INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED Risk Assessment and ...

INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED

Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan for

Expansion of Oil Terminal At

Dist. Deoghar, Jharkhand

6(b) Isolated storage & handling of hazardous chemicals, Category B

Prepared By

ABC TECHNO LABS INDIA PVT. LTD.

AN ISO ISO 9001:2008, ISO14001:2004 & OHSAS 18001:2007 certified

Environmental Engineering and Consultancy Organization

(NABL Accredited & MoEF Recognised Environment Laboratory)

QCI NABET Accredited for Sector 5F (Certificate No. NABET / EIA / 1316 / RA001)

Corporate Office:

No.2, 2

nd Street, Thangam Colony, Anna Nagar West, Chennai – 600040.

Tamil Nadu, India.

Tel: 044 – 26161123 / 24 / 25

Mumbai Office:

A-355, Balaji Bhavan, Plot No. 42 A, Sector 11, CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai – 400614.

Maharashtra, India

Tel: 022 27580044

www.abctechnolab.com [email protected]

http://www.abctechnolab.com/

mailto:[email protected]

Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil

Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar,

Jharkhand

RISK ASSESSMENT & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

1.1 Introduction

Industrial plants deal with materials, which are generally hazardous in nature by

virtue of their intrinsic chemical properties or their temperature or pressure of

operation or a combination of these. Fire, explosion, hazardous release or a

combination of these are the hazards associated with industrial plants. These have

resulted in the development of more comprehensive, systematic and sophisticated

methods of Safety Engineering such as Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment to

improve upon the integrity, reliability and safety of industrial plants.

The primary emphasis in safety engineering is to reduce risk to human life and

environment. The broad tools attempt to minimize the chances of accidents occurring.

There always exists, no matter how remote, that small probability of a major accident

occurring. If the accident involves highly hazardous materials in sufficient large

quantities, the consequences may be serious to the plant, to surrounding areas and the

populations therein.

M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) have proposed to install additional

storage tankages of MS, HSD, SKO and 4Nos. bottom filling loading bays (TLF bays)

within exiting terminal at Jasidih, District-Deoghar, Jharkhand. Product such as MS,

HSD and SKO have received through Haldia-Barauni product pipeline. Construction

of additional tankages is utmost need to fulfil the need of petroleum product as per

market requirement in nearby area. Since the petroleum products are highly

inflammable, it is necessary to evaluate to risk from this installation. IOCL has

retained ABC Techno Labs India Pvt. Ltd. as a consultant for carrying out the risk

analysis study of the proposed additional tankages of MS, HSD and SKO at Jasidih

terminal, District-Deoghar, Jharkhand. Scope of work includes:

(i) Identify different hazard scenarios, which are likely to cause damage to the

installation and other properties, operating staff as well as the surrounding

communities and installations.

(ii) Evaluate the damage potential of the probable hazardous events in relation to

their location to assess the magnitude of the impact and the impact zones.

(iii) Suggest remedial/preventive measures.



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(iv) Prepare an effective on-site disaster management plan.

1.2 Risk Assessment and Hazard Identification

Risk is defined as the unwanted consequences of a particular activity in relation to the

likelihood that this may occur. Risk assessment thus comprises of two variables,

magnitude of consequences and the probability of occurrence of accident. The first

step in risk assessment is identification of hazards. Hazard is defined as a physical or

chemical condition with the potential of accident which can cause damage to people,

property or the environment. Hazards are identified by careful review of plant

operation and nature of materials used. The various scenarios by which an accident

can occur are then determined, concurrently study of both probability and the

consequences of an accident is carried out and finally risk assessment is made. If this

risk is acceptable then the study is complete. If the risk is unacceptable then the

system must be modified and the procedure is restarted.

1.3 Scope of Risk Analysis

The scope of risk analysis study includes:

(i) Identify potential hazard sections of the plant, which are likely to cause damage to

the plant, operating staff and the surrounding communities in case of any accident

due to the proposed plant facilities.

(ii) Assess overall damage potential of the hazardous events in relation to main plant

and environment.

(iii) Assessment of total individual risk.

(iv) Recommended emergency preparedness plan to mitigate the effects of any

accident.

1.4 Risk Analysis

Risk Analysis of any plant / installation handling hazardous materials include –

1.4.1 Hazard Identification

● Identify potentially hazardous materials that can cause loss of human life/injury,

loss of properties and deteriorate the environment due to loss of containment.

● Identify potential scenarios, which can cause loss of containment and consequent

hazards like fire, explosion and toxicity.



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1.4.2 Consequence Analysis

● Analysis of magnitude of consequences of different potential hazard scenarios and

their effect zones.

● Consequence analysis is a measure of potential hazards and is important for taking

precautionary measures for risk reduction as for well as mitigation of effect in

case of such accidents happening.

This report has been prepared by applying the standard techniques of risk assessment

and the information provided by IOCL. Based on the Risk Assessment, Disaster

Management Plan (DMP) has been prepared.

1.5 Glossary of Terms used in Risk Assessment

The common terms used in Risk Assessment and Disaster Management are elaborated

below:

“Risk” is defined as a likelihood of an undesired event (accident, injury or death)

occurring within a specified period or under specified circumstances. This may be

either a frequency or a probability depending on the circumstances.

“Hazard” is defined as a physical situation, which may cause human injury, damage

to property or the environment or some combination of these criteria.

“Hazardous Substance” means any substance or preparation, which by reason of its

chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling is liable to cause harm to human

beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the environment.

“Hazardous Process” is defined as any process or activity in relation to an industry,

which may cause impairment to the health of the persons engaged or connected

therewith or which may result in pollution of the general environment.

“Disaster” is defined as a catastrophic situation that causes damage, economic

disruptions, loss of human life and deterioration of health and health services on a

scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected area or

community. Disaster occasioned by man is factory fire, explosions and release of

toxic gases or chemical substances etc.



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“Accident” is an unplanned event, which has a probability of causing personal injury

or property damage or both.

“Emergency” is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the resources. This

highlights the typical nature of emergency “It will be after experience that enough is

not enough in emergency situations. Situations of this nature are avoidable but it is

not possible to avoid them always.”

“Emergency Preparedness” is one of the key activities in the overall Management.

Preparedness, though largely dependent upon the response capability of the persons

engaged in direct action, will require support from others in the organization before,

during and after an emergency.

1.6 Scope of Study

The risk assessment has been carried out in line with the requirements of various

statutory bodies for similar type of projects:

● Identification of potential hazard areas;

● Identification of representative failure cases;

● Identification of possible initiating events;

● Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and the

impact zones from the accidental scenarios;

● Consequence analysis for all the possible events;

● Assess the overall suitability of the site from hazard minimization and disaster

mitigation points of view;

● Furnish specific recommendations on the minimization of the worst accident

possibilities; and

● Preparation of broad Disaster Management Plan (DMP).

1.7 Approach to the Study

Risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of

an event or sequence of events. The description of the tasks of the various phases

involved in risk analysis is detailed below:



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Phase-I: Hazard Identification

The technique employs for the Hazard Identification is MCA analysis. MCA stands

for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with maximum

damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include

quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice, the selection

of accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering

judgment and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis.

Process information study and relevant data would help in the identification of hazard

prone section of the plant. Inventory analysis and Fire and Explosion and Toxicity

Indices and following manufacture, storage and transport of hazard chemicals rules of

Government of India (GOI Rules, 2000) are also the methods used in hazard

identification.

Phase-II: Hazard Assessment and Evaluation

Ranking of each unit in hazard prone sections are done based on the Fire and

Explosion Index (F & EI), Toxicity Index (TI) and Inventory Analysis. Safety of

hazard prone section is studied using Preliminary Hazard Analysis.

A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a part of the US Military Standard System

Safety Program requirements. The main purpose of this analysis is to recognize

hazards early, thus saving time and cost, which could result from major plant

redesigns, if hazards are discovered at a later stage. Many companies use a similar

procedure under a different name. It is generally applied during concept or early

development phase of a process plant and can be very useful in site selection. PHA is

a precursor to further hazard analysis and is intended for use only in the preliminary

phase of plant development for cases where past experience provides little or no

insight into any potential safety problems, e.g. a plant with a new process. The PHA

focuses on the hazardous materials and major plant elements since few details on the

plant design are available and there is likely not to be any information available on

procedures. The PHA is sometimes considered to be a review where energy can be

released in an uncontrolled manner. The PHA consists of formulating a list of hazards

related to:

● Pipeline / equipment;

● Interface among system components;



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● Operative environment;

● Operations (tests, maintenance, etc.);

● Facility; and

● Safety equipment.

The results include recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the subsequent

plant design phase. The PHA is followed by evaluation of MCA and Consequence

Analysis.

Phase-III & IV: Disaster Management Plan (DMP) and Emergency

Preparedness Plan (EPP)

Safety review of especially vulnerable process units is covered in this phase. This

helps in reducing the risk qualitatively while the outcome of Phase-I and Phase-II

would reduce risk in quantitative terms. Emergency Preparedness Plan based on the

earlier studies is covered in this activity. Customarily, major industries to have their

EPP‟s and therefore, there is a need to look into those details and recommend a

realistic EPP based on the above studies.

1.8 Hazard Identification

1.8.1 Introduction

Identification of hazards in the proposed project is of primary significance in the

analysis, quantification and cost effective control of accidents involving chemicals

and process. A classical definition of hazard states that hazard is in fact the

characteristic of system/plant/process that presents potential for an accident. Hence,

all the components of a system/plant/process need to be thoroughly examined to

assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned event/sequence of

events, which can be termed as an accident. Typical schemes of predictive hazard

evaluation and quantitative risk analysis suggest that hazard identification step plays a

key role (Refer Figure - 1.1). Estimation of probability of an unexpected event and its

consequences form the basis of quantification of risk in terms of damage to property,

environment or personnel. Therefore, the type, quantity, location and conditions of

release of a toxic or flammable substance have to be identified in order to estimate its

damaging effects, the area involved and the possible precautionary measures required

to be taken. The following two methods for hazard identification have been employed

in the study:



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Identification of hazardous storage units based on relative ranking technique, viz.

Fire-Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE & TI); and

Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA).

1.8.2 Classification of Major Hazardous Substance

Hazardous substances may be classified into three main classes namely flammable

substances, unstable substances, and toxic substances.

Flammable substances require interaction with air for their hazard to be realized.

Under certain circumstances the vapours arising from flammable substances when

mixed with air may be explosive especially in confined spaces. However, if present in

sufficient quantity such clouds may explode in open air also. Unstable substances are

liquids or solids, which may decompose with such violence so as to give rise to blast

waves.

Finally, toxic substances are dangerous and cause substantial damage to life when

released into the atmosphere. The ratings for a large number of chemicals based on

flammability, reactivity and toxicity are given in NFPA Codes 49 and 345 M.

1.9 Dow Index

1.9.1 Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE & TI) Approach

Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Indexing (FE & TI) is a rapid ranking method for

identifying the degree of hazard. The application of FE&TI would help to make a

quick assessment of the nature and quantification of the hazard in these areas.

However, this does not provide precise information. Respective Material Factor

(RMF), General Hazard Factors (GHF), Special Process Hazard Factors (SPHF) are

computed using standard procedure of awarding penalties based on storage handling

and reaction parameters. Before hazard indexing can be applied, the installation in

question should be subdivided into logical, independent elements or units. In general,

a unit can logically be characterized by the nature of the process that takes place in it.

In some cases, the unit may consist of a plant element separated from the other

elements by space or by protective walls. A plant element may also be an apparatus,

instrument, section or system that can cause a specific hazard. For each separate plant

process, which contains flammable or toxic substances, a fire and explosion index F



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and/or a toxicity index T may be determined in a manner derived from the method for

determining a fire and explosion index developed by the Dow Chemical Company.

1.9.2 FE and TI Methodology

Dow‟s Fire and Explosion Index (F and E) is a product of Material Factor (MF) and

Hazard Factor (F3) while MF represents the flammability and reactivity of the

substances, the hazard factor (F3), is itself a product of General Process Hazards

(GPH) and Special Process Hazards (SPH). An accurate plot plan of the plant, a

process flow sheet and Fire and Explosion Index and Hazard Classification Guide

published by Dow Chemical Company are required to estimate the FE & TI of any

process plant or a storage unit.

1.9.3 Computations and Evaluation of Fire and Explosion Index

The Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) is calculated from the following formula:

F & EI = MF x (GPH) x (SPH)

The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F&EI as

per the criteria given below:

F & EI Range Degree of Hazard

0 – 60 Light

61 – 96 Moderate

97 – 127 Intermediate

128 – 158 Heavy

159 – Up Severe

1.9.4 Toxicity Index (TI)

The toxicity index is primarily based on the index figures for health hazards

established by the NFPA in Codes NFPA 704, NFPA 49 and NFPA 345 m. However,

the products handled are not toxic.

1.9.5 Classification of Hazard Categories

By comparing the indices F&EI and TI, the unit in question is classified into one of

the following three categories established for the purpose (Table - 1.1).



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Table 1.1 Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index

A. C

ate

gor

y

B. Fire & Explosion

Index (F&EI) C. Toxicity

Index (TI)

D. I E. F & EI, 65 F. TI < 6

G. I

I H. 65 < or = F&EI <

95 I. 6 < or =

TI < 10

J. I

II K. F&EI > or = 95

L. TI > or =

10

Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are recommended for the

three hazard categories.

1.9.6 The Basic Data

1.9.6.1 Basic Data for Motor Spirit

(i) Substance stored-Motor Spirit

(ii) Quantity stored-10694 KL (max) in three Tanks, two tanks with a Capacity of

4241KL and one Tank with a capacity of 2212 KL

(iii) Quantity to be stored -10592KL

(iv) Type of storage-Internal Floating Roof Vertical Storage Tanks

1.9.6.2 Basic Data for HSD

(i) Substance stored-High Speed Diesel

(ii) Quantity stored-15814 KL (max) in four tanks (two tanks each of capacity 5303

KL & two tanks each of capacity 2604 KL)

(iii)Quantity to be stored-9025KL

(iv)Type of storage- Conical Roof Vertical Storage Tanks

1.9.6.3 Basic Data for SKO

(i) Substance stored-Superior Kerosene Oil

(ii)Quantity stores-4882 KL (max) in three tanks, one with a capacity of 3006 KL &

other two tanks each of capacity 938 KL

(iii)Quantity to be stored-2100KL

(iii)Type of storage -Conical Roof Vertical Storage Tanks

1.9.6.4 The Properties

The relevant properties of the above substances are given in Table-1.2.



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1.9.6.5 The Results

The detailed calculations are summarized in Table- 1.3.

1.9.7 Comments

The recommended minimum features, according to DOW Fire and Explosion Index

have been given at Table-1.3. Based on these features and the various values obtained,

the following conclusions can be drawn:

(i) The SKO and HSD Storage Tanks pose a “LIGHT” hazard, with an exposure

radius of about 40.10 ft. and 33.59 ft. respectively.

(ii) The Radii of Exposure for the MS Storage Tanks is 64.16 ft. and the hazard

potential is “MODERATE”.

(iii) Except the Fire Proofing for the Motor Spirit Tanks, all other “Recommended

Required” as per Table - 1.3 are optional.

Table 1.2 Properties of MS, SKO and HSD

Sr.

No. Tank No. Stored Material

Capacity

m3

Density

Kg/m3

Flash

Point oC,

max

Boiling

Point oC,

max

1. T-101, T-

102, T-103 Motor Spirit 10694 730.0 <18.0 215

2. T-108, T-

109, T-110

Superior Kerosene

Oil 4882 810.0 > 35.0 300.0

3.

T-104, T-

105, T-106,

T-107

High Speed Diesel

Oil 15814 800.0 > 32.0 380

4. T-111, T-

112, T-113 Ethanol 210 780.0 13 78.29

Table 1.3 Calculations for Dow Fire & Explosion Index

Tank No. Stored

Material

Material

Factor MF

General

Process

Hazard

Factor

F1

Special

Process

Hazard

Factor

F2

Unit

Hazard

Factor F3

Fire &

Explosion

Index

F&EI =

F3xMF

Exposure

Radius

(ft.)

Degree of

Hazard

T-101,

T-102,

T-103

Motor Spirit 16.00 1.55 3.08 4.774 76.384 64.16 Moderate

T-108,

T-109,

T-110

Superior

Kerosene

Oil

10.00 1.55 3.08 4.774 47.74 40.10 Light

T-104,

T-105,

T-106,

T-107

High Speed

Diesel Oil 10.00 1.55 2.58 3.993 39.99 33.59 Light

T-111,

T-112,

T-113

Ethanol 16.00 1.55 2.33 3.6115 57.78 48.5 Light



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1.10 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA) Approach

1.10.1 Introduction

A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized, as an accident with a

maximum damage potential, which is still believed to be probable.

MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an

accident. Moreover, since it is not possible to indicate exactly a level of probability

that is still believed to be credible, the selection of MCA is somewhat arbitrary. In

practice, the selection of accident scenarios representative for a MCA-Analysis is

done on the basis of engineering judgement and expertise in the field of risk analysis

studies, especially accident analysis.

Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to MCA

analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the hazards and

calculate the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of heat radiation, toxic

releases, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or potential accidents of the

major units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous

materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective

hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the

surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed. Figure-

3.2 depicts the flow chart for MCA analysis.

As an initial step in this study, a selection has been made of the processing and

storage units and activities, which are believed to represent the highest level or risk

for the surroundings in terms of damage distances. For this selection the following

factors have been taken into account:

● Type of compound viz. flammable or toxic;

● Quantity of material present in a unit or involved in an activity; and

● Process or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, flow, mixing and

presence of incompatible materials.

In addition to be above factors, the location of a unit or activity with respect to

adjacent activities is taken into consideration to account for the potential escalation of

an accident. This phenomenon is known as the Domino Effect. The units and

activities, which have been selected on the basis of the above factors, are summarized;



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accident scenarios are established in hazard identification studies, while effect and

damage calculations are carried out in Maximum Credible Accident Analysis Studies.

1.10.2 Methodology

Following steps are employed for visualization of MCA scenarios:

● Chemical inventory analysis;

● Identification of chemical release and accident scenarios;

● Analysis of past accidents of similar nature to establish credibility to identified

scenarios; and

● Short-listing of MCA scenarios.

1.10.3 Common Causes of Accidents

Based on the analysis of past accident information, common causes of accidents are

identified as:

● Poor house keeping;

● Improper use of tools, equipment, facilities;

● Unsafe or defective equipment facilities;

● Lack of proper procedures;

● Improvising unsafe procedures;

● Failure to follow prescribed procedures;

● Jobs not understood;

● Lack of awareness of hazards involved;

● Lack of proper tools, equipment, facilities;

● Lack of guides and safety devices; and

● Lack of protective equipment and clothing.

1.10.4 Failures of Human Systems

An assessment of past accidents reveal human factor to be the cause for over 60% of

the accidents while the rest are due to other component failures. This percentage will

increase if major accidents alone are considered for analysis. Major causes of human

failures reported are due to:

● Stress induced by poor equipment design, unfavourable environmental

conditions, fatigue, etc.

● Lack of training in safety and loss prevention;

● Indecision in critical situations; and

● Inexperienced staff being employed in hazardous situations.

Often, human errors are not analyzed while accident reporting and accident reports

only provide information about equipment and/or component failures. Hence, a great

deal of uncertainty surrounds analysis of failure of human systems and consequent

damages.



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1.10.5 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA)

Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures or catastrophes, causing

possible damage to the surrounding area. This section deals with the question of how

the consequences of the release of such substances and the damage to the surrounding

area can be determined by means of models.

It is intended to given an insight into how the physical effects resulting from the

release of hazardous substances can be calculated by means of models and how

vulnerability models can be used to translate the physical effects in terms of injuries

and damage to exposed population and environment. A disastrous situation is general

due to outcome of fire, explosion or toxic hazards in addition to other natural causes,

which eventually lead to loss of life, property and ecological imbalance.

Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to MCA

analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the hazards and

calculate the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of heat radiation, toxic

release, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or potential accidents of the

major units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous

materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective

hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the

surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed. The

MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of potential

vulnerability.



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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Fig. 1.1 Flow chart for Maximum Credible Accident Analysis

IS THE SD (EEC)

APPLICABLE

START

PLANT VISIT

DATA COLLECTION PROCESS DESCRIPTION

PROCESS CONTROL LOOPS PRI/PFD OPERATING

MANUAL START UP/SHUT DOWN PLOT PLAN

METEOROLOGICAL DATA PAST ACCIDENTS DATA

ALL RELEVANT PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL DATA OF

CHEMICALS INVOLVED

SELECT THE SECTION

SELECT THE UNIT

CLASSIFY VESSEL/EQUIPMENT OR PIPELINE

INVENTORY ANALYSIS

COMPARE QUANTITY - 50 YES

NO

IS FE/FET IN

SEVERITY? ADOPT CHECK LIST

APPROACH YES

CALCULATE EFFECT

IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD PRONE SECTION

CONSEQUENCE CALCULATION

PLOT DAMAGE DISTANCE



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7.

Fig. 1.2 Steps in Consequence Analysis

RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL

BLEVE

EFFECTS

CONTINUOUS INSTANTANEOUS

HEAT RADIATION

PRESSURES WAVE

FLASH

PRESSURES WAVE

LIQUID

VAPOUR

FIRE

IGNITION

TWO PHASE FLOW

NO

VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION

DISPERSION YES

HEAT RADIATION

IGNITION



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1.11 Risk Analysis

1.11.1 Properties of Materials Handled

Petroleum products like, Motor Spirit (MS), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO), and High

Speed Diesel (HSD) shall be handled in the Terminal. All these products are a

combination of hydrocarbons and are highly inflammable. Motor Spirit is a class-A

type petroleum liquid (Flash Point <23oC), Superior Kerosene and High speed diesel

are of Class B type (Flash point between 23oC and 55

oC) according to convention.

The products, when spilled from the containment will cause fire if they get a contact

with an ignition source. Incomplete combustion of these hydrocarbons may generate

carbon monoxide, which may cause toxicity as well as explosion. However, fire is the

main hazard. Lower the flash point, higher is the possibility of ignition and hazard.

The light hydrocarbons will evaporate from these petroleum oil liquids, which may

catch fire if they get into contact with an ignition source. Properties of the products

handled are given in Table 1.4.

Table 1.4 Properties of Liquid Handled

Properties Products

MS SKO HSD MS (Xtra) ETHANOL

1. Boiling point, oC (range) 50-215 150-300 260-380 50-215 78.29

2. Density at 15 oC 0.73 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.78

3. Flash point, oC <18 >35 >32 <18 <13

4. Vapour press. At 38

oC

(Kg/Cm2 abs)

0.73 0.2 0.1 0.73 0.079 at 250C

5. Heat of combustion

BTU/LB 18,800 21700 18,700 18,800

26847.8

KJ/Kg

6. Auto ignition tempoC 280 210 380 280 -

7. LFL (% V/V) 1.4 0.7 1.8 1.4 4.3

8. UFL (% V/V) 7.6 5.0 5.6 7.6 19

1.11.2 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products

The hazard of equipment/pipeline handling petroleum products is the potential loss of

integrity of the containment with subsequent release of liquid causing fire. The

pipelines carry large quantities of petroleum liquid. A rare pipeline fracture would

release large quantities of hydrocarbons. The product would get collected in the

neighbourhood of the pipeline and may lead to a fire hazard if it gets source of

ignition and proper precautions are not taken.



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Catastrophic failure of the shell of a storage tank is a very rare phenomenon, which

may occur due to earthquake or due to aerial bombardment during war. However,

vapour coming out through the vent line of fixed roof tank or through vapour seal

around the shell in floating roof tanks may be ignited through lightning. However,

such cases are also very rare. In such cases the whole tank may be on fire. Corrosion

in the tanks may cause small holes causing release of petroleum liquid from the tanks.

However, in such cases the oil will be contained in the dyke. In case of oil spill

collected on ground an oil pool will be formed. An ignited pool of oil is called Pool

Fire. It creates long smoky flames. The wind may tilt the flame towards ground

causing secondary fires and damages. Radiation from the flame can be very intense

near the fire but falls off rapidly beyond 3-4 pool diameters. Such fires are very

destructive within the plant area and near the source of generation.

In case of formation of small holes on the above ground pipeline the liquid may

escape in the form of jet and may catch fire if it gets an ignition source. Damage due

to heat radiation from such jets is mostly limited to objects in the path. However, the

ignited jet can impinge on other vessels and the pipelines causing domino effect.

1.11.3 Brief Review of Safety Related Facilities

Because of the inherent hazard potential of the petroleum products to be handled in

the installation, due care is required to be taken in the design and installation of the

storage tanks, pipelines and other associated facilities e.g.

i) Well established code of practice in design and installation.

ii) Well planned layout (as per guidelines of OISD 118).

iii) Provision of weather resistant painting for protection of exposed areas of

pipelines, valves and equipment.

iv) Provision of dykes and fire walls around storage tanks.

v) Well planned Fire Fighting Facilities.

vi) Well established organisation entrusted for design, inspection & erection of

the facility.

vii) Well trained manpower for operation and maintenance.



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1.11.4 Fire Fighting Facilities

(i) Fixed Fire Fighting Facilities: Well planned Fixed Fire Fighting Facilities have

been considered in the installation e.g.

a) Fire Hydrants and Monitors

Fire Hydrants and monitors shall be provided around the dyke walls of storage tanks.

They will also be provided for Pump Manifold, Pump Bay & Road Tanker Loading

gantry. Layout of fire hydrants & monitors and isolation valves have been made in

such a way that Fire Tenders can approach to put out fire in any possible area.

b) Spray Protection system

Storage tanks containing motor spirit shall be provided with water sprinkler system.

Perforated spray water pipes shall be provided around the shell of the storage tanks

and shall be located at the top of the shell.

Fire Fighting Systems has been designed as per guidelines of OISD-117 and TAC

rules.

(ii) Portable Fire Fighting Apparatus

Following types of Fire Extinguishers and other fire fighting apparatus shall be

provided in vulnerable areas of the plant, administrative block, control Room, Fire

Water Pump House. MCC etc. as per OISD guidelines.

S.No. Type of Area Portable Extinguishers

(i) Storage of Class-A/B products 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2.

In packed containers and stored

In open/closed area

(ii) Pump House upto 50 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 2 pumps

(Class - A & B)

Above 50 – 100 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for each

pump.Beyond 100 HP 2 nos. 10 Kg. or 1 no. of 25 Kg.

DCP for each pump.

Pump House upto 50 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 4

(Class – C) pumps upto 50 HP

Above 50 HP 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 KG

DCP for 4 pumps.

(iii) Tank Truck loading and unloading 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for

every 2 Bays for POL/speciality

products and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP mobile unit

for each gantry.



Jharkhand

(iv) Tank Wagon loading and 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 50 m

unloading gantry (siding) length and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP

mobile

unit in each siding.

(v) Above ground Tank Minimum 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or

1 x 25 Kg. DCP per tank and

4 x 75 Kg. or 6 x 50 Kg. DCP mobile

unit per

installation.

Underground Tank Farms 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 Kg.

DCP

(vi) Fire Pump House 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 2

pumps.

(vii) Admn. Building / Store House 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 200 m2.

(minimum 1 x 10 Kg. DCP on

each

floor)

(viii) Generator Room upto 250 KVA 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP and 1 no. 4.5

Kg.

CO2 for every Generator

Above 250 KVA 2 nos. 4.5 Kg. & 1 no. 10 Kg.

DCP

(ix) Main Switch Room 1 no. 4.5 Kg. CO2 for every 25

m2

(x) Computer Room/Cabin Halon / Its proven equivalent – 2

nos. 0.6 / 1 Kg. for 50 m2

or 1 no.

per Cabin whichever is higher

(xi) Security Cabin 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP

(xii) Canteen 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2

(xiii) Laboratory 1 x 10 Kg. DCP & 1 x 4.5 Kg.

CO2

(xiv) Effluent Treatment Plant 1 nos. 75 Kg. & 2 nos. 10 Kg.

DCP

Extinguisher

(xv) Workshop 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP & 1 no. 2 kg.

CO2

Extinguisher

(xvi) Transformer 1 no. 6.8 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher

(xvii) UPS / Charger Room 1 no. 2 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher



Jharkhand

1.11.5 Safety Valves

To prevent building of pressure and consequent damage two numbers of pressure

vacuum valves shall be provided on the roof of MS tanks to release pressure.

1.12 Risk Assessment

1.12.1 Introduction

The Jasidih Terminal of M/s IOCL, which includes the facilities for receipt, storage

and despatch of petroleum products mainly poses fire hazard due to unwanted and

accidental release of hydrocarbons. However, due safeguard is being taken in design,

installation and operation of the system to prevent any unwanted release of

hydrocarbons from their containment. However, in the event of release of

hydrocarbons from their containment, there is a risk of fire. The chances of explosion

are less. This section deals with various failure cases leading to various hazard

scenarios, analysis of failure modes and consequence analysis.

Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of hazard due to various failure

scenarios to determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to determine the

distances up-to which the damage may be affected. The reason and purpose for

consequence analysis are manifolds like -

Computation of risk.

Aid better plant layout.

evaluate damage and protective measures necessary for saving properties &

human lives.

Ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protective measures.

Formulate safe design criteria and protection system.

Formulate effective Disaster Management Plan.

The results of consequences analysis are useful for getting information about all

known and unknown effects that are of importance when failure scenarios occur and

to get information about how to deal with possible catastrophic events. It also gives

the plant authorities, workers, district authorities and the public living in the area an

understanding of the hazard potential and remedial measures to be taken.



Jharkhand

1.11.2 Modes of Failure

There are various potential sources of large/small leakages in any installation. The

leakages may be in the form of gasket failure in a flanged joint, snapping of small dia

pipeline, leakages due to corrosion, weld failure, failure of loading arms, leakages due

to wrong opening of valves & blinds, pipe bursting due to overpressure, pump

mechanical seal failure and any other sources of leakage.

1.11.3 Damage Criteria

The damage effect of all such failures mentioned above are mainly due to thermal

radiation from pool fire or jet fire due to ignition of hydrocarbons released since the

petroleum products are highly inflammable specially Motor Sprit oil whose flash

points is low.

The petroleum products released accidentally due to any reason will normally spread

on the ground as a pool or released in the form of jet in case of release from a

pressurised pipeline through small openings. Light hydrocarbons present in the

petroleum products will evaporate and may get ignited both in case of jet as well as

liquid pool causing jet fire or pool fire. Accidental fire on the storage tanks due to

ignition of vapour from the tanks or due to any other reason may also be regarded as

pool fire.

Thermal radiation due to pool fire or jet flame may cause various degrees of burns on

human bodies. Also its effect on inanimate objects like equipment, piping, building

and other objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects due to thermal radiation

intensity are elaborated in Table - 1.5.

Table 1.5 Damage Due to Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity

Incident Thermal

Radiation Intensity

KW/M2

Type of Damage

37.5 Can cause heavy damage to process equipment, piping, building etc.

32.0 Maximum Flux level for thermally protected tanks.

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood.

8.0 Maximum heat flux for uninsulated tanks.

4.5 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within

20 sec. (First Degree Burn).

1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure.

0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation.



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Table 1.6 Physiological Effects of Threshold Thermal Doses

Dose Threshold KJ/M2 Effect

375 3rd Degree Burn.

250 2nd Degree Burn.

125 1st Degree Burn.

65 Threshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin

caused.

1st Degree Burn Involve only epidermis, blister may occur; example - sun

burn.

2nd Degree Burn Involve whole of epidermis over the area of burn plus

some portion of dermis.

3rd Degree Burn Involve whole of epidermis and dermis; subcutaneous

tissues may also be damaged.

In case of motor spirit having relatively higher vapour pressure, there is a possibility

of vapour cloud explosion. Damage effects due to blast over pressure is given in

Table 1.7.

Table 1.7 Damage Effects Due to Blast over Pressure

Blast Over Pressure

(Bar) Damage Type

0.30 Major Damage to Structures

0.17 Eardrum Rupture

0.10 Repairable Damage

0.03 Damage of Glass

0.01 Crack of Windows

1.11.4 Dispersion and Stability Class

In calculation of effects due to release of hydrocarbons dispersion of vapour plays an

important role as indicated earlier. The factors which govern dispersion is mainly

Wind Velocity, Stability Class, Temperature as well as surface roughness. One of the

characteristics of atmosphere is stability, which plays an important role in dispersion

of pollutants. Stability is essentially the extent to which it allows vertical motion by

suppressing or assisting turbulence. It is generally a function of vertical temperature

profile of the atmosphere. The stability factor directly influences the ability of the

atmosphere to disperse pollutants emitted into it from sources in the plant. In most

dispersion problems relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground.



Jharkhand

Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the

vertical temperature profile.

Temperature of the atmospheric air normally decreases with increase in height. The

rate of decrease of temperature with height is known as the Lapse Rate. It varies from

time to time and place to place. This rate of change of temperature with height under

adiabatic, or neutral condition is approximately 1oC per 100 metres. The atmosphere

is said to be stable, neutral or unstable according to the lapse rate is less than, equal or

greater than dry adiabatic lapse rate i.e. 1oC per 100 metres.

Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from A to F

A = Extremely unstable

B = Moderately unstable

C = Slightly unstable

(a) D = Neutral

E = Stable

F = Highly stable

1.11.5 Selected Failure Cases

The mode of approach adopted for consequence analysis is first to select the probable

failure scenarios. The failure scenarios selected are indicated in Table 1.8.

Table 1.8 List of Failure Cases

Sl.

No. Failure Scenarios Likely Consequences

Credible/

Non-credible

1] Tanks on Fire

i) MS Tank

ii) SKO Tank

iii) HSD Tank

Thermal Radiation

Partially-Credible

2] Vessel connection failure for

inlet / outlet lines of MS, SKO,

HSD tanks

Thermal radiation for

MS, SKO & HSD and

also explosion for MS

Partially-Credible

3] Gasket failure in pump discharge

line SKO, MS and HSD (Road

Tanker Loading Pump)

Thermal radiation

Credible

4] Failure of 3” dia loading arm

(i) MS, (ii) SKO & (iii) HSD - do -

Partially-Credible

5] Hole in pump discharge lines (25

mm) HSD, SKO & MS (Road

Tanker Loading)

- do - Credible

6] Mechanical seal failure for MS,

SKO & HSD pumps for Tank

truck loading

Thermal radiation Credible



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7] Ethanol pump discharge line full

bore failure. Thermal radiation Non-Credible

It will be seen that most of the probable cases of failures have been considered for

Consequence Analysis.

1.12 Consequence Analysis

Consequence Analysis of the selected failure cases have been done to evaluate and

identify possible consequences as well as to incorporate suitable measures in

operational phase to prevent and mitigate such failure events.

1.12.1 Storage Tanks on Fire

Two numbers of floating roof tanks of capacity 4241 KL each and another additional

one number of capacity 2212 KL for storage of Motor Spirit, 2 nos. for storage

capacity of 5303 KL each and 2 nos. of 2604 KL each for H.S.D (Cone. roof) and 2

nos. of 938 KL and 1 no. 3006 KL for SKO (Cone roof). 3 nos. of Ethanol Tanks

(Underground) each of capacity 70 KL will be provided. In addition to dykes the

tanks of different products will also be provided with fire wall around them.

A floating roof tank is susceptible to fire hazard, if a static charge or a spark ignites

the vapour being released from the rim vent, causing fire. Vapours coming out of

vents of cone. roof tanks can catch fire by lightning. If the fire is not controlled at the

initial stage it can lead to collapse of the roof and total liquid becomes exposed to fire.

The hazard posed by such failure and subsequent fire is intense thermal radiation. The

thermal radiation emanating from such tank fire can cause damage to nearby tanks

and persons' in the vicinity. As per IP Code, thermally protected facilities and storage

tanks can withstand a thermal radiation of 32 KW/M2 while unprotected tanks and

process facilities can withstand only upto 8 KW/M2. Normal persons can withstand an

intensity of 1.5 KW/M2 for a long duration. A radiation intensity of 4.5 KW/M

2 can

cause 1st degree burn if a man is exposed for more than 20 seconds.

Hazard distances due to thermal radiation as a result of fires in storage tanks are

shown in Table 1.9.



Jharkhand

Table 1.9 Hazard Distances Due to Storage Tanks on Fire

(All distances are from edge of the tanks)

Incident Thermal

Radiation KW/M2

Hazard distances (m) for

1F 2B 3D 5D

MS TANK (DIA-20 M)

37.5 N R N R N R N R


12.5 13 13 13 13

8.0 14 14 14 14

4.5 15 15 15 15

HSD TANK (DIA-22.0 M)


32.0 9 9 9 9

12.5 13 12 12 12

8.0 14 13 13 13

4.5 15 14 14 14

SKO TANK (DIA-16 M)


32.0 9 9 9 9

12.5 9 9 9 9

8.0 10 10 10 10

4.5 11 11 11 11

NR = Not Reached

It is seen from the above table that in case of tank fire for MS the hazard distance for

thermal radiation level for 8 KW/M2

will extend upto a distance of 14 m. In case of

tank fire for HSD distances to 8 KW/M2 is 14 m and for SKO tank distances to 8

KW/M2 is 10 m. All MS tanks & HSD tanks of dia 22m shall be provided with foam

pourer system & all MS tanks will be provided with water sprinkler system. It is also

seen that the distances upto 8 KW/M2 remain within the battery limit of the proposed

installation.

However, such tanks fires are very very rare. Also the vapour pressure of HSD and

SKO being much low at atmospheric temperature, the chances of ignition of vapour

are very low and practically nil.

1.12.2 Vessel connection failure for tank inlet/outlet lines

All the storage tanks are having two lines (one inlet and another outlet) connected at

bottom of the tank. Diameter of inlet/outlet lines from storage vessels are - 12"/14",

12"/10" and 12"/14" for MS Tank, SKO Tank and HSD Tank respectively. Such

vessel connection failure is very rare i.e. 3x10-6

. In case of failure of such nozzles

liquid will spill inside the dyke and will form a pool. The liquid pool may get ignited

if the vapours come into contact with an ignition source. Hazard distances for 37.5



Jharkhand

KW/m2, 32 KW/m

2, 12.5 KW/ m

2, 8 KW/ m

2 and 4.5 KW/ m

2 are calculated and

presented in Table 1.10.

Table 1.10 Hazard Distances Due to Pool Fire

(All distances are from edge of the dyke)

Incident Thermal

Radiation KW/M2

Hazard distances (m)

1F 2B 3D 5D

MS TANK NOZZLE FAILURE

37.5 NR NR NR NR

32.0 NR NR NR NR

12.5 41 43 43 43

8.0 43 45 45 45

4.5 47 48 47 47

Incident Thermal

Radiation KW/m2


1F 2B 3D 5D

SKO TANK NOZZLE FAILURE

37.5 NR NR NR NR

32.0 NR NR NR NR

12.5 33 34 34 36

8.0 35 35 35 36

4.5 37 36 36 37

HSD TANK NOZZLE FAILURE

37.5 NR NR NR NR

32.0 NR NR NR NR

12.5 45 46 46 46

8.0 47 47 47 47

4.5 50 49 49 48

NR = Not Reached

Ignition of the pool and pool fire will cause damage to tanks inside the dyke and

nearby equipment/pipeline.

As such action shall be taken immediately for covering the spilled liquid with foam

compound. In case of fire a quick action is required to extinguish the fire to prevent

damage.

Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion for MS tank nozzle failure. The vapour

from the pool may disperse in down wind direction along wind and may come into

some ignition source causing vapour cloud explosion. The hazard distances for UVCE

under different wind speed and stability classes for MS is given in Table 1.11.



Jharkhand

Table 1.11 Hazard Distances Due to Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion

(MS)

S.

No.

Wind Speed

m/sec./Stability Class

Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of

0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar

1. 1F 156 171 213

2. 2B 171 181 209

3. 3D 211 221 250

4. 5D 171 208 232

It is evident that in case of vapour cloud explosion heavy damage may occur in

nearby equipment and structures. The overpressure distances may extend outside

battery limit of the plant in the direction of wind flow. The overpressure distances of

0.3 bar (heavy damage) for MS extend upto 211 metres. However, since the failure

probability is very low, the occurrence is very rare.

1.12.3 Gasket Failure in Pump Discharge Lines

Gasket failure is one of the credible failure scenarios in a plant. The pump discharge

lines diameters are 8" for MS, 10" for HSD and 8" for SKO. Failure area of 25% on

the perimeter of the gasket for MS & SKO and 20% for HSD and 3 minutes release is

considered before ignition as it is assumed that action will be taken for stopping the

leakage by that time. Hazard distances for 37.5 KW/ m 2

, 32 KW/ m 2

, 8 KW/ m 2

, 4.5

KW/ m 2 and 1.6 KW/ m

2 are calculated and presented in Table 1.12.

Table 1.12 Hazard Distances to Pool Fire Due to Failure of Gaskets

In Pump Discharge Lines

(All distances are from centre of the pool)

Incident Thermal

Radiation

KW/m2


1F 2B 3D 5D

MS PUMP GASKET FAILURE - Release Rate: 4.01 kg/sec.

37.5 12 13 13 13

32.0 13 14 14 14

12.5 31 32 32 33

8.0 34 34 34 34

4.5 37 36 36 36

SKO PUMP GASKET FAILURE - Release Rate: 4.36 kg/sec.

37.5 11 11 11 11

32.0 13 13 13 13

12.5 47 47 47 48

8.0 49 48 48 49

4.5 51 51 50 50

HSD PUMP GASKET FAILURE - Release Rate: 4.36 kg/sec.

37.5 13 13 13 13

32.0 14 14 14 14



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12.5 47 47 47 48

8.0 49 48 48 49

4.5 51 51 50 50

Table 1.13 Hazard Distances to UVCE Due To MS Pump Discharge Line

Gasket Failure

Sl.

No

.

Wind Speed

m/sec./Stability Class


0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar

1. 1F 42 45 51

2. 2B 52 53 58

3. 3D 52 63 67

4. 5D 51 53 57

It is seen that in case of failure of gaskets in pump discharge lines pool fire thermal

radiation distances for 37.5/32 KW/ m 2

are 13/14 m, 11/13 & 13/14 m in case of MS,

SKO and HSD respectively. For gasket failure in HSD line, the distances for target

radiation of 8 KW/ m 2

and 4.5 KW/ m 2

are 49 m and 51 m respectively from pool

centre and may go outside the Depot premises towards canal. In case of vapour cloud

explosion for MS pump discharge lines the distances to 0.3 bar / 0.1 bar /0.03 bar

extend upto a distance of 52 m / 63 m/ 67 m respectively. Hence, in case of any

leakage immediate action has to be taken to prevent any fire/explosion and to put out

the fire.

1.12.4 Snapping of 4 inches diameter loading arm for Tank Truck Loading

Failure probability of 4 inches diameter loading arm is in the order of 3x10-8

per hour

of operation. Although the probability is very low, however the failure scenario is

taken for calculation of hazard distances due to failure of loading arm for different

products. The consequences have been calculated for 3 minutes release as it is

assumed that action will be taken by the operators for stopping the pumps and closing

the isolation valves immediately within this period. Hazard distances for fire due to

snapping of loading arm for different products are presented in Table 1.14.



Jharkhand

Table 1.14 Hazard Distances to Pool Fire Due to Loading Arm Failure

(All distances are from centre of the pool)

Incident Thermal

Radiation

KW/m2


1F 2B 3D 5D

MS LOADING ARM FAILURE - Release Rate: 12.6 kg/sec.

37.5 NR NR NR NR

32.0 17 17 18 20

12.5 50 50 51 50

8.0 54 54 54 52

4.5 58 57 56 54

SKO LOADING ARM FAILURE - Release Rate: 16.2 kg/sec.

37.5 NR NR NR NR

32.0 NR NR NR NR

12.5 85 86 86 85

8.0 88 88 88 86

4.5 93 91 91 88

HSD LOADING ARM FAILURE - Release Rate: 20.0 kg/sec.

37.5 NR NR NR NR

32.0 NR NR NR NR

12.5 94 95 95 95

8.0 97 97 97 97

4.5 102 101 100 99

It is evident from the above table that in case of snapping of 4 inches diameter loading

arm for Tank Truck Loading action has to be taken to stop leakage immediately as

well as for prevention of fire.

Table 1.15 Hazard Distances Due to Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion

(MS)

S.

No.

Wind Speed

m/sec./Stability

Class


0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar

1. 1F 77 85 105

2. 2B 93 95 103

3. 3D 104 108 120

4. 5D 104 107 117

1.12.5 Creation of 25 mm dia hole in Pump Discharge Line

Formation of hole in a pipeline is a credible phenomenon as corrosion may occur if

proper protection is not taken. 25 mm dia hole has been chosen for risk analysis. Due

to formation of 25 mm dia hole in pump discharge lines the liquid at high pressure

will pass through the small opening in the form of jet. The jet of liquid may be ignited

if it comes into contact with any ignition source. The ignited jet may damage any

object in its path causing subsequent fire and domino effect.



Jharkhand

Jet fire is possible in case of flammable liquids with relatively high flash point i.e.

MS. Even if ignition of jet does not take place, the liquid will fall on ground and may

cause "pool fire". Hazard distances due to pool fire for such release and ignition of the

pool is presented in Table - 1.16.

Table 1.16 Hazard Distances to Pool Fire Due to 25 MM Dia Hole of Pump

Discharge Lines

Incident Thermal

Radiation

KW/M2


1F 2B 3D 5D

MS - Release Rate: 5.12 kg/sec.

37.5 12 13 13 13

32.0 13 17 17 17

12.5 35 35 36 36

8.0 37 37 38 38

4.5 41 40 40 40

SKO - Release Rate: 5.47 kg/sec.

37.5 13 16 16 16

32.0 14 17 17 17

12.5 52 52 53 53

8.0 54 54 54 54

4.5 57 56 56 55

HSD - Release Rate: 5.75 kg/sec.

37.5 19 16 16 16

32.0 20 17 17 17

12.5 53 53 54 54

8.0 55 55 55 55

4.5 58 58 57 57

Frequency of formation of 25 mm dia hole in 200 mm dia pipeline is 1.1x10-6

/m/year

and the same for 250 mm dia pipeline is 9.2x10-7

/m/year. The distances for 8 KW/M2

for MS, SKO and HSD due to leakage through 25 mm dia hole in Road Tanker

loading pump discharge lines are 38 m, 54 m and 55 m respectively. Ignition of the

pool and pool fire will cause damage to tanks and nearby equipment. As such action

shall be taken immediately for covering the spilled liquid with foam compound. In

case of fire a quick action is required to extinguish the fire to prevent damage.



Jharkhand

Table 1.17 Hazard Distances to UVCE Due to 25 MM Dia Hole in MS Pump

Discharge Line

S.

No.

Wind Speed

m/sec./Stability

Class


0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar

1. 1F 52 54 59

2. 2B 51 53 57

3. 3D 62 63 68

4. 5D 61 63 67

It is evident from the above table that the distance to heavy damage (0.3 bar) extends

upto 62 m.

1.12.6 Pump Mechanical Seal Failure

The frequency of failure of mechanical seal of centrifugal pumps specially handling

light hydrocarbons is quite high and poses risk due to fire and explosion. Failure of

seal releases considerable quantity of hydrocarbons into atmosphere and creates a

hazardous zone. Present thinking is to adopt double mechanical seal especially for

light hydrocarbon services. This helps in reducing their frequency of hydrocarbon

releases to atmosphere but still contribute to a great extent to the overall risk of the

plant. However, the type of seal, single or double, does not effect their release rate or

the hazard distances. Hazard distances have been calculated for the pump mechanical

seal failure. A shaft diameter of 40 mm and a seal gap of 1 mm for MS & SKO and 50

mm shaft diameter and 1 mm seal gap for HSD pump have been assumed for release

rate calculation.

The hazard distances to pool fire are given in Table 1.18 below:

Table 1.18 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Pool Fire

For Pump Mechanical Seal Failure

Incident Thermal

Radiation

KW/M2


1F 2B 3D 5D

MS PUMP - Release Rate: 0.72 kg/sec.

37.5 7 7 7 7

32.0 8 8 8 8

12.5 15 15 15 15

8.0 16 16 16 16

4.5 17 17 17 12

SKO PUMP - Release Rate: 0.74 kg/sec.

37.5 7 7 7 7

32.0 9 9 9 9



Jharkhand

12.5 20 20 20 20

8.0 21 21 21 21

4.5 22 22 22 22

HSD PUMP - Release Rate: 1.06 kg/sec.

37.5 8 8 8 8

32.0 9 9 9 9

12.5 24 24 24 24

8.0 25 25 25 25

4.5 27 26 26 26

The above table shows that the hazard distance of 1st degree burn i.e. 4.5 KW/m2 may

extend up to distance of 27 meters from centre of the pool for pool fire for pump

mechanical seal failure.

1.12.7 Ethanol Pump Discharge Line Failure

The Ethanol pump takes its suction from the Ethanol tank and pumps it for blending

with MS. In case of Ethanol pump discharge line failure ethanol shall fall and spread

on the ground .The spilled liquid forms liquid pool and catches fire resulting in pool

fire. The results of the above consequence envisaged are presented here below in

Table 1.19.

Table 1.19 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Pool Fire

(b) For Ethanol Pump Discharge Line Full Bore Failure

S.

No.

Thermal

Load

KW/m2

Distance (m) from centre of the pool

Release Rate: 2.57 kg/sec.

1F 2B 3D 5D

1. 37.5 11 15 16 17

2. 32.0 12 16 17 18

3. 12.5 21 24 24 24

4. 8.0 26 28 28 27

5. 4.5 33 35 34 33

From the above Table - 1.19, it is evident that the distance to thermal radiation of

4.5 KW/m2 extends to a distance of 35 meter in case of full bore failure in pump

discharge line. It is also evident that distance to 1st degree burn i.e. 4.5 KW/m2

remains confined within the factory boundary.



Jharkhand

1.13 RISKS AND FAILURE PROBABILITY

The term Risk involves the quantitative evaluation of likelihood of any undesirable

event as well as likelihood of harm of damage being caused to life, property and

environment. This harm or damage may only occur due to sudden/ accidental release

of any hazardous material from the containment. This sudden/accidental release of

hazardous material can occur due to failure of component systems. It is difficult to

ascertain the failure probability of any system because it will depend on the

components of the system. Even if failure occurs, the probability of fire and the extent

of damage will depend on many factors like:

(a) Quantity and physical properties of material released.

(b) Source of ignition.

(c) Wind velocity and direction

(d) Presence of population, properties etc. nearby.

Failure frequency of different components like pipes, valves, instruments, pressure

vessels and other equipment manufactured in India are not available nor any statutory

authority has tried to collect the information and form an acceptable data bank to be

used under Indian condition.

Failure frequency data for some components accepted in U.S.A. and European

Countries are given in Table 1.20.

Table 1.20 Failure Frequency Data

S.No. Item Failure Frequency / 106 Years

1] Shell Failure

(a) Process/pressure vessel

(b) Pressurised Storage Vessel

3

1

2] Full Bore Vessel Connection

Failure (Diameter mm)

< 25 ........

40 ........

50 ........

80 ........

100 ........

>150 …….

30

10

7.5

5

4

3

3] Full Bore Process Pipeline

Failure

d <50 mm

........

50 <d <150 mm ........

d >150 mm ........

0.3 *

0.09 *

0.03 *



Jharkhand

4] Articulated Loading / unloading

arm failure 3x10

-8**

* Failure frequency expressed in (/m/106 years)

** Failure frequency expressed in (/hr of operation)

1.14 Recommendations & Conclusions

The recommendations and conclusions as revealed from Risk analysis Study are as

follows:

(i) The Individual Risk value of 1.0 E-6/year as evident from the Iso-Risk

Contour (Drg. No. 2) is confined mainly within the plant premises. Hazard

distances arrived from the consequence analysis also reveals that in most of

the cases hazard is confined within the plant premises. Hence, installation of

the Terminal of the place is safe from risk point of view.

(ii) The fire fighting system for storage tanks shall be designed conforming to

OISD norms. Fire hydrant network should be considered taking into

consideration of additional cooling water required in addition to the tank on

fire.

(iii) Health check and maintenance of the equipment and pipelines should be

done at regular intervals to avoid any major failure.

(iv) Instruments and trip interlocks should be checked and calibrated at regular

intervals to prevent any wrong signalling and consequent failures.

(v) Fire fighting system as well as portable fire-fighting appliances should be

always kept in good working condition. Safety appliances should also be

checked and kept in good working condition.

(vi) Mock Drills should be conducted at regular intervals.

(vii) To reduce the failure frequency due care has been taken in design,

construction, inspection and operation. Well-established codes of practices

will have been followed for design, inspection and construction of the

facility.

(viii) The installation should be operated by experienced personnel trained for

operation of such facility and also in fire fighting.

(ix) Smoking should be strictly prohibited inside the installation.

(x) Non -sparking tools should be used for maintenance to avoid any spark.



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(xi) The storage tanks, pipelines and facilities in Tank Lorry Filling Shed should

be properly earthed to avoid accumulation of static electricity.

(xii) Vents in case of cone roof tanks should be provided with wire mesh.

(xiii) Entry of personnel should be restricted inside the licensed area.

(xiv) Good liaison should be maintained with outside organisation and District

Administration, hospitals and nursing homes in the locality.

(xv) A mutual aid agreement should be done with nearby industries, hospitals,

nursing homes, so that help may be obtained in case of any major hazard.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (DMP)

1.15 Introduction

The Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is prepared for meeting any emergency

response in the event of fire accident, hazards etc., through the effective and

optimum utilization of all the facilities inbuilt in the plant and available in the

neighbouring areas as such. This plan has got two sub chapters, First chapter guides

for meeting the „On - Site Emergency” and the Second chapter guides “Off - Site

Emergency”.

This off- site emergency response is prepared to ensure the participation of all the

concerned civil agencies in and around this plant with a view to seek their

preparedness in meeting such emergencies and to bring about a coordinated task

force involving in district authorities. Fire service department, railways, factories

inspectorate, electricity board and other protection forces available in similar type of

industries meeting of all the above agencies is also the method of operation of „ On

site Emergency Plan / Disaster Management Plan”.

Disaster management plan will have necessary scope for review of its effectiveness

in its working and adapting to any new systems of further improving upon the

implementation of the plan itself.

The objective of any plant should be safe and trouble free operation and smooth

production. This is ensured by taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design

of plant, equipment/pipeline as per standard codes, ensuring selection of proper

material of construction, well designed codes/rules and instruments for safe operation



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of the plant. Safety should be ensured afterwards by operating the plant by trained

manpower. In spite of all precautions accidents may happen due to human error or

system malfunction. Any accident involving release of hazardous material may cause

loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial installations

are vulnerable to various natural as well as manmade disasters. Examples of natural

disasters are flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightening etc. and manmade disasters are

like major fire, explosion, sudden heavy leakage of toxic and poisonous gases and

liquids, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities etc. The damage caused by any

disaster is determined by the potential for loss surrounding the event. It is impossible

to predict the time and nature of disaster, which might strike on undertaking.

However, an effective disaster management plan i.e. pre-planned procedure involving

proper utilization of in-house as well as outside resources helps to minimize the loss

to a minimum and resume the working condition as soon as possible.

1.16 Statutory Requirement

Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for IOCL‟s Jasidih Terminal.

The applicable regulations are:

(a) Factories Act, 1948 and as amended

(b) Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989, notified

under Environment Protection Act 1986 and amended in 1994.

(c) Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical

Accidents, 1996.

(d) Stipulations of OISD-168

(e) Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.

The Disaster Management Plan has been prepared based primarily on Schedule-11 of

the rule, Manufacture, storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 and

amended in 1994.

1.17 Objective of Disaster Management Plan

Disaster Management Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation Plan. The

plan includes activities before disaster, during disaster and post disaster:

The objective of disaster management plan is to formulate and provide organizational

set up and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in any

emergency situation in order to:



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a) Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside

resources

b) Protect the personnel inside the depot as well as public outside.

c) Safeguard the depot as well as outside property and environment.

d) Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties.

e) Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry

f) Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions.

The above objectives can be achieved by –

i) Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard

potential and identification of maximum credible hazard scenario.

ii) Arrange/augment facilities for fire fighting, safety, medical (both equipment

and manpower)

iii) Evolving proper action plan with proper organizational set-up and

communication facilities as well as warning procedure.

1.18 Definitions

Disaster

Disaster is a general term, which implies a hazardous situation created by an

accidental release or spill of hazardous materials, which poses threat to the safety of

workers, residents in the neighbourhood, the environment or property.

Emergency

Emergency condition and Disaster Condition are synonymous.

ON-SITE Emergency/Disaster

In an On-Site Emergency the effect of any hazard (fire/explosion/release of toxic

gases) are confined within the factory premises. An accident taking place inside the

depot and its effects are confined within the boundary wall.

OFF-SITE Emergency/Disaster

In case of any hazard inside IOCL, Jasidih Terminal the effects that are also felt

outside the boundary wall.

1.19 Description of Industrial Activity

Name and Address of the person furnishing the information

Chief Terminal Manager

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (MD)

Jasidih Terminal, Jasidih Industrial Area, Jasidih,

Dist: Deoghar, Jharkhand



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(a) Site Location

The pipeline terminal is located in the village Badladih (Jasidih) in the district of

Deoghar in Jharkhand. The Terminal is being set up on 27 acres of land owned by

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.

(b) Population around Site

There is no any major habitation within a radius of 1.0 KM of the factory.

(c) Activities & Facilities

A brief description the activities in Jasidih Terminal are:

i) Receipt of the petroleum products e.g. Motor Spirit, SKO, and HSD shall

be received through a pipeline tap-off from Haldia - Barauni pipeline

near Jasidih.

ii) Existing and proposed tankages details are as follows:

A. Existing Tankages

SR.NO. TAG.

NO. SIZE DIA X HT PRODUCT

NORMAL

CAPACITY

TANK

TYPE CLASS

1 T -101 20m DIAx 14.5m HT MS 4241 KL FR A

2 T-102 20m DIAx 14.5m HT MS 4241 KL FR A

3 T-103 16m DIAx 14m HT MS 2212 KL FR A

4 T-104 22m DIAx 14m HT HSD 5303 KL CR B




8 T-108 16m DIAx 15m HT SKO 3006 KL CR B



11 T-111 3m DIAx 10.5m LONG ETHANOL 70 KL HOR. A



13 T-116 10m DIAx9m HT MS 500 KL FR A

14 T-120 2.0m DIAx 6.0 LG HSD 20KL U/G

B

TOTAL 32120 KLS

13 T-114 24m DIAx 15m HT WATER 5600 KL CR

14 T-115 24m DIAx 15m HT WATER 5600 KL CR

SUB TOTAL 11200 KL

B. Proposed Tankages & 4 bottom loading bays

15 T-116 24m DIA x20m HT HSD 9025 KL CR B

16 T-117 26m DIA x20m HT MS 10592 KL IFRVT A

17 T-118 14m DIA x 14m HT SKO 2100 KL CR B



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SUB TOTAL 21717 KL

GRAND TOTAL 53837 KL

iii) Pump House

10 Nos. electrical driven centrifugal pumps have been proposed in pump house for

Road Tanker filling. Details of pumps provided are as follows:

Product Service Type (Capacity

LPM)

Head

(m) No. of Pumps

MS Loading 4000 42 1+1 = 2

HSD Loading 6000 40 3+1 = 4

SKO

(PDS) Loading 4000 40 1+1 = 2

SKO

(IND) Loading 2400 40 1+1 = 2

Ethanol Mixing 200 200 3

iv) Tank Lorry Filling / Tank Lorry Decantation

Tank Lorries are filled in filling bay by pumping products from storage tank to filling

bay. 12 Nos. of bays are provided. The discharge pipeline branches are connected to

tank Lorries by loading arm through a flow control valve and flow meter. The tank

Lorries are properly earthed before receiving the petroleum products.

1.20 Safety Related Utilities

i) Water

Fire water requirement is as per norms of OISD-117.

Water Storage Facilities: As per OISD-117

(Two water tanks)

Source of Water: Deep wells provided inside the depot.

Fire hydrants/monitors shall be provided in all the vulnerable areas of the plant.

All MS tanks & HSD tanks of dia 22m shall be provided with foam pourer system &

all MS tanks will be provided with sprinkler system.

ii) Power



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The terminal‟s power requirement is supplied by J.S.E.B. at 11 KV and Emergency

power: DG Set.

1.21 Disaster Planning

Modern approach to disaster management plan involves

a) Risk analysis Study

b) Action Plan

Risk analysis study involves

a) Risk Identification

b) Risk Evaluation

Risk identification involves

i) Identification of hazardous events in the installation, which can cause loss of capital

equipment, loss of production, threaten health and safety of employees, threaten

public health and damage to the environment.

ii) Identification of risk, important processes & areas to determine effective risk

reduction measures.

Risk evaluation involves calculation of damage potential of the identified hazards

with damage distances (which is termed as consequence analysis) as well as

estimation of frequencies of the events.

Hazardous areas with different hazard scenarios and their damage potential with

respect to fire & explosion have already been mentioned in earlier section. However,

failure rate of different hazard scenarios has been discussed broadly based on data

available for similar incidents outside India.

Probability of any hazardous incident and the consequent damage also depends on –

a) Wind speed

b) Wind direction

c) Atmospheric stability

d) Source of ignition and also

e) Presence of plant assets & population exposed in the direction of wind.

Action plan depends largely on results of risk analysis data and may include one or

more of the following:

a) Plan for preventive as well as predictive maintenance.



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b) Augment facilities for safety, fire fighting, medical (both equipment and

manpower) as per requirements of risk analysis.

c) Evolve emergency handling procedure both on-site and off-site.

d) Practice mock drill for ascertaining preparedness for tackling

hazards/emergencies at any time-day or night.

1.22 Identification of Hazards

1.22.1 General Nature of Hazard

In Jasidih Terminal petroleum products to be handled are highly inflammable and also

have explosive properties.

Any small fire in the installation, if not extinguished at early stage can cause large

scale damage and may have a cascading effect. Hence the terminal requires.

a) A quick responsive containment and control system requiring well planned

safety and fire fighting system.

b) Well organized trained manpower to handle the process equipment & systems

safely.

c) Well trained personnel to handle safety and fire fighting equipment to

extinguish fire inside the installation promptly as well as tackle any type of

emergency.

d) Well planned Disaster Management Plan.

1.22.2 Hazardous areas of the Plant

The plant activities handling petroleum products can be subdivided into the following:

Activities Place

a) Receipt of petroleum products i) Pipeline Manifold.

b) Petroleum products storage i) Tank Farm Area

c) Petroleum products pumping i) Pump House

d) Dispatch of petroleum products i) Road Tanker Loading Bay

1.22.3 Hazard Scenarios and effects

This has been discussed in detail in the Chapter on Risk Analysis. However, a brief

outline is given in the following table:

S.No. Scenarios Effect/Effect Distances

1. Tank on Fire. Fire in any one storage tank can damage the

tank as well as other tanks in the immediate

vicinity and may have a cascading effect.



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2. Vessel connection

Failure / Catastrophic

Failure of Storage

Tank.

Can cause fire damaging all the tanks if the fire

is not tackled immediately. Explosion can occur

due to failure of MS tank nozzle failure/MS

tank catastrophic failure.

3. Gasket Failure in

Pump Discharge Line.

Can cause pool fire/jet fire and explosion,

damaging adjoining pipelines, tanks and other

properties.

4. Hole in Pump

Discharge lines.

Can cause pool fire/jet fire and explosion,

damaging adjoining pipelines, tanks and other

properties.

5. Failure of loading

Arm.

Can cause fire/explosion damaging the trucks,

pipelines and entire loading bay.

6. Mechanical seal

failure of pumps.

Can cause fire damaging the pipelines and other

pumps.

7. Ethanol pump

discharge line FB

failure.

Can cause pool fire/jet fire, damaging adjoining

pipelines and other properties.

All the scenarios are having damage potential to a different degree. However,

maximum damage can happen due to storage tank pipeline connection failure or in

case of tank fire.

In all the above cases fire/explosion can occur due to ignition of the vapour of

petroleum products coming out from the containment. The sources of ignitions

may be (I) Hot work in the vicinity (ii) Smoking (iii) Lightning (iv) Generation of

static electricity (v) Radiant heat from outside. (v) Deliberate ignition or sabotage.

1.23 Safety Related Components Provided in the Depot

1.23.1 Safety Measures:

Jasidih Terminal is being provided with safety related measures right in the design

stage, which will minimize any accident e.g.

i) Layout of the plant with sufficient safety distances.

ii) Use of proper material of construction for equipment and piping

iii) Storage tanks provided inside a dyke wall with sufficient height.

iv) All MS tanks & HSD tanks of dia 22m shall be provided with foam pourer

system & all MS tanks will be provided with water sprinkler system.

v) Pumps shall be provided with mechanical seals to avoid spillage through

gland.

vi) All electrical items have been carefully selected and are either flame proof/

intrinsic safety type in licensed area.



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vii) Proper earthing of all storage tanks, pipelines, structures and trucks for

filling/despatch of petroleum products.

viii) Loading Arm shall be provided whose failure rate is much lower than

loading hoses.

ix) Provision of oil separation in Oil Separator for separation of oil to avoid any

oily water going out of the depot or spoiling ground water.

x) Arrangement of fire hydrants monitors and hose boxes have been kept in all

the hazardous areas and fire water storage tanks.

xi) Use of level indicators and level control measures with alarm system to

ensure storage tanks are filled upto the desired level only.

xii) Use of flow control devices and meters for tank truck filling to ensure that

each compartment in the tank truck is filled to the desired level.

xiii) Provision of portable fire extinguishers at vulnerable places to extinguish

fire.

xiv) The plant shall be properly guarded by a boundary wall of sufficient height.

xv) Licensed area shall be properly guarded for any unauthorized entry of

personnel.

xvi) All areas in the depot shall be properly illuminated through lighting.

Requisite numbers of High Mast Towers have been proposed around the

depot for better illumination.

xvii) Emergency Diesel Generator Sets are being provided to ensure operation

and illumination during power failure.

xviii) Emergency shutdown switch shall be provided to stop all operations.

1.23.2 Other Safety Measures

Some of the preventive & pre-emptive measures which are to be taken during

operational phase are as follows:

a) Safety measures

Following safety tips should always be borne in mind while working in the

plant to avoid emergency & hazardous situation.

i) Follow specified procedures and instructions for start-up, shut down

and any maintenance work.

ii) Follow permit to work system.



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iii) Identify correctly the part of the plant in which work is to be done.

iv) Isolate the part, machine properly on which work is to be done.

v) Release pressure from the part of the plant on which work is to be

done.

vi) Remove flammable liquid/gases thoroughly, on which work is to be

done.

vii) Use non-sparking tools.

b) Plant Inspection

Apart from planned inspection, checks and tests should be carried out to

reduce failure probability of containments.

i) Storage vessels and pipeline should be checked regularly during both

their construction and operational phase.

ii) Critical trips, interlocks & other instruments should be checked

regularly to avoid fail danger situation.

iii) Fire fighting system should be checked regularly to ensure proper

functioning during emergency situation.

iv) Proper lightning protection system should be provided and checked

regularly to avoid lightning effect.

c) Performance or Condition Monitoring

A systematic monitoring of performance or condition should be carried out

especially for large machines and equipment, which may be responsible for

serious accidents/disaster in case the defined limits are crossed.

i) Vibration, speed & torque measurements for pumps, DG sets etc.

ii) Thickness and other flaw measurements in metals of storage vessels,

Inlet & Outlet lines from storage vessels etc.

Many types of non-destructive testing/condition monitoring techniques are

available. X-ray radiography, acoustic emission testing, magnetic particle

testing, eddy current inspection techniques etc. are used for detection of

flaws and progression of cracks in metals. Testing equipments are also there

for checking vibration, speed, torque etc.



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The above condition monitoring techniques should be applied regularly by

internal/external agencies. Immediate corrective measures should be taken

if any flaws are detected.

d) Preventive Maintenance

A schedule for preventive maintenance for moving machineries should be

prepared based on experience in other similar plants as well as instruction of

the suppliers. The schedule should be followed strictly during operation as

well as planned shutdown period.

e) Entry of Personnel

Entry of unauthorized personnel is strictly prohibited inside the premises.

The persons entering the plant should not carry matches, lighters etc.

f) Hot work

Hot work should not be permitted except in-designated areas with utmost

precaution and proper work permit.

1.23.3 Details of Fire Fighting Facilities

Modern fire fighting facilities shall be provided in the depot in line with norms of

OISD.

i] Fire Hydrant System

The entire TERMINAL area shall be provided with a looped fire hydrant

pipeline connected to fire engines on auto system and always kept under

pressure to meet emergencies. Two numbers of fire water storage tanks

(adequate capacity) shall be provided, which are kept full and take care of

fire fighting requirement for four hours. The source of water shall be tube

wells provided inside the depot. The fire hydrant line shall be equipped with

required numbers of single/double headed hydrant valves, monitors and

hoses. The system can also be connected to foam making branches for

generating foam for extinguishing the fire.



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ii] Sprinkler System

Water sprinkler system with spray nozzles have been proposed for three

numbers of MS, SKO and HSD storage tanks for cooling the tanks if

required.

iii] Portable Fire Fighting Equipment

Following portable fire fighting equipment have been proposed in the plant

as per OISD:

Sl. No. Type of Area Portable Extinguishers

i] Storage of Class-A/B products 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2.

In packed containers and stored

In open/closed area

ii] Pump House upto 50 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 2 pumps

(Class - A & B)

Above 50 – 100 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for each pump.

Beyond 100 HP 2 nos. 10 Kg. or 1 no. of 25 Kg.

DCP for each pump.

Pump House upto 50 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 4

(Class – C) pumps upto 50 HP

Above 50 HP 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 KG

DCP for 4 pumps.

iii] Tank Truck loading and unloading 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 2

bays

for POL/speciality products and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP mobile

unit for each gantry.

iv] Tank Wagon loading and 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 50 m

unloading gantry (siding) length and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP

mobile

unit in each siding.

v] Above ground Tank Minimum 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or

1 x 25 Kg. DCP per tank and 4 x

75 Kg or 6 x 50 Kg. DCP mobile

unit per installation.

Underground Tank Farms 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 Kg.

DCP

vi] Fire Pump House 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 2

pumps.

vii] Admn. Building / Store House 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 200 m2.

(Minimum 1 x 10 Kg. DCP on

each

floor)



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viii] Generator Room upto 250 KVA 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP and 1 no. 4.5

Kg.

CO2 for every Generator

Above 250 KVA 2 nos. 4.5 Kg. & 1 no. 10 Kg.

DCP

ix] Main Switch Room 1 no. 4.5 Kg. CO2 for every 25

m2

x] Computer Room/Cabin Halon / Its proven equivalent – 2

nos. 0.6 / 1 Kg. for 50 m2 or 1 no.

per Cabin whichever is higher

xi] Security Cabin 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP

xii] Canteen 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2

xiii] Laboratory 1 x 10 Kg. DCP & 1 x 4.5 Kg.

CO2

xiv] Effluent Treatment Plant 1 nos. 75 Kg. & 2 nos. 10 Kg.

DCP Extinguisher

xv] Workshop 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP & 1 no. 2 kg.

CO2

Extinguisher

xvi] Transformer 1 no. 6.8 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher

xvii] UPS / Charger Room 1 no. 2 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher

v] First Aid

Jasidih Terminal have First Aid kits equipped with First Aid medicines as

per factory act.

1.23.4 Emergency Control Centre & Shelter Room

The emergency control centre shall be situated in the office building. The office room

of Terminal In-charge shall be designated as Emergency Control Centre. P&T

telephones, Alarms, Emergency Control Manual and Safety and Personal Protective

Appliances have been arranged in sufficient numbers and kept in the room.

Emergency Shelter

The room has been proposed outside the licensed area for giving shelter to

employees/other personnel who are not involved in emergency control actions.

1.23.5 Alarm and Communication System

a] Alarm System

i] Electrical Sirens and Hand Sirens shall be provided in office

building/Emergency Control Room and other vulnerable areas like Tank



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Farm Area, Pump House, Receipt Manifold, TLF for warning the public

as well as employees inside.

ii] The sound of electrical siren shall be audible upto 3 KM.

iii] For fire condition electrical siren will be wailing for minimum 2 minutes

and for all clear signal it will be a straight run siren for 2 minutes.

iv] For disaster condition the wailing sound shall be repeated with a

minimum 10 seconds gap.

b] Communication System

For communication with officers/employees page phone services, manual

call points and intercom services shall be provided with sufficient nos. of

P&T telephones at different places including Sr. Depot Manager‟s room for

communication with other agencies.

1.23.6 Mutual Aid

It is not possible to combat large scale fire/disaster single handed effectively by any

organization. Assistance of resources of fire fighting and other services are of utmost

importance during the hour of crisis. Following type of mutual aids are envisaged:

i] Assistance by fire fighting teams & equipment.

ii] Medical and first aid assistance.

iii] Assistance of vehicles for any emergency requirement.

iv] Help in liaisoning with police, District Collectorate, Fire Brigade and

Hospitals.

1.24 Disaster Control Plan

The plan include three major plans –

i] Equipment Plan

ii] Organization Plan

iii] Action Plan

1.24.1 Equipment Planning

Equipment plan i.e. arrangement of fire fighting, safety, transport etc. has been

discussed earlier.

1.24.2 Organization Plan

The disaster management organization and action plan is made in such a way that it is

capable of quick response at any time to meet emergency situation. The plan gives a



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detailed chain of command, area of responsibility of each personnel involved,

information flow pattern and coordination activity required to meet the emergency. A

typical Disaster Management Organization Chart is given below:

CHIEF EMERGENCY

CONTROLLER

SITE EMERGENCY

CONTROLLER

INCIDENT

CONTROLLE

R, FIRE

FIGHTING

INCIDENT

CONTROLLER,

SECURITY

INCIDENT

CONTROLLER

, RESCUE,

EVACUATION,

TRANSPORT

INCIDENT

CONTROLLER

, MEDICAL

AID,

WELFARE

Chief Emergency Controller

Chief Emergency Controller is the person to head the group during emergency

situation. Generally chief of the installation e.g. Terminal In-charge shall be the Chief

Emergency Controller. In his absence next man in the hierarchy or any designated

officer shall take charge.

Chief Emergency Controller is the ultimate authority in directing emergency

operations. He will be assisted by other incident controllers i.e.

i] Incident Controller - Fire fighting

ii] Incident Controller - Security

iii] Incident Controller - Medical Aid & Welfare

iv] Incident Controller - Rescue, Evacuation, Transport & Welfare

Main task of Chief Emergency Controller is to ensure that facilities are made

available without any confusion. He also activates District Crisis Group/Local Crisis

Group for necessary action during Pre Emergency and during emergency period.

He shall be responsible for –

a] Essential communication & liaison with outside agencies.

b] Fire fighting & rescue operations.

c] Emergency plant shutdown and declare emergency.

d] Demolition and repairs.



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e] Accident investigation.

f] Ensuring safety of important records.

g] Public relations for giving authoritative information to news media and

others.

h] Removal of casualties, giving information to their relatives & compensation

i] Arranging medical aid for treatment of the injured.

j] Bring back normalcy as early as possible.

Site Emergency Controller

He maintains close liaison between Chief Emergency Controller and other functional

Incident Controllers and controls emergency at site. He coordinates with different

team members to ensure that various activities are carried out promptly without any

chaos. He acts as per guidance of Chief Emergency Controller and takes charge in

absence of Chief Emergency Controller. The main functions of Site Emergency

Controller are :

i] Maintains close liaison with Chief Emergency Controller.

ii] Controls operation depending on situation. Shut down loading and unloading

operations and isolate storage area pipelines.

iii] Give alarm siren to warn all employees and public.

iv] Evacuate non essential persons to the designated place if required.

v] Operate water sprinklers on storage tanks for cooling if fire is inside dyke or

nearby.

vi] Start fire fighting till arrival of designated fire fighting crew from inside and

outside if necessary.

vii] Initiate rescue operations and first aid to the injured person till the arrival of

doctor and ambulance.

viii] Notify adjacent factory authority and local administration.

ix] Enforce entry of persons with authorized duties from outside with due care.

Functions of other incident controllers are detailed below:

Incident Controller – Fire Fighting

He will keep close liaison with Chief Emergency Controller. His main functions

are –



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i] Arrange and keep necessary appliances and supplies to combat emergency.

ii] Guide the fire fighting people under his command and render technical

assistance to combat fire/emergency.

iii] Establish barricade in the danger zone, if necessary.

iv] Keep liaison with fire fighting team coming from outside.

Incident Controller – Security

His functions during emergency operation will be –

i] Check entry of unauthorized personnel inside the installation.

ii] Control mob and spectators.

iii] Keep careful watch to prevent any further damage by sabotage.

iv] Help fire fighting controller to cordon affected area/danger zone.

Incident Controller – Rescue, Evacuation & Transport

His functions are –

i] Plan and organize rescue and evacuation services and train team members

both inside and outside if necessary.

ii] Arrange vehicles, ambulance etc. for transfer of injured personnel to nearby

hospitals, rural health centres and nursing homes as per instruction of

medical assistance coordinator/designated doctor.

Incident Controller – Medical Aid & Welfare

His functions are –

i] Designate doctors from outside who can be available during emergency and

keep liaison with them.

ii] Prepare plant dispensary under readiness for emergency.

iii] Call the designated doctor during emergency.

iv] Provide first aid to the injured and arrange to transfer them to nearby

hospitals, other designated doctors depending on the gravity of the injury.

v] Arrange food and shelter to the evacuated employees.

vi] Inform relatives of the victims.

In Jasidih Terminal in-charge shall control all activities with the help of officers,

workers, clerical staff, casual workers and security staff. All of them shall be trained

in fire fighting and use of safety appliances.



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In case of any leakage of petroleum products or fire anybody witnessing the same

should take immediate necessary action to stop leakage and extinguish fire with the

help of fire extinguishers as well as inform Terminal In-charge through page phone or

through messenger or shouting.

In case of any fire or explosion Terminal In-charge takes charge of the situation and

controls it with a well organized plan.

If any accident e.g. fire occurs during night, security personnel shall attend it and in

case of emergency Terminal In-charge and others shall be informed / called from their

residence.

1.24.3 Action Plan

This gives guidelines to prevent, control and terminate an emergency and consists of

three parts.

a) Pre-emergency action

b) Action during emergency

c) Post emergency actions

Pre-Emergency Actions

These are essentially PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE measures and are

extremely important. They include mock drills, checking of fire fighting facilities,

keeping personal protective equipments in good condition in proper places, medical

equipments, scheduled checking of safely devices, safety audits, preventive

maintenance, good house keeping, training of employees, education to the public and

liaison with State Fire Services, Police and district administration etc.



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Public Awareness

In case of major accidents like large fire, explosion, effect of which may spread

outside the plant boundary, people of the adjoining area may be panicky due to

ignorance and may aggravate the problems. To avoid panic, the depot management

will make easily understandable pamphlets in local language about the properties of

petroleum products and actions to be taken by them during an Off-site Emergency.

Training and education will also be imparted to the local public by audio-visual

system with the help of local authorities. This will be done through Local Crisis

Group consisting of District Administration.

Mock Drills

This is periodic simulation of emergency condition, sometimes in consultation with

District Crisis Group/Local Crisis Group. The sequence of operation undertaken by

Disaster Management Team members and systems provided like alarm &

communication system, information flow pattern etc. are carefully put into operation

by competent officials and the deficiencies/problems are recorded. Based on this

observation appropriate actions are taken to improve the efficiency of the plan.

Training of Employees

Regular training will be conducted to educate the employees about safely, fire

fighting and Disaster Management. A selected number will be given intensive

training in first aid, evacuation and rescue operation so that they can be utilized as a

part of Disaster Control Team.

Liaison with Police, District Administration & State Fire Services &

Neighbouring Industries

Help of Police and District Authorities are essential for off-site Emergency such as

evacuation, transportation and treatment of individuals etc. In case of On-Site

Emergency help of Police, District Administration, local hospitals and also fire

services at Deoghar district headquarter may be required depending on the severity of

the situation.



Jharkhand

Pre-Emergency functions of Site Controller are mainly

a) Ensure implementation of Emergency Planning

b) Ensure that all drafted for emergency are undergoing regular training.

c) Ensure all disciplines are fully prepared for tackling emergency.

d) Ensure that simulation of emergency condition is regularly arranged.

e) Ensure preventive and pre-emptive measures.

f) Keep liaison with outside agencies, police, district authorities etc.

Pre-Emergency functions of other Incident Controllers and their team are

a) Keep all the team members ready for tackling emergency.

b) Ensure that all members understand their specific duties during emergency.

c) Ensure regular participation of their team in mock drills.

d) Ensure supply of adequate number of safety & fire fighting equipment in

proper place and in good working condition.

Actions during Emergency

Actions to be taken by Chief Emergency Controller and other Incident Controller

have been discussed in the Organization Plan. In short the actions are:

a) Declare Emergency by electrical siren.

b) Instruct total/partial shutdown.

c) Arrange the team for tackling emergency.

d) Ask for outside help, if necessary.

e) Keep liaison with outside agencies and provide authoritative information to

news media and others.

Post Emergency Actions

These are directed towards termination of emergency, restoration of normalcy and

rehabilitation. It also includes identification of victims, information to their next of

kin, notification to various government authorities, appointment of enquiry committee

for identification of causes and suggestions to ensure that similar accident does not

occur.



Jharkhand

1.25 Disaster Combating Action Plan with Specific Reference to the Team

As already stated number of officers and staff within plant are less and Terminal In-

charge has to prepare the plan with available officers & staff only.

a] During general shift on working days

(Chief Emergency Controller) : Terminal In-charge

Role:

1] Take overall charge of the situation.

2] Rush to the spot where fire/explosion has occurred. Issue instruction for

speedy combating of the incident and preventing of damage to other

areas.

3] Stop all operations locally/shut down complete plant.

4] Declare emergency and operate electrical siren to inform employees,

authorities and public.

5] Inform nearby factory authorities over phone and ask for assistance.

6] Inform local Fire Brigade.

7] Inform higher authorities and seek assistance for coordination of civil

authorities, Fire Tenders from State/other agencies.

8] Inform Chief Inspectorate of Factories & Boilers, Deoghar.

b] Fire Combating Team

In-charge : AM/DM (Operation)

Assisted By : i] Operation Officer (Fire)

ii] Section In-charge, TLF/TLD

iii] Security Supervisor & Guards on duty.

Role:

On hearing Fire Alarm –

1] Rush to the disaster spot and organize the team for combating fire as per

direction of Chief Emergency Controller.

2] Security supervisor to ensure starting of Fire Engine and pressurization

of fire hydrant.

3] Pump House Operator to stop all pumps and close all valves of the

pumps as well tank body valves and join the team.



Jharkhand

4] Operator of TLF section to stop loading operations, remove loading arm

properly and join the combating team as per directions of control room

in-charge.

Section In-Charge TLF/TLD to ensure the above and act for combating

emergency as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller.

c] Emergency Rescue Team

In-charge : Operation In-charge

Assisted By : Security Guards on duty

Role:

On hearing the Fire Alarm –

1] In-charge to organize the team with office staff and other members as

per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. If needed the In-charge

should seek assistance of outside agencies.

2] Remove the injured from the spot after taking proper safety and personal

protective appliances.

3] Arrange for First Aid of the injured and hospitalization, if necessary as

per instruction of Chief Emergency Controller.

d] Emergency Team (Transport & Security)

In-charge : Operation Officer (OO)

Assisted By : Security Supervisor & Guards on duty

Role:

1] Stop entry of all unauthorized personnel.

2] Arrange transport for taking the injured personnel for hospital.

3] Seek assistance for vehicles/ambulance from outside agencies &

hospitals nearby as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller.

e] Emergency Auxiliary Team

In-charge : Accounts Officer

Assisted By : One Security Guard

Role:

On hearing Fire Alarm-



Jharkhand

1] In-charge to rush to spot, coordinate with team as per direction of Chief

Emergency Controller and organize the team and be ready for further

instruction.

2] Get all the operations in the field stopped and all tank valves to be

closed. Electric mains to be switched off.

3] The electrician to get ready with Fire Proximity Suit and other life

saving equipment for any need.

4] To ensures that half-filled T/Ts do not run away with product and

documents.

5] Take control of all employees in the field other than fire combating team.

6] Team In-charge to ensure uninterrupted supply of all available fire

fighting equipments and materials as well as water to the combating

team.

7] To supplement/replace injured or exhausted combating team persons.

f] Fire during night time and on Holidays

In-charge : Shift In-charge

Assisted by : Security supervisor on duty

Security guards on duty

Role:

1] Shift In-charge Security Guard on duty seeing the fire, will shout Fire

Fire and shall need assistance from other guards on duty in different

pockets and shall fight the fire with nearest available fire equipments.

2] Subsequently, Shift In-charge/Security Supervisor on duty will telephone

to the residence of Terminal In-charge and Asst. Manager (OPS).

3] Immediately telephone to Deoghar Fire Brigade and Police Station for

assistance.

4] The Security Guards to control the gates and ensure that no unauthorized

person enter the premises.

1.26 Role Orders for Disaster Combating Action Plan

i] General Instructions

(a) The In-charge of the section/sections (TLF) / Tank Lorry Decantation /

Administrative Office etc. affected shall ensure to take immediate action



Jharkhand

to isolate, close valves and mobilize enough equipment from nearby

places.

(b) In-charge of stores shall keep the list of equipment available at various

locations and coordinate with auxiliary team in-charge who mobilises the

materials.

(c) Auxiliary team in-charge shall ensure replenishment of water to static

water tanks from deep tube wells and nearby other sources.

(d) After actions, Stores-in-charge to take inventory of all fire fighting items

and to indent the shortfalls.

(e) All those moving towards scene of incident shall move with fire fighting

equipment available.

ii] Pump House

Role Orders –

(a) Operator (Pump House) to stop all pumps.

(b) Close all valves including those of main tanks.

(c) Report combating team In-charge.

iii] Administrative Block

Role Orders –

(a) Section officers to ensure stop all loading operations.

(b) All T/Ts go out of TLF bays in orderly manner after closing T/T valves

and manhole covers.

(c) Closing of all valves at TLF manifold.

(d) TLF officer to report to Fire Combating Team.

(e) Others to report to Auxiliary Team In-charge with available fire fighting

equipment.

iv] Generator Room

Role Orders –

(a) Operator to remain in Generator House for instructions from Chief

Emergency Controller.

(b) To switch off unwanted electrical connections as instructed by Chief




Jharkhand

v] Stores

Role Orders –

(a) In-charge to keep ready all fire fighting/first-aid/personal protective

materials and arrange speedy disbursement to the ECT/ERT crews.

(b) To issue materials as per demand.

(c) To liaise among Controllers / in-charges.

(d) To make proper inventory of all items and shortfall to be identified as

early as possible.

vi] Security Guards on Duty

Role Orders –

(a) To control the gate by allowing contract labourers to go out, ordering,

moving out of vehicles as instructed by Terminal in-charge with valid

documents.

(b) To prevent unauthorized entry of outsiders.

(c) Security Guard posted at the main entrance gate to ensure proper control

of traffic so that approach road is not blocked. Other Security Guards

posted other than the gates, to report to their in-charge for further

instruction.

1.27 Action Plan for Specific Cases

a) Fire/Explosion in TLF Shed

Facilities: 8 nos. of Filling Bays with multi-product filling points.

Products handled: MS, SKO & HSD

Structure: Entire TLF structure shall be of elevated iron structures with

proper roof, iron platforms and movable iron ladders with chains fixed to each

bay.

Hazard Minimiser

(a) TLF in-charge with his officers and staff

(b) Fire Extinguishers

(c) Fire Hydrant Points

(d) Foam

(e) Water Jet

(f) Water Gel Blankets



Jharkhand

(g) Alarm

(h) Combating as per disaster organisation chart

Special References

(a) Operate ESD

Fire in filling shed should be attacked promptly with fire extinguishers.

(b) Close all valves promptly.

(c) Ensure orderly removal of TTs.

(d) Stop spreading over of fire and call for help.

(e) Put sand on small oil spills of fire to put off the fire by preventing source

of O2.

(f) Apply foam on burning oil on the floor. Apply foam gently so as not to

scatter the burning oil and spread the fire. Apply foam from one side of

the fire and with the foam blanket from that side across the oil pool.

Remember that water destroys foam and water streams must not be turn

on fire which is blanketed with foam.

(g) Apply water cooling to neighbouring T/Ts.

(h) Remove records/documents to safe place.

(i) When oil is burning under the truck and tank is not leaking, remove the

truck away from fire, if possible or cover the oil with sand. Use water to

cool the tank truck.

(j) Use foam or sand to fight fire around engine, raise the hood direct the

stream of fluid at the base of fire.

(k) Use water or foam to fight fire in the cabin.

(l) Use water to fight fire on the tires.

(m) Whenever the leak is seen in the bottom of tank, try to fill water into the

tank so that oil level will be above the leak.

(n) In case of dome fire, close the dome cover immediately.

b) Fire in Pump House

Facilities: Building with sheet roof, electric power/diesel engine driven pumps.

Hazard Minimiser

(a) Staff members assigned to the pump house




Jharkhand


(d) Foam

(e) Water Jet

(f) Water Gel Blankets

(g) Main Switches in the Switch Room

(h) Alarm

(i) Fire Resistant Asbestos Suit

Action Plan as per disaster organisation chart

Special References-

(a) Operate ESD.

Discharge DCP to prevent fire from spreading.

(b) Shut down the pumps by cutting off power supply.

(c) Remove any person who is working in the manifold.

(d) Close all tank wagon valves and manifold valves.

(e) Put foam on burning oil spills.

(f) Put foam on burning oil spills. Do not splash burning oil.

(g) Use DCP or CO2 fire extinguisher on electrical fire.

(h) Cool the manifold with water.

(i) Wet down the structure close to the fire with water.

(j) When burning oil is running from the pump house or out of a broken

connection in the manifold, check the flow or direct it to the points

where it will not endanger structures and the surrounding properties.

c) Fire at small leak in pipeline

1] Fire at a small leak in pipeline must be attacked promptly with the

nearest fire extinguishers.

2] Shut off the flow of oil in the line by closing valves and by stopping

pumping.

3] Cover the oil pool with sand and build up the sand so as to cover the

leak.

4] Put foam on the burning oil pool.

5] Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil.



Jharkhand

6] Take care of the oil dropping from the leak even after extinguishing fire

as fire may occur again due to heating of oil dropped. Try to collect the

same in containers.

7] Wet down the adjacent structures to keep them cool.

d) Bursting of Gasket / leakage through joints

1] Stop pumping.

2] Stop flow of oil through drain. Keep oil within limited area.

3] Close line valves.

4] Dig pits to collect oil.

5] Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil.

6] Take care of the oil dropping from the leak even after extinguishing fire

as fire may occur again due to heating of oil dropped. Try to collect the

oil in containers.

7] Wet down the adjacent structures to keep them cool.

8] Take action for replacement of gasket/repair leak with due care.

e) Fire in electric Sub-station / Transformer Room / Switch Room

Facilities: HT OCB, HT Switch, FUSE UNIT

TRANSFORMER: 450 KVA

GENSETS, PANELS: 1X250 KVA, 1X75 KVA

SWITCH ROOM, CONNECTION CABLES

Hazard Minimisers

(a) Generator operators and other employees

(b) Fire extinguishers

(c) Sand buckets

(d) Main switches

(e) Alarm

(f) Earthing

Action Plan as per disaster organisation chart

Special Reference –

(a) Cut off power supply by switching off the mains

(b) Apply DCP/CO2 extinguisher or dry sand.

(c) Call for outside help if required.

(d) Do not allow anybody to touch any electrical appliances.



Jharkhand

(e) Take action to prevent spreading of fire.

(f) If fire is not extinguished, extinguish by spreading water with fog nozzle

only after ensuring complete isolation of electrical supply.

f) Fire in Tank Farm

Facilities:

Storage Tank:

Floating Roof- 10694 KL (3 nos.) - for MS Storage

Cone Roof - 4882 KL (2 nos.) - for SKO Storage

Cone Roof - 15814 KL (3 nos.) - for HSD Storage

Hazard Minimiser

(a) All employees particularly the employees of loading/receipt section



(d) Foam

(e) Water Jet

(f) Water Sprinklers

(g) Asbestos Suit

(h) Alarm

Disaster Combating Plan: As per Disaster Organization Chart

Special Reference –

(a) Operate ESD

A fire burning at the vent will not normally flash back into tank and explode if

the tank contains product since flame arrestors are provided.

(b) Start cooling of tanks by using water sprinklers provided on tanks as

well by wet jets.

(c) Close all valves since any removal of product will result in air being

sucked inside, with the resultant flash back and explosion.

(d) Close manhole covers of other tanks if they are open. Also stop

loading/receipt of oil in tank.

(e) Use foam to extinguish fire. Small fire can be handled with portable fire

extinguishers.



Jharkhand

(f) Call for help from outside agencies before fire is aggravated with the

instruction of Chief Emergency Controller.

g) Fire in Tank

(a) Fire in tank will normally burn quietly till the oxygen inside is consumed

unless temperature of the product is allowed to increase uncontrolled.

Hence, care must be taken to ensure that product temperature does not go

high by cooling with water sprinklers and jets. This also avoids

possibility of tank rupture due to hydrostatic Pressure.

(b) Care should be taken to ensure that the fire does not spread to other

areas. If there is product spill to outside, foam should be used to cover

the same.

(c) In such cases, foam should be pumped inside the tank for blanketing the

fire simultaneously taking action to cool the tank shell with water and

also removing the product by pumping it out to some other tank.

(d) Uncontrolled use of water on the burning product will result in product

spill over and spread of fire. In the case of heavy ends this will result in

boil over and frothing at the surface.

(e) When heavy ends like HSD burn, a layer of hot oil is formed below the

surface, which extends towards the bottom. Temperature of this layer is

of the order of 250 degree C to 300 degree C much above the boiling

point of water. When water turns into steam, it expands approx. 1600

times and this result in boil over. The boil over may overflow the tank

resulting in spreading of fire. Hence, in case of such fires, cool down the

tank by water sprinkler and also by continuous water jet on the tank

shell, transfer the product to other tanks and judiciously use foam to

smoothen fire.

(f) In case of F/R tanks, fires normally occur at F/R seals. Efforts should be

made to put foam in the correct place simultaneously cooling the tank

shell from outside.

(g) Do not waste foam by using it for cooling.

(h) Usage of water also should be in a controlled manner so that maximum

benefit can be obtained.



Jharkhand

h) Natural Calamities

(i) High Wind Storms/Cyclones

All structures/buildings in the depot have been designed to withstand

cyclonic storms and hence not much of damage is anticipated.

Action Plan

(a) Switch of all industrial electrical connections.

(b) Ensure immediate closing of oil/water separator outlet (conventional) if

any tank collapse happens.

(c) Inform Chief Emergency Controller.

(d) Keep constant touch with local authorities – District Magistrate and

Police authorities.

(e) Stop all operations and do not resume it till clearance is given by Chief


(f) Bring all vehicles to a halt and ensure that hand brake is applied.

(g) Evacuate persons from damaged buildings/structures.

(h) Avoid going on Terminal of high structures/storage tanks.

(i) After the cyclone has struck, assess the situation and take necessary

action as per the direction of Chief Emergency Controller.

(ii) Lightning

In the event of lightning strike, any of the following or all emergencies

may occur:

(a) Fire in the tanks

Action Plan: Already described under the topic of tank fire.

(iii) Floods

There is no river near the depot and in case of heavy rains during rainy

season the rain water gets cleared through the drainage provided.

Although the depot is not expected to get flooded, some precautionary

measures need to be taken to avoid any situation arising out of flood.

Action Plan

(a) Keep in touch with District Authorities

(b) Keep main gate closed

(c) Keep round the clock vigil and water level inside/outside the depot



Jharkhand

(iv) Earthquakes

All buildings/equipment are designed to withstand earthquakes and

therefore, major disaster is not expected. However in case of an

earthquake of much heavier scale may lead to

(a) Fall of structures/buildings

(b) Subsequent fire/explosion

(c) Release of petroleum products

Action Plan: Already described under the topic of fire at various

locations.

k) Riots / Sabotage / War

Action Plan

(a) Close all gates.

(b) Maintain tight security.

(c) Chief Emergency Controller to keep contact with local authorities.

(d) Keep round the clock patrolling.

(e) Alert all employees of disaster control action plan and activate in case of

requirement.

1.28 Important Telephone Numbers

D.C. Deoghar : 232680 (O)

232720, 232967 ®

9431166999 (M)

S.P. Deoghar : 232733 (O)

232777 ®

9431122777 (M)

S.D.O. Deoghar : 232326 (O)

232327 ®

9431134140 (M)

S.D.P.O. Deoghar : 232284 (O)

Sadar Hospital, Deoghar : 222247

Fire Brigade, Deoghar : 232260, 101

Deoghar Municipality : 232786 (O)



Jharkhand

9835354454 (M)

Deoghar Thana : 100, 222304, 9431390692 (M)

Jasidih Thana : 270234

INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED Risk Assessment and ...

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