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Islam and the Theology of Power

Khaled Abou El Fadl

Middle East Report, No. 221. (Winter, 2001), pp. 28-33.

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In deeply prejudiced fashion, commentators who explain the September 11 attacks by referring to a clash ofcivilizations assume that terrorism is somehow an authentic expression of the predominant values of Islam. Butthe common responses to this interpretation do not adequately explain the theology of radical lslamist groups.None of these perspectives engage the classical tradition in lslamic thought regarding political violence, andhow contemporary Muslims reconstruct the classical tradition. How might classical or contemporary Islamictheology contribute to the use of terrorism by modern lslamic movements?

8ince the early 1980s, commentators have argued thatIslam is suffering a crisis of identity, as the crumblingof Islamic civilization in the modern age has left Mus-lims with a profound sense of alienation and injury. Chal-lenges confronting Muslim nations-failures of developmentprojects, entrenched authoritarian regimes and the inabilityto respond effectively to Israeli belligerence-have induceddeep-seated frustration and anger that, in turn, contributedto the rise of fundamentalist movements, or as most com-mentators have preferred to say, political Islam. But mostcommentators have been caught off guard by the ferocity ofthe acts of mass murder recently committed in New Yorkand Washington. The basic cruelty and moral depravity ofthese attacks came as a shock not only to non-Muslims, butto Muslims as well.The extreme political violence we call terrorism is not asimple aberration unrelated to the political dynamics of asociety. Generally, terrorism is the quintessential crime ofthose who feel powerless seeking to undermine the perceivedpower of a targeted group. Like many crimes of power, ter-rorism is also a hate crime, for it relies on a polarized rheto-ric of belligerence toward a particular group that isdemonized to the point of being denied any moral worth.To recruit and communicate effectively, this rhetoric of bel-ligerence needs to tap into and exploit an already radicalizeddiscourse with the expectation of resonating with the socialand political frustrations of a people. If acts of terrorismfind little resonance within a society, such acts and their ideo-logical defenders are marginalized. But if these acts do findKhaied bou EI Fad is Omar and Azm era kh Distinguished Fellow in isiamicLaw at the UCL School of Law

a degree of resonance, terrorism becomes incrementally moreacute and severe, and its ideological justifications becomeprogressively more radical.sking Why

To what extent are the September 11 attacks in the US symp-tomatic of more pervasive ideological undercurrents in theMuslim world today? Obviously, not all social or political frus-trations lead to the use of violence. While national liberationmovements often resort to violence, the recent attacks are Setapart from such movements. The perpetrators did not seemto be acting on behalf of an ethnic group or nation. Theypresented no specific territorial claims or political agenda, andwere not keen to claim responsibility for their acts. One canspeculate that the perpetrators' list of grievances included per-sistent Israeli abuses of Palestinians, near-daily bombings ofIraq and the presence of Arnerican troops in the Gulf, but thefact remains that the attacks were not followed by a list ofdemands or even a Set of articulated goals. The attacks exhibita profound sense of frustration and extreme despair, ratherthan a struggle to achieve clear-cut objectives.Some commentators have viewed the underpinnings ofthe recent attacks as Part of a clash of civilizations betweenWestern values and Islamic culture. According to these com-mentators, the issue is not religious fundamentalism or po-litical Islam, but an essential conflict between competingvisions of morality and ethics. From this perspective, it ishardly surprising that the terrorists do not present concretedemands, do not have specific territorial objectives and donot rush to take responsibility. The September 11 attacks

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Mir-i-Arab Madrasa towers over Bukhara Uzbekistan. BURHAN OZBILICII P PHOTO

aimed to strike at the symbols of Western civilization, andto challenge its perceived hegemony, in the hope of empow-ering and reinvigorating Islamic civilization.The clash of civilizations approach assumes, in deeply

prejudiced fashion, that puritanism and terrorism are some-how authentic expressions of the predominant vaiues of theIslamic tradition, and hence is a dangerous interpretation ofthe present moment. But the common responses to this in-terpretation, focusing on either the crisis of identity or acutesocial frustration in the Muslim world, do not adequatelyexplain the theological positions adopted by radical Islamistgroups, or how extreme violence can be legitimated in themodern age. Further, none of these perspectives engage theclassical tradition in Islamic thought regarding the employ-ment of politicai violence, and how contemporary Muslimsreconstruct the classical tradition. How might the classicalor contemporary doctrines of Islamic theology contributeto the use of terrorism by modern Islamic movements?Classical lslamic Law and Political ViolenceBy the eleventh century, Muslim jurists had developed a so-phisticated discourse on the proper limits on the conduct ofwarfare, politicai violence and terrorism. The Qur'an exhortedMuslims in gened terms to perform jih d by waging war

against their enemies. The Qur'anic prescriptions simply callupon Muslims to fight in the way of God, establish justiceand refrain from exceeding the limits of justice in fightingtheir enemies. Muslim jurists, reflecting their historicai cir-cumstances and context, tended to divide the world into threeconceptual categories: the abode of Islam, the abode of warand the abode of peace or non-belligerence. These were notclear or precise categories, but generally they connoted terri-tories belonging to Muslims, territories belonging to enemiesand territories considered neutral or non-hostile for one rea-son or another. But Muslim jurists could not agree on exactlyhow to define the abode of Muslims versus the abode of oth-ers, especially when sectarian divisions within Islam were in-volved, and when dealing with conquered Muslim territoriesor territories where sizable Muslim minorities resided.' Fur-thermore, Muslim jurists disagreed on the legal cause forfighting non-Muslims. Some contended that non-Muslimsare to be fought because they are infidels, while the majorityargued that non-Muslims should be fought only if they Posea danger to Muslims. The majority of early jurists argued thata treaty of non-aggression between Muslims and non-Mus-lims ought to be limited to a ten-year term. Nonetheless, after the tenth century an increasing number of jurists arguedthat such treaties could be renewed indefinitely, or be of per-manent or indefinite d~rat ion. ~

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macy to the juristic class. Although not organized in a churchor a Single institutional s tructure, the juristic class in Islam hadclear and distinctive insignia of investiture. They attended par-ticular colleges, received training in a particular methodologyof juristic inquiry, and developed a specialized technical lan-guage, the mastery of which becarne the gateway to inclusion.Significantly, th e juristic class engaged as a rule in dis-cussion and debate. O n each point o f law, there are tendifferent opinions and a considerable amount of debateamo ng the various legal schools o f thoug ht. Various puri-tan theological movements in Islarnic history resolutelyrejected this juristic trad ition , whic h reveled in indete rmi-nacy. The hallmark of these puritan movements was anintolerant theology displaying extreme hostility not onlyto non-Mu slims b ut also to Muslims who belonged to dif-ferent schools of thought or even remained neutral. Thes emovements considered oppo nents an d indifferent Muslimsto have exited the fold of Islam, and therefore legitimatetargets of violence. These groups' preferred m ethod s of vio-lence were stealth attacks an d the dissemination of terrorin the general population.Muslim jurists reacted sharply to these groups, consider-ing them enemies of hu man kind. Th ey were designated asmuharibs (literally, those w ho fight society). A muharibwasdefined as som eone w ho attacks defenseless victims by stealth,and spreads terror in society,The y were not to be given quar-ter or refuge by anyone or at any place. In fact, Muslimjurists argued that any M uslim or no n-Muslim territory shel-tering such a group is hostile territory that may be attackedby the mainstream Islarnic forces. Altho ugh the classical ju-rists agreed on the definition of a muharib they disagreedabout which types of criminal acts should be consideredcrimes of terror. M any jurists classified rape, arm ed robbery,assassinations, arson and m urde r by poisoning as crimes ofterror and argu ed that suc h crimes must be punished vigor-ously regardless of the motivations of the criminal. Mostimportantly, these doctrines were asserted as religious im-peratives. Regard less of the desired goals or ideo logical jus-tifications, the terrorizing of the defenseless was re co pi ze das a moral wron g an d an offense against society and G od.De m ise of the lassical TraditionIt is often stated that terrorism is the weapon of the weak.Notably, classical juristic discou rse was developed wh en Is-lamic civilization was supre me, a nd this suprem acy was re-flected in the benevolent att i tude of the jurist ic class.Pre-modern Muslim juristic discourses navigated a Coursebetween principled th inking a nd real-life pragma tic concernsan d dem ands . Ultimately, these jurists spoke with a sense ofurgency, but no t desperation. Power and political supremacywere no t their sole pursuits.Much has changed in the modern age. Islarnic civiliza-tion has crum bled, and the traditional institutions that oncesustained the juristic discourse have all but vanished. Themoral foundations that once m apped out Islarnic law andtheology have disintegrated, leaving an unse ttling vacu um.

More to the point, the juristic discourses on tolerance to-wards rebellion and hostility to the use of terror are no longerPart of the norm ative categories of contem pora ry Muslims.Con temp orary Muslim discourses either give lip Service tothe classical doctrines without a sense of com mitme nt o rignore an d neglect them all together.There are many factors that contributed to this modernreality. Arnong the pertinent factors is the undeniably trau-matic expe rience of colonialism, which dismantled the tradi-tional institutions of civil society. The emergence of highlycentralized, despotic and often corrup t governments, and thenationalization of the institutions of religious learning unde r-mine d the mediating role ofjurists in M uslim societies. Nearlyall charitable religious endowments became state-controlledentities, and Muslim jurists in most Muslim nations becamesalaried state employees, effectively transforming them intowha t may be called court priests. T he establishment of thestate of Israel, the expulsion of the Palestinians and the persis-ten t military conflicts in which Arab states suffered heavy lossesall contributed to a widespread siege mentality and a highlypolarized and belligerent political discourse. Perhaps mostimportantly, Western cultural symbols, modes of productionand social values aggressively penetrated the M uslim w orld,seriously challenging inherited values a nd practices, and add-ing to a profou nd sense of alienation.Two developments became particularly relevant to thewithering away of Islarnic jurisprudence. Most M uslim na -tions experienced th e wholesale bo rrowing o f civil law con-cept s . Ins t ead of the d i a l ec t i ca l and inde terminatemethodology of traditional Islarnic jurisprudence, Muslimnations opted for more centralized and often code-basedSystems of law. Even Muslim modernists w ho attemp tedto reform Islarnic jurisprudence were heavily influencedby th e civil law System, an d so ugh t to resist th e fluidity ofIslarnic law and increase its unitary and centralized char-acter. No t o nly were the concepts of law heavily influencedby the E urop ean legal tradition, the ideologies of resistanceemployed by Muslims were laden with Third World no-tions of national liberation and self-determination. Forinstance, mod ern nationalistic thought exercised a greaterinfluence o n th e resistance ideologies of Muslim and Arabnation al liberation movem ents than a nythin g in the Islarnictradition. The Islarnic tradition was reconstructed to fitThird World nationalistic ideologies of anti-colonialismand anti-imperialism rather than the other way around.W hile nation al liberation movements-such as the Pal-estinian or Algerian resistance-resorted to guerrilla or non-conventional warfare, modern day terrorism of the varietyprom oted by Osam a bin Laden is rooted in a different ideo-logical paradigm. T her e is little dou bt that organizations suchas the Jihad, al-Qaeda, Hizb al-Tahrir and Jama'at al-Muslimin were influenced by national liberation and anti-colonialist ideologies, bu t they have anchored themselves ina theology tha t can be described as puritan, supremacist a ndthoroughly opportunistic. This theology is the byproductof the emergence an d eventual dominance of Wahhabism,Salafism and apologetic discourses in mod ern Islam.

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Contemporary Puritan IslamT he foundations of Wahhabi theology were put in place bythe eighteenth-century evangelist Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in the Arabian Peninsula. With a puritanical zeal,'Abd al-Wahhab sought to rid Islam of corruptions that hebelieved h ad c rept into the religion. Wahha bism resisted theindeterminacy of the m ode rn age by escaping to a strict lit-eralism in which the text became the sole source of legiti-macy. In this context, Wahhabism exhibited extreme hostilityto intellectualism, mysticism and any sectarian divisionswithin Islam. Th e Wahhabi creed also considered any formof moral thought that was not entirely dependent on thetext as a form of self-idolatry, and treated hu man istic fieldsof knowledge, especially philosophy, as the sciences of thedevil. According to th e Wahha bi creed, it was imperativeto return to a presumed pristine, simple and straightfonvardIslam, which could be entirely reclaimed by literal imple-mentation of the commands of the Prophet, and by strictadherence t o correct ritual practice. Importantly, Wahhab ismrejected any atte mp t to interp ret the divine law from a his-torical, contextual perspective, and treated the vast majorityof Islamic history as a corruption of th e true a nd au thenticIslam. T h e classical jurisprudential tradition was consideredat best to be mere sophistry. Wahhabism became very intol-eran t of the long-established Islamic practice of consideringa variety of schools of thought to be equally orthodox. Or-thodoxy was narrowly defined, an d 'Abd al-Wahhab himselfwas fon d of creating long lists of beliefs and acts which heconsidered hypocritical, the adoption or commission ofwhich immediately rendered a Muslim an unbeliever.In the late eighteenth century, the Al Sa'ud family unitedwith the Wahhabi movement and rebelled against Ottomanrule in Arabia. Egyptian forces quashed this rebellion in 18 18.Nevertheless, Wahhabi ideology was resuscitated in the earlytwentieth century under the leadership of 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'udwho allied himself with the tribes of Najd, in the beginnings ofwhat would become Saudi Arabia. Th e Wahhabi rebellions ofthe nineteenth and twentieth centuries were very bloody be-cause the Wahhabis indiscriminately slaughtered and terror-ized Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Mainstream jurists writingat the time, such as the H a n d Ib n 'Abidin and the Maliki al-Sawi, described the Wahhabis as a fanatic fringe g r ~ u p . ~Wahhabism scendantNevertheless, Wahhabism survived and, in fact, thrived incontemporary Islam for several reasons. By treating MuslimOtto ma n rule as a foreign occupying power, Wahhabism set apowerfu l precedent for notions ofA rab self-determination andautonomy. In advocating a return to the pristine and pureorigins of Islam, Wahhabism rejected the cumulative weightof historical baggage. Th is idea was intuitively liberating forMuslim refo rmers since it mea nt the rebirth of ijtihad or thereturn to de novo examination and determination of legalissues unencum bered by the accretions of precedents a nd in-herited doctrines. Most importantly, the discovery and ex-

ploitation of oil provided Saudi Arabia with high liquidity.Especially after 1 975 , with the sha rp rise in oil prices, SaudiArabia aggressively promoted Wahhabi thoug ht aro und theMuslim world. Even a cursory examination of predo minantideas and practices reveals the widespread influence ofWahhab ithoug ht on the Muslim world today.But Wahhabism did not spread in the modern Muslim worldunder its own banner. Even the term Wahhabism is consid-ered derogatory by its adherents, since Wahhabis prefer to seethemselves as the representatives of Islamic orthodoxy. To them ,Wahhabism is not a school of thought within Islam, but is Is-lam. Th e fact that W ahhabism rejected a label gave it a diffusequality, making many of its doctrines and m ethodologies emi-nently transferable. Wahhabi thought exercised its greatestinfluence not under its own label, but under the rubric ofSalafism. In their literature, Wahhabi clerics have consistentlydescribed themselves as SalaJis, and not Wahhabis .Beset with ContradictionsSalafism is a creed founded in the late nineteenth centuryby Muslim reformers such as Muh amm ad 'Abduh, al-Afghaniand Rashid Rida. Salafism appealed to a very basic conceptin Islam: Muslims ought to follow the precedent of theProphet a nd his comp anions (al-sahf al-salib). Methodo logi-cally, Salafism was nearly iden tical to Wahhabism except thatWahhab ism is far less toleran t of diversity an d differences ofopinion. Th e founders of Salafism maintained that on allissues Muslims ou ght to return to the Qu r'an and the sunna(precedent) of the Prophet. In doing so, Muslims oug ht toreinterpret the original sources in light of mod ern needs anddemands, without being slavishly bound to the interpreta-tions of earlier Muslim generations.

s originally conceived, Salafism was no t necessarily an ti-intellectual, but like Wahhabism, it did tend to be uninter-ested in history, By emphasizing a presumed golden age inIslam, the adherents of Salafism idealized the time of theProphet an d his companions, and ignored or demonized thebalance of Islamic history. By rejecting juristic precedents andundervaluing tradition, Salafism adopted a form of egalitari-anism that deconstructed any notions of established author-ity within Islam. Effectively, anyone was considered qualifiedto retu rn to the o riginal sources and speak for the divine will.By libera ting Muslims from the tradition of the jurists, Salafismcontributed to a real vacuum of authority in contemporaryIslam. Importantly, Salafism was founded by M uslim na tion-alists who were eager to read the values of modernism intothe original sources of Islam. Hence, Salafism was no t neces-sarily anti-Western. In fact, its founders strove to project con-temporary institutions such as democracy, constitutions orsocialism into the foundational texts, and to justi+ the mo d-ern nation-state within Islam.T he liberal age of Salafism carne to a n end in the 1960s.After 1975, Wahhabism was able to rid itself of its extremeintolerance, and proceeded to coopt Salafism until the twobecame practically indistinguishable. Both theologies imag-ined a golden age within Islam, entailing a belief in a histori-

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cai utopia that can be reproduced in contemporary Islam.Both remained uninterested in critical historical inquiry andresponded to the chailenge of modernity by escaping to thesecure haven of the text. Both advocated a form of egaiitari-anism and anti-elitism to the point that they came to con-sider intellectualism and rational moral insight to beinaccessible and, thus, corruptions of the purity of the Islamicmessage. Wahhabism and Saiafism were beset with contradic-tions that made them simultaneously ideaiistic and pragmaticand infested both creeds (especiaily in the 1980s and 1990s)with a kind of supremacist thinking that prevails until today.Between pologetics and SupremacyThe predominant intellectual response to the chailenge of mo-dernity in Islam has been apologetics. Apologetics consisted ofan effort by a large number of commentators to defend theIslamic system of beliefs from the onslaught of Orientaiism,Westernization and modernity by simultaneously emphasizingthe compatibilityand supremacy of Islam. Apologists respondedto the intellectuai challenges coming from the West by adopt-ing pietistic fictions about the Islamic traditions. Such fictionseschewed any critical evaiuation of Islamic doctrines, and cel-ebrated the presumed perfection of Islam. A common apolo-gist argument was that any meritorious or worthwhile moderninstitution was first invented by Muslims. According to theapologists, Islam liberated women, created a democracy, en-dorsed pluraiism, protected human rights and guaranteed so-cial security long before these institutions ever existed in theWest. These concepts were not asserted out of critical under-standing or ideological commitment, but primarily as a meansof resisting Western hegemony and affirming self-worth. Themain effect of apologetics, however, was to contribute to a senseof intellectual self-sufficiency that often descended into moraiarrogance. To the extent that apologetics were habit-forming, itproduced a culture that eschewed self-critical and introspectiveinsight, and embraced the projection of blame and a fantasy-like level of confidence.In many ways, the apologetic response was fundamen-tally centered on power. Its main purpose was not to inte-grate particular vaiues within Islamic culture, but to empowerIslam against its civilizational rival. Muslim apologeticstended to be opportunistic and rather unprincipled, and, infact, they lent Support to the tendency among many intel-lectuals and activists to give precedence to the logic of prag-matism over any other competing demands. Invoking thelogic of necessity or public interest to justiG Courses of ac-tion, at the expense of moral imperatives, became commonpractice. Effectively, apologists got into the habit of payinghomage to the presumed superiority of the Islamic tradi-tion, but marginalized this idealistic image in everyday life.Post-1970s Saiafism adopted many of the premises of theapologetic discourse, but it also took these premises to theirlogical extreme. Instead of simple apologetics, Salafism re-sponded to feelings of powerlessness and defeat with uncom-promising and arrogant symbolic displays of power, not onlyagainst non-Muslims, but also against Muslim women. Fun-MlDD LE E ST REPORT 221 WINT R 2 1

damentally, Saiafism, which by the 1970s had become a viru-lent puritan theology, further anchored itself in the confidentsecurity of texts. Nonetheless, contrary to the assertions of itsproponents, Saiafism did not necessarily pursue objective orbaianced interpretations of Islamic texts, but primarily pro-jected its own frustrations and aspirations upon the text. Itsproponents no longer concerned themselves with coopting orclaiming Western institutions as their own, but defined Islamas the exact antithesis of the West, under the guise of reclaim-ing the true and red Islam. Whatever the West was perceivedto be, Islam was understood to be the exact opposite.l ienation from Tradition

Of Course, neither Wahhabism nor Salafism is representedby some formal institution. They are theological orienta-tions and not structured schools of thought. Nevertheless,the lapsing and bonding of the theologies of Wahhabismand Salafism produced a contemporary orientation that isanchored in profound feelings of defeat, frustration and aiien-ation, not only from modern institutions of power, but alsofrom the 1slaAic heritage and tradition. The outcome of theapologist, Wahhabi and Salafi legacies is a supremacistpuritanism that compensates for feelings of defeat,disempowerment and aiienation with a distinct sense of self-righteous arrogance vis-2.-vis the nondescr ipt othern-whether the other is the West, non-believers in general oreven Muslims of a different sect and Muslim women. Inthis sense, it is accurate to describe this widespread moderntrend as supremacist, for it sees the world from the perspec-tive of Stations of merit and extreme polarization.In the wake of the September 11 attacks, several com-mentators posed the question of whether Islam somehowencourages violence and terrorism. Some commentators ar-gued that the Islamic concept of jihad or the notion of thedar al-harb (the abode of war) is to blame for the contem-porary violence. These arguments are anachronistic andOrientalist. They project Western categories and historicalexperiences upon a situation that is very particular and fairlycom~lex.One can easilv locate an ethical discourse withinthe Islamic tradition that is uncompromisingly hostile toacts of terrorism. One can also locate a discourse that is tol-erant toward the other, and mindful of the dignity and worthof ail human beinzs. But one must also come to terms withthe fact that supremacist puritanism in contemporary Islamis dismissive of all morai norms or ethical values, regardlessof the identity of their origins or foundations. The primeand nearly singular concern is power and its symbols. Some-how, all other values are made subservient. rnEndnotes1Khaied Abou EI Fa d, Islamic Law and Muslim M inoriries: Th e Jurisric Discourse on MuslimMinorities from the Second/Eighth to the EleventhlSeventeenth Cenruries, Jouml oflshmicLa u und Society 2211 (1994).

Khaied Abou EI Fa d, The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into Classical Sources, TheMwlim World 89 (1999).Muhammad Amin Ibn Xbidin, Haihiyar z al-Muhrar vol. Vi (Cairo: Musrafa al-Babi,1966),p. 413; Ahmad d-Sawi, Haihiyar al-Sawi k h fzr a l - J a h h r vol. 111 (Beiru t: Dar Ihya'ai-Turath al-habi , n.d.), pp. 307-308. See also Ahma Dd ai , T e Ori ins and Objectives ofIslamic Rwivaiisr Thoug hr, 1750-18 50, Joumlofth e Arnerican ~r i mta f~o cie g1313 (1993).

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You have printed the following article:

Islam and the Theology of Power

Khaled Abou El Fadl

Middle East Report, No. 221. (Winter, 2001), pp. 28-33.

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Endnotes

3The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850

Ahmad Dallal

Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 113, No. 3. (Jul. - Sep., 1993), pp. 341-359.

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