Human rights, Islam, and Iran - Soraya Ghebleh

Introduction

Iran has a history of abusing human rights whether civil, social, political, or

fundamental. The post-‐revolutionary period, however, from 1979 to the present, has

experienced a deplorable record of human rights atrocities and violations under the

Islamic Republic of Iran that has been witnessed by the international community

from the Republic’s inception with little tangible action taken to alleviate the

situation of those affected. Iran uses the manipulation of Islam and Islamic law to

serve its political interests. Every aspect of law and politics is centered on the

specific interpretation of Islam by those in power, thereby allowing the government

to operate however it chooses, targeting and punishing any opponent without fear

of consequences. International pressure at various periods in the last thirty years

has worked to put a stop on some of the more extreme violations such as executions,

arbitrary imprisonment, and torture but the protection of the rights of the Iranian

people has often been pushed to the backburner of the international community’s

agenda.

Human rights violations in Iran tend to parallel two phenomena. The first

phenomenon occurs when the regime feels any loss of absolute control or senses

instability of any kind. The second phenomenon occurs when there is an increase in

radicalism or surge of Islamic fundamentalism. With Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s

presidency, a combination of both phenomena can be seen. The radicalism and

militant Islamization in Iranian leadership witnessed in the early years of the

Republic is returning to Iranian society just as the Islamic Republic’s grip of power

is losing its iron fist. Although Ahmadinejad does not retain absolute power as

Ayatollah Ali Khameini does, his political presence is tremendous and his actions in

the international arena have shifted international attention away from the human

rights crisis currently taking place in Iran. The international community has allowed

this shift in focus to take place by continuing to cooperate economically with Iran,

focusing on Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities, exacerbating Ahmadinejad’s anti-‐

Semitic and anti-‐Israel comments more than needed, and engaging with Iran despite

the atrocious human rights record of the government. Escalation of human rights

violations in Iran, justified by the manipulation of Islamic and Iranian constitutional

law by government officials, occurs when domestic political instability is coupled

with intensified Islamic fundamentalism in government leadership.

Human Rights and Islam

Human rights, as defined by Amnesty International, are “basic rights and

freedoms that all people are entitled to regardless of nationality, sex, national or

ethnic origin, race, religion, language, or other status.” These rights also include

“civil and political rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and freedom of expression;

and social, cultural and economic rights including the right to participate in culture,

the right to food, and the right to work and receive and education.”1 Conversations

regarding human rights have been part of international dialogue for more than sixty

years and while an international consensus has been reached there is still a

considerable debate on whether the universal nature of human rights is

1 Amnesty International, Official Website

theoretically, culturally, and politically feasible. Human rights are part of the new

global identity that has emerged in the past century and in order for a state to be

valid and legitimate in the eyes of other nations, it must respect the international

standards that have developed to protect human relations.2

The compatibility of Islam with international human rights doctrine is a main

component of the debate that examines aspects “theoretically relevant to the

universalization of human rights and specifically relevant to the practical realization

of human rights in the Muslim World.”3 Some who believe Islam is incompatible

with universal human rights values are non-‐democratic Islamic states, extremist

religious groups, and Western theorists who support the infamous “clash of

civilizations” theory introduced by Samuel Huntington.4 The summation of those

who adhere to these different groups or schools of thought propagates further

violation of the rights of the people who are suffering in brutal regimes. The non-‐

democratic Islamic states act as God’s representatives on Earth and attach

legitimacy to their rule through religion rather than the vote of the people,

reminiscent of many monarchies of the past. These states are then free to act as they

please, manipulating Islam and Islamic law to stamp out any political opposition or

perceived threats to their rule, as is the case in the Islamic Republic of Iran.5 On the

other side, Western theorists who support the idea that Islamic civilization is 2 Osanloo, Arzoo, "The Measure of Mercy: Is lamic Just ice , Sovereign Power, and Human Rights in Iran," Cultural Anthropology . 21.4 (2006): 570-602. 3 Baderin , Mashood. "Is lam and the Real izat ion of Human Rights in the Muslim World: A Reflect ion on Two Essent ia l Approaches and Two Divergent Perspect ives ." Muslim World Journal of Human Rights . 4 .1 (2007) 4 Ebadi , Shir in . "Is lam, Human Rights , and Iran." Emory Universi ty School of Law. 17 10 2008. Address . 5 Ebadi, “Islam, Human Rights, and Iran.”

irreconcilable with international human rights standards “excuses Muslim

countries’ non-‐compliance with human rights” and allows exceptions for violations

of standards on culturally relativist grounds.6

The notion that Islam has its own set of human rights that are fundamentally

different than those of the rest of the globe is inaccurate. The aggressive approach of

many Muslim nations in developing an Islamic standard of human rights

demonstrates two agendas. The first agenda, is to demonstrate to the rest of the

world that Muslims and adherents of Islam are not savages and amoral beings,

rather they choose to remain firmly rooted in a human rights standard that is

unique to Islam. Various measures have been adopted in the last two decades, such

as the Arab Charter on Human Rights, the Charter of the Organisation of Islamic

Conference (OIC), the OIC Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, and the OIC

Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam.7 For some countries in the Muslim

world, these measures were meant to assert Islamic ideas on human rights and

standardize these ideas in a presentable, coherent, and systematic way to the rest of

the world.

The second agenda, unfortunately, deviates from the more positive and

sincere intentions of those truly invested in cooperating with the rest of the world in

coming to a universal consensus on human rights that involves Islam. While it has

been suggested by many that Islam can be “employed as a vehicle for improving the

6 Mayer , Ann Elizabeth. "The Is lam and Human Rights Nexus: Shif t ing Dimensions." Muslim World Journal of Human Rights . 4 .1 (2007) , 4 7 Baderin, 6

poor human rights situation in predominantly Muslim states,” the opposite has often

shown itself to be true, especially in the case of Iran.8 World history has shown that

the perversion and manipulation of peaceful religions in the pursuit of power and

control has often resulted in the persecution of different groups of people justified

in the name of those religions and what is currently taking place in Iran is no

different. Having a “separate” standard of human rights is preferable for Iran

because every single aspect of society is interpreted by those in power and will

always have the ultimate justification in the name of religion. Whether or not

citizens agree with the regime’s interpretation of Islam and the idea of a separate

Islamic standard of human rights are inconsequential because the structure has

been made such that speaking against these views is equivalent to speaking out

against God.9 This idea of separation based on cultural and religious grounds is

supported by countries with “deplorable human rights records” such as Iran and

Saudi Arabia, who serve to benefit the most from international acceptance of a

human rights standard specific to Muslim cultures that allows them to treat their

citizens however they choose without fear of international pressure or

consequence.10

The fact that there are polarized points of view on how to approach universal

human rights, whether from an absolute or a culturally relativist standpoint in of

itself allows human rights violations to occur unchecked. The Iranian government

8 Baderin, 22 9 Milani, Abbas, “Iran in Ferment: Cracks in the Regime,” Journal of Democracy, 20.4 (2009), 12-‐15. 10 Mayer, 6

takes the criticism of some that Islam is the inherent cause of the human rights

violations occurring in Muslim states and spins it to their advantage. By simply

engaging in this argument, Iran can accomplish many things. Iran can accuse the

West of misunderstanding Islam or choosing to attack Islam due to racial and

religious prejudices which takes attention away from the actual problems of the

people to the never ending debate on religious tension between the Judeo-‐Christian

West and the Islamic Middle East. It also allows Iran to further accuse the West of

promoting their own human rights agenda in the Middle East as a means of

interfering in the society and politics of the region and that the Western conception

of human rights is incompatible with a state governed by Islamic principles and

laws.11 All of these arguments are used by Iran in order to divert attention from the

brutality and abuse occurring in their own nation. It also focuses attention away

from the fact that it is not Islam that is incompatible with the human rights

standards of the world but the government who is incompatible, demonstrated by

the constant actions taken in the name of Islam according to their own

interpretation geared to accomplish selfish political goals.12

How the Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran Allows Violations

Iran serves as a perfect example of a non-‐democratic Islamic state that uses

Islam as a “means or pretext to arrive at a wrong interpretation of religion in order

to justify its goals.” The Revolution of 1979 was a result of millions of disillusioned

Iranians looking for a different leadership who would help alleviate their abysmal

11 Baderin, 17 12 Baderin, 15

social conditions and create a more egalitarian society.13 Islam was a common factor

among all of the different segments of society looking for change and the clergy with

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as their leader took advantage of this and took control

of the country with the proposed return of a grand Muslim civilization and

elimination of the Western influences that were associated with the disposed

regime of the Shah.14 From its inception, the Islamic Republic has always secured its

power by fighting and defending itself against “enemies,” whether real or

imagined.15 These “enemies” are always loudly attacked publicly and include the

United States, the West in general, Israel, and any supporter of Zionism. Less

publicly, enemies of the state tend to include any threat to the power of the regime,

or supposedly any threat to the sanctity of “Islam.” Any political opponent, religious

minority, piece of literature, cartoon drawing, or indirect statement taken out of

context can be viewed as an “enemy” of Islam and therefore an “enemy” of the state.

The constitution, judicial system, and the structure of the Islamic Republic became

centered not around justice and fair governance but on ensuring power and control

of the clergy and is geared to pursue anyone or anything that gets in the way of this

power and control.16 Although Iran signed the International Covenants on Civil and

Political Rights and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, domestic law maintains

13 Ebadi, “Islam, Human Rights, and Iran.” 14 Monshipouri, Mahmood and Ali Assareh, “The Islamic Republic and the ‘green movement’: coming full circle,” Middle East Policy 16.4 (2009): 27 15 Afshari , Reza, Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of Cultural Relat iv ism , Phi ladelphia , PA: Universi ty of Pennsylvania Press , 2001, 21 16 "Walk in Fear: Human Rights in Iran." Economist 23 July 1994: 39-40.

that anything opposed to government interpretation of Islamic law is not the final

word and does not have to be followed.17

The concept of velayat-‐i-‐faqih was introduced with the new government

established in 1979, which was a combination of a semi-‐democratic, semi-‐theocratic

government where absolute control lies within the Supreme Religious Ruler who in

1979 was the Republic’s leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Velayat-‐i-‐faqih, or Islamic

Jurist, is meant to “conduct the state’s affairs in accordance with God’s laws” in the

absence of the twelfth Imam.18 In an Islamic Republic, this translates to the velayat-‐i-‐

faqih having absolute power with the last say on everything related to politics, law,

and all aspects of civil society. Khomeini’s goal was to create an Islamic society ruled

by absolute Islamic law. The constitution of Iran was re-‐written but absolute power

and interpretation of law was given to the Supreme Ruler who could delegate

interpretation and follow-‐through of his laws as he deemed fit.19 Therefore, where

human rights are concerned, as long as Islam is used as the basis, virtually anything

decided by the velayat-‐i-‐faqih and those who are given authority by him is justified

and supported by law and the constitution.20 While the Iranian constitution allowed

elected assemblies, ultimate power was granted to the faqih.

The Iranian approach towards those accused of a crime is the opposite that is

seen in many democratic nations. In Iran, a person is “guilty until proven innocent,”

and that a “citizen’s every deed or word is potentially both a crime and an act of

17 Ebadi, “Islam, Human Rights, and Iran.” 18 Afshari, 15. 19 Osanloo, 577 20 Afshari, 17

disobedience.”21 This approach gives premise for mullahs, government officials, and

anyone else with a small degree of power, to imprison individuals without

explanation, proof, or even valid reason. In a nation where the rights of individuals

are protected by the legal system, an effective legal order has usually been

established and is not subject to change as a result of individual inclinations. In Iran,

the exact opposite of an effective legal order with checks and balances has been

established. Iran lacks an organized structure with objective legal practices,

consistent with a political and legal system that is in great need of protection of

human rights and freedoms. The arbitrary and unorganized nature of the entire

legal system allows violations to occur in an unnoticed and often undocumented

fashion that completely lacks any systematization.22

The Major Groups Persecuted and Why

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been notorious in the utilization of terror

tactics and quelling of any opposition that stands in the way of their absolute control

and power. These opponents or opposition take many forms and shapes and the

defeat or persecution of these groups is often preemptive without any provocation

whatsoever. According to the absolute power vested in the clergy by Iran’s

constitution, anyone that opposes the government or who can be accused of

opposing the government can be imprisoned with no explanation other than that

they insulted Islam in some way and punishment can range from physical lashes to

execution. The major categories of those whose rights are abused include any

21 Milani, 12 22 Baderin, 21-‐22

political opponents, religious minorities not recognized by the constitution, those in

academia, the press and the media, and women as a gender.

The introduction of specific Islamic laws in conjunction with the constitution

allowed for any opponent of the Republic to be eliminated without violating any

laws of the government. The Islamic government maintained that they accepted

international law only as much as it did not interfere with their interpretation of

Islamic law and where there was contradiction, Islamic law would always take

precedent.23 The specific Islamic laws instituted were the ancient Shiite penal laws,

divided into four different judicial categories that allowed for the massive numbers

of executions and imprisonments to take place in an extremely rapid manner. The

first category was hodud, which defines punishments for crimes against divine will

including rebellion against the Islamic state, apostasy, sex crimes, and the

consumption of alcohol. The second category was qesas, or retributive law, where a

victim’s family could demand a punishment equal to the crime or accept diyat or

blood money. The third category was ta’zir, or discretionary punishment, which

covered any crime outside of the first two categories, covering more of the “minor”

crimes committed by citizens. The fourth category includes the specific diyat laws

that provide an ancient chart for compensation to victims of homicide, assault, and

battery.24 For the discussion of human rights, the implementation of hodud, has the

most severe implications for abuse because any opponent of the regime, however

23 Secretar ia t of the National Counci l of Resis tance of I ran, . Human Rights Betrayed: Galindo Pohl 's Report Under Scrut iny . Auvers-sur-Oise , France: 1990,34 24 Afshar, 69.

peaceful in nature and action, could be accused of rebelling against the regime and

Islam and be executed or imprisoned accordingly. A person who is not even

speaking against the Islamic Republic but is merely disliked by an official or is

perceived to have made a statement that could be understood incorrectly could be

imprisoned without a second thought. Historic Islamic law is applied to modern

times where the interpretation is involved to fit in to modern times when it benefits

those in power and is kept to literal, historic interpretation at other times when the

clergy sees fit.25 The selective evolution of Islamic law is yet another example of how

the Iranian government manipulates religion.

After the Islamic Republic took power in 1979, the American embassy was

seized a few months later and international attention was solely focused on the

hostage crisis. Iran has managed repeatedly to avoid the necessary global attention

to the heinous abuses taking place domestically by distracting the world with

foreign policy issues and outlandish and dramatic rhetoric from Iranian leadership.

The hostage crisis was extremely unfortunate for those involved but served the

purpose of allowing the Islamic regime to consolidate power brutally and swiftly.

Those high up in the government took this opportunity with the world distracted to

completely crush any political opposition, discussion, or action that could threaten

the stability and consolidation of the Islamic Republic’s power and subsequently

imprisoned and executed over 12,000 people by the year 1985.26 The prisons

25 Baderin, 19 26 Hakakian, Roya. “When Eyes get Averted: The Consequences of Misplaced Reporting: ‘Poor Reporting from and about Iran has kept the West in the Dark. In this lightlessness, Iranians are rendered as ghosts’.” Nieman Reports (2009)

became the “madhouses of the Revolution,” with many of these executions not being

reported as political in nature but given some other reason such as espionage, drug

trafficking, prostitution, adultery, or violence just to name a few of the false

accusations made against many prisoners.27 The notorious Revolutionary Courts

that were established conducted “grossly unfair trials head for those against the

revolution or the clergy,” where individuals often did not have access to any legal

counsel, were imprisoned for months without knowing what they were accused of,

tortured, humiliated, and in many cases simply executed.28

Religious minorities are also harassed and humiliated but not in every

situation. While most of the abuse against religious minorities takes place against

the followers of the Baha’i’ Faith, members of Christian churches, mostly Protestants

are also harassed, imprisoned, and killed because of the prosthelytizing nature of

Protestantism and its threatening potential to convert Muslims.29 In the Iranian

Constitution, Christianity and Judaism are recognized religious minorities because

they are Abrahimic religions and came before Islam. The government recognizes

Iranian Jews as being different than Zionists and do not hold the same hatred and

prejudice against them. Baha’i’s, however, are not recognized in the Constitution

therefore making specific discourse regarding their minority status difficult in the

27 Afshar, 34-37. 28 Afshar, 74 29 “The U.S. Commission on International Religoius Freedom says it is “Deeply Concerned” about a Worsening Situation for Religious Minorities in Iran.” The Christian Century (2006), 17.

Iranian judicial context and put them in a no-‐man’s land where they can be accused

of virtually anything with no constitutional protection or defense.30

Professors and other members of academia have also been targeted

throughout the duration of the Republic’s existence because it is among the

educated that discourse usually takes place. For academic professors, to blindly

swallow whatever an oppressive regime dictates without at least questioning the

validity of the judicial system and government practices is virtually impossible and

the regime recognized this and quickly purged universities of any professor who

could be deemed subversive or anti-‐Islamic.31 Islamic education was instilled in

every school and university, media and propaganda were manipulated and

controlled by the government, and direct control of what was taught to students was

implemented in order for “Islamization” to occur.32 Approximately 60,000 teachers

were purged due to their beliefs many accused of being Shah-‐lovers, spies,

Freemasons, Zionists, Baha’i’s, leftists, and infidels.33

The press and the media are also very closely monitored and controlled by

the different political factions within the Iranian government and stepping out of

line under any circumstances could lead to a wide array of punishments. Limiting of

expression in Iran is achieved in a complex and intricate way with allowable content

shifting quickly and constantly. There is no one authority in the Iranian government

30 Ghanea, Nazila . Human Rights , the UN and the Baha' i 's in Iran . Kidl ington, Oxford: George Ronald, 2002, 25-27 31 Afshar, 78 32 Human Rights Watch, Guardians of Thought: Limits on Freedom of Expression in Iran . New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1993, 36-38. 33 Human Rights Watch, 134-137

who allows or disallows content in the media but everything goes under the

Ministry of Culture and the means of controlling what is published and presented in

the press and the media tend to be more subtle and indirect. At least one religious

authority or government official reviews everything that is to be published and all

television and radio is under the direct supervision of the religious leader and the

branches of government. .34 From a human rights perspective, Iran is in complete

violation of the guarantee of freedom of expression because this freedom is

“crippled by exceptions requiring compliance with fundamental principles of

Islam.”35 Even if freedom of expression was to be limited on the basis of Islamic

principles, the only way this could method could even begin to have a justifiable

basis is if the interpretation of the Islamic principles was consistent at all levels

throughout Iran and was a mutually agreed interpretation decided by those who

follow and adhere to the principles and laws of Islam.

Women’s rights are also consistently violated in Iran. In the Iranian

constitution, women’s rights are severely restricted. A married woman can only

hold employment if her husband agrees through written permission and may stop

her from working at any point in time.36 Women are segregated from men on buses

and have a de facto dress code with mandatory hejab, The strictness and severity of

the dress code has changed but now under Ahmadinejad the moral police are

constantly on the lookout for “bad hejab” and women cannot enter many public

34 Human Rights Watch, 1-7 35 Human Rights Watch, 23-30 36 “Status of Women in Iran: Fact Sheet,” WIN News, Spring 1998:67.

hospitals to be treated without being in a floor length chador.37 Polygamy continues

to be allowed and the legal age for girls to be married has been reduced to nine

years old. In court hearings, two female witnesses are required to substitute for one

male witness and in the Iranian criminal code a woman’s life is worth only half a

man’s life.38 Women’s right to divorce is severely limited and a woman must prove

the marriage is in violation of various codes of Islam, which almost never happens

but a man can divorce whenever he pleases.39 Women are more highly educated in

the universities than men yet political representation in the government is virtually

nonexistent. While many of the problems women face in Iran tend to span across

Muslim countries in general, women in Iran are fighting for t heir political freedom

and civil liberties.

Methods of Abuse

The methods employed by those in power range widely from social, civil, and

economic liberties to violations of fundamental protections and rights

internationally recognized by the global community. The abuse that occurs in Iran

can be divided into two categories. The first category includes the violations that

everyday citizens of Iran undergo in their daily lives whereas the second is the more

direct and violent persecution, torture, imprisonment, and occasional execution of

specific groups of people perceived as a threat to the regime.

37 Kitfield, James, “In Iran, Revolution is In the Air,” National Journal, 2010. 38 Ebadi, “Islam, Human Rights, and Iran.” 39 “Status of Women in Iran: Fact Sheet,” WIN News, Spring 1998, 67.

In the early days of the Revolution, strict adherence to Islamic codes and

behaviors was expected and enforced at all times but under Khatami’s presidency

many of these restrictions were softened. Under Ahamdinejad, however, a

“systematic campaign to consolidate power” has begun.40 Ahmadinejad has

expanded censorship by imposing major new restrictions on radio, television, and

film content, and has banned the publication of virtually all books. He has

restructured diplomacy by firing any diplomat that has failed to “promote the

president’s extremist agenda effectively.”41 Ahmadinejad has also begun to impose

ideological conformity echoing the “cultural revolution” or in a more realistic sense

the “Islamization” of society that took place soon after the 1979 Revolution. Efforts

to cleanse Iranian society of “immoral behavior” and to eliminate any Western

influence have increased exponentially with stricter dress codes imposed on women

and continued lack of equality between men and women.

Throughout the 1980s, extreme violence was recorded and monitored by

groups like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and to some extent the

United Nations. Physical and psychological torture became extremely commonplace

tools of the Revolution to obtain confessions, recant of Faith, and to instill fear.

Although torture is forbidden by the Islamic Republic’s own constitution and by

international human rights documentation that Iran is signatory to, the Republic

40 Berman, Ilan, “Who is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and What is He Really After?” USA Today, March 2007, 16. 41 Berman, 16.

continues to use torture as an effective method of forcing whatever answer was

desired out of a prisoner for public confession.42

Arbitrary imprisonment and the establishment of a police state is also

another means of maintaining control. Keeping people in fear that they may say a

comment that could be either misconstrued or purposefully used against them by

anyone at anytime keeps people under the control of the government.43 Iran is an

example of a modern police state, where terror tactics are employed randomly and

intensely to create a heightened sense of insecurity and fear and as a result an

obedient population. The approach that tends to be most commonly applied in the

pursuit of protecting and promoting human rights is generally political or legal in

nature, but social and cultural measures have shown to be important steps in

ensuring the protection of all citizens of a society. The creation of a police state,

however, prevents the development of solidarity among citizens in a community.

When a person is unable to know if a comment they make or action they take to

support another person who is being persecuted will land them the same fate,

silence persists and an attitude of nonintervention permeates the population, just as

the regime devised.44

The terror tactics used are yet another example of how in times of increased

fundamentalism and any slight or not so slight appearances of dissent towards the

regime, the human rights situation deteriorates and the people of Iran live in fear.

42 Human Rights Watch, 44. 43 Milani, 12 44 Baderin, 5

Political and legal assurances are absolutely necessary to improve and maintain the

protection of human rights in any nation and without legal safeguards against abuse

and a system of checks and balances that provides for the freedoms of a nation’s

citizens, rampant abuse will continue to no end. When basic juridical principles are

abandoned and no amount of international attention can ameliorate the situation or

improve the justice of a case, the problem is endemic within the government and

overall structure of the system.45

Case Study: The Baha’i's of Iran

The Baha’i’s of Iran are the largest minority group living in Iran yet they are

not considered a minority group or even a religion by the Iranian government or

constitution and have a history of being persecuted by those in power in Iran from

the inception of the Faith in the mid 19th century. The Baha’i’s in Iran are the most

persecuted religious minority, mainly because the government does not

acknowledge that they are in fact a religion, merely a perversion or deviant from

Islam and that all Baha’i’s are apostates for “converting” to Islam. In the aftermath of

the Revolution, many of the Baha’i’s who could leave Iran left but the 300,000

Baha’i’s remaining in Iran were to undergo systematic humiliation, imprisonment,

execution, and complete deprivation of social, economic, and civil liberties including

access to higher education and jobs in the private sector. In the years after the

Revolution, over two hundred Baha’i’s have been killed on false charges, with unjust

45 “Protest Against Civil Rights Violations in Iran,” Social Research, 67.2 (2000).

trials in almost every single case, a complete lack of evidence in any crime

committed and no legal representation.46

The accusations against Baha’i’s range from espionage for the West,

supporting Zionism therefore conspiring against the Islamic Republic, violent

activism against the regime, apostasy as well as any other humiliating crime such as

sexual deviance, thievery, and violence that they could be accused of. The Baha’i’ has

been branded a “political sect” and not a religion and have been consistently

accused and imprisoned for plotting against the regime. The hypocrisy and fear of

losing power shows, however, with the Baha’i's in prison. 47 When tortured and

questioned, virtually no Baha’i’s are asked about their political activities. Rather, the

agenda of the Islamic regime becomes clear where Baha’i’s are concerned with

efforts of making Baha’i’s recant their faith with persecutions truly based solely on

religious beliefs and nothing else.48 By constantly harassing and persecuting this

group of people the regime hopes to “secure conversion to Islam by depriving them

of freedom, means of subsistence, personal property and studying at universities.”49

The Baha’i’s have served as a political scapegoat for the regime and have

been a target of the clergy long before the clergy gained any political power. The

popularity of the religion, the deep-‐rooted religious prejudices the clergy has

against the Baha’i’s, and the direct threat to clerical dominance and Shiism in

general, all contribute to the overwhelming degree of persecution the Baha’i’s have

46 Ghanea, 32-40. 47 Hakakian, Roya, “Then, they came for the Baha’i,” Current, 505 (2008). 48 Afshar, 122 49 Afshar, 124

undergone in the country of its inception.50 Baha’i’s, based on their own beliefs, are

not politically active, do not protest violently against their government, and

therefore do not actively fight out against the regime in any volatile or hostile way

making them an easy target.51 The Baha’i’ plight has specific implications where

human rights are concerned because their situation has been monitored very closely

by the UN and the Baha’i’ International Community and have demonstrated the

failings of “UN mechanisms intended to enforce human rights standards,” and their

situation offers a “clear-‐cut indictment of the UN mechanisms for world response to

serious, continuing human rights violations.52 International monitoring has taken

place and resolutions have been passed but violence and extreme deprivation of all

rights that should be afforded to any citizen in any country and specifically citizens

in a country bound by international human rights legislation has yet to cease, even

in present day. This suggests a failure of the international community to intervene

to protect a non-‐violent minority suffering from abuse, torture, imprisonment,

execution, and deprivation of rights.53

The present day plight of the Iranian Baha’i’s continues to invoke

international condemnation of Iran’s discrimination against Baha’i's but the lack of

any ability to actually prevent what occurs in Iran puts the international community

in a difficult position. The most recent controversial incident involving

discrimination against the Baha’i’s of Iran was the imprisonment of the seven

50 Afshar, 119-128 51 Hakakian, “Then, they came for the Baha’i”. 52 Ghanea, 54-60. 53 Ghanea, 124.

leaders of the Iranian Baha’i’ community in Iran’s notorious Evin prison in 2008.54

This particular case has attracted international attention because of the complete

and total lack of justice surrounding their confinement in prison, lack of access to

lawyers, and complete and total lack of evidence on any of the false accusations

made against the leaders. Because of the Baha’i’s status as apostates rather than a

religious minority, they are barely afforded the same privileges of legal protection

and the right to a fair and just trial that a murderer or rapist is given. In August of

2010, these leaders were finally sentenced to twenty years in prison, an act that has

been condemned by many leaders internationally. Observations by those watching

the situation from the Baha’i’s outside of Iran follow similar conclusions of Amnesty

International with the agreement that the “verdict is a sad and damning

manifestation of the deeply-‐rooted discrimination against Baha’i’s by the Iranian

authorities.”55 This verdict, unfortunately, indicates a continuing trend of arbitrary

treatment and unjust and discriminatory actions taken towards the Baha’i'

community. Because the majority of the increasingly educated population of Iran no

longer holds the belief that the West is the source of all the evil and unrest that

occurs in Iran, the Baha’i’s have once again become a domestic scapegoat for unrest

and instability that the clerical government attempt to shift blame to.

International Involvement

54 "About the Persecution," Iran Press Watch, 2010. Web. <ht tp: / /www.iranpresswatch.org/persecut ion>. 55 "Sentences Against Jai led Iranian Rel igious Minority Leaders Condemned," Amnesty International, 2010. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/heavy-sentences-against-jai led-iranian-baha’i-rel igious-minority-leaders-condemned->.

The human rights situation in Iran is nothing new or surprising and the fact

that violations still occur has shown to some extent that lack of power international

organizations have in affecting absolute and concise change and improvement in

human rights situations. The Baha’i’ case has served as a specific example of how the

UN monitored and was very closely aware of a minority group whose rights were

grossly violated on no true grounds other than religion but no legal action that was

tangible was taken.56 Abhorrence with regard to the actions of the Iranian regime

has been internationally expressed since the inception of the regime, especially

when violent repression was at its peak. Many countries refused to negotiate or

interact economically with Iran and condemned the human rights violations that

were occurring but in present day this is not the case.

From 1984 to 2001, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has

sent different Special Rapporteurs to monitor the human rights situation in Iran and

while these visits did find evidences of executions on political basis, torture,

imprisonment, and violations of civil liberties, the reports did not come close to

describing the true situation of what was occurring in Iran. The monitoring took

place within the confines of what the government showed and allowed to be seen.

As to be expected, in almost every case monitors were given tainted information.

When interviewing political prisoners, the government officials prepared showcases

of prisons filled with brainwashed prisoners or those who feared for their own

personal physical safety as well as the safety of their loved ones. These “prisoners”

56 Ghanea, 22-24.

told stories that contradicted with virtually every report that managed to get out

undetected by the government. 57

While the international community has long condemned Iran for its

violations of human rights and has at times halted discussions or interaction, it is in

the best interests of most countries of the world to have some kind of interaction

with Iran and almost all countries interact politically and economically with Iran

despite its human rights records. Global discourse on human rights has further

complicated addressing the volatile situation in Iran. With the push for acceptance

of a different but equal standard of human rights derived from Islam, speaking out

against the politics of Islamic governments can now be interpreted as speaking out

against Islam and its standards. Many politicians in the West seem to have chosen

avoidance and inaction with regard to the human rights situation in Iran and other

areas of the Middle East because they are unwilling to be perceived as prejudice or

intolerant. During the reformist Khatami years when much of the violent abuses

had ceased and calmed down, a great improvement was noted by the international

community, but to those who lived in Iran and whose civil liberties were still being

infringed and violated they did not see this as success but as a public relations ploy

of the government.58

Although the UN has criticized Iran repeatedly and has issued various

resolutions against Iran’s abuse of human rights, the Iranian government has chosen

to portray themselves as victims of politically motivated attacks from the outside

57 Human Rights Watch, 44. 58 Ebadi, “Islam, Human Rights, and Iran.”

world rather than to take responsibility for their abuses against their own citizens.59

The fear of losing what little cooperation and support they have in the Middle East

has often prevented the UN and other nations from taking decisive action against

Iran. The West has attempted to maintain a delicate balance between having a

relationship with Iran and pursuing their own national security and foreign policy

interests and at the same time condemning the undemocratic and unacceptable

practices the government participates in.60 The UN has imposed harsh sanctions on

Iran as a result of their nuclear program, which has had negative diplomatic effects

for Iran, but the sanctions on Iranian’s human rights violations have yet to change

anything.61

Current State of Human Rights in Iran

Under Ahmadinejad, human rights violations have begun to increase. Under

the former reformist president, Khatami, there was movement in positive directions

and many of the civil liberties and “bad hijab” laws that were strictly enforced and

imposed on the Iranian people during the 1980s were softened in favor of more

dialogue among the Iranian population and more conciliatory gestures towards the

international community. With Ahmadinejad, as noted, the small tastes of reform

under Khatami have been reversed and efforts in the opposing direction have been

intensified. Ahmadinejad’s history of involvement in the Pasdaran, or the

Revolutionary Guard, indicates a shift towards increasing militarization and a

59 Osanloo, 574 60 Osanloo, 576 61 Monshipouri and Assareh, 27

heightened sense of a police state.62 Not only has Ahmadinejad demonstrated

personally the leaning toward fundamentalism but also the Revolutionary Guard is

often portrayed as being even more severe and zealous in the encouragement of

Islamic fundamentalism. A power distribution between Khatami, Ahmadinejad and

the Revolutionary Guard has begun to take form and the Revolutionary Guard

themselves have taken it upon themselves to further protect Iran from the “soft

threat” facing the nation.63 This “soft threat” claimed to be the largest threat against

the regime has been enthusiastically defended against by the current regime, with

the Revolutionary Guard and its supporters as the self imposed caretakers of the

moral character of the nation.64 This increased involvement in political and social

affairs by the Revolutionary Guard demonstrates the weakening of Ahmadinejad’s

regime as well as clerical following, where brutal force is the tool of choice to

control citizens indicating a loss of control.65

Ahmadinejad has clearly shown his commitment to Khomeini’s vision by

stating his beliefs that “all orders in the Islamic Republic be based on the Quran and

the revolutionary tradition.”66 His ideology parallels his actions. While Iran has

made headway in that it even allows human rights discourse to exist and there are

more university educated women than men, Ahmadinejad’s efforts to return to the

62 Moarefy, Sahand, “Changing of the Guard: the rise of radicalism in Iran,” Harvard International Review, (2009), 12. 63 Milani, 13 64 Milani, 14 65 Monshipouri and Assareh, 26 66 Berman, 16.

“moral fervour, and xenophobic zeal”67 of the Islamic Revolution’s early years

negates any small victory or improvement Iran may have made in the last 30 years.

Ahmadinejad is also in a politically unstable junction in his career, where he is

experiencing more dissention among the Iranian population as well as more

attention from the international world on Iran’s foreign policy activities and

increasingly on certain aspects of its domestic activities. While his outlandish and

dramatic remarks have caught the attention of the media more than his abusive

domestic policies, the current diversions of attention from domestic abuses will not

last forever in an increasingly interdependent and open world.68

The last four years have seen an increase in crackdown on civil liberties.

Arrests targeting women’s-‐rights advocates, journalists, political activists of any

kind, and Baha’i’s to name a few of the classic groups that have long been focused on

by the Islamic regime have increased greatly. The number of executions and those

undergoing capital punishment has increased as well as police brutality meant to

inspire fear in a population of people who have always feared their government

whether under the Shah with his secret police or the Ayatollah with his Pasdaran

and Basij.69 The political climate has changed however as have the population of

people. While many people were taken in very easily by the persuasive Ayatollah

Khomeini and his revolutionary ideas that supported the poor against the Western

regime the Shah’s monarchy had come to represent to the people, there is much

more knowledge and transparency in the world today than there was in 1979. A

67 “Islamic Republic of Fear: Iran,” The Economist, 25 August 2007, 46. 68 Berman, 16 69 Islamic Republic of Fear: Iran,” 46.

much larger amount of the population is educated and well aware of the freedoms

that exist outside of Iran’s borders and while many people do not want to leave their

country, a change is more likely to occur in the near future.70

At this point in Iran’s political history and in the life of the Islamic Republic,

dissent has developed to a point that can no longer be crushed by mass execution

without catching the world’s attention. The so-‐called Green Revolution that

surrounded the events of the Iranian presidential elections in the summer of 2009

could potentially be a turning point for the human rights situation in Iran. The

rioting and accusations against the government for rigging the election in favor of

Ahmadinejad caused dissent and protest on the streets that has been seen in very

short bursts in the last 30 years but nothing close to the outcry of the summer of

2009. Women were among the most active in protesting the current state of the

government, which is only natural being that they are among the most educated and

most repressed.71 Despite the government’s efforts to blame the dissent on the

West and all those they see as domestic enemies, the Iranian population is well

aware of the grassroots and homegrown nature of the most recent dissent.72 The

unemployment rate among those 15-‐29 is 20%, with Iran continuing to suffer from

unemployment, inflation, and a severe “brain drain.” The unsatisfactory economic

situation for the increasingly youthful population of Iran that is disconnected with

the Revolution of the past may in itself be a catalyst to ignite action without even

70 Berman, 17 71 Monshipouri and Assareh, 27-30. 72 Monshipouri and Assareh, 28

taking into account the multitude of other reasons that contribute to the discontent

spread throughout the nation.

Iranians no longer want to be left out from the global community and

President Obama’s Cairo speech in June of 2009, where he espoused ideals of

dialogue and negotiation rather than intervention and false promotion of

democracy, resonated loudly with the Middle East.73 At this juncture, even for the

short time the protests lasted before violent repression and crackdowns began to

occur, Iranian youth were on fire, becoming one of the first generations to use the

Internet and technology to report and share with the world the details of what was

truly taking place on the streets of Tehran.74 The spur of media attention on the

situation in Iran was beneficial to the citizens of Iran because for the first time by

many people around the world, the citizens were seen as separate from the

government. Many Iranians have family and friends outside of Iran with a very large

Iranian minority in America and for most, a more cordial and friendly relationship

between the Iranian and American leadership would be preferred over political

alienation and constant conflict with the US and the developed world. Even with

outside influences curbing the insistence on spreading democracy, the Iranian

people want justice and democracy for themselves.75

The crackdown on political opposition has demonstrated itself by the great

increase in numbers of people imprisoned with jails suffering from overcrowding

73 Obama, Barack,"Speech in Cairo ," Cairo , Egypt , 04 06 2009. 74 Monshipouri and Assareh, 28. 75 Monshipouri and Assareh, 27

similar to the early days of the Revolution. The increased radicalism of Ahmadinejad

backed by the large numbers of Pasdaran and military officials slowly filling the

ranks of many political positions in government accompanied by a very public and

international challenge to the power of the regime has mirrored the expected

increase in brutality and imprisonment. While Iran was in a relatively stable place

with regard to the United States before Ahmadinejad was elected, Ahmadinejad has

maintained a presidency based on preparing for the return of fundamental Islam,

and maintaining a positive relationship with the US, a purported enemy of Islam,

would go against this process (Berman). Not only is the increase in the power of the

presidency and the military important to note at this moment but also the increased

contention among the clerical factions within the regime as well as the tensions

between the religious, political, and military leadership that are beginning to show

themselves slowly (Akbar Ganji). If Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard

manage to expand their power within the Iranian government at all levels and take

over the influence of even more moderate clergy members while simultaneously

purging the political establishment of anyone who speaks out against Ahmadinejad

and the Revolutionary Guard, repression and further injustice will increase.

Conclusions: Why Abuse Continues and What Can Be Done

Human rights abuse in Iran continues for many different reasons that are

perpetuated by both domestic and international actors. As long as the Islamic

regime grasps for power over a population of very young people who do not identify

with the origins of the Islamic Revolution and who continue to lack employment,

opportunity, enjoyment, and the freedoms experienced everywhere else in the

world, violent clashes will continue and violent suppression of the voices of many in

Iran will persist. Poor reporting from and about Iran has contributed to lack of

understanding or knowledge about what is truly going on in Iran and distorted

information from Iran itself as well as insufficient monitoring by the international

community have further confused what little knowledge of Iran the media chooses

to focus on.76 Like the hostage crisis in the early months of the Revolution distracted

the world from the domestic brutality occurring in Iran, Ahmadinejad is providing

the world with plenty of distractions with his controversial rhetoric and his public

insistence on a nuclear-‐capable Iran that successfully diverts attention from his

increasingly harsh domestic policies and abuses of human rights.77

The international community is not at a complete loss in this situation. While

Iran claims to not be affected by international pressure, it seeks regional hegemony

and does not want to be economically isolated or to be a pariah in world affairs. The

citizens of Iran also do not want to be considered outcasts in a global society. The

international community’s impulse should not be to intervene militarily in Iran

because this will not improve the plight of those who are suffering from human

rights violations. Military intervention and continued attacks on the Iranian people

by the international community will only give the Iranian government more

evidence and excuses to fight “foreign” influence in order to “protect national

76 Hakakian, “When Eyes Get Averted,” 14 77 Hakakian, “When Eyes Get Averted,” 14

security” by means of tightening power and continued repression of individual

citizens.78

In terms of US intervention, no matter how dire the human rights situation is

in Iran it will always fall to the backburner of national security interests but perhaps

now is the time to consider fighting for increased global security by pushing to

provide people everywhere with basic rights and freedoms. Iranian people want

change for themselves and to improve their lives and do not want to be used as

pawns for other countries to gain economically or diplomatically. International

action plays a large role in affecting the human rights situation of the people in Iran

because if the international community were to reject the abuse in a much stronger

and decisive way while simultaneously reaching out to the Iranian people, the

influence and rhetoric of the Islamic Regime against the West would quickly become

transparent and meaningless.79 Merely condemning the violations and abuses that

are occurring, as is the common reaction when such incidents are reported to the

international community, should no longer serve as the only response. Even in light

of the very public, recent sentencing of the Baha’i’ leaders, the strongest reactions

were various international leaders condemning the act but with no threat of any

action that will render the regime insecure. As long as the Iranian regime remains

reassured that no real action would be taken against them, they will continue to act

as they please in violation of the natural moral sense every human being feels as

well as the international treaties it has agreed to honor.

78 Ebadi, “Islam, Human Rights, and Iran.” 79 Kitfield, “Revolution is in the Air.”

The ideas that many people in the West carry that Islam is inherently and

vehemently opposed to international human rights and the universality of a human

rights standard within global interactions should be abandoned in favor for a

convergent approach that leans towards reconciliation. There are obvious

discrepancies between various Islamic traditions and specific laws with certain

aspects of human rights dialogue but these should not be avoided or ignored.

Constructive discourse to find harmony between points of contention and

disagreement should be the main prerogative of the international community rather

than shame and division between the Islamic world and the rest of the global

community. The response of the international community at this potentially critical

phase for both domestic politics in Iran and international relations with Iran is

crucial and in the long run should aim for the best wishes, comfort, and security of

the Iranian people. The crackdown of human rights accompanied by the increase in

radicalism and militant Islam will only last so long if a state-‐sponsored enemy such

as the America and the West no longer exists to take blame for everything that goes

wrong in Iran. If the international community stands behind those being violated

with all of its weight, it will be beneficial to both the Iranian people and the rest of

the world in the long run, with the only potential victim being the Islamic Regime.

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Human Rights Violations In Iran as a Method of Maintaining Power

An examination of why human rights violations continue to persist at all levels in Iran,

how the government justifies human rights violations in the name of Islam in order to

assert power and control, the response of the international community to these

violations, and how the ebb and flow of the political climate of Iran affects the rights

and liberties of the Iranian people

Human rights, Islam, and Iran - Soraya Ghebleh

News & Politics

Transcript of Human rights, Islam, and Iran - Soraya Ghebleh