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How to Read an Anti‐terrorist Kit:LOFA and its implications for Australianidentity and securityBinoy Kampmark aa St John's College , University of QueenslandPublished online: 22 Jan 2007.

To cite this article: Binoy Kampmark (2004) How to Read an Anti‐terrorist Kit: LOFA and itsimplications for Australian identity and security , Journal of Intercultural Studies, 25:3, 287-301

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How to Read an Anti-terrorist Kit: LOFAand its implications for Australian identity

and security1

BINOY KAMPMARK

St John's College, University of Queensland

ABSTRACT This paper examines the anti-terrorist package Let's Look Out For Australia:

protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat (or LOFA) sent to Australian homes

in February 2003. It seeks to accomplish two things. Firstly, it critically interrogates various

political and mythological strategies used in the package, arguing that it fails to reassure the

public against terrorism. Instead, LOFA reveals quite the opposite: the possibility of an

authoritarian state, and a code of exclusive `Australian' values. Secondly, the response to

LOFA is examined. While many Australians expressed indignation at LOFA, debate

subsided in a matter of weeks. Using the language of Pierre Bourdieu, it is suggested that the

reception of LOFA was ultimately marked by an acceptance by the Australian community

of the doxa, or orthodoxy, of terrorism as a global phenomenon.

May you live in interesting times.

(Chinese curse)

On 3 February 2003, Prime Minister John Howard wrote the following:

Dear fellow Australian, I am writing to you because I believe you and your

family should know more about some key issues affecting the security of our

country and how we can all play a part in protecting our way of life.

Howard was concerned to communicate his message of a `new world', a world

transformed by terrorist fundamentalism, through a kit, a package that cost the

Australian taxpayer millions. Its heading is clear enough: Let's Look Out For Australia:

protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat (herein LOFA). Its enclosures were

somewhat unusual. Of particular interest was the fridge magnet, with key numbers

and the details of agencies in cases of `emergency'.

This paper seeks to accomplish two things. Firstly, it seeks to critique the various

meanings present in LOFA. It critically interrogates various political and mythological

strategies in the package. If the purpose of LOFA was to assure the Australian

ISSN 0725-6868 print/ISSN 1469-9540 online/04/030287-15 ã 2004 Centre for Migrant and Intercultural Studies

DOI: 10.1080/0725686042000315777

Journal of Intercultural Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2004

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population against a terrorist attack by administering, in the words of Ghassan Hage,

a familial `cuddle' in a period of uncertainty, then it proved a failure.2 In LOFA, one

®nds a failure to adequately distribute social hope through an inability to account for

terrorism as a coherent threat. It instead offers remarkably unspeci®c guidelines on

de®ning what terrorism, or for that matter a `suspicious' act, might be.3 Instead,

Canberra seeks to establish a national security state with greater surveillance and

powers of detention, a development that has the prospect of diminishing civil

liberties.4 This invites the provocation that the state may be placed on an authoritarian

path, though the theoretical limits of this assertion must be recognised.5 LOFA also

reveals a series of crude cultural equations in its portrayal of Australian values. While

LOFA suggests a cultural inclusiveness by not speci®cally targeting Muslims, this

paper argues that such a reading is unwarranted: the representation of culture in the

document encourages a distinctly modi®ed reading of Islam, assimilated, and very

much de®ned against fundamentalism or terrorism. Standard Australian images of

cricket and the beach are used to counter the threat. A crude cultural calculus is

thereby introduced using Australian icons as their reference point against terrorism.

In the second instance, the actual responses to the package are given a cursory

examination. Many Australians exercised their liberty to protest by discarding the kit

in bins, and marking the document `return to sender'. The effect of returning these

packages was that thousands of Australians, while insulted that the federal

government could paternally assume their vulnerability from terrorism and train

them in the awareness of vague phenomena such as `suspicious activity', remained

untouched by this monumental public relations project, in so far as perusing the

contents were concerned. The indignation was not critically aware; the public

discussion on the matter was one of hilarity rather than seriousness on government

assumptions. The paper advances the suggestion that the vanishing of debate on the

subject of LOFA is very much due to the overall success of the government to

inculcate the consciousness of terrorism in the Australian populace. Using the

language of Pierre Bourdieu, it is suggested that the reception of LOFA was ultimately

marked by an acceptance of the doxa, or orthodoxy, of terrorism as a global

phenomenon.6

De®ning Terrorism

In combating terrorism, the document is ambivalent in de®ning the threats

Australians face. It conveys both a message of warning, and an optimistic message:

that terrorism is a real danger but can be overcome. LOFA is a statement of `back to

normal' amidst the prospects of a possible terrorist attack. To refer to Ghassan Hage's

analysis on worrying, the national subject seeks a `well-administered cuddle', an

`energising cuddle' which `replenishes their capacity to face the world'.7 But how has

this cuddle been administered, and what is being communicated to the readers?

LOFA does two things: suggesting that we are not to be `alarmed' by the geopolitical

changes that have highlighted the importance of ®ghting terrorism, and assuring the

public of the changes that have been made to buttress Australia against a possible

attack. This suggests a few things: the government assuages the public by lessening the

288 Binoy Kampmark

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threat of attack, yet puts in place a security apparatus which it considers to be

unof®cious yet effective.

Being alarmed is exactly the kind of reaction one would have, if acquainted with the

evolution of modern terrorism and the facts that surround its motivations.8 The

document never details the nature of the terrorism, only that circumstances have

changed in Australia's environment that warrant such a public warningÐBali and 9/

11 are mentioned brie¯y.9 If LOFA accepts the terrorist threat as real, it proves

frivolous in de®ning it. Consider the vague statement of ASIO chief Denis Richardson:

`Terrorism takes many forms and there is no de®nitive list.'10 In short, one could be

forgiven in believing that the threat of terrorism is a rhetorical strategy. In November

2002, LOFA notes that the government came across information of `a possible

terrorist attack'.11 It goes no further, omitting any mention on how credible the

information was. This is the paradox of LOFAÐit supposes something that might not

exist; it simulates doom just as it denies that it would happen. Its subtext is after all,

`Protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat' just as it says that one

should be `alert, but not alarmed'.12 We are simply to assume that life will continue,

even if the entire document commences with the now worn phrase that, `Terrorism

has changed the world, and Australia is not immune.'13 The document slips into a

stoic call to Australian society: `the way of life we all value highly must go on'.14 But

what has changed? Why does Australia ®nd itself in a position of vulnerability? The

circumstances are not elaborated, nor the context of previous foreign policy discussed,

whether involving previous Australian involvement in East Timor, or its alliance with

the USA. LOFA can only suggest that, `Every country, including Australia, is a

potential terrorist target.'15 One is, in fact, discouraged from seeing the bloody

realities of terrorism through a distinct absence of grim images. In reading the

document, there is only the tranquil life, on crowded beaches; a smoking barbeque,

and a multicultural array of hand clapping Australian children.

In some ways, the readers can empathise with the government, who probably

should never have embarked on a public relations program using the term `terrorism',

itself an inherently problematic concept.16 The `new terrorism' has been de®ned as

the old paradigm of predominantly state-sponsored terrorism has been

joined by a new, religiously motivated terrorism that neither relies on the

support of sovereign states nor is constrained by limits on violence that state

sponsors have observed themselves or placed on their proxies.17

The new terrorism is also discussed in the US National Commission Report

responsible for investigating the circumstances surrounding the attacks of 9/11. Now,

national security, it urges, needs to be updated, being no longer a ®xation of `studying

foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial

might'.18 But having undertaken such a task, it duly failed to formulate a coherent

framework for explaining the threat, its history and its agents.

In addition to its failure to articulate the nature of the new terrorism in any speci®c

detail, LOFA also provides a poor account on how best to identify the ingredients of a

potential terrorist threat. What is `suspicious' activity, and what are factors which

make a seemingly unusual act tantamount to terrorism? The writers of the document

How to Read an Anti-terrorist Kit 289

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become holistic: `Whether or not something is suspicious can depend on the

circumstances.' We read the comments of the Australian Commissioner of the

Federal Police. He is not attempting to be humorous, least of all ironic. But he insists

that the terrorist mind-set has been capably parried by the package's `practical

advice'.19 As the document is vague as to what an example of a `suspicious' activity is,

we are presented with a children's phrase, a vulgar arithmetical solution: `Look at the

situation as a whole. If it doesn't add up, ring up the 24-hour National Security

Hotline.'20 The avenue for pranks and hoaxes is assured, as the callers `may remain

anonymous if they wish'.

A few pages on, we might hope for clues to this new cosmology of the terrorist

thought process, but we are left disappointed. `While planning an attack, terrorists

may lead lives that appear unusual or suspicious.'21 The deceptive terrorist has

curious rental habits (how many go out with gloves from a garage, even in winter?),

and an overly developed sensitivity to videoing or photographing `of®cial buildings or

other critical infrastructure'.22 This effectively places all tourists in a suspect category.

The document gives few concrete examples of `suspicious' activity, though it selects

the behaviour of the 9/11 hijackers as a case in point.

Before the 11 September 2001 attacks, terrorists in the US undertook ¯ight

training but were not interested in learning how to take off or land. The

leader of that group also paid cash for many large purchases such as ¯ight

training, accommodation, vehicles and air tickets.23

But such an example does not identify why such activities are necessarily suspicious,

since each preparatory act of terrorism need not follow a universal formula. The

reader is still left unenlightened.

Authoritarian Suggestions?

Perhaps one of the more dangerous aspects of the package's revelations on counter-

terrorism is its `totalitarian' or authoritarian import.24 Most signi®cantly are the new

laws against terrorism; as LOFA notes, `Six new laws to combat terrorism are in

place.'25 Care must be taken here in advocating that the package signi®es a political

shift in Australian politics towards the totalitarianÐindeed the impulse on the Left,

argues Slavoj ZÏ izÏek, is to label certain movements totalitarian without a key

understanding of its signi®cance.26 Indeed, some have suggested that the legislative

changes on terrorism, in the main, `hardly seem extraordinary' in the face of

draconian drug enforcement laws and powers of surveillance that have been part of

the security landscape since the 1990s.27 Nor can the need for intelligence in

combating terrorism be denied, as this provides the `®rst line' in monitoring and

defusing terrorist threats.28 But LOFA goes further, informing the public of security

changes that potentially mimic certain features of a totalitarian or authoritarian state

by maximising state power against citizens. The suggestion is not one that is without

precedent in the literature. Some authors suggest that totalitarian modalities can be

mimicked in liberal democracies.29 While a full development of totalitarian ideology

may not occur in the Australian political system, there is certainly a chance that

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certain authoritarian structures could be put in place. Indeed, as Hocking noted in her

earlier work on the subject of the Australian security state, certain government actions

have the effect of altering the traditional administration of justice through the vitiation

of fundamental common law rights and liberties.30

What is at issue here is something far more sinister: that the liberal democratic

consensus could itself be at stake, threatened by populism and an erosion of privacy, a

consensus that is driven by its disavowal of totalitarian Islamic fundamentalism (or

Islamo-fascism). When one employs the term `totalitarianism', or, in the terrorist

debate, Islamic fascism, one is tempted to ignore other threats that might pose a more

credible risk to the `hegemony' of liberal democracies.31 LOFA conceals the

background changes that pose such a threat (greater security surveillance, the

abridgement of key rights, interrogations), since it implies that `soon, our daily lives

will be registered and controlled to such an extent that the former police state control

will look like a childish game: the `̀ end of privacy'' is in sight'.32

Even if we do not accept the ZÏ izÏek thesis that the onset of totalitarianism may be the

outcome of increased digitisation and screening, LOFA is set in a new security

environment that presents the readers with a vision of a highly regulated and

coordinated state with centralised executive and military powers. In her most recent

work on the subject, Hocking argues that the current counter-terrorist laws indicate a

movement away from the `criminal justice model' towards a more extreme example of

`exceptional powers'.33 The survey by a Senate Committee on the ®rst version of the

ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill argued that it was `one of the most

controversial pieces of legislation considered by the Parliament in recent times' with

the potential of undermining `key legal rights and erode the civil liberties that make

Australia a leading democracy'.34 Amongst the new laws mentioned and ¯agged in

LOFA, it is criminal to `plan, support or engage in a terrorist act, or to train with or be

a member of a terrorist organisation'. It is also criminal to `provide or collect funds to

support terrorism'.35 The executive has the power to ban political parties, imprison its

members and freeze associated assets.36 Most notably, the disturbance of certain

cornerstones of Anglo-Australian lawÐthe right to a speedy trial and the privilege

against self-incrimination are a few examplesÐconstitute a challenge to Australia's

democratic image.37 Indeed, the laws on detention without trial for certain periods

may themselves be unconstitutional as an undue usurpation of judicial power.38

These new laws have been widely condemned in the legal community. One lawyer

has noted how,

It is ironic that 50 years after the case of Australian Communist Party v

Commonwealth and the subsequent defeat of a referendum to ban the

Australian Communist Party, the major political parties have passed

legislation that goes beyond the measures of 1950±51 in its potential to

outlaw dissenting political activity.39

It is true that the more savage aspects of the bills were modi®ed by Labor amendments

in June 2002, but the laws remain signi®cant for introducing `sweeping de®nitions of

terrorism and treason, both now punishable by life imprisonment, which could outlaw

many forms of political protest and industrial action'.40 Even lawyers inclined to view

How to Read an Anti-terrorist Kit 291

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the anti-terrorist measures as unexceptional argue that the abolition of the right to

silence constitutes a fundamental blow to the rule of law.41

This response documented in LOFA may be largely due to the failure of the State to

adequately respond to non-State threats. There is an asymmetrical relationship

between the State and non-State actor in the ®eld of terrorism, the latter being merely

a manifestation of tactics. The State only reacts to such threats as if they were quasi-

states and rival sovereign powers, and thus can only amplify its pre-existing powers.

Hence, the State sends regular troops against terrorist forces; it invades countries on a

suspicion that they either harbour terrorists or aid and abet them. The entire discourse

on the terrorist con¯ict is one that is set in traditional state-frameworks, while the

USA and its allies still claim to be combating it with radically innovative strategies.42

One of the key tendencies revealed in the document is that the strategy to combat

terrorism is projected through a resurgence of state activity in an age when the value of

the state has been challenged.43 As Hocking points out, this move should be regarded

with suspicion, as it constitutes a `pattern established elsewhere in the government's

counter-terrorism legislative package of a dramatic expansion of Executive power and

a signi®cant recasting of the balance between the Executive and the judiciary'.44 In

LOFA, the various archons of the state are presented as protectors of Australian

security rather than detractors of liberty: David Templeman, who suggests ways of

managing emergencies; Richard Smallwood, the Commonwealth Chief Medical

Of®cer on `essential ®rst aid'; Federal Police Commissioner Mike Keelty, and the

Director-General of ASIO, Denis Richardson.45

Not Adding Up: imagery

One of the most notable strategies in the document is the use of well-known icons of

Australian life. This use of images has a dual function: to approve of citizens who have

mastered the cultural code implicit in LOFA, and preclude citizens who have not.

Presumably, the barbeque±surfer±cricketer identity precludes any cultural referents

that are unusual; to use the words of the kit, a different way of living provides potential

competition by being a `lifestyle that doesn't add up'. The document suggests that

anything `suspicious' or `unusual' be reported.46 The small wallet-sized form that

citizens were encouraged to cut and carry about (we imagine a rush of eager callers at

phone booths and mobiles), insists that the caller `use ¼ judgment and common

sense'.47

The adoption by the authors of a balance sheet of anthropological measures clearly

alludes to Howard's cultural sensitivities about the `Australian' way of life and where

his conservatism can be situated.48 There is a suggestion here of `cultural'

fundamentalism. Hage calls him, ironically, Ayatollah Howard, for he expresses an

obsession with the `Australian way' of life which is governed by some `causal essence'.

Australian values form `a trans-historical unchanging core which is almost automat-

ically espoused by good nationals and is responsible for giving society its enduring

character amidst all the changes it can experience'.49 Australian society, writes

Howard in his introductory letter attached to the kit, is `a strong, free, compassionate

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societyÐtogether, we will look out for Australia and protect the way of life we value so

highly'.50

The use of a cricket scene on the front page of LOFA gives the reader a clue as to

how certain `transhistorical' themes operate on the cultural balance sheet. Howard's

cricketing loves are well noted in his statements to the media and studies of his

political ideology.51 His evocation of Sir Donald Bradman as the exemplar of

principle and upright moral appeal, most notably after his death, betrayed a

sentimental nostalgia.52 Wendy Frew, a student of the Bradman era and its

connection with Australian nationalism, has suggested that Howard `believed

Bradman's prowess on the cricket pitch had helped nurture and reinforce

Australia's national spirit'. The Don `represented the values and character of his

countrymen'.53 Such values involved an observance of such basic rules as `fair play'.

The display of the beach on the front cover with its iconic bathers, sand and

umbrellas is also symbolic of such values, since Australia, in the words of the weekly

National Times, `means the beach'.54 According to Robert Drewe,

The Australian spirit, whether it resides in the Gold Coast businessman or

the Byron Bay New Ager, is primarily a search for physical and emotional

comfort which seems only attainable with a glimpse of the ocean in the

mind's eye.55

Indeed, the beach does more for current Australian mythology than the outback

precisely because it has a resonance with the extremes of business and `new ageism'.

The beach signi®es Australianness by combining the themes of `the natural, the free,

the outdoors, the physical' with the detritus of the Australian metropolis: bins, hotels,

fast food outlets.56 For most Australians, `only the coast provides that irresistible

nationalistic combination of bush and ocean'.57 In other words, if one is to read the

signi®cance of the beach as a text authored by an Australian community, the

document can be read as suggesting a set of practices supposedly opposed to

terrorism. The beach posits the idea that such a life is both `free'Ðthe beach as natural

and `untamed', and culturally iconic, and therefore resistant to the barbarities of

terrorism.58

Culture is mathematically de®ned: it becomes a matter of careful nationalistic

bookkeeping. Indeed, the nature of this prescriptive outlook in LOFA makes perfect

sense in the scheme of Howard's attitude to Islam immediately prior and after 9/11.

`September 11 sealed the position of the Muslim as the unquestionable other in

Australia today.' The new target of white paranoia, argues Hage, is considered as

threatening, if not more so, than its `Asian' counterpart. `Muslims are moved by a

single essence, and whenever one of them does something good he or she is

unusual.'59 The images used in LOFA reveal a fundamental problematic on how

`whiteness' is conceived in a multicultural society. In White Nation, Hage draws these

themes out in a form of analysis he called `internal orientalism': `White multicul-

turalism and the whole discourse of nationalist exclusionÐrecently represented by

Pauline Hanson's One NationÐshared a similar [white] fantasy structure.'60 This

enables him to suggest that, `White racists and White multiculturalists share in a

conception of themselves as nationalists and of the nation as a space structured

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around a white culture'.61 Jon Stratton similarly assesses Howard's use of `tolerance'

to highlight `the image of separate and delimited cultures', a tolerance that precludes

the active civic engagement of `ethnicised individuals', or those `exiled from a uni®ed

and dominant theme which is essentially Australian'.62

The document does give the impression of being inclusive and tolerant: cultures are

not what the document targets, but a seditious lifestyle antithetical to Australian

values. `Now more than ever, it is important that we all respect our different

backgrounds and beliefs.'63 At the back of LOFA is an impression of worldliness: the

document issues its warnings in several languages; on one page, a photo has been

carefully placed showing a girl with the hijab, and a boy of `Asian' background.64 A list

of anti-discrimination organisations are also noted in the event that plaintiffs need to

complain of `racial or religious discrimination of vili®cation'.65 It would be more

accurate to say that LOFA always remains clear as to who the arbiter of cultural

tolerance is. The exercise of tolerance is a prerogative that rests with the Federal

Government of the day. It is one which may be revoked at any given time, whether

through populist campaigns or nationalist mobilisation. We are told that the

Australian `community embraces people, religions and languages from every corner

of the world' but like terrorism, this is only a provisional reality.66 When the document

urges us to do the sum `if it does not add up, ring up', we are presented with the

margins of tolerance, the limits of Howard's Australia. Cricket players add up; women

wearing the hijab in practice do not.

To understand where the Howard government stands on this, two examples can be

suggested. First, we are reminded of Howard's reluctance to castigate the Christian

Democrat Rev. Fred Nile of the New South Wales parliament after he argued that the

hijab be banned from train stations and other public places where terrorist Muslims

might congregate. In November 2002, Nile urged Premier Bob Carr's government of

New South Wales to `consider a prohibition on the wearing of the chador in public

places, especially railway stations, city streets and shopping centres'.67 It is

arithmetically problematic: it does not add up. As two feminist authors in the Los

Angeles Times have noted, `Headlines in the mainstream media have reduced Muslim

female identity to an article of clothingÐthe `̀ veil''.'68 Howard's refusal to issue a

reprove was evident: `I don't always agree with him, but he speaks for the views of a lot

of people.'69

In the second instance, the refugee policy of the government has been neatly

combined with its counter-terrorist policy, thereby revealing a marked ambivalence to

cultural tolerance.70 LOFA makes this point by noting, `Tighter border controls' to

protect the continent from the bacilli of terrorism, a move that sanctions another

marriage of convenience between Howard's politics of refugee exclusion and the `war

on terror'. Amongst these measures are more `air and sea patrols', modernised

`equipment to detect fake passports' and more `state-of-the-art surveillance systems

on Coastwatch planes'.71 The rei®cation of refugee identity is merely con®rmed in

this document, the refugee arriving by boat being merely another instance of cultural

(and terrorist) penetration by sea. The accusation made against the boat arrivals from

the Middle East from 2000 onwards was that of the `false identity'Ðlacking papers, or

possessing false identity papers. The false identity makes its appearance as a terrorist

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trait in LOFA: `Terrorists frequently use stolen or fake documents, including

documents and driver's licenses.'72

Resistance or Doxic Submission?

The ®nal issue is one of response. How did Australians react to the package and what

sort of strategies were adopted to counter LOFA? On the surface, LOFA was a failure,

given the initial resistance mounted against it. A summary was provided by the

Kalgoorlie Miner:

The word-of-mouth campaign to promote a `return to sender' attitude will

keep some post of®ces busy in the coming weeks. Many other Australians

will be less offended but will still just throw the booklet on the pile of

newspapers.73

One resident from Novar Gardens found an ecologically sound manner to cope with

the excess paper in her mail that month, ®nding `space for it in my recycle bin'. But

the spectral terrorist was less a worry to her than government ineptitude in sending her

another package 5 days later. `After talking to many in my areaÐI ®nd that they, too,

had a repeat in their mailboxes. How many trees were killed through this stuff-up.'74

A Keperra resident, congratulating the Lord Mayor of Brisbane in his encouragement

to residents to send the package back, saw such stubbornness as a means of resistance.

`Refusal of this kit is an outright protest against the Federal Government's fear

campaign.'75

Examples of traditional irreverence could also be found. Stage performer Simon

Kingsley Hall told a Melbourne paper that his most recent production Babel Towers

was inspired by LOFA.76 Tim Harris of the Age was impatient to receive the package,

infantalised by its prospects. `As soon as I heard it was coming, I couldn't wait to get

my hands on it. I was like a birthday kid, waiting anxiously for the post, checking the

box at regular intervals.' Harris found the cultural pointers amusing, since they

ensured that he, as a reader, was not focused on Uzbekistan or the Faroe Islands.

`There was a beach, surely a target for any terrorist, and a barbecue.' Harris was,

however, insulted by the absence of a strategic context: the war on Iraq, the

dissimulation over weapons of mass destruction, and the insistence on Canberra's

part to be at one with US foreign policy, the likelihood which `ensured us a place on

the list of targets'.77

But how do these responses ultimately measure up? The debate was only intense for

the ®rst few weeks after the package was delivered, and soon subsided. The

government rarely mentioned it. A spare copy of the kit was virtually impossible to

obtain after it was sent to homes, and by the end of 2003, the Prime Minister's of®ce

had the sole remaining issue that was sent to a constituent in the North Queensland

seat of Townsville.78 The kit was forgotten, either through fear, or through ridicule.

Either way, the statements in the package had receded from the realm of popular

discourse. It was, in a sense, a government triumph. Even if it was mocked, the

Howard government could not be accused of doing nothing about terrorism. The

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public may not have entirely approved, but nor did they dissent en masse from the

government line that Australia needed to be `looked out' for.

Could this perhaps have been a form of `submission' to the government strategy,

however grudging, an acceptance of an unquestionable orthodoxy `that operates as it

if it were an objective truthÐacross social space, in its entirety, from the practice and

perceptions of individuals to the practices and perceptions of the State and their social

groups'?79 Bourdieu illuminates the problem of interpreting social actions in the

context of submission to orthodoxy or doxa, arguing that the motivations for

behaviour have both conscious and unconscious roots. `It is this immediate and tacit

agreement, in every sense opposed to an explicit contract, that founds the relation of

doxic submission which attaches us to the legal order with all the ties of the

unconscious.'80 Bourdieu refers to David Hume on the topic of legitimacy, or the

acceptance of a particular order by members of society.

The state does not necessarily have to give orders or to exercise physical

coercion in order to produce an ordered social world, as long as it is capable

of producing embodied cognitive structures that accord with objective

structures and thus of ensuring the belief of which Hume spokeÐnamely,

doxic submission to the established order.81

Bourdieu is useful here, because the behaviour of the Australian public to LOFA

after initial strategies of resistance provides a classic instance of a social body

accepting certain changes or conditions (the ASIO laws for instance) even if they are

pernicious.82 Using Bourdieu's understanding of doxa, we might suggest that the war

on terrorism, and its associated fears, have established themselves as doxa in

Australian and global popular consciousness. Despite documented instances of

indignation towards the package, the absence of debate soon after LOFA was sent out,

or the strategies of sending back the document, did nothing to dispel the notion that

Australians did not fear some kind of attack. In fact, psychologist Michael

Carr-Gregg, interviewed on the 7.30 Report in mid-December 2002, spoke of

clients who `tell me that they do look up in the sky now when they see an aeroplane

¯ying overhead. And if a car back®res, instead of thinking, `̀ That's a car back®ring,''

they think, `̀ I wonder if it's a gunshot or a bomb.'''83 There was also an increase of

requests at various medical services for ®rst-aid training. This, claimed a St John

ambulance employee in Watsonia, was largely due to the package. `There's a large

number of the public who are concerned about things in the brochure, and they want

to safeguard themselves and their families.' As he noted, there were `mixed feelings'

with some residents unconcerned, others `too frightened to get out and enjoy life as

before'.84

The establishment of the doxa of terrorism and counter-terrorist measures may

have been due in part to the subliminal strategies contained in LOFA. One key

example was the use of the fridge magnet. Australians are meant to enshrine the threat

of a spectral terrorist in their homes; to suggest the reality of a threat the government

never discloses or articulates with clarity. On the fridge door, whenever residents place

or take out domestic items, they are reminded that Australia has changed, but in

actual fact will not change in the wake of such threats. Howard, in effect, presents the

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terrorist to the Australian public, involving its members in a speculative dialogue on

terrorism, with the State as protector. The fridge magnet mentions who `to contact

and when'Ðemergency services, the national security hotline, local police and

translators. Symbolically, the State imposes its presence as the ultimate carer, always

ready to provide that cuddle in an insecure environment through a keen deployment

of domestic images. This is what makes the positioning of the magnet so effective,

the assertion of State paternalism in the domestic environment of the home kitchen.

The magnet asks citizens to `report suspicious activity that may be a sign of terrorism

and need investigation by security agencies'.85 The language of the magnet also

purports to domesticate the terrorist threat by treating it as a simple issue of law

enforcement. It suggests, as far as the `local police' are concerned, a situation that is

not terroristic at all: `Call to report a crime or for general advice on security in your

environment.'86 The rhetoric of LOFA urges the citizens to defuse staggering terrorist

threats through orthodox policing methods, thereby mobilising concerned citizens for

a programme that is never explained. Terrorism is to be opposed using standard,

crime-watch specialties harnessed from the public's `common sense and good

judgment'.87

Conclusion

This critique of LOFA suggests that the package failed in its objectives for various

reasons. While Australians generally accepted the existence of a terrorist threat, they

remain, according to Australia's foremost biographer, Donald Horne, a phlegmatic

lot. `We could also remind ourselves that, on occasion, we don't panic. Responses to

the Bali massacre were almost completely lacking in fatuities about how things would

never be the same again for Australia, or its view of the world.'88 Indeed, it can be

argued that the government's packaging could have been more effective had it

remained speci®c and honest on what Australians face, articulated a more coherent

picture of terrorism and suggested some pointers on what to `look out for' in potential

terrorist activities. It did none of these.

Instead, more sinister readings could be gleamed from the package. To cope with

terrorism, Canberra is seeking a national security state with greater surveillance and

the abrogation of certain liberties, but chooses to conceal this by assuming that the

Australian `way of life' has not been affected, that it will triumph against terrorism.

LOFA has gone even further by describing the nature of this Australian existence,

introducing a calculus of cultural values that must be met if one is to `add up' and

avoid being `suspicious'. This basic calculus involves images of the cricketer or a love

of the beach, symbols of outdoor freedom.

In the end, the government may have been successful by default, whatever the

weaknesses of LOFA. Little debate has taken place on the package since its reception,

indicating a possible `doxic' submission of its basic premise: that Australia is in danger

and requires a fair degree of vigilance to guard against imminent attack. Perhaps the

disappearance of the package after its initially hostile reception was due as much to

Bourdieu's concept of submission vis-aÁ-vis terrorism as it was to simple fatalism. In

looking at images of Australia, Peter Conrad noted this sense of morbid, stoic

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resignation in the Australian character. Before the slaughter of World War I,

Australian soldiers made two-up their own, a game where, `No element of skill

in¯uences the outcome of the spin; the players who bet on which way up the coins

come down cannot read a form guide or compute averages, and must simply take their

chances.'89 As the Kalgoorlie Miner surmised, even if critics levelled accusations of

`propaganda' and `scare mongering' at the package, it was probably, in the end, only `a

waste of public money'.90

Notes

1. The author wishes to thank the anonymous referees for their suggestions on a previous draft, the

editors for their encouragement, and Helen Chambers for loaning her copy of LOFA.

2. Hage, Ghassan (2003) Against Paranoid Nationalism: searching for hope in a shrinking society, p.

27 (Annandale, NSW, Pluto Press).

3. LOFA, p. 9.

4. See Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth); Australian Security Intelligence

Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth), herein ASIO Act.

5. See, for instance, Bronitt, Simon (2003, June) Constitutional rhetoric v criminal justice

realities: unbalanced responses to terrorism. Public Law Review, 14(2), pp. 76±80, claiming that

some of the terrorist laws were unexceptional.

6. Only this aspect of Pierre Bourdieu's (1984) work is focused on, particularly as discussed in

Distinction: a social critique of taste (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul).

7. Hage, Against Paranoid Nationalism, p. 27.

8. For a good text, see Sinclair, Andrew (2003) An Anatomy of Terror: a history of terrorism

(London, Macmillan).

9. LOFA, p. 2.

10. LOFA, p. 7.

11. LOFA, p. 2.

12. LOFA, p. 8.

13. LOFA, p. 4.

14. LOFA, p. 4.

15. LOFA, p. 14.

16. See Bonanate, Luigi (1979) Some unanticipated consequences of terrorism. Journal of Peace

Research, 16(3), pp. 197±213, 197; Hocking, Jenny (1993) Beyond Terrorism: the development of

the Australian Security State, p. 29 (St Leonard's Street, Allen & Unwin).

17. Simon, Steven and Benjamin, David (2000) America and the new terrorism. Survival, 42(1),

pp. 57±75, 60.

18. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) The 9/11

Commission Report: ®nal report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

States, pp. 339, 361 (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Of®ce).

19. LOFA, p. 8.

20. LOFA, p. 7.

21. LOFA, p. 9.

22. LOFA, p. 9.

23. LOFA, p. 9.

24. See LOFA, p. 4.

25. LOFA, p. 5.

26. The argument is made in ZÏ izÏek, S. (2001) Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five interventions

on the (misuse) of the word, p. 3 (London, Verso).

27. See Bronitt (2003) Constitutional rhetoric v criminal justice realities, p. 78.

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28. Hocking, Beyond Terrorism, p. 23; McKnight, David (2004, summer) Clear thinking, dogma

and the war on terrorism. Sydney Papers, 16(1), pp. 88, 96±101, 98.

29. See, for instance, Lefort, Claude (1986) The logic of totalitarianism, in: John B. Thompson

(Ed.) The Political Forms of Modern Society, pp. 273±291 (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press).

30. Hocking, Beyond Terrorism, p. 21.

31. ZÏ izÏek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?, p. 164.

32. ZÏ izÏek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?, p. 229.

33. Hocking, Jenny (2004) Terror Laws: ASIO, counter-terrorism and the threat to democracy, p. 194

(Sydney, UNSW).

34. Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, An Advisory Report on the

Australian Security Intelligence Organization Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002,

May 2002, Report 1, Foreword.

35. LOFA, p. 5.

36. Criminal Code (Cth) div 102.7; Charter of United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) s 15(5), amended by

Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002 (Cth) sch 3.

37. See ASIO Act, ss. 34G(8)-(9).

38. Head (2002) Counter-terrorism laws: a threat to political freedom, civil liberties and

constitutional rights. Melbourne University Law Review, 26(3), pp. 666±689, 685±687.

39. Head, M. (2002) Counter-terrorism laws, p. 669.

40. See, e.g. Criminal Code (Cth) divs 80.1, 100.1; Head (2002) Counter-terrorism laws, pp. 668±

670.

41. Bronitt (2003) Constitutional rhetoric v criminal justice realities, p. 79.

42. Rice, Condolezza (2002, December) A balance of power that favours freedom. US Foreign

Policy Agenda: An Electronic Journal of the Department of State, 7(4), pp. 5±9.

43. See review article by Humphrey, Michael, et al. (2002, spring) New visions of the state. Social

Analysis, 46(1), pp. 154±163.

44. Hocking, Jenny (2004, summer) National security and democratic rights: Australian terror

laws. Address to the Sydney Institute, 3 February 2004. Sydney Papers, 16(1), pp. 88±95, 93.

45. LOFA, pp. 11, 13, 8, 7.

46. LOFA, p. 7.

47. LOFA, p. 7.

48. For recent discussion about Howard's politics, see Manne, Robert (Ed.) (2004) The Howard

Years (Melbourne, Black Inc. Agenda).

49. Hage, Against Paranoid Nationalism, p. 71.

50. Introductory Letter, LOFA Package.

51. In particular, see Hutchins, Brett (2001) Social conservatism, Australian politics and cricket:

the triumvirate of Prime Minister John Howard, Sir Robert Menzies and Sir Donald Bradman.

Journal of Australian Studies, 67, pp. 55±66, 213±215.

52. Hutchins, B. (2002, April) The uses of nostalgia: Don Bradman and Australian cricket. Social

Alternatives, 19(2), pp. 35±39.

53. Frew, Wendy (2002) Who's driving our history? Sydney Morning Herald, Spectrum, 2 March,

p. 6.

54. Quoted in Fiske, John, Hodge, Bob and Turner, Graeme (1987) Myths of Oz: reading Australian

popular culture, p. 53 (Sydney, Allen & Unwin).

55. Drewe, Robert (1994, spring±summer) The beach or the bush? Or the shark vs the dingo.

Island, 60/61, pp. 4±6, 5. For the classic work see Dutton, Geoffrey (1985) The Beach: sun, sea,

surf, sandÐthe myth of the beach (Melbourne, Oxford University Press); and a less academic text,

Wells, Lana (1982) Sunny Memories: Australians at the seaside (Richmond, Vic., Greenhouse

Publications).

56. Fiske et al., Myths of Oz, pp. 53±55.

57. Drewe (1994) The beach or the bush?, p. 6.

58. Fiske et al., Myths of Oz, p. 55.

59. Hage, Against Paranoid Nationalism, p. 67.

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60. Hage, Ghassan (1998) White Nation: fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural Australia, p.

232 (Annandale, NSW, Pluto Press).

61. Hage, White Nation, p. 18.

62. Stratton, Jon (1998) Race Daze: Australia in identity crises, p. 83 (Annandale, NSW, Pluto

Press).

63. LOFA, p. 10.

64. LOFA, p. 10.

65. LOFA, p. 10.

66. LOFA, p. 10.

67. Quoted in Riley, Mark, Burke, Kelly and AAP (2002) PM's `veiled' comments on how Muslim

women dress. Sydney Morning Herald, 22 November, p. 1.

68. Al-Marayah, Laila and Issa, Semeen (2002) An identity reduced to a burka. Los Angeles Times,

Sunday Opinion, 30 January.

69. Quoted in Harvey, Adam (2002) Don't judge us by how we dress. Sunday Telegraph, 1

December, p. 14.

70. This has been examined in Kampmark, Binoy (2002, June) Refugee identities and the MV

Tampa. Antipodes, 16(1), pp. 66±71.

71. LOFA, p. 5.

72. LOFA, p. 9.

73. Kalgoorlie Miner (2003) Government's information kit on terror is a waste of public money, 15

February.

74. Dobyn, Anne (2003) Terror check in the mail. Sunday Mail, Letters, 2 March, p. 48.

75. Bouloukos, Letitia (2003) Congratulations on anti-war stance. North West News, Letters, 19

February, p. 7.

76. On the stage with performer, Simon Kingsley Hall, MX, 18 June 2003, p. 28.

77. Harris, Tim (2003) The cultureÐbuddy, can you spare us a hat? And other weapons of mass

deduction. The Age, 14 February, p. 3.

78. The author now has possession of this particular copy.

79. Chopra, Rohit (2003, May±July) Neoliberalism as doxa: Bourdieu's theory of the state and the

contemporary Indian discourse on globalization and civilization. Cultural Studies, 17(3/4),

pp. 419±444, 421.

80. Bourdieu, Pierre (1999) Rethinking the state: genesis and structure of the bureaucratic ®eld, in:

George Steinmetz (Ed.) State/Culture: state formation after the cultural turn, pp. 53±75, 70

(Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press).

81. Bourdieu (1999) Rethinking the state, p. 70.

82. Bourdieu, Distinction, p. 471.

83. Johnson, Natasha (2002) Terror attacks trouble children. 7.30 Report, Transcript, 17

December.

84. Quoted in Gonzalez, Caroline (2003) Terror worry stirs action. Diamond Valley News, 26

February, p. 3.

85. LOFA Fridge Magnet, available in the LOFA Package.

86. LOFA Fridge Magnet.

87. LOFA, p. 8.

88. Horne, Donald (2002) Best-case scenario. Sydney Morning Herald, Spectrum, 9 November,

p. 4.

89. Conrad, Peter (2003) At Home in Australia, p. 174 (Canberra, National Gallery of Australia).

90. Kalgoorlie Miner (2003) Government's information kit.

Note on Contributor

Binoy Kampmark is a resident tutor in law and international relations at St John's

College, University of Queensland, having written extensively on the impact of

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terrorism on Australia. He has been awarded a Commonwealth Scholarship to

Cambridge University. Correspondence: Binoy Kampmark, St John's College,

University of Queensland, Q. 4067, St Lucia, Brisbane, Australia. E-mail:

bkampmark2@yahoo.com.au

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