Ideology, power and materialization -...

Ideology, Materialization andPower Strategies

Luis Jaime Castillo Butters

Elizabeth DeMarais

Timothy Earle

Pontificia UniversidadCatólica del Perú

Castillo, DeMarais and Earle, Ideology, Materialization and Power Strategies 2

Ideology, Materialization and PowerStrategies1

Luis Jaime Castillo Butters, Elizabeth DeMarais, and Timothy Earle

ways. On one hand, ideology is seenbasically as epiphenomenal, as determined bythe more persuasive productive aspects ofsociety. On the other hand, ideology has beenreduced to the expression of the innerself of theindiv idua l , mul t ip ly ing the number ofideologies at any given time to an equivalentof the individuals’ minds.

The way we look at ideology is ratherdifferent . Fi rs t of a l l , we recognize thatideology i s one of the mos t impor tan tcomponents in a social system. This componenti s usua l ly c lose ly and even exc lus ive lyassociated with the most powerful socialsegments . As a rchaeologis t s we see atremendous limitation in most definitions ofideology, particularly when it is perceived asbeing composed exclusively of ideas andbel ie fs—unl ike ly to appear in thearchaeological record. Here is where oursdiffers from other perspectives. We considerthat ideology is as much embedded in the ma-terial means to communicate and manipulateideas, as in the ideas themselves. Furthermore,we think that the archaeological record isparticularly rich in these types of expressions,which are very likely to be preserved or passedon.

Luis Jaime Castillo Butters. Profesor Principal del Departamento de Humanidades, Sección Arqueología y Director de RelacionesInternacionales y Cooperación de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. ([email protected]).Elizabeth DeMarais.Timothy Earle.

Current Anthropology 37 (1):15-31. Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1996

«A society works best when people want to do, what they have to do...» Eric Fromm

Abstract

Ideology, as a part of culture, is an integralcomponent of human in teract ions and powerstrategies that configure sociopolitical systems. Weargue that ideology must be materialized, or givenconcrete form, in order to be a part of the humanculture that is shared by a society. This process ofmater ia l iza t ion makes i t poss ible to control ,manipulate, and extend ideology beyond the localgroup. Ideology is an important source of power;to be controlled it must be rooted in a materialmedium. To illustrate these concepts three cases areexamined: Neolithic and Bronze Age chiefdoms ofDenmark, the Moche states of northern Perú, andthe Inka empire of the Andes.

Introduction

In recent years many archaeologica ldiscussions, coming from both the processualand post-processual perspectives, have focusedon the nature and role of ideology in thedevelopment of social complexity (Cowgil1993; Demarest and Conrad 1992; Earle 1991a;Hodder 1982; Miller and Tilley 1984; Renfrewand Zubrow 1994; etc.). The positions taken inthese essays have been as diverse as thetheoretical backgrounds of their authors, butroughly can be characterized in one of two

3Castillo, DeMarais and Earle, Ideology, Materialization and Power Strategies

There are two aspects to these materialmeans of ideology: a symbolic and a material.Symbolic objects and religious monuments ofa l l sor t s convey and t ransmi t symbol icinformation and meanings, standing for andrepresenting them. The symbolic meaningsthese objects and monuments stand for andrepresent , and especial ly how these wereperceived by individual actors, are inaccessibleto the archaeologist. But as material objectsthey are part of the fabric of the social, political,and economic aspects of society, revealingpatterns of access and manipulation of thepower of some social segments over others.Archaeologically we can study differentialaccess to the material expressions of theideological system, and how this access affectedthe dynamics of social power.

From this standpoint, the study of ideologyin a rchaeology can cont r ibu te to ourunderstanding of power relations. Although weare in te res ted in the symbol ic aspec t ofideology, the avenue we pursue here is that ofideology as social power, par t icular ly incomplex, stratified societies. We are purposelyomi t t ing a lengthy d iscuss ion of therelationships between ideologies of dominationand resistance (McGuire 1992), and we are alsosetting aside the applicability of our ideas tothe s tudy of s imple socie t ies . We s tudy,therefore, the relationships between ideologicalmeans and relations of domination: What givesprimacy to one ideology over another; how canan ideology suporting domination be sustainedin the presence of an ideology of resistance?The answer, we argue, is grounded in theprocesses by which these ideologies becomephysical, that is in the Materialization ofIdeology.

Ideology and Social Power

Social power is the capacity to control andmanage the labor and activities of a group togain unequal access to the benefits of socialaction. Michael Mann (1986) proposed foursources of social power: economic, political,military, and ideological. Throughout history,these four sources have been used in a varietyof ways, creating distinct power strategies.

Power strategies are the means by whichrulers and ruling social segments combine the

sources of social power to pursue theirgoals. In some instances, these strategies relyheavily on the coercive effects of militaryaction; in others, economic action, that is theproduction and distribution of goods, has«ultimate primacy.» In sti l l others, as weconsider in this paper, ideology plays a basicrole in political and social dynamics.

The choice of one power strategy overanother has profound implications for theprocess of social evolution (Earle 1987, n.d.;Johnson and Earle 1987). In essence, thedifferent power strategies represent differentroutes to social complexity, different means tocentralize and to extend the scale of a polity.

The strategic use of each power sourcedepends on the historical circumstances of thesocial group and its objectives. The selectionof one strategy over others involves comparingthe effectiveness and costs of implementingparticular strategies and the length of time thateach can be sustained. Carneiro (1967, 1981),Webster (1985), and others have argued for thesignificance of mili tary might. For themwarfare provides the immediate means to extendpolit ical dominance. But mili tary might,although sometimes efficacious in the short-run,is inherently costly and unstable as a means toinst i tut ionalize power relat ionships. I t iseffective primarily where control over themeans of destruction is possible (Goody 1971).Still others (Brumfiel and Earle 1987; Earle1991a) have argued for the ultimate precedenceof economic control by which the evolution ofsystems of land tenure and property rightspermit a direct control over the systems ofproduction and exchange. But control over theeconomic system is usually problematic exceptin such extraordinary circumstances as thedevelopment of irrigation systems within whichan agrarian population can be «caged» (Mann1986), or in an insular setting where control ofthe seaways can serve the same function.

In this article we consider the alternativerole of ideology in the evolution of socialcomplexity by looking at the emphasis thatthree complex societies placed on ideology intheir power strategies. The relative costs ofstrategies based on ideology are evaluated andcompared with strategies whose priority isalternative sources of power. We argue that, inorder to be an effective source of power,


alike about the order of the cosmos andevery th ing i t conta ins» i s , fo r example ,indistinguishable from a broad definition ofMaya culture. A neutral ideology is the sum ofshared experiences and interactions, evident inritual events, sacred symbols, and ceremonialfacilities.

The critical conception of ideology alsoadopts the perspective that ideology is a systemof beliefs and ideas. However, in this view,ideologies are created and manipulated by theruling elite to establish and maintain their so-cial power. The critical view, more than itsneut ra l counterpar t , cont r ibu tes severa limportant points for the analysis of powerrelations in society. Ideology is a mechanismused by certain social segments to manipulate,control, suppress, or exploit populations tofulfill their own interests. Not all ideology is,therefore, spontaneously generated throughhuman in te rac t ion ; a s ign i f ican t par t i sintentionally created and transformed to directthe thoughts and the actions of subject peoples.Ideology is, in essence, a source of socialpower2.

Louis Althusser (1971, 1990) emphasizesthree aspects of the relat ionship betweenideology and power. First, deriving directlyfrom Marx (1977:176), Althusser argues that arul ing ideology a t a l l t imes leads socia lconsciousness, and expresses the interests of theruling class. Second, he postulates a closerelationship between the state and ideology,conce iv ing of bo th as mechanisms fordomination by the ruling class (Althusser 1990).Third, he maintains that this close associationconditions ideology’s instrumental character.Ideology operates through the act ions ofspec i f ica l ly des igned and s ta te opera tedinstitutions, the «ideological state apparatuses»(Althusser 1971).

Al thusser ’s def in i t ion of ideologyrecognizes the existence of social values andbeliefs that contribute to the reproduction of thematerial conditions of social life, so that thesocial values have to be constantly reproducedin order to perpetuate the social order. Theproblem arises when we want to define to whatdegree these values and beliefs are shared byall individuals, and what mechanisms permit thetransmission of shared values and beliefs.Althusser assumes that the action of a class

ideology must be «materialized» in distinctand tangible forms, including symbolic objects,ceremonies , monuments , and wr i t ing .Materialized ideology, like materialized culture,can achieve the status of shared values andbeliefs. Materialization makes it possible toextend ideologies beyond the local group andto communicate the power of a central authorityto the broader population.

The materialization of an ideology is astrategic process that allocates resources tostrengthen and legitimize institutions of elitecontrol. Thus the character of social power andideology, and their ties to the economy, will beref lec ted in the d i ffe ren t forms ofmaterialization within a society. Importantly,the costs of materialization make it possible forpowerful individuals or social segments tomonopolize or restrict access to the materialsymbols and events that comprise an ideology.When distinct social segments control differentresources, each group may actively promote itsown ideology through materialization. In thisway, power and economic control may shiftbe tween groups over t ime, so tha torganizational change may result from thestrategic activities and competition throughwhich elites build and materialize specificideologies.

Problems of Definition

Ideology has been systematically definedin two somewhat contradictory ways, a neutraland a critical conception (Thompson 1990).The neut ra l concept ion assumes tha t anideology is comprised of ideas and beliefs,concepts and modes of thought, religious cre-dos, and moral norms. Together, these form thementali ty of a social group. The neutralconception assumes the perspective of the in-dividual , for whom ideology, as much ascosmological systems and culture, is onecomponent of his world view. In this view,ideology is continually created and re-createdthrough social interaction; it is not necessarilymisleading, nor does it serve particular interests(Thompson 1990:52). It is essentially similarto the broader concept of culture (Larrain 1983;McGuire 1992). Freidel’s (1992:116) definitionof Maya ideology as «the interconnected fun-damental ideas held by the elite and commoners


controlled state lies behind the creation andt ransmiss ion of ideologies . This s ta temanipulates specific institutions and agents—the ideological state apparatuses—to promotethe beliefs and ideals of the ruling elite. Theseinstitutions ensure the participation of allindividuals in a social order that benefits firstand foremost the rul ing c lass . Thus theeducational system, religious institutions, andthe cultural establishment are apparatusesoperated by the state to generate the rulingideology. As a result, a significant part of thesystem of shared beliefs and values constitutesa dominant ideology, and «ideology is thusdestined, above all, to assure the dominationof one class over the others, and the economicexploitation that maintains its preeminence, bymaking the exploited accept their condition asbased on the will of God, nature, moral duty,etc.» (Althusser 1990:28). For Althusser thereare no competing ideologies, only competitionfor control over the apparatuses. Competingideologies, the ideological representations ofnondominant social segments, will effectivelytranslate into competitions for control of theideological apparatuses, and ultimately for con-trol of the state.

The most significant problem with thisnotion of ideology is that Althusser assumes aclass reductionist conception of the operationand determination of both the state and theideological system. The state is not runexclusively by the ruling class, nor is ideologygenerated exclusively by this class. The statecan come into conflict with the ruling class, ora f rac t ion thereof , and ideology can begenerated by other social segments. Theconfrontation of alternative ideologies with theruling ideology can generate contradictions thateither precipitate social change, or by whichthese competing ideologies are absorbed,restructured, or ignored by the ruling elite.

Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980) haverejected the notion of a ruling ideology becausethey consider that the ideology can be effectiveonly in integrating the dominant class. For therest of society, a ruling ideology is rejected andavoided through ideologies of resistance. Atany time, multiple competing ideologies shouldexist in a given society, and no single ideologyis more effect ive than the others. Thesecriticisms are echoed by McGuire, for whom

the ruling «ideology may be accepted bysubordinate classes, or they may rework it intoan ideology of resistance. Conflict may resultfrom the inconsistencies between the ideologyof elites, and the ideology of subordinates,providing the conscious basis for resistance»(1992: 141–142). If ideology is accepted bydominated segments of society, it is becausethey are fooled into believing these misleadingconcepts.

Michael Mann, in a much less pessimisticview, argues agains t the not ion of naiveindividuals easily fooled by the system (1986).He also argues that ideological systems arenever crafted entirely by power-hungry eliteswith the sole objective of exploit ing andbringing misery to the oppressed. For Mann,ideologies are accepted, not only becauseresistance may be too costly, but also becausethey offe r a benef i t : «People a re no tmanipulated fools. And though ideologiesalways do contain legitimization of privateinterests and material domination, they areunlikely to attain a hold over people if they aremerely this. Powerful ideologies are at leasthighly plausible in the conditions of the time,and they are genuinely adhered to» (1986:23).

The central problem with the cr i t icalconception of ideology is, therefore, that, in anygiven society, a set of competing ideologiesexists. Unless we specify what conditions giveprimacy to one ideology over another, the useof ideology as a source of power is problematic.Recogniz ing the ex is tence of compet ingideologies is critical to understanding the natureof ideology as a tool for societal change. Butrecognizing the existence of multiple ideologiesdoes not mean that all competing ideologies areequally effective.


advantageous position. Archaeologists,while ill-equipped to study specific thoughtprocesses requir ing the daunt ing task ofcreating a «middle range theory» (MRT) of themind (Cowgil 1993), can however study theexplicit and vivid materialization of ideologyused to create a common experience. We canstudy the investment itself (what was done withthe available social capital) and the outcome ofthese dec is ions ( the way in which theinves tment a ffec ted the s tab i l i ty anddevelopment of the overall society). Since theideas and precepts of an ideological systemmust be made physical so as to be promulgatedover a broad region and through time, thearchaeologist comes into contact with the sametranscultural materials created to mold theminds of peasants and subjugated populations.

To control the product ion and use ofideology, the ruling elite must monopolizeaccess to it. An ideological system made up ofelements freely available to every individualwould lose its efficacy as an instrument of so-cial action and social power. Ideology is aninherently weak source of social power becauseideas themselves are impossible to control.Ideas are cheap and highly personal; nothingcan prevent members of a group f romgenerating their own ideas about the world andthen attempting to convince others of theirvalidity. Ideologies function equally as a meansto assist and to resist authority. If ideologiesare to be an effective source of power, then theproduction and transmission of ideas must becontrolled. The ideas must somehow be owned,transferred, and inherited.

When ideas a re mater ia l ized , themechanisms of the i r p roduct ion andtransmission can indeed be controlled. In itsmaterial form, ideology can be experienced bya large group through public ceremonies,signified by status objects that are displayed andgiven, and owned through controlled access tothe grounds and monuments on which thelegitimization ceremonies are staged.

Through the process of materialization, anideology takes on the characteristics of othermanufac tured th ings , whi le re ta in ing i t ssymbolic character. The tremendous costs ofhos t ing ceremonia l feas t s , cons t ruc t ingmonuments, or manufacturing the paraphernaliaand costumes for events ground ideology in the

The Materialization of Ideology

To become an effective source of socialpower, ideologies must have a form that can beeffectively manipulated and controlled by aruling elite. As we will argue, this requires thatthe ideology becomes mater ia l ized .Materialization is the transformation of ideas,values, stories, myths, and the like into aphysical reality that can take the form of cere-monial events, symbolic objects, monuments,and writing systems.

Materialization of an ideology is essentialin order to create common, shared experiencesand to control the production and use of theideology. To crea te common, sharedexperiences, it is necessary to manipulate ideasabout appropriate values and norms. Culturesare inherently fragmented, representing themany voices that characterize differences ofage, sex, occupat ion, local i ty, c lass , andindividuality (Keesing 1985). If we think ofculture as norms and values held in people’sheads, it is difficult to understand how culturecould be very broadly shared at all. Each humanbeing, sculpted by personal experience, has anindividualized reality. To even attempt to moldindividual beliefs for social action, ideologiesmust be manifested in material forms that canbe experienced in common by a targeted group.How the external world is organized and givenmeaning gives an important element of sharingto the cultural experience.

Essentially, we are arguing for the funda-mental materiality of human culture. Howshared values and norms could be held leads toa consideration of the essence of culture; it mustbe given a form in daily practice and materialrepresentation outside of the individual’s mind.To be shared within an institutional setting,values and norms must be materialized. Byusing the te rm mater ia l ized ( ra ther thanmater ial i ty) , we emphasize the cont inualprocess of creation and do not suppose theprimacy of ideas. In fact the ideas and normsof culture and ideology are encapsulated in theirpractice and conditions of life as much as inpeople’s heads.

To the degree tha t mater ia l iza t ion i sessential to the process of creating a sharedpolitical culture across historical divisions, thearchaeologist holds an exceptionally


economy. I f ideo logy i s seen asrepresentation, ceremony, and material culture,we can unders tand how control over theeconomy and the labor force directly extendsto control over ideology. An ideology rootedin a material medium can be controlled in muchthe same way that the manufacture of otheru t i l i t a r ian and weal th goods i s owned,res t r ic ted , and t ransfer red through theinstitutions of political economy.

Means and Forms of Materialization

In this section, we describe three means ofmaterialization—ceremonial events, symbolicobjects, and public monuments. Each hasdifferent characteristics in terms of the audienceto whom it can be directed and the process bywhich its production can be controlled. Theselection of one of these means therefore, hasprofound effects on the nature of the ideologyand its effectiveness as a source of social power.

A given form may be more or less effectivein accomplishing a particular objective: forexample, ceremonies are events that integrateand define large groups, while prestige goodsor symbolic objects are transportable and usedto reward individuals and define their socials ta tus . Centra l to the Inka’s in terpol i tyrelationships were ceremonial events and feastsof enormous magnitude, and the exchange ofprestigious objects, and even monuments.Monumenta l a rch i tec ture i s a means ofcommunicating on a grand scale, so that cen-tral places arise not only to house the activitiesof a political life, but also to serve as thesymbolic focus of a polity. The temple moundsof the Moche stand literally as the center of thepolity. Symbolic objects and monuments aremanufactured under the ruling elite’s direction,and distributed under their control. Suchobjects are owned by the rulers and inheritedwith political office.

Because the impact of each of these meansis distinct, and because their production variesin terms of raw materials, gross labor, and theskills required, their application will vary inaccordance wi th the e l i t e ’s par t icu la rcapabilit ies and available resources. Theoverall development of a society’s economicinf ras t ruc ture wi l l d i rec t ly a ffec t theavailability of resources that can be allocated

to the materialization of ideology. Associeties increase in complexity more resourceswil l be made avai lable , and more socia linequalities will likely have to be legitimizedby the ideological system.

By examining the forms of materialization,as well as the way resources are allocated toalternative sources of power within a politicaleconomy, we can begin to reconstruct thestrategies through which ideologies weregenerated. For societ ies with a complexpolitical economy, such as the Moche states orInka empire , the d i ffe ren t forms ofmater ia l iza t ion were of ten combined toaccomplish the diverse goals of the state.

Because ideology must be materialized inobjects and actions in order to be a source ofsocial power, it is particularly relevant to thestudy of archaeology. Objects and actions,especially if repetitive and patterned, leave amark in the archaeological record. The studyof ideology in archaeology, therefore, has to bethe study of how meaning, ar t iculated insymbolic forms, is used to establ ish andmaintain relations of domination (Thompson1990:44).

Ceremonial Events . Events providecommon, shared experiences to a group throughparticipation in rituals, feasts, or performances.Ceremonial events are usually cyclical andrepetitive actions, where participants performthe great mythical and ritual narratives of asociety. Although examples of unstructuredceremonial events exist, most ceremonies arestrictly prescribed in form, participation, andsequence (Geertz 1973). Ceremonial events areprobably the most basic and simple form ofmaterialized ideology, and have been with ussince the beginning of human ideologicalbehavior.

As mater ia l express ions of ideology,ceremonies , and r i tua l events can bemanipula ted and access to them can berestricted. The most basic restriction to theperformance of a ritual event is its cost. Large-scale ritual events are costly, therefore theresources required to organize them usuallysurpass the resources that a single individualcan expend for such activities. In hosting large-sca le feas t s , a l eader or a ru l ing e l i t edemonstrates the capacity to marshal quantitiesof food beyond the reach of others. Inka


paraphernalia. Because of their immediacy,rituals are among the most valuable strategiesfor enculturation of individuals, such as newlyconquered populations.

Symbolic Objects and Icons. Symbolicobjects and icons, such as paraphernalia usedfor the performance of a ceremonial event, ri-tual attires, mural paintings, or icons depictedin any medium are some of the most efficaciousforms of materialized ideology. The portablenature of most symbolic objects makes themstrong candidates for symbolic communicationamong and within social segments and betweenpolitical entities, and for personal display ofstatus or affiliation with specific segments ofsociety, whether determined by gender, age,function, or social position. On the other hand,icons of public display can communicate astandardized message to a large number ofindividuals simultaneously.

Portable objects are especially efficient forlong-distance communication between politicalor cultural entities. In this context they cansignify relation of dependency, affiliation, orcorrespondence. They can also be distributedwithin the segments of a society to create orre inforce ver t ica l as wel l as hor izonta lre la t ionships , and generate loyal t ies andconsensus among individuals differentiallybenefiting from the social action. Ceremonialparaphernalia or status symbols can be paradedas part of ceremonial events, and because theycan contain coded information they can serveas mechanisms for narrative representations.This narrative character, common in manycomplex iconographic systems and shared bythe performance of ceremonial events, is oneof the ruling elites’ most powerful tools toreinforce a message aimed at large masses ofsubordinated individuals.

Restricting access to the possession ofsymbolic objects can be achieved by controllingthe production and distribution of such objects.This restriction can be achieved if access to theraw materials, technology, or skills required toproduce them can also be restricted. In otherwords, the means of producing these kinds ofobjects must also be controlled by the rulingelites. Controlling the settings where theseobjects are more efficacious, or adding a specialcharacter to the object (e.g., by baptizing orblessing it), is another way to prevent their

feastings, or Moche ceremonial events areexceptional examples of the enormous costinvolved in the organization of such activities,and of the capacity of ruling elites to stratifytheir participation and control their performan-ce by prescribing ritual spaces and participants.

Another way of restricting access to thebeneficial action of ceremonial events is toincrease their organizational complexity, thatis, the specialized nature and number of thecomponent elements required for its performan-ce. These components include the requiredparticipation of specific individuals—religiousspecialists—commonly associated with theruling elites. The performance might alsorequire specific skills, such as the execution ofl i fe - threa ten ing ac ts tha t can only beaccomplished by trained specialists. Thecongregation of a number of participants isusually an ingredient of ritual events, such thatonly the prestige and power of the state can pulltogether large numbers of individuals. Specificsacred spaces, either designated as such orartificially constructed, are also prescribed forthe performance of ritual events. Finally, ri-tual paraphernalia are usually associated withthe correct performance of a ritual event.

Ceremonies are usually repetit ive andprecisely timed. Much of their efficacy isattributed to their calendric nature, and to theneed to reproduce them in the appropriate order.The beneficial effect of a ceremonial event isonly transitory. Events are by definit ionenacted or performed, therefore they cannot bepassed on to the succeeding generations, northey can be owned. Only the right to performthe ceremony may be owned; once performed,it is over, and a new capital expenditure isrequired for its re-enactment. The internalorganization of the ceremonial event usuallyrelates to the need to create a narrative, and toreproduce rea l i ty by the ac t ion of theperformers.

Ceremonial events can be efficient in theshort-term, especially if they include dramaticperformances combined with coercive elements,such as human sacrifice. But their efficacy inthe long-run depends on the repetition of theevent. Investments done in ceremonial eventstherefore, are not capital investments like theconstruction of a ceremonial place or theinvestment in the creation of ritual


indiscr iminate use , spec ia l ly i f the i rproduction cannot be controlled. A round pieceof metal is not a crown until it is consecratedin a coronation ceremony.

Symbolic objects, unlike events, can beowned, inherited, and transferred, making themideal signifiers of social position and socialrelationships. Symbolic objects can accomplishtheir function even beyond death. But symbolicobjects must be distinguished from commonwealth objects, which can be exchanged onlyas determined by their commercial value. Whilesymbolic objects do have commercial value,based on supply and demand, they require alsoadditional special and predetermined conditionsto become important objects of exchange.

Also in cont ras t wi th o ther forms ofmaterialized ideology, symbolic objects can beof lower cost, and even very small in size. Inthese cases the material with which the objectswere made (e.g., royal insignia), or the contextof their production and use are unique (e.g.,ancient Olympic laurel crowns). Objectscrafted with great skill may be held in extremevalue in their own cultural context, but inabsolute terms may have «cost» only the foodrequired by the craftsmen who produced them.

Public Monuments and Landscapes.Publ ic monuments and landscapes se rveprimarily, but not exclusively, ideologicalpurposes. Some great buildings are constructedto serve as ceremonial facilities, others arecenters of pol i t ical power, and some aredefensive structures. One factor common to allmonuments, however, is their ability to be«experienced» simultaneously by large numbersof ind iv idua ls . Impress ive and evenoverwhelming, they can also be extremelyeffective in communicating simple messages.Whi le the i r des ign might no t have beenparticularly safe, they clearly convey a messageof power and wealth (Trigger 1990). This ele-mental message comes across regardless of theviewer ’s language, age, gender, or culturalaffiliation.

The construction of monuments, such aspyramids or massive ceremonial mounds, andthe rearrangements of the landscape, such as theconstruction of art if icial hil ls or barrowsrequi res enormous inputs of labor andresources. Enterprises of this magnitude aretherefore restricted to the most powerful agents

in a society; although fairly simple societiessuch as Southern England Neolithic chiefdoms(Earle 1991b), or Coastal Perú preceramicsocieties (Feldman 1987) created structures ofimpressive size. Because of its scale, monu-mental architecture is clearly one of the mostremarkable expressions of the exercise of so-cial power. The construction of these largebuildings requires the cooperation of numerousindividuals and the implementation of complexlevels of labor force organization. Monumentsare the result of regular taxation in the form ofcorvée labor, making them «works in progress.»In as much as there is a population to be taxed,the monuments will continue to grow in size orincrease in number. This seems to be true ofmany Moche ceremonial centers (Hastings andMoseley 1975) constructed of multiple discretesections apparently contributed by populationsunder the elite control.

Not on ly can monuments be sharedsimultaneously by numerous individuals, but,because of their impressive size, can usually beexperienced from an extensive geographicalarea . These faci l i t ies are thus ideal forindoct r ina t ion , popula t ion cont ro l , anddissemination of propaganda. Moreover, withinor a round monuments la rge numbers ofindividuals can congregate to participate in ri-tual events.

Among the elites, monuments are subjectto ownership, transference, and inheritance,thereby becoming capital investments of long-term reliability. Unlike events, which must berepeated on a regular basis, monuments remainpermanent representations of the ideologicalsystem—permanent witnesses to the power ofthe dominant c lasses . Monuments of teneffectively represent power, even long after astate or social system has disappeared, thereforedefying time, and giving the impression ofpermanence and transcendence.

Monuments usually form the setting withinwhich ceremonial events take place and whereportable objects acquire a symbolic status; theycan therefore legitimize other aspects of theideologica l sys tem. By prescr ib ingperformances to public monuments, as much asby controlling the ceremonial paraphernaliaused in these performances, ruling elites canrestrict access to ceremonial events. Ritualburials of elite individuals take place in this


setting, as in the Danish (Bech and Olsen1985) and Moche cases (Donnan and Castillo1992). In this way the ruling segments ofsociety not only legitimize their control of ce-remonial spaces in life, they seemingly extendtheir influence to the other world. Ownershipof this powerful means of social control istherefore sanc t ioned by genera t ions andascr ibed to ind iv idua ls tha t can c la imconsanguinity with the interred ancestors.

Monuments, as well as any constructionsor markings of the landscape, accomplish thetask of domesticating unused territories and ofsymbol iz ing the appropr ia t ion of space .Marked territories can be claimed, owned, andinherited, while unmarked territories are wildand unclaimed. This power of monuments canbe seen in the numerous barrows and artificialmounds of Denmark , and in wal l s andalignments, geogliphs and marks, roads andpaths that cross the Peruvian deserts. Thesestructures, if nothing else, stand as monumentsto their builders.

Monuments not only delineate ownershipof space, they also explicitly define verticalrelations within society. Space has to beorganized in accordance with the ways in whichsociety is organized and stratified because thisorganization often parallels the way in whichthe monument is used. In complex societies,public architecture and ceremonial facilitiesappear in capitals and ceremonial centers beforeother settlements within the polity have thesetypes of structures, thereby reflecting the powerof the central hierarchy and its monopolizationof civic-ceremonial activity. The distributionof monuments in a landscape, therefore, canoften serve as a roadmap of the sociopoliticalsystem.

Writing Systems. Writing, the fourth formof mater ia l ized ideology, has somepar t icu la r i t i es of i t s own and somecharacteristics in common with other forms ofmaterialized ideology. Written documents, suchas inscr ibed s te lae or monuments , l ega ldocuments, contracts, and policies are physicalmanifestations of belief systems and, like otherforms of ideology, can tell a story or transmit amessage. While the other ideological mediaaccomplish this task indirectly, texts can beexplicit and direct; therefore, they can be usedto state an unambiguous message. But this is

not always necessarily the case, nor is theinformation coded in written texts explicit foreverybody. Reading does not always meanunderstanding, and even when understood,written words are not necessarily truth. Writingis stating a point of view, an interpretation ofreality, not a statement of reality itself. Writing,therefore, can be the most deceiving form ofmaterialized ideology.

In terms of transmitting messages andinformation, written documents duplicate theeffects of other media such as oral accountings,songs, and prayers. The intrinsic difference ofa written document lies in its intransitive nature.Written words are here to stay, especially whenthey are «written in stone.» But often what is«written in stone» are not facts or customs thatare generally known and accepted. There wouldsimply be no reason to incur such costs. Rather,elites are more likely to sponsor the inscriptionof propaganda on the highly and permanent re-cord of stone monuments.

As physical objects, written documents arebounded and controlled through the sameproductive processes as other material things.The technology to produce and circulate insociety the raw materials of writing, such asinks, paper, and bark, can be controlled in muchthe same way as the materials required to pro-duce symbolic objects . Access to wri t tendocuments can be even more tightly restrictedthrough control of the extremely specializedtechnologies of writing and reading. Writingcan create a clearly specialized section ofsociety, a real class of «craft» specialist. Thesecraftsmen, because of the intrinsic qualities oftheir trade, were frequently ascribed privilegedpositions in society, unequal to that of otherprofessionals.

Case Studies

Three cases have been chosen for analysisin this paper: Thy, Denmark; the Moche of Peru;and the Andean Inka. We have chosen thesearchaeological cases pragmatically; we areconducting ongoing research with them. Suchf i r s thand knowledge informs us on thecomplexity and dynamism involved in thesearch for political power. In each situationleaders sought to es tabl ish and mainta inpolitical control over broad populations.


Although political success differed, the questfor power was a common process; ideology wasan important source for that political power, andbecame effective as it was materialized throughdifferent media. In each case we review thespecific media used for materialization ceremo-nial events, symbolic objects , and publicmonuments.

These cases represent an evolutionaryspectrum from emergent chiefdoms to massiveempires. To some measure, the variabilityobserved in the materialization of ideologyreflects differences in social complexity¾thesca le and ins t i tu t iona l se t t ing of powerrelationships. One may conclude that with theevolution of human society, the means by whichideology serves political goals are transformed.The arrangement of the cases illustrates thisdimension of the variability. Chiefdoms, asi l lus t ra ted by the Danish case , a refundamentally fragile political formations; theyfragment almost as quickly as they form.Ideology is only weakly controlled by the chiefswho sponsor small scale ceremonies, exchangeand posses simple symbols of position, andcons t ruc t modes t monuments to the i rimmortality. States, as illustrated by the Moche,are institutionally elaborated and more stable.They can take on the character of the theater inwhich social order is played out throughelaborate ceremonies and dramatic symbols oforder and relationship. Complicated historicalnar ra t ives tha t l eg i t imize tha t o rder a rerehearsed through continual practice. Theexpansionist empire, as illustrate by the Inkacase, may simplify its ideology into criticalelements that are «transportable» across cultu-ral boundaries. Elements of military power,monumentality, and massive ceremonialism areespecially appropriate.

Considerable variation exists among thecases, and much more broadly variability resultsf rom his tor ica l condi t ions of cu l ture ,institutional structure, and political economy.Given the scope of the present paper, anassumption must be made that diverse lines ofdevelopment in politics and ideology exist andmust be s tud ied more fu l ly in fur therinves t iga t ions . S imi la r ly, we have notconsidered egalitarian societies, in which so-c ia l dynamics involv ing r i tua l andceremonialism included materialized ideology

to def ine group ident i ty, in te r grouprelationships, and social power (Spielman1992).

1. The Evolution of Chiefdoms:Neolithic and Bronze Ages of Thy,

Denmark

From the Early Neolithic into the BronzeAge, the prehistory of northern and westernEurope witnessed cycles of chiefly evolutionand decline. The megalithic monuments andimposing barrow cemeteries testify to centralleadership and social ranking. Europe hasbecome an important case for understanding theevolutionary dynamics of chiefdoms (Bradley1984, 1991; Earle 1991a; Kristiansen 1984,1987, 1991; Randsborg 1974; Renfrew 1972,1974) . In some essent ia l character is t ics ,however, the chiefdoms of prehistoric Europemust be cons idered fa i led a t tempts a tconsol ida t ing and ex tending pol i t i ca ldomination, moving beyond the scale of Big-man polities.

Despite evident attempts to centralize andinstitutionalize power, the emergent chiefdomsremained l imi ted in scope and s tab i l i ty.Distinguished chiefs might emerge briefly insome regions, such as Wessex or Thy, only tolose power and be eclipsed temporarily byanother regional development. The workpresent ly be ing conducted by the ThyArchaeological Project in Denmark (Bech 1993)seeks to investigate the power strategies ofchiefly elites under adverse conditions. TheDanish case exemplifies chiefdoms in which theownership of productive resources was anineffect ive source of socia l power. Theextensive agricultural lands without developedfacilities, like irrigation systems or drainageprojects, could not be effectively owned orinherited. Warfare, as a potent source ofcoercive power, was problematic, because of thelimited control over the means of destruction.

In this section we review how the chiefs ofThy deve loped a h ie ra rch ica l ideo logy.Transforming an Early Neolithic ideology thatemphasized group identity, attention came tofocus on male warriors as distinctive anddominant. The effectiveness of the hierarchical,warrior ideology as a source of political power


ultimately depended on its materializationin ways that could be effectively controlled. Thecr i t i ca l s tep appears to have been theintroduction of metal production of specialchiefly swords that defined political office. Theconstruction in the landscape of the chieflyburial monuments may have been especiallyimpor tan t to ins t i tu t iona l ize powerrelationships in lineages with inherited offices.

Located on the extreme nor thwest ofJutland, Thy is a low and narrow land borderedon the west by the North Sea and on the east bythe Limfjord. The landscape is rolling with lowhills and small streams, lakes, and bogs, theterrain derives from terminal moraine. Soilsare fertile, but agricultural productivity islimited by the northern winters and by summerdroughts. In the Early Neolithic, farmingpopulations moved into Thy and the originalforests were modified by shifting cultivation.About 2600 B.C. the forests were rapidlycleared away and by 2000 B.C. the landscapewas open grasslands presumably used forpasture (Andersen 1993).

The culture history of Thy dramaticallyillustrates the patterns of chiefly expansion andcollapse. Early farmers in the Neolithic fromthe Funnel Beaker Culture had a low-densitypopulation. A few megalithic monuments clus-ter in several localities, and one causewayedenclosure has been excavated. Some leadershipcan be infer red f rom the monumenta lconstruction, perhaps equivalent to a Big MenCollectivity (Johnson and Earle 1987).

About 2600 B.C., a rapid and profoundeconomic and political change began with theSingle Grave Culture. As the forests wererap id ly removed, pas tora l i sm becameincreasingly important. Low barrow groups,marking the graves of single men with battleaxes or women with elaborate amber necklaces,demonstra te some ranking. Later in theNeolithic, long-distance cultural ties wereestablished between northern Jutland andwestern regions of Bell Beaker settlements(Jensen 1982; Vandkilde 1991). The work inThy has uncovered severa l Bel l Beakersettlements consisting of clusters of hamlet-sizesites, each with a few houses. Ranking was notelaborated, but the distinctive material culturemust have distinguished personal status.

During the Early Bronze Age the landscape

became crowded wi th thousands ofbarrows, some standing over 10 m high, and richburials with fine chiefly swords in the Nordicstyle. During this period, the status of chieflyelites was marked by beautifully crafted swords,distinct from the working swords of associatedwarriors (Kristiansen 1984). Following a brieffluorescence during Periods 2/3, the society ofThy again became less distinctive within thebroader Danish patterns.

Ceremonial Events . F r iedman andRowlands (1978) argue that chiefly status inEurope derived primarily from hosting feastsand social exchanges of prestige goods. Chiefscentralized and extended the kinship system andits structured obligations through multiple, re-gional marriages that established and reinforcedregiona l a l l i ance ne tworks . By hos t ingelaborated feasts, leaders established theirprestige and attracted marriage and exchangepartners that further allowed them to control theexchange of prestige goods, moving longdistances across Europe. In a pattern familiarfrom the Moka of New Guinea (Strathern 1971),success would have translated directly intoprestige both for the individual leader and hissocial group.

Although indirect and variable in character,the archaeological evidence for ceremonialevents is quite s trong. During the EarlyNeolithic, across Denmark and elsewhere inEurope , ‘causewayed enc losures ’ wereconstructed to stage elaborate ceremonialoccasions. Spaced fairly regularly through thelandscape (Madsen 1988), these monumentswere positioned on topographically prominentlocations. Chains of pits were excavated, andthe earth thrown up to build an earthen bankthat enclosed a sacred or poli t ical space.Special deposits of animal bone and ceramicsare found in the pits filled up as single events.Human skeletal material, such as lines of skulls,document death rituals at the site. In Denmarkat least, these enclosures existed for only a briefperiod around 3000 B.C.

More continuous, but also episodic, werethe construction of burial monuments associatedwi th r i t es of passage and success ion ofleadership. The monuments themselves arediscussed later, but the association with cere-monial occasions are relevant here. During theEarly Neolithic, the megalithic tombs were


constructed as homes for the dead thatcould be re-opened easily for additional burialsand cyclical rituals of the community (Hodder1990). In front of the chamber, large andelaborated ceramic pieces document ceremonialevents (Tilley 1984). The barrows of the laterNeolithic and Early Bronze Ages continue themonumentality associated with the rituals ofdeath, but the symbolic significance of thebur ia l r i tua l and assoc ia ted monumentsevidently changed (Bradley 1984). The indivi-dual, central burial became the focus of the ri-tual interment and apparently indicates specialstatus, perhaps of chiefs. These ceremonieswould have been critical to the success and thesuccession of leadership.

Further evidence for the importance of ce-remonial events is the use of Bell Beakerceramics. These ceramics were of specialforms, including large and small containers thatare interpreted as drinking vessels. They arestylistically elaborate with detailed geometricincised lines filled with brilliant pigments. Alikely use of these vessels would have been forcopious consumption of alcohol at ceremonialoccasions. The Bell Beaker phenomenon thusmay indicate the development of linked cere-monial events in a peer polity interactionsphere. Such events would have been both theplatform for status rivalry and the arena toestablish regional identities of leaders as setapart ideologically from local affiliations.

Control over such ceremonial events would,however, have been difficult to monopolize orextend, as is evident in the Moka ceremoniesof New Guinea (Strathern 1971). Such eventswould have given little opportunity to enlargerelationships or to pass on achieved prestige.The fact that ceremonial occasions are bestdocumented for the Early Neolithic, when ran-king was not elaborated, suggests that ceremo-nial events may have emphasized group identityand would have had only limited use alone as abasis of political authority.

Symbolic Objects of War and Wealth.The basis of power in Thy derived from con-trol over the production and distribution ofsymbolic objects and the ideology that theymaterialized (Earle 1991b). Different types ofsymbolic objects were used at different periods,and the different character of their productionand articulation to subsistence should have

fundamentally affected societal scale andstability. The first contrast is between weaponryand jewelry (Kristiansen 1984, 1991). Bothsymbolize social distinction, but the finelycraf ted swords se rved as symbols andinstruments of naked force. The second contrastis between objects locally available and simplymanufacture versus those requiring foreignmaterials and complicated fabrication. Thesesource of ideological power have differentpotentials and problems for the emergingleaders of northern Denmark.

The prestige goods that characterized theNeolithic and Bronze Age societies of Thyinclude items of personal decoration, ritual/ce-remonial use, and war. Personal decorativeobjects were amber pendants and beads andbronze broaches, arm rings, belt pieces and thelike. Ritual and ceremonial objects includedelaborate decorated ceramics and flint axes.Weapons of war include stone battle axes, flintdaggers and arrow points, and bronze swordsand daggers.

During the Funnel Beaker period, symbolicobjects that would have served at ceremoniesinclude elaborately decorated ceramics andhordes of axes used to clear forests. Theceramics are found in the ritual settings at theopenings of megalithic tombs where feastingand offerings at death rituals probably occurred.The ax hordes are found at supposed sacred wetlocat ions (bogs , s t reams, spr ings) whereagr icu l tura l r i tua l p robably took p lace .Elaborate amber necklace pieces were found inthe megalithic monuments of Thy, but becausethe individual interments were mixed, it is nowimpossible to identify the grave goods withindividuals. These objects, made of the locallyavailable amber, would have been used for per-sonal decoration, but the mixing after deathwould seem to emphasize groups individualidentity.

The use of symbolic objects changes in theSingle Grave and Bell Beaker contexts to anemphasis on individuals and warfare. SingleGrave men’s graves were typically marked bya stone battle ax (or sometimes only flintb lades) ; women’s graves inc lude ambernecklaces, occasionally with many hundredsmall beads (Bech and Olsen 1985). Whilefemale status may still be marked by items ofpersonal decoration, male objects identify them


as warriors. Bell Beaker graves are rare forThy, but elsewhere they contain beautifullycraf ted f l in t daggers . These daggers ,manufactured in Thy from locally mined flint,are long and carefully manufactured withgrinding and a finishing flaking pattern thatcreated beautiful objects. The high level ofcraftsmanship in the finishing flaking wouldhave restricted the numbers of knappers ableto produce a highest quality piece, but lowerquality, simply-flaked daggers were also made.Daggers were items to display warrior status,but the broad availability of them would havemade it difficult to control their use. In the ThyArchaeological Project (TAP) se t t lementexcavations, f l int daggers were routinelyrecovered from household excavations and musthave been significant in everyday life. At thesame time, the use of amber for personal dis-play declined markedly, probably tied to itsexport to southern Europe (Shennan 1982). AtThy 2758, amber manufacture can be postulatedbased on raw amber, amber dust found inflotation samples, and micro-drills; no finishedbeads, however, were found. The importantpoint is that symbolic objects continued to bemanufactured of local materials, but that thedominant symbol ic reference changed toemphasize male military power.

In the Early Bronze Age, the nature ofsymbolic objects changes dramatically again.Objects of local manufacture all but cease tobe used to define status. In TAP excavations,ceramics became simplified with only minimaldecorative elaboration. No flint daggers orarrowheads were found. Amber, although foundon all sites, was always in raw form mostprobably being collected for export. Thesymbolic objects were now almost exclusivelyof bronze, made from tin and copper, neither ofwhich were ava i lab le in Denmark . Mostdramatic were the elaborately decorated chieflyswords (Fig. 1). More than 100 swords anddaggers from these barrows in Thy have beenrecovered, and their s tyles correspond tobroadly shared patterns of manufacture anddecoration that spread through Denmark andGermany. Most were probably loca l lymanufactured, but the complicated steps of theirmanufacture, including lost wax molding andelaborate working, document a sophisticatedproduction process (Kristiansen 1987).

Decorative brooches, found in graves andassumed to be female decoration, were alsofrequently used to define status in Thy burials.In contrast to the swords, these items requirequite simple fabrication and may have beenmanufactured by annealing of traded wire orbars; brooch fragments from Thy 2999 may wellindicate the local fabrication of the broochesin this residence where no evidence of eliteassociation is evident.

The use of symbolic objects in Denmarkchanged quite dramatically during the timeperiod under consideration. While female sta-tus may have continued to signal personaldecoration/attractiveness, male status came torefer to weapons of destruction. Initially theseitems, especially the flint daggers, were copiesof southern metal daggers produced locallyfrom avai lable f l in t . The qual i ty of themanufacturing process permitted some controlover the availability of these symbolic meansof coercion, but this control would have beencomparatively weak. It was the introductionof bronze metal working with the sophisticatedmanufacturing needed specifically for theswords that gave the economic control neededto permi t the expans ion of po l i t i ca lcentralization seen dramatically in the EarlyBronze Age. Kristiansen (1984, 1987, 1991)argues that, during the Danish Bronze Age,chiefs controlled long-distance procurement ofmetal through chiefly exchange partnershipsand alliances. The local manufacture of wealthcould be controlled by supporting artisansattached to elite patrons. Through this controlover metal and i ts fabrication, the chiefsretained exclusive access to weapons, to thesymbols of military might, and to an ideologyof warrior domination.

Public Monuments. Public monumentswere essential elements of the materializationof ideology, bu t the na ture of thesematerializations changed dramatically throughthe Neolithic and Early Bronze Ages. Theconstruction of the monuments in Denmark andelsewhere in Europe appears to have beenrelatively small scale and episodic. Shortperiods of construction were followed by longper iods of l i t t l e bu i ld ing on a spec i f icmonument, within a local area, and within aregion. Spurts of building puctuated by longperiods of inaction suggest the cyclical nature


of local polities, rising to local prominenceand then rapidly declining (Bradley 1984).

Beyond this, the symbolic character of themonuments seems to change quite dramatically.During the first half of the Neolithic, associatedwith the Funnel Beaker Culture, the monumentsof Thy comprise both the megalithic burialmonuments and causewayed enclosures. Themegalithic monuments involved the selectionof some very large boulders, weighing upwardsof 20 tons , the i r t ranspor ta t ion to theconstruction site, and their near miraculousplacement as upright walls and roofing of a cen-tral burial chamber. Most impressive were thepassage graves, represented in Thy by theimpressive monument of Lundhøj. Here a cen-tral chamber was constructed of boulderschinked by careful stonework and a clay cap tomake the room fully waterproof. Hansen (1993)argues that the stone work of these monumentswas the resu l t o f t es ted , sophis t ica tedengineering. The architects may well have beenspecialists working for a number of patrons/groups in a large region.

The labor involved in the construction of apassage grave was certainly considerable;estimates for England range upwards of 15,000man days (Startin 1982), and the direction oflocal leaders in their construct ion seemsevident. But the symbolic referent seemsequally clearly to have been the larger corporategroup and not the leader. The monuments wereused repeatedly for multiple burials, with indi-vidual skeletons being intermixed. These werehouses for the ances tors of a group andapparently defined the corporate character ofthe group, as distinct from any specific groupleader.

The causewayed enclosures in Denmarksuggest a higher level of social integration thanthe megaliths. The enclosure ditches andembankments were quite extensive, definingareas up to 20 ha. Within the territory of a sin-gle causewayed enclosure, multiple megalithicmonuments existed (Earle 1991b; Madsen1988). Bradley (1984) argues that the chainsof pi ts that characterize these enclosuresdocuments the division of labor into separatework crews, perhaps indicating the spatialdivision of the area into separate polities orsocial segments.

During the Middle Neolithic, burial rituals

and associated monument constructionschanged dramatically. In Thy, Single Gravemonuments, with one or two central interments,were low mounds, within which a central plankcoffin was covered with turf cut from thesurrounding pasture grasslands. The amount oflabor and monumental character of the moundswere less notable than the earlier megalithicmonuments, but the symbolic reference clearlyshifted to define the status of an individual,p resumably of spec ia l s ta tus or a l eas ta t tempt ing to represent d i s t inc t iveness .Symbolically the early definition of the groupis replaced by individuality.

During the Early Bronze Age, constructionof the famous barrows of Thy transformed thelandscape. The hilltops became dotted withclusters of burial mounds. A central internmentwas marked by a cist of glacial boulders,sometimes of considerable size. Then themound was built-up with turf and edged with acurb of glacial boulders. Typically only onecentral burial was laid out before being coveredby the bar rows; i t was common for themonument then to be used for additional burials.Several of the monuments that we excavated inThy showed major rebuilding, with a secondconstruction phase that added an outer curb andraised the monument’s height. Most markedly,the sizes of all the monuments were not thesame. Some barrows, such as the distinctivemound of Bavnehøj in Sønderhå parish, Thy,were over 3 m high and 30 m in diameter.Clustered around this monument were lessermounds, usually less than 1 m high. The evidentdistinction is that some monuments requiredsignificantly more labor in their manufactureand most probably indicate a paramount chief.

The Early Bronze Age barrows must havestood in the landscape as the materialization ofthe social hierarchy and the religious sanctityby which it was legitimized. The landscape wastransformed from an open rolling grassland inthe Middle Neolithic, to a landscape marked bythe monuments of the dead chiefs. The deadhad been planted in the soil and their places ofinterment remain marked to the present day.This socially transformed landscape was nolonger a natural world; it was a world ownedand controlled by the chiefs whose right toleadership was rooted in their living deadancestors (Earle 1991a).


The chiefdoms of Thy represent weaklycentralized polities. The ideology of leadershipwas grounded in ceremonial events, symbolicobjects, and burial monuments each in differentways demonstrating the distinctiveness andsanctity of leaders. Importantly the symboliccharacter of the societies was significant in allperiods. Early on, leadership is suggested bygroup corporate monuments; later, individualdistinctiveness is represented by monumentsand symbolic objects. This transformation fromgroup to individual focus in the symbolicreference has been described as two differenttypes of chiefdoms (Renfrew 1974). The reasonfor the shi f t seems to have been largelyhistorical, associated perhaps with an increaseemphasis on pastoralism which would havepermitted a more centralized control overproduction through the ownership of the herdsand control of their use in ritual feasting andthe export of the special products over broadregions (Sherratt 1981). The real centralizationof power seems, however, to depend on thedevelopment of an ideology of warrior eliteidentified closely with their metal weaponry. Awarrior would have been identified by hisweapon. The prestige goods exchange involvedthe controlled importation and fabrication ofthese symbols of power and distinctiveness.The ritual burial of the chiefs in the barrowsthen created the symbolic landscape with itsevident definition of sanctity and ownership onwhich the ch ie fdoms a t tempted toinstitutionalize power through its long-termmaterialization.

2.- The Transition from Chiefdoms toState Level Societies: The Moche Case

Some of the best examples of the effects ofmaterialized ideology in an emerging state levelsociety can be found among the Moche ofnorthern Perú. The Moche have been thesubject, in the last few years, of numerorusreserch projects. The data presented here is ba-ses primarily on the results of the San José deMoro Archaeological Project, co-directed byChristopher B. Donnan and Luis Jaime Casti-llo.

At around A.D. 100, in the fertile coastalvalleys of the northern Peruvian desert, the

Moche began to evolve from the fairly sim-ple Cupisnique and Sal inar chiefdoms tobecome, by around A.D. 450, some of the firststate-level societies in the Andes. Mochesociety was clearly stratified into distinct so-cial segments as expressed in differential burialpractices (Castillo and Donnan 1994, Donnan1991), and settlement patterns. Not only do wefind sites of different function and size (Willey1953; Wilson 1988) but within the sites we canident i fy soc ia l ly d i ffe ren t ia ted a reas orne ighborhoods (Bawden 1977, 1982) .Product ion d ivers i f ica t ion and c raf t sspecialization, long distance exchange andcons t ruc t ion of la rge sca le i r r iga t ioninfrastructure are some of the most distincteconomical achievements of the Moche.

Tradi t iona l ly the Moche have beenconsidered as one single and unified politicalentity (Larco 1945). This assumption of a sin-gle state society was based on the apparentsimilarities in art styles and ceramic forms. Theevidence available at present seems to indicatethat the Moche were organized into at least twoindependent pol i t ies (Donnan 1990), onecentered in the southern valleys of Moche andChicama, and the other sharing centers in theJequetepeque and Lambayeque valley systems(Castillo and Donnan 1994).

A remarkable aspect of the cultural historyof the Moche is that these two distinct politiesexhibit different developmental sequences, withone pol i ty ach iev ing h igher leve ls ofcomplexity than the other. While the northernMoche polities remained independent regionalstates, never expanding beyond their traditionallimits, by about A.D. 400 the southern Mochedeveloped an expansive territorial state thatconquered and controlled valleys to the southof their original territory. Nevertheless, thesimilarities reflected in some important aspectsof the material culture of both northern andsouthern Moche indicates that, in spite ofpolitical differences, they were part of the samecultural phenomenon. This cultural similarityis evident in funerary practices, in complicatedceremonies and mythologies as depicted inmurals and painted ceramics , and in theparaphernalia associated with these ceremonies.


Throughout their history Moche elitesapparently developed a peculiar power strategythat relied heavily on ideology and religiousper formances . Power was c rea ted andmaintained through an unequal and sociallystratified access to and possession of symbolicobjec ts and par t ic ipa t ion in ceremonia lactivit ies. The development of a complexsystem of religious ceremonies—enacted byMoche elite individuals—and the investment ofsocial wealth in the creation of symbolic objectsseems to relate to two strategies aimed atincreasing elite’s power. The first strategy wasdirected toward increasing social solidarity andhence involving all levels of society in the stateendeavors. This was accomplished by means ofa system of rituals and ceremonies shared byall Moche, that created a common ground ofsymbolic communication within the ranks of theelites and between them and the lower levelsof society. In the ceremonial system the socialorder was reflected by a stratified participation,in which every segment of society was ascribedthe enac tment and personi f ica t ion of anequivalent position in the pantheon of deitiesand supernatural entities. In this way onlyindividuals of the high elite could enact theleading roles and therefore legitimize theirprivileged position in society. By performingthese ceremonial activities the Moche recreatedtheir myths and traditions and effectivelymaterialized narratives that in essence wherethe representation of their past. In this wayMoche elites could appropriate and own historyand tradition.

The second s t ra tegy was to increaseinterdependencies and communication amongthe ranks of the elites, decreasing the tendenciestowards dispersion or cultural drift of eliteindividuals disconnected from the core ofMoche soc ie ty. Moche’s h igh e l i t eaccompl i shed th i s by means of t igh t lycont ro l l ing the product ion of symbol icobjec ts—the access to them—and the i rmanipulation via their distribution among lowerlevels of their own social segment. This strategytook two forms: a vertical communicationbetween the ranks of the elites, that implied theredistribution of ritual objects; and a horizon-tal communication among the upper ends of theeli tes by exchanging the most elaboratedsymbolic and exotic objects. This strategy

eventually generated a pan-Moche eliteideology (Castillo 1994).

Ceremonial Events . One of the mostremarkable aspects of Moche society is that itshows ev idences of complex soc ia lstratification beginning with its early stages.Burial ceremonies were evidently instrumentalin def in ing the soc ia l s t ruc ture and i t ssupporting ideology, therefore it is in burialpractices where organizational aspects ofMoche society are best expressed. Mocheburials show an enormous variability in theirforms, the amount of labor invested in theirconstruction and preparation of the bodies, andespecially in the number and type of objects thataccompany the deceased. More than 300 Mocheburials have been excavated archaeologically(Donnan 1991); the picture that emerges fromthe study of these burials is rather astonishing.

Differences in funerary treatment betweensoc ia l segments a re usua l ly qua l i ta t ive ;different status groups had access to differenttypes and qualities of symbolic objects. Highstatus burials frequently contain gold and silverobjects, fine ceramics, imported materials suchas spondylus shells, and precious stones suchas lapis lazuli and turquoise (Alva and Donnan1993; Donnan and Castillo 1992). Middle sta-tus burials contain a few metal and ceramicobjects, but not of the quality found in high sta-tus burials (Donnan and Mackey 1978). In lowstatus burials almost no associations are found(Donnan 1991). In addition to these qualitativeinequalities, some differences can be foundwithin a given socia l segment expressedbasically by quantitative differences. In otherwords, within a social segments individuals aregetting more or less of the same type of objects.But social inequalities are not restricted tobur ia l ascr ip t ion . Household s izes andarrangement, and quality of the materials usedin their constructions are clearly stratified alongthe same l ines as bur ia l s . Fur thermore ,settlement organization demonstrates that so-cial status implied also a differential access toceremonial spaces (Bawden 1977, 1982; Haas1985).

Moche elites’ preferential access to andmanipulation of the ceremonial system isclearly one of the most important componentsof their power strategy. Until recently we couldnot ascertain whether the relationships between


this social segment and the ceremonialsystem were restricted to the ascription, forfunerary purposes, of objects in which the ce-remonia l and myth ica l sys tems wererepresented. The only available clue wascontained in the vivid representations thatcharac ter ize Moche iconography. Mocheiconography depicts a number of ceremonialevents, such as ritual deer hunts, dances orcombats, where the participants seem to bemembers of this society’s elite, and where lowersocial level individuals only figure as service-providers (Donnan 1978). Ample archaeologicalevidence exists to support that elite membersof Moche society were participating in theseceremonial events (Castillo 1991; Donnan andCastillo 1992; Donnan and Mackey 1978). Butthese events were clearly second in importanceto more complex ceremonies where deities andsupernatural individuals have the central roles(Castillo 1989).

Among the Moche r i tua l events theSacrifice Ceremony (Fig. 2) was evidently themost complex ceremonial event in the Mocheliturgy (Alva and Donnan 1993; Donnan 1975).In the Sacrifice Ceremony, defeated warriors aresacrificed by anthropomorphized animals andanimated objects, that cut open the prisonersthroats, pouring the blood into tall ceremonialgoblets (Fig. 2, bottom). The blood-full gobletsare then transferred to several mythical figu-res, usually Figure B (a bird-like individual)and Figure C (a female), who present them totwo or the most important Moche deities, Figu-res A and D, who promptly consume the blood(Fig. 2, top). The archaeological data shows thatthe Sacr i f ice Ceremony was prac t icedthroughout 450 years of Moche history (Alvaand Donnan 1993). Evidence of this ceremonyhas been found, e i ther in iconographicrepresentat ions or in r i tual paraphernaliaassociated with elite burials, in every regionunder control of Moche polities (Alva andDonnan 1993; Bonavia 1959, 1985; Donnan andCastillo 1992, 1994; Strong and Evans 1952;Ubbelohde-Doering 1983) . The Sacr i f iceCeremony can be considered a pan-Moche ce-remonial event, crosscutting political entitiesand giving consistency to the Moche culturalphenomenon.

Resent research on Moche funerarypractices shows that the relationship between

the elites and the ceremonial system waseven closer than we expected. Findings in eliteburials of ritual paraphernalia associated withthe Sacrifice Ceremony, such as the goblet thatcontained the blood of the prisoners (Donnanand Castillo 1992:40), figure’s A scepter (Alvaand Donnan 1993:97-101) , and c lo th ingelements associated with Figures A, B and C,demons t ra te tha t some e l i te ind iv idua lspersonified, probably throughout their lives andcertainly at the time of their death, the mostimportant deities and priests in this ceremony.These symbolic objects are key to the perfor-mance of mythical events recreated by livingmember of the Moche elites.

Based on the funerary associations foundin one of the tombs at Sipan, in the Lambayequevalley, Alva and Donnan (1993) suggest that theLord of Sipan fulfilled in life the ceremonialroles of Figure A. Figure A is depicted in theSacrifice Ceremony receiving the goblet full ofhuman blood (Fig. 2). Also at Sipán the authorshave been able to recognize another deityfeatured in the same ceremony, this time Figu-re B, an individual wearing a large bird-likeheadpiece, that presents the goblet to Figure A(Alva and Donnan 1993:143-161). At the siteof San José de Moro, in the Jequetepeque valley,Donnan and Castillo (1992) have located twoelaborate tombs of females containing examplesof the goblet used in the Sacrifice Ceremony(Castillo and Donnan 1994). These femaleswere buried with the headdress of yet anotherdeity that took part in the Sacrifice Ceremony,Figure C, a female who presents to Figures Aand B the goblet full of human blood (Donnanand Castillo 1992:41). Finding the goblet andheaddress toge ther in two roughlycontemporaneous funerary contexts confirmsthat elite individuals were personifying the mostimportant deities of the Moche pantheon, andthat these roles were passed from one indivi-dual to the other.

An individual’s position in society not onlyimplied a preferential or detrimental access toand possession of resources and goods, but alsodifferential participation in the political andceremonial realms of Moche life. This unequalaccess to the material expressions of theideological system signals the position of theindividual and allows us to understand howimportant it was for Moche elites to keep a tight


control over this system. Control wasespecially exercised over material expressionsof the ideology that signaled the position of theindividual in society and legitimized right topower, therefore determining a person’s socialidentity and rights and obligations.

We find among the Moche social segmentsrepresented by d i ffe ren t ia l access toqualitatively unequal funerary goods. Thistranslates into a stratified access to the cere-monia l sys tem and i t s a r t i fac tua lrepresenta t ions , expressed , in tu rn , byqualitative differences in symbolic objects inburials of different social levels. In burials ofthe highest status, such as those of the Lords ofSipán or the elite females of San José de Moro,we find the actual paraphernalia and ritual attireworn during the most important rituals, such asthe Sacrifice Ceremony (Alva and Donnan1993; Donnan and Castillo 1992). In burial ofmembers of the immediately inferior sociallevel, for example lower elite individuals inPacatnamú (Ubbelohde-Doering 1983), we findartifacts such as carved gourds and ceramicvessels with detailed fine-line or three-dimen-sional representations of the ceremonial events,but not the actual paraphernalia required toperform them. In the middle levels of societywe f ind only representa t ions of par ts orelements of the ritual events; that is the case ofsome burials of infants at San José de Moro(Donnan and Castillo n.d.). Finally, at thelowest levels of Moche society almost noobjects associated with the symbolic system canbe verified (Donnan 1991). This differentialaccess to the ceremonia l sys tem or i t srepresentations mark vert ical relat ions inMoche society. Differentiation of status orgradation within social segments, especiallyamong members of the elite where we see amuch clearer resolution, are marked by thenumber of symbolic objects, especially ceramicand metal pieces ascribed to a burial.

Symbolic Objects. Another way in whichthe materialization of ideology was used tocreate and maintain the social fabric of Mochesociety was in the differential distribution ofritual or symbolic objects among the ranks ofthe elites. This distribution reflects a deliberates t ra tegy tha t impl ied cont ro l over theproduction and distribution of such objects.Tight control over the production of symbolic

objects restricts in access to them, whiletheir centralized and unequal distribution is oneof the ways of manipulating this particularexpression of ideology.

Elite Moche funerary contexts show apreferential and sometimes restricted access tocertain symbolic objects and raw materials,especially fine ceramics. Moche fine ceramicswere f requent ly decora ted wi th complexiconography, often narrative (Castillo 1991) andextremely detailed, such as the representationsof the Sacrifice Ceremony discussed above (Fig.2). Since only el i te burials contain theseobjects , they can be interpreted as beingsocially restricted, as can the information codedin the iconographic representations they depict.We have seen both in the Danish and Mochecases how restricted ideological information,mater ial ized in symbolic objects such asiconographic ceramics, not only marks the sta-tus of the individual in death, but was used asmeans to exercise power in society. We canassume that this differential distribution is theresult of a deliberate policy aimed at preventinglarge sections of Moche society access to theseobjects. These objects also tend to be theproduct of specialized labor, and in their ma-nufacture Moche artists made use of exotic rawmater ia l s , such as p igments , c lays , andSpondylus shells imported from Ecuador, orlapis lazuli and turquoise stones imported fromChile and Argentina.

A hypothetical scenario for the productionand distribution of ceremonial ceramics inMoche can be postulated from studies ofceramic production centers (Russell, Leonard,and Briceño 1994). Based on the distributionof identifiable ceramic styles it is quite apparenttha t f ine ceramics seems to have beenmanufactured in every Moche region, probablywith more than one ceramic production centerwithin a region at every point in time. It is fairlyclear that ceramic production was divided onthe basis of the target populations, and thequality of the products needed to supply thesepopulations. In this way the production ofsymbolic objects become firmly imbedded inthe economic process. A few middle-rangeceramic production centers have been located,and lower range production areas, in charge ofsimple domestic wares are known from manyareas (Russell, Leonard, and Briceño 1994).


Unfortunately fine ceramics productioncenters have yet to be located; however basedon their distribution, we can assume that thehigh elites kept the production of fine ceramicwares under the i r cont ro l , keeping forthemselves the more elaborated pieces, andrestricted their access by other segments ofsociety. In turn, the high elite distributed theremaining production of fine wares among thelocal lower ranks of the elite. There is also someevidence to show that the rulers of differentregions and polities were exchanging some oftheir finest ritual objects (Glenn Russell, per-sonal communication 1992). These mechanismsof product ion and d is t r ibu t ion a re c learexamples of restricted access to the materialexpressions of ideology. They are also goodexamples of the manipulation of these types ofobjects since this redistribution served to createand maintain loyalties among the elite ranks,generated a dependency of the lower ranks, andlegitimated the power of whomever controlledtheir production and distribution. Exchangesamong the higher ranks of the elites probablycontributed to the affirmation of a sharedidentity, reinforcing political links and certainlypreventing or at least slowing cultural drift.

Symbolic objects were, therefore, a meansof communication between elites from differentregions and polities and also served to integratedifferent ranks of the elite within a particualrregion or polity. The lowest levels of society,the peasantry, although knowledgeable of therituals enacted in ceremonial places, of orallytransmitted narratives, and of public renditionsof iconography, such as mural paintings, hadno access to the symbolic objects.

Current research at the northern Moche siteof San José de Moro (Castillo 1994, Castilloand Donnan 1994; Donnan and Castillo 1992,1994, n.d.) allows us to test this hypotheticalsystem of product ion and dis t r ibut ion ofsymbolic objects. By around A.D. 650 we cansee a significant change in the original sourceof supply of some Moche fine ceramics: For thefirst time we find evidence of imported ritualobjects, sometimes coming from the centralcoast valleys of Lima and Lurín, as far as 700km south. These objects, some of the finestproduced in their home societies, appear onlyin the most complex burials and no sign of themis found in domestic settings. This distribution

pattern implies that the highest ends of theLate Moche elite controlled the long-distanceexchange networks, thereby monopolizing theimportation of ritual objects that representedinteractions with the then-flourishing centralcoas t soc ie t ies . This exchange of f ineideological artifacts was important for a societyin decline as was the Late Moche, particularlybecause Moche elites had traditionally based agreat part of their power on the manipulationof materialized ideology.

The introduct ion of foreign symbolicobjects must have severely impacted the socialrelationships among Moche elites. Accordingto our model, the higher elite was obliged toredistribute some of the ritual objects theycontrolled among the lower ranks to maintainreciprocity and generate dependency links. Butintroducing foreign ceramic objects into theequat ion changed the manipula t ions ofsymbolic objects, complicating what used to bea fairly simple process. For the first time theMoche higher elites did not entirely controledthe production of the symbolic objects, and thefact that we f ind them in small numbersindicates that they were in short supply. Thesolution was apparently to locally generate co-pies of the foreign ritual objects, some of themstill retaining Moche elements, others entirelydependent on foreign forms and designs. Thesecopies were, as we can expect, distributedamong the middle and lower ranks of the elite,decreasing in quanti ty and qual i ty as wedescend in the social ladder, in the same wayas Moche ceramics with complex iconographydid when these were the only fine ceramicobjects.

The absence of foreign ceramics throughoutmost of Moche history indicates a deliberateeffort to prevent foreign symbolic objects—thatpromoted a foreign power strategy—to enter inMoche te r r i to ry and inf luence Mochepopulations. Political or ideological associationwith this foreign power was of no use to theMoche, especially when they were expandingand vigorous states. So what led them to notonly vehemently import foreign symbolicobjects, but to also go through the complicatedprocess of copying them? One possibility is thatas material wealth these fine objects weresimply more prestigious than the local versions,therefore the late Moche copied them


because they acknowledged their intrinsicqual i ty, o r technica l super ior i ty. In th i sscenario, owning these foreign precious objectsbecame a matter of prestige and conspicuousconsumption for Moche elites (Trigger 1990).Although reasonable, under closer scrutiny thisexplanation implies an open market economy,in which finely crafted objects are ratherautomatically more valuable than simplerobjects, regardless of their origin and symboliccharacter, and where exchange of artifacts is notmediated and does not adhere to appropriateideological preconditions. Explanations of thiskind, although not necessarily wrong, arecertainly incomplete because they deny thesymbolic value of the objects, reducing themto exchange goods only.

Another possibility is that importing andreproducing not only the symbolic objects, butthe ideological information they promote,signifies adherence to, or at least an affiliationwith, the foreign ideologies. We do see thatthese foreign objects are not accepted withoutres t r ic t ions : They a re re in te rpre ted andmanipula ted to f i t the Moche canons ofproduction and distribution of symbolic objects.Moche elites did indeed try to restrict theproduction and distribution of these objects,attempting, therefore, to manipulate this newmaterial expression of ideology as they alwayshad. They did not succeed, and less than onegeneration after these new types of objectsappear, the Moche are gone, this time for good.

Monumental Architecture. One aspect inwhich the northern and southern Moche are notcomparable is in the construction of monumen-tal architecture. The territory controlled by thesouthern Moche is dotted with some of the mostimpressive ceremonial pyramids in the NewWorld, such as the Huacas del Sol and de laLuna in the Moche Valley, constructed withmore than 100 million adobe bricks (Hastingsand Moseley 1975); Huancaco, in the VirúValley (Willey 1953); and Pañamarca, in theNepeña Valley (Proulx 1973). In contrast, in thenorthern Moche territory ceremonial centers,such as Pacatnamú and San José de Moro in theJequetepeque Valley, are smaller and lessimpressive3.

The d i ffe rences in the monumenta larchitecture from the northern and southernMoche polities seems to relate to the expansive

nature of the southern Moche state. Thesouthern Moche u l t imate ly cont ro l ledpopula t ions wi th c lear ly d iverse e thn icbackgrounds, but succeeded, surprisinglyrapidly, in integrating these populations to theMoche mode of production and geopoliticalstrategy. This rapid integration of conqueredpopulations to the Moche sphere has beenexplained by either the militaristic character ofMoche society (Wilson 1988), or by assuminga common cultural substratum to all northerncoas t soc ie t ies , which fac i l i t a ted theenculturation process. While these two factorsare probably components of the Mocheintegration strategy, they cannot wholly accountfor long-term cultural transformations.

It is our impression that one of the mostimportant components of the southern Mocheexpans ive s t ra tegy was an ideologica linfiltration, carefully planned and executed inadvance of true geopolitical control, with cere-monial centers of monumental proportionsserving as ‘beach-heads’ for this advance. Forexample, the southernmost valley under Mocheinfluence, the Nepeña Valley, was never totallyunder Moche control. What Proulx (1973) foundwhile surveying this valley was a Moche cere-monial center of monumental proportionssurrounded by residential areas of non-Mochepopulations. No evidence of Moche domesticsettlements was found in the valley. Why do wefind a clearly Moche large ceremonial centerin a territory that is so obviously non-Moche?This center certainly did not serve the needs ofa devoted Moche community, but insteadtargeted a local population. The investment insuch a monument, whether built by Moche orlocal labor, implies that the state was interestedin first occupying the minds of the inhabitants,to ease the latter occupation of their fields.

Among the northern Moche, ideologicalpower did not rely on monumental architecture.Instead, ceremonial events and the productionand distribution of symbolic objects were themost important agents for ideological action.These ceremonia l events and objec t saccomplish the difficult task of legitimizing anext remely unequal soc ia l s t ruc ture . Thenorthern Moche were not interested, apparently,in enculturating foreign populations. Their goalseems instead to have been to legitimize thestatus quo, and to perpetuate their social system


through the manipulation of ideology. Mo-numenta l a rch i tec ture d id no t p lay asimportant a role in these processes.

Does this means that only expansivesocieties are forced to develop monumentalarchitecture? Not necessarily. Our point is thatto gain and legitimize social power by meansof materialized ideology, any society hasmultiple choices and pathways. Some rely onmonumental architecture and its trans-societalintegrative powers; others emphasize symbolicactivities and objects, and their intra-societalintegrative powers.

3.- An Expansionist Empire: TheInka case

During the 15th century A.D., the Inkaestablished dominion over a vast territoryreaching from Ecuador to Argentina. Startingas a complex chiefdom with a single ethnicgroup of probably no more than 100,000, theInka literally exploded through conquest tobuild an empire expanding over roughly350,000 mi2 of diverse environments with 8-14 million subjects and more than 100 separateethnicities. Conquered groups ranged from thegreat coastal states, like the Chimú, to small-scale tribal societies on the jungle fringe. TheInka ruled using various strategies that rangedfrom the direct assimilation of groups instrategically important areas to more indirectrule through client elites in more marginala reas (LeVine 1985; D’Al t roy 1992) .Materialization of a state ideology was inte-gral to the implementation of state rule in allareas of the empire.

The Inka case illustrates the problems ofpower confronted by an expansionist empire.Initial conquest relied on an overwhelmingmilitary might, and a continued threat of for-ce underlay the state’s domination. A long-term goal, however, seems to have been tosolidify and institutionalize the empire’sdomination by exporting a state ideology thatleg i t imized the new pol i t i ca l o rder.Materialized ideologies of empires are meantto communicate with conquered peoples whomay not share language or customs with theirconquerors . By producing s tandardizedceremonies , symbol ic ob jec ts , andarchitectural monuments, the state creates a

political culture experienced by all whoare incorporated into its territory. The Inkaempire of western South America offers a vi-v id example of how the process ofmaterialization allows for the imposition of anideology to unify a newly created polity.

Ceremonial Events. Inka ceremonies werethe most direct and important element of therelationship between the state and its subjects.Inka ritual hospitality materialized the powerand wealth of the state on a grand scale throughfeasting. After conquering new territory, thestate alienated militarily and symbolically allagricultural lands and then reallocated them tothe ayllu (a kin-based corporate group) as ademonstration of «Inca omniscient benevolencein action» (Murra 1980:94). By granting landr igh ts back to the communi ty, the Inkalegitimized their right to exact tribute. Inrea l i ty, the s ta te d id no t in te r fe re wi thtraditional land tenure practices, and the basicsubs is tence and wel fa re of i t s membersremained the respons ib i l i ty of the loca lcommunity. Much of the state’s revenue camefrom a labor tax, so that subject groups providedthe labor to till agricultural lands set aside forstate use. Labor crews also created new statelands (Murra 1980:55-56), formed the military,constructed facilities to house the bureaucracy,and built roads to tie the centers together. Thestate, in return for these services, hosted workparties in traditional Andean fashion, providingworkers with food and chicha beer (Murra1980:97).

Craig Morris’ excavations at Huánuco Pam-pa suggests that state hospitality took place ona massive scale (Morris and Thompson 1985).This Inka center is located far from agriculturallands and local set t lements, yet i ts manystorehouses contained abundant foodstuffs. Atthe center of the settlement was a large plazaof 19 hectares. The monumental space suggeststhe large-scale ceremonies that we know fromthe early chroniclers took place here. In theexcavated assemblage, the dominant ceramicvessel form was the standarized large, high-necked Inka storage vessel, the aryballos. Thesehave been interpreted as liquid storage vesselsmost probably used to serve chicha (maize beer)in publ ic ceremonies . Morr is (1985:485)emphasizes the dominant ro le p layed byceremony and hospitality in the state activities


at Huánuco Pampa. While the state reliedupon mi l i ta ry s t rength and an e ff ic ien tbureaucracy, «the sal ient feature of Inkacontrol...was the amplification of many of theprinciples of Andean reciprocity from thevillage level» (Morris 1985:481).

Maize was, by all accounts, a prestige cropin Andean society before the conquest; the Inkaelaborated its importance and expanded its usein ritual contexts (Murra 1960). The ritualconsumption of chicha was a traditional Andeanceremony before the Inka period, and chiefsprovided large quantities to their followers. Tomaintain social and political relationships,chiefs carried heavy jars of chicha along withthem as they traveled (Rostworowski 1977). Inthe Mantaro Valley, Peru, the Inka co-opted thero le of hos t f rom loca l e l i t es . In th i sstrategically important region, feasts sponsoredby local elites declined in frequency after theInka conquest (Costin and Earle 1989), prior towhich, maize and large liquid storage vesselswere found primarily in elite domestic areas,suggesting local hosting by the chiefs. Underthe Inka, the consumption of maize greatlyincreased, especially as seen in the stableisotope ratios of male skeletons (Hastorf 1990),but the maize was no longer limited to the elitehouseholds . I t i s assumed tha t the loca lpopulations must have been receiving the maizeas chicha served at s tate ceremonies. Byassuming the role of host, the Inka ensured thatthe rights to community labor, formerly apolitical and economic prerogative of localelites, would instead legitimately belong to thestate. In a very real sense, the state was«earning» its authority (Morris 1982) directlyfrom the populace. Elaborate rituals wereconducted to ensure a productive maize harvest.The Inka himself participated in a yearlyplanting ritual, and the creation myth of theInkas also linked them to maize (Murra 1960;Conrad and Demarest 1984).

Feasts were also held to celebrate importantevents in the royal family and to rewardveterans of successful military campaigns. Atthese feasts, the Inka distributed numerousobjects, elaborate food, and chicha. The statereligion equated the emperor with the divinegod of the sun, Inti, from whom the Inka rulingline directly descended. Religious worship wasat the same time a veneration of the emperor

(Rowe 1946; Conrad and Demarest 1984).Thus r i tua l events expressed a complexideology that venerated the emperor andjustified his position.

On a continuing basis, those who laboredfor the state enjoyed its hospitality and in sodoing were directly reminded of the divinenature of its ruler and the vastness of hisdomain. Because feasts encompassed all ofthese levels of social and religious meaning,their impact on participants was that much moreeffective.

Despite their symbolic importance, the statereligion and ideology were a political tool. Theintentions behind Inka ritual differed from itsoutward manifestations. Feasts demonstrated,outwardly, an ideology of generosity andreciprocity in a form that was experienceddirectly by a populace that had little else incommon. At the same time, this ideologymystified the existing power relationships andlegitimized the position of the emperor.

Publ ic Monuments and Pol i t ica lLandscapes . Archi tec ture , roads , andmonuments a re permanent symbols tha tt ransform a landscape, mater ia l iz ing thepresence of a particular group and organizingthe landscape in accordance with the socialstructure and activities of the group. The roadsof the Inka empire symbolized the logisticalstrength and organizational power of the empire(Hyslop 1984). Corvee labor crews constructedover 30,000 km of roads with suspensionbridges, causeways, and stairways across thesteep Andean terrain. These roads bound thestate facilities of the empire together within atight network of primary and secondary routes.The impressive achievements of Inka laborcrews and engineers provide visual evidence ofthe fundamental militaristic power that underlayand drove Inka expansion. In spite of theirmilitary might, the Inka preferred diplomacy toactual combat, relying as much on the threat offorce as on its implementation (D’Altroy 1992).Hyslop (1984:341) writes that «...John Murrahas referred to the roads as a ‘flag’ of the Inkastate because of their high visibility and theclear ways that they linked the individual tocentral authority».

Inka architecture is also widely recognizedfor its massive walls and fine masonry. Equallydiagnostic of Inka architectural canons is the


repetition of particular settlement layoutand structure forms (Fig. 3). Each major statesettlement was dominated by a large centralplaza, in the center of which stood the ceremo-nial platform, the usnu. At one edge of the pla-za s tood one or more la rge rec tangularbuildings, the kallanka, and around the edgewere residential compounds in the distinctiverectangular style, the kancha. This uniformityof style most probably carried over to ceremo-nial practice, creating a common culturalexperience through the empire: «[The Inka]made their subjects accept in their towns thesame arrangements of shrines, dedicated todiverse dei t ies , that there was in Cuzco,showing them the order in which they were tomake sacrifices to each one and for whatreason» (Cobo 1979:241). Elements of Inkaarchitecture repeatedly appear together inadministrative centers and way stations alongthe Inka road. The usnu, commonly found inthe center of plazas, was particularly importantceremonially, because the emperor stood uponit to address his subjects; in his absence the usnuwas a physical reminder of his central role inall proceedings in the plaza.

Outside Cuzco and its immediate environs,Inka builders constructed almost none of thefine, cut-stone masonry that characterizes thefinest state buildings in Cuzco. However, therepeated use of the same building forms of Inkaconstruction throughout the empire provided auniform and recognizable structure to Inka sitesin the hinterland (Gasparini and Margolies1980:66—67). As far south as the CalchaquíValley, Argentina, 1,500 km south of Cuzco,state installations were carefully modeled afterInka architectural canons. Morris (1982:155),who has argued that provincial centers werecenters of state hospitality, emphasizes theirartificial nature and separation from the localcenters that remained the foci of economic andsocial life. Inka sites were visual symbols ofthe power of the state, focal points for ceremonyand hospitality.

In the Calchaquí Valley, Argentina, the mostelaborate ceremonial site, Potrero de Payogasta,was located about 20 km north of a region ofdense local settlements that were clearly underthe control of the Inka. Potrero has a large,well-defined plaza, with more than a third ofthe settlement area given over to the public

plaza and usnu complex. Potrero, and notthe local centers, probably became under theInka the setting for feasts (DeMarrais 1993).By removing feasting from local settlementsand requiring a special journey to participatein the feas t ing , the Inka separa ted localadministration and state hospitality. Potrero,like Huánuco Pampa, appears to have been anartificial, intrusive center.

Finally, it seems essential to distinguish thesymbolic role of roads and architecture fromtheir functions. Any investment in roads andsettlements drew energy and personnel awayfrom subsistence production. At the same time,i f a road through a region convinced i tsinhabitants that state armies were poised tos t r ike , then the shor t - te rm cos ts of i t sconstruction may have been well invested. Thisexample demonstrates the mix of strategies, aswell as the different forms of materialization,through which the Inkas pursued the long-termgoal of securing the empire.

Symbolic Objects. In the Inka empire, thepolitical and ritual meaning of symbolic objectswere inseparable, created through their directassociation with the emperor. Symbolic objects,most importantly cloth and metal, were givenas tokens to strengthen alliances, fund newinstitutions of control, and reward supporters(Friedman and Rowlands 1978; Brumfiel andEarle 1987). D’Altroy and Earle (1985) havesuggested that wealth finance was the primarymeans through which the Inka maintained theirrelationships with the local managerial ranks.Weal th goods concentrate value in smallpackages and are easily transported to pointsof central control.

Finely woven cloth was the most importantInka prestige item; given as gifts to newlyconquered peoples, it had strong ceremonial andpolitical significance (Murra 1962).

Although it is true that the women andIndian servants of the [ local lords] madeclothing for them , it was ordinary and coarse,used only to dress their servants; but themagnificent clothing made or cumbi worn bythe caciques and lords could only be made forthe Inca, and he handed it out to these lords.Apart from this, at many of the fiestas that wereheld during the year, as a favor to the lords,cac iques , and nobles , the Inca gave ou tmagnificent shirts and blankets, gold and silver


cups, necklaces, bracelets, and other jewels ofemeralds, turquoise, and other precious stonesset in gold. (Cobo 1979:221).

The gesture of giving was a «priming of thepump» (Murra 1980), meant to create anobligation that, while phrased in terms ofreciprocity, would ensure a continuing supplyof labor and goods to s tock the s ta te ’sstorehouses.

The Inka nobility monopolized gold andsilver, so that «gold and silver had special ri-tual and political significance [through] theiremployment by the Inca royal dynasty assymbols of political power used solely by theemperor» (Lechtman 1984:14—15). Thesegoods materialized wealth in their scarcity, butthe technological virtuosity achieved by Andeanmetallurgists and weavers suggests that theInkas also restricted control of wealth objectsthrough the superior craftsmanship of objectsthat represented the state. In the Mantaro Valley,the objects of metal recovered archaeologicallyevidently marked status in both the Inka andpre-Inka periods (Costin and Earle 1989; Owenn.d.). Here and throughout the empire, the shiftfrom local metals to tin bronze suggests thatthe state took control over the manufacture ofthe symbolic objects which mixed together bothlocal and statewide symbols.

These parallels in technological processessuggest that, in Andean society, meaning wasembedded in, as well as contained in theiconography of , meta l and c lo th objec ts(Lechtman 1984). As in the realm of feastingand reciprocity, the Inka were drawing onexisting elements of Andean material cultureand technology in the production of wealthgoods to support the empire. The rich culturalsignificance of cloth provided a foundationupon which the Inka could elaborate. Similarly,the production of golden al loys could becontrolled by the Inka to create a symbolicworld of elite privilege expressed in preciousmetals.

Craft activity, particularly cloth production,was reorganized under state control near Cuz-co and in special enclaves, such as the potterswho were resettled near Cajamarca by Topa Inca(Rowe 1982). As Inka conquests continued, theranks of craft specialists and retainers expandedto include attendants and servants (aklla, yana,and mitima) who were no longer simply corvée

laborers but full-time attached specialistswho converted raw materials into wealth (Murra1980:154-158; Rowe 1982). These products inturn had both a pol i t ical and ceremonialimportance. The aklla, «chosen women» whowove fine cloth and brewed chicha for the statedemons t ra te the over lapping spheres ofre l ig ious and economic ac t iv i ty tha tcharacterized Inka Cuzco. Morris and Murra(1976:276) have noted tha t , in the Inkareorganization of the craft producing sector,«Pot ters , weavers , or smiths provide thebenefits of mass production under workshopconditions, which could be fairly compared withthe ‘industrial’ establishments of Europe at thesame t ime». This i s a c lear example ofideological control maintained through attachedspecialization.

By understanding how ideologies are givenconcrete, physical form, we can identify the roleof ideological systems in the maintenance andconsolidation of political power. Each of thedifferent forms of materialization—ceremonialevents, public monuments and landscapes, andsymbolic objects—has inherent qualities thatare experienced in distinct ways by a subjectpopulace. Especially important for empires areproblems of integration and communicationover a vast territory. At the same time, thecomplexity and diversity of imperial economiespresents a broad range of strategic choices tothe i r l eaders . Through the success fu lmanipulation of ideology, leaders can, and do,radically alter the costs of political domination.The Inkas actively transformed and materializedexisting ideologies and institutions to supportthe goals of the empire. Their success inmaterializing Inka ideology was integral to theexpansion of the empire.


Conclusions

On the surface the three cases chosen foranalysis seem diverse and divergent. They comefrom very different times and places, such thatthey must be cons idered h is tor ica l lyindependent. They are the result of adaptationsto s t r ikingly different environments , anddifferent developmental sequences. They alsovary greatly in terms of their political scale andcomplexi ty, f rom s imple ch ie fdoms inDenmark, to emergent states in the north coastof Perú, and to the extensive empire of the Inka.

As we examine these cases we see how theireconomies turned toward central izat ion,specia l iza t ion , and d ivers i f ica t ion; the i rpolitical organization became increasingly moreelaborate , requir ing pol i t ical special is ts ,recording systems, and a network of politicalagencies. Their military apparatuses also grewin size, through enforced conscription and fulltime specialists of war, to cope with the needsof a larger and more populated political entity.Despi te the his tor ical and organizat ionaldistinctions, ideology was a common source ofsocial power in each case. The emergence andinstitutionalization of social stratificationevident ly res ted in no smal l measure onideological power and its materialization. Theprocess of materialization transformed ideologyinto events and material things that wereproduced by the labor of society and ownedlargely by its leaders.

The three cases illustrate how the differentorganiza t iona l contex ts and media ofmaterialization determined the specific uses ofideology, the size and homogeneity of the targetpopulations, the resources available for thistype of investment, the willingness to invest inthese types of power strategies, and eventually,the outcome of the materialization of ideology.Ceremonial events appear to be the most basicform of materialization. It was an importantsource of cultural meaning in stratified as wellas unstratified societies. Ceremonial eventscreate and recreate narratives that generate andpromote social group identity, and that reiterateand legitimize the relative position of socialsegments, such as in the case of the FunnelBeaker community, in the overriding sanctityof the social hierarchy of the Moche, or theexuberance of the Inca feasts.

These «soc ia l nar ra t ives» can betransformed into a source of political power inseveral ways. One costly means is to increasethe size and intricacy of the ceremony, such thatthey require prodigious expenditures or ritualspecialists. Alternatively the ceremonies maybe tied to other media which are more easilymanipulated. Symbolic objects were importantelements in the ceremonial dramas of all cases.They signified the social roles and relationshipsof participants, and encode the narratives of thesocial order. In the Danish case, the introductionof bronze as the material from which the chieflyswords were made, created an opportunity forcontrol over materialization through control ofthe attached specialists in charge of their ma-nufacture . Up to this point , the pol i t icalinstitutions in Denmark were small in scale. Thehighly elaborated ceremonial artifacts seen inthe burials of the Moche’s «living gods» wouldhave strictly limited the ritual performances tothose few individuals controlling the productionand distribution of the requisite sophisticatedmetal and textile elements of the ceremonialattire. The development of a high status elite inMoche society runs parallel to an increasinglycloser association with the symbolic system. Inthis and other ways, social status the Mochestates was, therefore, equivalent to preferentialaccess to the symbolic and ceremonial system.The elaboration of materialization through mo-numental buildings was especially important inthe control over ideology in the Inka empire.The size of the monument was a constantremainder of the labor involved in i t sconstruction, and its message of political powerwas elemental and easily read cross-culturally.The monumental construction became the stagefor the ceremonies of legitimation that were theessence of the Inka state ideology.

The soc ie t ies ana lyzed here a recharac te r ized by in te r- and in t ra -c lasscompetition and strong tendencies to fragmentin to smal le r po l i t i ca l un i t s . In thesec i rcumstances ideo logica l sys tems mustcontinually institutionalize and legitimize anemerging social order. Power strategies basedon materialized ideology are characteristicallyambivalent and contradictory. While promotinga sense of community and shared participationin the social network, the ideological systemenforces social differences and a corresponding


differential distribution of wealth andauthor i ty. To th is end, manipula t ing andrestricting access to the materialized ideologicalsystem is a key mechanism.

Ideologies comprise narratives and storiesabout the world, its history, and its future. Anemerging social segment must promote theideology that justifies the social domination onwhich it rests. The ability to mold this ideology,we argue, is restricted by and made powerfulthrough the social and economic processes ofits materialization.

Addendum: The Trap of Ideology

We have tried to demonstrate how a powerstrategy based on ideology can contribute to thecreation and maintenance of a social order, but,although materialized ideologies have beenpresented as an effective means to these ends,they are certainly not without problems. At thispoint several questions are unavoidable. Is itpossible for the ideological system to workagainst the economic base of the social system?In order to perpetuate itself can a ruling eliteoverexpend on the creation and maintenance ofthe ideological apparatuses and so weaken theoverall social system as to cause i ts owndestruction? This effect of the overextensionof ideology we term «the trap of ideology.»

Specific conditions and circumstances setthe trap. If the ideological system becomes theprincipal source of legitimization and power forthe ruling elite, the protection and perpetuationof this ideology will likely become one of thisgroup’s most important functions. Not onlymust the e l i t es inves t soc ia l cap i ta l inideological apparatuses, they must also preventother groups from gaining access to these sameapparatuses. When these peculiar conditions arese t in mot ion , a soc ia l s t ruc ture and i t ssupporting ideology will have established arelationship of mutual necessity making themcomplete ly inseparable . I f the ideologycollapses, so will the ruling elite.

Social structures under these conditionswill be primarily perpetuated by manipulatingand maintaining the ideological system, and byrecreating and restricting access to it. Althoughthis is true of almost every system that usesideology to legitimize its social organization,in some cases this association can destroy the

whole system by weakening its productivebasis. This happens as the ruling elite drawsincreasingly more resources away from theproduction of essential goods for use in theproduction, maintenance, or protection ofideological apparatus. As illustrated by theinflationary competitions among New Guineanbig men in the ritual Moka (Strathern 1971),and by the increasingly expensive funeraryfurnishings of the Moche (Alva and Donnan1993) and Danish (Bech 1993), this pattern willresult in cyclical disruptions and changes in theleadership of society: The same activities andru les tha t gave e l i t es the i r power andprominence will end up driving them to theirdemise. The ruling elites in this case functiononly to maintain the ruling ideology and thereproduction of the rules that were effective toacqui re power, wi thout regard for themechanisms necessary to maintain the well-being of society. Ideology is no longer a meansof power but rather an end in itself.

The trap of ideology can be used to modelsocietal collapse. The expression of a collapsegenerated by an overexpenditure in ideologicalapparatuses would be particularly sudden andcatastrophic. Archaeologically, we would seea society at what is generally considered itspeak of deve lopment and ach ievement ,expressed in the high expenditures on art andmonumental construction, as well as elaborateceremonies and ritual events, long-distancetrade and consumption of exotic materials, andso on. This peak would be followed by thesudden destruction and abandonment of itsstructures, the disappearance of its art styles andthe dispersal of its population, probably goingback to simpler forms of life. Two cases wherethis scenario seems likely are the collapse ofthe Moche and the Maya. No foreign invasion,meteorological catastrophe, or other exogenouscauses generated these events, although suchfactors have been known to accelerate or evenprecipitate the process. In this paradigm, thecenter loses control over the periphery, and themeans of production that imply the control bya cen t ra l ized au thor i ty decay and evendisappear. Ideology, therefore, can serve as anagent of social change and catastrophe.

Another expression of the trap of ideologyis more subtle and implies more altruisticrelationships between individuals and


ideological systems. We have to considerthat materialized ideology is composed ofphysical means to encode and communicatemessages, that is, to try to persuade an audience.Whether the message is one of peace andequality, or if i t is the legitimization andrationalization of a patent system of inequality,ideologies are most successful when a majorityof the population is indeed convinced by theirmessages. But, can the message also convincethe messenger—can the message act over thoseintended to benefit from it? The question to beasked is not actually if this can happen, becausewe well know that it can, but if in spite of thishappening the ruling elite still can retain theability to command, manipulate, and restrictaccess to the ideological system. In otherwords, is it possible to «believe in» a ritualsystem, a massive religion, a political doctrine,a peace movement, a charismatic leader, andstill be able to not only prevent others fromgaining access to this ideology but also tomanipulate the messages so that the socialsystem is perpetuated and reproduced? Furtherresearch i s requi red to unders tand theimplications of this form of ideological trap.

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1 The ideas presented in this paper have grownout of a lengthy discussion among the three authors.The three cases that constitute the body of the articlewere written by Earle (Thy, Denmark), Castillo(Moche, Perú), and DeMarrais (Inka, Andes).Thefu l l t ex t has been read and rev i sed by uscollaboratively. Funding for the research on whichthese cases are based includes the following: forThy, Denmark, the National Science Foundation(DBS 9207082, DBS 9116921) and the AcademicSenate, UCLA; for the San José de Moro Project,the John B. Heinz Charitable Trust, the Friends ofArchaeology, UCLA, and the Academic Senate,UCLA; for the Calchaquí, Argentina, the NationalScience Foundation (BNS-88-05471). An earliervers ion of th i s paper was p resen ted a t thesymposium of the Complex Society Group, October23, 1993, at the Arizona State University, Tempe.We would like especially to thank Cathy Costin andAntonio Gi lman who read and commentedthoughtfully on an earlier draft, and Patty Rechtmanwho edited the original draft.

2 Thompson’s discussion of ideology is a goodapproximation to a critical definition of ideology:«ideologies are meanings, expressed throughsymbolic forms, that are mobilized in the serviceof dominant individuals and groups, that is the waysin which the meanings constructed and conveyedby symbol ic fo rms se rve , in par t i cu la rcircumstances, to establish and sustain structuredsocial relations from which some individuals andgroups benefit more than others, and which someind iv idua l s and groups have an in te res t inpreserving while others may seek to contest.»(1990:73).

3 Only one comparable structure can be foundin the Northern Moche territory, the late Mochepyramid of Huaca Grande, in the Pampa Grandecomplex of the Lambayeque valley (Haas 1985).There is still a heated debate as to whether thisstructure is the result of an expansion of thesouthern Moche, and the consequent relocation ofthe capital in this northerly site (Moseley 1992;Castillo and Donnan 1994). In any case, HuacaGrande i s an ex t remely la te phenomenon,constructed with a very peculiar technique thatprecludes the massive pyramids build in this regionduring the Lambayeque Period, therefore not com-parable to any other previous structure in thenorthern Moche territory.

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