II & III of Statcon Cases
-
Upload
chanel-garcia -
Category
Documents
-
view
224 -
download
0
Transcript of II & III of Statcon Cases
-
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
1/26
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ,petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,
Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy."
1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in
the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.2The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot
ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka
kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHIKasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESGTapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHIHindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon
ESGIto and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka,
kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako
ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHIHindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to
10:00 p.m.
ESGBastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano
ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung
hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHIItutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG
Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.ESGNakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on
your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHIKumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESGOo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHIEh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESGKukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHIEh, di sana
ESGHuwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala
mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHIMag-eexplain ako.
ESG
Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kungpaano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at
tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESGWala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHIKasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESGNandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHIIna-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESGHuwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHIPaano kita nilapastanganan?
ESGMabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.
Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes."
An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated
October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
-
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
2/26
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of
Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S.
Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then andthere willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder
secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing
the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court
granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) theviolation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by
a personotherthan a participant to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorariwith this Court, which forthwith referred the case to
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section
1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that
the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution6dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends
that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.8In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of astatute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11or absurb
or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of
secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not
-
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
3/26
criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a reco rding is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the
intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor,that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record
the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him .It
is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the
intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the
board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to
this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:
"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you."
That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning,
he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more.But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being
taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the
bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is
done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It
is the communication between one person and another person not between
a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxxThe unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with
the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recordingprivate communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the SolicitorGeneral pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a
third person should be professed."14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
-
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
4/26
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversationsbeing overheard. But this statement ignores the usual
nature of conversationsas well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Freeconversationsare often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity,
agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views notintended to be taken seriously. The right to theprivacy of communication,
among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to
state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversationsbetween individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of
the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and
free exchange of communicationbetween individuals free from every
unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17
In Gaanan vs.Intermediate Appellate Court, 18a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension
for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization
did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neitheramong those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19following
the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused."20The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 88-403, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 64.2Rollo, p. 48.3Rollo, pp. 47-48.
4Rollo, p. 9.5Rollo, p. 37.6Rollo, p. 99, Annex "H".
7Rollo, p. 13.
8Id.
9Rollo, p. 14.10Rollo, p. 14-15.11 Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank 37 SCRA 685 (1971).
12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 (1970).
13Rollo, p. 33.14Rollo, p. 67.15 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 460 (1976).
16Id.17 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. III, No. 31, at 573 (March 10, 1964).18 145 SCRA 112 (1986). See also, Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA 235 SCRA 111 (1994).
19Id., at 120.20Id., at 121.
-
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
5/26
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ,Petitioner,vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on
certiorari2under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3On
January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City.
4
Due to work and other professional commitments,Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that
his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered
the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite
the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn
still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead
a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8in order for him
or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9Article 26 of the Family
Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behindthe enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10the provision was
enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a
determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to
the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched
the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spousean interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a
proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there
is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marr ies his Filipina
fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would
be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General
and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14both support Gerberts position.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt1 -
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
6/26
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipinospouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
void15and voidable16marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording,
as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the F ilipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.20and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign
courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus,
recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."
23
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, byclarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to
the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a s imilar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national
law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.
In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusioni.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt15 -
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
7/26
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of
right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Courtwhich provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or
final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country."28This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself
or herself.29The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically
for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as
an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,
30
but failedto include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31Under this situation, we
can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will al low
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized,
shall have the effect of res judicata32between the parties, as provided in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata
effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e.,
those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt27 -
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
8/26
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate
or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, a lthough a foreign one, affecting a
persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753
or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of
divorce decrees in the civil registry:Sec. 1. Civil Register.A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books.The local registrars shall keep and preserve in
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be
given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as
yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of
a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237both of which
required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,
the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize thecancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed
with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings;39and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40As these
basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registryone for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding41by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and
REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#fnt35 -
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
9/26
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice
WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate JusticeChairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17,
2010.
1 Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.
2 Id. at 3-20.
3 Id. at 27.
4 Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.
5 Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.
6 Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:
It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of
execution of such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.
7 Supra note 1.
8 Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.
9 Rollo, p. 31.
10 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.
11 Id. at 121.
12 Gerberts motion for reconsideration of the RTCs October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated February 17, 2009; rollo,p. 32.
13 Supra note 2.
14 Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.
15 The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.
16 The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.
17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.
18 Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with the Family Code of the Philippines (2004
ed.), p. 262.
19 Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.
20 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
21 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
22 Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.
23 Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.
24 The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
25 See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
x x x x
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
26 Parenthetically, we add that an aliens legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her respect ive diplomatic and consular
officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still
resort to a judicial action for a declaration of authority to remarry.
27 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.
28 Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.
29 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November
7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
30 Rollo, pp. 38-41.
31 The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the Canadian court. Th e full text of the courts
judgment was not included.
32 Literally means "a thing adjudged," Blacks Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, on points and matters determined in the former.Supra note 28
at 462.
33 See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for
enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly
determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
34 On the face of the marriage certificate, the word "DIVORCED" was written in big, bold letters; rollo, p. 37.
35 Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
36 Rollo, pp. 47-50.
37 Id. at 51.
38 Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
39 Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
40 Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
41 When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil
Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt1 -
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
10/26
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
surnamed ABISTO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to
cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set
aside the Decision1promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent
Resolution2promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of
Appeals3in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged
Decision reads:4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal
appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the
registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident
of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now
deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and
Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D
located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private
oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding
taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529.5The application was docketed as Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.6However, during the pendency of his petition,
applicant died. Hence, his heirs Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary
Ann, all surnamed Abistado represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who
was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed thepetition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to
publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in
the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is
of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction
over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory
provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982,
which in its pertinent portion provides:8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of
PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the
provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the
Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is
mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to
publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of
general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is
indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be
powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case.
As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a
newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a
requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the
court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which,
as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA
Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
-
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
11/26
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition
on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he
is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his
petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorariunder Rule 65.9
The IssuePetitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of
discretion"10in holding
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case
No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and
in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial
hearing shall be "published bothin the Official Gazette andin a newspaper of
general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is
"necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper
of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process." 11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere
"procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient
to confer jurisdiction.12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette andin a newspaper of general circulation is couched in
mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with
equal force that publication in the Official Gazetteshallbe sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the
opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it justified its
disposition in this wise:14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required
procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other
requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by
mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were
complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded
to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23.Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall,
within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the
date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-
five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for
land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)posting.
1.By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,
the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial
hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines:Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain
date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not
be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of
statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication
requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15While concededly such literal
mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately
depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case
the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic
vs.Marasigan,16the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that
Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1)
publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If
the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition
-
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
12/26
who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and
occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise
imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.17Being in
rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as
against allpersons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. Anin remproceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who
may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred
from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been
ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration
court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership
thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who
institutes an action for recovery of realty.18He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved
when all persons concerned nay, "the whole world" who have rights to or
interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to
court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary
norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from
concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be
given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the
Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that
the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may
not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may
not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate. In sum, the all-encompassingin remnature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective
of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement
of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it
would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly,
this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The
law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application.19There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration
filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication
in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.Footnotes
1Rollo, pp. 29-36.
2Ibid., p. 37.3 Seventh Division composed of Justice Celso L. Magsino,ponente; andJustices Serafin E. Camilon, Chairman; and Artemon D. Luna, concurring.
4Ibid., p. 35.5 Known as the Property Registration Decree.
6 Presided by Judge Niovady M. Martin.7Rollo, p. 41.8Ibid., pp. 41-42.
9 The Solicitor General asked for and was granted an extension of 30 dayswithin which to file a "petition for review on certiorari." It is thus strange whythe OSG described its petition as one "forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court." In any event, the Court, in its Resolution dated M arch 9, 1992admitted the OSG's "petition for review on certiorari," clearly ruling that the
petition was one for review, and not one for certiorari.10Ibid., p. 21. This should really read "reversible error" since as alreadyexplained, the petition should be treated as one for review under Rule 45.
11Ibid., pp. 22-23.12Ibid., pp. 56-57.13Ibid., p. 34; Decision, p. 6.
14Ibid.
15 Bersabal vs. Salvador, 84 SCRA 176, 179-180, July 21, 1978, citingDizonvs. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717, December 24, 1963.16 198 SCRA 219, 227-228, June 6, 1991.
17 Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, September 16, 1910.18 Archbishop of Manila vs. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593, March 31, 1915.19 Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 24 SCRA
708, 712, August 22, 1968 citingLizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil.504, 1913; People vs. Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968; Dequito vs. Lopez,L-27757, March 28, 1968.
-
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
13/26
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL,petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE
C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C.
PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE
OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES
PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-
NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL,
GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING
JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro
Manila, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorariwhich seeks to reverse and set aside:
(a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C.Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista,
Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the
petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the
resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged
natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother
of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and wassurvived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the
deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. PascualWenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood
of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased
and represented by the following:
-
8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases
14/26
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal,
Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental
Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly statedthat Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit,
to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full
blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement
made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the
deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V ofsuch compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the
court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres
Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate HereditaryRights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge
Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby
resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and
Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo,
pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No.
14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the
decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo,