Hume on Ethics and the Passions The influencing motives of the will and of moral judgment Paola...

Hume on Ethics and the Passions

The influencing motives of the will and of moral judgment

Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015. 1

The Atlantic Magazine How an 18th-Century Philosopher Helped Solve My Midlife CrisisDavid Hume, the Buddha, and a search for the Eastern roots of the Western Enlightenment http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/how-david-hume-helped-me-solve-my-midlife-crisis/403195/

Paola Chapa, Oct. 20152

1. The influencing motives of the will 1.1. Will vs liberty 1.2. Elements involved in actions. 1.3. Human mind as a “fabric”. 1.4. The “threads” of the will.

2. The influencing motives of moral judgment 2.1. Moral judgment as sentiment 2.2. Moral categories vs scientific categories 2.3. The possibility of a standard

3. Conclusion 3.1. Objective vs subjective 3.2. Problem



1. The influencing motives of the will

1.1. Will vs liberty

• Hume argues against free will. He claims that human action is bound by necessity. (T 2.3.1)

• Necessity is neither a quality of the action nor of the agent, but an idea of the imagination of the observer. (T 2.3.2)

• Hume’s does not cancel deliberation and responsibility. This is why we still must examine what influences will.



1.2. Elements involved in actions

• External. Circumstances and objects, “matters of facts” conceived by the reason.

• Internal. Desires and aversions.




• Two senses of “reason” (DP 5.4; T 2.3.3)

• Abstract reason. Conceives abstract relations and matters of facts, which are neither pleasant nor painful.

• “Reasonability”. Calm passion. This second sense belongs to the internal elements.




• Matters of fact are neither pleasant nor painful; therefore, reason does not move us. (Cf. Rational Choice Theory)

• However, we do have deliberation: • “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never

pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” (T2.3.3) Reason finds the means.

• There is a tension between [calm and violent] passions. As a result, “Men often act knowingly against their interest”. (DP 5.4; T2.3.3) “It is not the view of the greatest possible good what always influences men.” (DP 5.4)

NB. Calm passion: comprehensive view due to distance.Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015

7



• It seems that reason is merely instrumental and deliberation occurs only between passions. However, reason does play an active role: The moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means, our passions yield to our reason without any opposition. (T2.3.3)



1.3. Human mind as a “fabric”

• Hume says that if the observer knows all the elements (i.e., circumstances, desires, aversions, etc.), he will understand the necessity of the action. (T2.3.2) None the less, the predictive power of this “science” of human affairs is very limited (DP 5.4; T2.3.3), because internal elements make human mind as complex as a fabric (Scep 174).



1.3. Human mind as a “fabric”

• According to Hume, the principle of simplicity is wrong; philosophers must not keep one single principle for their entire theory because nature shows variety (Scep 171). Thus, Hume offers a variety of principles (go to 2.3), because we need to organize the variety of elements.



1.4. The “threads” of the will

• The view of external elements.

• Internal elements: original and formed (Scep 175)• Natural temper; predominant inclination • Acquired habits and character• The present disposition: calm vs violent passion (my situation

concerning the object of my desire)• Taste (and things that modify it: education, custom, prejudice,

caprice and humour) (Scep 176)Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015

11


1.4. The “threads” of the will

• Combination of all these elements vary from one person to another, from one moment to another.

• As a consequence, “A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment…” (T2.3.3)


2. The influencing motives of moral judgment

2.1. Moral judgment as sentiment

• “… there is nothing, in itself, valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but […] these attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of human sentiment and affection.” (Scep 174)

• Qualities are not in the objects, but in the sentiment of the mind (Scep 175)



2.2. Moral categories vs scientific categories

• Judgments of reason are either true or false

• Sentiments are always right: Everybody is as barbarous to me as I am to them (ST 241). Sentiment is the way in which one’s mind is affected by objects. Therefore, no sentiment represents what is really in the object (ST 244).

• Up to this point, it seems that there is no standard.



2.2. Moral categories vs scientific categories

• Actions, however, are not always right. (!?)• “Is there no difference then between one man’s conduct and

another? I answer, there is a great difference.” (Scep 172, 173)

• And actually, Hume thinks there is such a thing as “good taste”.



2.3. The possibility of a standard

• There is no precept besides what is implied in moral concepts. (ST 244; Scep 173)

• In the concepts: virtue entails praise, whereas vice entails blame (ST 243)

• Experience shows that there is certain agreement concerning good taste (ST 244)




• “Nature is more uniform in the sentiments of the mind than in most feelings of the body, and produces a nearer resemblance in the inward than in the outward part of human kind. There is something approaching to principles in mental taste; and critics can reason and dispute more plausibly than cooks or perfumers.” (Scep 175, 176)




• Principles that organize the elements involved in will*• Delicacy of temper (Scep 179)• Implications in concepts as virtue and vice• Instincts originally implanted in our natures: benevolence and

resentment, the love of life, kindness to children. (T2.3.3)

NB “Principles” are descriptive, not prescriptive. *Or merely the judgment about actions and taste?


3. Conclusion

3.1 Objective vs Subjective

• There is not an “objective” principle of taste or moral judgment, in the sense of “belonging to things”. Taste and judgment depend on the particular relation of the objects and the passions, emotions, sentiments in every person. This does not mean, however, that anything is subjective or that there is no principle. We still can reach a science and talk about “good” and “bad” objectively, both in ethics and aesthetics. Principles for these, nonetheless, are not a priori; they are acquired through experience and must be sought, systematized and tested by it.


3. Conclusion

3.1. Problem

If every fabric is different, in which sense does Hume’s enquiry resemble a scientific one? To what extent enquiry concerning human affairs could be organized like an enquiry concerning natural philosophy?


Hume on Ethics and the Passions


Paola Chapa, Oct. 2015. 21

Hume on Ethics and the Passions The influencing motives of the will and of moral judgment Paola...

Documents

Transcript of Hume on Ethics and the Passions The influencing motives of the will and of moral judgment Paola...