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How the Self-Transcendent Emotion of Awe
Affects Cooperation, Distributional Preferences
and Stability in Measurement of the Five Factor
Model of Personality Traits
Caleb Lo
School of Economics and Finance
QUT Business School
Queensland University of Technology
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of
Master of Philosophy (Economics)
2019
Declaration of AuthorshipThe content of this thesis is the original work of the author. The work has not been
previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher
education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no
material previously published or written by another person except where due refer-
ence is made.
Name: Caleb Lo
Date: 3rd September, 2019
Signature: QUT Verified Signature
AcknowledgementsFirst of all I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Uwe Dulleck and Dr.
Stephen Whyte. Without your inspirations, support and guidance, this thesis would
be impossible. I would like to thank Anthony and Alice for their help, in particular
with coding. I would also like to thank Martin and Laura for all the chats we had and
ideas you provided. To everyone else in the School of Economics and Finance, Aimee,
Azhar, Ben, Jeremy, Naomi, Richard, Ryan, Poli, thank you for all the coffees, chats
and laughter we had together. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my
family for your love and support during this research journey. To my parents, Martin
and Karen, I never thank you enough for having raised me over all these years.
AbstractThe emotion of awe has attracted research interest in the past decade on its particular
ability of changing people behaviour. Recent studies have found that experience of
awe leads to a sense of “small self”, and therefore leads to increased prosociality, This
research aims to further investigate awe’s impact on different aspects, including coop-
eration, distributional preferences and stability in measurement of personality traits.
Through a laboratory experiment and exposing participants in a natural awe environ-
ment, this study found that individuals exposed to awe exhibited higher cooperation
level in the public goods game, and increase in their measurement of agreeableness.
Understanding that agreeableness predicts prosociality and cooperation, findings in
this study established an indirect theoretical link between awe and prosociality/ co-
operation.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Literature Review 6
2.1 Introduction to cooperative behaviour and shared intentionality . . . 6
2.2 Prosocial behaviour and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Relational consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 The emotion of awe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.1 Self-transcendence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.2 Individual differences in experiences of awe . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Somatic Marker Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 Stability of the Big Five Personality Traits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7 Factors affecting Public Goods Game Contribution . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8 Distributional preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.9 Gender difference in Behavioural and Experimental Research . . . . . 26
2.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3 Methodology and Design 29
3.1 The experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.1 Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.2 Emotion labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.3 Appraisal endorsement for target experience . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.4 Next hour activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.5 Equality Equivalence Test (EET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2.6 Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2.7 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2.8 Public Goods Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4 Results and Discussion 35
4.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2 Awe and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3 Awe and Distributional Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.4 Awe and the Stability in the measurement of the Five Factor Model of
Personality Traits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4.1 OLS Estimation on Measurement of Personality Traits Stability 51
4.4.2 Wilcoxon rank-sum test and Two-sample t-test on Measure-
ment of Personality Trait Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4.3 Components of Agreeableness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4.4 Further Analysis on Stability in the measurement of Agreeable-
ness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.5 Moderating effect of agreeableness on cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.6 General Discussion of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5 Conclusion 63
A Experiment screenshots i
B Experiment instructions xvii
B.1 Task A instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
B.2 Task C instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii
C Other tests xxi
D Experimental treatment xxv
References xxviii
List of Figures
4.1 Contribution in the Public Goods Game. (N=126) . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 Frequency of the (x,y) scores. (N=117) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.1 Welcome page. Participants were to enter their participant label into
the box above. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
A.2 Welcome Page. The experimenter presented participants with a brief
introduction. This screen captures no data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
A.3 FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the first screen of the standard FFM
questionnaire before the target experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
A.4 FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the second screen of the standard FFM
questionnaire before the target experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
A.5 FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the third screen of the standard FFM
questionnaire before the target experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
A.6 Demographic questions. This is the first screen of the demographics
questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions such
as age, gender, education, marital status, field of study and whether
English is their first language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
A.7 Demographic questions. This is the second screen of the demographics
questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions
regarding their ethnic and religious background. . . . . . . . . . . . vi
A.8 Demographic questions. This is the third screen of the demographics
questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions
about their devoutness to religion, interest in politics, political views,
next hour activites as in Shiota et al. (2007), life satisfaction, health
and comments on the experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
A.9 Emotional labels (as in Shiota et al., 2007). After the target experience,
participants were asked to describe their emotional state according to
the emotional labels on a scale of 0-100. Two examples of the emotional
labels are shown above. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
A.10 Instructions for Task A. This screen is to inform participants that Task
A is about to start. The instructions for Task A were read aloud by
the experimenter. Participants also received a physical copy of the
instructions when they reach this screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
A.11 Contribution page for Task A. Participants were to choose their con-
tribution to the joint project on this page. The top of this page shows
participants the round they are in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
A.12 Results page. This page shows participants the details of all the con-
tributions in the group, as well as the participants earnings for the
round. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
A.13 Question on the reasoning behind their decisions. Participants were
asked this question about the reasons behind their choice of contribu-
tion to the joint project, after round 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
A.14 Appraisal endorsement for target experience (as in Shiota et al., 2007).
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they remembered
having several appraisals of the target experience, on a scale of 0-100. xi
A.15 Question on whether the target experience affected their decision to
contribute. Participants in the main treatment were asked this ques-
tion, whether they felt the target experience affecting their decisions
on how much to contribute in the PGG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
A.16 Question on participants previous visits to the Gibson Room. Partic-
ipants in the main treatment were asked this question, as familiarity
may reduce the level of awe during the experience. Participants were
to complete the FFM questionnaire the second time after this question. xii
A.17 Task B instructions. After the second FFM questionnaire (post-treatment),
the instructions for Task B were shown to participants. Participants
were told by the experimenter that Task B involves ten decisions of
splitting money between you (the participant) and another participant. xii
A.18 Decision Task for Task B. This is the decision task from Kerschbamer
(2015), with earnings adjusted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
A.19 Task C instructions. This screen is to inform participants that Task
C is about to start. The instructions for Task C were read aloud by
the experimenter. Participants also received a physical copy of the
instructions when they reach this screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
A.20 Decision screen for Task C. Participants start collecting boxes by press-
ing the Start button and they can press Stop anytime. Every second
before the Stop button a box will be marked by a tick symbol, indi-
cating that the box is collected. Participants press the Solve button to
locate the bomb after pressing Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
A.21 Results screen for Task C. Participants were informed their earnings
for Task C, including the number of boxes collected and whether the
bomb is located in one of the boxes they collected. . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
A.22 Payment screen. This is the final screen of the experiment. Partici-
pants were informed the details of their earnings from the experiment,
including the selected rounds for payment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
Chapter 1
Introduction
“The beauty of the trees,
the softness of the air,
the fragrance of the grass,
speaks to me.
The summit of the mountain,
the thunder of the sky,
speaks to me.
The faintness of the stars,
the trail of the sun,
the strength of fire,
and the life that never goes away,
they speak to me.
And my heart soars.”
Chief Dan George
Sunsets, starry skies, mountains, oceans, waterfalls, childbirth, - transformative, un-
forgettable once-in-a-lifetime experiences, bring an immense sense of wonder, fascina-
tion, and joy. How do these experiences impact, and transform individuals? If these
experiences are beneficial to ourselves, how do these experiences benefit the rest of
the society, including those who did not experience it? If so, does it have collective
implications, where people feel part of a greater community, by making decisions that
are beneficial to others, not just beneficial to themselves?
Awe is an emotional response to perceptually vast stimuli that overwhelms and chal-
lenges frames of reference. Awe is by no means a new concept, as historic reference
1
of awe can be found in religion, sociology and philosophy. Keltner and Haidt (2003)
define the important properties of awe as vastness and accommodation, laying a solid
theoretical foundation for later studies and leading to a resurgence in the research
on awe. The five essential elements - threat, beauty, ability, virtue and supernatural
causality distinguish awe from other positive emotions such as admiration (Keltner
& Haidt, 2003). Combining the solitary nature of experience and a seemingly contra-
dictory unifying power, awe is neither an other-oriented emotion, nor a self-oriented
emotion, but a stimulus-oriented emotion, which is different to other positive emo-
tions such as gratitude (Prade & Saroglou, 2015). The mechanism behind the social
function of awe is different to other positive emotions, and requiring further explo-
ration.
Pioneering studies of the social function of awe have only emerged a few years ago,
when researchers such as Piff et al. (2015), Prade and Saroglou (2015) and Stellar
et al. (2017) examined the relationship between awe and prosocial behaviour. Piff
et al. (2015) propose that the sense of diminished self brought by awe experiences
will lead to greater prosociality, while Prade and Saroglou (2015) look particularly
into the effect of awe on helping behaviour. However, these studies were limited by
the simple priming methods they employed in their elicitation of awe. The social
function of awe needs to be explored and tested in different dimensions, using differ-
ent methodologies. Having a well-established link between awe and prosociality also
has important implications for the study of cooperation. A problem for this study
concerns the distinction between prosociality and cooperation. Chapter 2 will detail
the parallels between prosociality and cooperation, in the basis of which this study
expects a positive impact of awe on cooperation.
Key Research Question 1. How does the emotion of awe affect cooperation in
economic experiments?
Following from Key Research Question 1 and past findings on the social function
of awe, it would be interesting to further explore the effect of awe on different types
of social preferences.
Key Research Question 2. How does the emotion of awe affect distributional
preferences in economic experiments?
2
In addition, this study aims to investigate the effect of an awe experience on in-
dividual personality. Understanding that behaviours manifest from one’s personality
traits, it would be interesting to study the stability of personality traits with the
impact of awe (Ajzen, 1987).
Key Research Question 3. To what extent does the emotion of awe affect per-
sonality reporting?
Current literature has divergent views with respect to the stability of personality
traits. More traditional theory argues that personality change is intrinsic and is
therefore relatively stable throughout adulthood, even in the case of a significant life
event (eg. McCrae and Costa, 1999), but more recent studies found that environ-
ment has an impact on the stability of personality traits (eg. Bleidorn et al., 2009;
Hopwood et al., 2011).
To address Key Research Questions 1, 2 and 3, this study examines the relation-
ship between the emotion of awe, cooperation and distributional preferences as well
as the stability in the measurement of the five factor personality traits using a lab-
oratory experiment. Participants in the experiment experienced the emotion of awe
through exposure to a natural environment setting - a balcony with panoramic views.
This study used a 16-round public goods game as a measurement of cooperation,
the Equality Equivalence Test (EET) by Kerschbamer (2015) as a measurement of
distributional preferences, and collected data of the participants’ five factor model of
personality traits before and after the target experience as a measurement of person-
ality traits stability.
This study found that controlling for other factors, participants in the Walk/Awe
treatment group exhibited higher contributions in the public goods game, in other
words, higher levels of cooperation than those who were not exposed to the emotion
of awe. The awe experience also impacted participants’ prosocial preferences, shown
by their x-scores in the EET. A significantly positive treatment effect was also found
on trait stability in the measurement of agreeableness. In other words, participants
in the Walk/Awe treatment group had a positive change in agreeableness compared
to participants in the other treatments. Given the fairly well-established positive re-
lationship between agreeableness and prosociality/cooperation in the literature (eg.
3
Habashi, Graziano & Hoover, 2016; Caprara, Alessandri, Giunta, Panerai & Eisen-
berg, 2009; Volk, Thoni & Ruigrok, 2011; Carlo, Okun, Knight & de Guzman, 2005;
Kagel & McGee, 2014; Koole et al., 2001), this establishes an indirect theoretical link
between awe and prosociality/cooperation: awe experiences increase agreeableness,
and a greater level of agreeableness increases prosociality and cooperation.
Our study contributes to the current literature in three ways. Firstly, by adding
different dimensions into the social function of awe, our results strengthen the the-
oretical understanding of awe. Using the natural environment and the public goods
game as tools confirmed that exposure to awe experiences leads to better coopera-
tion. The results of this study add to the well-established small self hypothesis of
Piff et al. (2015), by establishing an indirect relationship between awe and prosocial-
ity/cooperation through the personality trait of agreeableness. The theoretical link
between awe and prosocial behaviour/cooperation is further bolstered by showing
that exposure to awe experiences lead to an increase in agreeableness, which in turn
leads to higher prosociality and cooperation.
Secondly, by using a setting in the natural environment to induce awe, our study
contributes to the methodology of awe studies. This can overcome the challenge of
stimulating the awe experience in a confined experimental environment. Moreover,
the sufficiency and pureness of awe elicited in an experimental setting has been lim-
ited, although methodologies with highly controlled stimuli such as recalling a past
experience and visual imagery (eg. Piff et al., 2015; Prade & Saroglou, 2015) were
able to demonstrate the relationship between awe and prosocial behaviour. Utilising
panoramic views in a natural setting is worth considering for future research as a
natural stimulus, which more closely approximate a real life awe experience.
Lastly, this study of awe and the change in personality traits contributes to both
strands of the literature, proposing a connection between the two. Previous research
on the emotion of awe has not looked into any possible impacts awe experiences have
on stability in the measurement of personality traits. On the other hand, existing
literature show the change in personality traits over years, or periods in life, but few
have considered the change after a shock event, in a short period of time (within a
single day). Our study showed that in the event of an experience that forces adjust-
ment of the mental schema, it is possible for the measurement of personality traits
4
to be unstable. Future studies might consider how experiences affect the stability in
the measurement of personality traits over short periods of time.
5
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Before investigating further into the behavioural implications of awe, it is important
to understand various underlying concepts. This chapter will provide a summary of
the literature surrounding the topics of awe, transcendence and emotions. We will
also provide literature background to Key Research Questions 1, 2 & 3, including
cooperative behaviour, the public goods game, distributional preferences and the
stability of the five factor model of personality traits.
2.1 Introduction to cooperative behaviour and shared
intentionality
Humans are fundamentally isolated. We are born alone and will die alone (Gergen,
2009). However, we live in groups, and rely on groups. Homo sapiens are an unusually
cooperative species - we are all social and at least minimally cooperative (Sussman
& Cloninger, 2011). In fact, cooperative and altruistic behaviours are the glue that
underpins the ability for primates and humans to live in groups. There are competing
explanations of the cooperative behaviour of human beings. One explanation argues
for group selection, where the groups that cooperate outperform selfish groups. An-
other position is Tomasello’s theory of shared intentionality. Shared intentionality
refers to the collaborative interactions of sharing psychological states with one an-
other (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). It could be a shared goal or a shared action.
Tomasello’s perspective is based on the assumption that young, human infants’ abil-
ity to share interest and attention are much better than that of our nearest primate
relatives, chimpanzees. For example, humans are able to communicate in a unique
way, based on some shared common ground (attentional frame). Also, humans’ in-
6
tentions are different to those of chimpanzees. Chimpanzees engage in cooperative
communication as an individualistic means of manipulating others, while for humans
we share experience or even helpful information. In addition, humans may collabo-
rate just for the sake of collaborating, where chimpanzees do not. Chimpanzees are
much more individualistic, even in learning. Humans would engage in demonstrat-
ing and imitative learning, in other words, copying others actions. Humans seem to
have the ability to see the collaborative structure of this interactive learning. These
different examples of sharing psychological states is what Tomasello argued to be the
foundation of human interactions, including social behaviours.
2.2 Prosocial behaviour and Cooperation
The term prosocial behaviour broadly refers to behaviours that benefit others. Coop-
eration refers to the action of two or more individuals helping one another to reach the
same end, but at a cost to the individual (Hinde & Groebel, 1991). Both prosociality
and cooperation belong to the general category of positive social behaviour, and they
both increase others’ positive outcomes (Derlega & Grzelak, 1982). However, the na-
ture of interdependence, and the underlying motivations are two key distinguishing
factors . The like nature generally defines prosocial behaviour by its unilateral depen-
dence in contrast to the mutual dependence of cooperation . However, Schwartz and
Howard (1982) argue that mutual dependence is central to both, and that the differ-
ence is instead in the nature of the jointly determined costs and benefits. Unlike the
general view of prosocial behaviour that the costs are borne by the helper and the ben-
efits are gained by the receiver, Schwartz and Howard’s (1982) model proposes that
both parties gain rewards and incur costs from their decisions. The helper incurs ma-
terial or social costs, but potentially gains psychological, social or material rewards.
The receiver gains material rewards, but potentially incurs social or psychological
costs. In the case of prosocial behaviour where the costs and benefits of both parties
are dependent on the other parties’ decisions, this mutual dependency is similar to
cooperative behaviour. Cooperative behaviour implies that a person’s decision will
affect others, and others decision will affect that person. Whether or not the interests
of the person and other parties are correspondent (or aligned), cooperation simply
means acting in a way that maximises both the person and the other parties’ interests.
Rewards, on the other hand, play an important role in any interdependence situation.
7
Theories generally classify the intention of a social act into exocentric (external re-
wards) motivation or endocentric motivation (no external reinforcement) (Karylowski,
1982). Yet, largely influenced by game theory, most theories of cooperation, have
focused on the external, situational structure instead of the internal, motivational
structure (Derlega & Grzelak, 1982). Psychologists such as Kelley and Thibaut (1978)
reinterpreted interdependence, showing that it is not formed by the external structure
but the individual perception of the situation, the subjective evaluation of outcome.
If in fact the internal structure, is what constitutes interdependence, then the psy-
chological analysis of cooperation and prosocial behaviour are identical. Although
the prosocial behaviour and cooperation cannot be integrated directly, Derlega and
Grzelak (1982) argue there is a huge overlap in the research domain of the two, and
difference in theoretical approach will gradually converge.
2.3 Relational consciousness
Hay and Nye (1998) introduced the idea of relational consciousness in their book The
Spirit of the Child. The term relational consciousness broadly refers to the awareness
of our interrelationship with other beings, including people, the environment and also
God for religious believers. It is made popular by Hay and Nye’s study into the
spirituality of children in the 1990s. There are three central themes: Awareness of
here and now, Awareness of value, and Awareness of mystery. It is an experiential
awareness, and a feeling of the sensitivity of the connection between all creatures, not
merely from an intellectual level. Contrasting to Western individualism, relational
consciousness stresses that a person’s primary identity is from their relationship with
other beings. There are four key relationships: Self and God, Self and people, Self
and World, and Self and Self. In particular, self and people is about interpersonal
relations, and self and world is about the sensitivity of beauty and nature. ‘Worldly’
possessions are relatively less important under this concept, and supernatural, spir-
itual or nonmaterial realities are all important as a part of our knowledge. In fact,
different people have different contexts for their relational consciousness (Hay & Nye,
1998). To many, relating to the natural world is a common context - they experience
wonder and meaning in connecting with the world. Hay (2000) believes that rela-
tional consciousness is a biologically inbuilt aspect which underlies every altruistic
behaviour. When the psychological distance between the self and reality is shortened
or disappears, they realise they are an inextricable part of the manifold reality (Hay
& Nye, 1998). This sense of shared humanity, a perception of self at one with all
8
mankind, can help explain prosocial behaviour and cooperation, as relational con-
sciousness by definition is always concerned with self-transcendence.
2.4 The emotion of awe
Early examples of awe can be found in sociology, philosophy, and religious texts. Ref-
erences of awe can be found in many religious texts, for example in the Bible:
“When Jacob awoke from his sleep, he thought, Surely the Lord is in this place, and
I was not aware of it. He was afraid and said, How awesome is this place! This is
none other than the house of God; this is the gate of heaven. (Genesis 18:16-17, New
International Version)
In sociology, Emile Durkheim (1972) brought into attention the impact of power-
ful emotions on political, social and religious movements. He proposed two classes of
emotions by their social effects, the first, such as love, fear and respect binds individ-
uals together. The second is collective sentiments that possess transformative powers
and bind individuals with social entities, closely resembling awe:
“Following the collectivity, the individual forgets himself for the common end and
his conduct is directed by reference to a standard outside himself.” (Durkheim, 1972,
p.228, as cited in Keltner & Haidt, 2003).
An important record of awe in philosophy is Irish philosopher Edmund Burke’s defini-
tion of the sublime, an aesthetic experience similar to awe. In his book A Philosophical
Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, Burke proposed
two key properties to the sublime - power and obscurity. He also suggested thun-
derstorm, art, symphony as stimuli, bringing a wider perspective into the aesthetic
emotion.
More recent studies on awe have emerged around 2000, and the study by Keltner
and Haidt (2003) well defines it. Keltner and Haidt (2003) describes awe as the
emotion a lower status individual feels towards a more powerful other. They stated
that perceptual vastness and a need for accommodation are two central themes and
conditions for a state of awe. Perceptual vastness refers to the encounter of some-
thing tremendous in size, number, scope, complexity, power, ability, social bearing, or
9
greater than one’s frame of reference in general (Rudd, Vohs & Aaker, 2012; Stellar et
al., 2018). Without perception of vastness the emotion becomes admiration instead
of awe. Accommodation, on the other hand, is the Piagetian process of adjusting
mental structures which could not otherwise assimilate this new experience (Keltner
& Haidt, 2003). Awe challenges our mental structures as we fail to make sense of the
experience. Stellar et al. (2018, p.260) defines the need for accommodation as the
process by which a person revises his or her mental schemas or creates a new one to
account for the deviation between the stimuli and one’s current understanding of the
world. If one fails to understand and satisfy the need for accommodation, the awe
experience can be terrifying. Contrarily, the awe experience can be enlightening if one
is successful in satisfying the need for accommodation. The two are interconnected to
expand one’s usual frame of reference, stimulating new mental models (Rudd et al.,
2012; Shiota et al., 2007). Lazarus (1991) describes awe as ambiguous as it can either
be positive or negative. An awe experience floods consciousness rapidly but it can be
‘switched off’ by diverting attention (Konecni, 2005). Awe usually also includes the
factor of unexpectedness, or surprise (Colantonio & Bonawitz, 2018). Frijda (1986)
believes this sense of wonder is a passive, receptive mode of attention in the presence
of something unexpected. It involves a sense of suspense, interesting, and pleasing
degree of risk (Konecni, 2005). However, the individual’s existential security cannot
be threatened. In that moment one is overwhelmed but is still safe.
Awe has certain distinctive features in different aspects. People in experience of
awe involves pulling their lips apart, dropping their jaws and stretching their mouths
(Campos et al., 2013). Shiota, Campos and Keltner (2006) also found facial displays
of slightly raised inner eyebrows, upper lid raise, and raised head and eyes. Physically,
goosebumps are commonly observed (Maruskin, Thrash & Elliot, 2012). Vocal dis-
plays is another aspect to distinguish awe from other emotions, where Simon-Thomas
et al. (2009) discovered vocal bursts unique to awe.
Experiences of awe also brings various psychological and epistemological consequences
or benefits. Griskevicius, Shiota and Neufeld’s (2010) study revealed that awe in-
creases people’s ability to systematically process information-rich stimuli (Zhang &
Keltner, 2016). Berger and Milkman (2010) tested and proved the virality of videos
involving high arousal of awe based on the assumption that awe stimulates curiosity
and interest. Saroglou, Buxant and Tilquin (2008) and Valdesolo and Graham (2014)
10
found that participants primed with awe were more likely to endorse spiritual and su-
pernatural beliefs. In addition, they show greater spiritual eagerness, shown by their
desire to visit a spiritual destination rather than a hedonistic one (Van Cappellen
& Saroglou, 2012). More recently, Chirico et al. (2018) showed that awe enhances
creative thinking. Awe expands mental frames, and enables people to find new con-
nections among objects and ideas.
In addition to being a stimulus-oriented emotion, from another perspective, awe is a
collective emotion which brings about certain cognitive and behavioural tendencies
and transformation of the self, which binds the individual with broader social enti-
ties and engage in collective action (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Piff et al., 2015). In
the state of awe, individuals develop stronger interest and connectedness with the
world around them. In other words, greater relational consciousness, and less focus
on their self-interest and personal goals (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Zhang & Keltner,
2016; Stellar et al., 2018; Colantonio & Bonawitz, 2018). In that moment, people
forget momentarily their individual identity, the thoughts that were occupying their
mind, where they are and what they are doing afterwards (Stegemoeller, Quinn &
Graupmann, 2016). The emotion of awe draws attention away from one-self unlike
many other emotions, and shifts attention towards the needs and concerns of others
(Piff et al., 2015; Stellar et al., 2017). Awe could lead to lower ego defensiveness
and even a shift in one’s self-concept (Stellar et al., 2018). Although awe stimuli
like natural wonders, panoramic views, music and art are asocial in nature, expe-
rience of awe also brings along the drive to treat others better. It could then lead
to prosocial outcomes, such as increased sharing, assistance and generosity (Shiota
et al., 2007; Piff et al., 2015; Stellar et al., 2018). Piff et al.’s (2015) study found
that awe arouses prosocial tendencies. Individuals who experienced awe were found
to be more generous in a dictator game, and also exhibit greater ethicality and de-
creased entitlement. Prade and Saroglou (2015) found the induction of awe leads to
increased helpfulness and generosity in daily settings. In Stellar et al.’s (2018) study,
they found that the diminished self led by awe brings greater humility. The trait of
honesty-humility can then lead to higher cooperation in economic games in Hilbig and
Zettler’s (2009) study. Rudd et al. (2012) found that awe expands time perception
and reduces impatience. People are also more willing to volunteer their time help-
ing others and they even get a momentary boost in life satisfaction. Following the
proven linkage between awe and prosociality, Yang et al. (2015) hypothesized that the
sense of small self can reduce aggression. Although the casual relationship through
11
small self to reduced aggression has not been proven, Yang et al. (2015) nonetheless
had shown that awe has a mediating effect on aggression. Another study by Koh,
Tong and Yuen (2019) found that awe has a buffering effect towards possession loss.
The recent research on awe raises the question of how to elicit awe, and eliciting an
adequate amount of awe in experimental settings. Keltner and Haidt (2003) listed
five criteria that could lead to awe: beauty, ability, virtue, threat and supernatural
ability. Stellar et al. (2017) believes the largest category of awe elicitor to be other
focused appraisals, which relates to the physical and psychological actions of others.
Shiota et al. (2007) find that feeling awe towards another person enhances group co-
hesion through devotion and commitment to the leader and group, and also through
creating feelings of interconnectedness and common humanity. The second largest
category following would be nature. Shiota et al. (2007) believe that nature scenes
brings a feeling of smallness to an individual. In nature, people feel connected to the
surrounding world, forget their day-to-day concerns and they would wish to prolong
and memorise the experience.
The first approach to inducing awe in laboratory settings is personal narratives. Sh-
iota et al. (2007), Rudd et al. (2012) and Piff et al. (2015) all employed a priming
method to elicit awe by asking participants to recall a personal experience of awe,
either verbal or written. However, the biggest problem with priming is the emotional
intensity when recalled compared to the original experience, especially with awe being
a complex emotional state. The second approach is using visual imagery of images
and videos: for example, the use of videos, images of waterfalls, animals and even
astronauts in space in Rudd et al. (2012), Van Cappellen and Saroglou (2012) and
Piff et al.’s (2015) studies. The clear advantage of this method is the standardised
and highly controlled stimuli, however, the intensity of the emotions induced is still
under question. The third method is to situate participants in natural awe-inspiring
environments. Examples include Shiota et al. (2007) asking participants to look at a
full-sized replica of a Tyrannosaurus rex skeleton for a minute, and Piff et al. (2015)
asking participants to stare at a grove of tall eucalyptus trees for a minute. This
method avoids the above limitations, but it is necessary to control for any possible
factors of influence. A more recent step forward is Chirico et al.’s (2017) use of im-
mersive videos using Virtual Reality (VR). The use of VR brings greater intensity,
further reaching the expectancy violating nature of awe. It also allows experimenters
to test different subcomponents of awe. However, this methodology is still in its pre-
liminary phase and needs further empirical testing. Overall, the ongoing challenge of
12
eliciting awe in experimental settings is finding a stimulus that generates a sufficient
intensity and a pure measure of awe.
2.4.1 Self-transcendence
A concept closely related to awe is self-transcendence (also known as spiritual tran-
scendence). Not only are these two emotions’ definition and theoretical construct
similar, their research findings are also similar (Landis et al., 2009). Piedmont (1999,
p.4) describes spiritual transcendence as “The capacity of individuals to stand outside
their immediate sense of time and place to view life from a larger, more objective per-
spective”. Transcendence is also a fundamental capacity of a person, and this innate
motivation drives and directs our decision-making. According to Deikman (1982,
p.21), transcendent experiences takes one momentarily into a mystical consciousness
which “involves a different perspective on time, causality, and self - a different real-
ity, considered from our ordinary point of view”. Similar to awe, self-transcendence
involves a subjective experience of self loss and dissolution of the body sense (Yaden
et al., 2017). It involves two subcomponents, annihilation and relation. During self-
transcendent experiences (STEs), the sense of self could disappear. It leads to a
reduction of self-centredness and selfish motivations. The experience may also bring
an increase in the sense of interpersonal connectedness. From the transcendent per-
spective, an individual discovers fundamental unity between beings, with a feeling
of greater bonding with others (Piedmont, 1999). They realise the synchronicity to
life, leading to a sense of commitment to others. According to Yaden et al. (2017),
the enhanced sense of social connection occurs via two major mechanisms. Firstly,
neuropeptides such as oxytocin and vasopressin, together with alterations to parasym-
pathetic activity and vagal tone, increase the level of self-other overlap. Second, STEs
may increase social-cognitive processes. Interpersonal connection is potentially en-
hanced through perceived similarity, leading to increased prosociality and possibly
societal well-being. Transcendent experiences can also lead to enhanced psychologi-
cal functioning and integration and manifestation of the world (Waldron, 1999).
Past studies have looked at self-transcendence from different perspectives. The two
major definitions of self-transcendence are by Reed (1991, 2003) and Tornstam (1996,
1997). According to Reed (2003), self-transcendence is the “ability to expand self-
boundaries intrapersonally (toward greater awareness of one’s philosophy, values, and
dreams), interpersonally (to relate to others and one’s environment), temporally (to
13
integrate one’s past and future in a way that has meaning for the present), and
transpersonally (to connect with dimensions beyond the typically discernible world)”
(2003, p. 147). Although Reed’s definition has been evolving since 1991, his main
idea is that self-transcendence influences a person’s relationship with self, others,
the outside environment and unseen cosmic forces. Meanwhile, Tornstam’s (1996)
perspective draws similarities with Reed’s theory. He describes self-transcendence
as “a shift in metaperspective, from a midlife materialistic and rational vision to a
more cosmic and transcendent one, accompanied by an increase in life satisfaction”
(p.38). Earlier studies such as Frankl (1966), who referred to self-transcendence as a
prioritization of other people over self-focus, and Erikson (1982), who described self-
transcendence as a non-egocentric understanding of the world, have laid the forefront
foundation of the study of self-transcendence. Considering behaviour philosophies
such as patriotism, altruism and secular humanism, all of them can be viewed as al-
ternative expressions, or outlets of our innate motivation of transcendence (Piedmont,
1999). They all require individuals to sacrifice their personal benefits for the greater
benefit of the society. The reason behind these appeals unquestionably relates to our
intrinsic motivation of searching for deeper sense of meaning and motivation.
In fact, Maslow (1969) over the years has recognised self-transcendence as a part
of Maslow’s hierarchy, beyond self-actualisation. He defines it as “seeks to further a
cause beyond the self and to experience a communion beyond the boundaries of the
self through peak experience”, and he calls this special cognitive activity as “being-
cognition”. He argues that a developed and fortunate human being seeks to go
beyond self-actualization and looks for benefits beyond the pure personal. Through
mystical/transpersonal experiences, or engaging in services to others, a person iden-
tifies with something greater than the self. Differences between self-actualization and
self-transcendence, as Maslow explains, is that the former is self-oriented and the
latter is others-oriented. Self-actualization is the working to actualize one’s potential,
whereas self-transcendence puts aside personal needs to help others, or with reasons
outside the personal self. Decades later, Maslow (1993) found that not only self-
actualizing, fortunate beings can transcend, but in fact people who has not reached
the self-actualization stage can also transcend. He said that many individuals have
transcendent experiences regardless of their position on the hierarchy: self-actualizing
individuals may or may not have peak/transcendent experiences, and individuals who
have peak/transcendent experiences may or may not be self-actualizing.
14
This humanistic and transpersonal approach to psychology was developed from the
1960s, and Abraham Maslow was one of the pioneers in this field. He addressed the
importance of peak experiences in various papers and lectures in the 1950s and 1960s,
which include for example mystical experiences, aesthetic experiences, and emotional
experiences involving nature. Over the years, spiritual transcendence and the field
of transpersonal psychology have been largely ignored by conventional psychology
(Frankl, 1966). Transcendence, however, is an integral part of our ability to cre-
ate meaning which has an important impact on societal well-being. Pargament and
Mahoney (2005) found that spirituality affects mental health, drug and alcohol use,
marital functioning, parenting, stress, as well as morbidity and mortality. Comparing
to other strivings, spiritual strivings were found to be more highly correlated with
measures of well-being in Emmons et al.’s (1998) study. Psychologists found that
those with a positive perception of an external agency report higher levels of personal
well-being (Kirkpatrick & Shaver, 1992; Pargament, Smith, Koenig & Perez, 1998;
Pollner, 1989). In comparison, those with a more negative or punitive views of the
external agency report greater psychological distress (Pargament et al., 1998; Schwab
& Petersen, 1990). Spirituality is also a cultural fact. According to Pargament (1999,
p.12), spirituality is defined as a search for the sacred. It is centred around perception
of the sacred, and covers different approaches of spiritual expressions. The search for
the sacred is a common desire across different countries, cultures and ethnic back-
grounds. It is a highly individualized process of discovering, conserving, and rediscov-
ering. It should be noted that this process is not without risks, and some fail in the
search. Yet, for many people, the search gives them better understandings of them-
selves, better relationships with others, and a greater feeling of interconnectedness.
It is also important to note the differences between transcendence and religiousness.
Piedmont (1999) believes that the scope of transcendence is larger than religiousness,
including a broader domain of motivations. Some fundamental elements of transcen-
dence includes connectedness, universality, prayer fulfillment, tolerance of paradoxes,
non-judgementality, existentiality and gratefulness. For example, universality is re-
ferred to as the unitive nature of life, and prayer fulfillment is the feelings of joy and
contentment that result from personal encounters with a transcendent reality (p.5).
In addition, Piedmont states that self-transcendence is a personal journey searching
for larger sacredness, where religiousness has a more social approach.
The question then extends to when this journey of searching for the sacred starts.
In many different studies including Coles (1990), children are found to be spiritual
15
pilgrims. Although Goldman (1964), for example, questioned children’s ability to
comprehend religious abstractions, social scientists have found many cases of children
seeking the divine (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005). There are different explanations
for children spirituality. Some suggests that it is innate and genetic - children are
born with this desire, or the perception of external agency is embedded in a child’s in-
trapsychic capacity (Bouchard et al., 1990; Rizzuto, 1979). Some argue that spiritual
desire comes from challenges in life where human limitations are exposed (Pargament,
1997). Others such as Kaufman (1981) highlight the role social context plays as the
child grows. It is important to note that the search for the sacred is an unending
process in a person’s life (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005).
An important issue regarding transcendence is the lack of a comprehensive, orga-
nized paradigm, resulting in a conceptual disarray in the field. Apart from Maslow’s
inclusion of transcendence into his hierarchy of needs, Piedmont (1999) proposed that
spiritual transcendence is the sixth factor of human personality, extending from the
Five Factor Model (FFM). Although there are parallels between transcendence and
the personality domains of extraversion, openness and agreeableness, the theoretical
construct of transcendence also contains solitude, simplicity and structure. In short,
the above domains embody some qualities of transcendence. There lacks a separate
measure of transcendence, and thus supports the case for transcendence to be an
individual domain of personality. Piedmont points out that having transcendence as
the sixth personality factor helps us understand why people seek transcendence, and
how we interact with ourselves and other beings.
2.4.2 Individual differences in experiences of awe
Known as an aesthetic emotion, the emotion of awe is closely connected to amaze-
ment, elevation, fascination, and wonder (Silvia, Fayn, Nusbaum & Beaty, 2015).
However, different individuals have different tendencies in enjoying these aesthetic
experiences. One possible explanation for the heterogeneity in awe-proneness is the
difference in personality traits, and psychologists such as Silvia et al. (2015) inves-
tigated into whether individual differences in the Five Factor Model of Personality
(FFM) accounts for any difference in awe-proneness. One factor in particular, Open-
ness to Experience, draws similarities with the emotion of awe in construct. Added
to the FFM by Costa and McCrae (1980), it is the least understood and most dis-
puted personality factor of the five, involving scholarly debates over the past decades
16
regarding its construct. Commonly deemed as an intrapsychic dimension, McCrae
(1994) proposed that Openness to Experience has a broad construct that includes re-
ceptivity to many varieties of experience and a permeable structure of consciousness.
Openness also implies welcoming of new input, which could be sensory, cognitive or
affective. Open people are often curious, independent thinkers who are sensitive to
aesthetics (McCrae & Costa, 1997). In fact, Silvia et al. (2015) proposed Openness
to Experience as an aesthetic trait. Instead of being passive receivers of new experi-
ences, they are characterised by an active pursuit of novelty, which Canaday (1980,
p.5) describes as a quest to “clarify, intensify, or otherwise enlarge our experience”.
Open individuals are also likely to be reflective and thoughtful about the experience.
Unsurprisingly, Silvia et al. (2015) found that Openness to Experience has the
strongest positive correlation with awe-proneness. People who score high in this fac-
tor experience a wider range and complexity of emotions, feelings and thoughts, and
tend to be more creative (McCrae & Costa, 1997; Terracciano, McCrae, Hagemann
& Costa, 2003; Kaufman, 2013; Nettle, 2009; Swami & Furnham, 2014). Those who
are lower in this factor experience a narrower, simpler range of emotions, and tend to
be more factual, practical and down-to-earth. Other possible hallmarks of openness
include tolerance of ambiguity, emotional ambivalence, and perceptual synathesia,
potentially leading to a greater capacity for absorption. McCrae & Costa (1997)
also finds that open individuals have more artistic and investigative interests, often
shown by their appreciation of arts, and they tend to make more mid-career shifts.
It therefore implies that those who are higher on the particular factor of openness to
experience are more likely to experience aesthetic emotions, including awe.
The other important factor affecting awe-proneness is religion. Awe has an essen-
tial role in religious and spiritual experiences, and many early records of awe were
found in religious texts, such as the Mahabarata in the Hindu Itihasa and the Bible,
where the characters experience an encounter with a greater power (Keltner & Haidt,
2003). This strong, overwhelming sensory experience not only lead to confusion and
amazement, it also led to a transformation. Closely related with concepts such as
spirituality and transcendence, it is reasonable to assume some level of relationship
between religion and awe. For example, Van Cappellen and Saroglou (2011) found
that induction of awe endorses spirituality for religious individuals, and Valdesolo
and Graham’s (2014) study which found that induction of awe endorses supernatural
17
control and belief in God. Zhang and Keltner (2016) suggests that awe activate reli-
gious feelings, spiritual desire, and a belief in supernatural forms. However, contrary
to the stereotypical belief that non-religious individuals are less awe-prone, recent
studies such as Caldwell-Harris et al. (2011) suggest that atheists also seek and value
experiences of awe and wonder. Findings by Caldwell-Harris et al. (2011) shows
that although the notion of a transcendent entity is rejected by most atheists, they
embrace the use of spirituality in psychological and experiential contexts. Overall,
there is little consensus in the literature on whether religious individuals are more
prone to experiencing awe.
2.5 Somatic Marker Hypothesis
Most neo-classical economic theories largely neglects the role emotions play on decision-
making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). Decision-making was traditionally viewed as a
cognitive process, one of choosing the best actions to maximise utility through eval-
uating the consequences of each action (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). The economic
assumption of rational maximisation expects individuals, knowing the possible out-
comes, to make rational decisions that are logical and consistent. In the 1960s,
critiques of the traditional decision theory focused on the people’s cognitive errors
and the heuristics that are involved. However, in recent decades, research began
to question whether emotional processes, aside from cognitive processes, guide deci-
sion making. A famous example from neuroscience and psychology is the Somatic
Marker Hypothesis (SMH), introduced by Damasio (1994) in his book Descartes’ Er-
ror (Bechara et al., 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000). Damasio proposed that decision-making
processes are affected by marker signals, brought by emotions and feelings, providing
a neuroanatomical and cognitive framework of emotions’ impact on decision-making
(Bechara, 2004). According to Damasio (1994), somatic markers are instances of
feelings generated from secondary emotions, and are bodily states that correspond
to emotional reactions to different possible courses of action. On a conscious level,
somatic states would mark outcomes of responses as positive or negative, where sub-
sequent decisions of avoidance or pursuit are based on. Through learning, emotions
and feelings are connected to predict future outcomes of certain options or scenarios.
These somatic states are generated by the neural machinery, which we were born
with, in response to stimuli. During education and socialisation, our brains connects
certain stimuli with certain somatic states, creating somatic markers that we use for
rational decision-making based on secondary emotions. This hypothesis also argues
18
for the importance and potential benefits of emotions in decision-making.
The hypothesis is originated from Bechara et al.’s (1994) study into patients with
a frontal lobe damage, especially to the Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC).
The original experiment compares the skin conductance responses (SCRs, which in
this case is used as an index of the activation of somatic states) between patients
with frontal damage and normal individuals, in a setting where they view a set of
projected slides (Damasio, 1994). Most of the slides are banal, but every once in a
while there would be a disturbing slide. They found that normal individuals gener-
ated SCRs when the disturbing pictures are shown, but not the bland pictures. On
the other hand, patients with a frontal lobe damage did not generate any SCRs to any
pictures throughout the entire set of pictures. Although those patients are attentive
in the entire experiment and possess factual knowledge, Damasio (1994) believes and
suggests that they failed to produce a somatic state, and that is the reason they failed
to feel the disturbance from the pictures.
Extending from this experiment, Damasio and colleagues sought to discover whether
and how this lack of somatic markers affect decision making, through the Iowa Gam-
bling Task (IGT). The task requires participants to choose between four decks of
cards. Each deck contains cards of reward or punishment. Some decks will contain
more reward than punishment, hence the good deck’, and some decks will contain
more punishment than reward, hence the bad deck’. The majority of normal, healthy
participants were able to choose the good decks’ over the course of the game, however,
participants with a damaged VM were found to be incapable of avoiding the decks
that lead to serious monetary losses - they tend to cling to the bad decks’. In other
words, they are unable to learn from their mistakes, bringing negative consequences
(Bechara et al., 1994). Their behaviour in the IGT resembles their behaviour in real-
life. Although these patients have normal intellect and normal results in standard
neuropsychological tests, damage in their VMPC impairs their decision-making on
both personal and social level. In other words, abnormalities in their emotions and
feelings, in particular their failure in registering losses, damage their decision-making
abilities.
Maia and McClelland (2004) carried out a replication of Bechara et al.’s (1994) study,
suggesting different interpretations and raising several questions regarding the SMH.
Firstly, Maia and McClelland suggest that VMPC patients’ performance in the IGT
19
could be due to an inability to reverse a learned contingency (Bechara et al., 2005).
They found that a vast majority of participants who behaved advantageously also
possess conscious, reportable knowledge of the advantageous strategy, which they ar-
gue provides sufficient basis for their decisions. Therefore Maia and McClelland do
not believe Bechara et al.’s (1994) claim of nonconscious biases that guide behaviour
before conscious knowledge does. Maia and McClelland also questioned Bechara et
al.’s (1994) claim that anticipatory SCRs reflect somatic markers. They believe that
the higher SCRs correspond to the higher variance in the bad decks, but not neces-
sarily to the negative outcomes, or negative somatic states. Bechara et al. (2005)
disagree with the above arguments, stating that the important notion of the SMH
is to address the possible physiological processes between knowledge and behaviour,
and to highlight the role of emotions, whereas consciousness is relatively less impor-
tant. Although the SMH is frequently under question, by bridging the mechanisms
of conditioning and cognition, the pioneering hypothesis still provides great insights
into the understanding of decision-making and reasoning processes.
2.6 Stability of the Big Five Personality Traits
In recent years, personality has attracted more attention in economics. Economists
view it as a type of non-cognitive skill, and it affects the economic decisions individ-
uals make and therefore the outcomes (Cobb-Clark & Schurer, 2012). Past literature
has mixed debates regarding the stability of personality traits, and whether person-
ality development is mainly driven by exogenous or endogenous factors. The original
Five Factor Theory by McCrae and Costa (1999) suggests that personality traits are
essentially temperaments - they remain stable in adulthood and are unaffected by the
external environment. The Five Factor theory states that traits are shaped by bio-
logical (intrinsic) maturation- they develop through childhood, mature at adulthood,
and are thenceforth stable. It implies that genetic factors are the major determinants
of personality development, not external environments or experiences (eg. McCrae
and Costa, 1999). Costa et al. (2000) argues that changes in personality traits are
subtle, whether it is led by an intrinsic process or various environmental factors. Per-
sonality remains largely resilient even in the case of a life event, regardless positive or
negative. Most empirical studies into the economic returns of personality also make
the same assumption.
However, in the case that personality traits are not in fact stable over time, results
20
can be biased. Many longitudinal studies showed that personality traits change in
mean-levels throughout the entire lifetime (eg. Haan, Millsap, & Hartka, 1986; Hel-
son & Moane, 1987; Helson & Wink, 1992; Roberts, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2001; Robins,
Fraley, Roberts, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Contrary to McCrae and Costa’s (1999) the-
ory, some studies found that the change in personality traits also occurs in middle
and old age (Helson, Jones, & Kwan, 2002; Helson & Kwan, 2000; Srivastava, John,
Gosling, & Potter, 2003).
There are models that look at the role of other factors in the development of person-
ality traits. For example, Zelli and Dodge’s (1999) model looks at the role of envi-
ronment and proposes that personality consistency comes within social roles, through
a person’s interactions with the social environment. A similar set of developmental
model such as Levinson’s (1978) highlights the interplays between the traits and con-
texts of life. The model emphasises the building of life structures, which represents
the relationship between self-driven goals and societal and age-graded roles. Another
model by Baltes (1997) and Baltes, Lindenberger and Staudinger (1998) focuses on
adaptation. Taking a life span development approach, it proposes that we humans
are open systems, and we demonstrate both continuity and change in personality
across the whole of our lifetime. More recently, Roberts and Caspi (2003) introduced
a similar alternative to Baltes’s (1997) approach, stressing the importance of identity
processes in explaining the continuity and change in personality. This theory states
that as we get older, we become more capable at interacting with the environment
in ways that lead to consistency of personality. To put differently, development of a
person’s identity is clearer and strengthened with age, thus explaining the increasing
continuity of traits. In addition, commitments to social institutions, such as work and
family, which provide a sense of identity, facilitates psychological maturity. Recent
studies such as Bleidorn et al. (2009) and Hopwood et al. (2011) have found both
genetic and environmental influences on the stability of personality. According to
Roberts, Wood and Caspi (2008), people have different preferences and perceptions
regarding their environments. Individuals also change environments to suit their per-
sonalities. This model of person-environment transactions focuses on the impacts of
social roles, normative changes and major life events (Specht, Egloff & Schmukle,
2011).
The concept of personality change is multifaceted. There are two main measures
of change in the literature, mean-level change and rank-order changes. Mean-level
21
stability is also known as normative or absolute change, representing shifts of groups
of people to higher or lower values over time on a specific trait (Specht et al., 2011).
Rank-order stability, also known as differential stability, is the degree of consistency
in the rank ordering of individuals over time on a given trait (Hopwood et al., 2011).
To put differently, it is whether groups of people maintain their relative placement
over time. There are studies that look for the developmental course of personality
perceptions, for example, Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2011) showed that personality is
relatively stable across a 4 year period for working-age adults. Numerous studies have
looked into whether major life events and experiences change personality traits, but
the results are mixed. For example, Bleidorn, Hopwood and Lucas (2018) and Specht
et al. (2011) support the claim, but Costa et al. (2000) and Sutin et al. (2010) rejects
it.
2.7 Factors affecting Public Goods Game Contri-
bution
The public goods game is a widely used experiment exploring cooperation in eco-
nomics. There are many other factors affecting the level of cooperation in this social
dilemma game, and it is important to consider these factors when designing the exper-
iment and carrying out analyses. The first group of factors is individual differences.
Differences in social motives exist, where people can be categorised into types of indi-
vidualistic, competitive and cooperative (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). Cooperators
often consider from the viewpoint of the group, while individualists think more ego-
centrically, from the standpoint of their individual rationality. Differences in social
motives not only associate with different choice behaviour, but also relate to different
perceptions of rationality and intelligence (Kopelman, Weber & Messick, 2002). Cul-
ture also plays a part in this context, where people from individualistic cultures tend
to be more task-oriented, fixated on their personal goals, whereas people from collec-
tivist cultures tend to cooperate with those in their in-group, but compete with those
perceived as their out-group. However, the influence of culture on social motives is
complex, for example, Garling’s (1999) study found that not all cultural values have
a direct relationship with social motives. For gender, although its impact in social
dilemma games has not been widely studied, it could impact cooperation as male and
female differ in understanding, reacting and responding to actions, resources, group
interactions and discussions (Stockard et al., 1988; Cadsby & Maynes, 1998; Sell et
22
al., 1993). Van Lange et al. (1997) found a weak but reliable relationship, where the
percentage of prosocials is higher in female than in male, and the percentage of pros-
elves is higher among males. Yet, the findings by different public goods games studies
showed mixed results: the effect of gender on cooperation is likely to be unpredictable
and weak. The impact of religiosity and ethnicity on public goods experiments have
also been studied. Religion has long been believed by social scientists as a key factor
of determining behaviour and outcomes. However, studies such as Anderson, Mellor
and Milyo (2010) found little correlation between religious affiliation and contribu-
tions in the public goods game. Ethnic diversity, on the other hand, has a negative
impact on public goods provision, and this finding is largely accepted in the literature
(Banerjee et al., 2005). However, the overall empirical results on social heterogene-
ity’s impact on cooperation is mixed. Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson’s (2002) study
and Cardenas’s (2000) field study finds that economic heterogeneity inhibits cooper-
ation, but a general consensus in the field is still lacking.
The second group of factors is the decision structure of the task. Literature shows
that the monetary payoff structure of the task, including rewards and punishments,
affects individuals’ decisions. While Gachter and Fehr (1999) took a step forward and
studied the effect of social rewards, they found the effect social approval has on con-
tribution in collective actions to be insignificant, in a situation where the participants
are strangers to one another. However, if group identity is created, forming weak so-
cial ties and reducing social distance, it may act as a “lubricant” for social exchange
and thus reduce free-riding. On the other hand, uncertainty makes cooperation more
difficult in most cases. Young (1994) argues that uncertainty strengthens coalitions,
other studies such as Iida (1993) argues that uncertainty weakens coalitions, while
Burger and Kolstad (2009) found no effect on coalition size. However, most studies
such as Burger and Kolstad (2009) found that uncertainty hinders cooperation, and
in environmental contexts, uncertainty impedes the emergence and sustainment of a
common resource (Agrawal, 2002; McCay, 2002).
The third group of factors is the social structure of the task. Firstly, the finding that
groups with the same individuals, interacting repeatedly, have higher tendencies to
cooperate than groups that are shuffled every round is fairly well-established (Keser &
van Winden, 2000). This ties into the previous conclusion regarding social distances.
Apart from that, power and status, group size and communication are all possible
factors in social dilemma settings. Mannix (1993) argues that power imbalances in
23
groups will cause group members to focus on protecting their self-interests rather
than mutual gains, and even form coalitions. Members of these groups are also likely
to retaliate and behave competitively. In relation to leadership and administration in
commons-related decisions, Wit and Wilke’s (1990) study explored the role of who,
and to whom, were the rewards and punishment presented. For the undergraduate
participants, whether the rewards or punishments were presented by the government
or by their parent companies, they found no differences between the effectiveness of
the two. Whereas for the managers, rewards presented by their parent companies
were effective, and those presented by the government were counterproductive. The
results from this study raise the question regarding the source of rewards and sanc-
tions and their impact on potential decision-makers. In addition, small groups are
usually more cooperative than larger groups. Kerr (1989) offered an explanation that
small groups have higher self-efficacy than larger groups: smaller groups were found
to be higher in self and collective efficacy than larger groups when the provision point
is low. Allison et al. (1992) suggest that small groups often divide resources more
equally. Yet, Isaac et al.’s (1994) findings contradicted this proposition, where Issac
and his colleagues found that groups of 40 and 100 provided the public good more
efficiently than groups of 4 and 10. While this violates the standard game theoretical
model, Ledyard’s (1993) alternative approach serves as another possible explanation,
proposing that individuals obtain satisfaction (a warm glow) from being a part of a
cooperative group. For communication, its positive effects on cooperation are widely
confirmed in the literature. Bohnet (1999) found that not only two-way communica-
tion, but one-way communication is sufficient to enhance cooperation. However, the
underlying reasoning of communication’s effect on cooperation is still under debate.
Both attempts to the answer to that discussion creates group identity and fosters com-
mitments to cooperate were proven insufficient by Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994)
and Bouas and Komorita (1996). The form of communication also makes a difference,
where Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) study on emails versus face-to-face commu-
nication found no differences in simple tasks, but in more complex tasks, face-to-face
communication leads to greater cooperation. It provides implications for researchers
regarding the choice of communication medium in the provision of common resources.
The fourth set of factors is perceptual factors, for example, framing. Kahneman
and Tversky’s (1979) famous Prospect Theory states that the description of the out-
come as a gain or a loss can affect people’s decisions, as people have different risk
attitudes towards gains and losses. Describing the task as a Business Transaction
24
Study instead of social exchange, as found by Batson and Moran (1999), also changes
people’s cooperative behaviour. Van Dijk and Wilke (2000) suggests that even simply
describing the choices as taking, keeping, leaving or giving changes people’s other-
regarding preferences and therefore the decisions they make (Kopelman, Weber &
Messick, 2002).
Some additional factors such as other-regarding behaviour can also play a role in
affecting people’s cooperative behaviour. Reciprocity and social history, for example,
is an important consideration for many individuals (Kopelman, Weber & Messick,
2002). People evaluate others’ behaviour before making their decisions: if they be-
have cooperatively, then so will I.
2.8 Distributional preferences
The neo-classical economics assumption is that agents’ decisions are entirely driven
by selfish motives. However, psychologists and economists have realised that this
assumption does not reflect the reality of micro-level decision-making. In reality,
many agents take into account of other agent’s payoff in their decision-making. Re-
sultantly, researchers proposed models of other-regarding preferences, for example,
unselfish and altruistic behaviour (Becker, 1974; Andreoni & Miller, 2002), where a
decision maker’s utility increases as the payoff of others increases, efficiency loving
and surplus maximising (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004), where the decision maker looks
to maximise the sum of payoffs, inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Bolton &
Ockenfels, 2000), difference aversion (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007)
or egalitarian (Dawes et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008), where fairness motives play a
part, or oppositely equality aversion (Hennig-Schmidt, 2002; Charness & Rabin, 2002;
Fershtman et al., 2012), maximin (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004), Rawlsian (Charness
& Rabin, 2002) or Leontief preferences (Andreoni & Miller, 2002), maximising the
minimal payoff in the group, spiteful (Levine, 1998), competitive (Charness & Rabin,
2002) or status seeking (Duesenberry, 1949), where an agent’s utility decreases as
the payoff of others increases, envious (Bolton, 1991; Kirchsteiger, 1994; Mui, 1995),
which is similar to a spiteful agent, but an envious agent’s utlity is unaffected by the
payoff of agents. However, there is little agreement in the literature on the list of
distributional preferences, and these models require strong structural assumptions.
Nevertheless, the behavioural implications of distributional preferences are proven in
different aspects of decision making. such as donation (Derin-Gure & Uler, 2010;
25
Kamas & Preston, 2015), bargaining (Bolton, 1991; De Bruyn and Bolton, 2008),
voting (Hochtl, Sausgruber & Tyran, 2012; Paetzel, Sausgruber & Traub, 2014; Fis-
man, Jakiela & Kariv, 2015), public goods contributions (Offerman, Sonnemans &
Schram, 1996), competitive behavior (Balafoutas, Kerschbamer & Sutter, 2012), bid-
ding in auctions (Flynn, Kah, & Kerschbamer, 2016; Bartling, Gesche, & Netzer,
2017), provision in credence goods (Kerschbamer, Sutter & Dulleck, 2017).
2.9 Gender difference in Behavioural and Experi-
mental Research
Males and females are fundamentally different in their biological and social roles. The
biological theory explains the gender differences in personality traits by the difference
in hormones, and genetic predispositions. Social psychology theory focuses on the
difference in social roles (eg. Eagly 1987). For example, males are often expected to
be the initiator in mate choice settings, and therefore should exhibit higher levels of
aggression and assertiveness (Trivers, 1972; Buss, 2008). Females, on the other hand,
carry the role of raising offsprings, and are therefore assumed to be more agreeable
and emotionally involved. Such a disproportionate opportunity cost in reproduc-
tion also suggests key differences in both preference and choice in decision settings.
Behavioural economics research has shown as such with females exhibiting greater
preference for resource acquisition (Whyte & Torgler, 2017; Whyte et al., 2018) and
more risk averse personality traits that reflect cooperative behaviours (Whyte & Tor-
gler, 2016; Whyte et al., 2016; Whyte et al., 2017). A further example is Feingold’s
(1994) artefact model which argues the role of sociocultural factors, for example gen-
der stereotypes, therefore some traits are viewed by a particular gender to be more
(or less) desirable. Certainly males and females have been shown to favour different
personality traits at different life reproductive stages (Whyte et al., 2019). Such fun-
damental sex differences lead to the question of how much males and females differ
psychologically in terms of traits, and how this impacts their decision process.
Understanding the psychological differences provide implications on the difference
in their behaviour. Weisberg, DeYoung and Hirsh (2011) found females to be higher
in agreeableness, extraversion and neuroticism, while Schmitt, Realo, Voracek and
Allik (2008) found females to be higher in agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraver-
sion and neuroticism across nations. Over the years females were found to be higher
26
on agreeableness, inferring higher tendency of altruistic behaviour, cooperation, em-
pathy and kindness (Feingold, 1994; Costa et al., 2001). Females were also found to
score consistently higher on neuroticism, which relates to anxiety, depression, anger,
self-consciousness, and emotional lability (Weisberg et al., 2011; Costa et al., 2001).
However for anger, a facet under neuroticism, females do not always score higher
than males (Costa et al., 2001). For the different facets of extraversion, males tend
to score higher on assertiveness and excitement seeking, while females tend to score
higher on warmth, gregariousness, and positive emotions (Feingold, 1994; Costa et
al., 2001). The overall results of gender differences on the domain of extraversion
is mixed. Conscientiousness on the other hand reflects ones self-discipline and orga-
nization, but no significant gender differences have been found (Costa et al., 2001).
Openness to experience relates to imagination, creativity, intellectual curiosity, and
appreciation of esthetic experiences, and while males often scored higher on the ideas
facet, and females scored higher on the esthetics and feelings facet, no significantly
gender difference is found at the domain level of the trait (Weisberg et al., 2011;
Feingold, 1994; Costa et al., 2001).
Gender difference in social roles and personality traits suggest gender differences
are also intertwined in social behaviour. The stereotypical view perceives males as
more selfish and females as more selfless. The sociocultural view considers social
roles, biological differences, or gender hierarchy as the important determinants of so-
cial behaviour. Similar to the above arguments for personality traits, the social roles
rather assume females to be more caring, friendly, and less selfish, while males are
assumed to be more independent and dominant (Eagly, 2009). These gender assump-
tions and stereotypes penetrate into one’s self-concept and thus affect their social
behaviour. The evolutionary perspective looks at the processes of natural and sexual
selection and its impact on sex-differentiated adaptations, and how evolved disposi-
tions affects decision making (Schmitt et al., 2008). These adaptations (or survival
skills) play an important role in attracting sexual partners. For instance, according
to Wood and Eagly (2002), males search for large packaged resources while females
search for low-variance resources, through hunting and gathering respectively. As a
consequence, males and females evolve to possess different psychological adaptation
in order to perform and complete these sex-differentiated tasks. However, studies
over the years in the context of economic games have reported mixed results. Earlier
studies by Rapoport and Chammah (1965) in prisoner dilemma games found mixed
results. More recent studies surround public goods games and ultimatum/dictator
27
experiments. In public goods experiments, Nowell and Tinkler (1994) and Seguino et
al. (1996) found that females contributed significantly higher amounts to the public
good, while Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), Sell and Wilson (1991) and Sell et al.
(1993) found the opposite. On the other hand, the studies by Cadsby and Maynes
(1998) and Sell (1997) yielded mixed results. In ultimatum bargaining experiments,
neither Sohnick (2001) and Eckel and Grossman (2001) found significant difference
between the mean offers by males and female. However, Solnick (2001) found higher
rejection rates of offers made by females than males, while Eckel and Grossman (2001)
found higher rejection rates of offers made by males than females. In dictator games,
Eckel and Grossman (1998) and Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) found significantly
higher donation by females, while Bolton and Katok (1995) results were not signif-
icant in their restrictive experimental design (participants could only choose to give
zero or half of the sum). The inconsistency in the results between studies can be
possibly explained by the differences in methodology and experimental design, where
the payoff structure plays a role. However in experiments that involve exposure to
risk, no systematic gender differences was observed. In experiments without exposure
to risk, females were found to be more others-oriented.
2.10 Summary
The above chapter provided a brief summary of the literature relevant to answering
the three Key Research Questions. The social function of awe is widely agreed upon,
and more of its psychological benefits and implications on well-being are continuing
to be discovered. Although recent studies began to establish the relationship be-
tween awe and prosociality, the theoretical link between the two needs to be further
strengthened. In addition, a theoretical gap exists with no previous studies looking
into whether external stimuli cause sudden changes in personality traits. This chap-
ter also covered several factors that needs to be given careful consideration to when
designing a public goods experiment. Further discussion regarding the experimental
setup and design will be detailed in the next chapter.
28
Chapter 3
Methodology and Design
3.1 The experiment
126 participants were recruited via the QUT ORSEE system (Greiner, 2015) to take
part in the experiment. There were 9 sessions of the experiment in total, including 3
sessions of the Walk/Awe treatment (N=42), 3 sessions of the Walk/No Awe treat-
ment (N=42), and 3 sessions of the baseline treatment (N=42). Participants were
from various different study areas. Each participant only participated in one of the
treatment conditions. The experiment took place in the BEST (Behavioural Eco-
nomics, Society and Technology) lab of Queensland University of Technology, from
21 September 2018 to 25 February 2019. There are 20 widely separated computer
terminals in the laboratory. oTree was the experimental software used in the study
(Chen, Schonger & Wickens, 2016).
After signing and returning the informed consent form, participants were asked to
fill in some survey questions. It includes a Big Five Personality Test and some demo-
graphic questions. Upon completion of the pre-treatment questionnaire, the experi-
menter went for a walk with the participants. The Walk/Awe treatment included a
walk to a balcony on the tenth floor (Gibson Room), with panoramic views of the
Brisbane city and the Brisbane river (see Appendix D). The Walk/No Awe treatment
included a walk to the university library and back, in between buildings, without any
spectacular views. Walks in both the Walk/Awe and Walk/No Awe treatment took
approximately 8 minutes. Participants were told that they can do whatever they wish
during the walk. After the walk, participants were asked to complete an emotional
scale of current feelings and emotional states as in Shiota et al. (2007), but from 0
to 100. The baseline treatment did not include a walk and participants were to fill in
29
the emotional scale immediately after completing the demographic questionnaire.
The experiment consisted of three main tasks. Before each task, the instructions were
distributed to each participant, displayed on the computer screen and read aloud by
the experimenter. Task A is a standard public goods game for 16 rounds. Partic-
ipants were allocated into random groups of 3. Each participant is endowed with
100 Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) at the start of every round, and they can
choose to contribute ci ∈ [0,100] to a joint project in each round. Total contribution in
the group for the round will be multiplied by a factor of 1.5, and split evenly among
all three participants in the group. Participants payoff for the round equals their
earnings from the joint project, plus the amount they did not contribute. The payoff
function for subject i in each round is as follows: πi = 100− ci + 0.5n∑
j=1
cj, where 100
is the endowment at the start of each round, c is the contribution to the joint project
by subject i, andn∑
j=1
cj is the total contribution to the project in a group. One round
was randomly selected as their payment for the task. During round 8, participants
were asked the reason behind their decisions on how much to contribute to the project.
After Task A, participants were asked a set of questions about appraisals during
the target experience. They were then to fill in another Big Five Personality Test
(which was identical to the one before).
Task B consisted of ten decisions tasks from the Equality Equivalence Test (EET) by
Kerschbamer (2015). It was an independent task. A participant’s decision did not
affect other participants’ payoffs. One of ten decisions was randomly chosen as their
payment for Task B.
Task C was the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) by Crosetto and Filippin (2013).
For each box collected, participants earn 2 ECUs if none of their boxes contains a
bomb. The number of boxes collected represents their risk attitudes. Details on the
EET and the BRET will follow in later sections.
At the end of the session participants payoffs from all three tasks were added up
and converted into AUD at a rate of 20 ECUs to AUD $1. Each session lasted about
50 minutes. Average earnings was $15.37, where highest earnings was $23.4 and the
lowest $10.
30
3.2 Design
3.2.1 Treatment
Since situating participants in a natural environment gives an experience that is sim-
ilar to an original awe experience, this was deemed to be the most suitable treatment
methodology for this experiment. Similar methods of eliciting awe had been used by
Shiota et al. (2007) and Piff et al. (2015), asking participants to look at a full-sized
replica of a Tyrannosaurus rex skeleton and a grove of tall eucalyptus trees respec-
tively. But apart from nature, which itself had been shown by Weinstein, Przybylski
and Ryan (2009) and Zhang, Piff, Iyer, Koleva and Keltner (2014) to increase proso-
ciality, this study is interested in looking into another elicitor of awe - panoramic
views. Understanding the intensity of an awe experience decreases with time, the
location of the target experience is a potential factor. The fact that the location of
the balcony is close to the laboratory (3 levels apart) allows participants to complete
the tasks after the awe experience with minimal time in between (approximately 2
minutes), and minimises the interference of other factors.
Using panoramic views as an instrument to elicit awe requires control for the ef-
fect of the walk, and the potential group experience during the walk. Therefore, the
Walk/No Awe treatment group in comparison should have a similar group experi-
ence but without the natural awe environment. In order for the target experience
in the Walk/No Awe treatment to be as mundane as possible, the walk is designed
to be to the library and back to the laboratory, in between buildings. The downside
of this route is, participants had to walk up the stairs from the second floor to the
seventh floor. Another limitation, and a major difference between the Walk/Awe and
Walk/No Awe treatment is that participants in the main treatment spent most of
their time standing still in the awe environment, where those in the Walk/No Awe
treatment continued walking for the entire target experience, as there was nothing
that captures their attention like the awe experience so that they could stand still for
a few minutes. This tiring physical activity could have a potential effect on individ-
uals’ behaviour in the Walk/No Awe treatment.
Thus, a baseline treatment with no target experience or activity was necessary. Com-
paring the results from the Walk/Awe treatment with the Walk/No Awe treatment
and then to the baseline treatment is interesting, as it may indicate the significance
of the group experience, or reflect the nature of the Walk/No Awe treatment.
31
3.2.2 Emotion labels
It is important to capture participants’ emotions immediately after the target experi-
ence. Here the set of emotion labels from Shiota et al. (2007) was used. In the original
paper, participants in the nature condition were higher on awe, love, rapture and con-
tentment, while participants in the accomplishment condition were higher on pride,
surprise, fear and excitement. Different to the original paper asking participants to
rate the appropriateness of the words for describing emotions during the target expe-
rience, here the question was instead asking participants the appropriateness of the
words for describing their current feelings/ emotional state. The advantage of Shiota
et al.’s (2007) choice of wording is to remind subjects of their emotions during their
awe experience (since in the original task participants were asked to recall a recent
awe event), but since in this case the target experience happened just before this sur-
vey, participants were expected to have a fresh memory of the experience. Instead of
priming participants again of the experience by asking them to recall the experience,
it would be interesting to study the effect of the awe experience has on cooperation
without further priming. In addition, these emotion labels were all on separate pages,
leading participants to evaluate each item individually without having reference to
another.
3.2.3 Appraisal endorsement for target experience
Different to the emotion labels, the survey here was completed after Task A. This
task did not have the immediacy comparing to the emotion label, together with the
fact that it requires priming, it was designed to be after a lengthy and somewhat
monotonous Task A to remind participants of the awe experience before Tasks B and
C. In the original paper, participants in the nature condition rated higher on “Felt
small or insignificant”, “Felt presence of something greater than self”, “Unaware of
day-to-day concerns”, “Felt connected with the world around me” and “Did not want
the experience to end”, while participants in the accomplishment condition rated
higher on “Challenging”, “Tiring”, “Felt connected with my personal values” and
“Felt connected with my culture”.
3.2.4 Next hour activity
Literature of awe (eg. Keltner and Haidt, 2003) suggests that individuals who ex-
perienced awe would want to repeat the experience, or be in the same environment
again. Shiota et al. (2007) has found that participants in the awe treatment are more
32
likely to choose creative activities or to spend time in nature for their next hour It
would be interesting to study that as well in this study.
3.2.5 Equality Equivalence Test (EET)
The Equality Equivalence Test (EET) is an experimental task by Kerschbamer (2015)
to classify individuals into different distributional preference types. It includes a set
of 10 binary choices. The switching point implies an individual’s willingness to pay
for equality, which allows the classification into different types. The purpose of the
EET here is to study whether the awe experience has any effect on individuals’ more
complex distributional preferences. The EET task used in the experiment is the
same as that in the original paper by Kerschbamer (2015), but with adjusted payoffs
of ECUs instead of Euros. Instead of e = 10, g = 3, s = 1, t = 2 (in euros) in the orig-
inal task, in this task, e = 50, g = 15, s = 5, t = 2 (in ECUs), where e, g and s were
scaled with the common factor of 5, and the multiplier t which is 2 remains unchanged.
Calculating the (x,y) scores requires Step 1 in the original paper of eliminating pref-
erences that violate the strict m-monotonicity assumption, meaning that holding the
payoff of the other player constant, a decision maker should strictly prefer higher own
payoff than lower own payoff. That is, letting m denote ”my” payoff and o for the
”other” person’s payoff, given that (m, o) ∈ A and ∆ ∈ <++, the decision maker’s
utility u(m+∆, o) > u(m, o). Then the participants’ (x,y) scores were calculated from
the row number which they decide for the asymmetric allocation (left-hand side).
3.2.6 Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET)
The Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) is an experimental task by Crosetto and
Filippin (2013) to elicit risk preferences. No prior theory of awe has established a
relationship between awe and risk preferences, therefore the task was carried out only
to serve as a possible control variable. Due to technical issues with this task, 27
observations were lost in the experimental process.
3.2.7 Demographics
Demographic data was collected before the target experience, after the pre-treatment
FFM questionnaire. Collecting data regarding participants’ religion and their de-
voutness was particularly necessary, to study whether that has any effect on their
33
awe-proneness and tendency to cooperate. Different to many laboratory experiments,
demographic data here was collected at the start of the experiment, as participants’
report of their happiness, health, devoutness in religious activities and interest in
politics would potentially be affected by the treatment.
3.2.8 Public Goods Game
The public goods game in this experiment consisted of 16 rounds. A multiple-round
public goods game captures the decay in cooperation, as a decline in contribution
levels is often observed in repeated play of the game. In many cases players in the
game withdraw from cooperation as they learn how behaviour affects payoffs, and
also as a form of punishment to the defectors.
The groups were shuffled after half of the rounds to observe any restart effect (An-
dreoni, 1988; Croson, 1996).
3.3 Summary
This chapter covered the experimental design and setup, as well as a simple theo-
retical framework of the approach and methodologies used. The main focus of the
experimental design is to create an experience of awe that allows studying of the
behavioural implications brought by it.
34
Chapter 4
Results and Discussion
This chapter will present and discuss all the relevant findings from the experiment.
Section 4.1 presents descriptive statistics collected from the experiment, including
demographic data, emotion labels after the treatment, thoughts/ appraisals during
target experience, ideal next hour activities, as well as pre and post treatment FFM
Scores. Section 4.2 attempts to answer Key Research Question 1: How does
the emotion of awe affect cooperation in economic experiments? using results from
Task A. Regression analysis were completed to identify whether a treatment effect is
present on cooperation: whether individuals with the experience of awe exhibit higher
cooperation in the public goods game. Section 4.3 explores Key Research Ques-
tion 2: How does the emotion of awe affect distributional preferences in economic
experiments? using the results from the EET. Section 4.4 examines the mean-level
and rank-order stability in the measurement the Five Factor Model of Personality
Traits. The comparison of the pre and post treatment FFM scores across treatments
attempts to answer Key Research Question 3: To what extent does the emotion of
awe affect the stability in the measurement of personality traits?. Section 4.5 examines
the moderating effect of agreeableness on cooperation, originally proposed by Prade
and Saroglou (2015). Finally, Section 4.6 gives a general discussion of all results.
35
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1: Demographics statistics.
Demographics (% of participants in treatment)Baseline Walk/No
AweWalk/Awe Total
Gender Male 14 (34.15%) 20 (48.78%) 19 (45.24%) 53 (42.74%)Female 27 (65.85%) 21 (51.22%) 23 (54.76%) 71 (57.26%)
Age Under 18 3 (7.32%) 3 (2.42%)18-21 17 (41.46%) 16 (39.02%) 17 (40.48%) 50 (40.32%)22-25 6 (14.63%) 16 (39.02%) 12 (28.57%) 34 (27.42%)26-29 6 (14.63%) 1 (2.44%) 4 (9.52%) 11 (8.87%)30 or above 9 (21.95%) 8 (19.51%) 9 (21.43%) 26 (20.97%)
Ethnicity Asian 21 (51.22%) 20 (48.78%) 23 (54.76%) 64 (51.61%)Caucasian 9 (21.95%) 10 (24.39%) 9 (21.43%) 28 (22.58%)Latin 2 (4.88%) 2 (4.88%) 4 (3.23%)Middle-Eastern
1 (2.44%) 3 (7.14%) 4 (3.23%)
Sub-continental
7 (17.07%) 7 (17.07%) 6 (14.29%) 20 (16.13%)
Other 2 (4.88%) 1 (2.44%) 1 (2.38%) 4 (3.23%)
Continuation of Table 4.1Religion Atheist 6 (14.63%) 6 (14.63%) 3 (7.14%) 15 (12.10%)
Buddhist 10 (24.39%) 5 (12.2%) 7 (16.67%) 22 (17.74%)Catholic 6 (14.63%) 1 (2.44%) 6 (14.29%) 13 (10.48%)Christian(Protes-tant)
4 (9.76%) 3 (7.32%) 4 (9.52%) 11 (8.87%)
Christian(Other)
4 (9.76%) 4 (9.76%) 3 (7.14%) 11 (8.87%)
Hindu 5 (12.2%) 1 (2.38%) 6 (4.84%)Muslim 3 (7.32%) 5 (12.2%) 10 (23.81%) 18 (14.52%)Sikh 1 (2.44%) 1 (0.81%)Taoism 1 (2.44%) 1 (2.38%) 2 (1.61%)Other 5 (12.2%) 6 (14.63%) 5 (11.9%) 16 (12.9%)
Table 4.1 reports the demographics statistics of the subjects. One participant from
the Walk/No Awe treatment and one participant from the baseline treatment did
not complete the demographics survey. Most of the participants in the experiment
fell into the age group of 18 to 25. 57.26% of participants were female, 52% Asian,
23% Caucasian, 16% Sub-Continental, 3% Latino/Latina, 3% Middle-Eastern and
3% of another ethnicity. Of religion, there is a higher proportion of atheists in the
36
Walk/No Awe and the baseline treatments. Given the possible effect religion has
on transcendence, awe-proneness and prosociality, this factor has to be considered in
later sections.
Table 4.2: Emotion labels.Emotion labels (S.D. in parentheses)
Baseline Walk/No
Awe
Walk/Awe t t
(Walk/Awe
vs Base-
line)
(Walk/Awe
vs
Walk/No
Awe)
Awe 41.83
(31.47)
60.74
(26.2)
60.69
(26.72)
-2.96*** 0.01
Love 47.21
(30.15)
49.60
(29.8)
62.55
(23.62)
-2.59** -2.21**
Rapture 39.33
(28.78)
47.17
(27.16)
49.55
(24.98)
-1.74* -0.42
Contentment 59.62
(25.46)
55.60
(26.31)
61.69
(20.37)
-0.42 -1.19
Pride 40.69
(27.33)
40.69
(27.32)
46.29
(25.09)
-0.98 0.51
Surprise 33.12
(28.11)
69.14
(28.66)
58.10
(28.89)
-4.01*** 1.76*
Fear 29.98
(29.76)
23.83
(26.57)
23.90
(23.97)
1.03 -0.01
Excitement 60.79
(25.52)
51.21
(27.46)
57.74
(27.85)
0.53 -1.08
Joy 54.19
(25.52)
49.69
(27.9)
61.86
(21.97)
-1.48 -2.22**
Sadness 29.10
(29.81)
23.10
(26.73)
24.79
(22.03)
0.75 -0.32
All t-tests are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.2 shows the mean word ratings from the post treatment emotion labels
adapted from Shiota et al. (2007). Of interest to note is the similar level of self-
reported awe in the Walk/Awe and Walk/No Awe treatment. Given that the self-
reported awe level in the baseline is significantly lower than that in the Walk/Awe
37
treatment, it gives indication about the design of the Walk/No Awe treatment. Par-
ticipants in the Walk/Awe treatment also reported higher levels of joy comparing to
the Walk/No Awe treatment, and higher levels love comparing to the Walk/No Awe
and the baseline.
Table 4.3: Thoughts/appraisals during target experience.
Thoughts/appraisals during target experience. (S.D. in parentheses)
Walk/No
Awe
Walk/Awe t
(Walk/Awe
vs
Walk/No
Awe)
Novel 54.90 (21.78) 54.05 (22.36) 0.27
Meaningful 49.63 (28.78) 50.45 (22.57) 0.49
Intense 46.73 (29.27) 41.12 (24.8) 0.87
Felt connected with my culture 29.73 (26.84) 32.60 (23.54) -0.39
Felt connected with my personal values 43.29 (29) 44.55 (23.86) 0.66
Tiring 40.44 (32.84) 34.69 (27.36) 0.29
Challenging 41.32 (28) 37.02 (26.81) 0.43
Did not want the experience to end 29.98 (23.72) 36.95 (27.03) -0.72
Felt connected with the world around me 42.83 (29.86) 44.00 (25.49) -0.68
Unaware of day-to-day concerns 45.59 (27.48)) 45.02 (21.95) 0.44
Felt presence of something greater than self 38.20 (28.19) 41.83 (24.34) -0.42
Felt small or insignificant 28.05 (26.77) 40.45 (30.35) -1.49
Table 4.3 presents the mean endorsements of thoughts/appraisals during the target
experience as from Shiota et al. (2007). No significant statistical differences were
found comparing between the two treatments.
38
Table 4.4: Next hour activity.
Next hour activity (Count)
Baseline Walk/No
Awe
Walk/Awe
Next hour activity Contact loved ones 7 11 9
Creative activity 18 6 13
Play sports 6 10 6
Sleep 4 9 5
Spend time in nature 6 5 9
The ideal next hour activities as from Shiota et al. (2007) are presented in Table 4.4.
39
Table 4.5: Average FFM Scores.
Average FFM Scores (S.D. in parentheses)
Baseline WN WA t t
(WA
vs B)
(WA
vs
WN)
Before
treat-
ment
Agreeableness 5.15
(0.79)
5.19
(0.79)
5.12
(0.71)
0.17 0.42
Conscientiousness 5.07
(0.99)
4.96
(0.86)
4.82
(0.73)
1.35 0.78
Extraversion 4.20
(0.89)
4.29
(0.83)
4.18
(0.87)
0.09 0.55
Neuroticism 4.32
(0.87)
4.34
(0.85)
4.41
(0.84)
-0.51 -0.37
Openness 4.78
(0.85)
4.67
(0.92)
4.64
(0.93)
0.72 0.13
After
treat-
ment
Agreeableness 4.99
(0.87)
5.11
(0.90)
5.18
(0.72)
-1.13 -0.40
Conscientiousness 5.18
(0.93)
4.91
(0.89)
4.82
(0.76)
1.93 0.46
Extraversion 4.18
(0.85)
4.22
(0.92)
4.21
(0.80)
-0.16 0.09
Neuroticism 4.42
(0.90)
4.46
(0.94)
4.65
(0.93)
-1.16 -0.91
Openness 4.73
(0.90)
4.65
(0.87)
4.54
(1.00)
0.95 0.54
Note: WA=Walk/Awe, WN=Walk/No Awe, B=Baseline
Table 4.5 reports the average pre and post treatment FFM Scores. T-tests found no
significant differences comparing each of the five factors across treatments.
4.2 Awe and Cooperation
Based on the previous findings of awe’s positive effect on prosociality and helping by
Piff et al. (2015) and Prade and Saroglou (2015), awe’s positive impact on cooperation
in the public goods game is expected.
40
Figure 4.1: Contribution in the Public Goods Game. (N=126)
Figure 4.1 shows the contribution levels in the public goods game across different
treatments. From the figure it appears that participants in the baseline treatment
started with the highest contribution levels, but exhibited the greatest magnitude of
decline. With the groups shuffled at round 8, a slight restart effect was observed in
the participants’ contribution in round 9.
Using Stata 15, regression analyses were conducted using different estimation tech-
niques. The dependent variable here is the participants contribution in the public
goods game, as a measure of cooperation. The independent variable of focus here
is the treatment dummy, which allows investigation of whether a treatment effect is
present. The first group of variables is demographic variables of age and gender, as
well as age’s interaction effect with the treatment dummy, to control for any gen-
der and age effects. The second group of control variables is related to the payoff
structure of the task, controlling for round number, individual payoff in the previous
round and the group contribution in the previous round. Including round number
as an independent variable controls for the decay in the level of contribution over
rounds, while the groups contribution and the participants payoff in the previous
round are important predictors of the individuals contribution in the current round.
41
The remaining control variables are self-reported awe and its interaction effect with
the treatment dummy.
Five different regression models are used in the above estimation. Model 1 is a
Pooled OLS regression, mainly for comparison purposes. Model 2 is a standard ran-
dom effects model. Model 4 is a panel random effects tobit model, with 0 and 100
as the censoring points for the dependent variable. The censoring is suitable in this
context, as the contribution in the PGG can only fall between 0 to 100. Model 5 is
a fractional probit model, where the dependent variable takes values between 0 and
1. From another perspective, contribution in the PGG can be seen as a proportion,
and scaled to be in [0,1]. Different to the previous random effects estimators, this is a
quasi-likelihood estimator. However with a clustered data structure, the most appro-
priate model of estimation is Model 3, which is a multilevel mixed-effects regression.
The fact that individuals play the game in groups and the groups are shuffled at
round 8 means that the data needs to be nested in two different levels, individual and
group (each player has one individual id and two group ids). It is important to note
that the individuals choice of contribution in the PGG has a level of dependence on
other group members decisions (and past decisions). Without clustering for groups,
standard errors will likely be underestimated and statistical significance will therefore
be overstated. With two different group ids for a single individual (for the first and
second half of the rounds), the multilevel mixed-effects regression model is a model
that allows a correct clustering of data in this scenario.
42
Table 4.6: Public Goods Game (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Depvar: PGG Contribution OLS RE ME Tobit Fractional
Treatment (dummy) 9.230** 9.230** 14.37* 30.02 0.340**
(4.571) (4.571) (8.443) (19.98) (0.148)
Self-reported awe -0.0480 -0.0480 -0.0688 -0.168 -0.00141
(0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0823) (0.191) (0.00152)
Treatment x self-reported awe -0.0321 -0.0321 -0.0620 -0.241 -0.00155
(0.0590) (0.0590) (0.107) (0.262) (0.00209)
Payoff (previous round) -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.220*** -0.241*** -0.0121***
(0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0615) (0.0574) (0.00125)
Group contribution 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.272*** 0.388*** 0.0113***
(previous round) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0176) (0.0252) (0.000449)
Round no. -0.355** -0.355** -0.625*** -1.044*** -0.0134**
(0.180) (0.180) (0.222) (0.285) (0.00654)
Age 2.900*** 2.900*** 4.387*** 11.00** 0.108***
(1.034) (1.034) (1.524) (4.665) (0.0408)
Treatment x Age -3.895*** -3.895*** -6.123** -11.08* -0.143***
(1.398) (1.398) (2.600) (6.214) (0.0520)
Gender -2.821* -2.821* -2.412 -5.636 -0.126**
(1.532) (1.532) (2.468) (6.769) (0.0560)
Constant 52.97*** 52.97*** 40.43*** 30.85* -0.0385
(5.433) (5.433) (9.986) (18.40) (0.204)
Observations 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245
R-squared 0.545
Number of id 83 83
Number of groups 56 56 56 56
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.6 shows the estimation output from analysing only the Walk/Awe and Walk/No
Awe treatments. A significant treatment effect was found with Model 2 and 5, but
not with Model 4. With Model 3, the treatment effect is only significant at a 10%
level. The awe experience appears to have a borderline significant impact on cooper-
ation when comparing the Walk/Awe treatment with the Walk/No Awe treatment.
Of interest to note is that age and its interaction effect with the treatment dummy is
significant across all models.
43
Table 4.7: Public Goods Game (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Depvar: PGG Contribution OLS RE ME Tobit Fractional
Treatment (dummy) 9.358** 9.358** 17.79** 34.15** 0.325***
(3.961) (3.961) (8.555) (17.36) (0.120)
Self-reported awe 0.0376 0.0376 0.0462 0.135 0.00127
(0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0658) (0.155) (0.00101)
Treatment x self-reported awe -0.119** -0.119** -0.214** -0.548** -0.00433**
(0.0532) (0.0532) (0.107) (0.234) (0.00175)
Payoff (previous round) -0.452*** -0.452*** -0.113** -0.116** -0.0126***
(0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0556) (0.0473) (0.00117)
Group contribution 0.361*** 0.361*** 0.196*** 0.268*** 0.0108***
(previous round) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0207) (0.0205) (0.000461)
Round no. -0.399** -0.399** -1.102*** -1.081*** -0.0135**
(0.178) (0.178) (0.215) (0.228) (0.00633)
Age -0.292 -0.292 0.0417 0.589 -0.0134
(0.785) (0.785) (1.498) (3.429) (0.0259)
Treatment x Age -0.728 -0.728 -2.283 -1.369 -0.0246
(1.191) (1.191) (2.870) (5.232) (0.0402)
Gender -2.397 -2.397 -2.765 -5.149 -0.0939*
(1.527) (1.527) (3.082) (6.713) (0.0533)
Constant 55.28*** 55.28*** 42.08*** 29.49** 0.0778
(4.857) (4.857) (7.616) (14.37) (0.173)
Observations 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245
R-squared 0.497
Number of id 83 83
Number of groups 56 56 56 56
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.7 shows the estimation output from analysing only the Walk/Awe and base-
line treatments. Different to the results from Table 4.6, here a significant treatment
effect with all models was found. In this estimation, age is not a significant variable,
but the significance of the interaction between self-reported awe and the treatment
dummy is something noteworthy given the results from Table 4.2.
44
Result 1. Awe has a significant positive impact on cooperation.
The above estimations have confirmed the finding that the emotion of awe enhances
cooperation. Given the proven social function of awe in relation to prosociality, gen-
erosity and helping, it is within expectation that awe also leads to higher cooperation
in groups. The finding by Campos et al. (2013) and Piff et al. (2015) that awe
induction leads to the “small self” is a reasonable explanation for the increased con-
tribution levels in the awe treatments in this study. Individuals experiencing awe are
likely to feel less significant, reducing their attachment to their personal success and
goals.
4.3 Awe and Distributional Preferences
This section attempts to answer Key Research Question 2 using the results obtained
from the EET in Task B.
Figure 4.2: Frequency of the (x,y) scores. (N=117)
Figure 4.2 presents a jittered scatterplot of the (x,y) scores of the remaining 117
participants (9 out of 126 participants’ responses were eliminated due to inconsistent
45
preferences). According to Kerschbamer (2015), an individual’s x-score is defined by
(t+1.5) points minus the row number in which the individual switches from right to
left (the asymmetric allocation), and an individual’s y-score is calculated by the row
number in which the individual makes the switch minus (t+1.5) points. From the
graph it is apparent that most participants are consistent with the selfish type, and
the second and third most common are the inequality averse and altruistic types.
Table 4.8: Frequency of Distributional Types.
Frequency of Distributional Types
Total Baseline Walk/No
Awe
Walk/Awe
Altruistic 13 2 4 7
Equality Averse 2 1 1 0
Inequality Averse 24 9 9 6
Spiteful 6 2 1 3
Selfish 51 18 18 15
Table 4.8 shows the frequency of the five distributional types across treatments. In
the Walk/Awe treatment, there seems to be a higher proportion of altruists, and
slightly fewer number of equality averse, inequality averse and selfish individuals.
Table 4.9: Test of Proportions for the Distributional Types
Test of Proportions for the Distributional Types
Walk/Awe vs
Baseline
Walk/Awe vs
Walk/No Awe
(z-score) (z-score)
Altruistic -1.76* -0.97
Equality Averse 1.01 1.01
Inequality Averse 0.85 0.85
Spiteful -0.46 -1.02
Selfish 0.67 0.67
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.9 formally tests the frequency of the five distributional types across treat-
ments. The only significant difference if found in the number of altruists between the
Walk/Awe treatment and the baseline treatment.
46
Table 4.10: Rank Correlation Tests for x,y scores
Rank Correlation Tests for x,y scores
Walk/Awe vs
Baseline
Walk/Awe vs
Walk/No Awe
(z-score) (z-score)
x-score -1.90* -1.32
y-score -0.50 -0.63
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.10 presents the rank correlation z-scores for the (x, y) scores between treat-
ments. It shows that individuals in the Walk/Awe treatment has higher x-scores than
those in the baseline with weak significance. In other words, between being inequal-
ity averse and altruistic, individuals with the awe experience have a slight tendency
towards altruism.
Table 4.11: OLS Regression on x scores (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)
(1) (2)
Depvar: xscore xscore
Treatment dummy 0.583** 0.777***
(0.286) (0.291)
Self-reported awe -0.0136***
(0.00486)
Gender 0.512*
(0.277)
Age -0.0823
(0.105)
Constant -0.775*** -0.733
(0.201) (0.496)
Observations 79 79
R-squared 0.051 0.191
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To further analyse the difference in x-scores, OLS estimations were performed with
respect to treatment, as shown in Table 4.11. Without controlling for other factors,
the treatment dummy is significant at 5% level. While controlling for self-reported
47
awe, gender, and age, the significance of the treatment dummy rises to 1% level. This
suggests that awe has an effect on participants’ x-scores in the Walk/Awe and baseline
treatments. Participants with the awe experience are more likely to be altruistic than
being inequality averse.
Table 4.12: OLS Regression on x scores (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)
(1) (2)
Depvar: xscore xscore
Treatment dummy 0.413 0.415
(0.295) (0.290)
Self-reported awe 0.000548
(0.00551)
Gender 0.551*
(0.290)
Age -0.191
(0.126)
Constant -0.605*** -1.033
(0.210) (0.657)
Observations 77 76
R-squared 0.025 0.096
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
48
Table 4.13: OLS Regression on y scores (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)
(1) (2)
Depvar: yscore yscore
Treatment dummy 0.0885 0.0632
(0.294) (0.321)
Self-reported awe -0.00127
(0.00537)
Gender 0.233
(0.306)
Age -0.101
(0.116)
Constant 0.950*** 0.928*
(0.207) (0.548)
Observations 79 79
R-squared 0.001 0.020
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
49
Table 4.14: OLS Regression on y scores (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)
(1) (2)
Depvar: yscore yscore
Treatment dummy 0.144 0.159
(0.308) (0.313)
Self-reported awe -0.00612
(0.00593)
Gender -0.105
(0.313)
Age 0.127
(0.136)
Constant 0.895*** 1.123
(0.219) (0.708)
Observations 77 76
R-squared 0.003 0.030
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Carrying out the same regression in Table 4.12 between the Walk/Awe and Walk/No
Awe treatments for x scores, and y-scores in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 between the
Walk/Awe and Baseline and Walk/Awe and Walk/No Awe treatments, no signifi-
cant treatment effect was found.
Result 2. Awe has a significant positive impact on altruistic preferences
Summing up the findings in this section, the regression outputs showed that indi-
viduals in the Walk/Awe treatment had significantly higher x-scores than those in
the baseline treatment. Participants in the Walk/Awe treatment are likely to be
more concerned about the sum of payoffs than being concerned about the inequality
in payoffs (the utility of an altruistic individual increases as the payoff of the other
individual increases). In other words, if the other player has higher payoffs than the
individual, the individual with the experience of awe are less likely to take away from
the other player’s payoff. This ties into the finding in Section 4.2 that participants in
the Walk/Awe treatment exhibited higher levels of cooperation.
50
4.4 Awe and the Stability in the measurement of
the Five Factor Model of Personality Traits
This section attempts to answer Key Research Question 3 using the the pre and post
treatment Five Factor Model questionnaire results. OLS regressions, two sample t-
tests, and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test were employed to study whether there is a
treatment effect on the stability in the measurement of the Five Factors. In other
words, whether awe experience changes people’s personality traits.
4.4.1 OLS Estimation on Measurement of Personality Traits
Stability
The OLS regressions below study the mean-level stability in the measurement of
personality traits. Here the difference between the Five Factor scores before and
after the treatment were calculated (as the measure of personality trait stability),
and use that difference in the scores as the dependent variable. The independent
variable is the treatment dummy, indicating whether a treatment effect is present.
Table 4.15: FFM Personality Traits Stability (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)
Depvar: Difference (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
in personality traits A C E N O
Treatment dummy 0.187** 0.0243 0.0696 0.123 -0.133*
(0.0806) (0.0844) (0.0733) (0.0881) (0.0768)
Constant -0.122** -0.0209 -0.0488 0.115* 0.0314
(0.0574) (0.0600) (0.0521) (0.0627) (0.0546)
Observations 83 83 83 83 83
R-squared 0.062 0.001 0.011 0.024 0.036
(A = Agreeableness, C=Conscientiousness, E=Extraversion
, N=Neuroticism, O=Openness)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.15 reports the estimation including only Walk/Awe and Walk/No Awe treat-
ments. From the regression table it appears that the emotion of awe has a significantly
positive impact on agreeableness, whereas the treatment effect on openness is nega-
tively significant at 10% level. Other factors remain stable on the mean level. Further
51
testings are required to examine the validity of the findings from this estimation.
Table 4.16: FFM Personality Traits Stability (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)
Depvar: Difference (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
in personality traits A C E N O
Treatment dummy 0.224** -0.102 0.0476 0.136 -0.0578
(0.0938) (0.0919) (0.0661) (0.0894) (0.0777)
Constant -0.160** 0.105 -0.0268 0.102 -0.0442
(0.0663) (0.0650) (0.0467) (0.0632) (0.0549)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.065 0.015 0.006 0.027 0.007
(A = Agreeableness, C=Conscientiousness, E=Extraversion
, N=Neuroticism, O=Openness)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.16 reports the estimation including only Walk/Awe and baseline treatments.
Again a significant positive treatment effect on agreeableness is apparent. Other
measurements of personality traits were stable on the mean level, including openness
to experience.
4.4.2 Wilcoxon rank-sum test and Two-sample t-test on Mea-
surement of Personality Trait Stability
The above results were further examined by a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which exam-
ines the mean-level stability in the measurement of personality traits.
Table 4.17: FFM Personality Traits (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)
FFM Personality Traits (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)
Rank Correlation z-score
Agreeableness 2.12**
Conscientiousness 0.69
Extraversion 0.96
Neuroticism 1.29
Openness -1.95*
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
52
Table 4.17 confirms the findings in Table 4.15. Comparing the Walk/Awe and
Walk/No Awe treatments, there is a significant positive change in agreeableness for
individuals who experienced awe, in both absolute and differential level. The negative
change in Openness here at 10% significance also corresponds to that in Table 4.15.
Table 4.18: FFM Personality Traits (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)
FFM Personality Traits (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)
Rank Correlation z-score
Agreeableness 2.15**
Conscientiousness -0.15
Extraversion 0.77
Neuroticism 1.56
Openness -1.09
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Similarly, Table 4.18 confirms the findings in Table 4.16. The positive treatment effect
on the measurement of agreeableness is again verified by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test
and a two sample t-test.
4.4.3 Components of Agreeableness
To analyse the factors that are driving the change in the measurement of agreeable-
ness, it is necessary to dissect the change in different components of agreeableness.
Table 4.19: Rank Correlation Tests for change in components of Agreeableness
Rank Correlation Tests for change in components of Agreeableness
Walk/Awe vs
Walk/No Awe
Walk/Awe vs
Baseline
(z-score) (z-score)
Sympathetic -0.01 -0.42
Kind -1.94* -0.49
Cooperative -0.79 -0.33
Warm 1.09 1.46
Harsh 0.81 2.40**
Cold 2.26** 2.66***
Selfish 1.94* 2.66***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
53
From the rank correlation test results in Table 4.19 it appears that cold and selfish
are the two common components driving the change in the Walk/Awe treatment.
4.4.4 Further Analysis on Stability in the measurement of
Agreeableness
To further investigate the change in the measurement of agreeableness, it is necessary
to break down the mean-level change with respect to different demographic factors.
Estimation 1 is an OLS regression similar to Table 4.15 and 4.16, but included an
interaction term between gender and the treatment dummy. Estimation 2 analysed
the change in the measurement of agreeableness with respect to Age. Estimation 3
broke down the change with respect to religiosity.
54
Table 4.20: Further Analysis for Stability (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indepvars: Gender Age Religiousness All
18-21#1 0.239* -0.217
(0.128) (0.150)
22-25#0 0.140 0.135
(0.130) (0.126)
22-25#1 0.271* -0.239
(0.140) (0.154)
26-29#0 -0.181 -0.132
(0.375) (0.368)
26-29#1 0.319 -0.0977
(0.204) (0.214)
30 or above#0 0.337** 0.305*
(0.159) (0.153)
30 or above#1 0.502***
(0.153)
Female#1 -0.0355 0.324*
(0.106) (0.181)
Male#0 -0.228** -0.210*
(0.111) (0.112)
Male#1 0.231** 0.591***
(0.111) (0.174)
Non-religious#1 0.191 0.0299
(0.148) (0.140)
Religious#0 0.137 0.135
(0.118) (0.114)
Religious#1 0.295**
(0.112)
Constant -0.0204 -0.248*** -0.205** -0.221*
(0.0766) (0.0936) (0.0919) (0.119)
Observations 82 82 83 82
R-squared 0.174 0.162 0.085 0.269
#0: Non-treatment, #1: Treatment
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
55
Table 4.20 shows that males in the Walk/No Awe treatment exhibited a significant
reduction in their measurements of agreeableness, where males in the Walk/Awe
treatment exhibited a significant increase in their measurements of agreeableness.
For females, no significant changes were found. With student participants as subjects
in this experiment, age was relatively homogeneous, therefore it is within expectation
that little insightful results with regards to age is found. The only interesting finding
with regards to age is that participants aged 30 or above increased in their measure-
ments of agreeableness in both treatments. Religious individuals in the Walk/Awe
treatment, on the other hand, exhibited a significantly positive change. Putting gen-
der, age and religiosity together in the same estimation (in 4), it is shown that the
significant factor that continue to stand out is the treatment effect on male partici-
pants.
56
Table 4.21: Further Analysis for Stability (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indepvars: Gender Age Religiousness All
18-21#1 0.0672 -0.217
(0.138) (0.172)
22-25#0 -0.0434 -0.0431
(0.191) (0.191)
22-25#1 0.0994 -0.239
(0.152) (0.177)
26-29#0 -0.401** -0.398**
(0.191) (0.194)
26-29#1 0.147 -0.0977
(0.223) (0.246)
30 or above#0 0.171 0.169
(0.166) (0.166)
30 or above#1 0.330*
(0.166)
Under 18#0 -0.782*** -0.786***
(0.252) (0.259)
Female#1 0.103 0.204
(0.121) (0.211)
Male#0 -0.00454 0.0358
(0.141) (0.136)
Male#1 0.369*** 0.471**
(0.128) (0.203)
Non-religious#1 0.205 0.0299
(0.182) (0.161)
Religious#0 0.0868 0.0202
(0.145) (0.140)
Religious#1 0.309**
(0.142)
Constant -0.159* -0.0756 -0.220* -0.101
(0.0822) (0.0975) (0.120) (0.141)
Observations 83 83 84 83
R-squared 0.110 0.263 0.074 0.305
Standard errors in parentheses
#0: Non-treatment, #1: Treatment
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
57
Table 4.21 analyses the change in the Walk/Awe and baseline treatments, with re-
spect to the same demographic factors as above. Similar to Table 4.20, males in the
Walk/Awe treatment demonstrated a significant increase in their measurements of
agreeableness. Participants aged 26-29 showed a decrease in their measurements of
agreeableness in the baseline treatment, while those aged 30 or above increased in
their measurements of agreeableness at 10% significance level. Meanwhile, similar to
above, religious individuals in the Walk/Awe treatment showed a significant increase.
In estimation 4, males in the Walk/Awe treatment continue to be the one significant
factor throughout the analysis.
4.4.5 Discussion
Result 3. Awe has a significant positive impact on the personality trait of agreeable-
ness.
As shown from the above tables, treatment effect does not seem evident on other
personality trait factors. This change can be explained in different ways, especially
given that the second FFM measure is after 16 rounds of the PGG. A possible ex-
planation of the change in agreeableness ties into the findings by Yang et al. (2016),
where they found that awe reduces aggression. Studies such as Barlett and Anderson
(2012), Gleason, Jensen-Campbell and South Richardson (2004) and Trninic, Baran-
cic and Nazor (2008) all found a significantly negative correlation between aggression
and agreeableness. It is possible that individuals in the awe treatment have reduced
levels of aggression and is therefore is comparatively higher on agreeableness.
It is also important to address the potential critique that the increase in the mea-
surement of agreeableness arose from the increased level of contribution in the public
goods game. Whilst that could be true to a certain extent, the appraisal endorsement
for target experience was intentionally placed immediately after the 16-round PGG.
It was done in order to prime participants of the target experience before completing
the post treatment FFM questionnaire. The following regressions attempt to address
this critique:
58
Table 4.22: Stability of Agreeableness
Depvar: (1) (2)
Difference in Agreeableness Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe Walk/Awe vs Baseline
Contribution in PGG #0 0.000708 -0.000656
(0.000920) (0.00137)
Contribution in PGG #1 0.00311*** 0.00285***
(0.000868) (0.000941)
Constant -0.116** -0.0968
(0.0571) (0.0629)
Observations 1,328 1,344
R-squared 0.069 0.062
#0: Non-treatment, #1: Treatment
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.22 shows the OLS regressions with change in measurement of agreeableness
as the dependent variable and the interaction between contribution in the PGG and
the treatment dummy as the independent variable. It is clear that with individual
contribution in the PGG as the independent variable, the treatment effect is still
strongly significant when comparing the Walk/Awe treatment to both Walk/No Awe
and baseline treatments.
4.5 Moderating effect of agreeableness on cooper-
ation
According to the finding by Prade and Saroglou (2015, p.258)
“the effect (of generosity) was present mainly among those low in agreeableness ...
For people who are dispositionally low in agreeableness, awe may be a specific self-
transcendent, stimulus-oriented, positive emotion that stimulates them and facilitates
prosocial behavior ... people low in agreeableness may exhibit, thanks to awe, proso-
cial behavior at similar levels to those high in agreeableness, who may need less of the
emotion of awe to express their personal prosocial dispositions in agreeableness”
It would be interesting to investigate into the role of agreeableness in cooperation
59
in the public goods game. As the mean score of agreeableness is our data collected
is 5.15 (median is 5.14), individuals who score higher than 5.15 were considered to
be high in agreeableness and those who were lower than 5.15 were considered low in
agreeableness. The following regressions were estimated with the multilevel mixed-
effects model in section 4.2 with individuals who are high in agreeableness and low in
agreeableness respectively.
Table 4.23: Public Goods Game Contribution with respect to Agreeableness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Low High Low
WA vs WN WA vs WN WA vs B WA vs B
Treatment (dummy) 11.02 14.52* 15.61 17.53**
(10.90) (7.721) (12.06) (8.099)
Self-reported awe -0.0654 -0.0650 0.0399 0.0435
(0.0759) (0.0754) (0.0637) (0.0620)
Treatment x self-reported awe 0.0234 -0.113 -0.129 -0.260**
(0.110) (0.104) (0.128) (0.109)
Payoff (previous round) -0.279*** -0.273*** -0.134** -0.152***
(0.0726) (0.0652) (0.0656) (0.0590)
Group contribution 0.297*** 0.303*** 0.205*** 0.226***
(previous round) (0.0197) (0.0185) (0.0249) (0.0226)
Round no. -0.730*** -0.501** -1.364*** -0.982***
(0.260) (0.256) (0.227) (0.255)
Age 3.981*** 3.914*** 0.0122 -0.0155
(1.465) (1.442) (1.488) (1.398)
Treatment x Age -5.897 -5.104** -2.036 -1.696
(3.867) (2.471) (4.691) (2.780)
Gender -2.636 -2.847 -3.406 -3.198
(2.651) (2.262) (3.641) (2.948)
Constant 45.77*** 42.53*** 46.85*** 42.47***
(11.25) (10.39) (8.991) (7.997)
Observations 885 975 885 975
Number of groups 49 53 49 53
WA=Walk/Awe, WN=Walk/No Awe, B=Baseline
High=High in Agreeableness, Low=Low in Agreeableness
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
60
The results in Table 4.23 agrees with the finding by Prade and Saroglou (2015). In
this experiment, the effect of awe on cooperation was mostly found among individuals
who are low in agreeableness, and not among those who are high in agreeableness.
It thus suggests that for individuals that are low in agreeableness, experience of awe
increases their agreeableness and enhances their cooperation. However the difference
between those who are high and low in agreeableness is small and insignificant.
4.6 General Discussion of Results
The overall findings in this studies builds on the “Small self” hypothesis, and con-
firms previous findings by Piff et al. (2015) and Prade and Saroglou (2015), that the
emotion of awe has a positive impact on prosociality. It also aligns with the vast lit-
erature on the impact of positive emotions on prosociality. Taking a slightly different
approach, and based on the findings by Piff et al. (2015) and Prade and Saroglou
(2015), Result 1 adds to the literature about the social function of awe by proving its
impact on cooperation.
Key Research Question 2 aims to further investigate how the social preferences of
individuals change with the impact of awe. From previous studies, participants with
the experience of awe are expected to be less selfish and more altruistic. However,
it is interesting to see the effect of awe on other distributional types. Overall no
statistically significant results were found between the Walk/Awe and Walk/No Awe
treatments, but significant difference is found in the x-scores between participants
in the Walk/Awe and the baseline treatments. The findings here agree with Result
1, where participants in the Walk/Awe treatment care more about the sum of total
payoffs than the relative “fairness” in payoffs.
Key Research Question 3 explores the rather open question of the stability in the
measurement of personality traits after an awe experience. Result 2 shows that the
awe treatment increases individuals’ agreeableness. In fact, Peterson and Seligman
(2004) have shown that agreeableness links with appreciation of beauty and excel-
lence, and that subjective experience of beauty was proven to be associated with
greater empathy and charitable giving by Einolf (2011). Prade and Saroglou’s (2015)
findings of the moderating effect of agreeableness have also been replicated with re-
spect to cooperation in the public goods game, suggesting that awe leads to higher
agreeableness and higher cooperation levels for individuals who are low in agreeable-
ness. This study agrees with Prade and Saroglou’s (2015) proposition that individuals
who are high in agreeableness do not require the same level of awe as those who are
61
low in agreeableness to exhibit a high level of prosociality or cooperation, therefore
the effect of awe on prosociality/cooperation is more substantial to the latter. On a
side note, this does not imply that the low agreeableness group is more awe-prone
- it simply means that the effect of awe on prosociality/cooperation is maybe more
significant on the low agreeableness group.
There is an evident parallel in the above findings. In answering KRQs 1 and 2,
participants with the awe experience behaved more cooperatively and prosocially in
purely economic tasks. Their behaviour in those tasks can then be explained by the
increase in their psychological measurement of agreeableness. Through exploring the
stability of personality traits with the effect of the awe treatment, the social function
of awe is further bolstered on both the individual level and the group level.
62
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Understanding the factors that affect cooperation and social preferences is an impor-
tant topic in economics. Previous studies on awe have given a glimpse of the transfor-
mative power of awe on both the individual level and the group level. Building from
the existing literature, this study provides insights on how the emotion of awe affects
behaviour, in particular, cooperation, distributional preferences and stability in the
measurement of personality traits. Chapter 1 posed the three research questions and
motivated the research problem. Chapter 2 provided background literature of awe
and key dependent variables of interest such as cooperation, distributional prefer-
ences and stability in the measurement of personality traits. Chapter 3 outlined the
details of the experimental treatments and tasks employed to answer the key research
questions. Chapter 4 provided the answers to the following key research questions
Key Research Question 1. How does the emotion of awe affect cooperation in
economic experiments?
In a 16-round public goods game, participants in the Walk/Awe treatment (balcony
with panoramic views) exhibited higher levels of cooperation. This result suggests
that the self-transcendent ability of awe shifts one’s focus, brings a greater sense of
community and therefore enhances cooperation.
Key Research Question 2. How does the emotion of awe affect distributional
preferences in economic experiments?
Participants in the Walk/Awe treatment were found to have higher x-scores than
those in the baseline treatment. This indicates that after an awe experience individ-
uals tend to be more altruistic.
63
Key Research Question 3. To what extent does the emotion of awe affect per-
sonality reporting?
The personality trait of agreeableness increased in participants after the awe experi-
ence. Given that agreeableness is a predictor of cooperation and prosocial behaviour
(Habashi et al., 2016; Caprara et al., 2009; Volk et al., 2011; Carlo et al., 2005; Kagel
& McGee, 2014), the results here establish a potential indirect relationship between
awe and prosocial behaviour/ cooperation.
However this key finding is not without limitations. To the best of the author’s
knowledge, there were no previous studies showing that a shock experience like awe
can lead to a sudden change in the measurement of personality traits. For the results
to be robust, this finding has to be replicated in future studies.
In this study, the emotion control in Walk/ No Awe appeared to be unsuccessful.
According to Table 12, self-reported awe in the Walk/Awe treatment (M=60.69) is
significantly higher than that in the Baseline treatment (M=41.83), with a t-statistic
of 2.96 (two-tailed p=0.004). However, it is not significant different to the Walk/No
Awe treatment (M=60.73), with a t-statistic of -0.0082 (two-tailed p=0.9934). There
is no clear explanation of why the level of self-reported awe in the Walk/No Awe
treatment is higher than the anticipated level. It may also imply that the design of
an appropriate baseline treatment could be improved.
The design of the Walk/No Awe treatment in this experiment is a potential lim-
itation of this study. The appropriateness of the Walk/No Awe treatment design
affects the significance and validity of the results, as the main results were produced
by comparing the Walk/Awe treatment to the Walk/No Awe treatment.
As with most laboratory experiments, one of the limitations of the study is external
validity. Even though the natural environment bears a closer resemblance to a real
life awe experience, the intensity and complexity of experimentally elicited awe does
differ from a real life awe experience. It is also possible that participants experienced
less awe, as they may have felt less relaxed because they were in an experimental en-
vironment. As in many other studies conducted with student participants, there are
questions as to the extent to which a student sample reflects the entire population.
However these limitations point to opportunities for future studies to be carried out
in the field, especially given the surprisingly scarce number of studies on the emotion
of awe done in the field.
64
The question of how long does the impact of awe experiences last requires further
exploration. Understanding that awe experiences generally occur within a short pe-
riod of time, and understanding whether experiences of awe have a lasting impact on
personality reporting is still yet to be studied.
From a neuro-biological standpoint, it would be interesting for future studies to mea-
sure the Heart Rate Variability (HRV) or brain activities of participants with the
impact of an awe experience. Unfortunately, the scope and duration of this study did
not allow inclusion of these factors.
Overall, this study has more firmly established the social function of awe, and the
role of personality traits in the social function of awe. It has facilitated further under-
standing of awe on both individual and group level. There are important theoretical
implications especially for social preferences in decision making.
65
Appendix A
Experiment screenshots
Figure A.1: Welcome page. Participants were to enter their participant label into the
box above.
Figure A.2: Welcome Page. The experimenter presented participants with a brief
introduction. This screen captures no data.
i
Figure A.3: FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the first screen of the standard FFM
questionnaire before the target experience.
ii
Figure A.4: FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the second screen of the standard FFM
questionnaire before the target experience.
iii
Figure A.5: FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the third screen of the standard FFM
questionnaire before the target experience.
iv
Figure A.6: Demographic questions. This is the first screen of the demographics
questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions such as age,
gender, education, marital status, field of study and whether English is their first
language.
v
Figure A.7: Demographic questions. This is the second screen of the demographics
questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions regarding their
ethnic and religious background.
vi
Figure A.8: Demographic questions. This is the third screen of the demographics
questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions about their de-
voutness to religion, interest in politics, political views, next hour activites as in
Shiota et al. (2007), life satisfaction, health and comments on the experiment.
vii
Figure A.9: Emotional labels (as in Shiota et al., 2007). After the target experience,
participants were asked to describe their emotional state according to the emotional
labels on a scale of 0-100. Two examples of the emotional labels are shown above.
viii
Figure A.10: Instructions for Task A. This screen is to inform participants that Task
A is about to start. The instructions for Task A were read aloud by the experimenter.
Participants also received a physical copy of the instructions when they reach this
screen.
Figure A.11: Contribution page for Task A. Participants were to choose their contri-
bution to the joint project on this page. The top of this page shows participants the
round they are in.
ix
Figure A.12: Results page. This page shows participants the details of all the contri-
butions in the group, as well as the participants earnings for the round.
Figure A.13: Question on the reasoning behind their decisions. Participants were
asked this question about the reasons behind their choice of contribution to the joint
project, after round 8.
x
Figure A.14: Appraisal endorsement for target experience (as in Shiota et al., 2007).
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they remembered having several
appraisals of the target experience, on a scale of 0-100.
Figure A.15: Question on whether the target experience affected their decision to
contribute. Participants in the main treatment were asked this question, whether
they felt the target experience affecting their decisions on how much to contribute in
the PGG.
xi
Figure A.16: Question on participants previous visits to the Gibson Room. Partici-
pants in the main treatment were asked this question, as familiarity may reduce the
level of awe during the experience. Participants were to complete the FFM question-
naire the second time after this question.
Figure A.17: Task B instructions. After the second FFM questionnaire (post-
treatment), the instructions for Task B were shown to participants. Participants
were told by the experimenter that Task B involves ten decisions of splitting money
between you (the participant) and another participant.
xii
Figure A.18: Decision Task for Task B. This is the decision task from Kerschbamer
(2015), with earnings adjusted.
xiii
Figure A.19: Task C instructions. This screen is to inform participants that Task C
is about to start. The instructions for Task C were read aloud by the experimenter.
Participants also received a physical copy of the instructions when they reach this
screen.
xiv
Figure A.20: Decision screen for Task C. Participants start collecting boxes by press-
ing the Start button and they can press Stop anytime. Every second before the Stop
button a box will be marked by a tick symbol, indicating that the box is collected.
Participants press the Solve button to locate the bomb after pressing Stop.
xv
Figure A.21: Results screen for Task C. Participants were informed their earnings for
Task C, including the number of boxes collected and whether the bomb is located in
one of the boxes they collected.
Figure A.22: Payment screen. This is the final screen of the experiment. Participants
were informed the details of their earnings from the experiment, including the selected
rounds for payment.
xvi
Appendix B
Experiment instructions
B.1 Task A instructions
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please end all conversations now and
switch off your mobile phone.
Please read the following instructions carefully.
Your earnings in this experiment will depend on the choices you make. Please
think carefully when making decisions. Your earning will be paid to you in
cash at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate of Experimental Cur-
rency Units (ECUs) to Australian dollars (AUD) will be 20ECU to $1 AUD.
Task A
Task A comprises 16 rounds. You will be in random groups of 3. Each group will be
undertaking a joint project Each group member will be endowed with 100 ECUs for
every round. In each round, you will be asked to choose how much to contribute to
the joint project.
For each round, the contributions of all participants are added up, and multiplied
by the factor of 1.5. That resulting amount will be evenly split among all members
in the group. Your payoff for that round equals your earnings from the project, plus
the amount you did not contribute.
After each round you will see a screen as follows:
xvii
ONE round of the game will be randomly selected by the end of the experiment and
you will be paid according to your earnings in that round.
B.2 Task C instructions
In the following, you will see a 10x10 matrix containing 100 boxes on your screen. As
soon as you start the task by hitting the ’Start’ button, one of the boxes is collected
per second, starting from the top-left corner. Once collected, the box marked by a
tick symbol. For each box collected you earn 2 ECUs.
xviii
Behind one of the boxes hides a bomb that destroys everything that has been
collected. You do not know where the bomb is located.
You only know that the bomb can be in any place with equal probability. The longer
the collecting process, the more likely it is that one of your ticked boxes contains the
bomb but also the more money you will potentially receive.
Your task is to choose when to stop this collecting process. You do so by hitting
’Stop’ at any time. If you collect the box where the bomb is located, the bomb will
explode and you will earn zero. If you stop before collecting the bomb, you gain the
amount accumulated that far and this is added to your final payoff for today.
Please note that you will not know if one of your ticked boxes contains the bomb
until AFTER you have pressed the ’Stop’ button.
xix
At the end of the task boxes are toggled by hitting the ’Solve’ button. A dollar
sign or a fire symbol (for the bomb) will be shown on each of your collected boxes.
xx
Appendix C
Other tests
Table C.1: FFM Personality Traits Stability in measurement (Walk/No Awe vs Base-
line)
FFM Personality Traits Stability in measurement (Walk/No Awe vs Baseline)
Rank Correlation z-score Two sample t-test t-stat
Agreeableness 0.02 -0.40
Conscientiousness 0.94 1.46
Extraversion 0.20 0.33
Neuroticism -0.43 -0.15
Openness -0.85 -0.99
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
xxi
Table C.2: FFM Personality Traits Stability (Walk/No Awe vs Baseline)
Depvar: Difference (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
in personality traits A C E N O
Dummy for Walk/No Awe 0.0379 -0.126 -0.0220 0.0129 0.0756
(0.0946) (0.0866) (0.0673) (0.0853) (0.0762)
Constant -0.160** 0.105* -0.0268 0.102* -0.0442
(0.0665) (0.0609) (0.0473) (0.0599) (0.0535)
Observations 83 83 83 83 83
R-squared 0.002 0.026 0.001 0.000 0.012
(A = Agreeableness, C=Conscientiousness, E=Extraversion
, N=Neuroticism, O=Openness)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
No significant effect was found in any measure of the five factors when comparing the
Walk/No Awe treatment to the Baseline.
xxii
Table C.3: Public Goods Game (Walk/No Awe vs Baseline)
(1)
Depvar: PGG Contribution ME
Treatment dummy for Walk/No Awe 0.592
(5.327)
Self-reported awe 0.0415
(0.0499)
Treatment x self-reported awe -0.107
(0.0863)
Payoff (previous round) -0.310***
(0.0564)
Group contribution (previous round) 0.309***
(0.0166)
Round no. -0.833***
(0.208)
Age -0.142
(1.077)
Treatment x Age 3.911**
(1.759)
Gender -3.502*
(2.114)
Constant 49.76***
(6.913)
Observations 1,230
Number of groups 56
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
No significant effect was found comparing the contribution levels between the Walk/No
Awe treatment to the Baseline.
xxiii
Table C.4: Rank Correlation Coefficients (Five Factors Before vs After)
Rank Correlation Coefficients (Five Factors Before vs After)
(Before and after
treatment)
Baseline Walk/No
Awe
Walk/
Awe
All
Agreeableness 0.86 0.91 0.85 0.87
Conscientiousness 0.88 0.90 0.82 0.88
Extraversion 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.93
Neuroticism 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.90
Openness 0.92 0.90 0.94 0.93
All of the above measures of the five factors before and after the treatment have a
significantly positive correlation according to Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients.
It shows that the treatment itself does not have an effect on the base measurement
of the five factors.
xxiv
Appendix D
Experimental treatment
The following pictures show the view from the balcony (Walk/Awe treatment)
xxv
xxvi
xxvii
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