this is a significantwork of scholarship on the eventsleading up to the Civil War.


U. S. Army photo

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment plan their next movement during Operation Viper Shake April 21 in Afghanistan.

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ANSWERS TO QUIZ: 1)a 2)d,b,c,a 3)e 4)a 5)a 6)c 7)c 8)d 9)a 10)c

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