Hopkins_Conquerors and Slaves - Sociological Studies in Roman History, Volume 1

C O N Q U E R O R S A N D S L A V E S

S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D I E S I N R O M A N H I S T O R Y

V O L U M E 1

CONQUERORS A N D

SLAVES S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D I E S I N R O M A N H I S T O R Y

V O L U M E 1

K E I T H H O P K I N S Professor of Sociology, Brunei University

C A M B R I D G E U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S Cambridge

London New York Melbourne

Published by the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press T h e Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 IRP

Bendey House, 200 Euston Road, L o n d o n N W I 2DB 32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022, U S A

296 Beaconsfield Parade, Middle Park, Melbourne 3206, Australia

© Keith Hopkins 1978

First published 1978

Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Hopkins, Keith.

Conquerors and slaves. (Sociological studies in Roman history; v. 1)

Bibliography: p. Includes index.

1. Slavery in Rome, 2. Social structure. 3. Rome - Social conditions. 4. Rome - History.

I . T i d e . I I . Series.

HT863.H66 3O I-44'93'°9376 7*-9M°9 I S B N o 521 21945 o

C O N T E N T S

List of plates page v i i List of tables v i i i List of figures v i i i Preface i x Abbreviations x i i i Map x v i

I C O N Q U E R O R S A N D S L A V E S : T H E I M P A C T O F

C O N Q U E R I N G A N E M P I R E O N T H E P O L I T I C A L

E C O N O M Y O F I T A L Y I

T h e a r g u m e n t i T h e i n t r u s i o n o f slaves 8 A sketch o f t h e e c o n o m y 15 C o n t i n u o u s w a r 25 T h e p r o d u c t s o f w a r 37 T h e f o r m a t i o n o f large estates 48 L a n d i n polit ics 56 T h e s o l u t i o n - mass m i g r a t i o n 64 S t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d t h e w i d e r i m p l i c a t i o n s

o f change: t h e a r m y , e d u c a t i o n a n d t h e law 74 A p p e n d i x : O n the probable size o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f

t h e ci ty o f R o m e 96

I I T H E G R O W T H A N D P R A C T I C E O F S L A V E R Y I N

R O M A N T I M E S 99

T h e g r o w t h o f a slave society 99 W h y d i d t h e Romans free so m a n y slaves? 115 Conclusions 131

v

Contents

111 B E T W E E N S L A V E R Y A N D F R E E D O M : O N F R E E I N G S L A V E S

A T D E L P H I 133

T h e b a c k g r o u n d 133 F u l l f r e e d o m a n d c o n d i t i o n a l release 141 Prices 158 F a m i l y ties a m o n g the f r e e d 163 Conclusions 168

I V T H E P O L I T I C A L P O W E R O F E U N U C H S 172

T h e p o w e r a n d privi leges o f c o u r t eunuchs 172 Changes i n t h e p o w e r s t r u c t u r e 181 T h e strategic p o s i t i o n o f eunuchs 186

V D I V I N E E M P E R O R S O R T H E S Y M B O L I C U N I T Y O F

T H E R O M A N E M P I R E 197

I n t r o d u c t i o n 197 T h e beg innings o f e m p e r o r w o r s h i p i n R o m e , its

establ ishment a n d d i f f u s i o n 200 Some f u n c t i o n s o f bel ief - the l i v i n g presence 215 O m e n s a n d p o r t e n t s 231 Conclusions 241

Bibliography 243 M o d e r n w o r k s c i ted i n C h a p t e r i 243 M o d e r n w o r k s c i ted i n C h a p t e r 11 246 M o d e r n w o r k s c i ted i n C h a p t e r 111 248 M o d e r n w o r k s c i ted i n C h a p t e r i v 249 M o d e r n w o r k s c i ted i n C h a p t e r v 250

Supplementary bibliography

R o m a n his tory f o r sociologists a n d sociology f o r R o m a n historians 252

Index of subjects 255 Index of proper names 261

v i

P L A T E S

Between pages 222 and 223 i Apotheosis o f Sabina. R o m e , Palazzo d e i Conservatory, I n s t . N e g .

60.2542

2 a Apotheosis o f A n t o n i n u s Pius a n d Faustina. V a t i c a n , A r c h i v i o Fotograf ico Vat icano, M o n u m e n t ! M u s e i e Gal ler ie Pontif ic ie , A r c h . V a t . x v m 27.22

2ft Cameo o f a n e m p e r o r ' s apotheosis. Paris, Cabinet des médail les, B i b l . N a t . C4656

3 a M a x i m i n u s T h r a x . C o p e n h a g e n , N y Car lsberg G l y p o t e k 744. F r o m Archäolog isches I n s t i t u t des deutschen Reiches, M . W e g n e r , ed . , Das römische Herrscherbild: Caracalla ( B e r l i n , 1971) p l . 6 9 a

36 D o m i t i a n . M u n i c h , G l y p o t h e k 394. F r o m W e g n e r , Flavier (1966) p l . 2 3 a

3c M a r c u s A u r e l i u s . R o m e , Museo C a p i t o l i n o , I m p e r a t o r i 38. F r o m W e g n e r , Antonine (1939) p l . 26

3d L u c i u s V e r u s . T u r i n , Museo d i Antichità. F r o m W e g n e r , Antonine

(«939) P1- 41 4 a H a d r i a n . I s t a n b u l , A n t i k e n m u s e u m 585. F r o m W e g n e r , Hadrian

(1956) p l . 16c

46 Severus A l e x a n d e r . Naples, Museo Nazionale 5993. F r o m W e g n e r , Caracalla ( 1971 ) p l . 5 6 a

4c M a r c u s A u r e l i u s . R o m e , C a m p i d o g l i o - A n d e r s o n 347. F r o m W e g n e r , Antonine (1939) p l . 22

4<f A u g u s t u s . V a t i c a n , Museo C h i a r a m o n t i e B r a c c h i o N u o v o

v i i

T A B L E S

1.1 T h e m i l i t a r i s m o f R o m e : the n u m b e r s o f c i t izens s e r v i n g as s o l d i e r s i n t h e R o m a n a r m y , by d e c a d e s , 2 2 5 - 2 3 BC page 33

1.2 P o p u l a t i o n c h a n g e s a n d m i g r a t i o n i n I t a l y , 2 2 5 - 8 BC: s o m e s p e c ulat ive f igures 68

11.1 T h e p o p u l a t i o n o f five s lave societies 101 H I . 1 P r e l i m i n a r y a n a l y s i s o f 1,237 m a n u m i s s i o n s r e c o r d e d a n d s u r

v i v i n g f r o m D e l p h i 140 H I . 2 C o n d i t i o n a l l y f r e e d slaves w e r e i n c r e a s i n g l y e x p l o i t e d 151 H I . 3 T h e a v e r a g e p r i c e s p a i d by slaves f o r f r e e d o m at D e l p h i

(201-1 BC) 159 111.4 T h e cost o f ful l f r e e d o m i n c r e a s e d , b u t t h e cost o f c o n d i t i o n a l

r e l e a s e h e l d steady at D e l p h i (201-1 BC) 161 HI.5 M a n u m i s s i o n s by m a l e s l a v e - o w n e r s d e c r e a s e d ; m a n u m i s s i o n s by

f e m a l e s l a v e - o w n e r s i n c r e a s e d . M a n u m i s s i o n s i n w h i c h relat ives f o r m a l l y c o l l a b o r a t e d i n c r e a s e d 164

i n . 6 S l a v e famil ies w e r e split by m a n u m i s s i o n 166 A p p e n d i x i n . 1 C o n d i t i o n s o f r e l e a s e i n m a n u m i s s i o n s f r o m C a l y m n a 170 111.4 615 R e c a s t to i n c l u d e p r i c e s p a i d by slaves m u l t i p l y f r e e d 171

F I G U R E S

1.1 T h e g r o w t h o f s l a v e r y i n R o m a n I t a l y - a s c h e m e o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e page 12

1.2 P e a s a n t s ate m o s t o f t h e i r o w n p r o d u c e : a h y p o t h e t i c a l s c h e m e 17 1.3 Y o u n g m e n ' s l e n g t h o f s e r v i c e i n t h e R o m a n a r m y : s o m e

c o o r d i n a t e s 34

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P R E F A C E

T h i s is a b o o k about t h e R o m a n e m p i r e . I t is n o t a n a r r a t i v e h is tory , b u t an a t t e m p t to analyse a c h a n g i n g social s t r u c t u r e a n d t o evoke a lost w o r l d . I t is also a n a t t e m p t t o a p p l y some m o d e r n sociological concepts a n d techniques t o R o m a n history . T h a t may seem strange, b u t i t w o u l d n o t have seemed strange t o t h e f o u n d i n g fathers o f sociology, M a r x a n d Weber , n o r t o Pareto. W e b e r w r o t e t w o l o n g w o r k s about t h e ancient w o r l d . Yet most students o f sociology l e a r n m o r e about t h e A r a p e s h , t h e N u e r a n d t h e T r o b r i a n d e r s t h a n they d o about the Romans o r the Chinese, w h o created a n d preserved m i g h t y e m p i r e s a n d h i g h l y i n f l u e n t i a l cul tures .

Social historians o f the post-mediaeval w o r l d have l o n g taken advantage o f deve lopments i n the social sciences. Economic h is tory , d e m o g r a p h i c h is tory , q u a n t i t a t i v e his tory have become accepted, p r o d u c t i v e , even fashionable branches o f h i s t o r y - w r i t i n g . B u t classical historians, w i t h some notable exceptions, have typical ly insulated t h e m selves f r o m these t r e n d s w i t h the n o t i o n that the ancient evidence is too f r a g m e n t a r y a n d t h e ancient w o r l d too a l ien f o r these m o d e r n concepts t o be easily a p p l i e d .

A l l h is tory is c o n t e m p o r a r y h is tory a n d reflects n o t o n l y the prejudices o f the sources b u t c u r r e n t concerns a n d concepts. T h e achievements o f t h e R o m a n w o r l d need t o be i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h e m -pathetic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t t h e Romans themselves t h o u g h t a n d w i t h concepts w h i c h we ourselves use. M o d e r n historians m i g h t wel l take this f o r g r a n t e d , b u t m a n y ancient historians have a l lowed themselves t o be isolated f r o m m a i n s t r e a m m o d e r n history . Several factors have c o n t r i b u t e d : the rigours o f l e a r n i n g classical languages, the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f universit ies, c o n v e n t i o n a n d t r a d i t i o n . W h a t e v e r the causes, t h e results are clear: a w i d e g u l f between the ways i n w h i c h m o d e r n a n d ancient historians w r i t e t h e i r h is tory .

T h i s book l i k e its t w i n v o l u m e (Succession and Descent) a t tempts to b r i d g e t h e gap between m o d e r n concepts a n d ancient sources; sometimes they are w o v e n together i n a single analysis; at o t h e r t imes

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m o r e can be ga ined f r o m m a i n t a i n i n g a c o u n t e r p o i n t between m o d e r n a n d R o m a n perspectives. O n e objective is t o e x p e r i m e n t w i t h m e t h o d s b o r r o w e d f r o m sociology i n o r d e r t o ga in new insights i n t o changes i n R o m a n society - n o t new facts, b u t a d i f f e r e n t way o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between various changes.

T h i s is n o t the place t o e m b a r k o n a l o n g discussion a b o u t methods . T h a t requires an abstract language o f its o w n . B u t let me m e n t i o n one d i f f i cu l ty . T h r o u g h o u t this b o o k I t r y t o e x p l o r e some o f t h e l o n g - t e r m consequences o f repeated actions, f o r e x a m p l e , the consequences o f i m p o r t i n g slaves i n t o I t a l y d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f Rome's i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n , o r o f a l locat ing co lonia l plots t o e m i g r a n t I t a l i a n peasants. I w a n t t o e x p l o r e t h e consequences o f these actions i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l actors. Actors o f t e n d i d n o t k n o w t h e l o n g - t e r m consequences o f t h e i r actions. T h e r e f o r e , I cannot p r o p e r l y f o l l o w t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l practice o f c i t i n g quotat ions f r o m a n ancient source i n o r d e r t o authent icate each step i n the a r g u m e n t . T h e ancient source, i f we are lucky , tells us o n l y w h a t a n ancient a u t h o r t h o u g h t was h a p p e n i n g a n d h o w he fe l t a b o u t i t , o r h o w he t h o u g h t t h a t others fe l t a b o u t i t . T h a t is obviously i m p o r t a n t , b u t p a r t i a l . I n the face o f this d i f f i cu l ty , we have t o l o o k o u t f o r o t h e r m e t h o d s by w h i c h we can val idate analyses. O f course n e i t h e r e f fort n o r awareness o f t h e diff icult ies guarantees success.

H i s t o r y is a conversat ion w i t h t h e dead. W e have several advantages over o u r i n f o r m a n t s . W e t h i n k we k n o w w h a t h a p p e n e d subsequently; we can take a l o n g e r view, clear o f e p h e m e r a l d e t a i l ; we can d o a l l the t a l k i n g ; a n d w i t h a l l o u r pre judices , we are alive. W e s h o u l d n o t t h r o w away these advantages by p r e t e n d i n g t o be j u s t col lators o r i n t e r p r e t e r s o f o u r sources. W e can d o m o r e t h a n that . A l m o s t inevi tably , whatever o u r a m b i t i o n s , we f in ish u p by f o i s t i n g s i m p l i f y i n g f ictions o n t h e complexi t ies o f a past w h i c h is largely lost. A t first sight, this may seem u n f l a t t e r i n g ; b u t i t helps account f o r some o f t h e differences between successive generat ions o f historians. H i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s d o n o t necessarily get better; m a n y s i m p l y change. Even so, o n e o f t h e persistent p r o b l e m s i n each g e n e r a t i o n is h o w t o choose between c o m p e t i n g fictions. T h a t is w h e r e sociological m e t h o d s can be h e l p f u l . A n d that is w h y these t w o books m a k e use o f sociological concepts a n d a r g u m e n t s , set o u t e x p l i c i t hypotheses, a n d seek t o s u p p o r t those a r g u m e n t s w i t h models , figures a n d coordinates , as wel l as w i t h q u o t a t ions f r o m t h e sources. T h e y are a l l a t tempts t o reveal h o w Romans t h o u g h t a n d t o measure l inks between factors; they are a t tempts t o l i m i t t h e arena w i t h i n w h i c h elusive a n d c o m p e t i n g t r u t h s may p r o b a b l y be f o u n d .

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M o d e r n historians w i t h t h e i r w e a l t h o f data sometimes seek to discover w h y actors behaved as they d i d ; they seek t o recover i n t e n t i o n . A n c i e n t historians f o r t h e most p a r t k n o w o n l y about behaviour ; they are t h e r e f o r e sometimes t e m p t e d t o read back f r o m b e h a v i o u r t o i n t e n t i o n by i m p u t i n g r a t i o n a l i t y . T w o obvious p r o b l e m s arise: whose rat ional i ty? a n d s h o u l d we assume t h a t actors (emperors , generals o r peasants) were rat ional? I n the c h a p t e r called ' D i v i n e e m p e r o r s ' , I t r y t o show h o w sociologists are concerned n o t o n l y w i t h statisticsand models b u t also w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g actors' t h o u g h t s a n d feelings a n d w i t h symbolic ac t ion; i n this chapter I e x a m i n e w h a t we i n o u r c u l t u r e w o u l d p r o b a b l y call t h e i r r a t i o n a l a n d t h e u n t r u e . I suggest that cer ta in u n t r u e stories about e m p e r o r s ( r u m o u r s , predic t ions , miracles) were t h e c u r r e n c y o f the pol i t i ca l system, just as m o n e y was the currency o f t h e economic system. These u n t r u e stories have been largely neglected, because p r o p e r historians, l ike detectives, are t r a i n e d to scent o u t t h e t r u t h . Yet i f we w a n t t o enter the t h o u g h t - w o r l d o f the Romans, we m u s t r e s t r a i n o u r prejudices a n d treat Mies' seriously.

I have been e x t r e m e l y f o r t u n a t e i n m y advisers. Professors P. A . B r u n t a n d M . I . Finley have read chapter after chapter w i t h m e t i c u lous care a n d cr i t ica l a c u m e n ; D r J . A . N o r t h has r e a d the final version o f each chapter a n d saved m e f r o m n u m e r o u s e r r o r s o f fact a n d t h o u g h t . Professor Sir H e n r y Phelps B r o w n has g iven m e repeated tutor ia ls i n economics a n d I w o u l d l i k e t o t h a n k Professor R. P. D o r e f o r his f r i e n d l y encouragement . I n a d d i t i o n several scholars have g iven m e t h e i r advice o n i n d i v i d u a l chapters: C h r i s t i a n H a b i c h t a n d Chester Starr read C h a p t e r i ; D a v i d A p t e r a n d E d w a r d Shils m a d e suggestions a b o u t C h a p t e r n ; E r n s t B a d i a n i m p r o v e d C h a p t e r i n considerably; R o b e r t Bocock gave m e t h o u g h t f u l advice about C h a p t e r i v as d i d Geoffrey L l o y d about C h a p t e r v .

T h i s b o o k has been over ten years i n t h e w r i t i n g a n d over that t i m e I have i n c u r r e d debts o f g r a t i t u d e to colleagues i n several universit ies a n d t o ins t i tut ions w h i c h have been generous i n t h e i r grants o f research f u n d s . I a m p a r t i c u l a r l y g r a t e f u l t o King 's College, C a m b r i d g e f o r the g r a n t o f a four-year research fe l lowship , t o t h e I n s t i t u t e o f A d v a n c e d Study, P r i n c e t o n w h i c h f o r t w o years, 1969-70 a n d 1974-5, al lowed m e t o sit q u i e t l y r e a d i n g a n d t h i n k i n g i n ideal circumstances; I a m also very g r a t e f u l t o Professors F r a n k G i l l i a m a n d C a r l Kaysen f o r n u m e r o u s conversations, as wel l as t o m y o t h e r colleagues at the I n s t i t u t e . T h e N u f f i e l d F o u n d a t i o n , t h e Social Research D i v i s i o n o f t h e L o n d o n School o f Economics, t h e Social Sciences Research C o u n c i l a n d B r u n e i U n i v e r s i t y have each p r o v i d e d m e w i t h f u n d s w i t h w h i c h I c o u l d e m p l o y research assistants t o h e l p w i t h t h e e n o r m o u s task o f

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c o d i n g ancient data. I w a n t t o t h a n k L y n d a Rees, G r a h a m B u r t o n , P. J . Roscoe a n d O l i v e r N i c h o l s o n f o r h a r d w o r k a n d amused tolerance. F inal ly , I s h o u l d l ike t o t h a n k m y colleagues at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Leicester w h o first t a u g h t m e sociology, a n d m y colleagues at the LSE a n d B r u n e i w h o to lerated m y strange interests i n the R o m a n w o r l d .

K . H .

L o n d o n N o v e m b e r 1977

x i i

L I S T O F A B B R E V I A T I O N S U S E D

AE Année Epigraphique. Ancient Roman Statutes A.C. J o h n s o n et al., A Translation with Commentary,

A u s t i n , T e x a s , 1961 BMCRE Coins of the Roman Empire in the Brituh Museum, e d . H . M a t t i n g l e y

et al., L o n d o n 1 9 2 3 - . CAH The Cambridge Ancient History, e d . J . B . B u r y etal., C a m b r i d g e , 1923-39. CCAG Catalogus codicum astrologorum gracecorum, v o l , 6, e d . W . K r o l l ,

B r u s s e l s , 1903; vol . 8, e d . F . C u m o n t et ai., B r u s s e l s , 1911-29. CIG Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum, e d . A . B o e c k h et al., B e r l i n , 1828-77. CIL Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, e d . T . M o m m s e n et al., B e r l i n , 1 8 6 3 - . CJ Codex Justinianus, e d . P. Krüger, B e r l i n , 1877. Corp. Pap. Jud. Corpus Papyrorum Judaicorum, e d . V . A . T c h e r i k o v e r et al.,

C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . , 1957-64. CPR Corpus Papyrorum Raineri, e d . C . W e s s e l y , V i e n n a , 1895. CSHB Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, e d . B . G . N i e b u h r et al., B o n n ,

1828-78. C. Th. Codex Theodosianus, e d . T . M o m m s e n , B e r l i n , 1905.

The Theodosian Code, t r a n s . C . P h a r r , P r i n c e t o n , 1952. D . T h e Digest o f J u s t i n i a n , e d . T . M o m m s e n , B e r l i n , 1870.

ESAR T . F r a n k et at., An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, B a l t i m o r e , M d . ,

»933-40· FD Fouilles de Delphes, e d . G . D a u x et al., P a r i s , 1 9 2 2 - . F I RA Fontes Iuris Romani Anteiustiniani, e d . S . R i c c o b o n o et al., F l o r e n c e * ,

i 9 4 0 - 3 -GCS Die griechische christliche Schriftsteller, L e i p z i g , 1897- . GDI H . C o l l i t z , J . B a u n a c k et al., Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-

Inschriften, Göttingen, 1899. IG Inscriptiones Graecae, B e r l i n , 1873- · ILAlg Inscriptions Latines de VAlgérie, e d . S. G s e l l , P a r i s , 1922-57. ILS Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, e d . H . D e s s a u , B e r l i n , 1892-1916. JRS Journal of Roman Studies. MG H Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auetores antiquissimi, B e r l i n , 1 8 7 7 - 9 1 · NJ J u s t i n i a n ' s Novellae, e d . R . Schöll a n d W . K r o l l , B e r l i n , 1895. OGIS Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae, e d . W . D i t t e n b e r g e r , L e i p z i g ,

i9°3-5-ORF Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta, e d . H . M a l c o v a t i , T u r i n 3 , 1967.

PBSR Papers of the British School at Rome.

x i i i

List of abbreviations

PG Patrologioe cursus computus, series Groeco, e d . J . -P. M i g n e , P a r i s , 1857- . P . O . Potrologia Orientalis, vols. 18-19, e < *- R- G r a f f i n a n d F . N a u , P a r i s ,

1924-6. P.Giss. Griechische Papyri im Museum... zu Glessen, e d . O . E g e r et at., L e i p z i g ,

1910-12. P.Lond. Greek Papyri in the British Museum, e d . F . G . K e n y o n et al., L o n d o n ,

1893-1917. P.Oxy. The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, e d . B . P. G r e n f e l l et al., L o n d o n , 1 8 9 8 - . PSI Papiri greci e latini, e d . G . V i t e l l i et al., F l o r e n c e , 1 9 1 2 - . R.A.C. Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, e d . T . K l a u s e r , Stuttgart ,

1 9 5 0 - . RE Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, e d . A . F . v o n

P a u l y et al., Stuttgart , 1 8 9 4 - . RIB The Roman Inscriptions of Britain, e d . R . G . C o l l i n g w o o d a n d R . P.

W r i g h t , O x f o r d , 1965. SIG Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, e d . W . D i t t e n b e r g e r , L e i p z i g 3 ,

1915-24. TAM Tituli Asiae Minoris, e d . E . K a i i n k a et al., V i e n n a , 1901- . ZSS Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung.

To f i n d s t a n d a r d e d i t i o n s o f c lassical a u t h o r s , see The Oxford Classical Dictionary, e d . N . G . L . H a m m o n d , O x f o r d 2 , 1970, o r W . B u c h w a l d et al., Tusculum Lexikon griechischer und lateinischer Autoren, M u n i c h , 1963. F o r t r a n s l a t i o n s a n d texts, see t h e L o e b C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y ; m a n y u s e f u l t r a n s l a t i o n s a r e also i n T h e P e n g u i n C l a s s i c s . S e l e c t e d s o u r c e s a r e t r a n s l a t e d w i t h a c o m m e n t a r y i n N . L e w i s a n d M . R e i n h o l d , Roman Civilization, H a r p e r T o r c h -b o o k s , N e w Y o r k , 1966, two v o l u m e s .

M e a s u r e s a n d c o i n s T h e f o l l o w i n g r o u g h e q u i v a l e n c e s a r e u s e d : 1 modius — 8 . 6 2 - 8 . 6 7 l i tres = 6.5 k g w h e a t 1 medimnos = 52 l itres = 39 k g w h e a t 1 iugerum = 0.25 h e c t a r e = 0.625 a c r e

4 H S (sesterces) = 1 denarius (dn) = 1 drachma (dr) 100 drachmae = 1 mna (usually)

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S T h e f o l l o w i n g t r a n s l a t i o n s a r e r e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n o f P e n g u i n B o o k s L t d :

P l u t a r c h , Makers of Rome, t r a n s l a t e d by I a n S c o t t - K i l v e r t ( P e n g u i n C l a s s i c s , 1965), p p . 145, 159-60, 160-2 C o p y r i g h t © I a n S c o t t - K i l v e r t , 1965

T a c i t u s , The Annab of Imperial Rome, t r a n s l a t e d by M i c h a e l G r a n t ( P e n g u i n C l a s s i c s , 1971)» p p . 112, 175-6 C o p y r i g h t © M i c h a e l G r a n t P u b l i c a t i o n s L t d , 1956, 1959, 1971

T a c i t u s , The Histories, t r a n s l a t e d by K e n n e t h W e l l e s l e y ( P e n g u i n C l a s s i c s , 1972), p p . 2 6 3 - 4 C o p y r i g h t © K e n n e t h W e l l e s l e y , 1964, 1972

x i v

To Juliet

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The Roman Empire in the 2nd 0 m i l .,>«., bOO

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Mountain areas «*oovs» îOOOm ar»? i>h;»d<»j

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I C O N Q U E R O R S A N D S L A V E S :

T H E I M P A C T O F C O N Q U E R I N G A N E M P I R E O N T H E P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y

O F I T A L Y

T H E A R G U M E N T

A t its h e i g h t , t h e R o m a n e m p i r e stretched f r o m t h e n o r t h o f E n g l a n d t o the banks o f t h e r i v e r E u p h r a t e s , f r o m the Black Sea to t h e A d a n t i c coast o f Spain (see m a p ) . I ts t e r r i t o r y covered a n area equal t o m o r e t h a n h a l f that o f c o n t i n e n t a l U S A a n d i t is n o w spl i t a m o n g m o r e t h a n t w e n t y n a t i o n states. T h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n was t h e empire ' s o w n i n t e r n a l sea. I t s p o p u l a t i o n is c o n v e n t i o n a l l y est imated at a b o u t fifty t o sixty m i l l i o n people i n the first c e n t u r y A D , a b o u t o n e fifth o r o n e s i x t h o f t h e w o r l d p o p u l a t i o n at t h e t i m e . 1 Even today this w o u l d be cons idered a large n a t i o n a l p o p u l a t i o n , d i f f i c u l t t o g o v e r n w i t h t h e a i d o f m o d e r n technology. Yet t h e R o m a n e m p i r e persisted as a single po l i t i ca l system f o r at least six centuries (200 B C - A D 400); its i n t e g r a t i o n a n d preservat ion surely r a n k , w i t h t h e Chinese e m p i r e , as o n e o f t h e greatest po l i t i ca l achievements o f m a n k i n d .

T h e m a i n subject o f this chapter is t h e i m p a c t o f a c q u i r i n g a n e m p i r e o n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l a n d economic i n s t i t u t i o n s o f t h e c o n q u e r o r s . Most o f this story is w e l l k n o w n . I shall n o t t r y t o give yet a n o t h e r deta i led c h r o n o l o g i c a l account. Instead I have selected c e r t a i n repeatedly i m p o r t a n t e lements i n t h e process o f conquest (such as t h e m i l i t a r i s t i c ethos o f t h e c o n q u e r o r s , the economic consequences o f i m p o r t i n g t w o m i l l i o n slaves i n t o I t a l y , the shortage o f f a r m i n g l a n d a m o n g t h e free p o o r ) a n d I have a t t e m p t e d t o analyse t h e i r r e l a t i o n ships t o each o t h e r . T h i s involves g o i n g over f a m i l i a r t e r r i t o r y , i f sometimes by u n f a m i l i a r paths. R o m a n his tory can be p r o f i t a b l y s t u d i e d f r o m several v i e w p o i n t s w h i c h c o m p l e m e n t each o t h e r .

T h e acquis i t ion o f a h u g e e m p i r e i n t h e last t w o centuries before C h r i s t t r a n s f o r m e d a large sector o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l I t a l i a n economy. T h e i n f l u x o f i m p e r i a l p r o f i t s i n t h e f o r m o f booty a n d taxes c h a n g e d 1 F o r estimates of world population, based on backward extrapolation and on estimates

of Chinese and R o m a n populations of this period, see D. M. Heer, Society and Population (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968) 2.

I

Conquerors and slaves

the c i ty o f R o m e f r o m a large t o w n to a r e s p l e n d e n t city, capital o f a n e m p i r e . B y the e n d o f t h e last c e n t u r y B C , the p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e city o f R o m e was i n t h e r e g i o n o f o n e m i l l i o n . R o m e was one o f t h e largest p r e - i n d u s t r i a l cities ever created by m a n . 2 I t was here t h a t aristocrats d isplayed t h e i r booty i n t r i u m p h a l processions, spent most o f t h e i r i n c o m e a n d c o m p e t e d w i t h each o t h e r i n ostentatious l u x u r y . T h e i r p r i v a t e e x p e n d i t u r e , a n d p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e o n b u i l d i n g m o n u ments , temples , roads a n d d r a i n s , d i r e c t l y a n d i n d i r e c d y c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e l i v e l i h o o d o f several h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d new inhabi tants . I m m i g r a t i o n f r o m t h e c o u n t r y s i d e was also e n c o u r a g e d by t h e g r a n t o f state subsidies o n wheat d i s t r i b u t e d t o citizens l i v i n g i n the c i ty o f R o m e .

T h e g r o w t h i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e capita l c i ty a n d i n d e e d i n the p o p u l a t i o n o f I t a l y as a w h o l e (see T a b l e 1.2), i m p l i e d a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the c o u n t r y s i d e . T h e people l i v i n g i n t h e city o f R o m e c o n s t i t u t e d a h u g e m a r k e t f o r the purchase o f f o o d p r o d u c e d o n I t a l i a n f a r m s : wheat , w i n e , o l ive o i l , c l o t h a n d m o r e specialised p r o d u c e . T o be sure, t h e city o f R o m e was f e d p a r t l y f r o m t h e provinces; a t e n t h o f t h e Sici l ian wheat c r o p , f o r e x a m p l e , was extracted as tax a n d was o f t e n sent to R o m e . B u t a large p a r t o f the f o o d c o n s u m e d i n t h e city o f R o m e a n d i n o t h e r p r o s p e r o u s towns such as C a p u a a n d Puteol i also came f r o m estates newly f o r m e d i n I t a l y , o w n e d by rich Romans a n d cu l t ivated by slaves. 3

T h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f a subsistence e c o n o m y w h i c h h a d previously p r o d u c e d o n l y a small s u r p l u s i n t o a m a r k e t e c o n o m y w h i c h p r o d u c e d a n d c o n s u m e d a large s u r p l u s was achieved by increas ing the p r o d u c t i v i t y o f a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r o n l a r g e r farms. Fewer m e n p r o d u c e d m o r e f o o d . U n d e r - e m p l o y e d smal l-holders were e x p e l l e d f r o m t h e i r plots a n d replaced by a smal ler n u m b e r o f slaves. 4 T h e r i c h b o u g h t

2 Rome was the largest city in the world and was perhaps not equalled in size before the rise of the great cities of C h i n a in the Sung dynasty. See G . Rozman, Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan (Princeton, 1973) 35 and the compendious, useful but not obviously reliable T . Chandler and G . Fox, 3000 Years of Urban Growth (New York, 1974). T h e population of L o n d o n reached about one million in 1800 and it was then by far the largest city in E u r o p e . I n 1600, only two E u r o p e a n cities had populations over 200,000 namely Paris and Naples.

3 T h e r e is no direct confirmation of this generalisation in the classical texts. But that does not matter. W e must suppose either that large Italian landowners sold the produce of their estates to Italian townsmen, or that they got no return on the capital which they repeatedly invested both in land and in the slaves who worked it. T h e first generalisation seems more economical.

4 It is not possible to prove this assertion by the traditional method of selective quotation from classical sources. F o r example, Livy (6.12) suggested that the frequent wars in a district of central Italy in an earlier period might be explained by its high population. H e noted that in his time the district produced few soldiers, and would have been deserted but for slaves. My assertion is compatible with such passages in the sources, but cannot be validated by them. Instead, I have tried to consider

2

The argument

u p t h e i r l a n d , o r t o o k possession o f i t by violence. T h e y reorganised smal l -holdings i n t o l a r g e r a n d m o r e p r o f i t a b l e f a r m s i n o r d e r t o c o m p e t e w i t h o t h e r nobles, t o increase t h e r e t u r n o n t h e i r investment i n l a n d a n d i n slaves, a n d t o e x p l o i t t h e i r slaves m o r e effectively. M o r e o v e r , i n m a n y parts o f I t a l y , large land-owners changed the p a t t e r n o f land-use. 5 Considerable areas o f arable l a n d were t u r n e d i n t o pasture, perhaps so t h a t h i g h e r value p r o d u c e such as w o o l o r meat , instead o f wheat , c o u l d be sold i n the c i ty o f R o m e , even after t h e heavy t r a n s p o r t costs h a d b e n p a i d . O t h e r l a n d was c o n v e r t e d i n t o o l ive p lantat ions a n d v ineyards , a n d t h e value o f its p r o d u c e increased. These i m p r o v e m e n t s were i m p o r t a n t ; they figured largely i n R o m a n h a n d b o o k s o n a g r i c u l t u r e . B u t t h e i r scope was l i m i t e d by t h e size o f the available m a r k e t . M a n y peasant f a r m s r e m a i n e d intact . A f t e r a l l , the u r b a n p o o r c o n s t i t u t e d t h e o n l y mass m a r k e t , a n d they p r o b a b l y spent about as m u c h o n b r e a d as o n w i n e a n d ol ive o i l t o g e t h e r . 6 T h i s

both the probability and the consequences of the assertion being wrong, and then to ask: What alternative assertion is more likely to be true? T h i s procedure, based on a compatibility theory of historical truth, is used often in this book.

5 * I was the first to make shepherds give way to ploughmen on the public land*, Inscriptiones Lotinoe liberoe rei publico*, ed. A . Degrassi (Florence, 1957-63) n° 454. T h i s was one of the proud boasts of a consul (? of 132 BC) who had a milestone, in the genre of a market cross, set up in a southern Italian town and inscribed with his achievements. T h e inscription is commonly understood to refer to the distribution of public land to small-holders in accordance with the Gracchan land laws (133 BC). V a r r o (On Agriculture 2, preface 4) also wrote that latterly Romans had * turned arable into pasture out of greed and against the law*.

F r o m such snippets, it is difficult to prove any general change in land use. But my general impression is that the rapid expansion of pasture and vineyards was based on the conversion of arable as well as on the extension of private property over hitherto unclaimed or common lands. O n the growth in volume and prestige of Italian wines, dated to the second century BC, see Pliny, Natural History 14.87-8; on the growth of pasture, see A . J . Toynbee, Hannibal*s Legacy (Oxford, 1965) vol. 2, 286ff.

s T h e relative size of the markets for agricultural crops is obviously an important problem. T h e ancient data are clearly insufficient. As a sighting shot, without any implication that the prices in Rome were of the same order and for illustration only, I looked at the single case of Madrid in the mid-eighteenth century. Goods entering the city (which had a population of about 135,000 in 1757) were checked for customs; in 1757, imports totalled as followed: 96,000 arrobas of olive oil, 500,000 arrobas of wine, 520,000 fanegas of wheat. I took average prices for 1753-62 for New Castille from L . J . Hamilton, War and Prices in Spain 1651-1800 (New Y o r k , 1957) 229 ff. and figures on consumption from D. R. Ringrose, * Transportation and economic stagnation in 18th-century Castille', Journal of Economic History 28 (1968) 51-79. O f the three products, wheat consistuted 46 % of the total costs; wine 45 %; olive oil 9 %. Wheat consumption works out at about 160 kg per person year, wine at 100 litres per adult year - which is rather low for wheat and high for wine. However, these figures can serve as only a very rough guide. F o r comparison, I posited the same consumption but with prices from Marseille, 1701-10; this produced somewhat different ratios of cost: wheat 6 4 % , wine 19%, oil 17%; data from R. Baehrel, Une Croissance (Paris, 1961) 530ft. I n Rome wheat was probably also the single most important product, in volume and value, particularly for the poor.

3


weakness i n the aggregate p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r o f t h e u r b a n sector h e l p e d insulate a sizeable sector o f t h e I t a l i a n peasantry f r o m t h e a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n w h i c h t r a n s f o r m e d w o r k i n g practices o n larger farms.

T h e conquest o f a n e m p i r e affected t h e I t a l i a n c o u n t r y s i d e i n several o t h e r i m p o r t a n t respects. M i l i t a r y campaigns a l l a r o u n d t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin f o r c e d p r o l o n g e d m i l i t a r y service o n tens o f thousands o f peasants. T h r o u g h o u t t h e last t w o centuries B C , t h e r e were c o m m o n l y over 100,000 I ta l ians s e r v i n g i n t h e a r m y , t h a t is m o r e t h a n t e n p e r cent o f t h e est imated a d u l t male p o p u l a t i o n . 7 G l o b a l n u m b e r s disguise i n d i v i d u a l s u f f e r i n g ; we have t o t h i n k w h a t p r o l o n g e d m i l i t a r y service m e a n t t o i n d i v i d u a l peasants, w h a t its i m p l i c a tions were f o r t h e i r famil ies a n d f o r t h e f a r m s off w h i c h they l i v e d . M a n y s ingle- family f a r m s c o u l d bear t h e absence o f a g r o w n - u p son, even f o r several years; m i l i t a r y service m a y even have h e l p e d by g i v i n g t h e m some a l ternat ive e m p l o y m e n t a n d pay. B u t i n some famil ies , t h e c o n s c r i p t i o n o f t h e o n l y a d u l t male o r t h e absence o f a n o n l y son i n t h e a r m y overseas w h e n his f a t h e r d i e d m e a n t increas ing p o v e r t y a n d d e b t . 8

O v e r t i m e , mass m i l i t a r y service m u s t have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f m a n y free R o m a n smal l-holders . A t least we k n o w t h a t thousands o f R o m a n peasants lost t h e i r l a n d . I n a d d i t i o n invasions by C a r t h a g i n i a n s a n d Celtic tr ibes, slave rebel l ions a n d c iv i l wars w h i c h were repeatedly f o u g h t o n I t a l i a n soil a l l c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l h o l d i n g s . Even so, m o r e I t a l i a n peasants m i g h t have s u r v i v e d b o t h t h e d e m a n d s o f m i l i t a r y service a n d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f w a r b u t f o r o n e o t h e r factor: t h e massive i n v e s t m e n t by t h e r i c h o f t h e p r o f i t s d e r i v e d f r o m e m p i r e i n I t a l i a n l a n d . T h e r i c h c o u l d establish large estates i n I t a l y o n l y by t h e wholesale ev ic t ion o f I t a l i a n peasants f r o m t h e i r f a r m s . T y p i c a l l y these estates were

7 See T a b l e 1.1 below, which deals with R o m a n citizen soldiers only. P. A . Brunt, Italian Manpower 225 BC-AD 14 (Oxford, 1971) 425 lists the size of the Italian armed forces for the twenty-one years between 200 and 168 BC for which we have full information. T h e average size of the army and smallish fleet was about 140,000, drawn from an adult male population of about one million (ibid. 59).

6 I n the traditional Roman histories, folk-heroes faced similar problems; it seems likely that their problems reflected anxieties which persisted. F o r example, Cincinnatus summoned to be dictator while working at the plough is said to have exclaimed:' My land will not be sown this year, and so we shall r u n the risk of not having enough to eat* (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 10.17). Another famous general, Atilius Regulus serving in Africa d u r i n g the first war against Carthage wrote to the senate to say that the bailiff of his small farm had died, that a farm hand had taken the stock, and requested that a replacement be sent to see to its cultivation, so that his wife and children should not starve (Valerius Maximus 4.4.6). Poor soldiers had no such privilege.

4

The argument

c u l t i v a t e d by i m p o r t e d slaves. T h e d isplacement o f large n u m b e r s o f f ree peasants by slaves h e l p e d t r a n s f o r m t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l e c o n o m y o f I t a l y , a n d f o m e n t e d t h e p o l i t i c a l conflicts o f t h e late Republ ic .

T h e mass ev ic t ion o f t h e p o o r by t h e rich u n d e r l a y t h e po l i t i ca l conflicts a n d c i v i l wars o f t h e last c e n t u r y o f t h e R o m a n Republ ic . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e possession o f p u b l i c l a n d (oger publicus) a n d its redist r i b u t i o n t o t h e p o o r became a m a j o r po l i t i ca l issue, a n d exacerbated t h e tensions between t h e r i c h a n d t h e p o o r . 9 T h i s p u b l i c l a n d i n I t a l y h a d been k e p t a p a r t o u t o f l a n d sequestrated by t h e Romans f r o m c o n q u e r e d tr ibes o r rebel l ious allies, ostensibly f o r t h e collective benefit . I t c o n s t i t u t e d a s ignif icant b u t m i n o r p a r t o f a l l R o m a n l a n d , b e i n g by m o d e r n estimates w e l l less t h a n a fifth o f a l l R o m a n l a n d i n the m i d - t h i r d c e n t u r y B C , a n d h a r d l y m o r e t h a n t h a t i n the second c e n t u r y B C (such estimates are inevi tably c r u d e ) ; b u t its m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n became a po l i t i ca l cause célèbre. T h e p u b l i c l a n d was concentrated i n t h e hands o f t h e r i c h ; t h e laws w h i c h p r o h i b i t e d large h o l d i n g s o f p u b l i c l a n d were i g n o r e d (so Cato, f r a g . 167 ORF); a n d t h e rents w h i c h s h o u l d have been p a i d to t h e state w e r e by senatorial i n e r t i a left uncol lected ( L i v y 42.19). 1 0

A n a r r a t i v e h i s t o r y o f t h e last c e n t u r y o f t h e Republ ic w o u l d be p u n c t u a t e d by conflicts over this l a n d , by l a n d laws a n d by l a n d dist r i b u t i o n s , w h i c h were m o r e o f t e n p r o p o s e d t h a n effected. I n 133 B C f o r e x a m p l e , a y o u n g aristocratic a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r i b u n e o f t h e people p r o p o s e d t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c l a n d i l legal ly h e l d by t h e r i c h . H e was assassinated by his o p p o n e n t s i n t h e senate, b u t t h e l a n d c o m m i s s i o n w h i c h he h a d f o u n d e d succeeded i n d i s t r i b u t i n g

• Ancient commentators on the political struggles of the late Republic usually saw the main axis of conflict as between nobles and the people; see L . R. Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley, 1944). T h e direct opposition rich-poor is only rarely mentioned in historical sources of the period (see, for example Appian, Civil Wars 1.10). Nevertheless, it seems to have underlain much social and political conflict; see the interesting discussion by M . I . Finley, The Ancient Economy (London,

«973) 35ff-1 0 See Toynbee (1965): vol. 1, 166; vol. 2, 556-7). T h e traditional histories reflect this

concern with the maldistribution of public land, sometimes anachronistically. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Roman Antiquities 8.73-75; cf. 9.51 ) who lived in the reign of Augustus; he recorded a debate purportedly held in 486 BC, but it probably reflected typical attitudes of a much later period. A leading senator, Appius, said (73.4): ' A s things now stand, the envy of the poor against the rich who have appropriated and continue to occupy the public lands is justified; it is not surprising that they demand that public property should be divided among all citizens instead of being held by the f e w . . . ' B u t he went on to argue that splitting state-land into small lots would be troublesome to the poor, because they were poor; it would be better for the state to lease land in large lots: these would bring in large revenues, from which soldiers could be paid and fed. With some refinements, the suggestion was generally approved. F o r a long discussion of the evidence, see G . TibUetti, ' II Possesso dell* Ager Publicus*, Athenaeum 26 (1948) 173-236.

5


some l a n d t o p o o r citizens. T h e t r o u b l e was that i n spite o f legal safeguards, the new settlers were as l ike ly t o be evicted as t h e o l d ; t h e same forces were st i l l at w o r k . A g a i n i n t h e first c e n t u r y B C , c i t izen soldiers w h o h a d m i l i t a r y p o w e r a n d t h e p a t r o n a g e o f p o l i t i c a l generals such as Sulla, Pompey a n d Jul ius Caesar, occasionally secured smal lh o l d i n g s f o r themselves at t h e e n d o f t h e i r service. B u t they usually t o o k over l a n d w h i c h was a lready b e i n g c u l t i v a t e d by o t h e r smal l h o l d e r s , a n d i n a d d i t i o n , some o f t h e m f a i l e d t o settle d o w n o n t h e i r lands, w h i c h were again b o u g h t u p by t h e r i c h . T h u s t h e successive r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f smal l -hold ings p r o b a b l y d i d n o t s ignif icant ly increase t h e to ta l n u m b e r o f smal l -holders , even i f i t s lowed d o w n t h e i r d e m i s e . 1 1 T h e overa l l tendency was f o r p o o r R o m a n s t o be squeezed o u t o f any s ignif icant share i n the p r o f i t s o f conquest so l o n g as they stayed i n t h e I t a l i a n c o u n t r y s i d e .

T h e c e n t r a l place o f l a n d i n R o m a n polit ics s p r a n g f r o m t h e overw h e l m i n g i m p o r t a n c e o f l a n d i n the R o m a n economy. L a n d a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r r e m a i n e d the t w o most i m p o r t a n t const i tuents o f weal th i n a i l per iods o f R o m a n his tory . M a n u f a c t u r i n g , t r a d e a n d u r b a n rents were o f m i n o r i m p o r t a n c e i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h a g r i c u l t u r e . T h a t does n o t m e a n they s h o u l d be i g n o r e d ; the d e p l o y m e n t o f t e n to t w e n t y per cent o f the l a b o u r force i n n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l tasks is one o f t h e factors w h i c h di f ferentiates a few p r e - i n d u s t r i a l societies f r o m the rest. I n I t a l y at t h e e n d o f the p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n , t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n engaged i n u r b a n occupations m a y have risen towards t h i r t y p e r cent (see T a b l e 1.2; t h e figures are speculative), because t h e prof i t s o f e m p i r e a n d t h e economic changes, ref lected i n t h e change o f o c c u p a t i o n f r o m c o u n t r y t o t o w n , f r o m a g r i c u l t u r e t o handicra f ts o r t o service trades, were c o n c e n t r a t e d i n I t a l y . T h e city o f R o m e was the capital o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin. I n t h e rest o f t h e R o m a n e m p i r e , the p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e l a b o u r force p r i m a r i l y engaged i n a g r i c u l t u r e was p r o b a b l y i n the o r d e r o f n i n e t y p e r cent, as i t h a d been i n I t a l y before t h e p e r i o d o f e x p a n s i o n . 1 2 B u t even i n I t a l y

1 1 Soldiers were commonly given land which was already under cultivation; 'where the plough and reaping hook have been', as a law of Augustus on colonies stated (Hyginus, On the Fixing of Boundaries, ed. L a c h m a n n (Berlin, 1848) 203). T h i s led to repeated friction between colonists and the old inhabitants (see, for example, Granius Licinianus p. 34F). Some ex-soldiers settled by Sulla before 80 bc were involved in the rebellion of Catiline in 63 b c ; according to Sallust (Catiline 16): 'they had squandered their resources and remembered their former victory and booty'. T h i s seems an inadequate basis for thinking that all ex-soldiers were bad farmers. It was always assumed in the classical world that soldiers could turn into peasants and vice versa. O n all this, see B r u n t (1971: 204fF.).

1 2 Some comparative evidence may help as a guide. Bulgaria (1910), Yugoslavia (1931) had 81 % and 79 % of their work-force engaged in agriculture. T h e figures for T u r k e y

6

The argument

at t h e peak o f its p r o s p e r i t y , a n d at a l l levels o f society, a m o n g nobles, bourgeois a n d peasants, p o w e r a n d w e a l t h d e p e n d e d almost d i r e c t l y o n t h e area a n d f e r t i l i t y o f t h e l a n d w h i c h each i n d i v i d u a l possessed. L a n d - h o l d i n g s w e r e t h e geographica l expression o f social s trat i f icat ion.

A m o n g t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n , even w h e n slavery i n I t a l y was at its h e i g h t , free peasants p r o b a b l y const i tuted a m a j o r i t y o f t h e I t a l i a n p o p u l a t i o n outs ide t h e c i ty o f R o m e . 1 3 B y peasants, I m e a n ideal ly famil ies engaged p r i m a r i l y i n t h e c u l t i v a t i o n o f l a n d , w h e t h e r as f ree-holders o r as tenants ( o f t e n as b o t h ) , t i e d t o t h e w i d e r society by t h e liens o f tax and/or r e n t , l a b o u r dues a n d pol i t i ca l o b l i g a t i o n . T h e persistence o f t h e peasantry is i m p o r t a n t ; b u t so were t h e changes i n t h e o w n e r s h i p a n d o r g a n i s a t i o n o f estates, a n d t h e mass e m i g r a t i o n o f free I t a l i a n peasants w h i c h m a d e those changes i n estate organisation possible.

Some indicat ions o f scale may be h e l p f u l ; they are r o u g h o r d e r s o f m a g n i t u d e only* t h o u g h based o n o r d e r i v e d f r o m t h e c a r e f u l analysis o f t h e evidence by B r u n t (1971). Rather speculatively I calculate that i n t w o generat ions (80-8 B C ) , r o u g h l y h a l f t h e peasant famil ies o f R o m a n I t a l y , over o n e a n d a h a l f m i l l i o n people , were f o r c e d most ly by state i n t e r v e n t i o n t o m o v e f r o m t h e i r ancestral f a r m s . T h e y w e n t e i t h e r t o new f a r m s i n I t a l y o r overseas, o r they m i g r a t e d o f t h e i r o w n accord t o t h e city o f R o m e a n d o t h e r I t a l i a n towns. T h e m a i n c h a n n e l o f t h e i r m o b i l i t y was t h e a r m y . I n a c o m p l e m e n t a r y flow, m a n y m o r e t h a n t w o m i l l i o n peasants f r o m t h e c o n q u e r e d provinces became w a r captives

(1927) and C h i n a in the 1940s were 8 2 % and over 8 0 % . See O. S. Morgan ed., Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe (New Y o r k , 1933) 48 and 359; Recensement general de la population ig2j (Ankara, 1929) 29; C . K. Yang, A Chinese Village ( M I T , 1959) 23. T h e composition of these populations was already somewhat affected by their links with foreign, industrial markets. I think the comparable figures for the Roman empire would have been higher.

1 3 It is impossible to calculate the ratio of free men to slaves outside the city of Rome accurately, but we can see whether our guesses are compatible with each other and with what else we know. F o r present purposes, I assume a total population in Italy of 6.0 million, which is between the best guesses of Beloch (5.5 million (Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt 436) and B r u n t (7.5 million (1971: 124)). I follow Beloch in thinking that there were no more than two million slaves (see note 14 below). F o r crude estimates, which may be useful as illustrations of rural/urban distribution, see Table 1.2 below (p. 68).

I f all the rural population worked on the land, and the agricultural land constituted 4 0 % of Italy's surface (as against 5 5 % in 1881), then at roughly 10 million hectares, it allowed over two hectares per person, which is feasible but not generous, given (a) low yields, (b) the high proportion of adults among slaves, and (c) their need to produce a surplus. F o r similar arguments, see Beloch (1886: 417) and B r u n t (1971: 126). I agree with Beloch that the estimated slave population was extremely high for Roman conditions.

7


a n d t h e n slaves i n I t a l y . 1 4 Changes such as these affected even those peasants w h o stayed secure i n t h e i r ancestral f a r m s . I n d e e d , t h e g r o w t h o f m a r k e t s , t h e i m p o r t o f p r o v i n c i a l slaves a n d taxes, t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f rents a n d a genera l increase i n monétisat ion c h a n g e d t h e w h o l e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e R o m a n e c o n o m y . B u t i n spite o f these changes a n d m i g r a t i o n s , t h e sol id core o f I t a l i a n peasants r e m a i n e d peasants.

I n this chapter , I shall concentrate o n t h e i m p a c t o f conquest o n t h e t w o most i m p o r t a n t e lements i n t h e R o m a n e c o n o m y , l a n d a n d l a b o u r . W e can see t h e i r c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p , f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e acquis i t ion o f large estates by t h e r i c h a n d t h e massive i m p o r t o f slaves t o w o r k t h e m ; b o t h h a d d e e p social a n d po l i t i ca l repercussions. T h e i m p a c t o f v i c t o r y o n t h e c o n q u e r i n g society presents us w i t h a process o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y sociological interest . R o m e p r o v i d e s o n e o f t h e few w e l l - d o c u m e n t e d examples o f a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l society u n d e r g o i n g r a p i d social change i n a p e r i o d o f technical s tagnat ion. M i l i t a r y c o n quest served t h e same f u n c t i o n as w i d e s p r e a d technical i n n o v a t i o n . T h e resources o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin were heaped i n t o I t a l y a n d spl i t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s asunder . T h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t t r i e d t o absorb t h e new w e a l t h , values a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i t h i n t h e e x i s t i n g f r a m e w o r k . I t f a i l e d , j u s t as most m o d e r n d e v e l o p i n g countr ies f a i l , t o establish i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r t h e a l locat ion o f new resources w i t h o u t v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t . 1 5

T H E I N T R U S I O N O F S L A V E S

T w o aspects o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e I t a l i a n e c o n o m y i n t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n s tand o u t : t h e increase i n t h e w e a l t h o f t h e

1 4 T h e r e is no clear evidence on the number of slaves in Italy, and the best we can do is guess. Beloch (1886: 418) thought that there were less than two million slaves in Italy at the end of the first century BC; B r u n t (1971: 124) thought that there were three million. T h e discrepancy serves as an index of the plausible margin of error.

O n e discrepancy should be mentioned here. Since male slaves predominated and mortality was high, the total of slaves ever imported was higher than the number of slaves at any one time. T h e r e is therefore little point in adding up the known figures of enslaved captives, even if they were accurate.

F o r a thorough discussion of the sources of slavery, see E . M. Schtaerman, Die Blütezeit der Sklavenwirtschaft in der römischen Republik (Wiesbaden, 1969) 36-70. She is quite right to point out how exceptional it was for Romans to enslave the conquered. B u t I still think that war was the most common source of slaves in the period of imperial expansion. Nor were war a n d trade mutually exclusive; enslaved prisoners of war were imported into Italy and distributed by traders.

1 5 I have dealt with some of the problems of this process in 'Structural differentiation in R o m e ' in I . M. Lewis ed., History and Social Anthropology ( L o n d o n , 1968) 63-78 and also at the e n d of this chapter; more generally, see S. N . Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New Y o r k , 1963), and N . J . Smelser i n B . F . Hoselitz a n d W . E . Moore, Industrialization and Social Change (Paris, 1963).

8

The intrusion of slaves

R o m a n el i te a n d t h e massive g r o w t h o f slavery. L e t us deal w i t h slavery f irst (see also C h a p t e r n ) . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e best m o d e r n estimates, t h e r e w e r e a b o u t t w o ( o r even three) m i l l i o n slaves i n I t a l y by the e n d o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C . T h a t is about t h i r t y - f i v e t o f o r t y p e r cent o f t h e to ta l est imated p o p u l a t i o n o f I t a l y . G i v e n o u r evidence, these figures are o n l y guesses; they m a y w e l l be t o o large; w h e n slavery was at its h e i g h t i n t h e s o u t h e r n states o f t h e U S A , t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f slaves was o n l y o n e t h i r d . H o w e v e r t h a t may be, n o o n e can reasonably d o u b t t h a t h u g e n u m b e r s o f slaves w e r e i m p o r t e d i n t o I t a l y d u r i n g t h e last t w o centuries B C . R o m a n I t a l y b e l o n g e d t o t h a t very smal l g r o u p o f five societies i n w h i c h slaves c o n s t i t u t e d a large p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e l a b o u r force.

W h e n we c o m p a r e R o m a n w i t h A m e r i c a n slavery, t h e g r o w t h o f slavery i n R o m a n I t a l y seems s u r p r i s i n g . I n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , slavery was used as a means o f r e c r u i t i n g l a b o u r t o cul t ivate n e w l y discovered lands f o r w h i c h t h e r e was n o adequate local l a b o u r force . Slaves by a n d large g r e w crops f o r sale i n m a r k e t s w h i c h w e r e bolstered by t h e i n c i p i e n t i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . I n R o m a n I t a l y ( a n d t o a m u c h smal ler e x t e n t i n classical A t h e n s ) , slaves w e r e r e c r u i t e d t o cul t ivate l a n d w h i c h was a lready b e i n g c u l t i v a t e d by c i t izen peasants. W e have t o e x p l a i n n o t o n l y t h e i m p o r t o f slaves b u t t h e e x t r u s i o n o f citizens.

T h e massive i m p o r t o f a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves i n t o c e n t r a l I t a l y i m p l i e d a drast ic r e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f l a n d - h o l d i n g s . M a n y smal l f a r m s w e r e t a k e n o v e r by t h e rich a n d a m a l g a m a t e d i n t o l a r g e r f a r m s so t h a t slave-gangs c o u l d be eff iciendy supervised a n d p r o f i t a b l y w o r k e d . 1 6

E v e n so, slavery was by n o means a n obvious s o l u t i o n t o t h e elite's needs f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r . M a n y peasants h a d s u r p l u s l a b o u r , a n d free labourers w o r k e d p a r t - t i m e o n t h e estates o f t h e r i c h . T h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e o f r i c h m e n a n d o f f r e e peasants, m a n y o f w h o m o w n e d some l a n d a n d also w o r k e d as p a r t tenants o r as labourers o n t h e l a n d o f t h e r i c h , is w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g passage f r o m t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l treatise o f V a r r o (last c e n t u r y B C ) :

A l l agricultural work is carried out by slaves or free men, or by both; by free men, when they cultivate the ground themselves, as many poor people do with

1 6 It is useful to distinguish between holdings and farms. Rich men had huge holdings of land, commonly divided into farms; many of these were much larger than peasant family farms, but they were not lotifundio. T h i s is deduced from the illustrations used by the agricultural writers Cato, V a r r o and Columella of farms varying from 25 h a (100 iugtra) for a vineyard to 50 ha (arable) and 60 ha (olives), worked by 16, 8-11 and 13 slaves respectively. T h e recommended size of herds was 50-100 goats, 100-120 cattle, 100-150 pigs - large by peasant standards, but hardly ranching.

F o r testimony, see Cato, On Agriculture 10-11; Columella, On Agriculture 2.12; and on livestock, see V a r r o , On Agriculture 2.3-5 and P. A . Brunt, JRS 62 (1972) 154.

9


t h e i r f a m i l i e s , o r w h e n t h e y w o r k as h i r e d l a b o u r e r s c o n t r a c t e d f o r t h e h e a v i e r w o r k o f t h e f a r m , s u c h as t h e h a r v e s t o r h a y i n g . . . I n m y o p i n i o n , it is m o r e profi table to w o r k u n h e a l t h y l a n d w i t h f r e e w a g e l a b o u r e r s t h a n w i t h slaves; a n d e v e n i n h e a l t h y p l a c e s , t h e h e a v y tasks s u c h as t h e s t o r a g e o f t h e h a r v e s t c a n best b e d o n e by f r e e l a b o u r e r s . (On Agriculture 1.17) 1 7

T h e e x t r u s i o n o f peasants f r o m t h e i r plots increased t h e p o o l o f u n d e r - e m p l o y e d free labourers . W h y d i d t h e r i c h n o t m a k e use o f f ree wage-labourers, instead o f b u y i n g slaves o u t o f capital? T h a t is always o n e o f t h e p r o b l e m s a b o u t mass chatte l slavery. I a r g u e be low ( p . 110) t h a t slaves were n o r m a l l y q u i t e expensive ( t h o u g h t h e evidence is sparse); t o m a k e a p r o f i t o n t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t i n slaves, slave-owners h a d t o keep t h e i r slaves at w o r k twice as l o n g as R o m a n peasants n o r m a l l y needed t o w o r k i n o r d e r t o l ive at t h e level o f m i n i m u m subsistence. 1 8 T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t R o m a n a g r i c u l t u r a l slavery c o u l d w o r k economical ly o n l y i f peasant smal l -hold ings w e r e a m a l g a m a t e d i n t o l a r g e r u n i t s a n d i f crops were m i x e d so as t o p r o v i d e slaves w i t h f u l l e m p l o y m e n t , a n d masters w i t h a l a r g e r p r o d u c t f r o m slaves' l a b o u r t h a n was c o m m o n l y achieved w i t h free l a b o u r o n smal l peasant f a r m s . Masters also h a d t o t a k e n i n t o account t h e risk t h a t t h e i r slaves m i g h t d i e , a n d t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t m i g h t be lost; a d d t o t h a t t h e cost o f superv is ion. T h e massive r e p l a c e m e n t o f f ree c i t izen peasants w i t h c o n q u e r e d slaves was a c o m p l e x process, w h i c h is d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d .

A s w i t h most sociological p r o b l e m s , each a t t e m p t at a n e x p l a n a t i o n involves f u r t h e r explanat ions . A n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e g r o w t h o f slavery involves us i n a w h o l e n e t w o r k o f changes w h i c h affected a lmost every aspect o f R o m a n society. W h y slaves? Was i t t h e chance o f greater p r o f i t w h i c h i n d u c e d t h e r i c h t o b u y slaves, o r was i t r a t h e r t h e values o f f ree m e n w h i c h i n h i b i t e d t h e m f r o m w o r k i n g as t h e p e r m a n e n t d e p e n d a n t s o f o t h e r Romans? H o w f a r was t h e g r o w t h o f slavery affected by t h e f r e q u e n c y o f wars, t h e d e m a n d f o r citizens as soldiers, o r t h e ease w i t h w h i c h t h e c o n q u e r e d were enslaved? W h a t was t h e fit between t h e increase i n t h e size o f f a r m s , i n t h e size o f t h e s u r p l u s a n d o f t h e u r b a n m a r k e t s w h i c h c o n s u m e d t h e increased surplus? I t is o f course, m u c h easier t o asks questions t h a n t o p r o v i d e answers. B u t f o r t h e m o m e n t I w a n t t o stress t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e p r o b l e m a n d t h e degree t o w h i c h e c o n o m i c changes were connected w i t h a n d

! T Sec also: Cato, On Agriculture 5 and 144; Suetonius, Julius Caesar 42. T h e best discussion of R o m a n agricultural labour, although awkwardly arranged, is still W . £. Heitland, Agricota (Cambridge, 1921) and see also K. D. White, Roman Farming ( L o n d o n , 1970).

1 8 See Chapter u , notes 15 and 23.

10


affected by p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d social values. Rather a r b i t r a r i l y , I have dec ided t o concentrate o n seven processes, w h i c h i n m y view most affected t h e g r o w t h o f slavery:

c o n t i n u o u s w a r ; t h e i n f l u x o f booty ; its i n v e s t m e n t i n l a n d ; the f o r m a t i o n o f large estates; the i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f peasants; t h e i r e m i g r a t i o n to towns a n d t h e provinces; a n d t h e g r o w t h o f u r b a n markets .

I shall deal first w i t h t h e i r in terconnect ions , a n d t h e n w i t h each o f t h e processes i n t u r n i n t h e later sections o f this chapter ( p p . 25ff.); b u t t h e processes were i n t e r w o v e n to such a n e x t e n t t h a t neatly segregated analysis o f each factor has been impract icable .

A first look at the scheme

T h e d i a g r a m ( F i g u r e I . I ) provides a n overview o f the connect ions between these seven processes. I a m n o t sure w h e t h e r t h e scheme is m o r e useful as a n i n t r o d u c t i o n o r as a s u m m a r y w h i c h s h o u l d be p u t at the e n d o f t h e chapter ; i t is m e a n t , r a t h e r l i k e a passport p h o t o o r a m e n u , o n l y as a g u i d e t o a c o m p l e x rea l i ty , n o t as a r e p l a c e m e n t f o r i t . I ts shape was g r a d u a l l y d e t e r m i n e d by a series o f a r g u m e n t s w h i c h I shall set o u t b r i e f l y at first, a n d t h e n elaborate.

T h e R o m a n s c o n q u e r e d t h e w h o l e o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin i n t w o centuries o f a lmost c o n t i n u o u s fighting. D u r i n g these t w o centur ies o f conquest , a h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n o f R o m a n citizens was u n d e r a r m s f o r l o n g e r t h a n I have f o u n d i n any o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l s tate . 1 9

Repeated successes i n w a r enabled t h e R o m a n s t o b r i n g back t o I t a l y h u g e quant i t ies o f booty i n t h e f o r m o f treasure, m o n e y a n d slaves. T h e a c c u m u l a t e d treasure o f t h e eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n was transf e r r e d t o R o m e . B o o t y d e l i v e r e d t o t h e state t reasury was soon supp l e m e n t e d by p r o v i n c i a l taxes w h i c h t h e n g r a d u a l l y became t h e chie f

'· I n Prussia under Frederick William I and Frederick the Great for less than fifty years, and in France under Napoleon for less than twenty years, rates of recruitment perhaps equalled a n d may have surpassed average rates of recruitment in late Republican Rome. B u t these rates were not maintained for long compared with Rome. See The New Cambridge Modern History vol. 7, ed. J . O. Lindsay (Cambridge, 1957) 179 and 305; vol. 9, ed. C . W. Crawley (Cambridge, 1965) 32 and 64. I have not considered warlike tribes such as some R e d Indians or the Zulu as comparable. O n the general problem of military participation ratios see S. Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London, 1954).

11


Continuous w a n of imperial conquest c. 250 BC-AD 9

T h e plundering of conquered territories

T h e financing of further wars

Ostentatious expenditure in towns

T h e repopulation of provinces by Roman cobnuts

T h e import into Italy of booty, taxes and slaves

U r b a n slaves

T h e growth of towns and luxury in Italy

Agricultural slaves

T h e purchase of land in Italy; the formation of large estates worked primarily by slaves

Food sold to growing towns — *

Ejected peasants migrate to towns and help create a market for food

T h e displacement of free yeomen by slaves

T h e production of a food surplus provides land* owners with rent

Peasants are recruited to the Roman army

Figure 1.1. T h e growth of slavery i n Roman Italy - a scheme of interdependence

source o f state r e v e n u e . T h e R o m a n el i te e n h a n c e d its status by s p e n d i n g this new w e a l t h o n ostentatious display i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e a n d o t h e r I t a l i a n towns . Such e x p e n d i t u r e p r o v i d e d n e w f o r m s o f e m p l o y m e n t f o r b o t h f ree citizens a n d f o r slaves, a n d created a new d e m a n d f o r f o o d i n towns. T h i s increased d e m a n d f o r f o o d was m e t p a r t l y by i m p o r t s o f f o o d raised as tax i n t h e provinces , a n d p a r d y o u t o f a n e w s u r p l u s g r o w n o n I t a l i a n f a r m s .

T h e same forces created n e w markets a n d a n e w s u r p l u s at r o u g h l y t h e same t i m e . As m e m b e r s o f t h e R o m a n el i te g r e w r i c h e r , they

12


invested a considerable p a r t o f t h e i r w e a l t h i n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d i n I t a l y . L a n d was t h e o n l y safe a n d prest ig ious large-scale i n v e s t m e n t available. T h e r i c h c o n c e n t r a t e d t h e i r l a n d - h o l d i n g s a n d b u i l t u p t h e i r estates near h o m e o n l a n d prev ious ly o c c u p i e d by citizens. L a r g e n u m b e r s o f t h e displaced citizens m i g r a t e d t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e t o take advantage o f the increased e x p e n d i t u r e t h e r e , o r j o i n e d t h e a r m y , o r m i g r a t e d t o t h e newly o p e n e d n o r t h e r n I t a l i a n p l a i n . I t does n o t seem at a l l clear w h y t h e R o m a n land-owners so o f t e n p r e f e r r e d slaves t o free w o r k e r s . Several a r g u m e n t s have been advanced: the greater p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f slaves, t h e cheapness o f slaves ( w h i c h I d o u b t ) , t h e l iab i l i ty o f free smal l -holders t o m i l i t a r y service a n d t h e i r consequent unavai labi l i ty as p a r t - t i m e labourers , a n d t h e reluctance o f f ree citizens t o w o r k f u l l - t i m e as labourers o n t h e f a r m s o f t h e r i c h . W h a t e v e r the reasons, several results seem clear. T h e economic s i tuat ion o f m a n y free peasants d e t e r i o r a t e d . M a n y o f the ' c o n q u e r o r s o f t h e w o r l d ' , as t h e R o m a n s o f t e n cal led themselves, were ejected f r o m t h e i r f a r m s a n d displaced by peoples w h o m they h a d vanquished a n d enslaved.

Yet t h e massive i m p o r t o f slaves d e f i n e d even p o o r citizens as be longi n g t o a s u p e r i o r s t r a t u m (estate). T h e displacement o f peasants h a d pol i t i ca l repercussions w h i c h resul ted i n t h e rea l locat ion o f smal l h o l d i n g s t o t h e landless a n d t o ex-soldiers. These allocations t e m p o r a r i l y al leviated b u t d i d n o t effectively i m p r o v e t h e c o n d i t i o n o f p o o r citizens. State subsidies f o r f o o d d i s t r i b u t i o n to t h e u r b a n p o o r increased t h e flow o f m i g r a n t s t o t h e city o f R o m e , a n d , as I shall a r g u e , f u r t h e r s t i m u l a t e d a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n o n large estates, by u n d e r w r i t i n g t h e p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r o f t h e u r b a n p o o r . T h e f i n a l s o l u t i o n t o t h e conf l ic t o f interests between cit izen peasants a n d large land-owners was i n i t i a t e d by Jul ius Caesar a n d f o l l o w e d t h r o u g h u n d e r A u g u s t u s : t h e massive resetdement o f R o m a n colonists i n the provinces r e d u c e d t h e pressure f r o m landless citizens a n d t h e u r b a n p o o r o n l a n d i n I t a l y ; a n d i t also a l l o w e d t h e f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n o f el i te l a n d - h o l d i n g s i n I t a l y .

These , i n s u m , are t h e a r g u m e n t s w h i c h I shall be p u t t i n g f o r w a r d i n t h e rest o f this c h a p t e r a n d w h i c h are s u m m a r i s e d i n t h e flow-chart ( F i g u r e I . I ) . B u t I s h o u l d l ike t o a d d a n o t h e r perspective o n t h e f u n c t i o n o f slavery i n t h e p o l i t i c a l system. T h e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f slaves p e r m i t t e d t h e R o m a n el i te t o e x p a n d its w e a l t h t o a level w h i c h was c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h its p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin, w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o e x p l o i t t h e mass o f f ree citizens o v e r t l y , except i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e as soldiers. T h i s statement may seem strange, i f we consider t h e scale o n w h i c h peasants were e x p e l l e d f r o m t h e i r lands. B u t i t makes sense i f we consider h o w m u c h m o r e obvious t h e

*3


e x p l o i t a t i o n w o u l d have been, i f , f o r e x a m p l e , e x p e l l e d peasant citizens h a d been r e d u c e d t o w o r k i n g f o r rich R o m a n s as domest ic servants, as they w e r e i n E n g l a n d b e f o r e a n d d u r i n g t h e I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n .

Slavery also m a d e i t possible t o m a i n t a i n a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n i n I t a l y , i n spite o f t h e h i g h levels o f r e c r u i t m e n t i n t o t h e a r m y a n d o f e m i g r a t i o n t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e . U n l i k e t h e M a n c h u c o n q u e r o r s o f C h i n a i n t h e seventeenth c e n t u r y , w h o latched o n t o t h e e x i s t i n g bureaucracy a n d became pensioners o r sinecurists o f t h e tax-system, t h e R o m a n c o n q u e r i n g el i te secured its w e a l t h by t h e acquis i t ion o f l a n d i n t h e h o m e c o u n t r y . As M a x W e b e r saw, this process r e q u i r e d changes i n t h e laws g o v e r n i n g t h e o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d so as t o a l low u n l i m i t e d a c c u m u l a t i o n a n d secure t e n u r e o f p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e l a n d . 2 0

O n c e large u r b a n m a r k e t s h a d been established, l a n d - o w n e r s h i p p r o v i d e d t h e el i te w i t h c o n t i n u o u s i n c o m e , whereas e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e provinces d i d n o t . F o r u n d e r t h e R o m a n pol i t i ca l system, aristocratic famil ies h a d t o seek elect ion t o p o l i t i c a l office f r o m t h e plebs. T h e great m a j o r i t y o f R o m a n aristocrat ic famil ies r a n t h e risk o f n o t s e c u r i n g e lect ion t o h i g h office i n each g e n e r a t i o n a n d t h e chance o f p r o v i n c i a l p r o f i t w h i c h w e n t w i t h i t ( o n this see C h a p t e r i i n V o l u m e T w o o f this w o r k ) . W h e n they d i d reach office, t h e pressure t o m a k e a p r o f i t , a n d t o c o n v e r t t h e i r b o o t y i n t o l a n d e d i n c o m e was a l l t h e greater. T h u s o n e o f t h e m a i n f u n c t i o n s o f slavery was t h a t i t a l l o w e d t h e e l i te t o increase t h e discrepancy between rich a n d p o o r w i t h o u t a l i e n a t i n g t h e free c i t izen peasantry f r o m t h e i r wi l l ingness t o fight i n wars f o r t h e f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n o f t h e e m p i r e ; slavery also a l l o w e d t h e r i c h t o r e c r u i t l a b o u r t o w o r k t h e i r estates i n a society w h i c h h a d n o l a b o u r m a r k e t ; a n d i t p e r m i t t e d ostentat ious display, again w i t h o u t t h e d i r e c t e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e f ree p o o r . Slavery m a d e i t unnecessary f o r t h e r i c h t o e m p l o y t h e p o o r d i r e c d y , except as soldiers.

T h i s f a i l u r e o f t h e r i c h t o e m p l o y t h e u r b a n masses d i r e c d y le f t t h e p o o r at t h e m e r c y o f m a r k e t forces. A g r i c u l t u r e was l iable t o s h a r p var iat ions o f p r o d u c t i o n , a n d supplies t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e d e p e n d e d u p o n u n r e l i a b l e t r a n s p o r t . L u c k i l y f o r t h e u r b a n p o o r , t h e i r p o w e r as c i t izen voters secured t h e use o f state resources, t h r o u g h t h e agency

*° M. Weber, Die rdmische Agrargeschichte (Stuttgart, 1891) 67ft. and 119ft. R o m a n law (in contrast, for example, to traditional Chinese law) was marked by the complete freedom of the head of the household to sell or testate land to whomever he wanted. Moreover, communal land was slowly transformed into privately held land (through the right of seizure, ager occupatorius), and the traditional limits on the amount which could be held were removed; by agrarian laws of c. 113-111 BC, private tenure of previously public land in Italy was confirmed. See £. G . Hardy, Roman Laws and Charters (Oxford, 191a) 35ff.

H


o f pol i t ic ians w h o w a n t e d t h e i r f a v o u r . T h e state i n t u r n secured supplies o f wheat t h r o u g h t a x a t i o n , a n d s u p p l i e d a substantial sector o f t h e m a r k e t w i t h wheat (34 k g p e r m o n t h p e r c i t izen) f irst at a f i x e d l o w pr ice a n d later f ree . I a r g u e below t h a t this s u p p o r t by t h e state served t o u n d e r w r i t e t h e capacity o f t h e p o o r t o b u y m o r e wheat a n d o i l a n d w i n e p r o d u c e d o n t h e estates o f t h e rich. B u t t h e convers ion o f t h e capital's citizens i n t o state pensioners, w h i l e i t c u s h i o n e d t h e m against p o v e r t y , also h e r a l d e d t h e demise o f t h e i r p o l i t i c a l p o w e r .

A S K E T C H O F T H E E C O N O M Y

T h e R o m a n e c o n o m y i n I t a l y a n d t h e provinces , i n a l l p e r i o d s , rested u p o n t h e backs o f peasants. L e t us t h e r e f o r e b e g i n by e x a m i n i n g some factors w h i c h repeatedly c o n s t r a i n e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between peasants a n d t h e el i te . A f t e r w a r d s we can t u r n o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e economic c o n d i t i o n s o u t o f w h i c h t h e R o m a n state began its t e r r i t o r i a l e x p a n s i o n overseas. T o s i m p l i f y o u r task, we shall m a k e t w o assumptions* These assumptions, l i k e several w h i c h f o l l o w , are obviously speculative, b u t t h e y d o h e l p us g a i n a clearer perspective o f t h e R o m a n economy. O n e easy check o n t h e i r p laus ib i l i ty is t o t h i n k o f t h e consequences o f a l ternat ive a s u m p t i o n s . First , let us assume t h a t f o u r f i f ths o f t h e I t a l i a n a n d p r o v i n c i a l l a b o u r force w e r e p r i m a r i l y engaged irt p r o d u c i n g f o o d ( I t h i n k t h e rea l figure was p r o b a b l y h i g h e r ) . A n d second, let us assume t h a t t h e average c o n s u m p t i o n by t o w n s m e n , most o f w h o m were p o o r , was near t h a t o f peasants. W e can t h e n d r a w t w o conclusions. F irs t , a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y was l o w since i t t o o k f o u r f o o d - p r o d u c i n g famil ies t o feed a fifth. I t was o n l y af ter t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l r e v o l u t i o n i n E n g l a n d i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h a t these average p r o p o r t i o n s began radica l ly t o be c h a n g e d ; i n t h e U S A n o w (1973 figures) f o r e x a m p l e , o n e f a r m w o r k e r produces e n o u g h f o o d f o r over fifty people . Secondly, on average, R o m a n peasants c o n s u m e d f o u r fifths o f t h e i r o w n p r o d u c e a n d s u p p o r t e d non-peasants w i t h t h e r e m a i n i n g fifth.

A$ i n any self-sufficient p r e - i n d u s t r i a l e c o n o m y , t h e b u l k o f t h e empire ' s l a b o u r force was p r i m a r i l y engaged i n p r o d u c i n g f o o d , most o f w h i c h t h e p r o d u c e r s also c d n s u m e d . T h i s was t h e most i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f t h e R o m a n economy. W e may a d d t o this p i c t u r e by assuming also t h a t peasants i n d i v i d u a l l y g r e w most o f t h e i r o w n f o o d a n d d i d n o t exchange m u c h p r o d u c e w i t h each o t h e r . I n a d d i t i o n , i t seems l i k e l y t h a t h a n d i c r a f t w o r k e r s , because o f t h e l o w level o f capita l i n v e s t m e n t , each p r o d u c e d l i t t i e m o r e t h a n t h e average peasant. W e can n o w see t h a t a n e x t r e m e l y large p r o p o r t i o n o f a l l t h a t was p r o d u c e d b o t h i n I t a l y a n d i n t h e provinces was n e v e r t r a d e d ; i t

15


stood outs ide t h e m a r k e t , so l id a n d i n f l e x i b l e , a lmost u n t o u c h e d by t h e forces o f m o n e y . Analysis o f t h e R o m a n e c o n o m y has always to take t h a t so l id u n m a r k e t e d core i n t o account.

T h e m e t h o d s b y w h i c h t h e el i te b o t h created a n d extrac ted t h e peasants' s u r p l u s p r o d u c e : taxes, r e n t a n d m a r k e t exchange, c o n s t i t u t e d a second i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t i n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e R o m a n economy. O f these t h r e e , i n t h e e m p i r e as a w h o l e , t a x a t i o n g r a d u a l l y came t o be t h e largest i n v o l u m e , a n d t h e tax o n l a n d a n d crops c o m p r i s e d a very large p r o p o r t i o n o f a l l taxes; however , i t s h o u l d be stressed t h a t t h e R o m a n s m a d e t h e i r way r a t h e r j e r k i l y f r o m a t r a d i t i o n o f p l u n d e r t o a stable system o f t a x a t i o n . A n d l e v y i n g taxes d i d n o t p r e c l u d e officials f r o m p r i v a t e p r o f i t e e r i n g b o t h at t h e m o m e n t o f conquest a n d d u r i n g t h e subsequent a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f c o n q u e r e d p r o v i n c e s . 2 1 T o be c o m p r e h e n s i v e , t h e r e f o r e , we s h o u l d a d d p l u n d e r , i n c l u d i n g slaves, a n d p r i v a t e p r o f i t e e r i n g t o taxes, rents a n d m a r k e t exchange as c o m m o n m e t h o d s o f e x t r a c t i n g a s u r p l u s f r o m p r i m a r y p r o d u c e r s .

T h e r e w e r e w i d e r e g i o n a l differences i n t h e inc idence o f t a x a t i o n . R o m a n citizens i n I t a l y p a i d n o tax at a l l o n l a n d a f ter 167 B C . T h i s p r i v i l e g e was preserved u n t i l t h e e n d o f t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y A D . W h o p r o f i t e d f r o m it? I m m u n i t y f r o m tax enabled l a n d l o r d s t o charge h i g h e r rents a n d so h e l p e d p u s h u p t h e p r i c e o f I t a l i a n l a n d . I n E g y p t , by contrast , peasants l i v i n g of f i r r i g a t e d C r o w n l a n d p a i d n o r e n t , b u t r e g u l a r l y gave u p h a l f t h e i r p r o d u c e i n tax. I n o t h e r provinces , t h e most c o m m o n rate o f tax seems t o have been a t i t h e o f t h e c r o p (decuma).22 I f we take this t e n t h o f t h e c r o p as a n average tax f o r t h e

1 1 R o m a n nobles thought themselves judged by their victories and by the value of their booty. F o r example, in 182 BC, a governor returned from Spain where he had one or two minor victories, 4 H e entered the city with an ovation [i.e. a minor triumph]. I n his procession he carried 9,320 [Roman] pounds of silver, eighty-two [Roman] pounds of gold and sixty-seven golden crowns* (Livy 40.16). T h i s passage implies both the public record of booty and competition. E v e n when R o m a n administrators took over previous systems of taxation, as in Sicily, they were still under pressure to make a profit for themselves. Laws to protect subjects were ineffective. O n e exceptionally rapacious governor (Cicero, Verrines 1.40) boasted that one third of the profits from the province would be used to pay off his patrons and protectors in case of trial for unjust extortion, one third for the jurors, a n d one third to secure a comfortable living. I n the civil wars of the last century BC, rivals for power extorted as much as they could from the provinces, and it was only in the H i g h E m p i r e that extortion was firmly controlled; it was never suppressed. See P. A . Brunt, 'Charges of provincial maladministratlion under the early Principate*, Historia 10 (1961) 189-227.

n A tithe was paid in Sicily and Sardinia. T a x was reckoned as a tithe in Asia, until the reform of Julius Caesar, but was probably often paid in money. A tax in kind was also collected in Africa (see for example ESAR 4.89ft). T h e evidence is collected by W . Schwann in RE sv Tributum and A . H . M. Jones, The Roman Economy, ed. P. A . B r u n t (Oxford, 1974) 151ft.

16

peasants* subsistence seed tax rent c

peasants' subsistence seed a b c

O 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 IOO

I I I I I I I I I I I

a = rent and tax paid i n produce. b = produce sold i n the local market for cash to pay rent and tax i n

money. c = produce sold in the market to buy goods for peasants' consumption. * T h e scheme illustrates the large subsistence sector of the economy, the small

non-agricultural sector, the equivalent functions of tax and rent, the low value of money exchange between peasant and town, the low average standard of l iving of peasants. I t is, of course, crudely hypothetical and i f roughly true, only true for the population as a whole.

Figure 1.2. Peasants ate most of their own produce: a hypothetical scheme*

w h o l e e m p i r e , w h i c h seems reasonable, t h e n o n o u r prev ious assumptions, l a n d taxes b r o u g h t i n ( o r w e r e equal i n value to) a b o u t o n e h a l f o f t h e f o o d c o n s u m e d by non-peasants.

A s t h e c o m m o n use o f t h e w o r d t i t h e (decuma) f o r tax i m p l i e s , a considerable v o l u m e o f tax i n t h e late Republ ic was extracted d i r e c t l y as f o o d , n o t m o n e y . W h e a t f r o m Sicily a n d A f r i c a , f o r e x a m p l e , was used t o feed t h e a r m y a n d t h e c i ty o f R o m e . E v e n w h e n taxes were raised i n m o n e y , t h e y were o f t e n spent by t h e state to b u y f o o d f o r R o m a n soldiers. T h e considerable rel iance o n taxes levied i n f o o d h e l p e d t h e R o m a n state s u p p o r t a large s u p e r s t r u c t u r e w i t h f a i r l y s imple economic i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d o n l y a smal l m a r k e t sector. T h e c i ty o f R o m e , f o r e x a m p l e , d e p e n d e d f o r its p r o s p e r i t y o n R o m a n pol i t i ca l p o w e r a n d o n t h e consequent i n f l o w o f taxes a n d rents ; u n l i k e p r e -i n d u s t r i a l L o n d o n , i t d i d n o t d e p e n d f o r its size o n its capacity t o e x p o r t m a n u f a c t u r e s o r o n t r a d e . I t is w o r t h n o t i n g that i n so f a r as taxes w e r e lev ied i n m o n e y i n t h e provinces a n d spent i n I t a l y , they p r o b a b l y s t i m u l a t e d t h e i m p o r t o f a n equal v o l u m e o f goods by value i n t o I t a l y , w i t h w h i c h t h e provinces c o u l d , as i t were , b u y t h e i r m o n e y back, a n d pay t h e i r taxes i n t h e n e x t year. N o d o u b t , i t t o o k q u i t e a t i m e t o establish such a balance o f t r a d e a n d tax , so t h a t i n the early stages

17


o f conquest t h e provinces were i m p o v e r i s h e d a n d f e l l i n t o debt , w h i l e some i n f l a t i o n o c c u r r e d i n I t a l y . O f course, this c r u d e m o d e l o f t h e i m p e r i a l e c o n o m y needs t o be r e f i n e d t o take m o r e factors (such as m i n i n g ) i n t o account, b u t even i n this p r i m i t i v e f o r m , i t d r a w s a t t e n d o n t o i m p o r t a n t re lat ionships between taxes a n d t r a d e .

A f t e r taxes, rents f r o m a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d w e r e t h e most i m p o r t a n t m e t h o d f o r g e t d n g t h e s u r p l u s p r o d u c e o u t o f t h e hands o f peasants i n t o t h e hands o f t h e e l i te a n d i n t o towns . F o r t h e u p p e r classes, a g r i c u l t u r a l rents a n d t h e i n c o m e f r o m f a r m s w o r k e d by slaves a n d a d m i n i s t e r e d by agents c o n s t i t u t e d t h e largest source o f i n c o m e . G o v e r n m e n t service ( i n c l u d i n g tax-col lect ion) came a p o o r second. Some rents t o o w e r e col lected i n f o o d n o t m o n e y ; this practice restr icted t h e m a r k e t sector st i l l f u r t h e r . I n the e m p i r e as a w h o l e , t h e t o t a l value o f rents ( i n c l u d i n g i n c o m e f r o m f a r m s m a n a g e d by agents) p r o b a b l y a m o u n t e d t o less t h a n taxes. T h i s was because m a n y fewer people p a i d r e n t t h a n p a i d tax, n o t because r e n t levels were l o w e r . T h e r e was always a substantial b o d y o f i n d e p e n d e n t , n o n - r e n t - p a y i n g peasants b o t h i n I t a l y a n d t h e provinces . T h e i r n u m b e r s fluctuated b u t they never d isappeared. F ina l ly , f r o m descr ipt ions o f peasant l i fe i n m a n y o t h e r societies, i t seems reasonable t o suppose t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e r e was considerable v a r i a t i o n , nevertheless most peasants i n t h e R o m a n e m p i r e w e r e p o o r ; r e n t a n d tax t o o k away most o f t h e i r s u r p l u s ; i f t h e r e was a n y t h i n g le f t t o spare, they w e r e l i k e l y t o eat most o f i t . O n l y a very smal l p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e i r gross p r o d u c t w e n t o n t h e purchase o f goods m a n u f a c t u r e d ( m a d e by h a n d ) i n towns. B u t I d o n o t w a n t t o exaggerate. T h e aggregate d e m a n d s o f fifty m i l l i o n peasants* even i f most o f t h e m w e r e p o o r , constitutes a s igni f icant m a r k e t f o r u r b a n p r o d u c e .

T h e p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f tax p lus r e n t over m a r k e t exchange u n d e r lines t h e c o m m o n view t h a t i n t h e R o m a n w o r l d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t o w n a n d c o u n t r y was t o a large e x t e n t o n e o f e x p l o i t a t i o n * 2 8

T h e towns w e r e 'centres o f c o n s u m p t i o n ' , c o n s u m i n g t h e b u l k o f t h e townsmen's o w n p r o d u c e as w e l l as t h e b u l k o f t h e peasants' s u r p l u s . B u t i t s h o u l d n o t be f o r g o t t e n t h a t t o w n s m e n also p r o v i d e d services, f o r e x a m p l e o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w h i c h gave peasants a stable e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h they c o u l d w o r k . T h e p r i c e w h i c h t h e

tt T h i s was one of the basic perspectives in M. I . Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford*, 1957). See also the evocative book by R. MacMullen, Roman Social Relations (New Haven, 1974), and the articles by M. I . Finley, ' T h e city from Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and beyond', Comparative Studies in Society and History 19 (1977) 305ff. and K. Hopkins, 'Economic growth in towns in classical antiquity', in P. Abrams and E . A . Wrigley eds., Towns in Societies (Cambridge, 1978) 35ff.

18

A sketch of the economy

peasants p a i d f o r th is peace was very h i g h . As i n o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l e m p i r e s , i t seems r e m a r k a b l e t h a t they to lerated t h e i m p o s i t i o n s o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d l a n d l o r d s f o r so l o n g .

Yeomen in early Rome

M y m a i n c o n c e r n i n this chapter is w i t h t h e effects o n t h e I t a l i a n e c o n o m y o f t h e i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n w h i c h t o o k place af ter Rome's l o n g s truggle against Carthage (264-202 BÇ ) . A S b a c k g r o u n d t o this , I w a n t br ie f ly t o describe some aspects o f t h e ear ly R o m a n e c o n o m y w h i c h m a y be h e l p f u l i n t h e discussion o f later deve lopments . T h e r e is o n e m i n o r d i f f i c u l t y ; we have n o c o n t e m p o r a r y sources. W e can ta lk o f early R o m a n social h i s t o r y ( that is, be fore t h e m i d d l e o f t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y B C ) o n l y by w o r k i n g backwards f r o m i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h we k n o w better i n later p e r i o d s , a n d by r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a d is tant past f r o m t h e images left us by later historians. N o t m u c h is cer ta in a n d almost e v e r y t h i n g is d i s p u t e d ; t h e account g iven below is c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y d u b i o u s . 2 4

F o r a l l its p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n centra l I t a l y , R o m e i n t h e early t h i r d c e n t u r y h a d a s i m p l e near-subsistence economy. T h e r e was l i t t l e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , n o i n s t i t u t i o n s such as a professional a r m y o r perm a n e n t bureaucracy w h i c h d e p e n d e d u p o n t h e r e g u l a r d e l i v e r y o f a large surplus . T h e r e was l i t t l e o r n o usefu l coinage m a d e i n R o m e a n d p r o b a b l y l i t d e t r a d e . Even t h e R o m a n el i te was n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y r i c h ; witness t h e smal l area w h i c h i t c o n t r o l l e d (equal i n 296 B C t o a b o u t o n e q u a r t e r o f B e l g i u m ) a n d t h e s t r o n g t r a d i t i o n o f s imple l i v i n g w h i c h persisted i n t o h is tor ica l t imes. T h e c h r o n i c p r o b l e m s o f t h e state c e n t r e d o n c o n q u e r i n g h i l l - t r ibes , o n r i v a l r y between aristocrats, a n d a m o n g t h e p o o r o n l a n d shortage a n d i m p o v e r i s h m e n t t h r o u g h debt .

Most o f t h e l a b o u r force consisted o f smal l f a r m e r s l i v i n g o n f a m i l y f a r m s , m a n y o f w h i c h , i t seems reasonable t o guess, were o n l y just large e n o u g h to p r o v i d e a m i n i m u m subsistence. U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e r e is h a r d l y any s o u n d evidence w i t h w h i c h this general isat ion can be v a l i d a t e d ; yet i t seems m o r e attract ive t h a n any a l ternat ive I can t h i n k of . T h e r e are several pieces o f evidence, each insuff ic ient o r

*4 T h e structure of the economy in early Rome is rarely discussed in Roman history books which concentrate like the sources on political and military history. T h e view expressed here is compatible with and seemingly implied in the modern tradition, although many scholars might think it applies better to Rome say in the early fourth century BC. But see Toynbec (1965: vol. 1, 290ft.), and cf. K. J . Beloch, Romische Geschichte (Berlin, 1926) 333ft.; £. Pans and J . Bayet, Histoire Romaine (Paris, 1926) 77ft.; and see R. Besnier, 'L'état économique de Rome [500-264 BC]', Revue historique de droit français et étranger 33 (1955) 195ft.

l9


u n t r u s t w o r t h y i n itself, w h i c h seem collectively t o c o n f i r m i t . I call this t h e w i g w a m a r g u m e n t : each pole w o u l d f a l l d o w n by itself, b u t t o g e t h e r t h e poles stand u p , b y l e a n i n g o n each o t h e r ; they p o i n t r o u g h l y i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n , a n d c i rcumscr ibe ' t r u t h * . I realise t h a t i t is d a n g e r o u s t o accept t h e genera l t e n o r o f t h e evidence w h i l e d o u b t i n g t h e t r u t h o f i n d i v i d u a l pieces. B u t this is w h a t we are f o r c e d t o d o i n r e c o n s t r u c t i n g even t h e c r u d e o u d i n e s o f Rome's ear ly social s t r u c t u r e .

First , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l histories w h i c h present t h e R o m a n elite's pict u r e o f its o w n past i m p l y a w i d e s p r e a d o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d i n ear ly R o m e . A l t h o u g h these histories are a n a lmost i n e x t r i c a b l e m i x t u r e o f fable a n d d o u b t f u l fact (e.g. heroes, batdes, v ictories , t e m p o r a r y defeats, f ic t i t ious speeches o n t h e batdef ie ld a n d i n t h e senate), t h e stories w h i c h they t e l l are u n l i k e l y t o be complete ly false a n d o n t h e m u n d a n e level are l ike ly t o reflect c o n d i t i o n s at some ear ly p e r i o d . F o r e x a m p l e , Dionys ius o f Halicarnassus (Roman Antiquities 2.28) r e c o r d e d t h a t t h e second k i n g o f R o m e , w h o r e i g n e d i n t h e e i g h t h c e n t u r y B C , a p p o i n t e d slaves a n d f o r e i g n e r s t o sedentary a n d mechanica l trades, a n d r e s t r i c t e d R o m a n s t o a g r i c u l t u r e a n d w a r f a r e . Secondly, t h e o b l i g a t i o n o f s e r v i n g i n t h e i n f a n t r y , o f p r o v i d i n g one's o w n a r m o u r a n d o f p a y i n g taxes d e p e n d e d u p o n t h e o w n e r s h i p o f some, t h o u g h a p p a r e n d y n o t very m u c h l a n d . I t seems t h a t t h e R o m a n a r m y , u n l i k e t h a t o f classical A t h e n s , d i d n o t r e q u i r e heavy a n d expensive a r m o u r , a n d i t was t h e r e f o r e r e c r u i t e d f r o m a large p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . * 5 T h i r d l y , t h e R o m a n census figures o f a d u l t male citizens (e.g. 262,321 citizens i n 294/3 B C ) suggest h i g h p o p u l a t i o n densi t ies . 2 6

** T h i s is the conclusion of Beloch (1886: 26); it is based mainly on the mid-second-century account by Polybius (6. igff.) of Roman soldiers' armour, which varied according to age and wealth. According to Polybius (6.19) the lowest property qualification for legionaries was only 400 drachmae = 400 denarii. T h i s is difficult to interpret because of the lack of contemporary prices; at a cheap wheat price of 2 ^ H S per modius, it equals only 4 tons of wheat and so could not yield an income sufficient to support a family. Dionysius Halicarnassus (Roman Antiquities 4.18) and Livy (1.43) in their accounts of the reforms of Servius T u l l i u s in the sixth century BC set the minimum property of soldiers at 1,250 a n d 1,100 denarii. T h e figures are probably anachronistic, and may instead refer to the third century BC. See the brilliant essay of E . Gabba, Republican Rome, the Army and the Allies (Berkeley, 1976) 1-69. Gabba takes the evidence to reflect a fall in the m i n i m u m property requirement for legionaries. Dionysius also averred that half the R o m a n population had less than this m i n i m u m ; but he also tells us a lot which cannot be believed. I take the evidence to imply a low property requirement, a widespread ownership of land a n d a widespread obligation to fight.

M T h e transmitted figures for the early third century are unbelievable: they give an average density of 111 persons per k m 1 in R o m a n territory, which is several times the figure for the agricultural population in Italy in 1936 (Brunt 1971:54; Beloch 1886: 320). At the end of the third century BC, according to Brunt's estimate (loc. cit.)t

Roman territory had 36 persons per km* compared with 22 for the rest of R o m a n Italy. T h e traditional histories transmitted myths of overpopulation: for example,

20


A l t h o u g h these ear ly f igures are m u t u a l l y inconsistent a n d p r o b a b l y inaccurate , t h e genera l in ference o f h i g h p o p u l a t i o n density seems c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e h i g h rate o f e m i g r a t i o n t o colonies. Between 338 a n d 218 B C , t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t established f o r t y colonies o n c o n q u e r e d I t a l i a n l a n d a n d f i l l e d t h e m w i t h a m i x t u r e o f c i t izen a n d non-c i t izen setders f r o m a r o u n d R o m e . T h e sources give us f igures o n t h e n u m b e r o f a d u l t males w h o w e n t t o several o f these colonies (i.e. 300, 2,500, 4 ,000, 6 ,000); 4,000 a d u l t male colonists w o u l d involve a t o t a l i n i t i a l p o p u l a t i o n o f a b o u t 13,000 m e n , w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , w h i c h seems t o o h i g h . 1 7 Yet at a conservative estimate, t h e flow o f e m i g r a n t s t o these f o r t y I t a l i a n colonies m u s t have exceeded o n e h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d a n d m a y have reached a q u a r t e r o f a m i l l i o n m e n , w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n .

F inal ly , stories f e a t u r i n g folk-heroes l i k e C i n c i n n a t u s a n d M a n i u s C u r i u s Dentatus , n o b l e b u t p o o r , i m p l i e d t h a t peasant l a n d - h o l d i n g s w e r e usual ly smal l . T h e sources repeatedly cite l a n d plots o f t w o a n d seven iugera (0.5 a n d 1.75 ha) as t r a d i t i o n a l o r sufficient. F o r e x a m p l e , ' T h e r e is a f a m o u s saying o f M a n i u s C u r i u s [consul i n 290 B C ] . . . t h a t a c i t izen n o t satisfied w i t h seven iugera m u s t be cons idered subversive (perniciosum); f o r t h a t was t h e size o f plots g iven t o t h e people a f ter t h e k ings w e r e d r i v e n out* (Pl iny , Natural History 18.18). L i k e t h e ear ly census f igures, these f igures o f p l o t size seem d i s t o r t e d . A t t h e most p r o b a b l e levels o f p r o d u c t i v i t y , a p l o t o f seven iugera w o u l d barely p r o v i d e h a l f t h e m i n i m u m subsistence f o r a n average f a m i l y . N o r is i t easy t o see h o w m u c h such a smal l i n c o m e c o u l d r e g u l a r l y be s u p p l e m e n t e d ; p o o r peasants w e r e least l ike ly t o a f f o r d g r a z i n g a n i mals; a n d i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t mast peasants i n th is ear ly p e r i o d were d e p e n d e n t f o r h a l f t h e i r i n c o m e o n w o r k i n g t h e f a r m s o f t h e r i c h . T h e risk o f b e i n g t e n d e n t i o u s is obvious; even so, i t is h a r d t o a v o i d a genera l i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t peasant plots i n early R o m e were typical ly s m a l l . 2 8

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Roman Antiquities 1.16) wrote that in early times all the youths b o m in a certain year were sent out of R o m a n territory to look for land to conquer and settle. I assume that some truth lay behind these tales.

, 7 T h e ancient evidence is conveniendy but uncritically listed by E . T . Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic (London, 1969) 55-81. A colony of 6,000 adult males would involve a total population of about 20,000; if we assume a stationary population with an average expectation of life at birth of 25 years, then males aged 17+ constitute rather less than 3 0 % of the population (see U . N . Model Life Tables in 'Methods for population projections by sex and age*, Population Studies (New Y o r k , 1956)). T h e establishment of such large settlements seems out of proportion to R o m a n resources around 300 BC.

** It is obviously dangerous to take what the Romans believed about their past as evidence of their past, because of the difficulties later Romans had in knowing much about it. O n the farmer heroes, see Heitland (1921: 134*?.). F o r a slighdy different discussion of the implications of small colonial allotments in the second century BC see B r u n t (1071: 194).


I n s u m , t h e absence o f i n s t i t u t i o n s d e p e n d e n t u p o n a large s u r p l u s , t h e absence o f locally m i n t e d silver coins, t h e smal l scale o f t r a d e , t h e absence o f g r o u p s o f landless reta iners l i v i n g of f rents , t h e w i d e s p r e a d obl igat ions o f m i l i t a r y service t i e d t o t h e o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f c e n t r a l I t a l y was dense i n spite o f considerable e m i g r a t i o n , a n d f inal ly t h e evidence o f small ish l a n d p l o t s , w h e n a l l are t a k e n together , seem t o s u p p o r t t h e view t h a t t h e R o m a n e c o n o m y i n t h e ear ly t h i r d c e n t u r y B C was d o m i n a t e d by a w i d e c e n t r a l b a n d o f self-sufficient y e o m e n , t h a t is by peasants w h o o w n e d a n d c u l t i v a t e d t h e i r o w n f a r m s .

B e l o w t h e b r o a d b a n d o f y e o m e n , t h e r e m a y have been a s ignif icant m i n o r i t y o f d e p e n d e n t peasants w h o got some o f t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d by w o r k i n g f o r those w h o were better off . I n d e e d m a n y y e o m e n famil ies l i v i n g j u s t above t h e m a r g i n o f subsistence may have been r e c u r r e n d y d e p e n d e n t o n w e a l t h i e r n e i g h b o u r s . T h e v a r y i n g d e m a n d s o f t h e f a m i l y at d i f f e r e n t stages o f its l i fe cycle, t h e h i g h a n n u a l v a r i a t i o n i n t h e size o f crops w h i c h st i l l bedevils M e d i t e r r a n e a n a g r i c u l t u r e , a n d t h e s u d d e n i m p o s i t i o n o f taxes i n o r d e r t o meet a n emergency , a l l r e i n f o r c e d a p a t t e r n o f b o r r o w i n g a n d dependence , w h i c h is c o m m o n t o most peasant societies. I n some, this dependence was p a r t l y expressed t h r o u g h debt , h i g h interest rates, debt-bondage a n d sale a b r o a d i n t o slavery. D e b t bondage was m a d e i l lega l i n R o m e i n 326 B C , b u t i t persisted i n o t h e r parts o f t h e e m p i r e a n d p r o b a b l y i n I t a l y t o o u n t i l m u c h l a t e r , 2 9

D e p e n d e n c e was also expressed i n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f c l ientship . I n its idealised f o r m , c l i e n t s h i p was seen as a h e r e d i t a r y b o n d o f i n t e r dependence s i m i l a r t o a b l o o d r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d sancti f ied by ritual penalties f o r its v i o l a t i o n . Cl ients o w e d services, were m e a n t t o give t h e i r p a t r o n gi f ts w h e n e v e r he h a d t o pay r a n s o m , d o w r y , fines o r t h e expenses o f p u b l i c office. I d e a l l y , t h e p a t r o n was expected t o e x p l a i n

*· I n early Rome, the laws provided for the savage treatment of debtors. According to the Twelve Tables (traditional date 451 BC), a debtor who could not pay his debt might be kept chained for sixty days by his creditor (fed at the creditor's expense), then be produced in public and either sold abroad as a slave, or executed (see Ancient Roman Statutes 8, Table 3). As a midgation of this law, it was later possible 4 for a free man to give his services as a slave, for money which he owed until he paid it' (Varro, On the Latin Language 7.105). Such men were called nexi, bondsmen, an indication in itself of their powerlessness. Cf. H . F . Jolowicz, A Historical Introduction to Roman Law (Cambridge 3 , 1972) 164ft. Eventually the maltreatment of debtors was seen to conflict with cidzen rights. I n 326 BC (the date is conventional) a law was passed which prohibited holding the body of a debtor as security (Livy 8.28; R. M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy (Oxford, 1965) ad loc.). It was, said Livy, a new beginning of liberty for the plebs. It also reflected the power and will of citizens to defend their rights against the upper classes. B u t the practice of working off debts in slavelike conditions persisted.

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laws t o clients a n d t o p r o t e c t t h e m against law suits. W h a t seems i m p o r t a n t a b o u t th is a n d seemed n o t e w o r t h y t o o u r sources was t h e idea o f m u t u a l service w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h e d R o m a n c l i e n t s h i p f r o m f o r m s o f d e p e n d e n c e elsewhere, i n w h i c h masters t r e a t e d free d e p e n dants as t h o u g h they were slaves. O n e di f ference lay i n t h e assumption t h a t R o m a n cl ients h a d s o m e t h i n g t o give t h e i r p a t r o n s a n d were t h e r e f o r e n o t c o m p l e t e l y d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e m . T h i s r e c i p r o c i t y i n t h e c l i e n t - p a t r o n r e l a t i o n s h i p fits very w e l l w i t h m y view t h a t a lmost a l l citizens i n early R o m e o w n e d some l a n d . H o w e v e r , we s h o u l d be cautious a b o u t accept ing a n idealised p o r t r a i t o f c l i e n t s h i p ; s i m i l a r ideals i n Japan, f o r e x a m p l e , have masked considerable e x p l o i t a t i o n . I t seems l ike ly t h a t c l i e n t s h i p s igni f icandy restr ic ted t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f some y e o m e n . 3 0

T h e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l wage- labour i n R o m e seems t o have assumed t h a t most labourers o w n e d some l a n d . T h i s can be d e d u c e d f r o m t h e fact t h a t t h e R o m a n s a p p a r e n d y never deve loped a system o f e m p l o y i n g f ree l a b o u r f o r l o n g per iods s imi lar t o t h e E n g l i s h i n d e n t u r e , a p p r e n t i c e s h i p o r a n n u a l h i r i n g s . N o r is t h e r e any evidence t h a t R o m a n l a n d l o r d s r e g u l a r l y i n the early p e r i o d exacted l a b o u r f r o m tenants as p a r t o f t h e i r r e n t ; instead, t h e wel l - to-do e m p l o y e d free peasants usual ly f o r a day o r f o r a specific j o b , such as h a r v e s t i n g o r t h r e s h i n g . 3 1 Such i n t e r m i t t e n t w o r k h a d several i m p l i c a t i o n s . First , l abourers m u s t have h a d l a n d plots o f t h e i r o w n t o p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h t h e b u l k o f t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d . Secondly, i n t h e R o m a n w o r l d o f t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y B C , t h e r e was n o effective l a b o u r m a r k e t o f m o b i l e , landless labourers . A s a resul t , w h e n t h e g r o w t h o f e m p i r e i n d u c e d a change i n the pat terns o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n i n I t a l y , new l a b o u r was

3 0 T h i s paragraph is in part a summary of the ideals set out by Dionysius of Hali -carnassus, Roman Antiquities 2.9-11; see also A . Gellius, Attic Nights 5.13. T h e R o m a n lawyer Proculus (D. 49.15.7.1) held that clients were free, although inferior in authority and rank. R. P. Dore discussed a Japanese tract of 1934 (Land Reform in Japan (London, 1969) 55): ' T h e s e master-servant reladonships, b a s e d . . . o n the landlord's paternal care for his tenants and the tenants' implicit obedience of the landlord's authority may, of course, from one point of view be considered a fine and noble expression of the ideals of harmony and co-operation, of mutual regard and help.' But they often worked out differendy in practice; cf. ibid. $gtt. See also on the recent exploitation of clients, S. F . Silverman, Exploitation in rural central Italy', Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist. 12 (1970) 327ft.

3 1 T h i s is the impression I get from Cato, On Agriculture (5 and i44f.); it is the earliest surviving such treatise from Rome, written in the second century BC. T h e small shares given to share-croppers, 1/6-1/8 of the crop depending on the quality of the land, would keep them alive only if they also had land of their own to work. I n a subsequent publication, I shall discuss probable values of yield, labour input and household consumption in Roman agriculture. It is worth stressing that land-owners and tenants are in many peasant societies overlapping not separate categories. Y o u can own some land and lease more.

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r e c r u i t e d p r i m a r i l y by c o m p u l s i o n , t h r o u g h t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f slavery. O f course, even i n t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y B C , t h e r e w e r e some slaves i n R o m a n I t a l y , b u t n o t , I suspect, m a n y . M o s t o f t h e references to slavery i n ear ly R o m e i m p l y small-scale slavery; others seem a n a c h r o n i s t i c . 3 2 T h i r d l y , prosperous l a n d o w n e r s w h o o w n e d m o r e l a n d t h a n they c o u l d cul t ivate by t h e i r o w n l a b o u r used c l ientship c o m b i n e d w i t h tenancy a n d s h a r e - c r o p p i n g as m e t h o d s o f e n s u r i n g that t h e i r l a n d was w o r k e d first at cr i t ica l seasons, b e f o r e peasants l o o k e d a f t e r t h e i r o w n plots.

I n s u m , as I see i t , t h e area g o v e r n e d d i r e c t l y by R o m e i n t h e ear ly t h i r d c e n t u r y B C was n o t large a n d r i c h e n o u g h t o s u p p o r t sizeable concentrat ions o f w e a l t h . T h e p o l i t i c a l system ref lected t h e w i d e s p r e a d o b l i g a d o n t o bear arms a n d t h e w i d e s p r e a d o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d ; a lt h o u g h f a r f r o m democrat ic , i t effectively l i m i t e d t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h most citizens w e r e e x p l o i t e d . T h e nobles collectively p r o b a b l y o w n e d m u c h o f t h e best l a n d , b u t typical ly h a d o n l y modest estates. Few o f t h e f a r m s w e r e large e n o u g h t o r e q u i r e t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f n o n - f a m i l y l a b o u r t h r o u g h o u t t h e year. T h e b u l k o f a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d a n d o f c o m m o n l a n d was e x p l o i t e d by smal l -holders o r y e o m e n peasants, some o f w h o m were p a r t l y d e p e n d e n t o n t h e p a t r o n a g e o f t h e p r o s p e r o u s .

Most R o m a n s w e r e u n d e r - e m p l o y e d . Even i n d e p e n d e n t y e o m e n l i v i n g j u s t above t h e level o f m i n i m u m subsistence h a d p l e n t y o f t i m e w i t h n o t h i n g t o d o . A n average peasant h o u s e h o l d p r o d u c i n g its m i n i m u m subsistence o n q u i t e g o o d arable l a n d used u p very m u c h less t h a n h a l f o f its o w n l a b o u r p o w e r . T h i s c h r o n i c u n d e r - e m p l o y m e n t is st i l l c o m m o n i n m a n y peasant economies u s i n g d r y f a r m i n g . I t was i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n R o m e i n n u m e r o u s p u b l i c hol idays a n d i n p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n pol i t ics . A b o v e a l l , u n d e r - e m p l o y m e n t a l lowed t h e state, w h e n i t c o u l d n o t extract a sufficient s u r p l u s o f p r o d u c e i n t h e f o r m o f taxes, t o tax l a b o u r instead.

S u r p l u s l a b o u r was t a x e d i n t h e f o r m o f m i l i t a r y service. O v e r a l l , t h e p o v e r t y a n d u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t o f m a n y R o m a n peasants p e r m i t t e d a h i g h rate o f m i l i t a r y m o b i l i s a t i o n ( r e g u l a r l y over t e n p e r cent o f a d u l t male citizens) t h r o u g h o u t t h e last t w o centuries B C . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e lands o f absent soldiers were c u l t i v a t e d by others . T h e d i s o r g a n i sation a n d social costs i n v o l v e d were considerable. Soldiers ' wives 8 1 Such a method of argument is obviously dangerous: I have a picture of Rome in

the early third century BC; it had a simple, relatively undifferentiated economy. I f any evidence fits in with my view, I claim it as corroboration. Anything in the traditional history which does not fit in with this picture, I call anachronistic. I see the danger, but can think of no better method. F o r similar views and a discussion of the evidence see Heitland (1921: 149-50); Tibiletti (1948: i73ff.).

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a n d c h i l d r e n , w i d o w s a n d o r p h a n s were lef t u n p r o t e c t e d ; t h e i r f a r m s were m o r e t h a n usually l iable t o be e n c u m b e r e d w i t h debt . T h e y fe l l i n t o t h e hands o f the r i c h . C o m p l e m e n t a r i l y , i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l system, t h e r i c h d e p e n d e d f o r t h e c u l t i v a t i o n o f t h e i r f a r m s o n the s u r p l u s l a b o u r o f t h e free p o o r , e m p l o y e d as tenants, share-croppers o r as occasional labourers . B u t t h e conquest o f an e m p i r e increased t h e incidence o f m i l i t a r y service, a n d e i t h e r t o o k free l a b o u r away o r increased its u n r e l i a b i l i t y . Besides, as t h e estates o f t h e rich increased i n size, so d i d t h e i r need f o r l a b o u r . Yet peasants, as we k n o w f r o m p r e - m o d e r n studies, are typical ly r e l u c t a n t t o d o m o r e w o r k t h a n is sufficient t o p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h m i n i m u m subsistence. T h e R o m a n rich t h e r e f o r e l o o k e d elsewhere f o r f u l l - t i m e d e p e n d e n t labourers . T h e y c o u l d n o t be d r a w n f r o m t h e l a b o u r m a r k e t , because t o al l intents a n d purposes i t d i d n o t exist. I n s t e a d , slaves were c a p t u r e d i n w a r a n d i m p o r t e d by force. T h e e m i g r a t i o n o f free l a b o u r i n t o t h e a r m y a n d t h e i m m i g r a t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves were c o m p l e m e n t a r y .

C O N T I N U O U S W A R 3 3

I w a n t n o w t o deal w i t h t h e f irst o f t h e seven factors w h i c h most affected t h e g r o w t h o f slavery a n d t h e pol i t i ca l e c o n o m y o f I t a l y . D u r i n g t h e last t w o centuries o f t h e Republ ic , t h e R o m a n state was almost c o n t i n u a l l y at war . T h e R o m a n el i te was p e r m e a t e d w i t h p r i d e i n its m i l i t a r y achievements; t h e histories o f its past were filled w i t h accounts o f battles; its heroes a n d leaders w e r e generals such as Fabius t h e Delayer, Scipio t h e C o n q u e r o r o f A f r i c a ( R o m a n generals f r e q u e n d y t o o k soubriquets f r o m t h e lands w h i c h they h a d conquer e d ) , Pompey t h e Great a n d Jul ius Caesar. T h e centre o f t h e city o f R o m e was packed w i t h t h e t r o p h i e s o f war : altars a n d temples v o w e d i n a m o m e n t o f crisis i n t h e bat t le f ie ld a n d t h e n b u i l t f r o m the spoils; v i c t o r y arches a n d t r i u m p h a l statues; t h e c o l u m n s o f temples covered w i t h shields a n d m i l i t a r y ins ignia o f every k i n d ( L i v y 40.51); a n d inscr ibed stones w h i c h b o t h r e c o r d e d achievements a n d i n s p i r e d e m u l a t i o n i n t h e y o u n g ( f o r e x a m p l e , a n i n s c r i p t i o n i n t h e T e m p l e o f M a t e r M a t u t a , set u p i n 174 B C ) :

Under the Command and Auspices of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus Consul, the Legion and A r m y of the Roman People conquered Sardinia. I n this

3 3 I n this section, I am again especially indebted to B r u n t (1971), although we disagree occasionally on interpretation. I have discovered that my arguments in this section and the next are similar to and complementary to those of W . V . Harris , War and Imperialism in Republican Rome $27-70 BC (Oxford, 1978).

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province, more than 8 0 , 0 0 0 of the enemy were killed or captured. The State was well served; the allies freed; the revenues restored. He brought back the A r m y safe and sound, laden with booty. He returned to the City of Rome i n T r i u m p h , for the second time. I n Commemoration of This Event, he gave this Tablet as a Gift to Jove. (Livy 4 1 . 2 8 ) 3 4

W h e n a R o m a n g e n e r a l h a d c o n d u c t e d a successful c a m p a i g n , he w r o t e t o t h e senate d e t a i l i n g his achievements. I f his victories were over * w o r t h y enemies ' , a n d at least five t h o u s a n d o f t h e m h a d been k i l l e d i n a single batde, he m i g h t request a t r i u m p h a l procession o n his r e t u r n to t h e city o f R o m e . 3 5 T h e scale o f R o m a n s laughter is ref lected i n t h e a w a r d o f over seventy t r i u m p h s i n t h e t w o h u n d r e d years 252-53 B C .

T h e g r a n t o f a t r i u m p h was a pr ize reserved f o r senior R o m a n magistrates: praetors , consuls a n d dictators . Even f o r t h e m i t was a n e x c e p t i o n a l h o n o u r , a p e r m a n e n t e m b l a z o n m e n t o f t h e f a m i l y l i n e . I t was t h e o n e occasion o n w h i c h a genera l c o u l d leg i t imate ly parade his t r o o p s t h r o u g h t h e c i ty o f R o m e . First came t h e magistrates a n d senators a c c o m p a n i e d by t r u m p e t e r s , t h e n t h e spoils o f w a r cerem o n i a l l y d isplayed ( a n d c o m p e t i t i v e l y e n u m e r a t e d i n t h e p u b l i c records) : ' . . . g o l d e n c r o w n s w e i g h i n g 112 [ R o m a n ] p o u n d s ; 83,000 p o u n d s o f si lver; 243 p o u n d s o f g o l d ; 118,000 A t h e n i a n tetrodrochmoe; 12,322 coins cal led Phi l ippics ; 785 b r o n z e statues; 230 m a r b l e statues; a great a m o u n t o f a r m o u r , weapons a n d o t h e r e n e m y spoils, besides catapaults, ballistae a n d engines o f every k i n d . . . ' ( L i v y 39.5; o n 187 B C ) . Pictures a n d slogans, such as Jul ius Caesar's * I came, I saw, I c o n q u e r e d ' , i l l u s t r a t e d t h e general's achievements. A f t e r these, the pr isoners o f w a r : k ings i n chariots w i t h ropes a r o u n d t h e i r necks,

3 4 T h e centres of modern d u e s in relatively non-militaristic countries also have their war memorials, statues of generals on horseback and May Day parades. I find it difficult to portray the intensity of R o m a n militarism - I use the word evocatively, not pejoratively. But a reading of Livy, or for that matter of any Roman historian, shows it clearly. T h e i r concern with war was not merely a historiographical convention. Rather, historians put war at the centre of the stage because it deserved to be there. O n R o m a n war statues see Pliny, Natural History 34.1 iff.; on personal emulation see ibid. 35-2ff.

3 6 See especially Valerius Maximus 2.8. T h e r e was a law forbidding generals to exaggerate the number of enemy killed; on entering the city triumphant generals had to swear the truth of their reports. Generals who had been refused public triumphs customarily (Livy 42.21) celebrated private triumphs just outside Rome. It was an indication of their competitive exhibitionism. See also Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 5.6.21 on the difference between a triumph and a lesser * ovation*.

Specific triumphs are described by Plutarch (Aemilius Paullus 32) and by Livy (34.52; 37.46; 45-35ff.). F o r an extremely detailed discussion, see H . S. Versnel, Triumphus (Leiden, 1970); otherwise usefully sv Triumphus in RE or DS. Lists of all triumphators in the history of Rome were, at least by the reign of Augustus, inscribed on large tablets on show on the Capitol; they survive incomplete (Inscriptumes Italiae, A . Degrassi (Rome, 1947) vol. 13.1, 534ff.).

26

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princes i n chains, t h e c o m m a n d e r s o f defeated armies - a l l f o d d e r f o r p h i l o s o p h e r s i n t e n t o n m o r a l i s i n g about t h e wheel o f f o r t u n e . T h e n came t h e vict ims to be sacrificed, bulls w i t h g i l d e d h o r n s . A n d finally, t h e genera l h imsel f ; he was c a r r i e d o n a c h a r i o t , decorated w i t h l a u r e l a n d d r a w n by f o u r w h i t e horses; beneath t h e c h a r i o t was s l u n g a phal lus . T h e general's cheeks w e r e d a u b e d w i t h r e d ; he was c l o t h e d , l i k e J u p i t e r h imsel f , i n a p u r p l e cloak over a toga sown w i t h g o l d e n stars. I n o n e h a n d , he c a r r i e d a sceptre c r o w n e d w i t h a n eagle, i n t h e o t h e r a l a u r e l b r a n c h . A b o v e his head, a slave h e l d a heavy g o l d c r o w n . Each t i m e the c r o w d cheered, t h e slave r i tual is t ica l ly m u r m u r e d : ' R e m e m b e r y o u are o n l y a m a n . ' T h e t r i u m p h a l procession d r a m a t i s e d t h e s p l e n d o u r o f R o m a n victories, r e i n f o r c e d p u b l i c p r i d e i n t h e value o f conquest, at once elevated t h e successful leader a n d yet fitted h i m i n t o a w e l l - w o r n slot, so t h a t w i t h l u c k his p o p u l a r i t y w o u l d n o t subvert t h e p o w e r - s h a r i n g o l igarchy.

Such p u b l i c displays o f prowess can serve as o n l y o n e i n d e x o f m i l i t a r i s m i n t h e R o m a n el i te . T h e r e are m a n y others : f o r e x a m p l e , t h e p r e o c c u p a t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l histories w i t h campaigns a n d battles. T h e m o d e r n reader may be i n c l i n e d t o sk ip these seemingly repet i t ious accounts. I n so d o i n g , he does less t h a n just ice t o t h e i r c o n s u m i n g interest f o r R o m a n readers, a n d t h e i r p r o m i n e n c e i n t h e p u b l i c records f r o m w h i c h t h e histories were d e r i v e d . T h e histories reveal a c o m p e t i t i o n f o r g l o r y a m o n g t h e R o m a n nobles w h i c h was itself i n p a r t the cause o f war . F o r e x a m p l e , o n e consul ( i n 176 B C ) was d e t a i n e d at R o m e f o r a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y e lect ion; ' h e h a d l o n g been a n x i o u s t o get t o his p r o v i n c e , w h e n l u c k i l y f o r his a m b i t i o n letters a r r i v e d i n f o r m i n g h i m t h a t t h e L i g u r i a n s h a d r e b e l l e d ' ( L i v y 41.17). I n yet a n o t h e r case, w h e n t h e e n e m y gave hostages a n d sued f o r peace, the consul (177 B C ) , w h o was st i l l i n R o m e , was deeply c o n c e r n e d t h a t he h a d lost his o p p o r t u n i t y f o r v i c t o r y ( L i v y 41.10). These s h o u l d n o t be seen as t h e att i tudes o r acts o f i rresponsible m a d m e n ; r a t h e r , they s h o u l d be seen as t h e r e c u r r e n t p r o d u c t s o f a c o m p e t i t i v e el ite c u l t u r e w h i c h b o t h p r o v o k e d a n d effectively c o n d o n e d bel l igerence. As o n e R o m a n genera l said: I d o n o t negotiate f o r peace, except w i t h people w h o have s u r r e n d e r e d ( L i v y 40.25).

R o m a n pol i t i ca l i n s t i t u t i o n s ref lected a s imi lar c o n c e r n w i t h war . Every senior R o m a n off ice-holder was s i m p l y expected t o be a c o m petent genera l . T h e best i n d e x o f this is t h e fact t h a t even serious theatres o f w a r were al located t o t h e elected magistrates by lot. T h i s pract ice alone d ic tated t h e need f o r m i l i t a r y exper ience early i n a senator's career. D u r i n g t h e second c e n t u r y B C , t e n years* m i l i t a r y service, usual ly f r o m t h e age o f seventeen, was t h e n o r m a l prerequis i te

27


f o r e lect ion t o p u b l i c office. Symptomat ica l ly , t h e f irst m i n o r p u b l i c office t o w h i c h y o u n g nobles w e r e elected was t h a t o f l e g i o n a r y officer (tribunus militum); this was n o t a n essential step i n t h e career o f a successful leader, b u t i t was b o t h c o m m o n a n d useful . I t gave o p p o r t u n i t y f o r personal g l o r y i n batt le , as w e l l as f o r m i l i t a r y exper ience w h i c h m i g h t p r o v e v i t a l later. F o r once a m a n was elected t o h i g h office, as praetor or consul, he m i g h t w e l l c o m m a n d a large a r m y al located by lo t . D u r i n g t h e first c e n t u r y B C , l o n g m i l i t a r y service was n o l o n g e r r e q u i r e d o f y o u n g m e m b e r s o f t h e el i te. I t became increasingly fashionable t o concentrate instead o n g a i n i n g exper ience i n c i v i l i a n pol i t ics a n d i n advocacy i n t h e courts i n R o m e . B u t some a m b i d o u s y o u n g m e n o f r a n k s t i l l enl is ted w i t h t h e a r m y , a n d served as aides (contubernales) to a r m y c o m m a n d e r s . J u l i u s Caesar, f o r e x a m p l e , served i n this cap-, acity, a l t h o u g h o n l y f o r t w o o r t h r e e years. A n d t h r o u g h o u t the Republ ic , h i g h office c o n t i n u e d t o i n v o l v e t h e c o m m a n d o f armies . N o b l e generals were st i l l expected t o defeat Rome's enemies, a n d t o fight t h e i r way o u t o f cr i t i ca l s i tuations. Besides, m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d always p r o v i d e d t h e m a i n p a t h t o conquest, e n h a n c e d r e p u t a t i o n , a t r i u m p h a n d booty .

T h e ideal isat ion o f m i l i t a r y g l o r y disguised t h e h u g e costs o f w a r w i t h r h e t o r i c . T h e n as n o w , wars were f o u g h t i n defence o f t e r r i t o r y , t o p r o t e c t allies, t o secure l i b e r t y ( L i v y 35.16) a n d * i n t h e h o p e o f peace' ( L i v y 40.52). ' T h e o n l y reason f o r g o i n g t o war*, w r o t e Cicero, ' is t h a t we may l ive i n peace u n h a r m e d * (On Duties 1.35). T h e r e is i n o u r sources n o m e n t i o n o f t h e m a i m e d o r w o u n d e d . W e hear o n l y r a r e l y o f t h e devastat ion o f crops, o f l ivestock a n d o f homes; such losses m u s t have h i t t h e p o o r m u c h h a r d e r t h a n t h e rich. O u r sources d o r e c o r d t h e d e a t h i n batde o f j u s t u n d e r 100,000 R o m a n a n d a l l i e d soldiers i n t h e first h a l f o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C ; s ignif icant losses, i f they are t o be bel ieved, o u t o f a t o t a l a d u l t male p o p u l a t i o n o f p r o b a b l y less t h a n o n e m i l l i o n at t h a t time.36 These figures take n o account o f t h e deaths t h r o u g h epidemics t o w h i c h armies were p r o n e n o r o f t h e imcompleteness o f R o m a n records; i n times o f crisis, such as H a n n i b a l ' s invas ion o f I t a l y a n d t h e c i v i l wars o f t h e late R e p u b l i c , t h e i m p a c t o f d e a t h a n d d e s t r u c t i o n was even greater . N o d o u b t , t h e defeated ' b a r b a r i a n s ' o f n o r t h e r n I t a l y a n d t h e provincia ls f a r e d even worse t h a n t h e Romans. T h e d e a t h o f n u m e r o u s peasants i n w a r b o t h

** O n R o m a n losses in war, see ESAR vol. 1,110; for the Roman and Italian adult male population, see B r u n t (1971: 54); on the impact of the second Punic war on Italian peasants see Livy (28.11 on 206 BC): ' I t was not easy for the people [to go back to their farms] because free farmers had been wiped out by the war, there was a shortage of slaves, cattle had been stolen, farms ravaged or burnt.' See also Toynbee (1965: vol. af ioff.); cf. Brunt's cautious qualifications (1971: 269ff.).

28

Continuous war

at h o m e a n d a b r o a d was o n e o f t h e i m p o r t a n t factors m a k i n g f o r vacancies o n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d i n I t a l y .

C o n d n u o u s w a r a n d t h e conquest o f t h e w h o l e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin p r e c i p i t a t e d r a d i c a l changes i n t h e p a t t e r n o f m i l i t a r y service. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f citizens were l iable t o serve i n t h e a r m y . T h e c o m m o n style o f f i g h t i n g against nearby tr ibes h a d i n v o l v e d most ly s u m m e r campaigns by peasant soldiers. Even those w h o o w n e d o n l y smal l p lots o f l a n d a n d w h o c o u l d a f f o r d t o p r o v i d e s imple b o d y a r m o u r a n d weapons were o b l i g e d t o f i g h t ; they w e r e o f t e n categorised persuasively as ' those w i t h a stake i n t h e c o m m u n i t y ' . 3 7 T h e h i g h level o f m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n by citizens f o u n d its re f lec t ion i n t h e shape o f ear ly p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (such as t h e comitia centuriata), i n t h e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r o f citizens, i n citizens' legal r i g h t s , a n d i n a perceived c o m m o n interest {res publico), at least w i t h i n t h e s t r a t u m o f society w h i c h b o r e a r m s . 3 8 B y t h e same t o k e n , slaves, res ident aliens a n d w o m e n w e r e e x c l u d e d .

T h e repeated i n v o l v e m e n t o f R o m a n armies i n p r o l o n g e d wars overseas i n t h e last t w o centuries o f t h e R e p u b l i c b r o u g h t t h e t r a d i tional system o f r e c r u i t m e n t t o a n e n d . T h e n o r m a l l e n g t h o f m i l i t a r y service increased, a n d t h e b u r d e n s o f m i l i t a r y service g r a d u a l l y s h i f t e d f r o m t h e b r o a d b a n d o f c i t izen peasants w h o o w n e d l a n d a n d served occasionally as soldiers t o a p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y 3 9 smal ler g r o u p o f p r o fessional long-service soldiers, m a n y o f w h o m were p o o r a n d landless. I t is d i f f i c u l t t o attach d e f i n i t e f igures t o these t r e n d s , a n d p e r h a p s even m i s l e a d i n g . F o r o n e o f t h e m a i n characteristics o f t h e R o m a n a r m y

3 7 Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 16.10: ' B u t since property and family money were regarded as a hostage a n d pledge of loyalty to the Republic, and since there was in them a guarantee and assurance of love for one's fatherland, neither the proletariat, nor the capite censi [i.e. those with no property at all, or nearly none] were enrolled as soldiers, except in a state of e m e r g e n c y . . S o similarly, Valerius Maximus 2.3.

3 3 T h e comitia centuriata was the dtizen assembly originally organised in fighting units, centuries (whence centurions), and divided between those liable for military service (iuniores), and those past the age of forty-six (seniores). Because they used to meet armed, they met outside the dty walls in the Field of Mars. T h e cavalry (equites) and the first two classes (out of five classes categorised by the value of property owned) had a highly disproportionate weight in vodng and if they were unanimous constituted a majority. B u t in elections, which were usually disputed, we cannot assume such unanimity. T h a t said, the people (populus) as a whole, particularly in the tribal assembly, had considerable political power expressed, for example, in their election of nobles for office, a n d in their exdusive power to pass laws and to declare war. T h e protection of individual citizens against abuse of power by noble officials was vested in the T r i b u n e s of the People. My discussion here needs some qualification; see Jolowicz (1972: 19IF.).

3 9 T h e absolute size of the R o m a n army increased, but so by enfranchisement did the population of citizens from whom the soldiers were drawn. T h e proportion fell partly because of the increase in the length of service.

29


t h r o u g h o u t t h e w h o l e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n was the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f its size. Soldiers were enl is ted n o t f o r a specific t e r m o f service, b u t f o r a c a m p a i g n , w h i c h m i g h t last o n e o r several years. T h e size o f t h e a r m y f l u c t u a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e dangers f a c i n g t h e state. Nevertheless, t h e m a i n out l ines o f a t r e n d seem clear. I shall a r g u e below t h a t i n t h e ear ly second c e n t u r y B C , m o r e t h a n o n e h a l f o f a l l citizens served i n t h e a r m y p r o b a b l y f o r a n average p e r i o d o f less t h a n seven years. R o u g h l y t w o centuries later , i n t h e r e i g n o f A u g u s t u s , less t h a n o n e s i x t h o f a l l I t a l i a n - b o r n citizens served i n t h e a r m y f o r a s t a n d a r d t e r m o f t w e n t y years. A profess ional a r m y h a d replaced a r m e d peasants.

These changes i n t h e l e n g t h o f m i l i t a r y service, i n t h e social c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e a r m y a n d i n its profess ional ism a l l r e i n f o r c e d t h e repercussions o f t h e h u g e m i l i t a r y e f f o r t o n t h e p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y o f I t a l y . T h e absence, o n average* o f 130,000 I t a l i a n peasants i n t h e a r m y was i n effect a f o r m o f peasant e m i g r a t i o n . L i k e d e a t h i n war , i t h e l p e d t o create vacancies o n I t a l i a n l a n d , w h i c h t h e r i c h were o n l y t o o a n x i o u s t o occupy. B u t u n l i k e d e a t h , i t was t e m p o r a r y a n d u n p r e dictable i n d u r a t i o n . Some peasant soldiers r e t u r n e d af ter l o n g service a b r o a d o n l y t o f i n d t h a t d u r i n g t h e i r absence t h e i r famil ies h a d fa l len i n t o debt , o r t h a t t h e i r f a r m s h a d befen sequestrated by c r e d i t o r s . M o r e o v e r , t h e m e r e l i a b i l i t y o f peasants to be cal led away o n service r e d u c e d t h e i r d e p e n d a b i l i t y as share-croppers o r part- tenants . M i l i t a r y service aggravated t h e economic h a r d s h i p s o f t h e p o o r , w h i l e i t m a d e possible a n increase i n l a n d - o w n e r s h i p a n d p r o s p e r i t y f o r t h e el i te . R o m a n victories overseas w e r e c r e a t i n g a n a l ternat ive source o f l a b o u r , i n slaves. R o m a n peasant soldiers w e r e f i g h t i n g f o r t h e i r o w n displacement .

N o r was this a l l . T h e changes i n t h e p a t t e r n o f r e c r u i t m e n t s t i m u lated t h e d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t o f t h e R o m a n a r m y i n p o l i t i c a l conflicts i n R o m e . I n t h e o l d days, at t h e e n d o f a c a m p a i g n , o r between f i g h t i n g seasons, peasant soldiers r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r f a r m s . T h e a r m y was e m b e d d e d i n t h e peasantry. W e can trace t h e process o f its d isengagement i n t h e shortage o f r e c r u i t s w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l p r o p e r t y q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r m i l i t a r y service, i n t h e r e d u c t i o n a n d e v e n t u a l f o r m a l a b o l i t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y r e q u i r e m e n t (107 B C ) , a n d i n t h e a l locat ion o f f a r m s t o landless ex-soldiers, a n d f ina l ly , i n t h e P r i n c i p a t e i n t h e l o c a t i o n o f long-service profess ional t r o o p s a l o n g t h e f r o n t i e r s o f t h e e m p i r e f a r f r o m t h e i r b i r t h place. 4 0 T h e n e w pol icy o f r e c r u i t i n g

4 0 T h e evidence on recruitment is conveniendy gathered by W . Liebenam in RE sv dileetus, by B r u n t (1971: 391-415, 625-44). I do not agree with B r u n t (1971: 66) in his interpretation of Livy (24.18.7) that in 216 BC only 2,000 Romans had evaded

30

Continuous war

soldiers p r e d o m i n a n t l y f r o m a m o n g the p o o r o r landless, even t h o u g h c o n s c r i p t i o n was sometimes u n p o p u l a r a n d m e n were press-ganged i n t o service, h e l p e d alleviate social conf l ict i n I t a l y by o f f e r i n g t h e m e m p l o y m e n t of f the l a n d . I t h e l p e d solve t h e p r o b l e m s o f r e c r u i t m e n t , since t h e p o o r were m o r e w i l l i n g t o serve f o r l o n g per iods t h a n those w h o h a d f a r m s t o l o o k after. T h e l o n g e r they served i n t h e a r m y , the m o r e c u t of f they became f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n a l villages. B u t the pol icy created a new p r o b l e m o f w h a t t o d o w i t h a professional corps o f landless soldiers w h o faced discharge w i t h o u t any prospects o f a secure l i v e l i h o o d . T h e profess ional a r m y re l ieved m a n y peasants w i t h l a n d o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o f i g h t , b u t o n l y at t h e cost o f f o r g i n g a new w e a p o n o f c i v i l war .

L e t us take a closer l o o k at t h e R o m a n w a r e f for t . O n e obvious measure is t h e size o f t h e a r m y . T h r o u g h o u t t h e last t w o centuries o f the R e p u b l i c (see T a b l e 1.1), t h e R o m a n a r m y repeatedly t o t a l l e d e i g h t p e r cent o r m o r e o f a d u l t male citizens; t h e m e d i a n size o f t h e a r m y (225-23 B C ) a m o u n t e d t o t h i r t e e n p e r cent o f a d u l t male citizens. B u t i n t h e years before t h e mass e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t o f the I t a l i a n allies (90/89 B C ) , t h e c i t izen a r m y represented o n l y a p o r t i o n o f t h e to ta l R o m a n m i l i t a r y e f for t . T h e I t a l i a n allies c o n t r i b u t e d o n average about t h r e e f i f ths o f t h e to ta l R o m a n a r m e d forces d u r i n g t h i r t y years (200-168 B C ) a f ter t h e w a r against Carthage , f o r w h i c h we have f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n . I n this p e r i o d , t h e average size o f t h e R o m a n / I t a l i a n armies was over 130,000 m e n . I t was r o u g h l y t h e same f o r the p e r i o d 80-50 B C , f o r w h i c h we also have g o o d i n f o r m a t i o n (see T a b l e 1.1); patchy evidence f o r t h e i n t e r v e n i n g p e r i o d suggests t h a t t h e allies

military service, or in his conclusion that the Roman soldiers, even in times of crisis were predominantly recruited from peasants owning land (ossidui). O n this see my review of B r u n t (1971) in JRS 62 (1972) 192-3. I think B r u n t overestimates the efficiency of R o m a n recruiting and the objective reliability of the sources.

T h e testimony for the minimum property requirements of soldiers is provided by Livy 1.43 (11,000 asses); Polybius 6.19 (4,000 asses); Cicero, On the Republic 2.40 or Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 16.10.10 (1,500 asses). T h e changes seem difficult to date with any certainty, but see the interesting discussion by E . Gabba, T h e origins of the professional army at Rome* (Gabba, 1976: 1—19). T h e reduction in property qualifications supports the idea that there was a trend towards professionalisation and proletarianisation of the army d u r i n g the last two centuries BC - so well analysed by Gabba (1976: 1-69) and by B r u n t (1971: 405ff.).

I n 107 BC according to Sallust, JugurthaQ6, Marius broke with tradition by enlisting volunteers mostly from the poorest classes. It was perhaps less of a revolution than the confirmation of a trend. It is important to stress that poor men had probably served before (how else could the Romans have kept such large armies in the held? - see below), that the landed peasantry were forcibly conscripted in the decades following, and that poor soldiers were probably recruited mainly from the countryside. See B r u n t (1971: 403ff.), Gabba (1976) a n d J . H a r m a n d , Varmee et le soldat a Rome (Paris, 1967) 1 iff. O n land allotments, see B r u n t (1971:294-344).

3 1


repeatedly c o n t r i b u t e d m o r e soldiers t h a n R o m e . 4 1 I n b o t h p r o p o r tional a n d absolute t e r m s , R o m a n m i l i t a r y e f f o r t was i m m e n s e . T h e size o f t h e R o m a n a r m y compares , f o r e x a m p l e , w i t h t h a t o f t h e F r e n c h a r m y i n the mid-seventeenth c e n t u r y , t h e n t h e largest a r m y i n E u r o p e , b u t t h a t was d r a w n f r o m a p o p u l a t i o n o f o v e r t w e n t y m i l l i o n -r o u g h l y t h r e e t imes as large as t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f R o m a n I t a l y . 4 2

R i g h t d o w n t o t h e e n d o f t h e Republ ic , R o m e is best seen as a w a r r i o r state. T h e e m p i r e was w o n o n l y t h r o u g h t h e massive i n v o l v e m e n t o f t h e l o w e r classes i n w a r , a n i n v o l v e m e n t w h i c h m i r r o r e d t h e m i l i t a r i s m o f t h e el i te. W e can see this c learly e n o u g h i f we consider t h e average l e n g t h o f m i l i t a r y service. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , as so o f t e n i n R o m a n his tory , accurate i n f o r m a t i o n is missing. M o r e o v e r , i t is i m p o r t a n t t o stress t h a t i n t h e late R e p u b l i c t h e r e was n o f i x e d t e r m o f service. A n n u a l l y elected generals w e r e a u t h o r i s e d by t h e senate t o r e c r u i t legions, as t h e s i t u a t i o n d e m a n d e d , be fore they set o u t f o r t h e zone o f war. I n d i v i d u a l soldiers, w h e n they enl is ted, c o u l d have h a d very l i t d e idea h o w l o n g t h e i r service w o u l d last. T h i s instabi l i ty was a s igni f icant factor i n p o l i t i c a l instabi l i ty , a n d s h o u l d n o t be f o r g o t t e n . Yet obviously such v a r i a t i o n does n o t p r e c l u d e a n average. W e k n o w t h a t citizens were l iable t o serve i n t h e a r m y f o r u p t o sixteen years ( ten years f o r cavalry) between t h e ages o f seventeen a n d for ty-s ix . I n t h e ear ly second c e n t u r y B C , citizens w h o h a d served over six years c o n t i n u o u s l y were t h o u g h t o v e r d u e f o r r e t u r n h o m e ( L i v y 40.36.10); t o w a r d s t h e e n d o f t h e Republ ic , soldiers repeatedly served l o n g e r ; t h e e m p e r o r A u g u s t u s i n s t i t u t e d a profess ional a r m y i n w h i c h soldiers served f o r s ixteen, t h e n later t w e n t y years . 4 3 I t is t e m p t i n g t h e r e f o r e t o f i l l t h e gaps i n o u r i n f o r m a t i o n by speculat ion; t h e probabi l i t ies are l i m i t e d ; t h e coefficients are clear; t h e s h o r t e r

4 1 T h e r e is much scholarly argument about the trustworthiness of the figures transmitted by the sources for the size of legions, of armies a n d of the cidzen population recorded in the R o m a n census. I a m aiming here at rough orders of magnitude only; the figures would have to be widely awry to destroy the implications deduced here. T h e figures given here are based on B r u n t (1971: 424-5 and 449). T h e average for 200-16% BC indudes c. 10,000 marines a n d oarsmen; for 80-50 BC it is arrived at by multiplying the number of legions given by B r u n t by their probable size (i.e. 5,500 men). B r u n t (1971: 447) gives the average for 80-50 BC as 90,000, but this seems discordant with his own figures. O n the ratio of allied and R o m a n soldiers, see B r u n t (1971: appendix 26).

4 1 Based on H . Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst (Berlin, 1920) vol. 4, 261; F . F . Helleiner in the Cambridge Economic History (Cambridge, 1967) vol. 4, 67.

4 3 F o r six years service, see P. A . Brunt, ' T h e army and the land in the Roman revolution', JRS 52 (1962) 80; see also Appian, Spanish Wars 78 (c. 140 BC); A. Afzelius, Die römische Kriegsmacht (Copenhagen, 1944) 34fr*.» 47,61; A . £. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (Oxford, 1967) 167-72 (a very clear account). O n longer service later, see R. £. Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army (Manchester 1958) 22t?.; H a r m a n d (1967: 258-60).

3*

Continuous war

T a b l e I . I . The Militarism of Rome: the numbers of citizens serving as soldiers in the Roman army, by decades, 225-23 B C

a b e d Soldiers as a

Dates BC (mostly Estimated citizen Estimated size of proportion of all interval population citizen army male citizens

mid-points) Cooo) Cooo) (db) (%)

225 300 52 17 213 260 75 29 203 »35 60 26

»93 266 53 20

183 3 ' 5 4 * 15 '73 3«4 44 «4 163 383 33 9 "53 374 30 8

«43 400 44 11

'33 381 37 10 123 476 or 366 3 2 7 or 9

" 3 476 or 366 34 7 or 9

103 (400) 50 ' 3 93 (400) 52 «3 83 (1,030) (143) »4 73 1,030 171 17

63 1,030 120 12

53 (1,030) 121 12

43 240 16

33 1,600 250 16

23 1,800 156 9

Note to Table 1.1 T h e estimates of citizen population (col. b) are adapted from B r u n t (1971: 13-14,54-83 and 117-18). T h e y are based on the nearest R o m a n census figure, plus the estimated number of citizen soldiers serving overseas; I have followed B r u n t in adding a n extra 10% to this total to allow for under-reporting in the census.

T h e sudden changes in the figures deserve explanation. T h e changes in 213 a n d 183 BC were largely due to the dis- and re-enfranchisement of 38,000 Campanians; in 83 and 43 BC, they reflect the enfranchisement of the Italian allies and Cisalpines. T h e figures from 123 BC onwards are less certain because of the difficulty of interpreting the census data. U p to 53 BC I have not included Italians living overseas, because they did not serve in the R o m a n army in sufficient numbers. Thereafter, I have included them, a n d have followed Brunt's figures for them; roughly 150,000 in 43 BC and 375,000 in 23 BC. T h e figures in brackets are even less certain than the others.

T h e estimates of army size (col. c) are also based on B r u n t (1971: 44, 404, 418, 424, 432-49, 501-10). Between 198 and 59 BC, the figures given are averages for the decade (198-189,188-179 BC etc), the others are for single years. I have gone further than B r u n t in multiplying the number of legions in service by their nominal strength, that is 5,500 from 168-108 BC, and by 6,200 from 107 BC after the reforms of Marius to 91 BC. I n the civil wars which followed, it seems that more legions were formed than could be fully manned, and to allow for this I have multiplied by 5,500 only, except where B r u n t gives explicit figures. T h e margin of e r r o r may be quite large, but probably not so large that it would materially alter the percentage figures in column a\

33


o 20 40 50 60 80 IOO %

Proportion of young citizens aged 17+ in a r m y

F i g u r e 1.3. Y o u n g m e n ' s l e n g t h o f s e r v i c e i n t h e R o m a n a r m y - s o m e c o o r d i n a t e s . N B : t h e m e d i a n size o f t h e a r m y 2 2 5 - 2 3 BC w a s 1 3 % o f a l l a d u l t m a l e c i t izens.

t h e average l e n g t h o f service, t h e l a r g e r t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f cidzens i n v o l v e d .

I n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , t h e b u r d e n o f m i l i t a r y service f e l l d i s p r o p o r t ionate ly o n y o u n g m e n . Citizens became liable t o m i l i t a r y service o n t h e i r seventeeth b i r t h d a y . I n p r e p a r i n g F i g u r e 1.3,1 have m a d e f o u r s i m p l i f y i n g assumptions: (a) a l l m e n j o i n e d t h e a r m y at age seventeen, (b) they a l l served t h e same l e n g t h o f t i m e , (c) t h e rate o f d e a t h a m o n g soldiers was t h e same as f o r civi l ians, (d) t h e average expectat ion o f l i fe was r o u g h l y m i d - w a y between the h i g h a n d t h e l o w f o u n d i n p r e - i n d u s t r i a l p o p u l a t i o n s ($o = a s ) . 4 4 N o n e o f t h e first t h r e e assumptions is l i k e l y t o be accurate; b u t i n so f a r as m o r t a l i t y a m o n g soldiers was h i g h e r t h a n a m o n g civi l ians o r i f r e c r u i t s j o i n e d t h e a r m y s ignif icant ly later t h a n age seventeen, t h e n t h e b u r d e n o f service w o u l d

4 4 T h e average expectation (e) of life at birth (o) among soldiers is estimated at twenty-five years (e 0 = 25).

34

Continuous war

have been even heavier t h a n s h o w n . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i f t h e ci t izen p o p u l a t i o n ( o r i f t h e sector o f i t w h i c h b o r e arms) was u n d e r e n u m -erated a n d i f t h e legions w e r e systematically u n d e r m a n n e d , t h e n t h e b u r d e n was l i g h t e r t h a n s h o w n . T a b l e 1.1 a n d F i g u r e 1.3 s h o u l d be used t o i l lustrate l i m i t s o f p r o b a b i l i t y a n d r o u g h o r d e r s o f m a g n i t u d e o n l y .

T h a t said, t h e conclusions seem staggering. A n a r m y w h i c h accounted f o r t h i r t e e n p e r cent o f a l l citizens (the m e d i a n o f the last t w o centuries) c o u l d be raised by e n l i s t i n g e i g h t y - f o u r p e r cent o f seventeen-year-olds f o r five years, o r <;. sixty per cent f o r seven years, o r f o r t y - f o u r p e r cent f o r t e n years, o r twenty-e ight p e r cent f o r sixteen years. ( T h e c o h o r t o f seventeen-year-olds (at e0 = 25) equal led a b o u t t h r e e p e r cent o f t h e a d u l t male p o p u l a t i o n ; i t d i m i n i s h e d slowly each year af ter . ) T h e qual i tat ive a n d impressionist ic evidence o n e n l i s t m e n t i n t h e ear ly second c e n t u r y B C suggests t h a t service was typical ly o n t h e s h o r t side o f this s p e c t r u m . B y t h e e n d o f t h e Republ ic service h a d become signif icantiy longer . T h e impl ica t ions are t h e n inevi table; i f t h e evidence o n a r m y size a n d cit izen p o p u l a t i o n is a n y w h e r e near r i g h t , t h e n a very large p r o p o r t i o n (say over h a l f ) o f R o m a n cidzens r e g u l a r l y served i n t h e a r m y f o r seven years i n t h e early second c e n t u r y B C . B y t h e r e i g n o f A u g u s t u s , the a r m y was t h o r o u g h l y professionalised; b u t an average o f t w e n t y years* service st i l l r e q u i r e d t h e e n l i s t m e n t o f a b o u t o n e fifth o f seventeen-year-old citizens. A m o n g p r e - i n d u s t r i a l states, as far as I k n o w , o n l y Prussia u n d e r F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m I a n d F r e d e r i c k t h e Great a n d N a p o l e o n i c France, a n d those o n l y f o r s h o r t p e r i o d s , achieved such consistent m i l i t a r y e f f o r t . 4 5

I n s u m , c o n t i n u o u s wars w e r e largely a consequence o f the c o m pet i t ive a m b i t i o n s o f a m i l i t a r i s t i c e l i te , s u p p o r t e d by a h i g h rate o f r e c r u i t m e n t o f peasants i n t o t h e a r m y . W a r s affected I t a l i a n l a n d a n d l a b o u r d i r e c t l y by d e s t r u c t i o n a n d death . F o r e i g n invaders , rebel l ious slaves a n d i n s u r g e n t I ta l ians p l u n d e r e d f a r m s , ravaged crops a n d s laughtered livestock. I n a d d i t i o n , n u m e r o u s R o m a n soldiers a n d Ita l ians were k i l l e d o r m a i m e d i n batde. T h e i n d i r e c t economic a n d pol i t i ca l consequences o f w a r f a r e were even m o r e serious. T h e m i l i t a r y service o f over 100,000 Romans/Ital ians at most t imes t h r o u g h o u t t h e last t w o centuries o f t h e Republ ic was equal to a s ignif icant e m i g r a t i o n f r o m t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . 4 6 Absent peasants w e r e p a r t l y replaced by slaves; this * e m i g r a t i o n ' o f soldiers was o n e o f t h e factors w h i c h p e r m i t t e d o r even e n c o u r a g e d t h e f o r m a t i o n o f large estates. O r seen a n o t h e r

4 5 See note 19 above. 4 6 O n the recruitment of soldiers predominantly from the countryside, rather than

from the urban proletariat, see B r u n t (1962: 69*!.). Some urban recruitment also occurred.

35


way, t h e p a u p e r i s a t i o n o f m a n y peasants o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d t h e increases i n l a b o u r p r o d u c t i v i t y o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h i c h were associated w i t h a g r i c u l t u r a l i n n o v a t i o n a n d economies o f scale o n large estates, w e r e t h e t w o sides o f o n e c o i n , j u s t as they w e r e i n t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l r e v o l u t i o n i n E n g l a n d i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y .

T h e t r a n s f e r o f t h e b u r d e n o f p r o l o n g e d m i l i t a r y service f r o m p r o p e r t i e d peasants t o t h e p o o r o r landless h a d considerable po l i t i ca l repercussions. I n t h e m e d i u m t e r m , i t h e l p e d alleviate t h e u n p o p u l a r i t y o f c o n s c r i p t i o n a m o n g peasant voters; since such large armies c o u l d n o t be filled exclusively w i t h vo lunteers , t h e R o m a n s h a d o f t e n r e l i e d also o n persuasion a n d force. O u r sources reveal t h e m i l i t a r y levies as a repeated source o f t r o u b l e . I n one year (152 B C ) , f o r e x a m p l e , c o m p l a i n t s o f unfairness i n d u c e d t h e consuls t o select r e c r u i t s by l o t ; o n a n o t h e r occasion, s i m i l a r c o m p l a i n t s p r o v o k e d t h e t r i b u n e s o f t h e people t o fine a n d i m p r i s o n t h e consuls. G i v e n t h a t t h e executive a r m o f t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t was t o o weak t o d i s t r i b u t e t h e l o a d equi tably , i t was obviously advantageous t o shi f t t h e b u r d e n o f m i l i t a r y service o n t o fewer people d r a w n p r e d o m i n a n t l y f r o m those w h o w e r e pol i t ica l ly weakest, a n d w h o h a d least a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e l a n d . 4 7 Poverty p u s h e d t h e m o u t , w h i l e a r m y pay a n d t h e prospect o f b o o t y p u l l e d .

T h e s o l u t i o n o f t h e p r o b l e m o f r e c r u i t m e n t h a d its pr ice . A t t h e e n d o f t h e i r m i l i t a r y service, landless soldiers needed means o f s u p p o r t . I n the u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d R o m a n economy, that m e a n t l a n d . W h e n t h e p o w e r o f soldiers was w e d d e d t o t h e p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n o f a successful genera l , a n a r m y was i n a p o s i t i o n to get t h e l a n d i t w a n t e d . Sulla, a f ter his t r i u m p h a n t m a r c h o n R o m e i n 82 B C , is said t o have resetded t w e n t y - t h r e e legions, d e p l e t e d by w a r losses t o perhaps 80-100,000 m e n , o n I t a l i a n l a n d m a d e vacant by confiscation f r o m towns w h i c h h a d o p p o s e d h i m . 4 8 S i m i l a r policies o f reset t lement w e r e effected by o t h e r p o l i t i c a l generals; P o m p e y , Jul ius Caesar a n d A u g u s t u s . T h e n u m b e r s o f soldiers resetded i n I t a l y , perhaps a q u a r t e r o f a m i l l i o n between 80 a n d 25 B C , were s t i l l f a i r l y smal l as a p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e t o t a l l a b o u r force . B u t most o f I t a l y was t o o densely p o p u l a t e d t o a l low t h e easy ass imilat ion o f a s u d d e n i n f l u x o f large n u m b e r s o f new setders. T h e resetdement o f ex-soldiers t h e r e f o r e usual ly l e d t o t h e ev ic t ion o f e x i s t i n g tenants o r peasants. L i k e t h e smal l l a n d g r a n t scheme o f t h e G r a c c h i , i t w e n t against t h e t r e n d towards t h e f o r m a t i o n o f large estates. B u t t h e r e was n o t h i n g t o stop t h e n e w smal l -holders f r o m

4 7 Astin (1967: 167-72); Livy 43.14 on 169 BC; Appian, Spanish Wars 49; Livy, Summary of Book 55.

4 0 O n land allotments to Sulla's soldiers, see B r u n t (1971: 305).

36

Continuous war

b e c o m i n g themselves t h e v ic t ims o f s i m i l a r economic o r po l i t i ca l pressures; they t o o m i g h t soon be evicted. T h e resetdement o f ex-soldiers i n I t a l y seems o n l y t o have replaced o n e g r o u p o f smal l-holders w i t h a n o t h e r ; i t d i d l i t d e t o change t h e o v e r a l l p a t t e r n o f l a n d - h o l d i n g a n d i t m a d e a s ignif icant c o n t r i b u d o n t o instabi l i ty . F inal ly , t h e l o n g - t e r m p o l i t i c a l consequences o f c h a n g i n g f r o m a peasant t o a professional a r m y w e r e serious. T h e g r a d u a l d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n o f t h e y e o m a n r y u n d e r m i n e d the t r a d i t i o n a l b r o a d base o f the R e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n . L a n d e d peasants were re l ieved o f t h e heavy b u r d e n o f m i l i t a r y service at t h e eventua l cost, t o p u t i t somewhat d r a m a t i c a l l y , o f t h e i r po l i t i ca l l i b e r t y . Between Republ ic a n d Pr inc ipate , t h e a r m y changed f r o m a n expression o f c i t izen p o w e r t o a n i n s t r u m e n t o f c o n t r o l . Citizens became t h e e m p e r o r ' s subjects.

T H E P R O D U C T S O F W A R

T h e m a i n p r o d u c t o f c o n t i n u o u s w a r was e m p i r e . I t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n v o l v e d a n increase i n t h e professional skills o f t h e R o m a n el i te; f o r e x a m p l e , specialist lawyers became dis t inct f r o m priests, soldiers f r o m peasants, school-teachers f r o m fathers , tax-contractors f r o m p l u n d e r i n g generals. These deve lopments w e r e p a i d f o r , i n i t i a l l y o u t o f booty a n d w a r i n d e m n i t i e s , a n d eventual ly f r o m t h e taxes i m p o s e d o n t h e v a n q u i s h e d . Revenues f r o m e m p i r e m a d e possible t h e ' take-of f ' i n t o p o l i t i c a l e x p a n s i o n a n d t h e f i n a n c i n g o f f u r t h e r wars. As t h e e m p i r e became m o r e f i r m l y established, t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t i n c o m e d e r i v e d f r o m b o o t y d i m i n i s h e d ; i n d e m n i t i e s were replaced by taxes; v ic tor ious generals were succeeded by R o m a n a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . I n d e e d t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m b o o t y t o taxes was a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f t h e process o f establ ishing t h e e m p i r e . T h e revenues o f t h e state were secured. A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C , a c c o r d i n g t o Frank's tentat ive estimates, a b o u t t h r e e q u a r t e r s o f t h e revenues o f t h e R o m a n state came f r o m a b r o a d . B y t h e m i d d l e o f t h e f irst c e n t u r y B C , state revenues h a d increased t o r o u g h l y six times t h e i r previous level ; a n d almost a l l came f r o m a b r o a d . 4 9 A s i n o t h e r successful

4 9 I follow here T . Frank's speculative estimate of gross revenues in the early second century BC: about 50-60 million H S per year (ESAR vol. 1, 141).

A s a result of Pompey's conquests 63-60 BC, state revenues rose from 200 to 340 million H S (Plutarch, Pompey^). Plutarch's comment is ambiguous; but I prefer this interpretation to a rise from 200 to 540 million H S , argued by £. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Oxford 1 ,1968) 78 and accepted by P. A . Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (London, 1971) 39. T h e importance of booty and indemnities is reflected in the detailed accounts of them preserved in traditional histories (e.g. Livy 34.46). F o r what it is worth, F r a n k estimates that booty and indemnities accounted for about two fifths of R o m a n state revenues in the first part

37


p r e - i n d u s t r i a l e m p i r e s , t h e proceeds o f v ictory were d i s t r i b u t e d , albeit somewhat u n e q u a l l y , a m o n g the c o n q u e r o r s .

Soldiers were a m o n g t h e first t o benefi t . A t t h e e n d o f a war , t h e c o m m a n d i n g genera l r e g u l a r l y gave soldiers a share o f t h e b o o t y i n cash. I n t h e ear ly second c e n t u r y B C , these grants were q u i t e modest ; o n average bare ly e n o u g h t o feed a f a m i l y f o r t h r e e m o n t h s . I n the m i d - f i r s t c e n t u r y B C , i n the t w o p a r t i c u l a r l y lavish cases we k n o w of , t h e c o m m o n soldier's share o f t h e booty was e n o u g h t o b u y several years' f o o d f o r a h o u s e h o l d o r a modest p l o t o f l a n d . 5 0 W e d o n o t k n o w h o w m u c h b o o t y soldiers succeeded i n c a r r y i n g of f f o r themselves; b u t R o m a n c o m m a n d e r s were o f t e n i n d u c e d t o a l low t h e i r soldiers t o p l u n d e r ; sometimes t h e soldiers p l u n d e r e d a c a p t u r e d ci ty w i t h o u t o r d e r s . 5 1

N o t o n l y soldiers benef i ted. I n 167 B C , as a resul t o f o n e p a r t i c u l a r l y large h a u l o f booty f r o m Greece, taxes levied o n I t a l i a n l a n d o w n e d by R o m a n citizens were abol ished; the l a n d tax was n o t r e i m p o s e d i n I t a l y , except d u r i n g crises at the e n d o f t h e Republ ic . T h i s is o n e o f t h e factors w h i c h accounts f o r t h e h i g h p r i c e o f I t a l i a n l a n d , since, o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g equal , r e n t c o u l d equal r e n t p lus tax o n p r o v i n c i a l l a n d .

As t h e p r o f i t s o f e m p i r e increased, d i s t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e c i t izen b o d y became m o r e lavish. I n p a r t , t h e pay-off was v icarious a n d symbolic: p u b l i c games were g i v e n to celebrate victories; o n e o f t h e i r f u n c t i o n s was that they r e i n f o r c e d p o p u l a r p r i d e i n t h e army's achievements. I n 123 B C , a p o p u l a r t r i b u n e o f t h e people h a d a law passed by w h i c h citizens l i v i n g i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e received wheat at a subsidised pr ice . F r o m 58 B C o n w a r d s , t h e wheat was d i s t r i b u t e d f ree; t h e n u m b e r o f rec ipients fluctuated a p p a r e n t l y between 150,000 a n d 320,000. I n this way, a sizeable m i n o r i t y o f a l l R o m a n citizens, at t imes over o n e

of the second century BC, when less than a third of revenues came from provincial taxes and mines. At the end of the Republic (see ESAR vol. 1,322ff.) provincial taxes constituted the bulk of state revenues. T h e great hauls of booty taken by Pompey and Caesar were exceptional.

5 0 F r o m the early second century BC, we know of 17 gifts of money by generals to soldiers from booty (tabulated by B r u n t (1971: 394). T h e median was 100 H S , the average 122 H S . At the conventional price of wheat (3 H S per modius), the average would have provided c. 40 modii = 260 kg wheat = about one quarter of a family's minimum annual needs. B y contrast, Pompey gave his soldiers 6,000 H S (Plutarch, Pompey 45), Julius Caesar 20,000 H S (Appian, Civil Wars 3.44) and 24,000 H S (Suetonius, Julius Caesar 38). Augustus gave soldiers 12,000 H S after sixteen, later twenty years' service. See P. A. Brunt, JRS 52 (1962) 786*.

5 1 Ideally, R o m a n soldiers shared all the booty; according to Polybius 10.15ff. a specific body of soldiers, never more than half the army, was detailed to collect booty, while the rest stood guard. Ancient ideals of discipline sometimes broke down (e.g. Livy 37.32; Plutarch, Lucullus 14 and 19) H a r m a n d (1967: 410-16).

38

The products of war

q u a r t e r , received a d i r e c t share o f t h e prof i t s o f e m p i r e . A t most af ter 58 B C , t h e cost o f t h e wheat-dole equal led a s i x t h o f state revenues, w h i l e each r e c i p i e n t got a b o u t t w o fifths o f t h e m i n i m u m subsistence r e q u i r e m e n t s o f a f a m i l y ; t h e wheat-dole h e l p e d t h e p o o r o u t , b u t i t d i d n o t m a k e w o r k unnecessary. 5 2 T h e use o f state resources t o subsidise p o o r voters h a d several u n i n t e n d e d a n d perhaps u n p e r -ceived consequences. I t e n c o u r a g e d t h e f u r t h e r m i g r a t i o n o f peasants t o R o m e ; i t was o n e o f t h e factors w h i c h m a d e possible t h e c i ty o f Rome's h u g e g r o w t h ; a n d i t h e l d d o w n the cost t o t h e r i c h o f e m p l o y i n g free l a b o u r i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e . I n a d d i t i o n , as I a r g u e below, i t h e l p e d s u p p o r t t h e m a r k e t f o r t h e f o o d g r o w n o n t h e f a r m s o f t h e r i c h . O n e final p o i n t . M o s t o f t h e official revenues f r o m e m p i r e w e n t t o finance m o r e wars. I t a l i a n t r o o p s were p a i d a n d s u p p o r t e d . I n effect, t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t was p r o v i d i n g a l ternat ive e m p l o y m e n t f o r I t a l i a n peasants; they were p a i d t o keep off t h e l a n d , w h i c h t h e r i c h w a n t e d t o occupy. O n e can u n d e r s t a n d t h e f u r y o f conservative leaders w h e n occasionally soldiers r e t u r n e d en masse, a n d t h r o u g h t h e p a t r o n a g e o f t h e i r generals d e m a n d e d l a n d i n I t a l y t o settle o n .

A b o v e a l l , t h e i n c o m e f r o m e m p i r e flowed i n t o t h e purses o f t h e p r i v i l e g e d . T h a t was o n e o f t h e ch ie f advantages o f b e i n g p r i v i l e g e d , at once a t o k e n o f h i g h status a n d a means o f r e i n f o r c i n g i t . T h r o u g h o u t t h e second c e n t u r y B C , t h e r i c h became steadily richer, a n d i n the first c e n t u r y B C , t h e process accelerated. R i c h m e n boasted p u b l i c l y o f t h e i r w e a l t h ; t h e size o f one's possessions o r debts became matters o f c o m m o n k n o w l e d g e . T h e richest nobles a c q u i r e d p r i v a t e f o r t u n e s w h i c h equal led t h e revenues o f smal l states, a n d c o u l d by themselves sustain p r i v a t e armies a n d dispense massive c h a r i t y . O n e m a n , M . L i c i n i u s Crassus, r e p u t e d l y t h e richest o f his day, gave R o m a n cidzens l i v i n g i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e e n o u g h wheat t o l ive o n f o r t h r e e m o n t h s i n t h e h o p e o f susta in ing his po l i t i ca l p o p u l a r i t y w h i l e he was away seeking m i l i t a r y g l o r y . H i s f o r t u n e a m o u n t e d t o a b o u t 192 m i l l i o n H S , r o u g h l y e n o u g h t o feed 400,000 famil ies f o r o n e year. A c o n t e m p o r a r y notable r e c k o n e d t h a t o n e needed 100,000 H S t o l ive c o m f o r t a b l y a n d 600,000 H S a year t o l ive w e l l , incomes r o u g h l y equal t o t w o h u n d r e d

M O n the wheat-dole in Rome, see B r u n t (1971: 376-82). I calculate its cost very roughly as 5 (modii per m o n t h ) x i 2 (months per year)x320,000 (maximum number of recipients) x 3 H S (conventional wheat price) = 58 million H S from a revenue in 60 BC of more than 340 million H S . Cicero's polemical implication (pro Sestio 55) that free wheat for citizens cost the state a fifth of its budget was probably an exaggeration. I reckon the m i n i m u m living requirements of an average sized family at 1,000 kg wheat equivalent per year (c. 150 modii).

39


a n d o n e t h o u s a n d t w o h u n d r e d t imes t h e m i n i m u m subsistence level o f a f a m i l y . 5 3

A s a resul t o f this g r o w t h i n w e a l t h , t h e differences between t h e r i c h a n d p o o r i n w e a l t h a n d style o f l i f e w i d e n e d . T h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e poorest , t h e u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t a n d landless labourers , d e t e r i o r a t e d s h a r p l y b o t h absolutely a n d re lat ive ly t o t h e r i c h . A t t h e same t i m e , sections o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n outs ide t h e t r a d i t i o n a l e l i te w e r e also p r o f i t i n g f r o m e m p i r e . T h i s is m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t h a p p e n e d , b u t i t is d i f f i c u l t t o d o c u m e n t ; el i t ist l i t t e r a t e u r s d i d n o t discuss increas ing d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n outs ide t h e e l i te . O n e s y m p t o m o f this d e v e l o p m e n t m a y be f o u n d i n t h e b o o t y d i s t r i b u t e d t o soldiers. W e have a lready seen t h a t ear ly i n t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n t h e a m o u n t s g i v e n t o soldiers by generals were v e r y smal l ; at t h e e n d o f t h e p e r i o d , they were , o n t h e t w o k n o w n occasions, very large . I n t h e ear l ier p e r i o d (c. 200 B C ) , c e n t u r i o n s r e g u l a r l y g o t o n l y twice as m u c h b o u n t y as o r d i n a r y soldiers; i n t h e last c e n t u r y B C , o n o n e occasion, c e n t u r i o n s received t w e n t y times as m u c h as o r d i n a r y soldiers ( P l u t a r c h , Pompey 33), a n d by t h e e n d o f t h e Republ ic , t h e r e g u l a r pay o f c e n t u r i o n s was five t imes h i g h e r t h a n t h a t o f o r d i n a r y soldiers ( A p p i a n , Civil Wars 4.100); at t h e e n d o f A u g u s t u s ' r e i g n , i ; m a y have been sixteen t o s ixty times h i g h e r . 5 4 Some soldiers s t i l l got d o u b l e pay (duplicarii), b u t t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h e r a n k o r d e r was f a r be low t h a t o f a c e n t u r i o n . A t t h e o t h e r e n d o f t h e scale i t is w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t Pompey's senior officers (legates, quaestors) a p p a r e n d y g o t five h u n d r e d t imes as m u c h as o r d i n a r y soldiers (ESAR, v o l . 1, 325). T h e p i c t u r e we get f r o m a l l these examples is o n e o f increas ing d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n t h e a r m y . I t p a r t l y ref lected t h e army's o w n increased profess ional isat ion a n d b u r e a u -

M T h e fact that the size of his fortune was public knowledge reflects the competition among nobles for wealth. I n fact Pompey's fortune was significandy larger than that of Crassus. See Badian (1968:8iff.); Plutarch, Crassus 2; Pliny, Natural History33.134; Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 49. It is noteworthy that Pompey's assets roughly equalled the state's annual revenues - an index of the weakness of the state machine relative to the nobility in the late Republic.

M O n this, see P. A . Brunt, 'Pay and superannuation in the R o m a n army*, Papers of the British School at Rome 18 (1950) 71 and the slighdy different calculations in A . von Domeszewski, Die Rangordnung des rbmischen Heeres (Cologne 1 , 1967) i n extrapolating backwards from an early third-century inscription (CIL 3.14416). I n 46 BC Caesar gave centurions the old traditional ratio, i.e. twice as m u c h bounty as ordinary soldiers (Appian, Civil Wars 2.102); this was a clear exception to the trend I describe. However, it is worth noting that in this distribution centurions got 40,000 H S , which was enough to set them u p as substantial peasants. T h e high ratio (20:1) of bounty given to centurions in 66 BC (see also Appian, Mith. 104) may also have been due to exceptional political circumstances. T h a t said, the evidence of a trend, although scant and patchy, seems cumulatively convincing. See also B r u n t (1971:459) for a sensible discussion of the evidence.

40

The products of war

crat isat ion; i t also ref lected, I t h i n k , t h e increased s trat i f icat ion o f c i v i l i a n society.

T h e m a i n source o f new w e a l t h f o r nobles was p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n m e n t . 5 5 T h e o r i g i n s o f p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n conquest affected its style. L i k e t h e R o m a n a r m y , p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was c o n t r o l l e d by high-status amateurs , w h o h e l d office f o r s h o r t p e r i o d s o n l y a n d saw i n i t a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o enhance t h e i r status a n d m a k e a p r o f i t . T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f w a r b o o t y d e c l i n e d , t h o u g h t h e p l u n d e r col lected by t h e armies a n d officers o f Sulla, P o m p e y a n d Jul ius Caesar prov ides notable exceptions. I n s t e a d R o m a n aristocrats m a d e m o n e y f r o m t h e superv is ion o f t a x a t i o n a n d t h e dispensat ion o f just ice. I n t h e f i rst c e n t u r y B G , a cautious a n d u n e x p l o i t a t i v e g o v e r n o r o f a p r o v i n c e c o u l d m a k e e n o u g h p r o f i t f r o m a single year i n office t o set u p his f a m i l y i n style f o r generat ions. M a n y g o v e r n o r s a n d t h e i r aides saw a t o u r i n t h e provinces as a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r m a k i n g t h e i r f o r t u n e s , o r f o r r e s t o r i n g t h e m af ter they h a d been d e b i l i t a t e d by t h e cost o f s e c u r i n g e lect ion. T h e scale o f R o m a n e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e provinces is ref lected i n t h e fact t h a t t h e f i rs t p e r m a n e n t j u d i c i a l t r i b u n a l established i n R o m e was set u p ( i n 149 B C ) t o deal w i t h c o m p l a i n t s by provinc ia ls o f i l legal e x t o r t i o n . A t best, t h e t r i b u n a l p r o v i d e d prov inc ia ls w i t h a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o recuperate some smal l p a r t o f t h e losses they h a d i n c u r r e d a n d , f o r w h a t i t was w o r t h , t o p u n i s h g o v e r n o r s w h o h a d oppressed t h e m . A t w o r s t , t h e t r i b u n a l was p l a g u e d by domest ic R o m a n p o l i t i c a l i n t r i g u e s a n d col lusions. B u t p e r h a p s its most i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n , its u n i n t e n d e d consequence, was m e r e l y t o establish a c o n v e n t i o n as t o t h e level o f e x t o r t i o n w h i c h w o u l d be c o n d o n e d .

E v e n a w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d g o v e r n o r , l i k e Cicero , was res tr ic ted by his obl igat ions t o o t h e r senators a n d t a x - f a r m e r s , a n d by t h e i r expectations based o n w h a t p r e v i o u s g o v e r n o r s h a d a l l o w e d . C icero , w h o g o v e r n e d Ci l ic ia (at t h a t time t h e s o u t h e r n a n d eastern p a r t o f T u r k e y p lus C y p r u s ) i n 51-50 B C , set h i m s e l f u p as a m o d e l o f p r o p r i e t y . H e r e s t r a i n e d his o w n aides; b u t h e needed t h e p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t o f his f r i e n d s at R o m e t o o m u c h t o be able t o w i t h s t a n d t h e i r d e m a n d s successfully. F o r e x a m p l e , h e f o u n d t h a t t h e t o w n s o f C y p r u s h a d p a i d t h e p r e v i o u s g o v e r n o r 4.8 m i l l i o n H S ( r o u g h l y e n o u g h t o feed 10,000 famil ies f o r o n e year) i n o r d e r t o a v o i d h a v i n g soldiers g a r r i s o n e d t h e r e . T h i s was o n l y o n e i t e m i n t h e governor ' s p r o f i t s . C i c e r o osten-

5 6 T h e scale of R o m a n plunder is illustrated by Badian (1968: 8»ff.), a n d discussed in more detail by R. O . Jolliffe, Phases of Corruption in Roman Administration (Diss. Menasha, Wise., 1919), mostly excerpts from Cicero interestingly discussed.

41


tat iously abstained f r o m squeezes l i k e th is . I n d e e d , he r e t u r n e d o n e m i l l i o n H S f r o m his al lowance t o t h e treasury t o t h e c h a g r i n o f his aides w h o expected i t t o be d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e m . E v e n so, C icero tells us t h a t he m a d e 2.2 m i l l i o n H S f o r h imsel f , p r o b a b l y o u t o f t h e m o n e y al located t o h i m f o r t h e u p k e e p o f t h e soldiers assigned t o his p r o v i n c e . T h r o u g h o u t his g o v e r n s h i p , Cicero was engaged i n r e g u l a t i n g t h e co l lec t ion o f debts a lready i n c u r r e d b y provinc ia ls ( a n d by t h e k i n g o f a n e i g h b o u r i n g p r i n c i p a l i t y ) a n d a lready swol len by interest . Colleagues i n R o m e pressed h i m t o a p p o i n t t h e i r business agents as officials (prefects) o r t o send i n t r o o p s t o e n f o r c e t h e i r requests f o r p a y m e n t . A p p a r e n d y o t h e r g o v e r n o r s o f t e n d i d this . O n l y recendy, t h e agent o f o n e n o b l e senator h a d s h u t u p some t o w n c o u n c i l l o r s i n t h e i r c o u n c i l house i n a n a t t e m p t t o e n f o r c e p a y m e n t o f a d e b t swol len by a h i g h ra te o f interest , a n d h a d n o t released t h e m u n t i l f ive h a d d i e d o f s t a r v a t i o n . 5 6 E x a c t i o n o f such debts e x t e n d e d t h e scope o f p r o f i t e e r i n g f r o m provinces w e l l b e y o n d t h e s h o r t t e n u r e b u i l t i n t o t h e R o m a n system o f g o v e r n o r s h i p s .

M o s t R o m a n a d m i n i s t r a t o r s w e r e p r o b a b l y less callous. Y e t t h e r e are sufficient stories f r o m t h e late R e p u b l i c t o indicate t h e scale o n w h i c h t h e a c c u m u l a t e d treasures o f t h e c o n q u e r e d provinces w e r e transf e r r e d t o R o m e , a n d h i n t s o f t h e m e t h o d s used t o extract t h e m . I n effect, most R o m a n g o v e r n o r s a n d t h e i r aides c o u l d exercise t h e i r p o w e r , i n p u r s u i t o f p r o f i t o r pleasure, a r b i t r a r i l y a n d w i t h o u t fear o f r e p r i s a l . L e t m e give a n e x a m p l e , t a k e n , I a m a f r a i d , f r o m a somewhat biased source: a prosecutor 's speech (Cicero, Against Verres 2.1 .648.) against a g o v e r n o r o n t r i a l f o r e x t o r t i o n i n 70 B C . I t describes a n episode e a r l i e r i n his career f o r w h i c h he was never t r i e d ; t h e p r o s e c u t o r p r o b a b l y cast i t i n t h e w o r s t possible l i g h t . Nevertheless, i t seems revea l ing . A s t h e governor ' s a ide (legatus), V e r r e s was q u a r t e r e d i n a smal l t o w n i n w h a t is n o w western T u r k e y ; he lusted a f ter t h e d a u g h t e r o f a l e a d i n g c i t i zen; this c i t izen gave a feast i n V e r r e s ' h o n o u r ; d u r i n g t h e feast V e r r e s o r d e r e d t h e d o o r s locked a n d dem a n d e d t h a t t h e g i r l be b r o u g h t t o h i m . T h e r e ensued a batde between t h e house slaves a n d those o f Verres* i n w h i c h o n e o f Verres* official g u a r d s was k i l l e d . N e x t m o r n i n g * t h e townspeople , w h o s ided w i t h

5 6 O n Cicero's governorship, see best his Letters to Atticus, ed. D. R. Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge, 1968) vol. 3. Specific references used here are (in the old enumeration) 5.21; 6.1; 7.1; a n d ad Fam. 5.20.9. It is difficult to know what was normal; exploitation may have worsened considerably d u r i n g the last decades of the Republic. T h e ravages committed were public knowledge, regretted a n d c o n d o n e d : 4 Words cannot express, citizens, how hated we are among foreign nations because of the lust of those we have sent to govern them d u r i n g the past years and the damage they have d o n e ' (Cicero, O n the Manilian Law 65; cf. ad Fam. 15.1.5).

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The products of war

t h e i r o w n c i t i zen, g a t h e r e d t o bat ter d o w n t h e d o o r o f t h e house i n w h i c h V e r r e s was l o d g e d , b u t w e r e eventual ly dissuaded f r o m h a r m i n g h i m by a g r o u p o f R o m a n citizens l i v i n g i n t h e t o w n . V e r r e s escaped, b u t q u i c k l y b r o u g h t t h e f a t h e r o f t h e g i r l t o t r i a l f o r t h e m u r d e r o f his g u a r d . H e fixed this by g e t t i n g t h e j u r y packed w i t h R o m a n citizens t o w h o m provincia ls o w e d m o n e y a n d w h o w o u l d welcome his h e l p i n g e t t i n g t h e i r debts p a i d . T h e prosecutor was a m o n e y - l e n d e r t o o ; t h e f a t h e r c o u l d find n o o n e w h o was w i l l i n g t o d e f e n d h i m a n d risk o f f e n d i n g t h e g o v e r n o r . H e was f o u n d g u i l t y a n d executed. So m u c h f o r R o m a n justice.

I t seems w o r t h stressing t h a t t a k i n g p r i v a t e p r o f i t f r o m p u b l i c office was b u i l t i n t o t h e R o m a n system o f p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T o some extent , o f course, c o r r u p t i o n , o v e r t l y recognised as w r o n g b u t c o n d o n e d , has been a n d s t i l l is t h e h a l l - m a r k o f bureaucrat ic a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 5 7 T h e exceptions are few a n d notable . B u t I a m n o t t h i n k i n g here o f t h e r o u t i n e i n a b i l i t y o f a c e n t r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n complete ly t o c o n t r o l t h e i n c o m e o f its officials. Rather I a m t h i n k i n g o f t h e m e t h o d s first a d o p t e d by t h e R o m a n s t o secure revenues f r o m t h e r a p i d l y e x p a n d e d e m p i r e . As i n m a n y o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l e m p i r e s , t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t c o m m o n l y sold t h e right t o collect taxes t o p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s ( tax- farmers , publicani). T h i s h a d l o n g been t h e practice i n I t a l y f o r t h e col lect ion o f fees f r o m state lands a n d b u i l d i n g s , as w e l l as i n t h e l e t t i n g o f state contracts , a n d h a d been c o m m o n i n t h e G r e e k k i n g d o m s o f t h e eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n w h i c h t h e Romans absorbed. Since t h e r e was at R o m e n o t r a d i t i o n o f e m p l o y i n g m e n o f h i g h status o n a salary f o r a l o n g t e r m , e i t h e r i n t h e p u b l i c o r t h e p r i v a t e sphere, t h e r e was n o effective a l ternat ive t o t a x - f a r m i n g easily available. H o w else c o u l d t h e Romans have t a x e d t h e i r provinces regular ly? T o be sure, several variants o f t a x - f a r m i n g w e r e k n o w n a n d used i n d i f f e r e n t parts o f t h e e m p i r e ( f o r e x a m p l e , i n Sicily a n d Asia) . Y e t t h e var iat ions d i d n o t m a t t e r e i t h e r t o t h e R o m a n state o r t o t h e p r o v i n c i a l tax-payers as m u c h as t h e degree o f c o n t r o l exercised by R o m a n magistrates o v e r t h e tax- farmers .

F o r t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t , t a x - f a r m i n g h a d several advantages. O n c e t h e tax contracts h a d been a u c t i o n e d , t h e g o v e r n m e n t received cash i n advance, p r o b a b l y w i t h I t a l i a n l a n d p l e d g e d as security f o r

5 7 T h e article by C . K. Y a n g in D. S. Nivison and A . F . Wright, Confucianism in Action (Stanford, 1959) is very suggestive.

See now, £. Badian, Publicans and Sinners (Oxford, 1972), the best even if a sometimes polemical discussion of R o m a n Republican tax-farming; on the Principate also, see M. I . Rostovtzeff, Geschichte der Stattspacht (Leipzig, 1901) 39ff.; cf. G . Urdgdi, sv Publicani in RE Supplement-Band x i , col. 1184-1208.

43


f u r t h e r p a y m e n t a n d o r d e r l y c o n d u c t . 5 8 Since contracts r e g u l a r l y lasted f o r f ive years, the g o v e r n m e n t secured its r e v e n u e a n d c o u l d c o m m i t itself t o e x p e n d i t u r e , such as a f o r e i g n war , w h i c h m i g h t last several years. B y se l l ing t h e right t o tax, t h e g o v e r n m e n t t r a n s f e r r e d its r i sk t o t h e t a x - f a r m e r s a n d t h e i r g u a r a n t o r s . O n e o f t h e m a i n risks was a b a d harvest; a n d harvests o f t e n w e r e b a d ; prov inc ia ls m i g h t n o t be able t o pay t h e i r taxes i n f u l l , o r i f t h e tax was a f i x e d p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e c r o p i t m i g h t n o t y i e l d as m u c h as t h e tax f a r m e r s h a d p a i d f o r t h e c o n t r a c t a n d its a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Such short fa l ls d i d h a p p e n , a n d o n t w o occasions we k n o w t h a t t h e t a x - f a r m e r s asked t h e R o m a n senate t o r e m i t p a r t o f t h e p r i c e agreed at t h e a u c t i o n . 5 9

T a x - f a r m i n g also h a d disadvantages f o r t h e state. C o l l u s i o n between b i d d e r s at auct ions p r e v e n t e d t h e state f r o m g e t t i n g t h e best pr ice . Even w h e n t a x - f a r m e r s b i d h i g h , they were m o r e l i k e l y t o screw e x t r a taxes o u t o f prov inc ia ls t h a n t o suffer losses themselves. T h e m a i n p r o b l e m , as has a lready been suggested, was t h a t t h e efficiency o f t a x - f a r m i n g as a n i n s t r u m e n t o f g o o d g o v e r n m e n t d e p e n d e d u p o n t h e effectiveness o f t h e s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e t a x - f a r m e r s . I n a smal l society, tax-payers c o u l d soon have m a d e t h e i r dissatisfaction w i t h abuses fe l t ; i n a m o n a r c h y , t h e k i n g o r e m p e r o r has a n interest i n p r e s e r v i n g t h e t a x - p a y i n g capacities o f his subjects a n d n o special interest i n t h e e n r i c h m e n t o f t a x - f a r m e r s . H o w e v e r , i n t h e o l i g a r c h i c early R o m a n e m p i r e (200-31 B C ) , t h e provinc ia ls h a d a lmost n o p o w e r a n d w e r e h u n d r e d s o f miles , even m o n t h s away, f r o m t h e c e n t r e o f p o w e r . T h e g o v e r n o r s , whose task i t was t o supervise t h e t a x - f a r m e r s , r u l e d usual ly f o r o n l y o n e year a n d h a d l i t t l e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e special p r o b l e m s o f t h e p r o v i n c e t o w h i c h they h a d been assigned a n d h a d n o p e r m a n e n t sk i l led staff o n whose exper ience t h e y c o u l d d r a w . B o t h g o v e r n o r a n d t a x - f a r m e r w e r e usual ly interested i n m a k i n g a p r i v a t e p r o f i t ; t h e r e w e r e o f t e n disputes over t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h e spoils; m y i m p r e s s i o n is t h a t c o l l u s i o n was t h e most f r e q u e n t s o l u t i o n t o t h e conf l ic t , t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o f t h e p r o v i n c i a l s . 6 0

M A n inscription from Puteoli, set up in 105 BC, records that a municipal building contractor had to pledge land against proper fulfilment of his contract (CIL 10.1781 * FIRA 153). T h i s is thought to have been typical and traditional; see similarly, Polybius 6.17 a n d Cicero, Verrines 2.1.142-3; Ps. Asconius 252 St; Schol. Bobb. 106 St.

w Plutarch, Coto the Elder 19; Cicero, ad Att. 1.17.9; ^ * Manilian Law 16; other references in ESAR vol. 1, 345. Collusion was the complement of risk.

*° Cicero, Letters to Atticus 6.1.16:' Y o u seem to want to know how I manage about the tax-farmers. I dote u p o n them, defer to them, butter them u p with compliments - a n d arrange that they h a r m nobody.. .My system is this: I fix a date. . . a n d say that if (the provincials) pay before that date I shall apply a rate of 1 % (interest per month): if not, then the rate in the agreement. So the natives pay a tolerable interest

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The products of war

D e p e n d e n c e o n t a x - f a r m i n g was a s y m p t o m o f t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n ment 's weakness t h r o u g h o u t the Republ ic . F irs t ly , t h e R o m a n senate h a d n o cadre o f m i d d l e a n d l o w e r level p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s u n d e r its c o n t r o l ; i t c o u l d t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d e o n l y a n e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d service, i f any, t o its newly c o n q u e r e d subjects. D u r i n g t h e Pr inc ipate a salaried o f f i c i a l d o m d i d evolve o u t o f t h e e m p e r o r ' s o w n h o u s e h o l d ; i t was staffed p r e d o m i n a n d y by slaves, a n d h e a d e d by ex-slaves a n d a few k n i g h t s . 6 1 I t s establ ishment spelt a slow d e a t h f o r t a x - f a r m i n g , w h i l e its smal l size h i g h l i g h t s t h e meagreness o f p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d u r i n g t h e Republ ic . Secondly, t h e R e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d a smal l b u d g e t ; re l iance o n t a x - f a r m i n g i m p l i e d t h a t g r o u p s o f weal thy m e n c o u l d raise h u g e sums o f cash m o r e easily a n d c o u l d better a f f o r d t o spread t h e i r risks over a few years t h a n t h e g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s is a n i n d e x o f t h e general ly l o w p r o p o r t i o n o f gross p r o d u c t s i p h o n e d of f f r o m t h e provinces i n t a x a t i o n i n t h e early stages o f i m p e r i a l conquest overseas a n d suggests t h a t d u r i n g this ear ly p e r i o d of. e m p i r e t h e share o f p r o v i n c i a l p r o f i t s w h i c h f o u n d its way i n t o p r i v a t e hands was greater .

O n e o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n s o f t a x - f a r m i n g was t o give p r o s p e r o u s non-senators a n d especially k n i g h t s a share i n t h e p r o f i t s o f e m p i r e ; t h e r e was n o o t h e r established c h a n n e l by w h i c h this c o u l d be d o n e . Polybius (6.17) w r i t i n g i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C , w i t h some e x a g g e r a t i o n , stated t h a t ' a lmost e v e r y o n e ' i n I t a l y seemed t o be i n v o l v e d i n some way w i t h p u b l i c contracts. M o r e o v e r , t a x - f a r m i n g p r o v i d e d t h e financial f r a m e w o r k w h i c h u n d e r p i n n e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e po l i t i ca l ' t h i r d f o r c e ' (P l iny , Natural History 33.34), t h e k n i g h t s , a b o u t w h o m m o r e i n a m o m e n t . F ina l ly , t h e system o f t a x - f a r m i n g h e l p e d preserve t h e t r a d i t i o n a l amateurishness o f t h e nobles. T h r o u g h o u t t h e c e n t u r y o f e x p a n s i o n w h i c h f o l l o w e d t h e defeat o f Car thage , t h e provinces w e r e g o v e r n e d by a h a n d f u l o f aristocrats a n d t h e i r fo l lowers sent o u t each year by t h e senate. T h e i r very s h o r t t e n u r e o f office, t h e smal l scale o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w h i c h they c o n t r o l l e d , a n d t h e i r e x c l u s i o n f r o m tax-col lect ing a l l h e l p e d preserve t h e o l i g a r c h y , w h i c h d e p e n d e d u p o n l i m i t i n g each aristocrat 's p o w e r .

I d e a l l y , g o o d p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e p e n d e d u p o n a balance

and the tax-farmers are delighted with the a r r a n g e m e n t . . . ' trans. D. R . Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge, 1968) vol. 3, 95. Cicero thought himself a model governor, as he was, compared with Verres (Cicero, Verrines 2.2.170). Badian (1972: 76) points out cases of the long-tenure of tax-contracts in particular towns a n d regions and the large size of companies. Oligopoly suggests collusion, then as now.

t ! O n patrimonial bureaucracy, see particularly Max Weber, Economy and Society (New Y o r k , 1968) vol. 3, ioo6ff.

45


b e i n g k e p t between t h e c o m p e t i n g interests o f nobles, t a x - f a r m e r s , c i t izen soldiers, c i t izen voters, a n d provinc ia ls . T h e increase i n t h e p r o f i t s at ta inable upset t h e balance, s h a r p e n e d t h e conf l ic t a n d t u r n e d t h e exercise o f c o n t r o l over p r o f i t - m a k i n g i n t o a p o l i t i c a l f o o t b a l l . A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C , t h e collective p o w e r o f t h e o l i g a r c h y was s t r o n g e n o u g h to r e s t r a i n b o t h i n d i v i d u a l g o v e r n o r s a n d t a x - f a r m e r s , at least w i t h i n very b r o a d b o u n d s . E v e n t h e n , however , t h e r e was a re luctance o n t h e p a r t o f senatoria l j u d g e s t o p u n i s h fe l low senators f o r faults c o m m i t t e d against m e r e prov inc ia ls ; convic ted g o v e r n o r s w e r e a l l o w e d s i m p l y t o go i n t o ex i le t o a l l i e d towns less t h a n 40 k m (25 miles) f r o m R o m e . 6 2 C o n d o n a t i o n at h o m e l e d t o licence a b r o a d ; t h e senate perce ived t h e p r o b l e m b u t was e i t h e r u n w i l l i n g o r u n a b l e t o d o a n y t h i n g t o c o n t r o l i t effectively. O n o n e occasion i n 167 B C , i t o r d e r e d some very p r o f i t a b l e mines i n Greece t o be closed, o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t w o r k i n g t h e m gave R o m a n t a x - f a r m e r s t o o m u c h o p p o r t u n i t y f o r o p p r e s s i o n , w h i l e h a n d i n g t h e m o v e r t o local contractors w o u l d n o t have p r o d u c e d any bet ter results. T a x - f a r m e r s , t h e h i s t o r i a n L i v y c o m m e n t e d (45.18), d e p r i v e d e i t h e r t h e state o f its right o r prov inc ia ls o f t h e i r l i b e r t y . B u t t h e w h o l e e m p i r e c o u l d h a r d l y be r u n w i t h such os tr ich- l ike tactics.

I n 123 B C , service o n t h e j u r y i n t h e c o u r t w h i c h t r i e d p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n o r s f o r e x t o r t i o n was restr ic ted t o k n i g h t s , t o whose r a n k s t h e wealthiest t a x - f a r m e r s be longed. T h i s r e s t r i c t i o n has been t a k e n by b o t h R o m a n a n d m o d e r n w r i t e r s as a n i m p o r t a n t s y m p t o m o f a conf l ic t o f interest between senators a n d k n i g h t s , w h i c h is a m a j o r t h e m e i n p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h o u t t h e last c e n t u r y o f t h e R e p u b l i c . 6 3 C e r t a i n l y t h e r e s t r i c t i o n o f j u r y service t o k n i g h t s was consciously i n t e n d e d as a flamboyant p o l i t i c a l act (Gaius Gracchus said t h a t he h a d t h r o w n daggers i n t o t h e f o r u m ; Cicero, On Laws 3.20), at once a n attack o n t h e senate a n d a n i d e n t i f y i n g focus f o r t h e s t r a t u m o f k n i g h t s . Gracchus h a d g i v e n t h e state t w o heads ( V a r r o , f r a g . 114R)

Yet t o o m u c h cart easly be m a d e o f this conf l ic t ; i n a l l t h e serious p o l i t i c a l confl icts w h i c h f o l l o w e d , b o t h senators a n d k n i g h t s w e r e o n each side; m o r e k n i g h t s w e r e s i m p l y I t a l i a n l a n d - o w n e r s t h a n tax-f a r m e r s ; i n n o reasonable sense o f t h e t e r m was t h e conf l ic t a class conf l ic t . Perhaps t h e c o n t r o l o f j u r i e s b y k n i g h t s can m o r e p r o f i t a b l y be seen as a m e t h o d o f r e c o g n i s i n g t h e e n l a r g e m e n t o f t h e el i te

tt O n this see Badian (1972: 11-47); Livy 43.2. ** See the incisive review of £. Badian, ' F r o m the Gracchi to Sulla' , Historic 11 (1962)

203-9; the detailed, evocative, though heavily prosopographical history of £. G r u e n , Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts 149-78 BC ( H a r v a r d , 1968); a n d the brief suggestive chapter on knights by C . Meier, ResPublicaAmissa (Wiesbaden, 1966)64-95. See also note 70 below.

46

T h e products of war

i n v o l v e d i n p r o f i t i n g f r o m t h e provinces , a n d t h e a c c o m m o d a t i o n o f t h a t e n l a r g e d el i te w i t h i n t h e po l i t i ca l system w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g execut ive m o n o p o l y by a senate o f o n l y t h r e e h u n d r e d m e m b e r s . T h i s view seems c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e p r o m o t i o n o f m o r e t h a n t h r e e h u n d r e d k n i g h t s t o t h e senate i n 81 B C ; th is was a n o t h e r a t t e m p t t o solve t h e same p r o b l e m , w h i c h a v o i d e d a n inst i tut ional i sed clash between elite social g r o u p s .

T h a t said, t h e r e was a n ident i f iab le t a x - f a r m i n g interest , c e n t r e d a m o n g weal thy, po l i t i ca l ly active k n i g h t s i n R o m e . T h e i r access t o a n d t e m p o r a r y m o n o p o l y o f j u r i e s w h i c h t r i e d senatorial g o v e r n o r s f o r c o r r u p t i o n weakened t h e g o v e r n o r s ' capacity to supervise t h e c o r r u p t acdvities o f t a x - f a r m e r s . T h e n o t o r i o u s c o n v i c t i o n i n 92 B C o f R u t i l i u s , a n i n n o c e n t , i n d e e d r e p u t e d l y i n c o r r u p t i b l e a c t i n g - g o v e r n o r was m e r e l y o n e e x t r e m e case; its i m p o r t a n c e was symbolic , a w a r n i n g t o o t h e r g o v e r n o r s t o t r i m t h e i r sails. I n Cicero's correspondence f r o m his p r o v i n c e a n d i n his [?] b r o t h e r ' s p a m p h l e t o n e lect ioneer ing , we can see t h a t t a x - f a r m e r s were a force t o be r e c k o n e d w i t h . 6 4 ' Y o u seem t o w a n t t o k n o w h o w I manage a b o u t t h e tax f a r m e r s . I d o t e u p o n t h e m , d e f e r t o t h e m , b u t t e r t h e m u p w i t h c o m p l i m e n t s . . . ' (Cicero, Letters to Atticus 6.1.6 - see note 60).

T h e k n i g h t s ' d o m i n a t i o n o f t h e j u r y courts f o r m o r e t h a n a generat i o n c o n f i r m e d t h e p o w e r a n d w e a l t h o f t h e t a x - f a r m i n g companies . T h e increased c o m p e t i t i o n between aristocrats f o r office (after 81 B C ) e n s u r e d t h e c o n t i n u a n c e o f w h a t h a d become a t r a d i t i o n ; senatorial a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d t a x - f a r m e r s c o l l u d e d i n g e t t i n g rich at t h e expense o f t h e weakest p a r t y , t h e c o n q u e r e d provincia ls .

I n s u m , w h i l e senatorial generals a n d g o v e r n o r s w o n battles, capt u r e d towns, i m p o s e d taxes, d r e w expenses a n d dispensed ' jus t ice ' , R o m a n k n i g h t s col lected taxes a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e charges, amenably l e n t provincia ls m o n e y w i t h w h i c h t o pay t h e i r taxes, at a suitable rate o f interest (cf. P l u t a r c h , LucuUus 7ff.), a n d i n case o f n o n - p a y m e n t foreclosed o n t h e mortgages. I n this way, a m o n g others , R o m a n citizens became t h e o w n e r s o f large estates i n the provinces , a n d t h e c o n q u e r i n g el i te o f t h e Romans g r a d u a l l y a c q u i r e d weal th c o m m e n surate w i t h t h e i r conquest o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n b a s i n . 6 5

6 4 [?Q.] Cicero, Guide to Electioneering (Comm. Pet.) 3; G r u e n (1968: Appendix E ) listed 22 known cases brought before the extortion court between 119 and 91 BC; eleven cases resulted in acquittal; two of the convicted committed suicide. T h e evidence is probably very incomplete; yet what we know reveals neither outright persecution of senators by equestrian jurors nor condonation. After 70 BC juries were drawn from senators, knights, and the stratum just below the knights.

w T h e r e is little evidence of senatorial land-holdings overseas before the Principate. Senators were restricted from travelling abroad privately, and may have been forbidden explicidy from owning land outside Italy (Cicero, 2 Verrines 5.45); in any case, it would have been difficult to be sure of getting stable revenues from estates

47


T H E F O R M A T I O N O F L A R G E E S T A T E S

T h e p r o f i t s o f e m p i r e , were t h e single m o s t i m p o r t a n t factor i n g r a d u a l l y b u i l d i n g u p t h e w e a l t h o f t h e R o m a n el i te . A large p o r t i o n o f t h e p r o f i t s t a k e n o u t o f t h e provinces was invested i n l a n d , especially i n I t a l i a n l a n d . Since t h e R o m a n u p p e r classes got most o f t h e i r r e g u l a r i n c o m e f r o m l a n d , a genera l increase i n t h e i r w e a l t h was necessarily a c c o m p a n i e d by t h e f o r m a t i o n o f l a r g e r estates. T h i s s t r o n g l i n k between ( i ) i m p e r i a l p r o f i t s , (2) t h e increased w e a l t h o f t h e elite a n d (3) t h e f o r m a t i o n o f large l a n d h o l d i n g s o f t e n seems o v e r s h a d o w e d by t h e m o r e d r a m a t i c processes, w h i c h we discussed i n t h e last section: t h e v i o l e n t a c q u i s i d o n o f f o r t u n e s i n t h e provinces , t h e i r ostentatious display i n t h e city o f R o m e , a n d t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n o f f ree f l o a t i n g cash by financiers, l i k e Crassus a n d r i c h t a x - f a r m e r s . O f course, t h e t r a n s f e r o f m o n e y f r o m t h e provinces a n d its i n v e s t m e n t i n I t a l i a n l a n d was a g r a d u a l process; its gradualness m a y have c o n t r i b u t e d t o its neglect. I n any o n e year o r even g e n e r a t i o n , t h e v o l u m e o f p r o f i t s b r o u g h t back f r o m t h e provinces was smal ler t h a n t h e i n h e r i t e d stock o f capi ta l ; a n d once t h e year's p r o f i t s w e r e invested, t h e y t o o became p a r t o f t h e c o m m o n capita l . T h e r e a f t e r , they were r e d i s t r i b u t e d t h r o u g h t h e n o r m a l channels: d o w r y a n d i n h e r i t a n c e , s u p p l e m e n t e d by bankr u p t c y a n d confiscat ion. T h u s at any o n e t i m e , these n o r m a l channels f o r t h e t ransfer o f p r o p e r t y seemed o f m o r e i m p o r t a n c e t o c o n t e m porar ies t h a n p r o v i n c i a l p r o f i t s .

T o be sure, a s ignif icant p r o p o r t i o n o f b o o t y was spent r a t h e r t h a n invested. W h e t h e r invested o r spent, t h e m o n e y was passed o n t o someone else. T h e same m o n e y c o u l d be used t o pay c r e d i t o r s , w h o m i g h t b u y l u x u r i e s w i t h i t ; they , i n t u r n , m i g h t b u y l a n d f r o m peasants, w h o t h e n used t h e same m o n e y to b u y clothes a n d f o o d . . . T h e concept *the m u l t i p l i e r effect o f m o n e y ' refers t o such sequences.

T h e h i g h cost o f m a i n t a i n i n g status by ostentat ious e x p e n d i t u r e a n d o f s e c u r i n g e lect ion t o p u b l i c office w e r e i m p o r t a n t factors u n d e r l y i n g p r o f i t e e r i n g i n t h e provinces . Nobles , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e first c e n t u r y B C , c o m m o n l y i n c u r r e d debts i n t h e h o p e o f p a y i n g t h e m off a f terwards w i t h w h a t they m a d e o u t o f p r o v i n c i a l o f f ice . 6 6 Retainers as w e l l as

abroad which could not be personally supervised. T h i s may partly explain the concentration of senatorial estates in central Italy. Knights did own estates abroad d u r i n g the Republic and clearly spent some time in residence there. See E . Rawson, ' T h e Ciceronian aristocracy and its properties\ in M. I . Finley ed. Studies in Roman Property (Cambridge, 1976) &$tt.

m F o r a discussion of debt, see M . W . F r e d e r i k s e n , 4 Caesar, Cicero and the problem of debt', JRS 56 (1966) especially 128-3,0; Cicero (Catiline 2.18; Offices 2.78!!.) mentioned a category of rich men, heavily in debt. F o r Pompey, see Pliny, Natural History 37.16 and ESAR vol. 1, 325.

48

The formation of large estates

credi tors h a d t o be p a i d . P o m p e y , i n 61 B C , f o r e x a m p l e , p r o b a b l y gave each o f his l ieutenants o n e m i l l i o n H S (c. 2,000 tons wheat equivalent) . H u g e sums were lavished o n prest ig ious displays, silver plate , m a r b l e statues a n d o t h e r objets a"art. O n e i n d i c a t i o n o f increas ing w e a l t h is t h a t t h e f inest t o w n house i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e i n 78 B C was said n o t t o have been even i n t h e t o p h u n d r e d a g e n e r a t i o n later (P l iny , Natural

History 36.109). T h e senate t r i e d t o preserve t r a d i t i o n a l s i m p l i c i t y ( a n d so t o restr ic t c o m p e t i t i o n f r o m r i c h arrivistes) by a w h o l e succession o f laws r e s t r i c t i n g c o n s u m p t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e , at feasts a n d f u n e r a l s ; 6 7

b u t i n v a i n . Senators a n d l e a d i n g k n i g h t s m a i n t a i n e d elaborate households staffed w i t h h u n d r e d s o f slaves, i n c l u d i n g cooks, scribes, l i b r a r i a n s , doctors , name-callers, at once a m a r k o f t h e i r c u l t u r e , a n d o f a n extravagance w h i c h e n h a n c e d t h e i r status.

T h i s e x p e n d i t u r e o f p r o v i n c i a l p r o f i t s i n the city o f R o m e p a r t i c u l a r l y concerns us h e r e because i t considerably e x p a n d e d t h e m a r k e t f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c e . Nobles k e p t a n d f e d slaves, b u i l t palaces, c o m m a n d e d services a n d spent m o n e y w h i c h by its m u l t i p l i e r effects gave lots o f people e n o u g h m o n e y t o b u y f o o d . W i t h o u t this expans ion o f t h e c i ty p o p u l a t i o n a n d m a r k e t , a n d a s imi lar e x p a n s i o n i n o t h e r I t a l i a n towns, i n v e s t m e n t by nobles i n I t a l i a n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d w o u l d have been useless.

As i n most o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l societies, l a n d - o w n e r s h i p was t h e b e d r o c k o f w e a l t h . Genera l ly speaking, b o t h senators a n d k n i g h t s derived t h e b u l k o f t h e i r incomes f r o m l a n d . T h e r i c h e r they became, t h e r e f o r e , t h e l a r g e r t h e i r l a n d - h o l d i n g s . B u t g o o d a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d i n c e n t r a l a n d s o u t h e r n I t a l y was a lready c u l t i v a t e d , m u c h o f i t by free peasants. T h e f o r m a t i o n o f large l a n d - h o l d i n g s inevi tably i n v o l v e d t h e i r e x p r o p r i a t i o n a n d e x p u l s i o n . T h e process was g r a d u a l , a n d estates were e n l a r g e d piecemeal, as a n d w h e n o p p o r t u n i t y o f fered . T h i s p a r t l y expla ins w h y large l a n d - h o l d i n g s i n I t a l y d u r i n g t h e late Republ ic typica l ly c o m p r i s e d several scattered estates. T h i s f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f l a n d - h o l d i n g s was pol i t ica l ly i m p o r t a n t i n t h a t i t by a n d large p r e c l u d e d R o m a n aristocrats, u n l i k e E u r o p e a n f e u d a l l o r d s , f r o m basing t h e i r p o w e r o n t l i e c o n t r o l o f a p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y . 6 8

9 7 Levels of ostentatious expenditure rose considerably after Rome's conquest of the eastern Mediterranean (see Pliny, Natural History 33 passim, but especially 138ff.). O n sumptuary laws, see for example, Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 2.24 and I . Sauerwein, Die Leges Sumptuariae (Diss. Hamburg, 1970).

** O f course, R o m a n aristocrats had local political connections and clients. I n 83 BC, Pompey recruited troops in Picenum 'because of his father's reputation there* (Appian, Civil Wars 1.80), but his support there melted away in the civil war against Julius Caesar in 49 BC. See also Caesar, Civil Wan 1.34 and 56, and M. Gclzer, The Roman Nobility (Oxford, 1969) 93L O t h e r political connections were much more important.

49


L a n d was the m a i n source o f w e a l t h , a n d w e a l t h was a m a i n s p r i n g o f po l i t i ca l p o w e r . T h e t r o u b l e was t h a t t h e r i c h a n d p o o r were c o m p e t i n g a m o n g themselves a n d w i t h each o t h e r f o r a str ict ly l i m i t e d resource. C o n f l i c t over t h e o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d i n I t a l y c o n s t i t u t e d a m a j o r axis o f po l i t i ca l act iv i ty t h r o u g h o u t t h e last t w o centuries o f t h e Republ ic . T h e conf l ic t was expressed, f o r e x a m p l e , i n laws l i m i t i n g the e x t e n t o f p u b l i c l a n d w h i c h a c i t izen c o u l d h o l d , i n mass confiscations o f p r o p e r t y a n d its r e d i s t r i b u t i o n t o soldiers a n d o t h e r citizens, a n d i n t h e i n d u c e d m i g r a t i o n o f citizens away f r o m t h e i r homes t o d is tant a n d less p o p u l a t e d parts o f I t a l y . As we have seen, t h e c h a n g i n g p a t t e r n o f l a n d - o w n e r s h i p led t o t h e mass i m p o r t a t i o n o f slaves a n d t o t h e e m i g r a t i o n o f t h e free p o o r f r o m t h e l a n d t o t h e a r m y a n d t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e . T h e r e s u l t i n g e v o l u t i o n o f a profess ional a r m y ( o r perhaps m o r e accurately, a core o f long-service soldiers) a n d o f a n u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t upset t h e t r a d i t i o n a l balance o f p o w e r a n d c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e chaos o f t h e last decades o f the Republ ic . T h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e conf l ic t over l a n d is i n t e r e s t i n g : t h e e m i g r a t i o n o f several h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d citizens t o t h e provinces , organised by Jul ius Caesar a n d A u g u s t u s , re l ieved t h e pressure o f t h e p o o r o n I t a l i a n l a n d ; c o m p l e m e n t a r i l y , t h e a d v e n t o f peace a n d t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e e m p i r e u n d e r t h e stable a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e e m p e r o r s enabled t h e I t a l i a n r i c h increasingly to o w n l a n d i n , a n d t r a n s f e r rents f r o m t h e provinces (see note 65).

As usual , t h e evidence f o r m a n y o f these assertions is b o t h f r a g m e n t a r y a n d d i s p u t e d . B u t t h e m a i n o u d i n e s seem clear e n o u g h . F o r e x a m p l e , we have n o deta i led i n f o r m a t i o n o n senators' o r k n i g h t s ' incomes, o n t h e re lat ive i m p o r t a n c e o f a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d u r b a n rents , o f i n c o m e f r o m loans o r t a x - f a r m i n g , c o m m e r c e a n d m a n u f a c t u r e . B u t i t is r e v e a l i n g t h a t ancient a u t h o r s s i m p l y assumed t h a t r i c h m e n were land-owners , t h a t l a n d was t h e i r p r i m e source o f w e a l t h . C icero f o r e x a m p l e , i n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussion o f t h e very r i c h a n d t h e c o m f o r t a b l y r i c h m a n n o t e d t h a t ' h e takes 600,000 H S f r o m his f a r m s , I take 100,000 H S f r o m m i n e ' (Paradoxes of the Stoics 49). T h e m i n i m u m census q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r senators a n d k n i g h t s (1 m i l l i o n a n d 400,000 H S respectively) was expressed i n value o f p r o p e r t y , most ly l a n d e d p r o p e r t y , a n d n o t i n t e r m s o f i n c o m e . Jul ius Caesar's a n d t h e e m p e r o r T i b e r i u s ' laws o n d e b t presupposed t h a t large-scale debtors h a d g iven l a n d as security, a n d seem t o have r e q u i r e d c r e d i t o r s t o invest t w o t h i r d s o f r a p i d loans i n I t a l i a n l a n d . T w o c o m m o n w o r d s f o r wea l thy (locuples, possessor) b o t h i m p l y t h e o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d . 6 9 Even t h e p o l i -

* O n laws of debt, see T a d t u s , Annals 6.17; Suetonius, Tiberius 48; and Frederiksen (1966) 134!!. T h e word possessor originally, and apparently still in the time of Cicero, referred to someone who held public land without full tide (on this see C . Nicolet,

5°


t ically p o w e r f u l m i n o r i t y o f k n i g h t s w h o specialised i n t a x - f a r m i n g p r o b a b l y o p e r a t e d f r o m a basis o f l a n d - o w n i n g . T h i s is i m p l i e d by the fact t h a t they were r e q u i r e d t o give l a n d as security f o r t h e p e r f o r mance o f t h e i r contracts (see note 58). I t fo l lows a fortiori that lesser k n i g h t s , locally p o w e r f u l i n t h e i r I t a l i a n h o m e towns, were p r i m a r i l y l and-owners ; i n d e e d Cicero r e f e r r e d t o t h e m several t imes collectively as f a r m e r s , c o u n t r y m e n (agricolae, rusticani).70 Besides, i t seems obvious t h a t i n a p r e d o m i n a n t l y a g r a r i a n society, w i t h o u t a sophisticated a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , l a n d w o u l d be t h e m a j o r source o f wea l th . Even i f a m a n m a d e a l o t o f m o n e y i n some o t h e r way, he w o u l d achieve b o t h h i g h status a n d security by invest ing i t i n l a n d (Cicero, On Duties 1.151).

T h e prevalence o f l a n d - o w n i n g a m o n g the R o m a n r i c h d i d n o t m e a n t h a t senators a n d k n i g h t s got t h e i r i n c o m e o n l y f r o m l a n d . L a n d - o w n e r s h i p was c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the p u r s u i t o f o t h e r f inancia l interests. I n the m o d e r n w o r l d , t h e specialisation o f occupations tempts us t o t h i n k o f land-owners , bankers , f inanciers , tax-officials a n d businessmen as d i f f e r e n t people . I n R o m e , they were o f t e n t h e same people . I t was c o m m o n f o r large land-owners , f o r e x a m p l e , n o t t o r e n t o u t a l l t h e i r l a n d t o free tenants, b u t t o e x p l o i t some o f i t d i r e c t l y . T y p i c a l l y , a slave m a n a g e r (vilicus) was p u t i n charge o f t h e day-to-day r u n n i n g o f a r i c h man's f a r m . B u t i t seems p r o b a b l e that m a n y r i c h m e n , even nobles, t o o k a d i r e c t a n d l ively interest i n the sale o f s u r p l u s p r o d u c e f r o m t h e i r estates, t h o u g h e x p l i c i t evidence o n this is scarce. 7 1 S i m i l a r l y i t seems probable t h a t m a n y r i c h m e n , even nobles, set u p t h e i r slaves a n d ex-slaves i n business, p r o v i d i n g t h e m w i t h

L'ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine (Paris, 1966) 301). O n locuples, see Cicero, de republica 2.16; Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 10.5. T h e prevalence of land in the estates of the rich persisted. T h e emperor T r a j a n ordered senators to have one third of their fortunes in Italian land; Olympiodorus (frag. 44) tells us that in the fourth century wealthy senators got one quarter of their incomes in the form of farm produce, the rest from rents.

7 0 By a swing in intellectual fashion this view of the knights has become widely accepted: the pioneering essays were: P. A. Brunt, ' T h e Equités in the Late Republic*, Second International Conference of Economic History ig6a (Paris, 1965) vol. 1, especially i22ff. and Nicolet (1966: 28sff.); see also Meier (1966: 64ff.). T h e previous view that knights were primarily a class of businessmen was over-modernising.

7 1 Nobility does not preclude concern with money; see the very interesting study of the fortunes of English aristocrats by L . Stone, Family and Fortune (Oxford, 1973). We have no such information about R o m a n nobles; some like Cato, V a r r o and Pliny obviously cared about their estates. Epictetus (Discourses 1.10) says that the conversation of non-philosophers presumably in court circles turned on accounts, land prices and wheat prices. Senators' names survive on wine-jars and bricks, presumably made on their estates (ESAR vol. 1, 355 and 5, 2 0 8 - 9 ) ; such labels are indices of involvement but not of close care. I n brief, we don't know how much the predominant culture induced aristocrats typically to care for or ignore their sources of income.

5*


capita l a n d i n o n e way o r a n o t h e r t a k i n g a share o f t h e i r p r o f i t s . T h i s is o n e fac tor w h i c h w o u l d h e l p t o account f o r t h e d o m i n a n c e o f ex-slaves i n t h e c o m m e r c i a l l i f e o f R o m e a n d o t h e r I t a l i a n cities (see C h a p t e r I I ) . B u t i t is o n l y a c o n j e c t u r e ; we have n o t e s t i m o n y o n h o w closely, o r w h e t h e r slave-owners supervised such business activities.

T h e i n v o l v e m e n t o f senators i n t r a d e o r c o m m e r c e o f any sort has o f t e n been d e n i e d , a n d i n s u p p o r t o f this v iew m u c h is usual ly m a d e o f a law passed i n 218 B C f o r b i d d i n g senators t h e r i g h t to o w n large ships. T h e y were a l l o w e d t o o w n smal l ships, o f u n d e r seven tonnes b u r d e n ' e n o u g h t o c a r r y crops f r o m t h e f a r m s . A l l p r o f i t m a k i n g was t h o u g h t d e m e a n i n g f o r senators ' ( L i v y 21.63). B u t we k n o w t h a t by 70 B C this law was a d e a d let ter , a n d t h a t by t h e n senators w e r e deeply i n v o l v e d i n l o a n finance, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r t h r o u g h agents. T h e y o u n g noble B r u t u s , f o r e x a m p l e , l e n t m o n e y t o a t o w n i n C y p r u s at f o u r p e r cent m o n t h l y c o m p o u n d interest a n d g o t t h e senate t o pass a special decree e x e m p t i n g his l o a n f r o m n o r m a l regula t ions l i m i t i n g interest rates. M . Crassus h a d q u i t e o p e n l y b u i l t u p his f o r t u n e p a r t l y by speculat ion i n m e t r o p o l i t a n p r o p e r t y . 7 2

I d e a l l y , nobles w e r e n o t expected t o be interes ted i n p r o f i t - m a k i n g ; we find s i m i l a r ideals i n o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l ' h i g h c u l t u r e s ' . B u t t h e idea l was b o t h h o n o u r e d a n d v i o l a t e d ; i n d e e d m a n y ideals exist because they are general ly n o t achieved. I r o n i c a l l y , C icero a p p r o v e d o f t r a d e , p r o v i d e d i t was o n a large scale; o n l y smal l scale t r a d e seemed dem e a n i n g t o h i m ( O n Duties 1.151). Probably at t i tudes h a d c h a n g e d i n t h e course o f Rome's e x p a n s i o n . Senators c o u l d be b a r r e d f r o m p r o f i t - m a k i n g by law i n 218 B C because i t was re lat ively u n i m p o r t a n t . W h e n b a n k i n g , l o a n - f i n a n c i n g a n d c o m m e r c e g r e w i n i m p o r t a n c e , I suspect t h a t senators p a r t i c i p a t e d , even i n v i o l a t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l values.

B u t c o m m e r c e a n d finance w e r e o n l y t h e c r e a m o n t h e cake, n o t t h e cake itself. W e have n o R o m a n figures, b u t estimates f r o m E n g l a n d i n 1801 are suggestive. T h e average i n c o m e o f t h e t o p t w o t h o u s a n d m e r c h a n t s a n d bankers was o n l y 2,600 p o u n d s s t e r l i n g p e r year, c o m p a r e d w i t h 8,000 p o u n d s s t e r l i n g p e r year f o r t h e t o p g r o u p o f l a n d o w n e r s , a n d 3,000 p o u n d s s t e r l i n g p e r year f o r t h e u p p e r g e n t r y . 7 3

B y t h a t time E n g l a n d was m u c h m o r e i n d u s t r i a l i s e d a n d c o m m e r c i a l l y

n Plutarch, Crassus 2; on Brutus, sec nn. 55 and 56 above; Cicero (Verrines 5.45) said that the law on ship-owning by senators was ineffectual, but it survived in a law of Julius Caesar - see the L e i d e n fragment of Paul's Sentential (edd. G . G . A r c h i et al. L e i d e n , 1956).

7 3 G . Mingay, English Landed Society in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1963) 21 (cf. 26). T h e number of land-owners discussed was smaller (400+750), but their aggregate wealth was greater than the merchants' and bankers'.

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sophisticated t h a n R o m e ever became. T h e r a d o o f a g r a r i a n t o n o n - a g r a r i a n incomes i n R o m e , even i n t h e except ional c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e Republ ic , was a lmost c e r t a i n l y h i g h e r . T h e h i g h status o f large land-owners was e n h a n c e d b y t h e i r h u g e w e a l t h (nihil dukius

agriculture).

Even i f R o m a n land-owners h a d w a n t e d to invest i n business, they faced o n e d i f f i c u l t y w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e d a serious obstacle t o economic g r o w t h . T h e Romans never evolved a legal f o r m f o r c o m m e r c i a l o r m a n u f a c t u r i n g enterprises s imi lar t o o u r j o i n t stock c o m p a n y , w h i c h h a d t h e advantage o f l i m i t i n g investors ' l iab i l i ty , a n d o f p r e s e r v i n g the business as a u n i t b e y o n d t h e d e a t h o f its o w n e r . I t was o n l y i n t h e spheres o f t a x - f a r m i n g a n d m i n i n g t h a t t h e R o m a n s devised a c o r p o r a t i o n (societas). T h e right t o collect taxes i n each p r o v i n c e was a u c t i o n e d every five years; t h e sums a n d t h e r isk i n v o l v e d w e n t b e y o n d t h e scope o f i n d i v i d u a l f o r t u n e s . T o solve this , t a x - f a r m i n g c o r p o r a t i o n s were set u p w h i c h t o o k i n investments a n d guarantees f r o m n u m e r o u s i n d i v i d u a l s . Each c o r p o r a t i o n existed as a j u r i d i c a l e n t i t y , b u t was m u c h m o r e l iable t o d isso jut i ion t h a n m o d e r n corporat ions . I n d e e d t h e d e a t h o r w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e pres ident (manceps)

was a p p a r e n d y sufficient i n some circumstances t o necessitate d i s s o l u t i o n . 7 4 I n v e s t m e n t i n t a x - f a r m i n g thus d e p e n d e d o n success i n p e r i o d i c auctions, a n d m i g h t be i n t e r m i t t e n t as w e l l as s h o r t - t e r m . Perhaps t h e system w o r k e d , o n l y because R o m a n tax- farmers , as we have seen, w o r k e d f r o m t h e m o r e stable base o f l a n d - o w n i n g .

T h e o r g a n i s a t i o n a n d aggregated capita l o f tax- farmers were never a p p l i e d t o t r a d e a n d m a n u f a c t u r e ; they r e m a i n e d very f r a g m e n t e d , d o m i n a t e d by smal l , s ingle- fami ly businesses. T h e largest h a d slave-w o r k e r s , b u t typica l ly e m p l o y e d f a r fewer m e n t h a n large a g r i c u l t u r a l estates (latifundia);™ besides, t h e r e was i n t r a d e a n d i n d u s t r y n o equivalent o v e r l o r d i n s t i t u t i o n such as tenancy, w h i c h a l lowed t h e large-scale, c o o r d i n a t e d e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e p o o r by a single rich m a n . Perhaps a few f o r t u n e s may have been m a d e i n t r a d e , b u t n o t m a n y a n d n o t large f o r t u n e s . T r a d e r s , u n l i k e tax- farmers , d i d n o t const i tute a g r o u p w h i c h [?] Q . Cicero t h o u g h t w o r t h c o u r t i n g i n elections; w h i l e i n m u c h later t imes, t h e f o r t u n e s o f p r o s p e r o u s merchants i n t h e

7 4 Cf. Badian (1972: 67-81); G . Urdgdi, sv Publicani in RE, Suppl. x i , col. 1184!!. 7 8 I think the largest factory we know of in the ancient world was in Athens in the

fourth century BC - a shield-factory with nearly 120 men (Lysias 12.19). & v contrast, Pliny's estate in Umbria, would have employed several hundred men, in different tenandes. T h e important texts are Pliny, Letters 10.8; 3.19; Columella, On Agriculture 2.12. F o r a detailed discussion, see R . P. Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire (Cambridge, 1974) 19-20,48-9; I agree broadly with his conclusions, but his calculations depend too m u c h on fixed assumptions.

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empire ' s ch ie f t r a d i n g c i ty , A l e x a n d r i a , were perhaps o n l y a f r a c t i o n o f those o f large l a n d - o w n e r s . 7 6

I t was t h e shortage o f a l ternat ive investments a n d t h e h i g h status o f l a n d - o w n i n g w h i c h above a l l i n d u c e d m e n t o invest capi ta l i n l a n d . A m o n g senators t h e r e was a n a d d i t i o n a l pressure. T h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r o f i t h u g e l y f r o m e m p i r e o c c u r r e d i n f r e q u e n t i y . M a n y senators h a d o n l y o n e o r t w o chances i n a l i f e - t i m e t o h o l d g o v e r n m e n t posts i n t h e provinces , a n d t h a t i n a j u n i o r capacity (as quaestor o r as governor ' s a ide - legatus). A m o r e f a v o u r e d g r o u p , w h i c h v a r i e d f r o m t w o t o t h r e e fifths o f those w h o e n t e r e d t h e senate, were elected t o t h e office o f praetor a n d so became el ig ible f o r a p p o i n t m e n t as p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n o r . I n t h e o r y , each official h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o g o v e r n a p r o v i n c e f o r one year, since t h e R o m a n s f o r l o n g per iods k e p t a balance between t h e n u m b e r o f provinces a n d t h e n u m b e r o f senior elected officials (praetors a n d consuls) . 7 7 I n fact, t h e r e were o f t e n lags a n d shortages, especially at t h e very e n d o f t h e Republ ic , so t h a t some officials l ike V e r r e s o r Cicero's b r o t h e r , f o r e x a m p l e , g o v e r n e d a p r o v i n c e f o r t h r e e years, w h i l e o thers , a l t h o u g h e l ig ible , never g o v e r n e d a p r o v i n c e at a l l . W e show i n C h a p t e r i o f V o l u m e T w o o f this w o r k t h a t o n l y a n e x t r e m e l y smal l n u m b e r o f l e a d i n g famil ies secured access t o h i g h office f o r o n e o f t h e i r sons i n each g e n e r a t i o n ; f o r e x a m p l e , o n l y f o u r p e r cent o f consuls 249-50 B C ( N = 364) came f r o m famil ies w i t h consuls i n six successive generat ions; c o m p l e m e n t a r i l y , over a q u a r t e r o f t h e consuls came f r o m famil ies w i t h o n l y o n e consul i n t w o centuries . T h e b u l k o f senators, t h e r e f o r e , c o u l d n o t be sure that e i t h e r they o r t h e i r sons w o u l d have a n o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o m a k e m o n e y o u t o f h i g h office. T h e senators w h o were successful t h e r e f o r e fe l t c o n s t r a i n e d t o m a k e t h e i r p i le a n d invest i t i n l a n d . I t m i g h t have t o s u p p o r t t h e f a m i l y f o r generat ions.

W e have n o exact evidence o n the increased size o f r i c h men's l a n d - h o l d i n g s . Pliny's f a m o u s r e m a r k t h a t * large estates r u i n e d I t a l y ' (Natural History 18.35) is as m u c h m o r a l j u d g e m e n t as fact, dates f r o m the m i d - f i r s t c e n t u r y A D , a n d may m a r k the c u l m i n a t i o n o f a l o n g process. A c q u i s i t i o n a n d aggregat ion o f estates h a d p r o b a b l y been g o i n g o n f o r centuries , as t h e c e n t r a l R o m a n e l i te s t r e n g t h e n e d its h o l d over t h e t e r r i t o r i e s o f I t a l i a n towns a n d tr ibes, w h e n they became pol i t i ca l ly assimilated t o R o m e . W e have o n l y very genera l indicat ions 7 6 [?Q«] Cicero, Guide to Electioneering (Comm. Pet.). O n Alexandrian trade, see Jones

(1964: 870-1); the evidence which Jones cites comes mosdy from the sixth century A D ; it is the only such evidence we have, and his conclusions are often referred to. Unfortunately, the testimony cited hardly authenticates Jones' conclusion. Nevertheless he may well be right. See also Jones (1974: 35ff.).

7 7 F . B. Marsh, The Founding of the Roman Empire (Oxford, 1927), 2ff.

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f r o m t h e late Republ ic ; b u t we can r isk some estimates. First , i f t h e m o d e r n c o n v e n t i o n a l estimates o f t h e n u m b e r o f slaves i n I t a l y are a n y w h e r e near r i g h t , t h e n by t h e m i d - f i r s t c e n t u r y B C t h e r e m u s t have b e n over a m i l l i o n a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves i n I t a l y . T h e slave rebel l ions i n Sicily a n d I t a l y (135, 104 a n d 73 B C ) , each o f w h i c h at tracted tens o f thousands o f rebel slaves, c o r r o b o r a t e this view. Secondly, the w r i t e r s o n a g r i c u l t u r e whose w o r k s survive: Cato, V a r r o a n d C o l u m e l l a , a l l assumed t h a t slaves w o u l d f o r m t h e m a i n w o r k force o n t h e i r o w n a n d t h e i r readers ' estates. Cato descr ibed t w o f a r m s as examples, one w i t h t h i r t e e n , t h e o t h e r w i t h fifteen slaves ( V a r r o , On Agriculture 1.18). E i t h e r figure impl ies slave-farms several t imes larger t h a n a single-f a m i l y peasant f a r m .

T h i r d l y , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a specialist l i t e r a t u r e o n a g r i c u l t u r e is itself a n i n d i c a t i o n o f a n increase i n e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l , o r even * capital ist ic ' a g r i c u l t u r e . I t s beg innings a p p a r e n t l y date back to the official t r a n s l a t i o n o f a C a r t h a g i n i a n treatise, c o m m i s s i o n e d by t h e senate s h o r d y after Rome's v i c t o r y over Carthage (202 B C ) . Cato, V a r r o a n d C o l u m e l l a are o n l y t h e s u r v i v i n g t i p o f a vanished iceberg; we k n o w o n l y isolated facts a b o u t o t h e r w r i t e r s o n a g r i c u l t u r e ; Cicero, f o r e x a m p l e , t ranslated X e n o p h o n ' s treatise Economicus, A Discussion on

Estate Management i n t o L a t i n . T h e r e is a m a r k e d d e v e l o p m e n t i n sophist icat ion f r o m Cato t h r o u g h V a r r o to C o l u m e l l a , a n d i t is t e m p t i n g to t h i n k that this was a re f lect ion o f a general advance i n k n o w l e d g e . T h a t said, a b r i e f r e a d i n g o f early n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E n g l i s h a g r i c u l t u r e h a n d b o o k s shows h o w b a c k w a r d R o m a n a g r i c u l t u r a l w r i t e r s were , especially i n t h e i r capacity t o d e t e r m i n e t h e re lat ive p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f c r o p s . 7 8

Final ly , i f R o m a n nobles' a n d k n i g h t s ' incomes came i n large measure f r o m rents , o r f r o m t h e d i r e c t e x p l o i t a t i o n o f l a n d , t h e n t h e areas o f g o o d l a n d w h i c h a r i c h m a n c o n t r o l l e d m u s t have been large. Figures are d i f f i c u l t to a r r i v e at, a n d d e p e n d o n several debatable assumptions; besides, t h e r e m u s t have been very considerable d i f fer ences a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f e r t i l i t y a n d locat ion o f t h e f a r m , the type o f c r o p , t o say n o t h i n g o f a n n u a l fluctuations i n t h e size o f the harvest a n d i n pr ice . I n spite o f a l l these dif f icult ies , a single e x a m p l e may be suggestive. I f , o n average, R o m a n senators got o n l y 60,000 H S a year f r o m a g r i c u l t u r a l rents (this is l o w ; i t was o n l y t e n p e r cent o f Cicero's very r i c h man's i n c o m e ) , a n d i f rents equal led t h i r t y p e r cent o f t h e

n F o r ancient agricultural writers, the most recent and very full discussion is by White (1970). It is in my view often apologistic and so should be read with some scepticism. Examples of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English agricultural writings can be found in A. Young's periodical, Annab of Agriculture 1784-1815.

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gross c r o p ( w h i c h is h i g h ) , t h e n at a c o n v e n t i o n a l p r i c e f o r wheat , i t w o r k s o u t t h a t 600 senators t o g e t h e r o w n e d l a n d sufficient t o m a i n t a i n 200,000 peasant famil ies (i.e. 800,000 m e n , w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n ) at t h e level o f m i n i m u m subsistence. T h i s was a f i f t h , at least, o f Italy 's free peasant p o p u l a t i o n . 7 9 O n e can play a r o u n d w i t h such f igures, b u t they serve t o give r o u g h o r d e r s o f m a g n i t u d e . W h e t h e r d o u b l e d o r ha lved , they show b e y o n d reasonable d o u b t t h a t t h e increased l a n d e d weal th o f t h e senate ( to say n o t h i n g t o t h e equites) was b o u g h t at t h e cost o f a h u g e d isplacement o f peasants.

L A N D I N P O L I T I C S

T h e c r e a t i o n o f large estates i n I t a l y c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h t h e w e a l t h , p o w e r a n d ostentat ion o f t h e R o m a n el i te , * c o n q u e r o r s o f t h e w o r l d ' , r e q u i r e d t h e mass e x t r u s i o n o f I t a l i a n peasants f r o m t h e i r l a n d . W e need to e x a m i n e t h e process o f t h e i r dispossession a n d its p o l i t i c a l consequences. F o r a l o n g t i m e t h e evacuat ion was k e p t w i t h i n o r d e r l y channels: t h e p o o r sold o u t a n d e m i g r a t e d to colonies established by t h e state i n I t a l y o r w e n t by themselves t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e . W a r s were one o f t h e p r i m e agents o f change; as we have seen, they k e p t o n average 130,000 I t a l i a n soldiers of f t h e l a n d . B u t t h a t was n o t a l l . H a n n i b a l ' s invas ion o f I t a l y h a d sent thousands o f peasants s c u r r y i n g f o r t h e protect ive walls o f R o m e . T h e i r f a r m s a n d catde w e r e des t royed . W h e n H a n n i b a l h a d r e t r e a t e d , t h e consuls were i n s t r u c t e d by t h e senate t o h e l p r e l u c t a n t peasants back t o t h e i r deserted f a r m s ( L i v y 1 28.11). T w o years a f ter t h e w a r was over , i n 200 B C , a l o t o f I t a l i a n l a n d was u p f o r sale ( L i v y 31.13, cf. 25.36); m e n o f h i g h social s t a n d i n g , w h o i n time o f crisis h a d l e n t m o n e y to t h e state, d e m a n d e d t h a t t h e i r loans be r e p a i d so t h a t they c o u l d take advantage o f t h e m a r k e t . T h e g o v e r n m e n t was unable t o pay i n cash because i t was f i n a n c i n g o t h e r wars; instead i t gave its c r e d i t o r s large tracts o f state l a n d at p e p p e r c o r n rents . T h e c i v i l wars a n d j u d i c i a l confiscations o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C gave s imi lar o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r t h e s u r v i v i n g r i c h t o accumulate large estates. 8 0

7 9 T h e values used here are: prices of wheat 3 H S per modius of 6.5 kg; yield 5 dmes seed; a m i n i m u m subsistence for an average family of four persons of 1,000 kg wheat equivalent per year. So [600 (senators)x60,000 H S (income)/3 ( H S price per modius wheat)] x [100/30 (gross product as a proportion of rent) x 6.5/1,250 (kg per modius/ gross family consumption in kg wheat equivalent = 1,000 kg net of seed)] = 208,000 families who could live off aristocrats' land as discussed. I f you do not agree with these values, please consider the implication of changing each of them u p or down; for example, if the normal price of wheat was less than 3 H S per modius, then the area of land occupied by the rich was larger.

8 0 See conveniendy B r u n t (1971: 300-4, 327-8) for discussion and references.

56

Land in politics

T h e upsets o f w a r can also be t raced t o t h e p r o g r a m m e o f c o l o n isation organised by t h e R o m a n senate between 194 a n d 177 B C . I n this p e r i o d , t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f c e n t r a l I t a l y was d i m i n i s h e d by a b o u t 100,000 m e n , w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n . T h e y were resett led i n over t w e n t y colonies, p r e d o m i n a n t l y i n the e x t r e m e south a n d i n n o r t h e r n I t a l y . T h e large n u m b e r s a n d t h e very smal l plots o f l a n d w h i c h most o f t h e m a p p a r e n d y received are evidence i n themselves o f considerable i m p o v e r i s h m e n t . 8 1 Peasants w e r e u n l i k e l y t o walk t h r e e h u n d r e d o r m o r e k i l o m e t r e s f r o m t h e i r ancestral homes i n c e n t r a l I t a l y , c a r r y i n g w i t h t h e m a l l t h a t they possessed, i n t o new a n d o f t e n hosti le t e r r i t o r y , unless they were p u s h e d h a r d - especially w h e n f o r m a n y o f t h e m t h e pr ize was less t h a n f o u r hectares ( ten acres) o f l a n d ; t o a d d i n s u l t t o i n j u r y the settlers sometimes f o r f e i t e d t h e i r f u l l R o m a n c i t izenship -t h o u g h they received e x t r a l a n d i n c o m p e n s a t i o n .

O t h e r peasants m i g r a t e d t o t h e towns, above a l l t o the c i ty o f R o m e . O n c e again we have o n l y f r a g m e n t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n t o be pieced together . I n 187 B C , a n d again i n 177 B C , the L a t i n allies t o g e t h e r ' c o m p l a i n e d t o t h e senate t h a t a large n u m b e r o f t h e i r citizens h a d m i g r a t e d t o R o m e a n d h a d been assessed there* ( L i v y 39.3). I f this w e n t o n , they said, t h e i r towns a n d f a r m s w o u l d be deserted. A l r e a d y they f o u n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o meet t h e i r obl igat ions t o p r o v i d e soldiers ( L i v y 41.8). O n each occasion t h e senate d i r e c t e d a n official t o flush o u t recent i m m i g r a n t s o f L a t i n o r i g i n ; we are t o l d t h a t o n t h e first occasion twelve t h o u s a n d L a t i n m e n w e r e i n s t r u c t e d t o go back h o m e ; w i t h t h e i r

8 1 T h i s calculation is based on the assumption that colonies of known size were typical of those of unknown size.

I assume that adult males contributed c. 3 0 % to the total population. T h e r e were probably no more colonies founded until 128 BC (Auximum), though there was an allotment of public land to individuals in 173 BC. We do not know why this fifty-year gap occurred.

T h e size of land allotments is known in 11/22 colonies. I n the maritime colonies, citizens apparendy received 5-6 iugera (1.25-1.5 ha; n = 3/13); more in other citizen colonies (5,8, 10, 51 Vi iugera); and much more in Latin colonies (15,20,50,50 iugera; n = 4/5) as though in compensation for loss of citizenship. Citizens got 10 iugera in individual allotments in 173 BC. Cavalrymen and centurions received more, It seems likely that colonists supplemented their living on small allotments by working the land of rich setders who occupied public land; how else would they have got the working capital to move, why else would rich Romans have helped move them? Colonies thus recreated the social situation in central Italy - this idea is also put forward by B r u n t (1971: 194). F o r details of colonies, see ESAR vol. 1, 122-3.

Total adult

13 maritime colonies (size of 5 known; 300 setders each) 4 citizen colonies (size of 3 known; 2,000 setders each) 5 Latin colonies (size of 5 known)

males

8,000 19,600

V>$oo

57


d e p e n d a n t s they c o n s t i t u t e d a sizeable body. N e w regulat ions restrict i n g i m m i g r a t i o n were passed, b u t w e r e evaded by a legal fiddle, a n d i t is d o u b t f u l i f m i g r a t i o n t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e was ever s topped by s imple a d m i n i s t r a t i v e decree. A n o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e g r o w t h i n t h e city's p o p u l a t i o n can be f o u n d i n t h e a t t e m p t s m a d e t o increase the water-supply . M o n e y was al located f o r a large new a q u e d u c t i n 179 B C , b u t t h e plans w e r e b locked by an aristocrat t h r o u g h whose lands i t h a d t o pass ( L i v y 39.41); i t was c o m p l e t e d eventual ly i n 143 B C ; yet a n o t h e r aqueduct , Rome's f o u r t h , was b u i l t i n 125 B C . Some o f t h e city's e x t r a p o p u l a t i o n w e r e slaves a n d t h e i r o f f s p r i n g . M a n y o f t h e rest were I t a l i a n peasants p u s h e d o u t by the large land-owners a n d by t h e d e m a n d s o f m i l i t a r y service a n d p u l l e d i n by the h u g e sums o f m o n e y b e i n g spent i n t h e city. As a result some areas o f the I t a l i a n c o u n t r y s i d e were d e n u d e d o f f ree peasants. I n 180 B C , f o r e x a m p l e , 40,000 defeated n o r t h e r n t r i b e s m e n ( L i g u r i a n s ; the figure inc ludes wives a n d c h i l d r e n ) were resetded i n t h e c e n t r a l I t a l i a n h i g h l a n d s ( L i v y 30.38). I t was a g o o d idea; t h e sett lement s u r v i v e d f o r at least t h r e e c e n t u r i e s . 8 2 B u t i t was a pal l iat ive n o t a c u r e f o r peasant e m i g r a t i o n .

T o a c o n t e m p o r a r y R o m a n noble , the changes m u s t have seemed so f r a g m e n t e d a n d v a r i e d i n t h e i r contexts t h a t they h a r d l y c o n s t i t u t e d a single process at a l l : he h a d m o r e m o n e y a n d a c q u i r e d m o r e l a n d ; a few p o o r f a r m e r s were b o u g h t o u t o r evicted; m o r e shacks c o u l d be seen a l o n g the r o a d i n t o R o m e , perhaps m o r e beggars were at his d o o r ; some m o r e slaves e n t e r e d his h o u s e h o l d ; t o o m a n y G r e e k phi losphers a n d new m o r a l s i n R o m e - a b e w i l d e r i n g var iety o f events, t h e c o n c e r n o f n o o n e i n p a r t i c u l a r t o cope w i t h o r t o p r e v e n t . W h e n m i g r a t i o n caused dif f icult ies by u p s e t t i n g e x i s t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s (as i t d i d by r e d u c i n g t h e allies' capacity to p r o d u c e t r o o p s ) , t h e n t h e a u t h o r i t i e s d i d w h a t they c o u l d . T h e y f o r b a d i m m i g r a t i o n . T h e r e was l i t t l e m o r e t h a t they c o u l d d o .

W i t h t h e w i s d o m o f h i n d s i g h t , R o m a n histor ians later saw t h e c u m u l a t i v e i m p a c t o f e v i c t i n g smal l -holders .

Whenever the Romans annexed land f r o m their neighbours as a result of their wars, i t was their custom to put a part u p for sale by auction: the rest was made common land and was distributed among the poorest and most needy citizens, who were allowed to cultivate it on payment of a small rent to the public treasury. When the rich began to outbid and drive out the poor by offering higher rentals, a law was passed which forbade any one individual to hold more than 500 iugera [ 125 ha] of [state] land. For a while this law restrained the greed of the rich and helped the poor, who were enabled to 8 2 See the Ligures Baebiani (CIL 9.1455 of A D 101), named after Baebius one of the

consuls who settied them there. O n the aqueducts, see T . Ashby, The Aqueducts of Ancient Rome (repr. Washington, D C , 1973).

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r e m a i n o n t h e l a n d w h i c h t h e y h a d r e n t e d , so that e a c h o f t h e m c o u l d o c c u p y t h e a l l o t m e n t w h i c h h e h a d o r i g i n a l l y b e e n g r a n t e d . B u t after a t i m e t h e rich m e n i n e a c h n e i g h b o u r h o o d by u s i n g t h e n a m e s o f fictitious t e n a n t s , c o n t r i v e d to t r a n s f e r m a n y o f these h o l d i n g s to t h e m s e l v e s , a n d finally they o p e n l y took p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f t h e l a n d u n d e r t h e i r o w n n a m e s . T h e p o o r , w h e n t h e y f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s f o r c e d off t h e l a n d , b e c a m e m o r e a n d m o r e u n w i l l i n g to v o l u n t e e r f 6 r m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e o r e v e n to r a i s e a family . T h e r e s u l t w a s a r a p i d d e c l i n e o f t h e class o f f r e e s m a l l - h o l d e r s a l l o v e r I t a l y , t h e i r p l a c e b e i n g t a k e n by g a n g s o f f o r e i g n slaves, w h o m t h e r i c h e m p l o y e d to cult ivate t h e estates f r o m w h i c h t h e y h a d d r i v e n off t h e f r e e ci t izens. ( P l u t a r c h , Life of Tiberius Gracchus 8; t r a n s l a t e d by I . S c o t t - K i l v e r t , P e n g u i n B o o k s ) .

I n 133 B C , the c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f l a n d i n t h e hands o f the r i c h e r u p t e d as a m a j o r po l i t i ca l issue. A l m o s t inevi tably i t has b e n presented as a conf l ict between r i c h a n d p o o r , between great land-owners a n d t h e landless. L i k e i m p o r t a n t po l i t i ca l issues i n o t h e r societies, i t was i n t e r -shot w i t h p r i v a t e a m b i t i o n s , ideologies a n d o t h e r pol i t i ca l p r o b l e m s ; nevertheless, i t seems reasonable t o t h i n k t h a t t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f l a n d was t h e cruc ia l issue. T h e events o f t h a t year are especially i m p o r t a n t because they epi tomise a n d h e r a l d t h e n e x t c e n t u r y o f i n t e r n a l s tr i fe . I n p a r t i c u l a r , Gracchus' l a n d law was o n e o f t w e n t y at tempts m a d e i n t h e course o f t h e n e x t h u n d r e d years t o solve t h e a g r a r i a n p r o b l e m by law a n d by t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f l a n d t o t h e p o o r . 8 3

B u t before we discuss t h e a t t e m p t e d r e f o r m s o f T i b e r i u s Gracchus, I w a n t to o u t l i n e t h r e e s t r u c t u r a l features w h i c h d e t e r m i n e d t h e shape o f t h e confl ict .

First , even t h o u g h t h e aristocrats i n the senate d o m i n a t e d R o m a n pol i t i ca l dec is ion-making , large sections o f t h e plebs r e t a i n e d c o n siderable p o w e r : t h e p o p u l a r assemblies were c o u r t e d by a n d chose between aristocrats i n the e lect ion o f the highest officials, a n d they h a d t h e f o r m a l p o w e r t o pass laws. T h e idea that the senate a n d t h e R o m a n people (SPQR is s t i l l s tamped o n d r a i n s i n Rome) were p a r t n e r s i n g o v e r n m e n t was t o a large e x t e n t m y t h , b u t a m y t h w i t h l i fe st i l l i n i t .

Secondly, t h e t r i b u n e s o f t h e people , as t h e n a m e o f t h e i r office i m p l i e s , were ostensibly o b l i g e d t o p r o t e c t t h e specific interests o f t h e people . T o be sure, they d i d n o t always f u l f i l this o b l i g a t i o n ; most m u s t have been c o n t e n t t o abide by t h e status quo. I n d e e d , the t r i b u n e s were usually aristocrats i n t e n t o n m a k i n g t h e i r way i n a senatorial career. Yet i n spite o f t h e d e m a n d s o f t h e i r careers, t r i b u n e s o f t h e people repeatedly cast themselves as t h o r n s i n t h e flesh o f senatorial c o n -

8 8 19 agrarian laws are listed in RE sv Leges agrariae, dated 133-44 BC; the list is not necessarily complete. T h e r e were three such laws in the previous century. T h e discussion of these laws by B r u n t (1971) is excellent.

59


servatism. T h e events o f 133 B C m e r e l y c o n f i r m e d a l o n g t r a d i t i o n . I n h i s t o r y , i t h a d been t r i b u n e s o f t h e people w h o h a d p r o p o s e d a g r a r i a n r e f o r m o r t h e r e s t r i c t i o n o f senatorial p r i v i l e g e . A n d i n t h e recent past, i n 151 a n d 138 B C , t r i b u n e s h a d even i m p r i s o n e d t h e consuls i n protest against t h e injustices o f t h e m i l i t a r y levy . 8 4

T h e p o p u l a r assemblies a n d t h e t r i b u n a t e p r o v i d e d l e g i t i m a t e a n d established channels f o r t h e expression o f conf l ict . Some R o m a n leaders t h o u g h t t h a t t h e i r suppression w o u l d eradicate t h e conf l ic t ; t h e t r i b u n a t e was c u r b e d t e m p o r a r i l y by Sulla, a n d p o p u l a r assemblies were i n effect c o n t r o l l e d subsequently by t h e t r i u m v i r s . As a resul t , t h e lines o f conf l ict became m o r e e x p l i c i t l y d r a w n elsewhere; p o l i t i c a l issues w e r e dec ided instead by generals a n d t h e i r armies.

T h i r d l y , we m u s t consider p u b l i c o r state l a n d (ager publicus populi

Romani). T h i s legal category o f l a n d h a d been very i m p o r t a n t as a cover u n d e r w h i c h large p r i v a t e estates were f o r m e d . State l a n d consisted o f l a n d w h i c h t h e R o m a n state h a d t a k e n over f r o m I t a l i a n c o m m u n i t i e s (usually o n e t h i r d o f t h e i r t e r r i t o r y ) w h e n they w e r e first c o n q u e r e d , p lus o t h e r lands confiscated by t h e R o m a n state; f o r e x a m p l e , R o m a n allies w h o s ided w i t h H a n n i b a l d u r i n g his invas ion o f I t a l y w e r e p u n i s h e d by h a v i n g t h e i r l a n d confiscated. Some o f t h e l a n d was g iven t o colonists, o r so ld , o r leased; b u t t h e greater p a r t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e second-century h i s t o r i a n A p p i a n , was n o t al located. A n y o n e c o u l d occupy i t ( i t was called ager occupatorius) o n p a y m e n t o f a r e n t t o t h e state, a l t h o u g h this o c c u p a t i o n gave n o legal security o f t e n u r e .

I t was the rich who took most of this unallocated land. I n time, they became confident that they would not be dispossessed. They acquired the lands nearby, including the plots of the poor, sometimes by purchase with persuasion, sometimes by force so that in the end they cultivated large estates not farms . . . (Appian, Civil Wars 1.7)

T h e r e is evidence t h a t o b l i g i n g l y t h e rents , n o r m a l l y a t e n t h o f t h e c r o p o n arable l a n d , w e r e o f t e n n o t col lected, a n d t h e laws w h i c h restr ic ted h o w m u c h state l a n d a m a n c o u l d h o l d were evaded w i t h i m p u n i t y . 8 5 L a n d w h i c h h a d been c o n q u e r e d by t h e R o m a n people a n d w h i c h was n o m i n a l l y e x p l o i t e d f o r its collective benef i t cast a t h i n veneer, as o f t e n be fore a n d since, over t h e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e p r o f i t o f t h e rich. 8 4 Livy, Summaries of Books 48 and 55, and see J . Bleicken, Das Volkstribunat der Klas-

sischen Republik ( M u n i c h 1 , 1968). 8 5 See the commentary on Appian, Civil Wars 1.7 by E . Gabba (Florence, 1958); Livy

42.1 and 19; Cato's speech in 167 BC (ORF* 167), which implies that men held more than 500 iugera of state land with impunity.

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T h e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r a n d pr iv i legesof land-owners weresodeep-rooted t h a t n o o n e at this stage suggested a genera l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f l a n d w h i c h be longed i n f u l l t i t l e by ' r i g h t o f p e r p e t u a l possession* (Cicero, On Behalf of Milo 78) to p r i v a t e R o m a n citizens. Such a suggestion w o u l d have u n i t e d t h e o p p o s i t i o n . B u t t h e status o f state l a n d , w i t h its c o n n o t a t i o n o f b e i n g a collective g o o d (ager publicus populi Romani),

i n technical t e r m s h e l d ' p r e c a r i o u s l y ' , o c c u p i e d n o t o w n e d , was a m biguous , a n d p r o v i d e d sufficient leverage t o m a k e its r e d i s t r i b u t i o n leg i t imate .

W i t h these factors i n m i n d let us t u r n to t h e events o f 133 B C . T i b e r i u s Gracchus was b o r n i n t o a n o b l e f a m i l y , t h e son o f a i n a n w h o h a d twice been consul a n d censor. As a y o u n g off icial , he served w i t h the a r m y i n Spain a n d h e l p e d negotiate peace t e r m s af ter a R o m a n a r m y h a d been defeated t h e r e , t e r m s w h i c h t h e senate subsequendy r e p u d i a t e d . I n his travels t h r o u g h I t a l y , Gracchus h a d been s t ruck by t h e e x t e n t o f estates c u l t i v a t e d b y slaves a n d by t h e decl ine o f t h e f ree peasantry. T h e slave r e b e l l i o n w h i c h b r o k e o u t i n Sicily i n 135 B C m u s t have r e i n f o r c e d his views. O n his r e t u r n to R o m e , he was elected t r i b u n e o f t h e people a n d p r o p o s e d t h a t state l a n d be r e d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e p o o r . O n e effect o f this w o u l d have been to increase t h e n u m b e r o f p r o p e r t y - h o l d e r s l iable t o serve i n t h e a r m y . A s imi lar p r o p o s a l h a d been p u t f o r w a r d a few years ear ier by Lael ius, b u t h a d been d r o p p e d because o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n w h i c h i t aroused. Needless t o say, the r i c h were opposed t o Gracchus ' proposals also. T o describe Gracchus* c a m p a i g n f o r his law, I cannot d o bet ter t h a n q u o t e t h e account by P l u t a r c h , w r i t t e n i n t h e second c e n t u r y A D , b u t d r a w n f r o m m u c h ear l ier sources. 8 6

Tiberius [Gracchus].. .went straight to the root of the matter as soon as he had been elected tribune. He was encouraged in his plans, as most writers report, by Diophanes the orator and Blossius the phi losopher . . . Some writers consider that Cornelia was at least partly to blame for Tiberius' death, since she often reproached her sons with the fact that the Romans still referred to her as the mother-in-law of Scipio, but not yet as the mother of the Gracchi. Others maintain that Tiberius was also influenced by his jealousy of a certain Spurius Postumius. This man was of the same age as Tiberius and a close rival as a public speaker. So when Tiberius returned f r o m the campaign against Numantia and found that his adversary had far outdistanced h i m i n fame and influence and had attracted general admiration, it seems likely that he resolved

8 6 T h e literature on the Gracchi is mammoth. I have followed Astin (1967: 161 ff.); and see D. C . E a r l , Tiberius Gracchus(Brussels, 1963),]. CarcopmotAutourdesGracques (Pans 2 , 1967), and especially E . Badian, 'Tiberius Gracchus and the beginning of the Roman Revolution \ in H . T e m p o r i n i ed., Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (Berlin, 1972) vol. 1.1, 668-731.

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to o u t d o h i m by i n t r o d u c i n g a c h a l l e n g i n g polit ical p r o g r a m m e , w h i c h w o u l d a r o u s e g r e a t e x p e c t a t i o n s a m o n g the p e o p l e . H o w e v e r , his b r o t h e r G a i u s h a s w r i t t e n i n a pol i t ical p a m p h l e t that w h i l e T i b e r i u s was t r a v e l l i n g t h r o u g h E t r u r i a o n his w a y to N u m a n t i a , h e saw f o r h i m s e l f h o w t h e c o u n t r y h a d b e e n d e s e r t e d by its nat ive i n h a b i t a n t s , a n d h o w those w h o t i l led t h e soil o r t e n d e d t h e flocks w e r e b a r b a r i a n slaves i n t r o d u c e d f r o m a b r o a d ; a n d that it w a s this e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h i n s p i r e d t h e p o l i c y that later b r o u g h t so m a n y m i s f o r t u n e s u p o n t h e t w o b r o t h e r s . B u t it was a b o v e al l t h e p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s w h o d i d m o s t to a r o u s e T i b e r i u s ' e n e r g y a n d a m b i t i o n s by i n s c r i b i n g s l o g a n s a n d a p p e a l s o n p o r t i c o e s , m o n u m e n t s a n d the walls o f h o u s e s , c a l l i n g u p o n h i m to r e c o v e r t h e p u b l i c l a n d f o r t h e p o o r .

H e d i d not, h o w e v e r , d r a f t h i s l a w by h i m s e l f , b u t c o n s u l t e d a n u m b e r o f t h e m o s t e m i n e n t a n d r e s p e c t e d c i t i z e n s . . . A n d c e r t a i n l y m a n y wil l a g r e e that n o l a w d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t i n j u s t i c e a n d a v a r i c e was e v e r f r a m e d i n m i l d e r o r m o r e c o n c i l i a t o r y t e r m s . F o r t h e m e n w h o d e s e r v e d to b e p u n i s h e d f o r b r e a k i n g t h e l a w , a n d w h o s h o u l d h a v e b e e n f i n e d as w e l l as o b l i g e d to s u r r e n d e r t h e l a n d w h i c h they h a d b e e n i l legally e n j o y i n g , w e r e m e r e l y r e q u i r e d to give u p t h e i r u n j u s t a c q u i s i t i o n s - f o r w h i c h t h e y w e r e c o m p e n s a t e d - a n d to a l l o w t h e o w n e r s h i p to pass to t h o s e c i t i z e n s w h o m o s t n e e d e d t h e l a n d . B u t e v e n t h o u g h this act o f r e s d t u t i o n s h o w e d s u c h t e n d e r n e s s f o r t h e w r o n g d o e r s , t h e p e o p l e w e r e c o n t e n t to forget t h e past so l o n g as t h e y c o u l d be a s s u r e d o f p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t i n j u s t i c e i n t h e f u t u r e . T h e w e a l t h y classes a n d l a n d o w n e r s o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w e r e bitterly o p p o s e d to these p r o c e e d i n g s : t h e y h a t e d t h e l a w o u t o f s h e e r g r e e d , a n d its o r i g i n a t o r o u t o f p e r s o n a l r e s e n t m e n t a n d p a r t y p r e j u d i c e , a n d t h e y d i d t h e i r u t m o s t to t u r n t h e p e o p l e a g a i n s t t h e r e f o r m by a l l e g i n g that T i b e r i u s ' object i n i n t r o d u c i n g a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f l a n d w a s r e a l l y to u n d e r m i n e t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f t h e state a n d stir u p a g e n e r a l r e v o l u t i o n .

H o w e v e r , these tactics a c h i e v e d n o t h i n g . T i b e r i u s w a s f ighting f o r a m e a s u r e w h i c h w a s h o n o u r a b l e a n d j u s t i n itself, a n d h e w a s a b l e to s u m m o n u p a n e l o q u e n c e w h i c h w o u l d h a v e d o n e c r e d i t to a f a r less w o r t h y c a u s e . T h e r e s u l t " w a s t h a t w h e n e v e r h e m o u n t e d t h e r o s t r a to p l e a d t h e c a s e o f t h e p o o r w i t h t h e p e o p l e c r o w d i n g a r o u n d h i m to l i s t e n , t h e effect o f h i s w o r d s was o v e r w h e l m i n g a n d n o o t h e r o r a t o r c o u l d s t a n d a g a i n s t h i m .

' T h e w i l d beasts that r o a m o v e r I t a l y ' , h e w o u l d tell h i s l i s t e n e r s , ' h a v e t h e i r d e n s a n d h o l e s to l u r k i n , b u t t h e m e n w h o fight a n d d i e f o r o u r c o u n t r y e n j o y t h e c o m m o n a i r a n d l ight a n d n o t h i n g else. I t is t h e i r lot to w a n d e r w i t h t h e i r w i v e s a n d c h i l d r e n , h o u s e l e s s a n d h o m e l e s s , o v e r t h e face o f t h e e a r t h . A n d w h e n o u r g e n e r a l s a p p e a l to t h e i r s o l d i e r s b e f o r e a b a t d e to d e f e n d t h e i r a n c e s t o r s ' t o m b s a n d t h e i r t e m p l e s a g a i n s t t h e e n e m y , t h e i r w o r d s a r e a m o c k e r y a n d a l ie, f o r n o t a m a n i n t h e a u d i e n c e possesses a f a m i l y a l t a r ; n o t o n e o u t o f a l l t h o s e R o m a n s o w n s a n a n c e s t r a l t o m b . T h e t r u t h is that they fight a n d d i e to p r o t e c t t h e w e a l t h a n d l u x u r y o f o t h e r s . T h e y a r e c a l l e d t h e m a s t e r s o f t h e w o r l d , b u t t h e y d o n o t possess a s i n g l e c l o d o f e a r t h w h i c h is t r u l y t h e i r o w n . '

T o s u c h o r a t o r y as this , t h e u t t e r a n c e o f a n o b l e s p i r i t , d e l i v e r e d w i t h a g e n u i n e p a s s i o n to a p e o p l e p r o f o u n d l y m o v e d a n d fully a r o u s e d to t h e s p e a k e r ' s s u p p o r t , n o n e o f T i b e r i u s * a d v e r s a r i e s c o u l d m a k e a n effective r e p l y . ( P l u t a r c h , Life of Tiberius Gracchus, ft-io; t r a n s . I . S c o t t - K i l v e r t , P e n g u i n )

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Land in politics

T h e conf l ict g r a d u a l l y escalated. I n defiance o f c o n v e n t i o n , w i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g t h e senate, Gracchus p u t his proposals d i r e c t l y t o a vote o f t h e people; a fe l low t r i b u n e used his veto t o block the proceedings. T h e n Gracchus, again by p o p u l a r vote, h a d h i m set aside - a n act ion w h i c h was u n p r e c e d e n t e d a n d possibly u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . B u t t h e new u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t a n d t h e peasants l i v i n g near R o m e a n d a m i n o r i t y o f nobles s u p p o r t e d h i m . T h e l a n d law was passed; t h e ancient law l i m i t i n g h o l d i n g s o f state l a n d t o 500 iugera (125 ha) was r e a f f i r m e d . A l a n d c o m m i s s i o n was set u p t o survey t h e state l a n d a n d allocate the s u r p l u s to t h e p o o r . A few o f t h e i r l a n d - m a r k e r s (cippi) s t i l l survive. T h e new smal l-holders t h e n needed m o n e y t o stock t h e i r f a r m s , b u t t r a d i t i o n a l l y o n l y the senate a u t h o r i s e d e x p e n d i t u r e ; Gracchus i n v a d e d t h e senate's preserve by p r o p o s i n g a law t o t h e people by w h i c h e x t r a revenues f r o m Asia M i n o r w o u l d be d i v e r t e d f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n t o t h e new f a r m e r s a n d m o r e general ly t o the p o o r r e m a i n i n g i n the city ( L i v y , Summary of Book 5 8 ) . 8 7 O n e can i m a g i n e t h e o u t r a g e o f conservative senators; t h e use o f p u b l i c m o n e y f o r a h a n d - o u t t o the plebs was r e v o l u t i o n a r y : a l l t h e m o r e so because t h e pol i t i ca l prestige o f b e i n g t h e benefactor o f t h e people w o u l d accrue t o T i b e r i u s Gracchus. B u t t h e final straw was Gracchus' a t t e m p t t o stay i n office by seeking re-elect ion, once again i n v i o l a t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n . O n t h e day o f t h e elections, a posse o f v ig i lante senators l e d by the chief priest (pontifex maximus), h i m s e l f t h e occupant o f large tracts o f state l a n d , o p e n l y assassinated T i b e r i u s Gracchus a n d f o u r h u n d r e d o f his i m m e d i a t e fo l lowers .

T h e w h i r l w i n d po l i t i ca l career o f T i b e r i u s Gracchus lasted less t h a n a year. Y e t i t is i m p o r t a n t , p a r t l y because i t was the p r e c u r s o r o f f u r t h e r c i v i l conflicts a n d p a r t l y because i t i l lustrates t h e intersect ion o f po l i t i ca l confl ict w i t h near ly a l l t h e factors o f social a n d economic change w h i c h we have been discussing: the increas ing weal th o f land-owners , the e m i g r a t i o n o f p o o r peasants, t h e g r o w t h o f slavery, t h e shortage o f recru i ts f o r t h e a r m y , the p o w e r o f t h e senate, the rise o f t h e u r b a n plebs, the c o m p e t i t i o n between nobles a n d the use o f i m p e r i a l revenues as a w e a p o n o f po l i t i ca l confl ict .

I n t h e s h o r t r u n , paradoxica l ly , b o t h Gracchus a n d his assassins were successful. T h e assassins res tored t h e supremacy o f t h e senate a n d secured peace by f u r t h e r j u d i c i a l executions. O n the o t h e r h a n d , i n spite o f Gracchus ' d e a t h , t h e l a n d c o m m i s s i o n persisted i n its w o r k a n d a p p a r e n t l y succeeded i n d i s t r i b u t i n g l a n d t o several t h o u s a n d citizens. Gracchus was m o r e effective d e a d t h a n alive. H o w e v e r , i n 129 B C , representatives o f t h e I t a l i a n allies objected s t r o n g l y t o t h e d i s t r i b u d o n

8 7 Some of what is recorded in ancient histories may not have happened; but in politics, rumours and beliefs about what is happening are often very important.

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o f state l a n d located w i t h i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r y , a n d t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n was e n o u g h w h e n c o m b i n e d w i t h p o w e r f u l p a t r o n a g e at R o m e t o h a m s t r i n g t h e commission's act iv i t ies . 8 8 I n 128 B C , as t h o u g h by c o m p e n sat ion, a new c o l o n y was established i n I t a l y , t h e first f o r fifty years; t h r e e o r f o u r m o r e f o l l o w e d soon a f terwards , t w o o f t h e m at the i n s t i g a t i o n o f T i b e r i u s Gracchus' b r o t h e r Gaius, w h o was t r i b u n e o f t h e people i n 123 B C . 8 9 A f t e r a l l , colonies i n d i s t a n t t e r r i t o r i e s served t h e same f u n c t i o n f o r t h e p o o r as l a n d - a l l o t m e n t s , o n l y t h e l a n d was n o t t a k e n f r o m t h e r i c h . Gaius Gracchus also h a d t h e restr ict ions prev ious ly placed o n t h e l a n d c o m m i s s i o n r e m o v e d , b u t even so i t seems n o t have achieved m u c h ; i t was abol ished p r o b a b l y i n 119 B C , as p a r t o f t h e backlash w h i c h f o l l o w e d Gaius' assassination.

T h r o u g h o u t , o n e basic p r o b l e m r e m a i n e d u n t o u c h e d . T h e new smal l -holders w h o h a d received l a n d f r o m t h e state e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l l y o r as colonists, w e r e l iable t o suffer f r o m t h e v e r y same pressures w h i c h h a d prev ious ly d r i v e n t h e m o r t h e i r fathers of f t h e l a n d . T i b e r i u s Gracchus h a d foreseen this p r o b l e m a n d t r i e d t o legislate against i t ; u n d e r his law, the new l a n d - h o l d e r s w e r e f o r b i d d e n t o sell t h e i r l a n d ; I d o u b t t h a t t h e law was effectively e n f o r c e d ; i n any case its provis ions w e r e f o r m a l l y a b a n d o n e d , p r o b a b l y i n 121 B C . A f t e r a l l t h e fuss, w h a t h a d t h e G r a c c h i achieved?

I n t h e l o n g r u n , seen, t h a t is, i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e events o f t h e n e x t c e n t u r y , b o t h l a n d laws a n d v i o l e n t repress ion f a i l e d t o deal adequately w i t h t h e social consequences o f e m p i r e . T h e y can best be u n d e r s t o o d as v a i n a t t e m p t s t o batt ie against t h e genera l t r e n d . I t is o n l y l o n g a f t e r w a r d s w h e n we have seen t h e same o r s i m i l a r v i o l e n t conflicts r e c u r r i n g t h a t we feel e n c o u r a g e d t o t h i n k o f b r o a d socio-economic changes. Such overviews are t h e p r i v i l e g e o f h istor ians. C o n t e m p o r a r y actors have m o r e o n t h e i r m i n d s , b o t h t o e n r i c h a n d t o c l o u d t h e i r views. O u r sources r e c o r d some, b u t o n l y some o f t h e i r percept ions a n d actions.

T H E S O L U T I O N - M A S S M I G R A T I O N

C o n v e n t i o n a l l y , m o d e r n histor ians o f t h e anc ient w o r l d have t r i e d t o r e c o n s t r u c t f r o m t h e i r p a r t i a l r e c o r d each successive crisis, l o o k e d at

M T h e census return for 125/4 BC perhaps recorded 76,000 more cidzens than that of 131/oBc. Interpretations vary, but it seems likely that the distributions of land by the Gracchan commissioners was partly responsible for the rise; see B r u n t (1971:

77*·)· * I follow Salmon (1970: 110) in dating A u x i m u m to 128; there might have been more

colonies founded but for the fact that they became a central political issue. A rival tribune to Gaius Gracchus upstaged him by proposing the foundation of twelve colonies for the poorest citizens, apparentiy without having the slightest intention of executing his proposals once they were confirmed.

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The solution - mass migration

i n its o w n context . T h e heroes a n d vi l la ins o f this reconstructed w o r l d are t h e society's leaders, ' m e n w h o shaped h i s t o r y ' : the Gracchi , M a r i u s , Sulla, Pompey, Jul ius Caesar, A u g u s t u s ; t h e m a i n subject m a t t e r o f such h is tory is t h e fact ional r ivalr ies o f aristocratic cliques; i n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e w o r l d as R o m a n notables a n d historians saw i t . M o d e r n historians have m a d e i t t h e i r j o b largely to u n d e r s t a n d these leaders' motives a n d i n t e n t i o n s , t h e i r b e h a v i o u r a n d its consequences a n d t o describe each o f t h e m , one after t h e o t h e r . I d o n o t m e a n by this t h a t ancient h is tory has consisted most ly o f b i o g r a p h y o r annalistic h is tory , b u t r a t h e r t h a t e l i te i n d i v i d u a l s l o o m large i n ancient a n d m o d e r n h is tory books o f R o m e , a n d t h a t these h is tory books are organised p r i m a r i l y by t i m e , n o t by topic o r p r o b l e m . C o n v e n t i o n a l ancient h is tory is t h u s very d i f f e r e n t i n flavour f r o m c o n t e m p o r a r y post-mediaeval h is tory . A t best, i t recaptures t h e a u t h e n t i c f e e l i n g o f w h a t i t was l i k e t o have l i v e d i n t h e ancient w o r l d . A t worst , i t is o n l y descr ipt ive a n d scholastic; m i n o r persons are g iven a spur ious i m p o r t a n c e , e i t h e r by the el i t ist p r e j u d i c e o f t h e sources o r by the m e r e accident t h a t a m e n t i o n o f t h e m has s u r v i v e d . T h e evidence is o f t e n so t h i n t h a t motives, t h e stuff o f b i o g r a p h y , can be d e d u c e d o n l y f r o m b e h a v i o u r - a speculative process t o say the least. A b o v e a l l , m o d e r n historians o f t h e ancient w o r l d t i e d t o tes t imony, systematically neglect those factors o r processes o f w h i c h the ancient actors a n d t h e sources w e r e u n a w a r e .

Instead o f e m b a r k i n g o n yet a n o t h e r deta i led account o f t h e recurr e n t disputes over l a n d d u r i n g t h e late Republ ic , I w a n t t o concentrate o n o n e aspect w h i c h seems especially i m p o r t a n t . I w a n t t o generalise a b o u t w h a t I shall r a t h e r c lumsi ly cal l t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e s i tuat ion . T h i s impl ies t h a t we can plausibly subsume a w h o l e series o f events, such as t h e t w e n t y l a n d laws spread over a c e n t u r y , as s y m p t o m s o f a single p r o b l e m . T h i s act o f general isat ion has f u r t h e r serious i m p l i c a t i o n s . I t i m p l i e s t h a t t h e actions o f i n d i v i d u a l legislators were m o u l d e d n o t o n l y by i m m e d i a t e considerat ions b u t also by l o n g - r u n factors o f w h i c h they were n o t necessarily aware; i t fo l lows t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e general isat ion c a n n o t d e p e n d o n w h e t h e r c o n t e m p o raries perceived i t ; i t c a n n o t be v a l i d a t e d , t h o u g h i t m a y be c o r r o b o r a t e d by c i t i n g a passage f r o m Cicero. I ts acceptabil i ty m u s t d e p e n d instead o n its i n t e r n a l coherence, its e c o n o m y , its f i t w i t h t h e k n o w n facts a n d w i t h some i m p l i c i t , c o v e r i n g laws. B u t e n o u g h o f t h e o r y .

I n t h e R o m a n economy, because i t was relat ively s imple , l a n d was t h e chief source o f l i v e l i h o o d a n d t h e p r e d o m i n a n t f o r m o f d i s t r i butable w e a l t h . Peasants, soldiers, t a x - f a r m e r s a n d aristocrats w a n t e d l a n d a n d m o r e l a n d . Preferably they w a n t e d l a n d i n I t a l y . T h e conquest o f a n e m p i r e gave i m p o r t a n t g r o u p s w i t h i n the society c o n t r o l

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over u n p r e c e d e n t e d l y large resources. C o m p e t i t i o n f o r a f i n i t e q u a n tity o f l a n d increased, a n d decisions a b o u t t h e c o n t r o l over l a n d repeatedly became a n i m p o r t a n t pol i t i ca l issue; the sett lement o f Sulla's veterans, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e abort ive l a n d b i l l o f R u l l u s i n 63 B C , a n d t h e d i f f i cu l ty o f secur ing l a n d f o r Pompey's veterans come readi ly t o m i n d . T h e t w e n t y l a n d laws, p r o p o s e d o r passed; t h e confiscations o f l a n d f r o m r i c h a n d p o o r ; its r e d i s t r i b u t i o n t o the landless, to ex-soldiers a n d t o t h e noble fo l lowers o f successful w a r chiefs o r t o weal thy o p p o r t u n i s t s , as wel l as t h e p r i v a t e acquis i t ion o f l a n d by t h e r i c h can a l l be seen as var iat ions o n the t h e m e : w h o was t o get w h a t o u t o f t h e p r o f i t s o f e m p i r e ? T h e b i t t e r c o m p e t i t i o n f o r a l i m i t e d g o o d f u e l l e d t h e po l i t i ca l conflicts o f t h e late Republ ic ; I d o n o t m e a n by this t h a t c o m p e t i t i o n f o r l a n d was t h e sole cause o f confl ict .

T h e solvent was c i v i l war , w h i c h i n v o l v e d t h e r e c r u i t m e n t o f h u g e armies , separated h a l f a m i l l i o n I t a l i a n peasants between 49 a n d 28 B C f r o m t h e soil a n d m a d e t h e m , as i t were , available f o r e m i g r a t i o n . 9 0

T h e s o l u t i o n was t h e acceptance by substantial n u m b e r s o f r i c h a n d p o o r o f a l ternat ive goods; a mass o f peasants, i n m y view, m i g r a t e d t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e w h e r e they were subsidised by the state w i t h gifts o f f ree wheat ; m u c h l a r g e r g r o u p s were resi ted e i t h e r o n new f a r m s i n I t a l y o r i n t h e provinces. T h e r i c h t o o , f irst k n i g h t s t h e n senators, a c q u i r e d estates outs ide I t a l y . T h u s b o t h social strata g r a d u a l l y accomm o d a t e d t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l a m b i t i o n s t o t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f fered i n an e n l a r g e d e m p i r e .

T h e scale o f m i g r a t i o n by the I t a l i a n p o o r is amazing . Between 80 a n d 8 B C , i n t w o generat ions, i t seems t h a t r o u g h l y h a l f t h e free a d u l t males i n I t a l y left t h e i r f a r m s a n d w e n t t o I t a l i a n towns o r were setded by t h e state o n new f a r m s i n I t a l y o r t h e provinces (see T a b l e 1.2). T h i s statement is d e r i v e d f r o m t h e s u r v i v i n g official f igures: t h e census u n d e r A u g u s t u s o f 28 a n d 8 B C , t h e n u m b e r o f soldiers u n d e r a r m s o r d ischarged, a n d t h e n u m b e r o f new colonies f o u n d e d o r r e f o u n d e d . B e f o r e I go f u r t h e r , I s h o u l d stress f o u r e lements i n m y discussion: f i rs t , t h e n u m b e r s g iven p r o v i d e r o u g h o r d e r s o f m a g n i t u d e o n l y ; secondly, they are largely based o n o r d e r i v e d f r o m the c a r e f u l analysis o f t h e evidence by B r u n t (1971); t h i r d l y , they describe net m i g r a t i o n o n l y , t h a t is they take n o account o f t h e several moves i n d i v i d u a l s may have m a d e f r o m before t h e i r f i n a l sett lement ( f o r e x a m p l e , f r o m f a r m e r t o landless l a b o u r e r , perhaps t o t o w n , t h e n soldier a n d eventual ly colonist) ; f o u r t h , they concentrate o n state-organised m i g r a t i o n , f o r w h i c h evidence survives i n official records; they take almost n o account o f p r i v a t e m o v e m e n t s , e i t h e r o f the m e n ,

9 0 B r u n t , (1971: 511).

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w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n u p r o o t e d t o m a k e r o o m f o r official settlements o r o f i n d i v i d u a l m i g r a n t s , w h o may have become progressively m o r e n u m e r o u s , as n u c l e i o f I ta l ians p r o v i d e d a base f o r f u r t h e r m i g r a t i o n i n n o r t h e r n I t a l y a n d t h r o u g h o u t t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n b a s i n . 9 1 1 realise t h a t t h e figures are speculative, b u t i f B r u n t ' s basic f r a m e w o r k is accepted, I d o n o t see h o w they can be w i l d l y w r o n g . T h e y show t h e sheer size o f the c u m u l a t i v e changes i n the late Republ ic , o f w h i c h o u r sources give us o n l y successive glimpses.

I n T a b l e 1.2, I have s u m m a r i s e d m y der ivat ions f r o m the evidence a n d i n the notes t o t h e table I have g iven some reasons f o r the figures. T h e most s t r i k i n g change is the decl ine i n t h e free r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n by 1.2 m i l l i o n ( f r o m 4.1 to 2.9 m i l l i o n ; a d r o p o f 2 9 % ) . I t is an e n o r m o u s figure; i t m u s t h i d e colossal h u m a n misery; i t may n o t be accurate, b u t i t gives a sense o f scale w h i c h is miss ing f r o m o u r sources. M o r e o v e r , i t seems l ike ly t h a t most o f the change was conc e n t r a t e d i n t h e last c e n t u r y B C .

W h e r e d i d t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n go? W e k n o w that wheat was d i s t r i b u t e d ' f r e e o f charge to 320,000 citizens i n 46 B C a n d t o 250,000 citizens i n 29 B C . T h i s evidence indicates that the city o f R o m e attracted Targe n u m b e r s o f i m m i g r a n t s ( b o t h free a n d slave, since we can call slaves f o r c e d i m m i g r a n t s ) ; i t seems plausible that a s ignif icant p a r t o f t h e overa l l u r b a n g r o w t h ( a r b i t r a r i l y I guess a b o u t ha l f ) was d u e t o peasant i m m i g r a t i o n . T h e city also served as a c h a n n e l f o r f u r t h e r m i g r a t i o n ; i n a n e f for t t o reduce the b u r d e n o f f e e d i n g t h e city, Jul ius Caesar resett led 70,000 a d u l t male pro le tar ians i n colonies overseas ( B r u n t 1971: 257); i t was o n l y p a r t o f his p r o g r a m m e o f colonisat ion. Between 45 a n d 8 B C , i t seems t h a t about one h u n d r e d colonies were established overseas, w i t h an est imated average o f 2-3,000 a d u l t male settlers each, most o f t h e m ex-soldiers. T o be sure, n o t a l l t h e colonies received settlers f r o m I t a l y , a n d i n others , g r o u p s o f I ta l ians already settled t h e r e p r o v i d e d the core o f t h e new colony. B u t i n spite o f these qual i f icat ions, over 250,000 a d u l t males f r o m I t a l y , about one fifth o f a l l t h a t l i v e d t h e r e ( N = c. 1.2 m i l l i o n ) , were decanted f r o m I t a l y by the R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t i n a single g e n e r a t i o n . 9 2

T h e m a i n c h a n n e l f o r this type o f m o b i l i t y as we have seen, was the a r m y . Between 49 a n d 28 B C , 500,000 I t a l i a n males served i n the armies

9 1 T h e cautionary remarks of B r u n t (1971: 159-65) are worth noting; private migration by poor peasants was difficult and hazardous and has often been thoughtlessly exaggerated. But large-scale private migration in agrarian states has sometimes occurred.

9 1 B r u n t (1971: Appendix 15) ascribes less than 100 provincial colonies to Caesar, the triumvirs and Augustus. F. Vittinghoff, Römische Kolonisation und Bürgerrechtspolitik (Wiesbaden, 1951) 148-50 gives 104 colonies.

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T a b l e 1.2. Population changes and migration in Italy0 225-8 B C : some

speculative figures Ç000)

A - Population changes Men, women Adult males and children (aged 17+ years)*

225 BC 28 BC 225 BC 28 BC gain (loss)

Free 4,000 ".350 1,220 (13°) Slave 500 2,OOOD 150 600 450

Total 5.000 6,ooorf I,5O0 1,820 320

B - Rural/Urban* split

R u r a l 4,100 2,900* 1,230 870 (360) free

R u r a l i ,200* 360 slaves

?5°° • ?i5°

360

U r b a n ?5°° 800 • ?i5° 240 . 450

slaves 240

Italian towns 250 / 500* 75 150 75 free

City of Rome 150 6oo> 45 200* free

Total 5,000 6,000 1,500 I,820 320

C - Migration from Italy overseas* - D - Decline of free r u r a l population -Adult males (aged 17+ years) Adult males (aged 17+ years)

Before 69 BC 125 Emigrants overseas, 265 69-49 BC 25 225-28 BC 49-28 BC 165 T o Italian towns 100"

Sub-tota) (net) 265' 315 (gross) Total loss 365 28-8 BC i o o m

E - Growth of Italian towns and City of Rome - Adult males (aged 17+ years)

225-28 BC Rural free to urban 100" Ex-slaves to urban free 130'

Total gain 230

F - R u r a l migration within Italy* - Adult males (aged 17+ years)

Gracchan reforms 133-120 BC 10 Sullan veterans c. 80 BC 80 Pompey's veterans 59 BC 50 Civil wars 41-36 BC 60 Augustan setdement (1) 30-28 BC 57 Augustan settlement (2) 28-8 BC 3

Total 260

T h e solution - mass migration 0 T h i s includes northern Italy (Cisalpine Gaul). b Adult males aged 17+ years are reckoned here as 30% of the total population. I n a stationary,

i.e. self-reproducing, population this implies an average life expectancy at birth of 27 years. T h i s is probably too high. It could also be justified, but only in the short term, by a fall in the birth rate (Brunt 1971: 117); the exclusion of infants aged less than one year from the Roman census-returns would raise the proportion of adult males in the remaining population by less than one per cent. I f the average expectation of life at birth was 25 years in a stationary population, adult males aged 17+ years would be roughly 26% of the total population. These calculations are based on U . N . Model Life Tables (see note 27). T h e number of adult males available in Rome was therefore probably less than the 35% proposed by Brunt (1971: 117).

c I accept Brunt's (1971: 59*121) estimate of the Italian free population of Italy at 3.1 million in 225 BC, plus 1.4 million for Cisalpine Gaul.

d See notes 13 and 14 above; the slave population here includes a full quota of men, women and children, a situation probably not achieved until later. I n the first century BC, at the height of imperial expansion, the ratio of adult males among war captives and in the slave population as a whole must have been abnormally high. I suspect therefore that the figure given here is too high. T h e figure for adult male slaves is better.

« Urban/rural here indicate the type of job-non-agricultural/agricultural, rather than the place of residence. T h u s a peasant living in a town but working in his fields counts as rural. T h e r e were 434 towns in Italy (Beloch 1886: 442).

/ T h e free urban population is reckoned at 9% of the total free population. I n the modern era, the city of Rome achieved a population of 150,000 again only in the seventeenth century, and was then fed primarily from local Italian sources. O n size, see K. J . Beloch, Bevdlkerungsgtschichte Italiens (Berlin, 1937) 13; on feeding Rome, see J , Delumeau, L a vie economique et social* de Rome (Paris, 1959) vol. 2, 52iff.

* T h e rural population in 28 BC is put at 4,100,000 free and slave as against 4,100,000 plus slaves in 225 BC. But note that the cultivated area was appreciably larger in 28 BC thanks to the drainage and clearance of parts of northern Italy.

* T h e total urban population in 28 BC is here arbitrarily estimated at 1.9 million including slaves, that is 32 % of the population of Italy; that is very high for a pre-industrial state, though of course Rome was the capital of the empire, not just of Italy. I assume that the high consumption in Rome produced ancillary urbanisation in Italy; even so the figures here at 0.5 million free urban and 0.5 million slaves (nearly 20% of the population outside Rome) are high.

' T h e number of citizens receiving free wheat under Augustus in 29 BC was 250,000 (Suetonius, Augustus 41) though that may include some boys aged 10+ years, and some men rurally occupied, living near Rome. T h a t said, 200,000 is a low estimate for adult male recipients, which at 30% would imply a total free population of 670,000. T o be on the safe side, I have taken a total free population for the city of Rome as 600,000, which presumably limits the probable number of slaves in Rome to about 300,000-350,000.

* Derived from Brunt (1971: 262-4);tnc figure for Italian emigrants overseas before 49 BC indudes Italians setded in more than a dozen colonies and other less formal settlements (such as that of the colonists at Carthage sent out in 122 BC, and of veterans in Spain); cf. Brunt (1971: 204&.). Brunt almost completely discounts the 'mythical' record that Mithridates in 88BC had 80,000 Italians massacred in Asia Minor; I am convinced that this number is an exaggeration; but B r u n t may also have overstated his case, in his attempt to fit scattered data to the surviving census figures. At least his figures for overseas migration are cautiously low.

' Some of the Italians abroad in 49 BC were caught up in the ensuing civil wars, and were killed or re-entered the setdements made after 49 BC. Brunt constructed the figure of 265,000 to take this into account; it refers to the number of adult male citizens of Italian origin living overseas in 28 BC. However, the total loss of Italian adult males through emigration by 28 BC is estimated at 315,000.

m B r u n t (1971: 264) reckons that the number of legionaries discharged between 28 and 8 BC was 127,000 or more, but thinks that only about 100,000 of these were setded in 42 colonies overseas. T h i s reduction is perhaps large enough to make unnecessary a further reduction to take account of legionaries of non-Italian origin.

" T h e figure for rural-urban migration appears arbitrary at first sight, and of course it is. I t is derived from Brunt's figures, though he may not agree with my conclusion. I n my view, the reduction in rural population was made possible primarily by the transfer of people elsewhere; thus, in this scheme, rural -urban migration (sub-tables D and E: 100,000) plus net rural overseas migration (sub-table c: 265,000) roughly equalled the loss in rural free population (sub-table o: 365,000). O f course, this is much too neat. T h e free rural poor may not have reproduced themselves, though I think that Brunt exaggerates this risk; after all, poverty does not by itself prevent reproduction. It seems plausible that substantial numbers of peasants migrated to Rome and other Italian towns. T h e number given here (100,000) is a crude guess.

P T h i s is also a crude guess. T h e evidence of tombstones suggests that the number of freed slaves was high both in Rome and other Italian towns.

4 These figures for rural migration within Italy relate to state allotments only. I have no idea how many people received Gracchan allotments, but five colonies were established in Italy 128-122 BC, so that the figure given here is minimal. T h e figures for 80-28 BC are taken from Brunt (1971: 342); the figure for 28-8 BC refers to the year 25 BC only; but there were other setdements of soldiers sent to colonies and towns (cf. Augustus, My Achievements 3).

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o f c o m p e t i n g generals i n a series o f c iv i l wars ( B r u n t 1971: 511). V i c t o r i o u s generals, Sulla, Ju l ius Caesar a n d his p o l i t i c a l he irs , A n t o n y a n d A u g u s t u s , a l l raised large armies t o s u p p o r t t h e i r cause. W h e n v i c t o r y came, they sought peace by d i s a r m a m e n t a n d gifts o f l a n d . T h e y h o p e d t h a t i f a n emergency arose, colonies o f t h e i r ex-soldiers w o u l d be a source o f s u p p o r t ( A p p i a n , Civil Wars 1.96; 2.140). F o r this p u r p o s e , o n l y colonies i n I t a l y w o u l d be useful . Between 80 a n d 28 B C , over a q u a r t e r o f a m i l l i o n soldiers ( a n d t h a t is a conservative estimate) were g iven new f a r m s i n I t a l y ( B r u n t 1971: 34).

A t first s ight , i t may seem clear t h a t t h e reset t lement o f so m a n y m e n o n the l a n d e i t h e r increased t h e n u m b e r o f peasants o r at least h e l p e d stem t h e i r dec l ine; t o some e x t e n t , o f course, i t d i d , j u s t as i t h e l p e d p o p u l a t e w h a t were t h e n the less f a v o u r e d parts o f I t a l y . B u t i n m a n y parts o f I t a l y , arable l a n d c o u l d be g i v e n t o p o o r citizens o n l y i f i t was t a k e n f r o m others . O u r evidence also suggests t h a t m a n y o f t h e new settlements were created o n l y at t h e cost o f e v i c t i n g o t h e r smal lholders .* 3 T h e n u m b e r s i n v o l v e d were s i m p l y too large t o be accomm o d a t e d o n vacant l a n d . Even t h e estates o f t h e r i c h w e r e t o o smal l o r scattered f o r a r e g u l a r colony. So large tracts o f l a n d were t a k e n away f r o m towns w h i c h h a d s u p p o r t e d o r even sympathised w i t h the l o s i n g side. Evidence f r o m over a c e n t u r y later shows that , i n some places, successive waves o f colonists r e t a i n e d t h e i r separate i d e n t i t y even w i t h i n a single c o m m u n i t y ; f o r e x a m p l e , i n Arezzo t h e r e w e r e t h r e e g r o u p s , t h e o l d inhabi tants , t h e * f a i t h f u l ' t h a t is Sulla's veterans, a n d t h e Caesarians (Pl iny , Natural History 3.52). I t was also said t h a t some ex-soldiers m a d e b a d f a r m e r s , o r s i m p l y got b a d l a n d (Sallust, Speech of Lepidus 23), o r were d r a f t e d back i n t o t h e a r m y ; i n o t h e r cases, a n e w wave o f v ic tor ious soldiers i n t h e i r t u r n evicted t h e o l d soldiers, o r t h e i r widows a n d sons (D1048.9). Each fresh e x p u l s i o n severed m o r e peasants f r o m t h e l a n d , created f resh reserves f o r t h e armies o f conquest a n d new m i g r a n t s t o I t a l i a n towns. T h e p a i n f u l cycle o f e x p u l s i o n , m i l i t a r y r e c r u i t m e n t , c i v i l w a r a n d t h e rea l locat ion o f l a n d achieved l i t t l e except to m a k e a d i f f e r e n t set o f p o o r peasants landless.

A m o n g t h e el i te , a n equal ly vicious circle o p e r a t e d . As we have seen, t h e R o m a n r i c h w a n t e d t o invest a large p a r t o f t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l p r o f i t s i n I t a l i a n l a n d ; t h e estates o f o t h e r r i c h m e n w e r e obvious targets f o r t h e i r g r e e d , prev ious ly , t h e R o m a n s h a d achieved a p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n w h i c h m e n i n the c i ty w e n t u n a r m e d ; t h e toga was a s y m b o l o f t h a t

w My discussion here is the briefest synopsis of B r u n t (1971: 30off.). Some of those resettled in Italy might have been evicted later, then re-enlisted in the army and then setded in colonies overseas. I think the element of double-counting is small and covered by Brunt's scaling down of ancient estimates.

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a c h i e v e m e n t . 9 4 I n t h e last decades o f t h e Republ ic , social c o n t r o l o f p r i v a t e violence b r o k e d o w n , so t h a t i n b o t h t o w n a n d c o u n t r y , rich m e n k e p t bands o f a r m e d slaves t o p r o t e c t t h e i r p r o p e r t y ; some, i f occasion of fered , used t h e m t o seize t h e p r o p e r t y o f others . T h r e e cases o f v i o l e n t seizure o f estates survive i n t h e speeches o f Cicero; t h e f requency o f violence is also ref lected i n t h e f o r m u l a s o f legal i n j u n c t i o n (interdictd) w h i c h o r d e r e d t h e r e s t i t u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y ; t w o o f the f o u r c o m m o n l y - u s e d f o r m u l a s envisaged violence o r a r m e d violence as t h e m e t h o d w h i c h h a d been used t o g a i n possession o f l a n d u n j u s t l y . 9 5

T h i s p r i v a t e violence pales i n t o insignif icance w h e n c o m p a r e d t o the violence w h i c h p e r v a d e d t h e t w o m a i n per iods o f c i v i l w a r (90-80 B C ; 49-31 B C ) . M u r d e r by decree (proscr ipt ions) a n d confiscation o f p r o p e r t y h i t t h e r i c h i n p a r t i c u l a r , p a r t l y because they h a d been pol i t ica l ly p r o m i n e n t , a n d p a r t l y because they were rich. T h e victors needed t o raise m o n e y f r o m t h e sale o f t h e i r estates o r w a n t e d to r e w a r d t h e i r fo l lowers by l e t t i n g t h e m b u y estates at k n o c k d o w n prices. O n e o f Sulla* ex-slaves, f o r e x a m p l e , is said t o have b o u g h t estates v a l u e d at six m i l l i o n H S f o r o n l y t w o t h o u s a n d H S (Cicero, I n Defence of Roscius of Anuria 6); Crassus b u i l t his f o r t u n e o n t h e m i s f o r t u n e s o f t h e p r o s c r i b e d . Sulla i n t h e e n d is said t o have k i l l e d o r banished 105 senators a n d 2,600 k n i g h t s ( A p p i a n , Civil Wars 1.103). T h e i r p r o p e r t y was u p f o r grabs. A l t o g e t h e r i t m u s t have a m o u n t e d to a sizeable p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e to ta l w e a l t h o w n e d by t h e el i te. V e r y l i t d e o f i t was used t o p r o v i d e lands f o r t h e p o o r . Part o f i t m e r e l y q u a l i f i e d a new set o f m e n f o r m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e el ite - a change o f p e r s o n n e l b u t n o t o f s t r u c t u r e . B u t p a r t o f i t m a d e possible a s ignif icant change i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w e a l t h : t h e s u r v i v i n g r i c h became i m m e n s e l y richer. T h e y i n t h e i r t u r n raised t h e level o f c o m p e t i t i v e e x p e n d i t u r e at R o m e a n d o f e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t h e provinces, a n d so k e p t t h e vicious circle t u r n i n g . T h e j u n t a f o r m e d i n 43 B C a f ter t h e assassination o f Caesar h a d 300 senators, a b o u t a t h i r d o f t h e senate at t h a t t i m e , a n d 2,000 k n i g h t s p r o s c r i b e d a n d p r o b a b l y executed; t h e i r p r o p e r t y was confiscated. I n t h e c i v i l wars w h i c h f o l l o w e d yet m o r e

9 4 T h e R o m a n general going out to war ceremoniously put on military clothes (pal-udamentum) and could re-enter the city as a soldier accompanied by his armed troops only if he was awarded a triumph by the senate. Romanists who take this level of political culture for granted will see from B . Cellini's Autobiography, for example, how difficult it was to re-establish after the Middle Ages. At least, in Rome, Cicero tried to get redress for his clients in court.

* Cicero, Pro Quinctio, Tullio and Caecina, and cf. also Pro Cluentio 161; Pro Vareno frag. 5; on restitutory injunctions (e.g. si quis.. .ex possessione vi eiectus sit) see A . H . J . Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero*s Time (Oxford, 1901) 21 off.; and Jolowicz (1972: 259ff.).

7*


senators a n d k n i g h t s w e r e k i l l e d ; t h e i r deaths m a d e a nove l p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n easier.

T h e i m p o s i t i o n o f a m o n a r c h y by t h e v ic tor ious genera l Octav ian (Augustus) radical ly c h a n g e d t h e t e r m s o f c o m p e t i t i o n between aristocrats. Pr ivate violence, e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t h e provinces a n d recourse t o t h e a r m y as t h e decisive w e a p o n i n po l i t i ca l struggles were severely res tr ic ted . T h e r e w e r e n o m o r e c i v i l wars f o r a c e n t u r y .

F o r t h e m o m e n t I w a n t t o concentrate o n w h a t can be seen as t h e economic u n d e r p i n n i n g o f t h e A u g u s t a n sett lement, a factor w h i c h is usual ly i g n o r e d . Augustus* p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n was r e n d e r e d viable, as I see i t , by t h e c u m u l a t i v e effects o f r e d u c i n g t h e pressure o n I t a l i a n l a n d . O f course, this was a necessary n o t a sufficient c o n d i t i o n . I t was achieved p a r t l y by large-scale, state-assisted m i g r a t i o n overseas ( T a b l e 1.2c); p a r t l y by r u r a l - u r b a n m i g r a t i o n ( T a b l e 1 . 2 E ) ; a n d p a r t l y t h r o u g h t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f a n e m p i r e - w i d e e c o n o m y w h i c h encouraged t h e richest R o m a n s t o o w n estates outs ide I t a l y .

T h e mass m o v e m e n t o f m e n overseas was s tar ted b y Jul ius Caesar, b u t as i n so m a n y o t h e r t h i n g s i t was A u g u s t u s w h o f o l l o w e d his plans t h r o u g h effectively. B o t h policies seem t o have been d e t e r m i n e d by i m m e d i a t e factors: f o r e x a m p l e , by t h e press ing need t o ease tens ion a f ter a c i v i l w a r by d i s b a n d i n g t r o o p s , a n d t o p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h a l ternat ive means o f s u p p o r t . T r a d i t i o n a l l y s u p p o r t f o r veterans i n v o l v e d t h e acquis i t ion o f I t a l i a n l a n d , b u t t h a t was expensive, po l i t i ca l ly a n d financially. Seizing t h e l a n d , as t h e t r i u m v i r s ( i n c l u d i n g Octavian) d i d i n 41 B C , created u n r e s t ; b u y i n g i t , as A u g u s t u s d i d a f ter 31 B C (My Achievements 16), cost 600 m i l l i o n H S , r o u g h l y equal t o twice t h e a n n u a l cost o f m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i m p e r i a l a r m y .

P r o v i n c i a l l a n d was cheaper; m o r e o v e r , i t b e l o n g e d t o subjects; a n d t h e r e was t h e a d d e d advantage t o t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t o f h a v i n g R o m a n veterans setded a m o n g t h e c o n q u e r e d . B u t t h e r e was n o t r a d i t i o n o f overseas co lonisat ion. I t m u s t have seemed a r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n n o v a t i o n . T h e first p r o p o s a l h a d been m a d e by Gaius Gracchus i n 123 B C ; u n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r his e x p e r i m e n t , he chose t h e o l d site o f C a r t h a g e f o r his n e w co lony , w h i c h a d d e d superst i t ious fears a b o u t t h e r e b i r t h o f a n e n e m y t o t h e e x i s t i n g po l i t i ca l o p p o s i t i o n ; wolves w e r e said t o have t o r n u p t h e n e w b o u n d a r y stones o v e r n i g h t , a n d t h e plans w e r e le f t u n c o m p l e t e d ( P l u t a r c h , Gains Gracchus*)). I n t h e n e x t seventy years, o n l y five colonies w e r e f o u n d e d overseas; we k n o w l i t d e a b o u t t h e m . W h e n he was d i c t a t o r i n 45 B C , J u l i u s Caesar was t h e first t o organise colonies overseas o n a g r a n d scale; his dec lared pol icy at h o m e o f n o - v i c t i m i s a t i o n against his enemies (dementia) a n d his slogans: * S e c u r i t y ' a n d 'Peace' (quies, pax, solus) w e r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h large-scale resetdement w i t h i n I t a l y - a l t h o u g h his o t h e r slogans 'Peace i n

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t h e Provinces ' a n d 'Safety i n t h e E m p i r e ' (Caesar, Civil Wars 3.57) m i g h t have l i m i t e d his acdons i n t h e provinces as w e l l . Besides, t h e m a i n objects o f his m i g r a t i o n pol icy w e r e citizens l i v i n g i n R o m e ; they were expensive t o feed, a noticeable b u r d e n o n t h e state b u d g e t , a n d they h a d less p o w e r t h a n veterans t o resist t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .

W h a t e v e r t h e i n t e n t i o n s o r d e t e r m i n a n t s o f t h e pol icy , o n e o f t h e f u n c t i o n s o f overseas settlements was t h a t i t s ignif icantly r e d u c e d t h e n u m b e r o f free I ta l ians (by 165,000 = 13% i n 17 years, 45-28 B C ) , w h o m i g h t leg i t imate ly c l a i m a . r i g h t t o e a r n t h e i r l i v i n g f r o m I t a l i a n l a n d . T h e f u r t h e r r e c r u i t m e n t o f I t a l i a n soldiers f o r i m p e r i a l armies a n d t h e setdement o f 100,000 o f t h e m i n t h e provinces d u r i n g t h e n e x t t w e n t y years (28-8 B C ; c. 9 % o f I t a l i a n a d u l t males) served t h e same f u n c t i o n . I n d e e d , m i l i t a r y service by I ta l ians was m a i n t a i n e d at such a h i g h level t h a t i t inevitably l e d t o a shortage o f y o u n g I t a l i a n males, a n d i n d u c e d t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t t o r e c r u i t provincia ls instead. T h e e m i g r a t i o n o f p o o r peasants f r o m I t a l y n o t o n l y r e d u c e d t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f u n w e l c o m e p o l i t i c a l pressure f r o m below, b u t also m a d e m o r e I t a l i a n l a n d available f o r o c c u p a t i o n by t h e rich.

T h e m i g r a t i o n o f peasants t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e served a s i m i l a r f u n c t i o n , a n d b r o u g h t even m o r e benef i t t o t h e R o m a n rich. I a m n o t r e f e r r i n g h e r e t o t h e fact t h a t t h e R o m a n rich d e p e n d e d f o r t h e i r increased w e a l t h u p o n t h e increased p u r c h a s i n g capacity o f I t a l i a n t o w n s m e n i n o r d e r t o d e r i v e prof i t s f r o m t h e i r f a r m s . M y a r g u m e n t h e r e is d i f f e r e n t a n d deserves some e l a b o r a t i o n . I n a n e f f o r t to secure t h e e lectoral a n d legislative s u p p o r t o f t h e plebs, Gaius Gracchus i n 123 B C h a d passed a law p r o v i d i n g citizens l i v i n g i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e w i t h a m o n t h l y al lowance o f wheat at a stable, state-subsidised pr ice . T h e al lowance r e m a i n e d fixed at m o r e t h a n e n o u g h f o r a m a n , n o t e n o u g h f o r a f a m i l y (five modii = 33 k g ) . T h e g r o w t h i n the city's p o p u l a t i o n m u s t have increased t h e average pr ice o f wheat , t o say n o t h i n g o f t h e f luctuat ions caused by t h e po l i t i ca l crises w h i c h affected supplies. So Gracchus* scheme was p r o b a b l y very h e l p f u l as w e l l as p o p u l a r , t h o u g h i t m u s t have e n c o u r a g e d m o r e peasants t o m i g r a t e t o t h e c i ty . B u t its part i san o r i g i n s gave i t a b u m p y ride i n t h e post-Gracchan p e r i o d ; i t became a p o l i t i c a l shutt lecock, rejected by conservatives, p r o m o t e d b y demagogues; t h e scale a n d cost o f t h e scheme v a r i e d . B u t f r o m 58 B C o n w a r d s , wheat was a p p a r e n d y g iven free o f charge t o a l l citizens l i v i n g i n t h e city o f R o m e . T h e n u m b e r o f recipients rose t o 320,000 by 46 B C ; Jul ius Caesar c u t t h e figure drast ical ly t o 150,000, b u t i t rose again t o 250,000 by 29 B C .

O n e o f t h e f u n c t i o n s o f wheat d i s t r i b u t i o n s was t o u n d e r w r i t e t h e p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r o f Italy 's largest m a r k e t f o r f o o d . T h e rich were rich largely by v i r t u e o f se l l ing t h e s u r p l u s p r o d u c e o f t h e i r f a r m s .

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T h e p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t m u s t o f t e n have been i n d o u b t W h a t bet ter way o f g u a r a n t e e i n g sales t h a n t o a r r a n g e purchase by the state instead o f by the consumers? C o n t e m p o r a r y leaders m a y n o t have seen t h e economic advantages o f wheat doles f o r t h e i r o w n s t r a t u m ; they may n o t have seen t h e l o n g - t e r m e c o n o m i c advantages o f e m i g r a t i o n overseas. W e d o n o t k n o w . E v e n i f they d i d , o t h e r considerat ions , f o r e x a m p l e t h e heavy cost t o t h e treasury o f gifts o f wheat , o r t h e p o w e r o f t h e soldiers o n occasion o u t w e i g h e d t h e m . B u t i t is m o r e l i k e l y that they saw t h e wheat-dole as a po l i t i ca l o r m o r a l issue; a way o f k e e p i n g t h e plebs q u i e t , w h i c h h a d its o r i g i n i n a par t i san a t t e m p t t o b r i b e t h e plebs w i t h state resources, b u t w h i c h h a d u n f o r t u n a t e l y become a t r a d i t i o n a l r i g h t . T h e senatoria l h i s t o r i a n T a c i t u s later d u b b e d i t a s y m p t o m o f t h e m o r a l d e g r a d a t i o n o f t h e R o m a n plebs, m a r k i n g t h e i r dec l ine f r o m i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d v i g o u r ; a l l they w a n t e d was ' b r e a d a n d circuses'. T h i s t o o has been t h e keynote o f its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by m o d e r n histor ians . B u t the m o r a l decadence o f t h e p o o r was c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p r o f i t by t h e r i c h ; t h e m o r a l a n d t h e f u n c t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are c o m p l e m e n t a r y , n o t c o m p e t i n g .

I t c o u l d be a r g u e d t h a t most wheat g iven t o t h e p o o r came f r o m a b r o a d i n t h e f o r m o f taxes; even so, t h e s u p p l y o f f ree wheat enabled p o o r citizens t o spend t h e m o n e y w h i c h they w o u l d have spent o n wheat o n e x t r a f o o d instead. W e k n o w t h a t t h e u r b a n p o o r i n u n d e r d e v e l o p e d economies today have a h i g h p r o p e n s i t y t o s p e n d e x t r a m o n e y o n f o o d . I suggest t h a t t h e R o m a n p o o r spent t h e m o n e y released by gi f ts o f wheat o n w i n e a n d ol ive o i l p r o d u c e d o n t h e estates o f t h e r i c h . T h e f u n c t i o n , t h e u n i n t e n d e d consequence, o f g i v i n g wheat free t o t h e plebs was a n increase i n p r o s p e r i t y f o r r i c h l a n d o w n e r s .

S T R U C T U R A L D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N A N D T H E W I D E R

I M P L I C A T I O N S O F C H A N G E : T H E A R M Y , E D U C A T I O N

A N D T H E L A W

U p t o n o w we have deal t w i t h changes i n the R o m a n pol i t i ca l e c o n o m y i n t e r m s o f the i n t e r a c d o n o f seven factors, set o u t i n t h e schema o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . T h i s p r o v i d e d us w i t h o n e perspective o n a nexus o f events. I t may be use fu l t o f i n i s h this c h a p t e r b y l o o k i n g once m o r e at t h e same events a n d t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s b u t f r o m a d i f f e r e n t perspective, by u s i n g t h e concept s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . 9 6 T h i s

·· I n using the concept * structural differentiation' I do not imply a necessary evolution in one direction. T h e concept is used retrospectively a n d analytically: this is how I perceive what happened, rather than as a total explanation: this is how it had to happen. F o r sophisticated elaboration, see T . Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. , 1966) 2iff. and Eisenstadt (1971). Cf. note 15 above.

Structural differentiation

concept impl ies that as societies become m o r e c o m p l e x , some i n s t i t u t i o n s separate o u t a n d become m o r e f u n c t i o n a l l y specific; these newly e m e r g e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s ( f o r e x a m p l e , a professional a r m y ) t h e n establish t h e i r i d e n t i t y by d e v e l o p i n g n o r m s a n d values specific to t h e i n s t i t u t i o n (such as rules o f c o n d u c t specific t o soldiers, even a * m i l i t a r y ' l aw) ; t h e i r m e m b e r s c o m p e t e w i t h o t h e r social g r o u p s f o r resources ( f o r e x a m p l e , by c l a i m i n g reset t lement f a r m s f o r veterans), a n d they even chal lenge t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t f o r h i g h e r rewards (as i n c i v i l w a r ) .

A t this p o i n t we come u p against a p r o b l e m . Idea l ly , t h e a r g u m e n t s h o u l d advance o n t w o f r o n t s at t h e same t i m e , t h e conceptual a n d t h e e m p i r i c a l ; b u t that is d i f f i c u l t . T h e r e f o r e , I shall b e g i n by e x a m i n i n g t h r e e i m p o r t a n t R o m a n i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e a r m y , e d u c a t i o n a n d the law, i n o r d e r t o i l lustrate s imilar i t ies i n t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t . T h i s involves m a k i n g forays i n t o new t e r r i t o r y at t h e e n d o f a l o n g chapter , b u t we can deal w i t h t h e a r m y b r i e f l y since several changes i n m i l i t a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n have a lready been discussed, a n d we can m a k e some economies i n o u r discussion o f e d u c a t i o n a n d law by c o m p a r i n g t h e i r state at the b e g i n n i n g a n d e n d o f t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l expans ion. T h i s c r u d e j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f extremes h a r d l y does just ice t o t h e i r h is tory , b u t i t serves t o h i g h l i g h t some o f t h e changes w h i c h o c c u r r e d . T h e n finally, we can r e t u r n t o t h e concept s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , l o o k i n g back t o t h e descr ipt ions f o r e m p i r i c a l i l lus trat ions .

T h e R o m a n a r m y was o r i g i n a l l y e m b e d d e d i n the peasantry; l a n d o w n i n g c i t izen peasants w h o p r o v i d e d t h e i r o w n a r m o u r served as soldiers a n d at t h e e n d o f a season's fighting r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r f a r m s ; d a i l y pay p r o v i d e d sustenance a n d c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r absence f r o m t h e i r l a n d . 9 7 B y t h e e n d o f t h e last c e n t u r y B C , c i t izenship b u t n o t l a n d - o w n e r s h i p was prerequis i te f o r service i n t h e legions; soldiers served f o r a s t a n d a r d p e r i o d o f t w e n t y years, usual ly outs ide I t a l y . As a re f lec t ion o f t h e soldiers' l o n g service, they were p a i d o n l y t h r e e t imes a year, a n d at a rate w h i c h r o u g h l y equal led twice t h e level o f m i n i m u m substistence f o r a peasant f a m i l y . A n d o n r e t i r e m e n t , legionaries received a resett lement b o u n t y w h i c h equal led m o r e t h a n t h i r t e e n years' pay. S o l d i e r i n g h a d thus become a p r i v i l e g e d o c c u p a t i o n , p a i d f o r i n taxes by c o n q u e r e d provinc ia ls . T h e a r m y h a d become f u l l y professional . I t h a d been t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m a se l f -armed c i t izen m i l i t i a i n t o a n i n s t r u m e n t o f i m p e r i a l c o n t r o l a n d defence, isolated by distance f r o m t h e c e n t r a l po l i t i ca l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e a n d d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e r e g u l a r d e l i v e r y o f m o n e y taxes. I ts existence t h u s d e p e n d e d u p o n o t h e r changes i n t h e p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y o f t h e e m p i r e .

* 7 See Gabba (1976) and Smith (1958).

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Secondly, e d u c a t i o n . 9 8 T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f e d u c a t i o n f o r o u r present a r g u m e n t lies n o t o n l y i n t h e s imi lar i t ies between its d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h e changes i n t h e a r m y , b u t also i n t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n w h i c h e d u c a t i o n m a d e t o t h e coherence o f t h e el i te i n a r a p i d l y g r o w i n g social system. O r i g i n a l l y a n d ideal ly , R o m a n boys l e a r n t w h a t they needed t o k n o w at h o m e a n d i n m i l i t a r y service. T h e e l d e r C a t o (consul 195 B C ) , f o r e x a m p l e , w h o was a d e v o t e d t r a d i t i o n a l i s t t a u g h t his son h imse l f ; he t a u g h t h i m t o r e a d a n d t o w r i t e ; he t a u g h t h i m law a n d physical prowess: t h r o w i n g t h e spear, f i g h t i n g , riding, b o x i n g a n d s w i m m i n g . H e said t h a t he d i d n o t w a n t a slave p u l l i n g his son by t h e ear f o r e r r o r s , n o r w o u l d he have his c h i l d owe g r a t i t u d e t o a slave f o r a g i f t so valuable as l e a r n i n g ( P l u t a r c h , Coto the Elder 20). B u t even i n t h a t p e r i o d , he was a p p a r e n d y a n e x c e p t i o n ; l e a d i n g R o m a n s usual ly h a d t h e i r y o u n g c h i l d r e n , b o t h boys a n d g i r l s , t u t o r e d at h o m e by G r e e k slaves o r sent t o school. A c c o r d i n g t o P l u t a r c h (Roman Questions 2 7 8 E ) , t h e first fee-paying p r i m a r y school was set u p i n t h e city o f R o m e i n t h e second h a l f o f t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y &c by a G r e e k ex-slave; b u t m o d e r n scholars have most ly d o u b t e d t h a t f o r m a l g r o u p t e a c h i n g i n basic w r i t i n g c o u l d have s tarted i n R o m e so late.

T h e b e g i n n i n g o f secondary e d u c a t i o n at R o m e , t h a t is e d u c a t i o n i n G r e e k a n d L a t i n language a n d l i t e r a t u r e (grammatike), d a t e d f r o m t h e m i d d l e o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C , w h e n a G r e e k o n a n embassy t o t h e R o m a n senate f e l l d o w n a n d b r o k e his leg , a n d d u r i n g his convalescence gave n u m e r o u s a n d s t a r d i n g l y p o p u l a r lectures (Suet o n i u s , On Grammarians 2). B e f o r e t h e n , aga in a c c o r d i n g t o Suetonius (ibid. 1), t h e R o m a n s w e r e t o o unc iv i l i sed a n d b e l l i g e r e n t t o spare t i m e f o r scholarship. B u t i t is also possible t o date these b e g i n n i n g s ear l ier t o t h e w o r k o f L i v i u s A n d r o n i c u s , w h o was b r o u g h t t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e as a p r i s o n e r o f w a r f r o m a G r e e k t o w n i n s o u t h e r n I t a l y towards t h e m i d d l e o f t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y B C . H e t a u g h t G r e e k l i t e r a t u r e a n d also w r o t e L a t i n plays a n d poems; his t r a n s l a t i o n o f H o m e r ' s Odyssey

m a r k e d t h e b e g i n n i n g o f L a t i n l i t e r a t u r e as we k n o w i t , a n d i t was f o r centuries used as a school text-book.

Exact dates f o r t h e start o f c o m p l e x changes have a n e l e m e n t o f fiction i n t h e m . W h a t matters f o r o u r present purposes is t h a t i n t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n , L a t i n h i g h c u l t u r e was created i n t h e i m a g e o f G r e e k models . A s H o r a c e w r o t e : ' C a p t i v e Greece overcame h e r b a r b a r o u s c o n q u e r o r a n d b r o u g h t c iv i l i sat ion t o w i l d Latins*

n I follow here the excellent book by H . I . Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity ( L o n d o n , 1956) (there is a sixth F r e n c h edition published in Paris, 1964); see also, A . G w y n n , Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian (Oxford, 1926); M. L . Clarke, Rhetoric at Rome ( L o n d o n , 1953) and Higher Education in the Ancient World ( L o n d o n , 1971).

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(Epistles 2.1.156). As p a r t o f this process o f c u l t u r a l change, the R o m a n el i te l e a r n t t h e G r e e k language a n d G r e e k l i t e r a t u r e , as w e l l as w h a t t h e r e was o f L a t i n l i t e r a t u r e . T h e i r c h i l d r e n a t t e n d e d secondary school f r o m t h e age o f a b o u t twelve to f i f teen . E d u c a t e d R o m a n s were expected t o be p r o f i c i e n t i n G r e e k as w e l l as L a t i n . Some R o m a n magistrates d e l i v e r e d elegant speeches i n G r e e k t o c o n q u e r e d p r o vincials; some even w r o t e R o m a n histories i n Greek. T h e c u l t o f H e l l e n i s m h a d its fatuit ies , b u t i t also i n d u e course fostered t h e g r o w t h o f L a t i n d r a m a , p o e t r y , h i s t o r y , p h i l o s o p h y a n d r h e t o r i c . " A n idea o f scale may be h e l p f u l ; a c c o r d i n g t o Suetonius, t h e r e were m o r e t h a n t w e n t y flourishing g r a m m a r schools i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e t o w a r d s t h e e n d o f t h e Republ ic (On Grammarians 3). W e can speculate: i f each o f t h e t w e n t y schools g r a d u a t e d o n l y t e n students aged fifteen each year, a n d t h a t is a modest a s s u m p t i o n f o r a flourishing school, t h e n at any o n e t i m e t h e r e w e r e a b o u t seven t h o u s a n d a d u l t Romans , w h o h a d been educated i n t h e city o f R o m e . D o u b l e o r q u a d r u p l e t h e n u m b e r (it can o n l y be a very r o u g h figure, since t h e base n u m b e r g i v e n by Suetonius may n o t be t r u s t w o r t h y ) , a n d t h e n u m b e r o f educated adul ts r e m a i n s a smal l p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e t o t a l l i v i n g i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e .

R o m a n e d u c a t i o n also h a d a t h i r d stage, w h i c h these few R o m a n boys e n t e r e d w h e n they were a b o u t sixteen years o f age a n d h a d assumed a d u l t dress ( the toga virilis). T h e m a i n subject was r h e t o r i c , w h i c h was also G r e e k i n o r i g i n . T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f f o r m a l t e a c h i n g i n r h e t o r i c , first i n Greek a n d t h e n i n L a t i n , aroused considerable o p p o s i t i o n . C o n v e n t i o n a l R o m a n s a p p a r e n d y t h o u g h t t h a t f o r m a l r h e t o r i c a l sk i l l was a waste o f t i m e , a t r i c k y way o f m a k i n g shallow a r g u m e n t s s o u n d plausible. ' K e e p t o t h e subject ' , said C a t o , 4 a n d t h e w o r d s w i l l f o l l o w ' (Cato, e d . H . J o r d a n ( L e i p z i g , i860) 80). T h a t was t h e t r a d i t i o n o f rea l Romans; a n d Cato was n o t a lone i n his o p i n i o n . I n 161 B C , t h e R o m a n senate passed a decree o r d e r i n g t h a t phi losop h e r s a n d teachers o f r h e t o r i c s h o u l d be e x p e l l e d f r o m t h e c i ty o f R o m e .

Fashion p r e v a i l e d over law. Six years later , t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e d p h i l o s o p h e r Carneades, f o u n d e r o f t h e n e w A c a d e m y at A t h e n s , came w i t h

·· Polybius (39.1) recounts with scorn the activities of A . Postumius Albinus, consul of 151 BC, who was a fervent admirer of Greek culture, and by his extravagances brought admiradon for Greek culture into disrepute * among the older and most distinguished of the Romans*. H e even wrote a poem a n d a history in Greek, and in the preface asked his readers to excuse his mistakes, since he did not have a complete mastery of the language. Cato ridiculed him for this and said it was like a man who put his name down for a boxing contest, and then when the time came for the fight, excused himself to the spectators because he could not bear being hit.

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o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s o n a n embassy t o R o m e . P l u t a r c h has le f t a l ively p i c t u r e o f t h e i m p a c t w h i c h t h e l e a r n e d G r e e k delegates m a d e :

. . . a l l t h e y o u n g R o m a n s w h o h a d a n y taste f o r l i t e r a t u r e h u r r i e d to f r e q u e n t t h e i r c o m p a n y a n d l i s t e n e d to t h e m w i t h d e l i g h t a n d w o n d e r . A b o v e a l l t h e y w e r e s p e l l b o u n d by t h e g r a c e a n d c h a r m w i t h w h i c h C a r n e a d e s e x p r e s s e d h i m s e l f . . . H i s d i s c o u r s e s a t t r a c t e d l a r g e a n d a d m i r i n g a u d i e n c e s . . . T h e r e p o r t s p r e a d t h a t a G r e e k o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y talents h a d a r r i v e d , w h o c o u l d s u b d u e a l l o p p o s i t i o n b e n e a t h t h e s p e l l o f h i s e l o q u e n c e , a n d w h o h a d so b e w i t c h e d a l l t h e y o u t h o f t h e city that t h e y s e e m e d to h a v e a b a n d o n e d a l l t h e i r o t h e r p l e a s u r e s a n d p u r s u i t s a n d to h a v e r u n m a d after p h i l o s o p h y . M o s t o f t h e R o m a n s w e r e g r a t i f i e d by this , a n d w e r e w e l l c o n t e n t to see t h e i r s o n s e m b r a c e G r e e k c u l t u r e . . . B u t C a t o . . . w a s d e e p l y d i s t u r b e d . H e w a s a f r a i d that t h e y o u n g e r g e n e r a t i o n m i g h t a l l o w t h e i r a m b i t i o n s to b e d i v e r t e d i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , a n d m i g h t c o m e to v a l u e m o s t h i g h l y a r e p u t a t i o n that w a s b a s e d o n feats o f o r a t o r y r a t h e r t h a n u p o n feats o f a r m s . ( P l u t a r c h , Cato the Elder 22 t r a n s l a t e d by I . S c o t t - K i l v e r t , P e n g u i n B o o k s )

R h e t o r i c was b a n n e d again i n 92 B C , t h a t is j u s t a f ter i t was f irst t a u g h t p u b l i c l y i n L a t i n i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e (Suetonius, On Rhetoricians 2). T h e censors' edict was a d a m a n t l y conservative:

I t h a s b e e n r e p o r t e d to u s that t h e r e a r e m e n w h o h a v e i n t r o d u c e d a n e w f o r m o f t e a c h i n g , a n d that o u r y o u t h is f r e q u e n t i n g t h e i r s c h o o l s ; that t h e s e m e n h a v e a s s u m e d t h e t ide o f L a t i n r h e t o r i c i a n s , a n d that o u r y o u n g m e n i d l e w h o l e d a y s t h e r e .

O u r f o r e f a t h e r s i n s t i t u t e d w h a t t h e y w i s h e d t h e i r c h i l d r e n to l e a r n a n d t h e s c h o o l s to w h i c h t h e y s h o u l d go. T h e s e i n n o v a t i o n s , w h i c h r u n c o u n t e r to t h e c u s t o m s a n d t r a d i t i o n s o f o u r a n c e s t o r s , n e i t h e r p l e a s e u s , n o r d o t h e y s e e m p r o p e r .

T h e r e f o r e it s e e m s to b e o u r d u t y to m a k e o u r o p i n i o n k n o w n b o t h to t h o s e w h o h a v e t h e s c h o o l s a n d t h o s e w h o h a v e b e c o m e a c c u s t o m e d to a t t e n d i n g t h e m . W e d o n o t a p p r o v e . ( S u e t o n i u s , On Rhetoricians 1)

Repression f a i l e d ; r h e t o r i c flourished. Rhetor ic ians deve loped c o m p l icated rules o n r h y t h m , o n style, o n t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f a r g u m e n t s ; they t a u g h t advocates h o w t o p l e a d i n c o u r t , a n d w o u l d - b e pol i t ic ians h o w t o sway t h e electorate; a l l were t a u g h t h o w t o expat iate o n m o r a l p r o b l e m s , a n d h o w t o eulogise t h e d e a d . Each b r a n c h o f o r a t o r y h a d its p r o p e r n a m e : ' j u d i c i a l , de l iberat ive , d e m o n s t r a t i v e ' ; f u r t h e r complex i t ies f o l l o w e d : ' A legal issue is d i v i d e d i n t o six sub-types: L e t t e r a n d S p i r i t , C o n f l i c t i n g Laws, A m b i g u i t y , D e f i n i t i o n , T r a n s ference a n d Syllogism* (?Cicero, Ad Herennium 19, cf. 2). A l l these categories were b o r r o w e d f r o m the G r e e k a n d so lemnly t rans lated i n t o L a t i n . T h u s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n e d u c a t i o n b r e d a special language ( the p h e n o m e n o n is n o t pecul iar t o sociology), by w h i c h cognoscenti

d i s t i n g u i s h e d themselves f r o m , a n d i n t h e i r o w n o p i n i o n elevated themselves above outs iders .

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T h e assimilat ion o f a n e w profess ion b r o u g h t w i t h i t p r o b l e m s o f relat ivit ies i n status a n d pay. I n the late E m p i r e , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e E d i c t o n M a x i m u m Prices ( A D 301), r h e t o r i c i a n s were p a i d five t imes, g r a m m a r i a n s f o u r t imes as m u c h as p r i m a r y school teachers. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e evidence f r o m ear l ier p e r i o d s is patchy. B u t c learly some g r a m m a r i a n s fe tched fancy prices; o n e was b o u g h t as a slave f o r 700,000 H S ; a n o t h e r was said to have m a d e 400,000 H S p e r year f r o m his school; a n d a n o t h e r was chosen by t h e e m p e r o r A u g u s t u s t o be t h e t u t o r o f his g r a n d s o n ; he was m o v e d w i t h his w h o l e school t o t h e i m p e r i a l palace a n d was p a i d a n a n n u a l salary o f 100,000 H S , w h i c h was r o u g h l y equal t o 200 t imes t h e level o f m i n i m u m subsistence o f a peasant f a m i l y (Suetonius, On Grammarians 3, 17 a n d 23). T h a t t o o was t h e r e g u l a r salary p a i d t o professors o f r h e t o r i c w h o h e l d state chairs i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e - they w e r e f o u n d e d i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e first c e n t u r y A D , b u t t h e r e w e r e n o n e f o r language a n d l i t e r a t u r e . I n any case, a l l such m e n w e r e e x c e p t i o n a l ; t h a t is w h y we k n o w a b o u t t h e m . Even so, they reflect t h e h i g h value p u t u p o n l e a r n i n g by i n f l u e n t i a l m e m b e r s o f t h e el i te.

M a n y teachers o f r h e t o r i c a n d l i t e r a t u r e w e r e Greeks, even slaves b y o r i g i n . T h e i r social acceptabil i ty is t h e r e f o r e s u r p r i s i n g . A c c o r d i n g t o Suetonius, some r h e t o r i a n s w e r e so w e l l received i n R o m e t h a t some advanced t o senatorial d i g n i t y a n d t o t h e highest magistracies ( O n Rhetoricians 1), b u t he c i ted n o examples. H o w e v e r , i t seems p r o b a b l e t h a t t e a c h i n g was a c h a n n e l o f social m o b i l i t y ; i t was also a n i n s t r u m e n t f o r t h e socialisation o f aristocrats. R o m a n aristocrats w a n t e d t o be l i t t e r a t e u r s ; t h e r e f o r e e x p e r t l i t t e r a t e u r s h a d a c r e d i t w i t h aristocrats by w h i c h they c o u l d advance t h e i r o w n status. T h i s m o v e m e n t affected b o t h teachers a n d p u p i l s . A m o n g t h e u p p e r classes i n R o m e , as i n t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n a a n d Japan, i n f o r m a l c o m p e t i t i o n f o r status o f t e n t o o k t h e f o r m o f p e p p e r i n g conversat ion o r correspondence w i t h l i t e r a r y al lusions, p h i l o l o g i c a l niceties a n d r h e t o r i c a l flourishes.100

E d u c a t i o n was t o t h e c u l t u r a l e c o n o m y w h a t m o n e y was t o t h e m o n e t a r y e c o n o m y , a lingua franca by w h i c h elites o f var ious sub-cultures c o u l d be assimilated a n d fused.

T h i s f u n c t i o n a l ' e x p l a n a t i o n ' o f c u l t u r a l change is n o t sufficient by itself; b u t i t supplements t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l d i f fus ionist view t h a t t h e R o m a n el i te s i m p l y i m i t a t e d a n d assimilated G r e e k c u l t u r e . I n short , n e i t h e r v iew is c o m p l e t e l y satisfactory; yet whatever its cause, t h e result

1 0 0 T h i s is as evident in the Greek allusions in Cicero as in the scholastic discussions of Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights) and of Fronto, the tutor of the emperor Marcus Aurelius. F o r similar conventions, see The Tales of Genji by the Lady Murasaki (London, 1965) and The Pillow Book o/Sei Shonagon (London, 1967) together with the brilliant evocation by I . Morris, The World of the Shining Prince (London, 1964).

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o f i m i t a t i o n was t h a t most upper-class I ta l ians , Romans , Greeks, c o n q u e r o r s a n d c o n q u e r e d a l ike , shared a n ident ica l h i g h c u l t u r e w h i c h was by o r i g i n a l ien t o a l l except t h e Greeks. E d u c a t e d Greeks t h e r e f o r e acted as t h e h i g h priests o f this c u l t u r e . B u t R o m a n s also w o n m e m b e r s h i p by a c q u i r i n g a b o r r o w e d e d u c a t i o n .

W e have come a l o n g way f r o m t h e o l d R o m a n system o f e d u c a t i o n i n t h e h o m e . As i n m o d e r n i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g states, e d u c a t i o n was t a k e n o u t o f t h e f a m i l y a n d was located instead i n f u n c t i o n a l l y specific i n s t i t u t i o n s , n a m e l y schools. T h e o l d - f a s h i o n e d r o l e - m o d e l o f t h e f a t h e r was t o o s i m p l e f o r t r a i n i n g t h e leaders o f a c o m p l e x society. A s we have seen, y o u n g R o m a n s d i d l e a r n G r e e k a n d L a t i n l i t e r a t u r e , r h e t o r i c a n d law, i n a d d i t i o n t o a n d o f t e n , as Cato feared , instead o f m i l i t a r y service. C h i l d r e n were n o w t a u g h t by specialised q u a l i f i e d p e r s o n n e l w i t h new names f o r new roles (grammcUistes, litterator, cal-

culator, paidagogus, hypodidaskalus, grammaticus, rhetor); t h e new p e r s o n n e l spoke a n e w - f a n g l e d profess ional language, a n d acted o u t t h e i r roles i n newly f o u n d e d i n s t i t u t i o n s (ludi, scholae) w h i c h were d i s t i n g u i s h e d by specific n o r m s a n d values, r a n g i n g f r o m sophistry t h r o u g h p h i l o l o g i c a l correctness t o scholasticism.

S i m i l a r d e v e l o p m e n t s o c c u r r e d i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e . 1 0 1

N e w i n s t i t u t i o n s w e r e created, a n d they w e r e staffed by new p e r s o n n e l , specialised lawyers (iuris consulti) a n d advocates (advocati, causidici,

patroni), w h o n o t o n l y f i l l e d new roles b u t also t a l k e d a n d w r o t e i n a specialised language, t h e language o f R o m a n law. T h e t r a d i t i o n a l source o f R o m a n law was t h e T w e l v e Tables o f 451 B C , a p r i m i t i v e c o d i f i c a t i o n , closer i n style t o Moses t h a n t o H a m m u r a b i . T h e T w e l v e Tables set o u t some g r o u n d rules f o r legal p r o c e d u r e a n d p u n i s h m e n t i n archaic a n d o f t e n arcane language. I t is n o t e w o r t h y t h a t several prov is ions le f t t h e exact ion o f vengeance f o r w r o n g s t o t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y , even i f t h e state magistrate h a d i n t e r v e n e d ear l ier t o j u d g e t h e w r o n g d o e r g u i l t y . T h e T w e l v e Tables survive o n l y i n f r a g m e n t a r y q u o t a t i o n s , b u t t h e f o l l o w i n g clauses give t h e i r c l i p p e d f l a v o u r :

I f one summons h i m to justice, he shall go. I f he does not go, summon a witness. T h e n shall one seize h i m . (1.1) I f one has broken his l imb, there shall be strict retaliation, unless one has made a pact with h i m . (8.2) I f theft has been done by night, i f one has killed h i m , he shall have been killed lawfully. (8.12)

1 0 1 R o m a n law is a jungle into which visitors stray at the risk of getting lost or in fear of being mauled by the resident scholarly tigers. I have been guided by W . K u n k e l , An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History (Oxford, 1973); Jolowicz (1972); F . Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford, 1946); Grecnidge (1901). I am very grateful to M r J . A . Crook for advising me how to correct several errors in this section.

8 0


A t t h e e n d o f o u r p e r i o d by contrast , t h a t is at t h e e n d o f t h e last c e n t u r y B C , t h e R o m a n s h a d several d i f f e r e n t specialised c r i m i n a l j u r y courts , a large b o d y o f statute law, c r i m i n a l , p r i v a t e , p u b l i c a n d p r o c e d u r a l (such as t h e C o r n e l i a n law o n m u r d e r , o r t h e Falc idian law w h i c h restr ic ted t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f a n estate w h i c h c o u l d be le f t i n legacies, o r t h e Caeci l ian law w h i c h f o r b a d composi te laws a n d presc r i b e d a delay between t h e p u b l i c a t i o n a n d t h e passage o f a b i l l ) ; there w e r e p u b l i s h e d c o m m e n t a r i e s o n t r a d i t i o n a l law a n d procedures , books o f legal o p i n i o n s a n d t h e edicts o f t h e praetors , w h o were the chief j u d i c i a l magistrates o f R o m e ; these edicts were i n effect s u p p l e m e n t a r y p r o c e d u r a l rule-books. A l l these t o g e t h e r f o r m e d t h e basis o f a sophisticated legal system, q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n its t e n o r f r o m the archaic law, a n d s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r (mutatis mutandis) i n its c a r e f u l p h r a s i n g to m o d e r n legal language. T h e f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n is taken f r o m a set o f m u n i c i p a l regula t ions ( the so-called Lex Iulia Municipalis):

(10) I f a n y o n e , w h o i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s l a w s h o u l d p r o p e r l y m a i n t a i n t h e p u b l i c street i n f r o n t o f his p r o p e r t y , d o e s n o t m a i n t a i n it as h e p r o p e r l y s h o u l d , i n t h e j u d g e m e n t o f t h e a e d i l e c o n c e r n e d , t h e latter at h i s d i s c r e t i o n s h a l l lease a c o n t r a c t f o r its m a i n t e n a n c e . F o r at least t e n d a y s b e f o r e h e a w a r d s t h e c o n t r a c t , h e s h a l l post i n f r o n t o f h i s t r i b u n a l i n t h e F o r u m t h e n a m e o f t h e street to be m a i n t a i n e d , t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e c o n t r a c t s h a l l b e g i v e n a n d t h e n a m e s o f t h e p r o p e r t y o w n e r s o n t h a t p a r t o f t h e street. T o t h e a f o r e s a i d o w n e r s o r t h e i r a g e n t s at t h e i r h o u s e s h e s h a l l give n o t i c e o f h i s i n t e n t i o n to lease t h e c o n t r a c t f o r t h e a f o r e s a i d street a n d o f t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e c o n t r a c t s h a l l be g i v e n . . . (Ancient Roman Statutes 113)

T h e law was obviously d r a f t e d by professionals (cf. Cicero, O n H i s Own House 48), a n d i n its sophist icat ion ref lected the conflicts o f interests w h i c h h a d to be catered f o r a n d t h e loopholes i n prev ious d r a f t s w h i c h w e r e n o w closed. Such f o r m a l laws seek t o a v o i d o p e n conf l ict by o u t l i n i n g predic table consequences f o r misbehaviour .

T h e significance o f this sophist icat ion s h o u l d n o t be exaggerated. Just as t h e just ice o f t h e T w e l v e Tables unreal ist ical ly presupposed a l l c la imants ' capacity t o h a u l t h e d e f e n d a n t t o c o u r t together w i t h t h e d i s p u t e d object , so t h r o u g h o u t R o m a n h i s t o r y t h e e x e c u t i o n o f j u d g e m e n t was t h e weakest l i n k i n t h e R o m a n legal s y s t e m . 1 0 1 T h e r e w e r e few c o u r t s ; they were available p r e p o n d e r a n d y t o t h e rich a n d p o w e r f u l ; b r i b e r y was r a m p a n t . W e k n o w very l i t d e a b o u t p o o r c r i m i nals; we suspect t h a t sophisticated just ice was r a r e l y available t o t h e m . T h a t is a n obvious l i m i t a t i o n o f just ice i n a l l p r e - i n d u s t r i a l states, a n d i n i n d u s t r i a l states as w e l l . T h a t said, appeals f r o m modest l i t igants

1 0 8 J . M. Kelly, Roman Litigation (Oxford, 1966) somewhat idealises modern judicial systems, but points up the inadequacies and distortions in R o m a n legal practice, as apparendy few scholars had done before him.

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d o survive i n t h e later R o m a n law codes; a n d i t seems p r o b a b l e t h a t some p o o r people got access t o t h e courts i n a l l per iods . Yet inevi tably most cases a b o u t w h i c h we k n o w c o n c e r n e d t h e p r i v i l e g e d .

W i t h these qual i f icat ions i n m i n d , let us very br ie f ly review some d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e R o m a n legal system. O n c e again I s h o u l d e n t e r t h e caveat that m u c h is u n c e r t a i n a n d n e a r l y e v e r y t h i n g is d i s p u t e d , a n d i n a b r i e f account I shall inevi tably s i m p l i f y c o m p l e x issues. H o w e v e r , at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n overseas, procedures i n R o m a n law w e r e st i l l h i g h l y r i tual is t ic . L i t i g a n t s h a d t o appear i n c o u r t be fore t h e magistrate t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e object whose possession was d i s p u t e d . I f t h e d i s p u t e d object was i m m o v a b l e , t h e n o r i g i n a l l y t h e magistrate h a d vis i ted t h e site, ' b u t w h e n t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e R o m a n state were e x t e n d e d a n d t h e magistrates w e r e f a i r l y busy w i t h legal business, they f o u n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o go t o d i s t a n t sites t o settle c la ims ' ( A u l u s Gel l ius , Attic Nights 20. t o ) . A n d so by a n agreed fiction, a c l o d o f e a r t h o r a r o o f t i le was used as t h e visible symbol o f a d i s p u t e d f a r m o r house: t h e change was b o t h a n i n d e x o f t h e pedestr ian concreteness o f o l d R o m a n legal practices a n d o f its transcendance by legal fictions.

T h e case was o p e n e d before t h e magistrate by t h e c l a i m a n t , w h o w i t h a r o d i n his h a n d p r o n o u n c e d a series o f f o r m u l a e ; 1 0 3 f o r e x a m p l e :

* I affirm that this m a n [a s lave] is mine by Quiritary r ight according to his proper tide. As I have spoken, so you behold: I h a v e l a i d my rod on him.* A n d at that moment he l a i d h i s rod o n t h e m a n . H i s opponent s a i d t h e s a m e w o r d s and performed t h e s a m e act . . .and t h e n the magistrate s a i d : * Unhand the man, both of you/ ( G a i u s , Institutes 4.16)

Reci ta t ion o f f u r t h e r f o r m u l a e f o l l o w e d , a n d t o q u o t e Gaius a g a i n : ' t h e excessive technical i ty o f t h e o l d law-makers was c a r r i e d so f a r t h a t i f e i t h e r p a r t y m a d e t h e slightest e r r o r , he lost t h e s u i t ' (Institutes 4 .30). So t o o i n R o m a n re l ig ious r i tes , any e r r o r i n p r o c e d u r e m a d e t h e r i t e v o i d . T h e rest o f this p r e l i m i n a r y act ion b e f o r e t h e magistrate t o o k t h e f o r m o f a sacred wager (sacramentum) f o r a fixed s u m ; a c c o r d i n g t o t h e value o f t h e d i s p u t e d object , t h e wager was f o r 50 o r 500 asses,

a p p a r e n t l y equiva lent t o five o r fifty sheep ( A u l u s Gel ius, Attic Nights

11.1), a substantial s u m , w h i c h was f o r f e i t e d by t h e loser together w i t h t h e d i s p u t e d object .

T h i s a n t i q u e p r o c e d u r e , w h i c h was o n l y o n e o f several w h i c h evolved, shows u p some i m p o r t a n t aspects o f ear ly R o m a n law. First , i t was r i tua l i s t ic , b u t t h e n so is m u c h m o d e r n legal p r o c e d u r e . Secondly

1 0 3 T h e rod signified a spear, which in turn symbolised rightful possession, see Gaius, Institutes 4.16.

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i t was formal is t i c , i n t h a t rec i ted w o r d s were invested w i t h symbolic o r r i t u a l m e a n i n g . T h i r d l y , i t was r i g i d , i n t h a t t h e f o r m o f act ion was fixed a n d p r e c l u d e d t h e possibi l i ty o f a c o m p r o m i s e j u d g e m e n t between c o m p e t i n g claims, b o t h o f w h i c h m i g h t have h a d some r i g h t o n t h e i r side. T h e c o u r t t o o k t h e f o r m o f a t o u r n a m e n t w i t h o u t weapons, i n w h i c h t h e r e h a d t o be a v ic tor a n d vanquished. F inal ly , i t was restr ict ive , i n t h a t t h e wager was f o r a s ignif icant s u m , so that p o o r l i t igants were effectively e x c l u d e d . B u t once t h e f o r m a l process before t h e magistrate was over , the case was t h e n a r g u e d i n a second a c d o n before a lay j u d g e a p p o i n t e d by t h e magistrate, a n d this second act ion may w e l l have been c o n d u c t e d i n f o r m a l l y a n d i n a m a n n e r w h i c h changed w i t h c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s .

As t h e sphere o f R o m a n inf luence w i d e n e d , Romans h a d extensive legal dealings w i t h f o r e i g n nat ionals; they also faced the new p r o b l e m s o f g o v e r n i n g a c o m p l e x state. These changes m u s t have e n c o u r a g e d c o r r e s p o n d i n g deve lopments i n R o m a n law; b u t obviously , there was n o neat fit between i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n a n d increas ing legal sophist i c a t i o n , o n l y a n observable t r e n d i n substantive law a n d i n legal procedures . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e scope o f law w i d e n e d t o cover consensual contracts a n d t h e r e was considerable e l a b o r a t i o n o f the law r e l a t i n g t o unjust i f iab le damage t o p r o p e r t y ; such changes i n substant ive law may have been an i m p o r t a n t factor i n i n d u c i n g increased flexibility i n p r o c e d u r e . M o r e o v e r , as i n e d u c a t i o n , law was considerably affected by Greek scholars, w h o i n t r o d u c e d Greek dialectical d is t inct ions i n t o R o m a n j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Cicero, f o r e x a m p l e , i n a lost w o r k , p r o p o s e d a n d m a y even have executed a systématisation o f R o m a n law (De iure civili in artem redigendo).

T h e o l d f o r m s o f l i t i g a t i o n by str ict f o r m u l a were g r a d u a l l y c i r c u m vented a n d t h e n s u p p l a n t e d , p r o b a b l y f r o m t h e second c e n t u r y B C o n w a r d s , by a new legal p r o c e d u r e . T h e p r e s i d i n g magistrate, n o r m a l l y t h e p r a e t o r , a f ter h e a r i n g b o t h parties settled o n a r u b r i c o r t e r m s o f reference (confus ingly t h e L a t i n f o r this is formula), suited t o t h e facts o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r case a n d to t h e claims a n d counterc la ims o f t h e l i t igants ; these were t h e t e r m s o f reference by w h i c h t h e j u d g e (index) dec ided t h e case i n a subsequent h e a r i n g . T h i s system a l lowed successive magistrates (especially the praetors) considerable d iscre t ion b o t h i n a d a p t i n g e x i s t i n g statute law t o c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s , a n d i n effectively c r e a t i n g new substantive law by s u p p l e m e n t i n g statute law, o f t e n t h r o u g h the i m a g i n a t i v e use o f legal fictions. F o r e x a m p l e , some p r i v a t e legal actions were f o r m a l l y available o n l y between R o m a n citizens; the magistrate i n his r u b r i c c o u l d author ise t h e j u d g e t o assume that t h e a l ien , i f l iable, s h o u l d pay damages as t h o u g h he were

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a R o m a n ci t izen. O r t o cite a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , i n t r a d i t i o n a l law, cases h a d been d e c i d e d by legal rights o f possession; u n d e r t h e new-style r u b r i c s , t h e magistrate m i g h t i n s t r u c t t h e j u d g e t o decide t h e case o n t h e basis o f w h a t s h o u l d be d o n e as a m a t t e r o f g o o d f a i t h (bona fides).

T h u s e q u i t y a n d sometimes even i n t e n t i o n s u p p l e m e n t e d str ict l a w . 1 0 4

T h e r e were also changes i n t h e practice o f c r i m i n a l law; i n t h e o l d days, i m p o r t m t c r i m i n a l cases h a d r e g u l a r l y been h e a r d o n appeal before t h e so-called courts o f t h e people (indicia populi), w i t h a p o t e n tial cast o f h u n d r e d s , even thousands; these courts h a d t h e same c o m p o s i t i o n as t h e p o p u l a r assemblies, t h e comitia centuriata a n d tributa, w h i c h also v o t e d o n legis lat ion a n d elected officers o f state. B u t f r o m t h e m i d d l e o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C o n w a r d s several separate a n d m u c h smaller j u r y courts (quaestiones) each specialising i n a specific t y p e o f c r i m e , such as e x t o r t i o n , b r i b e r y , treason a n d m u r d e r , w e r e established. T h e change was n o t a n u n q u a l i f i e d success. T h e r e d u c t i o n i n t h e size o f t h e j u r i e s m a d e t h e m m o r e accessible t o c o r r u p t i o n .

T h e r a n g e o f cases t r i e d i n these c r i m i n a l c o u r t s was b o t h n a r r o w e r a n d w i d e r t h a n i n m o d e r n c r i m i n a l courts . I t was n a r r o w e r because most pet ty cr imes w e r e deal t w i t h s u m m a r i l y o n t h e street o r by m i n o r magistrates f r o m w h o m t h e r e was l i t d e effective chance o f appeal . Besides, some cr imes against p r o p e r t y , such as t h e f t , were r e g a r d e d as matters o f p r i v a t e l a w . 1 0 5 T h e sphere o f R o m a n c r i m i n a l courts was also w i d e r t h a n i t is n o w , because i n t h e late R e p u b l i c p o l i t i c a l conflicts

KM * T n c praetorian law is what the praetors have introduced to help, supplement or correct the rivil law, in the public interest* (D. i . i .7.1: Papinian). T h e following rubric is typical; please note its emphasis on reparation and good faith. ' X shall be judge (index). Whereas Aulus Agerius [the plaintiff] deposited with Numerius Negidius [the defendant] the silver table which is the subject of this action, for whatever on that account Numerius Negidius ought to give or do to Aulus Agerius in good faith, you, judge, shall make Numerius Negidius liable to Aulus Agerius* (Gaius, Institutes4.47). A n d on the importance of intention, of the spirit as against the letter of the law, see for example Cicero, On Behalf of Caecina 53 and 67.

But I should not exaggerate the flexibility of R o m a n lawyers in the late Republic. F o r example, in the edict, it was held that when a man.left as a legacy * all his female slaves together with all their children \ and one of the female slaves died, the child of the dead female slave should not be part of the legacy, because the testator had legated the child only as an appurtenance of the mother. Later imperial jurists objected to this literal interpretation, because it defeated the wishes of the dead man (D. 30.63: Celsus). Cf. Schulz (1946: 79) for other examples.

"* Cf. Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 20.1 and Gaius, Institutes 3, 189: ' B y the law of the Twelve Tables, the punishment for thieves caught in the act was capital. A free m a n was whipped and then solemnly 'assigned' by the magistrate to the man from whom he had been stolen. Lawyers of old debated whether this 'assignment' (addictio) made the thief a slave or a debt bondsman. A slave caught in theft was similarly whipped and executed. But in later times, the cruelty of the punishment was frowned on, and the praetor's edict established, for both slave and free person, a suit for four times the value.' Such rivil suits must have had limited applicability except against rich thieves.

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w i t h i n t h e el i te t o o k t h e f o r m o f charges i n t h e c r i m i n a l courts . Fact ion leaders, o r t h e i r close s u p p o r t e r s w e r e accused o f t reason, o f c o r r u p t i o n , o f violence, sometimes w i t h g o o d cause, sometimes w i t h o u t , by m e m b e r s o f r i v a l po l i t i ca l factions a n d by o r a t o r s w h o h o p e d t h a t success i n t h e courts w o u l d serve as a s p r i n g - b o a r d f o r t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n s . T h e j u d i c i a l process was a w e a p o n i n fact ional pol i t ics ; f o r e x a m p l e , we k n o w o f over o n e h u n d r e d c r i m i n a l cases i n v o l v i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l e l i te i n t h e t w e n t y years 70 t o 50 B C . 1 0 6

R o m a n law was n o t m e r e l y a means o f express ing a n d t h e r e f o r e o f c o n t r o l l i n g p o l i t i c a l conf l ict w i t h i n t h e r u l i n g class, i t was also a m e c h a n i s m f o r p r o t e c t i n g u p p e r class p r o p e r t y . C icero m a d e this p o i n t p o w e r f u l l y :

I f t h e c i v i l l a w i s . . . n e g l e c t e d o r n o t c a r e f u l l y d e f e n d e d , t h e r e is n o t h i n g w h i c h a n y o n e wil l b e s u r e a b o u t p o s s e s s i n g , e i t h e r to b e i n h e r i t e d f r o m h i s f a t h e r , o r to b e left to h i s c h i l d r e n . W h a t is t h e a d v a n t a g e o f h a v i n g a h o u s e o r a f a r m left y o u by y o u r f a t h e r . . . i f y o u c a n n o t b e c e r t a i n o f k e e p i n g w h a t is y o u r s by t h e l a w o f o w n e r s h i p ? . . . B e l i e v e m e , w h a t e a c h o f u s h a s i n h e r i t e d is m o r e a legacy o f o u r l a w s a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h a n o f t h o s e w h o left it to us. A f a t h e r c a n b e q u e a t h a f a r m ; b u t t h e e n j o y m e n t o f t h e f a r m , w i t h o u t a n x i e t y o r d a n g e r o f l i t igation is b e q u e a t h e d n o t by t h e f a t h e r , b u t by t h e law. (On Behalf of Caecina 73-4)

O f course, this is r h e t o r i c , B u t t h e r e was some t r u t h i n i t . R o m a n law h e l p e d p r o t e c t p r o p e r t y , n o t j u s t i n R o m e , b u t also i n t h e I t a l i a n towns w h i c h came u n d e r R o m a n d o m i n a t i o n , a n d i n t h e p r o v i n c e s . 1 0 7

A l l these changes i n c i v i l p r o c e d u r e a n d i n t h e f o r m o f t h e c r i m i n a l courts i n d u c e d c o r r e s p o n d i n g changes i n legal personnel . I n t h e o l d days, p a t r i c i a n priests h a d m o n o p o l i s e d t h e k n o w l e d g e o f legal f o r m u l a e . L e g a l k n o w l e d g e was a b r a n c h o f re l ig l ious k n o w l e d g e a n d was t h e r e f o r e zealously g u a r d e d (Cicero, O n Behalf of Murena 25). A c c o r d i n g t o t r a d i t i o n , t h e m o n o p o l y was f i rst breached i n a b o u t 300 B C , w h e n t h e secretary o f a n o b l e censor was said t o have stolen f r o m his master t h e p r o c e d u r a l f o r m u l a e , t h e r i t u a l r e c i t a t i o n o f w h i c h

1 0 8 See E . S. G r u e n , The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley, Calif., 1974) 260S. for a long and lively account of the charges and counter-charges brought, especially in the period preceding Caesar's rise to supreme power.

1 0 7 T h e need to apply Roman law in Italian towns and in the provinces was probably a major factor in i n d u d n g flexibility. R o m a n law increasingly had to cover cases between parties with different legal systems. W e hear a lot of R o m a n corruption and mismanagement in the provinces, a n d rightiy so. B u t there is also impressive evidence of sophisticated thought about how best to manage relations between city-states, which when they were independent had often settled their conflicts by war not law. T h e following clause cited by Cicero seems typical of several: ' I f a private ritizen sues a municipality, or if a municipality sues a private citizen, then the senate of another city shall be appointed judge, and each party shall have the right to challenge one of the cities proposed' (Against Verres 2.2.32).

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o p e n e d c i v i l actions. H e p u b l i s h e d t h e m i n t h e first R o m a n law b o o k ( L i v y 9.46). A c e n t u r y later , a consul , Sextus Ae l ius Paetus, b r o u g h t c r e d i t o n h i m s e l f by p u b l i s h i n g new a n d m o d i f i e d f o r m u l a e , w h i c h h a d come i n t o use w i t h t h e g r o w t h o f t h e state, t o g e t h e r w i t h a c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e T w e l v e Tables ( D 1.2.2.7: P o m p o n i u s ) . B u t i n spite o f this p u b l i c a t i o n , nobles a n d priests o f t h e state cults, o r at least successful senators st i l l h a d a v i r t u a l m o n o p o l y o f legal k n o w l e d g e a n d ski l l (Cicero, O n Duties, 2.65).

T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t h e second c e n t u r y B C o f flexible r u b r i c s , o r t e r m s o f re ference a d a p t e d t o t h e facts o f each case, c h a n g e d legal p r o c e d u r e s f r o m r i tua l i s t ic r i g m a r o l e t o a n exercise o f legal s k i l l . T h e p r e s i d i n g magistrate h a d t o a d j u d g e a n d a m e n d c o m p l i c a t e d t e r m s o f re ference p u t u p by the l i t igants a n d pass t h e m o n t o t h e j u d g e (index) w h o actually t r i e d t h e case. T h e s e t e r m s o f re ference o r r u b r i c s (formulae) were p a r d y a m a t t e r o f precedent ; they were c o d i f i e d i n t h e praetor 's Edict, t h e set o f rules a n d p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h were h a n d e d d o w n f r o m o n e p r a e t o r t o t h e n e x t ; b u t t h e t e r m s o f re ference also h a d t o fit t h e m a t t e r i n d i s p u t e ; they m i g h t vary a c c o r d i n g t o facts o f t h e case o r t h e p o i n t o f law i n v o l v e d . Yet praetors were elected f o r o n l y o n e year i n office, a n d they were assigned t o m i l i t a r y o r legal duties by lo t .

I n s h o r t , they were n o t necessarily experts . T h e y d e p e n d e d u p o n advice. Magistrates, judges , a n d l i t igants a l l s o u g h t advice f r o m t h e same quarters , f r o m legal consultants (iuris prudentes). These m e n f o r m e d a new a n d g r o w i n g profess ion d i v o r c e d f r o m t h e o l d re l ig ious law, w h i c h f r o m t h e e n d o f t h e Republ ic n o o n e s t u d i e d a n y m o r e (Cicero, On Oratory 3.136). T h e break between priests a n d lawyers o p e n e d t h e profess ion t o outs iders ; a n d i n t h e last c e n t u r y B C several d i s t i n g u i s h e d legal consultants are k n o w n t o have been o f equestr ian , n o t senatorial s ta tus . 1 0 8 K n o w l e d g e o f t h e law served as a p l a t f o r m f o r a p o l i t i c a l career, p r o b a b l y as a less prest ig ious a l ternat ive t o m i l i t a r y service. C icero gives us a p i c t u r e o f t h e b u d d i n g lawyer:

Servius [later consul in 51 BC] d id his service in the city here with me, giving legal opinions, engrossing documents, and giving advice, a life ful l of worry and anxiety. He learned the civil law, worked long hours, helped many clients, put up with their stupidity, suffered their arrogance. . . He was at the beck and call of others, not his own master. A man wins widespread praise and credit with others when he works hard at a discipline which wil l benefit so many.

1 0 8 T h i s is documented by W. K u n k e l , Herkunft und soziale Stellung der römischen Juristen (Graz 2 , 1967) 48ff.

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B u t f o r a l l t h a t , Cicero p r e f e r r e d t h e claims o f his o w n c l ient , w h o h a d been i n effective c o m m a n d o f a n a r m y . ' W h o can d o u b t t h a t m i l i t a r y g l o r y confers m o r e d i s t i n c t i o n i n p u r s u i t o f a consulship t h a n achievements i n c i v i l law? ' ( O n Behalf of Murena 19 a n d 22). O r a t o r s also, i n Cicero's o p i n i o n , r a n k e d above lawyers, B u t re lat ive r a n k i n g concerns us less f o r t h e m o m e n t t h a n the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e professions. Pleaders (advocati, causidici, patroni) were d is t inct f r o m legal consultants (iuris prudentes); a n d m e m b e r s o f each g r o u p b o l stered t h e differences w i t h hosti le s tereotypes . 1 0 9

Final ly , I s h o u l d stress t h a t t h e changes i n the law w h i c h I have described were g r a d u a l n o t t h o r o u g h g o i n g . C i v i l actions by r i t u a l f o r m u l a (legis actio) a n d c r i m i n a l charges before large p o p u l a r j u r i e s (indicia populi) persisted to t h e e n d o f the Republ ic . O l d a n d new co-existed, n o t always c o m f o r t a b l y , as the r u l i n g g r o u p s a t t e m p t e d t o keep t h e new w i t h i n t h e m o u l d o f t r a d i t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , by t h e C i n c i a n law o f 204 B C , the p a y m e n t o f fees o r gifts t o lawyers was str ict ly l i m i t e d . Idea l ly , t h e advocate was expected to d e f e n d his c l ient as a f a v o u r , to increase his prest ige b u t n o t his w e a l t h (Cicero, On Duties

2. 65-6). T h e o b l i g a t i o n w h i c h t h e c l ient t h e n o w e d his p a t r o n was unspeci f ied a n d unact ionable . I n this way, advocacy w o u l d have rem a i n e d a n avocation f o r p r o p e r t i e d g e n d e m e n . B u t t h e C i n c i a n law, l ike m a n y R o m a n laws, was a lex imperfecta, t h a t is a law w h i c h f o r b a d e a n act, b u t w h i c h n e i t h e r penalised n o r a n n u l l e d a c o n t r a v e n t i o n . N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e r e f o r e , the law was evaded, i n spite o f its r e i n f o r c e m e n t u n d e r A u g u s t u s ( D i o 54.18; cf. Tac i tus , Annals 11.5-7).

B u t t o a s u r p r i s i n g extent , t h e system o f n o t p a y i n g lawyers d i d w o r k . Cicero, f o r e x a m p l e , received substantial sums f r o m his clients, b u t o n l y i n t h e i r last testament o r w i l l ; he c l a i m e d t o have received t h e h u g e s u m o f t w e n t y m i l l i o n sesterces by bequests (Cicero, Philippics

2.40). E v e n i n t h e c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f the late Republ ic , m e m b e r s o f the elite shared values a n d h o n o u r e d obl igat ions af ter a lapse o f t i m e , sometimes o f a g e n e r a t i o n , a n d i n matters f o r w h i c h we s h o u l d w a n t a n i m m e d i a t e a n d specified recompense. T o be sure, a system o f unspeci f ied m u t u a l o b l i g a t i o n does exist i n o u r society, i n c o n t e m p o r a r y u p p e r m i d d l e class c u l t u r e i n B r i t a i n a n d t h e U S A . B u t i t is reserved f o r relat ively u n i m p o r t a n t sectors o f behaviour . For e x a m p l e , I i n v i t e y o u to d i n n e r w i t h o u t exact ing f r o m y o u t h e specific o b l i g a t i o n t o i n v i t e m e back. B u t f o r most exchanges, we translate i m p o r t a n t obl igat ions i n t o m o n e y t e r m s a n d o f t e n r e i n f o r c e o u r expec-

1 0 9 For lawyers derogatory of orators, see the views cited by Cicero, O n Oratory 1.165; Topica 51; and vice versa: O n Behalf of Murena 25.

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rations o f r e p a y m e n t by contracts. I n d e e d , m o n e y so d o m i n a t e s o u r system o f social exchange t h a t we c o m m o n l y express o t h e r social matters , such as j o b satisfaction o r even social r e j e c t i o n i n m o n e y t e r m s : ' i t pays weir; ' s o r r y , I can't a f f o r d t o go t o t h e p u b , o r t o t h e movies, o r o n h o l i d a y w i t h y o u \

I n R o m a n society, t h e sphere o f diffuse unspeci f ied o b l i g a t i o n was t r a d i t i o n a l l y very w i d e . O r i g i n a l l y , i t c e n t r e d i n t h e nexus o f k i n s h i p a n d t h e n r a d i a t e d o u t a l o n g lines o f p a t r o n a g e . O n e s y m p t o m was t h e pract ice o f m a r r y i n g a d a u g h t e r of f i n o r d e r t o cement a n all iance between p o l i t i c a l factions. A n o t h e r was t h e appeal t o t h e ties o f k i n s h i p o r o f f r i e n d s h i p t o w i n p r i v a t e advantage, even i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f t h e law. A n y g o v e r n o r , any magistrate , any j u d g e o r j u r y m a n was pressured t o show f a v o u r , t o give benefits to relatives, t o f r i e n d s , t o t h e f r i e n d s o f relatives a n d t o t h e relatives o f f r i e n d s . K i n s m e n w e r e expected t o stick together , b u t t h e extens ion o f k i n ties t h r o u g h m a r r i a g e necessarily b r o u g h t conflicts o f interest . C icero c o m p l a i n e d :

Y o u c o m p a s s i o n a t e . I w a s y o u r c o n n e x i o n by m a r r i a g e ; at y o u r e l e c t i o n [to c o n s u l ] y o u h a d a p p o i n t e d m e to b e t h e first o v e r s e e r o f t h e t r i b e w h i c h o p e n e d t h e v o t i n g . . . y o u c a l l e d u p o n m e to s p e a k t h i r d i n t h e s e n a t e ; a n d yet y o u h a n d e d m e o v e r b o u n d to t h e e n e m i e s o f t h e r e p u b l i c ; w i t h a r r o g a n t a n d h e a r t l e s s w o r d s y o u d r o v e f r o m y o u r feet m y s o n - i n - l a w , y o u r o w n flesh a n d b l o o d (propinquum) a n d m y d a u g h t e r w h o w a s b o u n d to y o u by ties o f m a r r i a g e (odfinem). ( C i c e r o , To the Senate after his Return 17, t r a n s . L o e b C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y )

E l i t e pol i t ics w e r e t o o c o m p l i c a t e d t o r u n exacdy a l o n g k i n l ines, b u t n o t c o m p l e x e n o u g h t o d e v e l o p rival ideological g r o u p i n g s . A t t e m p t s t o e x t e n d factions t h r o u g h marr iages were sometimes t h w a r t e d because w o m e n , f r o m b e i n g pawns i n t h e p o w e r game o f m e n , a r r o g a t e d some p o w e r t o themselves; they benef i ted considerably f r o m t h e r u l e o f law w h i c h p r o t e c t e d t h e i r p r o p e r t y , as d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e i r husbands' ; a n d they were able t o i n i t i a t e d i v o r c e a n d subsequent r e m a r r i a g e s f o r themselves. T h e conservative i n s t i t u t i o n o f m a r r i a g e i n this way served as a vector o f social change a n d i n d u c e d a level o f female e m a n c i p a t i o n i n t h e R o m a n el i te w h i c h has r a r e l y been m a t c h e d i n h u m a n his tory .

Personal obl igat ions t o a n d claims f r o m wives a n d k i n , f r i e n d s a n d p a t r o n s were i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e f o r m a l r u l e o f law, i n c o m p a t i b l e t o o w i t h t h e i m p e r s o n a l ' r a t i o n a l i t y a n d d i l i g e n c e ' w h i c h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e provinces ideal ly r e q u i r e d . Some R o m a n s were conscious o f t h e conf l ic t between i m p e r s o n a l ideals a n d personal p r o f i t . B u t t o be a f u l l m e m b e r o f t h e el i te c l u b , o n e h a d t o w i n favours f o r one's o w n f r i e n d s a n d t o bestow favours o n t h e f r i e n d s o f others . Let ters o f r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , o f w h i c h t h e r e are so m a n y i n t h e p u b l i s h e d c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f Cicero, P l iny a n d Symmachus , w e r e t h e personal

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cheques o f t h e system: t h e member ' s c r e d i t d e p e n d e d u p o n his p o w e r to place f r i e n d s i n posit ions o f p r o f i t . 1 1 0 Patronage a n d c o r r u p t i o n ( w h i c h is t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f a p u b l i c office as p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y ) w e r e j u s t t w o sides o f t h e same c o i n . T h e i r persistence a n d prevalence u n d e r c u t any t h o r o u g h g o i n g changes towards t h e f o r m a l legal o r bureaucrat ic a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e e m p i r e .

W e have gone far e n o u g h . I t is t i m e t o reconsider t h e concept s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . T h i s can n o w be d o n e i n r a t h e r abstract t e r m s , w i t h o n l y b r i e f references back t o t h e deve lopments i n t h e a r m y , e d u c a t i o n a n d t h e law, w h i c h we have j u s t discussed. I s h o u l d stress t h a t these t h r e e areas were selected o n l y as i l lus trat ions o f t h e r a m i f i e d changes w h i c h o c c u r r e d i n t h e wake o f e m p i r e . A f u l l social h is tory w o u l d deal as w e l l w i t h s i m i l a r changes i n o t h e r areas o f social o r g a n i sation, such as a g r i c u l t u r e , t r a d e , a r c h i t e c t u r e , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .

I d o n o t l i k e f o r m a l d e f i n i t i o n s , b u t i n this case perhaps o n e may h e l p . S t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n refers t o t h e process by w h i c h a n u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n ( f o r e x a m p l e , a f a m i l y g r o u p c h a r g e d w i t h m u l t i p l e funct ions) becomes d i v i d e d i n t o separate i n s t i t u t i o n s (such as schools f o r e d u c a t i o n , factories f o r p r o d u c t i o n ) , each c h a r g e d w i t h a single m a i n f u n c t i o n . I shall t reat t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n u n d e r five headings: separat ion, c o m p e t i t i o n , o l d against new, p e r i p h e r y against centre a n d t h e g r o w t h o f state p o w e r .

First , t h e newly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s , such as, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e R o m a n a r m y , schools a n d t h e law-courts , deve loped n o r m s a n d values w h i c h l e g i t i m a t e d t h e i r i d e n t i t y as separate a n d a u t o n o m o u s parts o f t h e society. M i l i t a r y tactics a n d m i l i t a r y law, o r c o m p l i c a t e d rules o f g r a m m a r a n d r h e t o r i c , o f legal language a n d procedures a l l serve as c o n v e n i e n t examples o f new n o r m s , w h i c h d i f f e r e n t i a t e d each i n s t i t u t i o n f r o m t h e others . B u t above a l l , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f specific professional a n d o f t e n f u l l - t i m e social roles (soldier as d is t inct f r o m peasant, o r a t o r a n d advocate as d is t inct f r o m noble o r pr iest ) , i n d i c a t e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f personnel , specific t o t h e new a u t o n o m o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s . 1 1 1

1 1 0 F o r example, Cicero congratulated his brother on his three-year governorship of a province in which he had not been moved from the* highest integrity and self-control' by the gift of a picture, a slave, a woman, or by money (Cicero, Letters to his Brother Quintus 1.1.8). Cicero also told his brother (ibid, i.a) that lots of people had asked him (Cicero) to recommend them to his brother's secretary, who was an ex-slave. What worried Cicero was the low status of the intermediary, not the request for favours.

1 1 1 T h e concept autonomy is problematic, easier to think about than to operationalise, but then that is true of several useful concepts, such as cowardice or envy. Perhaps two points are worth making: the autonomy of insdtudons was relative not absolute; secondly, I should stress that my concentration here on autonomy is a tactic not a commitment; integration (how the differentiated institutions operated with each other) and conflict should also be considered.

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Secondly, t h e new d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s necessarily c o m p e t e d w i t h each o t h e r f o r society's resources, w h e t h e r these resources were expressed i n t e r m s o f pay, prest ige o r p e r s o n n e l . T h e circumstances o f this c o m p e t i t i o n were q u i t e e x c e p t i o n a l f o r a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l society. A p r e - i n d u s t r i a l society can be d e f i n e d , n o t m e r e l y as a society whose m a j o r source o f e n e r g y is t h e muscle p o w e r o f m e n a n d animals , b u t also as a society whose very smal l s u r p l u s p r o d u c t i o n is bespoken, e m b e d d e d , r o u t i n e l y used f o r t h e same p u r p o s e , year af ter year. B u t R o m a n society, because t h e f r u i t s o f conquest were b e i n g heaped i n t o I t a l y , t e m p o r a r i l y escaped f r o m some o f these l i m i t a t i o n s . I t h a d massive resources available, f o r w h i c h t h e r e was n o t r a d i t i o n a l a l locat ion i n t h e society. T h e resources were ' f r e e - f l o a t i n g ' . Romans t h e r e f o r e faced t h e new a n d b e w i l d e r i n g p r o b l e m o f h o w these resources were t o be used, a n d f o r whose benefi t .

W e k n o w o n e general answer: t h e rich g r e w r i c h e r . B u t t h a t is t o o s i m p l e a r u b r i c t o cover t h e c o m p l i c a t e d e x p a n s i o n o f R o m a n society, as i t m o v e d f r o m large city-state to i m p e r i a l p o w e r . T h e r e was c o m p e tition a m o n g t h e r i c h , f o r e x a m p l e , between equestr ian t a x - f a r m e r s a n d senatorial g o v e r n o r s over t h e d i v i s i o n o f p r o v i n c i a l spoils. T h e r e was c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h i n t h e el i te f o r prest ige; witness t h e s trenuous a t t e m p t s by some m e m b e r s o f the el i te t o master Greek , t h e language o f a c o n q u e r e d c u l t u r e . T h e r e were also e x p e r i m e n t s i n c o m p e t i t i o n , r e f l e c t i n g t h e elite's u n c e r t a i n t y about t h e c r i t e r i a f o r achiev ing h i g h status; hence exaggerated payments a n d h i g h fees t o r h e t o r i c i a n s , doctors , actors, artists a n d architects. Such payments elevated these n e w professions t o t h e status o f sub-elites, s h a r i n g i n Rome's n e w - f o u n d w e a l t h . A n d t h e r e were also at tempts by m e m b e r s o f t h e non-e l i te t o w i n a greater share o f t h e society's w e a l t h : claims f o r h i g h e r pay, m o r e p l u n d e r a n d l a r g e r f a r m s f r o m soldiers, f o r free wheat a n d m o r e e n t e r t a i n m e n t f r o m p o o r m e t r o p o l i t a n voters. A l l these claims were m a d e feasible by t h e h u g e i n f l u x o f f ree- f loat ing resources, a n d w e r e e n c o u r a g e d by t h e instabi l i ty o f social re lat ions fostered by unaccust o m e d w e a l t h .

T h i r d l y , as society c h a n g e d , t h e r e w e r e conflicts between the o l d el ite whose p o w e r was based o n t h e c o n t r o l o f t r a d i t i o n a l resources (such as l a n d , prest ige, o r t h e m e m o r y o f ancestors' status) a n d a new elite w h i c h p a r t l y d r e w its p o w e r f r o m new i n s t i t u t i o n s ( c o n t r o l o f t h e a r m y , o r a t o r i c a l s k i l l , legal k n o w l e d g e ) . I n p a r t , this d i s t i n c t i o n is conceptual r a t h e r t h a n r e a l , i n so f a r as new m e m b e r s o f t h e R o m a n el i te , o f t e n f r o m a l l ied I t a l i a n city-states, a lready h a d l a n d a n d t h a n k s t o grants o f R o m a n c i t izenship c o u l d acquire po l i t i ca l office i n R o m e . L a n d a n d pol i t i ca l office were t h e t w o h a l l - m a r k s o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l el ite.

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C o m p l e m e n t a r i t y , m e m b e r s o f t h e o l d el ite c o u l d a n d d i d acquire new skills. O l d a n d new elites d o n o t t h e r e f o r e r e f e r t o fixed g r o u p s . B u t i n any society, social change i n v o l v i n g new ideas, new values, spreads at an u n e v e n pace; d i f f e r e n t sectors o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n , y o u n g a n d o l d , peasants a n d m e t r o p o l i t a n s , assimilate change at d i f f e r e n t rates a n d o f t e n j u s t i f y t h e i r b e h a v i o u r w i t h hosti le stereotypes o f those w h o are d i f f e r e n t . Change was subjective as wel l as objective. F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n Cicero became consul , t h e first o f his f a m i l y t o be so successful i n pol i t ics , he st i l l fe l t at a disadvantage c o m p a r e d w i t h those w h o m he t h o u g h t h a d i n h e r i t e d ' n o b i l i t y ' .

I n o u r prev ious discussion o f t h e a r m y , e d u c a t i o n a n d t h e law, we have cons idered several instances o f conf l ic t between t h e o ld- fashioned a n d t h e new-fangled . A n d we have seen t h e p r o b l e m s w h i c h arose f r o m i n n o v a t i o n s , such as t h e r e c r u i t m e n t o f t h e landless t o t h e a r m y , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f L a t i n r h e t o r i c a n d t h e creat ion o f j u r y - c o u r t s . A n o t h e r b r i e f e x a m p l e m a y be h e l p f u l . I n the last c e n t u r y o f the Republ ic , the equestr ian o r d e r e m e r g e d as a separate legal ly-def ined social s t r a t u m , whose richest m e m b e r s were b o t h t a x - f a r m e r s i n the provinces a n d I t a l i a n land-owners . M o d e r n research has s h o w n that i n m a n y economic a n d social respects, these k n i g h t s were s imi lar t o senators, a n d t h a t i n a l l social conflicts, b o t h senators a n d k n i g h t s f o u g h t o n each side. Object ively , t h e r e f o r e , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between senators a n d k n i g h t s is n o t i m p o r t a n t ; b u t c o n t e m p o r a r y Romans a p p a r e n d y perceived k n i g h t s as a social g r o u p w h i c h was to a signi f i cant e x t e n t engaged i n a s truggle w i t h t h e senate. Cicero, f o r exa m p l e , t h o u g h t t h a t c o n c o r d between senators a n d k n i g h t s (concordia

ordinum) w o u l d f o r m a satisfactory basis f o r stable g o v e r n m e n t a n d w o u l d e n d c i v i l s tr i fe . T h e d i c h o t o m y senate-knights was i m p o r t a n t , even i f i t was misconceived. I t i l lustrates h o w d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s became points o f reference by w h i c h m e m b e r s o f a society organised t h e i r social maps; d is t inct ions between d i f f e r e n t i a t e d parts o f t h e society became items i n the po l i t i ca l vocabulary a n d were t u r n e d , sometimes unreal ist ical ly , i n t o axes o f po l i t i ca l confl ict .

F o u r t h , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f resources between c o n f l i c t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s is o f t e n o r u l t i m a t e l y t h e responsibi l i ty o f t h e centra l g o v e r n m e n t . T h e newly e m e r g e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s were t h e r e f o r e l ike ly (a) t o test the l i m i t s o f t h e c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y ' s p o w e r a n d (b) t o chal lenge t h e pol i t i ca l a u t h o r i t y o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t at t h e centre ; t h e p u r p o s e m i g h t be to w i n e x t r a resources ( f o r e x a m p l e , c o n t r o l o f t h e j u r y - c o u r t s by k n i g h t s , o r resetdement- farms f o r veterans) o r s i m p l y t o c o n f i r m t h e place o f a g r o u p w i t h i n the social o r d e r . L e t us i l lustrate these processes. B y t r a d i t i o n , state priests h a d t h e r i g h t t o declare cer ta in po l i t i ca l o r

9 1


legislative activities i l l i c i t , i f they ascertained t h a t s o m e t h i n g h a d gone a w r y i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r i tes. B u t i n several c r i t i c a l instances, pr iest ly str ictures were d i s r e g a r d e d ; po l i t i ca l leaders proceeded w i t h lawm a k i n g i n spite o f re l ig ious bans, j u s t as generals f o u g h t battles a f ter b l i n d l y i g n o r i n g u n p r o p i d o u s signs. T h e p o l i t i c a l t r i u m p h e d over t h e re l ig ious ; t h e status a n d p o w e r o f priests were c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y l o w e r e d .

Attacks o n t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t by po l i t i ca l generals w i t h armies at t h e i r backs w e r e m o r e d i f f i c u l t to survive a n d deserve m o r e deta i led a t t e n t i o n . I n d e e d , t h e escalation o f c iv i l wars between r i v a l generals ( M a r i u s a n d Sulla, Pompey a n d Caesar, A n t o n y a n d Octav ian) event u a l l y l e d t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e Republ ic a n d t o t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n t h e hands o f a single successful po l i t i ca l general , O c t a v i a n (later cal led A u g u s t u s ) . B u t this successful c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f p o w e r need n o t have h a p p e n e d ; t h e h u g e e m p i r e , l ike t h e Persian e m p i r e o r t h e e m p i r e o f A l e x a n d e r t h e Great , c o u l d have spl i t i n t o separate t e r r i t o r i a l satrapies, a n d a lmost d i d w h e n A n t o n y a l l i e d w i t h C l e o p a t r a i n E g y p t . T h e r e is n o universa l law t h a t m i l i t a r y conf l ict leads t o a c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f po l i t i ca l p o w e r , a l t h o u g h i t is a p h e n o m e n o n w h i c h has been f r e q u e n d y observed. I n s h o r t , we c a n n o t e x p l a i n A u g u s t u s ' success by i n v o k i n g o r i m p l y i n g some non-exis tent law o f the c e n t r i p e t a l tendency o f m i l i t a r y p o w e r .

O n e m a j o r p r o b l e m w h i c h t h e R o m a n state faced was t h e subord i n a t i o n o f t h e m i l i t a r y t o t h e p o l i t i c a l . I t is s t i l l a r e c u r r e n t p r o b l e m i n m a n y economical ly u n d e r - d e v e l o p e d states t o d a y . 1 1 2 I n t h e R o m a n Pr inc ipate (31 B C - A D 235), t h e p r o b l e m was solved f o r l o n g p e r i o d s ; t h e famous R o m a n peace, t h e pox Romana, a f f o r d e d R o m a n subjects p r o t e c t i o n f r o m c i v i l wars as w e l l as f r o m e x t e r n a l attack. B u t i n t h e late Republ ic , t h e delicate balance between t h e po l i t i ca l a n d t h e m i l i t a r y was upset by t w o factors: t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f p o w e r i n t h e hands o f super-generals a n d t h e exacerbat ion o f po l i t i ca l confl ict . L e t us deal w i t h each br ie f ly .

T h e conquest o f a h u g e e m p i r e repeatedly c o n f r o n t e d t h e R o m a n state w i t h m i l i t a r y p r o b l e m s w h i c h r e q u i r e d m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d l o n g e r last ing m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d s t h a n c o u l d be c o m f o r t a b l y t o l e r a t e d by a p o w e r - s h a r i n g a n d ega l i tar ian ( a m o n g peers) o l igarchy . F o r e x a m p l e , i n 67 B C , i n o r d e r t o clear pirates f r o m t h e eastern M e d i -

1 1 1 Mass poverty, rapidly rising expectations, expanding central government expenditure which threatens traditional elites, and the insecurity of army officers are some of the important factors in the coups d'etat in underdeveloped states. See S. E . Finer, The Man on Horseback (London, 1962), K. Hopkins, 'Civil-military relations in developing countries*, British Journal of Sociology 17 (1966) 165*1.; I . Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (New Y o r k , 1966) 254^.

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t e r r a n e a n , Pompey t h e Great was, i n t h e interests o f m i l i t a r y efficiency, g iven a c o m m a n d w h i c h covered several o r d i n a r y provinces; this inev i tably raised P o m p e y above o t h e r senatorial generals. S i m i l a r l y , Jul ius Caesar secured t h e c o m m a n d o f a large a r m y , i n effect f o r t e n years; a n d i t was this e x t r a l o n g c o m m a n d w h i c h a l l o w e d h i m t o c o n q u e r G a u l . T h u s Romans repeatedly created super-generals i n t h e interests o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n , a n d t h e n w a i t e d i n fear a n d anxiety , w o n d e r i n g w h e t h e r t h e super-generals, l i k e t h e generals o f o l d , w o u l d s u b o r d i n a t e themselves, w h e n t h e i r victories were w o n , to t h e state.

Sometimes they d i d ; at o t h e r t imes, they unleashed t h e i r forces against t h e c i ty o f R o m e , o r against t h e senate's hastily a p p o i n t e d defenders . T h e m e r e fact t h a t R o m a n generals a n d soldiers were w i l l i n g to attack t h e city o f R o m e was i n d e x e n o u g h o f deep-seated p o l i t i c a l instabi l i ty . W h a t h a d changed? Part o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e c h a n g e d b e h a v i o u r o f t h e el i te lay i n t h e exacerbadon o f po l i t i ca l conf l ic t , a n d i n t h e b r e a k d o w n o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l system o f t h e serial exchange o f p o l i t i c a l offices w i t h i n t h e el i te , based o n r e c i p r o c i t y a n d o n t r u s t as t o t h e l i m i t e d consequences o f b e i n g w i t h o u t po l i t i ca l p o w e r . I n the o l d days, loss o f a n e lect ion ( to p r a e t o r s h i p o r consulship , f o r e x a m p l e ) m e a n t loss o f face, b u t n o l o n g t e r m loss o f status f o r one's f a m i l y (we r e t u r n t o this t o p i c i n C h a p t e r i o f V o l u m e T w o ) . T o w a r d s t h e e n d o f t h e Republ ic , loss o f a n e lect ion c o u l d m e a n b a n k r u p t c y ; loss o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r c o u l d m e a n , as i t d i d i n Cicero's case, exi le a n d later e x e c u t i o n . Pol i t ical c o m p e t i t i o n h a d become fiercer because t h e rewards o f g a i n i n g office, at h o m e o r i n t h e provinces , a n d t h e disadvantages o f miss ing office h a d become greater . T h e use o f violence by armies a n d by a r m e d gangs h a d e r o d e d , even t h o u g h they d i d n o t destroy t h e r u l e o f law. R o m a n s i n t h e last decades o f t h e R e p u b l i c began again t o w a l k i n city streets c a r r y i n g a r m s , o r a c c o m p a n i e d by a r m e d retainers . I n t h e i r fight f o r v i c t o r y o r s u r v i v a l , p o l i t i c a l factions fe l t themselves f o r c e d t o use any w e a p o n w h i c h came t o h a n d ; they used especially those i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h h a d been f o r g e d i n t h e process o f s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , a n d w h i c h were n o t yet firmly e m b e d d e d i n t h e social o r d e r . H e n c e c r i m i n a l charges against p o l i t i c a l enemies i n t h e j u r y - c o u r t s , j u d i c i a l m u r d e r s by ' p r o s c r i p t i o n ' ( the p u b l i c a t i o n o f lists o f enemies o f t h e state w h o c o u l d be l a w f u l l y m u r d e r e d f o r a r e w a r d ) , attacks by t h e a r m y o n t h e capita l a n d c i v i l wars. As t h e p o w e r o f t h e state (measured i n taxes g a t h e r e d , coins m i n t e d , m e n e m p l o y e d o r r a n g e o f laws passed) increased, so i t became c r u c i a l f o r fac t ion leaders to m a k e sure t h a t they a n d n o t others c o n t r o l l e d t h e state.

F i f t h a n d finally, i f t h e R o m a n state was t o persist as a single e n t i t y , t h e n i t needed new i n s t i t u t i o n s , n e w n o r m s a n d values w h i c h w o u l d

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h e l p i n t e g r a t e t h e newly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d parts . T h e m a i n new i n t e g r a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n was t h e Pr inc ipate , t h e n a m e we give t o t h e p a t r i m o n i a l m o n a r c h y w h i c h was f o r g e d by A u g u s t u s a n d w h i c h i n its essentials persisted f o r close o n t h r e e h u n d r e d years. T h i s new p o l i t i c a l o r d e r represented t h e increased p o w e r o f t h e state. I t deserves a n d has received w h o l e vo lumes o f d e s c r i p t i o n a n d discussion. F o r o u r present purposes, i t is e n o u g h very br ie f ly t o describe several const i tuents w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e Pr inc ipate f r o m t h e Republ ic .

T h e emperors* p o w e r clearly rested o n c o n t r o l o f t h e profess ional , long-service a r m y . T h e legions were re located outs ide I t a l y o n t h e f r o n t i e r s o f t h e e m p i r e at a c o m f o r t i n g distance f r o m t h e scene o f active pol i t ics at R o m e . Legionaries ' pay h a d been s igni f icandy i n creased by Jul ius Caesar; A u g u s t u s a d d e d a b o u n t y t o be p a i d o n satisfactory c o m p l e t i o n o f s ixteen, later t w e n t y years* m i l i t a r y service. Such r e g u l a r payments , w h i c h accounted f o r a lmost h a l f o f t h e t o t a l i m p e r i a l b u d g e t , d e p e n d e d u p o n t h e r e g u l a r a n d predic table p a y m e n t a n d col lect ion o f taxes. T h e y also d e p e n d e d u p o n the increased m o n e t a r i s a t i o n o f t h e i m p e r i a l economy. U n d e r t h e Republ ic t h e r e h a d a lready been substantial increases i n t h e v o l u m e o f coins m i n t e d at R o m e ; b u t u n d e r t h e Pr inc ipate , the w h o l e e m p i r e was f o r t h e f irst t i m e g iven a near ly u n i f i e d system o f coinage, w h i c h i n t u r n ref lected a p a r t i a l u n i f i c a t i o n o f the w h o l e m o n e t a r y economy. T h i s p a r t i a l u n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e m o n e t a r y e c o n o m y was achieved largely by t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f tax a n d t r a d e . M o n e y taxes w e r e exacted i n t h e core provinces (such as G a u l , Spain a n d Asia) a n d w e r e most ly spent i n I t a l y o r o n a r m y pay i n t h e f r o n t i e r provinces; core provinces t h e n h a d t o e x p o r t goods i n o r d e r t o b u y back t h e m o n e y w i t h w h i c h t o pay t a x e s . 1 1 3

T h i s s i m p l i f i e d m o d e l goes some way t o w a r d s e x p l a i n i n g w h y I t a l y u n d e r t h e P r i n c i p a t e was such a heavy net i m p o r t e r o f p r o v i n c i a l goods.

A n o t h e r c o n s t i t u e n t o f t h e new i m p e r i a l o r d e r was its legi t imacy. T h i s leg i t imacy h a d several facets: t h e conscious r e s t o r a t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n , t h e extens ion o f po l i t i ca l s u p p o r t b e y o n d t h e m e t r o p o l i s t o t h e elites o f I t a l i a n a n d o f p r o v i n c i a l towns, a n d t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e r u l e o f law. A u g u s t u s , t h e first e m p e r o r , ostantatiously set a b o u t r e s t o r i n g t h e o l d R e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t was a s u r p r i s i n g act f o r a m o n a r c h . B u t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l o l igarchic c o n s t i t u t i o n was designed t o ensure ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h r o u g h collegiate t e n u r e a n d s h o r t per iods o f h o l d i n g office) t h a t n o aristocrat got t o o m u c h p o w e r . W i t h a m o n a r c h

1 1 3 O n the growth in money supply at Rome under the Republic, see M. H . Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage (Cambridge, 1974) 696^.; on the reciprocity of tax and trade, see briefly K. Hopkins (1978: 39ff.).

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s u p e r i m p o s e d to see that a l l t h e rules were obeyed, t h e t r a d i t i o n a l R e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n w o r k e d i n the m o n a r c h ' s f a v o u r . O n e i m p o r t a n t change was necessary: aristocrats ' access to t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n populace i n elections was b locked. T h e m e t r o p o l i t a n p o o r were effectively d is f ranchised; b u t t h e c i t izen a r m y was n o l o n g e r sufficiently i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e m t o p r o t e c t t h e i r ancient privi leges. T h e y were left w i t h b r e a d a n d circuses. M e a n w h i l e t h e basis o f t h e e m p e r o r ' s o w n pol i t i ca l s u p p o r t h a d been w i d e n e d (this h a d been p a r t i c u l a r l y necessary i n t h e b i t t e r c i v i l w a r against A n t o n y ) t o i n c l u d e t h e elites o f I t a l i a n towns, a n d t h e n later o f p r o v i n c i a l towns also. I n C h a p t e r v , we e x a m i n e some o f the beliefs a n d r i tua ls w h i c h h e i g h t e n e d t h e e m p e r o r ' s leg i t imacy a n d w h i c h h e l p e d m a n y subjects t h r o u g h o u t t h e e m p i r e t o i d e n t i f y w i t h t h e new r e g i m e . L e g i t i m a c y also rested u p o n t h e r u l e o f law. I n d e e d , i n m a n y h i s t o r y books, A u g u s t u s ' p o w e r is described as r e s t i n g o n t h e legal r e g u l a t i o n o f his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l powers (his consular imperium, his t r i b u n i c i a n p o w e r ) ; n o d o u b t , these w e r e i m p o r t a n t p r o p s f o r Romans, as w e l l as f o r m o d e r n scholars. B u t the r u l e o f law also s igni f ied a w i d e s p r e a d retreat f r o m violence i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l re lat ions, a n d even m o r e i m p o r t a n t a p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f o u t c o m e i n m a n y p o l i t i c a l , social a n d business a r r a n g e m e n t s .

T h e A u g u s t a n sett lement b r o k e t w o vicious circles. T h e first vicious circle we set o u t i n F i g u r e I . I ; i t was a sequence o f conquest a n d p l u n d e r , t h e i m p o r t o f booty a n d slaves i n t o I t a l y , t h e i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f I t a l i a n peasants a n d t h e i r e x t r u s i o n f r o m t h e i r f a r m s , t h e i r rec r u i t m e n t to t h e a r m y (or t h e i r m i g r a t i o n t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e ) a n d t h e i r subsequent d e m a n d s f o r I t a l i a n f a r m s o f t h e i r o w n . T h e break i n this c h a i n r e a c t i o n , as we have seen, was t h e mass e m i g r a t i o n o f I t a l i a n peasants, most ly ex-soldiers, t o settle i n colonies o n n o r t h e r n I t a l i a n o r p r o v i n c i a l l a n d . B y the e n d o f A u g u s t u s ' l o n g r e i g n (31 B C - A D 14), t h e t e r r i t o r i a l e x p a n s i o n o f t h e e m p i r e h a d v i r t u a l l y s topped, a n d the v o l u m e o f slave i m p o r t s h a d , i n m y view, considerably d i m i n i s h e d . A second vicious circle af fect ing aristocrats a n d o t h e r weal thy I t a l i a n land-owners was also b r o k e n . T h e massive e m i g r a t i o n o f soldier c o l o n ists h a d eased t h e c o m p e t i t i o n between r i c h a n d p o o r f o r I t a l i a n l a n d ; the peaceful c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e Pr inc ipate a n d t h e g r a d u a l u n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e m o n e t a r y e c o n o m y o f t h e e m p i r e as a w h o l e m a d e i t easier f o r r i c h Romans, i n c l u d i n g senators, t o o w n estates overseas i n the provinces , a n d t o have t h e i r cash rents safely t r a n s m i t t e d over l o n g distances t o be spent i n t h e city o f R o m e .

T h i s r a p i d character isat ion o f some o f the differences between Republ ic a n d Pr inc ipate a n d o f t h e process o f change i n t h e late Republ ic has c a p t u r e d some b u t o n l y some aspects o f a c o m p l e x

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rea l i ty . S t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n has t w o p a r t i c u l a r disadvantages: first, i t does n o t f o r m p a r t o f a n effective, large-scale t h e o r y o f social change; i n this respect, i t is n o t l i k e t h e concept ' m o d e o f p r o d u c t i o n ' w i t h i n a M a r x i s t t h e o r y ; secondly, s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n is a m o d e r n , n o n - R o m a n concept ( l ike social m o b i l i t y o r economic g r o w t h ) , s u p e r i m p o s e d o n R o m a n h i s t o r y , a n d i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e percept ions o f R o m a n actors. N e i t h e r disadvantage is o v e r w h e l m i n g . A n d o f course, u s i n g a m o d e r n concept does n o t p r e c l u d e considerat i o n o f actors' percept ions a n d i n t e n t i o n s . I n d e e d i n later chapters , I shall t r y e x p l i c i d y t o e n t e r i n t o t h e p e r c e p t u a l w o r l d o f R o m a n s a n d h o l d a c o u n t e r p o i n t between m y a n d t h e i r percept ions o f var ious p r o b l e m s , f r o m w i n n i n g f r e e d o m f o r a slave t o w o r s h i p p i n g t h e e m p e r o r as a g o d . T h e p o i n t I w a n t t o m a k e is t h a t a l l approaches, bourgeois , M a r x i s t , annalist ic , p r o s o p o g r a p h i c a l , are necessarily selective a n d p a r t i a l . 1 1 4 A change i n perspective o r t h e use o f a d i f f e r e n t concept leads us t o select d i f f e r e n t facts o r t o present the same facts i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . I n this sense, concepts are inte l lec tual ly p r i o r t o t h e evidence a n d d e m a n d as m u c h s k i l l a n d a t t e n t i o n as does t h e evidence itself.

A P P E N D I X

On the probable size of the population of the city of Rome

T h e size of the population of the city of Rome has often been disputed. There is not enough evidence f r o m which to deduce secure conclusions. However, i t seems worth out l ining such evidence as does exist and some of the problems surrounding i t , since an estimate of the city's size plays a significant part in any estimate of the population of Italy as a whole and its distribution.

T h e main basis for estimating the size of the city of Rome's population is the recorded number of recipients of the free wheat dole and/or the money gifts (congiaria) occasionally handed out i n the city of Rome. These were recorded as numbering 320,000 in 46 BC ; but they were then immediately reduced to 150,000 by Julius Caesar who organised emigration to the provinces and a careful block by block registration of those qualified (Suetonius, Julius Caesar 41 -2) . This reduction gives ground for th inking that the official number of recipients was swollen at other times also by malpractice or inefficiency. Augustus himself i n his record of his achievements claimed that the recipients of his money gifts and/or wheat doles in the city of Rome numbered 250,000 or more on five occasions (in 44, 29, 24, 23, and 12 BC ) ; i n 5 BC , the number of recipients rose again to 320,000 but then sank in 2 BC to * just over 200,000' (Res Gestae 15). Although the distribution was formally l imited to those l iving in the city of Rome, i t would have been worthwhile for peasants l iving nearby to walk to the city and claim a sizeable free ration of wheat (33 kg per month).

1 1 4 I do not mean by this to imply that since all approaches are partial, no choice can be made between them. F a r from it. Such choices are repeatedly made.

96

Appendix

P e r h a p s w e s h o u l d m a k e s o m e a l l o w a n c e f o r this. E v e n so a l l t h e r e c o r d e d n u m b e r s i n d i c a t e a v e r y l a r g e city by p r e - i n d u s t r i a l E u r o p e a n s t a n d a r d s .

A l l t h e r e c i p i e n t s w e r e m a l e a n d o f c i d z e n status; w e m u s t t h e r e f o r e a d d w o m e n , c h i l d r e n , r e s i d e n t a l i e n s w i t h o u t c i t i z e n s h i p , slaves a n d s o l d i e r s . W e d o n o t k n o w h o w m a n y . W e also d o n o t k n o w h o w o l d m a l e s o f c i d z e n status h a d to b e to q u a l i f y f o r t h e w h e a t d o l e . S u e t o n i u s (Augustus 41) s tated that A u g u s t u s i n h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n o f m o n e y i n c l u d e d y o u n g boys, e v e n t h o u g h they c u s t o m a r i l y r e c e i v e d l a r g e s s e o n l y w h e n they r e a c h e d t h e a g e o f t e n . B e l o c h (1886:392ff.), w h o s e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e a n c i e n t e v i d e n c e still s e e m s best, d e d u c e d f r o m this that boys a l s o n o r m a l l y r e c e i v e d t h e w h e a t d o l e f r o m t h e a g e o f t e n o n w a r d s . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n m a y n o t b e right, s i n c e S u e t o n i u s w a s w r i t i n g a b o u t m o n e y gifts, b u t it significantly l e s s e n s t h e m u l d p l i e r w h i c h w e h a v e to u s e i n o r d e r to a c c o u n t f o r w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e n u m b e r o f 250,000 m a l e r e c i p i e n t s a g e d t e n y e a r s a n d o l d e r i m p l i e s a total p o p u l a t i o n (if s e x r a d o s w e r e b a l a n c e d a n d t h e p o p u l a t i o n was s e l f - r e p r o d u c i n g - these a r e s i m p l i f y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s o n l y , n o t s t a t e m e n t s o f fact) o f a b o u t 670,000 (at «0 = 25). A l t e r n a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n s o f h i g h e r m o r t a l i t y = 20) o r a h i g h e r a g e o f q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e w h e a t d o l e (say a g e fifteen a n d 4, = 25) p r o d u c e total p o p u l a t i o n s o f a b o u t 690,000 a n d 770,000 respect ively . I n fact, t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f w o m e n a n d y o u n g c h i l d r e n i n t h e city m a y h a v e b e e n less t h a n i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n at l a r g e .

T o t h e s e figures w e s h o u l d t h e n a d d r e s i d e n t a l i e n s , s o l d i e r s a n d slaves, a n d s u b t r a c t t h e o u d y i n g c i t izens w h o w a l k e d to t h e city to col lect t h e i r d o l e . T h i s is p u r e g u e s s w o r k . B e l o c h r e c k o n e d that to t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e m a l l , w e s h o u l d a d d r o u g h l y a f u r t h e r 300,000 to m a k e a total p o p u l a t i o n f o r t h e city o f b e t w e e n 800,000 a n d j u s t u n d e r o n e m i l l i o n .

O t h e r e v i d e n c e c a n also be u s e d to h e l p u s : t h e b u i l t - u p a r e a o f t h e city, t h e q u a n t i t y o f w h e a t i m p o r t e d a n d t h e n u m b e r o f h o u s e s l isted. T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n s e r v e s as a c h e c k o n t h e e s t i m a t e s w e h a v e j u s t m a d e . T h e a r e a i n s i d e t h e city wal ls w h i c h w e r e bui l t i n t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y A D w a s 1,373

h e c t a r e s ( M e i e r 1953/4: 329): this a r e a c o r r e s p o n d e d r o u g h l y w i t h t h e e s t i m a t e d a r e a o f t h e city i n t h e t i m e o f A u g u s t u s ( F r i e n d l a n d e r 192110, v o l . 4,117). I f t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f this a r e a h a d b e e n o n e m i l l i o n , t h e n t h e a v e r a g e d e n s i t y w o u l d h a v e b e e n a b o u t 730 p e r s o n s p e r h e c t a r e . T h i s w a s c e r t a i n l y possible; t h e d e n s i t y i n t h e p o o r e s t districts o f R o m e a n d N a p l e s i n 1881 w e r e o v e r 800

a n d a l m o s t 1,500 p e r s o n s p e r h e c t a r e r e s p e c t i v e l y ( B e l o c h 1886: 409). A n d I m y s e l f h a v e s e e n s q u a t t e r sett lements i n H o n g K o n g , c o m p r i s i n g o n e - o r two-storey r a m s h a c k l e h u t s , bui l t o f b a m b o o a n d t i n - s h e e t i n g , w i t h d e n s i t i e s c o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r ( u p to 2,500 p e r h e c t a r e ) . B u t s u c h a h i g h a v e r a g e d e n s i t y f o r <ne w h o l e city o f R o m e , o n c e a l l o w a n c e is m a d e f o r p u b l i c s p a c e s , r o a d s , g a r d e n s , t e m p l e s , m a r k e t s a n d t h e h o u s e s o f t h e rich, s e e m s i m p r o b a b l e . O n this c r u d e r e c k o n i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f a n c i e n t R o m e w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r y o f t h e t h i r d - c e n t u r y walls w a s s o m e w h a t less t h a n a m i l l i o n i n t h e t i m e o f A u g u s t u s .

T h i s r o u g h o r d e r o f m a g n i t u d e is c o r r o b o r a t e d by w h a t w e k n o w o f w h e a t i m p o r t s . A s u s u a l t h e e v i d e n c e is d i s p u t e d . I follow B e l o c h a n d K a h r s t e d t (1921: 11 ff.) i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e e v i d e n c e o f J o s e p h u s (Jewish War 2.383 a n d 386) a n d t h e E p i t o m e (On the Caesars 1.6), w h i c h t a k e n t o g e t h e r suggest that R o m e ' s

97


a n n u a l c o n s u m p t i o n o f w h e a t total led 6 0 m i l l i o n modii = 390,000 t o n s p e r y e a r . T h i s w o u l d h a v e b e e n e n o u g h to f e e d a l m o s t two m i l l i o n p e o p l e at 200 k g w h e a t p e r p e r s o n y e a r . T h i s is a h i g h b u t n o t i m p o s s i b l e r a t e o f c o n s u m p t i o n , if w e a l l o w f o r s p o i l a g e a n d loss. B u t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o n p o p u l a t i o n size a r e i n c r e d i b l e .

A n o t h e r g e n e r a l l y u n r e l i a b l e s o u r c e (SHA, Septimius Severus 23) i n f o r m s u s that i n a b o u t t h e y e a r A D 200, d a i l y c o n s u m p t i o n i n t h e city o f R o m e w a s 75,000 modii ( = 180,000 t o n s p e r y e a r ) , less t h a n h a l f t h e figure c i t e d above. A s i m i l a r figure, 8 0 , 0 0 0 modii p e r d a y , is g i v e n by a n a n c i e n t c o m m e n t a t o r , a scholiast , o n L u c a n ( a d Pharsolia 1.319; e d . C . F . W e b e r ( L e i p z i g , 1831) v o l . 3, 53). T h e s e t w o figures c o u l d i m p l y p o p u l a t i o n s o f a b o u t 900,000 at t h e r a t h e r h i g h rates o f c o n s u m p t i o n c i t e d above.

F i n a l l y , t h e n u m b e r o f h o u s e s , as l isted i n a f o u r t h - c e n t u r y t o p o g r a p h y f o r e a c h r e g i o n o f t h e city o f R o m e (see R . V a l e n t i n o , Codice topografico delta citta di Roma ( R o m e , 1940) 89ff., a n d 161-2; a n d Z a c h a r i a s o f M y t i l e n e , ibid. 331). D e p e n d i n g o n w h i c h text o n e uses, t h e r e w e r e a b o u t 44,000, 46,000 o r 47,000 insulae a n d a b o u t 1,800 domus. T h e domus w e r e c l e a r l y g r a n d h o u s e s , palaizi. W h a t insulae w e r e is d i s p u t e d .

A u t h o r i t y c a n be f o u n d f o r two m e a n i n g s : s i n g l e r e s i d e n t i a l u n i t s l i k e t h e m e d i a e v a l h e a r t h s , o r h o u s e s , s o m e o f w h i c h w e r e s u b d i v i d e d a n d let to d i f f e r e n t f a m i l i e s a n d i n d i v i d u a l s . T h e m e a n i n g house s e e m s m o r e c o m m o n , a n d e v e n a v e r y m o d e s t m u l t i p l i e r , s u c h as o n l y t e n p e r s o n s p e r h o u s e (insula) gives a total p o p u l a t i o n o f close o n h a l f a m i l l i o n . B u t c l e a r l y w e d o n o t k n o w a n y t h i n g c e r t a i n a b o u t o c c u p a n c y rates i n R o m a n insulae.

I n s u m , p r e c i s i o n is i m p o s s i b l e . B u t al l t h e figures c i t e d suggest that t h e city o f R o m e h a d a v e r y l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n , a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y a b o v e 500,000 i n t h e r e i g n o f A u g u s t u s , a n d p r o b a b l y less t h a n o n e m i l l i o n . I a g r e e w i t h B e l o c h , that t h e m o s t p r o b a b l e g u e s s is i n t h e r e g i o n 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . B u t it is o n l y a g u e s s . F i n a l l y , I s h o u l d a d d that s u c h a l a r g e m e t r o p o l i t a n p o p u l a t i o n w a s possible o n l y b e c a u s e o f t h e s o p h i s t i c a t e d s y s t e m o f w a t e r s u p p l y ( e v e n t u a l l y w a t e r w a s b r o u g h t by n i n e t e e n a q u e d u c t s f r o m as f a r as 9 0 k m (56 m i l e s ) a w a y ) , a n d also b e c a u s e o f t h e less visible b u t e q u a l l y i m p r e s s i v e s y s t e m o f m a i n d r a i n a g e .

T h e l i t e r a t u r e o n this s u b j e c t is e x t e n s i v e . K . J . B e l o c h , Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt ( L e i p z i g , 1886) 392 ff. s e e m s best; t h e d i s c u s s i o n by U . K a h r s t e d t i n L . Friedländer, Sittengeschichte Roms ( L e i p z i g 1 0 , 1921) v o l . 4, 1 iff. a d d s s o m e t h i n g to this. F . G . M a i e r , 'Römische Bevölkerungsgeschichte u n d I n s c h r i f t e n s t a t i s t i k * , Historia 2 (1953/4) 3i8ff. is o v e r s c e p t i c a l .

T h e best d i s c u s s i o n i n E n g l i s h is p e r h a p s by W . J . O a t e s , ' T h e p o p u l a t i o n o f R o m e ' , Classical Philology 29 (1934) 101 ff.; that by P. A . B r u n t (1971:376ff.) is too m u c h i n f l u e n c e d by h i s v i e w s o n t h e p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f e x - s l a v e s i n t h e city's p o p u l a t i o n .

98

I I T H E G R O W T H A N D P R A C T I C E O F

S L A V E R Y I N R O M A N T I M E S

T H E G R O W T H O F A S L A V E S O C I E T Y

It 's n o f u n b e i n g a slave. A n d it's not j u s t t h e w o r k

B u t k n o w i n g that y o u ' r e a slave, a n d that n o t h i n g c a n c h a n g e it.

S l a v e c h a r a c t e r i n P l a u t u s , Amphitryo (c. 200 BC)

O n l y a h a n d f u l o f h u m a n societies can p r o p e r l y be called * slave societies', i f by slave society we m e a n a society i n w h i c h slaves play an i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n p r o d u c t i o n a n d f o r m a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n (say over 20 %) o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . 1 T h e r e are o n l y t w o w e l l established cases f r o m a n t i q u i t y : classical A t h e n s a n d R o m a n I t a l y ; b u t perhaps o t h e r Greek distr icts (such as c e n t r a l Greece a r o u n d D e l p h i ) o r t h e G r e e k cides o n t h e Asia M i n o r seaboard (such as Ephesus a n d P e r g a m u m ) were also slave societies i n this sense. T o be safe, we s h o u l d call the t w o a n d q u e cases: Greece u n d e r s t o o d l ibera l ly t o i n c l u d e Greek settlements overseas a n d R o m a n I t a l y . Yet even this loose f o r m u l a t i o n is i m p o r t a n t since i t impl ies t h a t i n most parts o f t h e R o m a n e m p i r e slavery was o f m i n o r i m p o r t a n c e i n p r o d u c t i o n . 2 F r o m t h e early m o d e r n p e r i o d ,

1 Twenty per cent is obviously an arbitrary cut-off point, but it marks a discontinuity between slave societies as defined here and other slave-owning societies. I n other words, I am claiming that the number of slave societies would not be increased if the dividing line were fifteen per cent or even ten per cent.

1 Marxists in particular have been keen to think that slavery predominated throughout the Roman empire, primarily because that was the received opinion when Marx wrote. Recendy, however, the discovery and acceptance of the Asiatic mode of production as an alternative link in the social evolutionary chain has diverted attention from slaves to other forms of dependency. T h e literature is enormous, but see F . Vitinghoff, 'Die T h e o r i e des historischen Materialismus über den antiken Sklavenhalterstaat', Saeculum 11 ( i 9 6 0 ) 89-131, E . Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory (London, 1968) 86ff., and E . Varga, * Uber die asiatische Produktionsweise', Jahrbuch f. Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1967, 4) 181 ff., a journal which regularly carries good articles by East G e r m a n marxists about ancient history. See also P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974) 462fr. T h e ancient evidence on slavery in the Roman empire outside Italy is so thin that it seems compatible with many theories. Incidentally the single passing statement by Galen (ed. Kühn, vol. 5, 49) that there were roughly equal numbers of (a) citizens, (b) women, (c) slaves in Pergamum is surely best understood not as a census statistic, but as meaning Mots of slaves'. We know so litde of rural: urban populations that this single statement by itself is difficult to interpret.

99

The growth and practice of slavery

o n l y t h r e e m o r e cases are k n o w n , t h e West I n d i a n Is lands, B r a z i l a n d t h e s o u t h e r n states o f t h e U S A . 3 These five societies i n w h i c h slaves p l a y e d a considerable r o l e i n p r o d u c t i o n ( a n d i n ostentatious c o n s u m p tion) f o r m a d is t inct category o f 'slave society'.

T h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f slave society is a d m i t t e d l y a r b i t r a r y , b u t i t may be use fu l , because i t u n d e r l i n e s h o w r a r e such * slave societies' have been, a n d t h e m a r k e d d i s c o n t i n u i t y between t h e m a n d t h e n u m e r o u s t r i b a l a n d p r e - i n d u s t r i a l s lave-owning societies, i n w h i c h a small p r o p o r t i o n o f m e n a n d w o m e n were k e p t as slaves. T h e Human Relations

Area Files r e c o r d t h e presence o f some slaves i n near ly h a l f o u t o f 800 societies s t u d i e d . 4 B u t sacrificial slavery a m o n g t h e K w a k i u d , f o r e x a m p l e , o r domest ic ' s lavery ' i n t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n a , o r t h e presence o f several t h o u s a n d black slaves i n E n g l a n d i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y was o n a complete ly d i f f e r e n t scale f r o m slavery i n slave societies as d e f i n e d above. A m o n g t h e K w a k i u d , i n t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n a a n d i n E n g l a n d , slaves were a negl ig ib le factor i n p r o d u c t i o n . I n R o m a n I t a l y , t h e s o u t h e r n states o f t h e U S A a n d B r a z i l , slavery was a very large factor i n p r o d u c t i o n (see T a b l e n . i ) .

T h e s i m i l a r i m p o r t a n c e o f slavery i n t h e five slave societies makes comparisons between t h e m seem attract ive. O b v i o u s l y , c o m p a r i s o n o f slavery w i t h i n the A m e r i c a s is easier. W h a t e v e r t h e differences i n c u l t u r e , a l l A m e r i c a n slave societies were t h e p r o d u c t o f s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n s : E u r o p e a n e x p a n s i o n i n t o spacious a n d u n c u l t i v a t e d t e r r i tories, the absence o f a n easily available a n d effective l a b o u r force, t h e mass i m p o r t o f black A f r i c a n s t o p r o v i d e l a b o u r , a n d finally t h e close l i n k s between p r o d u c t i o n by slaves a n d t h e economica l ly deve loped non-slave societies, w h i c h p r o v i d e d b o t h tools o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d m a r k e t s i n w h i c h t h e slaves' s u r p l u s p r o d u c e was sold.

I n this chapter , few e x p l i c i t compar isons are t o be m a d e between

3 F o r present purposes it seems reasonable to treat the West Indies as a single case. T h e West African kingdoms at the other end of the slave trade present a difficult case; there seems to be evidence of significant levels of slavery; in some kingdoms slaves probably accounted for fifty per cent of the total population according to nineteenth-century travellers' reports; but the functions of slavery a n d the treatment of slaves seem remarkably different from those we find in other slave societies. I have therefore, tentatively, not included them as slave societies. T h i s may be wrong. See further the essays in C . Meillassoux, L 'esclavage en Afriqueprecoloniale (Paris, 1975) and A . G . B. Fisher and H . J . Fisher, Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa (London, 1970).

4 Evidence of the presence or absence of slavery was available from 808 societies. O f 387 societies with some slavery, hereditary slavery was certainly attested in only 165 societies. B u t the quality of such data is inevitably uneven. See G . P. Murdock, 'Ethnographic atlas: a summary*, Ethnology 6 (1967) i09ff. T h e distinction between a slave-owning society and what I call here a 'slave society* is adapted from M. I . Finley, sv Slavery in The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New Y o r k , 1968).

too

The growth of a slave society

T a b l e I I . I . The population of five slave societies

E s t i m a t e d E s t i m a t e d S l a v e s as a total n u m b e r p r o p o r t i o n o f

p o p u l a t i o n o f s laves t h e p o p u l a t i o n ('000,000) ('000,000) (about)

A t h e n s * c. 400 B C (0.2)* (0.06) 30%

R o m a n I t a l y 225 B C * (4) (0.6) 15%

31 B C C (5-6) (2) 35% B r a z i l "

1800 3 1 33% 1850 8 2.5 30%

U S A , s o u t h e r n states

1820* 4 5 1.5 33% 1860^ 12 4 33%

C u b a 1804 0.5 0.18 28% 1861 i*4 0.4 3 0 %

* F i g u r e s i n p a r e n t h e s e s i n d i c a t e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e d e g r e e o f d o u b t . S o u r c e s to T a b l e 11.1

(a) R . L . S a r g e n t , The Size of the Slave Population at Athens ( U r b a n a , 111., 1924)

63, 127; (b) d e r i v e d f r o m P. A . B r u n t , Italian Manpower ( O x f o r d , 1971) 60

( e x c l u d i n g n o r t h e r n I t a l y ) - a r o u g h g u e s s ; (c) K . J . B e l o c h , Die Bevölkerung der gr.-röm. Welt ( L e i p z i g , 1886) 418, 435-6; (d) C . P r a d o , Historia Economica do Brasil (Säo P a o l o 6 , 1963), a p p e n d i x ; (e) S . E . M o r r i s o n et a l . v The Growth of the American Republic ( N e w Y o r k , s i x t h e d i t i o n 1969) 262, 499, 861; (/)

K . M . S t a m p p , The Peculiar Institution ( L o n d o n , 1964) 39; (g) H . S . K l e i n , Slavery in the Americas ( L o n d o n , 1967) 202. T h e s l a v e p o p u l a t i o n o f o t h e r i s l a n d s i n t h e W e s t I n d i e s w a s s m a l l e r .

R o m a n slavery a n d slavery i n t h e o t h e r * slave societies'. 5 B u t c o m parisons is i m p l i c i t , i n t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t concentrates o n f o u r i m p o r t a n t aspects o f R o m a n slavery, w h i c h seem except ional by c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e s o u t h e r n states o f t h e U S A . T h r e e o f these factors h a n g together : t h e h i g h status o f a n i m p o r t a n t b o d y o f p r o fessional a n d sk i l led slaves i n R o m e , t h e h i g h rate o f slave m a n u -

5 Explicit comparisons have been rare, but see particularly J . Vogt, Sklaverei und Humanität, Historia Einzelschrift 8 (Wiesbaden 1 , 1972), esp. gjtt. (now translated as Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man (Oxford, 1974) 170ft.); D. B . Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Ithaca, N.Y. , 1966); Finlcy (1968); C . A . Yeo, ' T h e economics of R o m a n and American slavery', Finanzarchiv 13 (1952) 445-83 is now somewhat dated.

I O I


miss ion, a n d the ass imilat ion o f f o r m e r slaves i n t o c i t izen society o n t e r m s o f near equal i ty w i t h n a t i v e - b o r n R o m a n citizens. T h e f o u r t h factor is m o r e c o m p l e x , a n d again i n stark contrast w i t h s o u t h e r n slavery: the Romans i m p o r t e d a massive n u m b e r o f a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves i n t o I t a l y i n o r d e r t o cu l t ivate l a n d w h i c h was already b e i n g c u l t i v a t e d by citizens. W e have t o e x p l a i n n o t o n l y the i m p o r t a t i o n o f slaves, b u t the e x t r u s i o n o f citizens. A n d we have t o fit the g r o w t h o f slavery i n t o its h is tor ica l context , c o n c e n t r a t i n g o n s t r u c t u r e a n d process i n t h e pol i t i ca l e c o n o m y o f R o m e d u r i n g its i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n . L e t us tackle this last p r o b l e m first; we can d o i t q u i t e r a p i d l y , b u t some r e p e t i t i o n o f a r g u m e n t s f r o m t h e last c h a p t e r is unavoidable .

Slavery and the expansion of empire

Mass slavery i n R o m a n I t a l y ( i n c l u d i n g Sicily) was a p r o d u c t o f c o n quest. I n j u s t over t w o h u n d r e d years, t h e R o m a n s c o n q u e r e d t h e w h o l e o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin. I n 260 B C , R o m e was a p o o r b u t pol i t i ca l ly p o w e r f u l city-state w i t h c o n t r o l over c e n t r a l a n d s o u t h e r n I t a l y . B y t h e e n d o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C , R o m e c o n t r o l l e d a n e m p i r e w h i c h stretched f r o m t h e E n g l i s h C h a n n e l t o t h e R e d Sea a n d f r o m A l g e r i a to t h e Black Sea. I t covered a l a n d area equal t o m o r e t h a n ha l f t h e U S A , a n d c o n t a i n e d a p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h is c o n v e n t i o n a l l y est imated at fifty o r s ixty m i l l i o n , w h i c h was (again by c o n v e n t i o n a l estimates) about o n e fifth o f t h e w o r l d p o p u l a t i o n at t h a t t i m e . 6

Slaves were c o n c e n t r a t e d i n R o m a n I t a l y , t h e h e a r t l a n d o f t h e e m p i r e . Most o f t h e m w e r e p r o b a b l y c a p t u r e d i n batde, a f t e r sieges o r i n t h e i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h o f conquest ; 7 a m o n g a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves, males p r e d o m i n a t e d ; w h i l e t h e e m p i r e was b e i n g e x p a n d e d , they were replaced by f resh captives, s u p p l e m e n t e d by t r a d e a n d b r e e d i n g . T h e evidence o n slave n u m b e r s is s l ight a n d d i s p u t e d ; b u t i t is c o m m o n l y agreed that t h e r e was a h u g e increase i n the slave p o p u l a t i o n i n the p e r i o d o f e x p a n s i o n , a n d i t seems l ike ly t h a t by the e n d o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C t h e r e w e r e a b o u t t w o m i l l i o n slaves i n I t a l y o u t o f a t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n o f six m i l l i o n . 8

6 K. J . Beloch, Die Bevölkerung der gr.-röm. Welt (Leipzig, 1886) 507; United Nadons, Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends (New Y o r k , 1953) 8; D. M. Heer, Society and Population (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. , 1968) 2.

7 T h i s is disputed, but wrongly, I think, by E . M. Schtaerman, Die Blütezeit der SMa-venwirtsckaft in der römischen Republik (Wiesbaden, 1969) 36-70; she thinks that even in the period of imperial expansion most slaves in Italy were bought or bred. O f course, war captives too were traded.

8 I follow Beloch (1886:418,435-6) rather than P. A. B r u n t , Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971) 124, who thinks in terms of about three million slaves out of a total Italian population of seven and a half million. T h e s e differences give some idea of the inadequate evidence.

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T h e conquest, p l u n d e r a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f a h u g e e m p i r e transf o r m e d t h e o l d po l i t i ca l o r d e r . T h e t r a d i t i o n a l o l i g a r c h y h a d l o n g been e n t r e n c h e d b u t its p o w e r (measured i n taxes o r i n t h e n u m b e r o f officials) was l i m i t e d by t h e lack o f g o v e r n m e n t a l resources a n d by a n electorate o f a r m e d ci t izen peasants. T h e new p r o s p e r i t y destroyed its stabil i ty. A series o f b i t t e r a n d destruct ive c i v i l wars between r i v a l generals l e d t o t h e establ ishment o f a p o w e r f u l m o n a r c h y s t rongly based o n exclusive c o n t r o l o f a profess ional a r m y . I n a para l le l process, t h e i n t r u s i o n o f a large n u m b e r o f slaves t r a n s f o r m e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l system o f p r o d u c t i o n . Peasants w h o o f t e n g r e w barely e n o u g h t o feed themselves were evicted t o m a k e r o o m f o r slaves w h o p r o d u c e d a s u r p l u s f o r sale i n t h e m a r k e t . T h e d isplacement o f c i t izen peasants by slaves, o f c o n q u e r o r s by t h e i r captives e m b i t t e r e d t h e p o o r , a n d f r o m t h e e n d o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C exacerbated a series o f po l i t i ca l d i s r u p t i o n s . 9 As soldiers a n d ci ty p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e landless peasants w e r e a n i m p o r t a n t factor b o t h i n f o m e n t i n g a n d i n p r o v i d i n g f o d d e r f o r t h e c iv i l wars w h i c h m a r k e d t h e demise o f t h e Republ ic (133 B C - 3 1 B C ) .

T h e p r o v i s i o n o f f o o d a n d w o r k f o r t w o m i l l i o n slaves i m p o r t e d to l ive side by side w i t h f o u r m i l l i o n citizens i m p l i e d r a d i c a l changes i n economic a n d pol i t i ca l o r g a n i s a t i o n . I t is i m p o r t a n t t o see t h e i n t e r dependence o f these changes, a n d so to be able t o set t h e m i n a f r a m e w o r k w h i c h i n some way transcends t h e specific circumstances o f any o n e event. T h i s v iew c o m p l e m e n t s t h e histor ians ' n o r m a l focus o n p a r t i c u l a r m e n a n d t h e i r actions o r d e r e d p r i m a r i l y by t i m e . F i g u r e 1.1 ( p . 12) i l lustrates t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e o f some o f t h e factors w h i c h affected t h e g r o w t h o f slavery i n R o m a n I t a l y . A s be fore , I m u s t stress t h a t t h e d i a g r a m is selective a n d schematic, b u t i t m a y be h e l p f u l i n p r o v i d i n g a g u i d e t o the discussion. I shall b e g i n f r o m t h e t o p l e f t - h a n d c o r n e r .

T h e R o m a n s c o n q u e r e d t h e w h o l e o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin o n l y by a fanatical d e d i c a t i o n t o f i g h t i n g wars. T h i s can be seen as a p r o d u c t o f t h e w a r r i o r ideology , e m b e d d e d i n t h e n o b i l i t y a n d shared by c i t izen soldiers. I t is d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d adequate c r i t e r i a o f m i l i t a r i s m . W e can see i t ref lected i n R o m a n folk-heroes such as Fabius t h e Delayer w h o re fused t o fight H a n n i b a l i n o p e n batt le , o r i n t h e i r later i m i t a t o r s such as P o m p e y t h e Great o r Jul ius Caesar, a n d i n t h e names a d o p t e d by R o m a n nobles t o c o m m e m o r a t e t h e regions w h i c h they h a d c o n q u e r e d (e.g. A f r i c a n u s , Asiaticus), a n d i n t h e b e l l i g e r e n t beh a v i o u r o f R o m a n generals. T h e R o m a n senate was once d ismayed to find t h a t a genera l assigned t o a r e g i o n i n w h i c h ' h e h a d n o t

9 F o r the most perceptive ancient comments on these developments, see Appian, Civil Wars i.7ff.

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accompl ished a n y t h i n g m e m o r a b l e ' h a d m a r c h e d several h u n d r e d k i l o m e t r e s t o fight a n u n p r o v o k e d war , p r e s u m a b l y i n t h e h o p e o f w i n n i n g g l o r y ( L i v y 43.1; 171 B C ) . F r o m t h e m i d d l e o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C o n w a r d s , t h e goddess V i c t o r y r i d i n g i n a c h a r i o t a n d b r a n d i s h i n g a w h i p became a c o m m o n s y m b o l s t a m p e d o n R o m a n silver coins. B u t t h e most p o w e r f u l i n d e x o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f w a r i n R o m e is t h e n u m b e r s o f soldiers enl isted. F o r t w o centuries , t h e R o m a n s typical ly m o b i l i e d a b o u t o n e e i g h t h o f a l l a d u l t male citizens, a n d a m u c h h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n o f y o u n g males . 1 0 T h i s was greater a n d m o r e sustained m i l i t a r y e f for t t h a n I have f o u n d r e c o r d e d i n any o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l state.

Economica l ly , f o r e i g n wars were disastrous f o r m a n y o f t h e R o m a n p o o r a n d p r o f i t a b l e f o r t h e rich. T h e r e is a n e l e m e n t o f c r u d e s i m p l i f i c a t i o n a n d t a u t o l o g y i n this statement: even so, i t seems w o r t h saying. T h r o u g h d e a t h i n batt le , i n j u r i e s a n d p r o l o n g e d absence, wars created vacancies o n I t a l i a n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d , w h i c h t h e r i c h w e r e o n l y t o o a n x i o u s t o occupy. W a r d e p r i v e d p o o r famil ies o f male l a b o u r ( a n d i n R o m a n law, l a n d neglected by its o w n e r c o u l d be legally c l a i m e d by a n y o n e ) , 1 1 w h i l e v ic tory p r o v i d e d r i c h R o m a n s w i t h t h e a l ternat ive l a b o u r o f slaves. Poor soldiers w e r e engaged i n c a p t u r i n g t h e i r o w n replacements .

F r e q u e n t victories enabled t h e Romans t o b r i n g back t o I t a l y h u g e quandt ies o f booty i n t h e f o r m o f treasure, m o n e y a n d slaves. T h e a c c u m u l a t e d w e a l t h o f t h e k i n g d o m s o f t h e eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n was b r o u g h t back t o R o m e . Provinces w e r e first p l u n d e r e d t h e n t a x e d ; t h e rapac i ty o f m a n y p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n o r s was n o t o r i o u s , a n d largely u n c h e c k e d . Some o f t h e booty was spent i n t u r n i n g t h e c i ty o f R o m e i n t o a r e s p l e n d e n t capita l c i ty. Ar is tocrats d isplayed t h e i r b o o t y i n t r i u m p h a l processions, spent t h e i r incomes i n t h e c i ty a n d c o m p e t e d w i t h each o t h e r i n ostentatious l u x u r y . T h i s lavish p r i v a t e e x p e n d i t u r e , t o g e t h e r w i t h g o v e r n m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e o n p u b l i c w o r k s a n d o n gifts o f wheat d i s t r i b u t e d t o R o m a n citizens l i v i n g i n t h e c i ty o f R o m e , a l l h e l p e d encourage t h e m i g r a t i o n o f peasants t o t h e c i ty ( just as heavy e x p e n d i t u r e i n capita l cities i n d e v e l o p i n g countr ies nowadays pul ls i n peasants f r o m t h e c o u n t r y s i d e ) . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n was swol len by slaves i m p o r t e d t o w o r k i n w o r k s h o p s a n d t o serve t h e rich i n t h e i r palaces. B y t h e m i d d l e o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C , t h e

1 0 B r u n t (1971: 391 ff.) reveals and tabulates the extent of this military effort. 1 1 \ . . a man may without violence take possession of another's land, which is lying

vacant either because of the owner's neglect, or because the owner had died without a successor or has been absent for a long time' Gaius, Institutes 2.51 - a text-book of the second century A D , but I assume that the laws derived from earlier times.

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p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e city o f R o m e was p r o b a b l y w e l l over t h r e e q u a r t e r s o f a m i l l i o n . 1 2 R o m e was t h u s one o f the largest p r e - i n d u s t r i a l cities ever created.

T h e rich invested a considerable p a r t o f t h e i r new weal th i n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d i n I t a l y . L a n d was t h e o n l y safe a n d prest ig ious large-scale i n v e s t m e n t available. B u t f e r t i l e l a n d a r o u n d R o m e was a lready densely occupied by c i t izen peasants. T h e r i c h b o u g h t u p peasants' l a n d , o r t o o k possession o f i t by violence. T h e y reorganised smal l -holdings i n t o l a r g e r a n d m o r e p r o f i t a b l e f a r m s . T h e e x i s t i n g p a t t e r n o f l a n d -h o l d i n g s p r e v e n t e d nobles f r o m c r e a t i n g h u g e single estates i n I t a l y ; t h e i r to ta l l a n d - h o l d i n g s were large, b u t were typical ly m a d e u p o f several p r o p e r t i e s . T h e r e is a lmost n o evidence o f estates o w n e d by R o m a n nobles i n t h e provinces u n t i l t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c a n p e r i o d o f c o n q u e s t . 1 3

L a r g e n u m b e r s o f t h e peasants w h o h a d been displaced by slaves m i g r a t e d t o t h e c i ty o f R o m e to take advantage o f t h e increased e x p e n d i t u r e t h e r e a n d t o o t h e r I t a l i a n towns, o r they j o i n e d t h e a r m y , o r they m i g r a t e d t o t h e newly pacif ied n o r t h I t a l i a n plains. T h e react ion t o d isplacement was o f t e n b i t t e r a n d p r o v i d e d a p l a n k f o r p o l i t i c a l activists, o f w h o m T i b e r i u s Gracchus is the best k n o w n exa m p l e . As we have seen, he t r i e d t o l i m i t t h e a m o u n t o f p u b l i c l a n d (ager publicus) w h i c h c o u l d be c u l t i v a t e d by the r i c h a n d p r o p o s e d that t h e r e m a i n d e r be d i s t r i b u t e d to t h e p o o r . H e was assassinated by conservative nobles, t h o u g h his plans were, i n t h e s h o r t r u n , modest ly successful. I n t h e course o f t h e n e x t c e n t u r y , soldiers repeatedly appealed t o t h e i r generals f o r l a n d t o settle o n a n d they were w i l l i n g t o fight f o r w h a t they w a n t e d . A s a result , smal l-holders w e r e o f t e n displaced by veterans, since large estates general ly escaped seizure a n d 1 1 T h i s figure is based primarily on the figures of male recipients of free wheat in the

late Republic: 320,000, 150,000,250,000; add females, children, free non-citizens and slaves. T h e best discussion of the evidence still seems to be by U . Kahrstedt, in L . Friendlander, Sittengeschichte Rams (Leipzig 1 0 , 1921) vol. 4, 11-21 (in detail, see Appendix I . I , pp. 96-8).

1 3 See E . Rawson in M. I . Finley ed., Studies in Raman Property (Cambridge, 1976) 85fF. R. P. Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire (Cambridge, 1974)324-33, has collected much of the relevant ancient evidence on estate size and farm size and on labour input from the Roman agricultural writers, and has tackled the problem again in Finley ed., op. ext. 8ff. His methods sometimes give a spurious precision to data of varying reliability, without providing criteria by which the plausibility of our records can be tested. T h e r e are other problems; estate and farm sizes varied; we need to know how much they varied, and how the variation changed over time. T h e Roman agricultural writers tried to overcome the variation in the real world by using formal modules of 25-60 hectares (according to crop), and these have sometimes been incautiously used as evidence of actual farm size. T h e classification of farm size by H . Dohr, Die Italischen Gutshofe (Cologne, 1965) uff. is arbitrary and misleading.

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w e r e g iven t o r i c h favouri tes . T h e c o m b i n e d pressure o f peasants, ex-soldiers a n d slaves o n I t a l i a n l a n d was f ina l ly re l ieved by t h e e m i g r a t i o n o f several h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d soldiers a n d civi l ians to p r o v i n c i a l colonies, set u p by Jul ius Caesar a n d A u g u s t u s (c. 50-10 B C ) , a n d by t h e f u r t h e r setdement o f n o r t h I t a l y . 1 4

The Economic Structure of Slave-Holdings

E c o n o m i c a l l y , m a n y o f these changes i n l a n d use a n d m o v e m e n t s o f p o p u l a t i o n m a y be seen s i m p l y as t h e s imultaneous c r e a t i o n o f a new s u r p l u s a n d a new m a r k e t f o r its c o n s u m p t i o n . T h e new slave f a r m s o f I t a l y p r o d u c e d a s u r p l u s o f m a r k e t a b l e crops o n l a n d w h i c h h a d prev ious ly s u p p o r t e d o n l y peasants near t h e level o f subsistence. L a n d - o w n e r s m u s t have achieved this s u r p l u s p r i m a r i l y by r a i s i n g t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y o f l a b o u r . Fewer m e n p r o d u c e d m o r e f o o d . U n d e r e m p l o y e d peasants ( typical ly p r o v i d i n g e n o u g h f o o d f o r themselves a n d t h e i r famil ies w i t h less t h a n one h u n d r e d man-days l a b o u r a year) w e r e e x p e l l e d f r o m t h e i r f a m i l y plots a n d replaced by a smal ler n u m b e r o f slaves. 1 5 T h e R o m a n w r i t e r s o f treatises o n a g r i c u l t u r e i m p l y t h a t i n t h e p e r i o d o f e x p a n s i o n a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves w e r e usual ly male a n d ce l ibate . 1 6 P r o v i d i n g a single male w i t h f o o d cost substantial ly less t h a n a f a m i l y ; t h e di f ference was o n e source o f t h e slave-owner's p r o f i t . F o r e x a m p l e , C o l u m e l l a ( O n Agriculture 2.12) r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t a n arable f a r m o f 200 iugera (50 ha) c o u l d be c u l t i v a t e d by e i g h t a d u l t male slaves. T h i s contrasts w i t h t h e m e d i a n size o f f a r m s a l l o t t e d 1 4 B r u n t (1971: 262-4); 1 think that he underestimated peasant migration to the city

of Rome; see also A. J . N . Wilson, Emigration from Italy in the Republican Age of Rome (Manchester, 1966).

1 5 Estimates of underemployment in dry-farming for R o m a n peasants may be based (a) on the known size of colonial allotments to Romans (see conveniendy E . T . Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic (London, 1969) or ESAR vol. 1, 123); (b) on the labour input indicated in ancient sources (see best Columella, On Agriculture 2.12 but see also Book 11 for the two-year cycle of cultivation; (c) on comparative evidence, see, for example, O . S. Morgan ed., Agricultural Systems of Modern Europe (New Y o r k , 1933). K. D. White, T h e productivity of labour in Roman agriculture', Antiquity 39 (1965) i02ff., contains several significant errors. I shall deal with this problem of labour input and farm size at length in a subsequent publication.

1 6 A s so often, the evidence is ambiguous. I n some passages, the R o m a n agricultural writers Cato, V a r r o and Columella seem to take it for granted that only overseers had female partners; but in other passages (for example, V a r r o 2.10.6 and Columella 1.8.19), it seems clear that slave offspring were encouraged. It is clear from the West Indies that it is possible to r u n an economy with a predominantly male labour-force, high mortality and a high rate of imports. Much depends on the relative cost of adult slaves and of breeding plus maintenance. Cf. O. Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery ( L o n d o n , 1967) 107. F o r a slightly apologistic account of some ancient evidence, see K . D. White, Roman Farming (London, 1970) 370.

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to ordinary Roman settlers in twelve colonies in the early second century BC - the only period from which we have such evidence; they were only 10 iugera (2.5 ha). This suggests that the same area of land could support either twenty free colonists' families, comprising some eighty men, women and children or just eight adult male slaves. Unfortunately, this evidence poses several problems of credibility which we cannot go into here. 1 7 But there can be no doubt that the man-power saving made by changing from peasant to slave farming was substantial.

An increase in productivity would have been useless without its reciprocal: the creation of a market. Land-owners needed to sell the newly created surplus so that they could make a return on their investment in land and slaves. The peasants who migrated to Rome (and other Italian towns) and the new urban slaves together provided this market; they consumed the surplus food which was transported from the Italian slave estates. Too much is sometimes made of the heavy cost of overland transport in Roman Italy. In so far as the rich owned surplus-producing farms distant from Rome, they must have sold the surplus, whatever the transport cost. In the sixteenth century, when the population of the city of Rome was under 200,000, wheat was regularly brought from the east coast of Italy around Ancona to Rome - partly by way of the Tiber. 1 8 In so far as the increased wealth of the Roman elite was based on the ownership of land, then a surplus produced on that land must have been sold. Most of it was probably sold to the largest market, the city of Rome. To the elite whose writings survive, the Roman proletariat seemed impoverished. But they must have earned enough money to buy food.19 This analysis cannot be authenticated in the conventional way by citations from ancient authors; ancient authors did not conceive contemporary changes in economic terms. But modern history-writing should not be limited to what the ancients themselves perceived. After all, it is commonly agreed that there was a great increase in the production of wine and olive oil in Italy during the last two centuries BC. This increase in production must have been based on an increase in the purchasing power of Roman consumers; and by far the single biggest market was the city of Rome. 17 Cf. Brunt (1971: 194!?.) for some doubts and explanations and ESAR vol. 1,

18 See J. Delumeau, La vie économique et sociale de Rome (Paris, 1959) vol. 2, 52iff. 19 What did the urban proletariat do? We do not know. In contemporary under

developed economies, there is often in the capitals what is called a bazaar economy, a fantastic fragmentation of services and retail sales. Expenditure by rich Romans must have had a considerable multiplier effect, as those who received money spent it - a process which was then repeated.

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The provision of subsidised and then free wheat to citizens living in the city of Rome must have provided important support to the market. It underwrote the capacity of the free poor to buy food produced on estates owned by nobles and worked by slaves, although there is no evidence that contemporary Romans perceived this function of the wheat dole. To be sure, some of the wheat was imported from the provinces as tax, especially from Sicily and North Africa. But the urban poor could still spend the money, which they would have spent on bread, on wine and oil instead. After all, the rich did not consume all the wine and oil produced on their own estates.

Why slaves and not citizens?

There is one problem about the growth of slavery in Roman Italy which seems particularly puzzling. Why did Roman landowners get rid of citizen peasants and put slaves in their place? At first sight, this may seem like making a mountain out of a molehill. The expansion of slavery may seem to need no explanation. It might be said that the conquering Romans simply took advantage of their victories, enslaved the defeated and carted them off to Italy to work their farms; after all, enslaving captives was an old trandition in the Mediterranean world. But then so was killing captives, putting them to ransom, sparing them, exacting a single indemnity from them, forcibly evicting them and taxing them. Of all these solutions to the problems of victory, slavery was one of the least common, and usually reserved for particularly obstinate or treacherous enemies. After all, the Romans conquered lands occupied by about fifty million people and had only about two million slaves. In a subsistence economy, not everyone wants a slave. Poor Italian peasants might well look the gift of a slave in the mouth, as someone extra to feed. Poor peasants with only small plots of land could not benefit from another pair of hands. They could not afford to maintain a slave.

The rich used slaves instead of free men as dependent workers, because slaves had advantages which outweighed their obvious disadvantages. Slaves cost money and were often, even usually expensive (see below, pp. no, 161); unlike wage labourers or tenants, they were probably unwilling to work hard or efficiendy, and were cosdy to supervise. On the other hand, slaves, unlike citizens, were not liable to be called away for several years on military service, they were at their master's beck and call and could be forced to work long hours throughout the whole year. Slavery allowed masters to sell land with an adequate supply of labour attached. Above all, unlike peasant

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families, slaves could be formed into permanent work-gangs several times the size of a family. Columella, for example, recommended gangs of ten male slaves spread over a large farm (On Agriculture i .9.7). Slaves could thus be made to cooperate in working the large farms of nobles who had grown rich on the profits of empire. Slaves were the fuel of an agrarian revolution,20 a means of organising labour in an economy without a labour market. In modern societies, we take the relationship of employer to employees for granted and sugar the pill of wage-slavery with political democracy.21 The Romans had no tradition which legitimated the regular employment of free men; in Roman law (the evidence comes from the High Empire), employees in the household were considered as slaves (loco servorum) for the duration of their service.22 Free citizens therefore tried to avoid such work. In the period of imperial expansion, continuous war made slavery seem an easy and attractive way for rich men to organise labour on farms which were much too large to be cultivated by a free family.

Slavery was by no means an obvious solution to the elite's need for agricultural labour. The extrusion of free peasants created a large pool of landless or underemployed citizens. The rich could have employed them to work their estates either as tenants or as day-wage labourers. Some did; Cato, who wrote on farming in the second century BC, advised that the manager of an estate should not employ the same labourers for more than one day, and so assumed a large pool of free labourers (On Agriculture 5); Julius Caesar passed a law (which like most Roman laws could not be enforced) that at least one third of men employed as herdsmen should be free citizens (Suetonius, Julis Caesar 42). Similarly, our sources generally assumed that most work on the

* * The ancient slave estate devours human beings as the modern blast-furnace devours coal.' So Max Weber, 'The social causes of the decay of ancient civilization' trans, in J. E. T. Eldridge, Max Weber (London, 1971) 263 or M. Weber, The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, trans. R. I. Frank (London, 1976) 398.

11 The long distance between production and consumption in industrial societies allows the growth of institutions and values which disguise the degree to which manual workers are exploited by the prosperous. In pre-industrial societies, exploitation was more likely to be face-to-face. I use the word exploitation, insofar as possible, neutrally to describe the process by which the product of one man's manual labour is consumed by someone else.

** A typical legal text is D. 43.16.1.16-20: '.. .the term household (familia)9 includes slaves.. .and those whom we keep like slaves {loco servorum) \ on which see the commentary of F. M. de Robertis, Lavoro e lavoratori net mondo romano (Ban, 1963) 101-42. The arguments of D. N 6 r r , 'Zur Bewertung der Arbeit in Rom', ZSS (rom. Abt.) 82 (1965) 9off. are a useful corrective to those of de Robertis. The sophisticated discussion about whether a debtor was really a slave (Quintilian, Institutes 7.3.26; Ps. Quintilian, Declamations 311) is evidence of their assimilation. See the arguments of E. M. Schtaerman and M. K. Trophimova, Slave ownership in the Early Roman Empire (Italy) (Moscow, 1971) 21 (in Russian).

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estates of the wealthy was done by slaves, helped out (for example, at harvest time) by free men.

Why did land-owners not make more use of free men? Free workers have obvious advantages. They can be paid wages out of current income, as and when they are needed; free tenants have an interest in productivity and cost much less than slaves to supervise. Throughout world history, tenancy has been a much more common method of exploitation than slavery. Tenancy was already well established in Roman Italy, and it was always much more important than slavery in the provinces. Its availability intensifies the difficulty of understanding why rich Romans preferred to buy slaves.

The chief disadvantage of slaves was their high capital cost, all the more so if we include the cost of buying the slaves who normally supervised other slaves. This assertion contradicts the common assumption by modern historians that Roman slaves were cheap. They probably were after a battle or in moments of glut in a conquered province. But such fragmentary evidence as we do have suggests that, at the end of the period of expansion, adult male unskilled slaves cost as much as would support an average peasant family for four years ( 2 , 0 0 0 HS = four tons of wheat equivalent at a conventional price for wheat of 3 HS per modius). At that price, slave-owners would have had to keep their slaves at work for at least two hundred days per year in order to make a profit.23 That is, more than twice as long as most subsistence farmers in Mediterranean (i.e. dry) farming normally work. Moreover, in conditions of high mortality, such as were prevalent in the ancient world, a slave owner risked the sudden death of the slaves he had bought and the immediate liquidation of his asset.

I do not mean by all this to question the profitability of Roman slavery in the period of expansion. Slavery lasted too long for that to 13 The demand price for slaves should reflect their marginal profitability; it is therefore

misleading to concentrate on knockdown slave prices ruling at moments of over-supply. The common price (500 dn = 2,000 HS) used here is the one given by A. H. M.Jones, 'Slavery in the ancient World', in M. I. Finley ed., Slavery in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, i 9 6 0 ) , 9 - 1 0 , admittedly on exiguous evidence, mostly chance remarks in poems; it is corroborated by a second-century inscription from Africa (CIL 8.23956): 'the price of a slave according to the census scale is 500 dn*. So also D. 4.4.31: Papinian; D. 5.2.8.17: Ulpian', D. 5.2.9: Paul. And see the prices for release cited in Chapter 111. The calculation of days' work is based on the amortisation of capital cost over twenty years, plus the cost of feeding, plus interest at 6% on capital invested against the cost of day wage labourers, derived from Diocletian's Edict on Maximum Prices at 2.5 kg wheat equivalent per person per day plus food (ESAR vol. 5, 3 3 6 ) ; I follow R. P. Duncan-Jones' persuasive argument that the castrensis modius used in the Edict equalled 1 Vi regular modii (each of 6.5 kg wheat), ZPE (1976). These data are crude, but the best we have, and give rough orders of magnitude. They would have to be absurdly wrong to upset the general conclusion advanced here.

1IO

The growth of a slave scxiety

be a realistic problem. Rather I want to stress the economic logic of slavery. The importation of a large number of agricultural slaves into central Italy necessarily implied a drastic reorganisation of land holdings. In a system of small family farms, slaves could not be adequately exploited. If slaves were to be properly supervised in gangs, then small family farms had to be amalgamated into larger holdings. The high capital cost of slaves led to the creadon of units large enough to provide them with work throughout the year. Moreover, large farms, especially those which concentrated on herding, olives or viticulture, could have yielded some economies of scale. Put another way, owners could afford to pay high prices for slaves, precisely because of the high productivity which could be forced out of them on larger farms.

For the owners of large farms, slaves offered several advantages over free labour. Slave-ownership conferred status. Slaves could be completely controlled by the master. They could be forced to work long hours throughout the year: Cato allowed oxen holidays on feast days unless there was grain to be stored, or firewood was needed; but mules and donkeys (and presumably the slaves working with them) got no holidays, except for family festivals (On Agriculture 138; cf. Columella 2.21). And slaves could be organised in gangs, in a way which cut across the traditional family organisation of free labour,24 and allowed some agricultural specialisation (such as ox-drivers, and vinedressers). In a society without a market in free labour, recruitment by force (i.e. slavery) was probably the only method of securing large numbers of full-time dependants with particular skills. Finally, in the exceptional circumstances of imperial conquest, Roman nobles could afford the high capital cost of slaves. They had massive spoils from the provinces at their disposal, and a shortage of opportunies for their profitable investment.25 At the same time they faced a shortage of amenable free labour. Slavery was one solution to this predicament.

Slavery and politics

Mass slavery in Rome should also be seen as a product of Roman politics. In the Roman political system, aristocrats depended for their status and power on election to political office, which they solicited from the plebs. To be sure, aristocrats manipulated the electorate. 44 Gangs of itinerant free labourers were available for specific agricultural tasks, such

as the olive harvest, but not all the year round. M These spoils were archetypal' free floating resources', rare in pre-industrial societies

in which the surplus is usually committed to a narrow range of conventional expenditures. For this idea, see S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political System of Empires (Ncvt York, 1963), 76ff.

I I I


Nevertheless, the political power of the citizen body significantly limited the extent to which rich Romans could systematically exploit free Roman citizens as overt dependants. Roman histories preserved the proud tradition of how, in the past, the armed plebs had marched out of the city of Rome in protest against aristocratic misrule and had won important concessions. An aristocrat who was shaking the hands of the people before an election once commented laughingly on the horny hand of a peasant; the rumour went round the rural tribes that he despised peasants for their poverty, and he lost the election.26

This story is only one illustration of the fact that throughout the period of conquest, portions of the Roman plebs had sufficient political and military power to limit the power of nobles and to secure a share in the imperial booty for themselves. Roman citizens living in Italy were exempted from direct taxes (after 167 BC); citizens living in the city of Rome received subsidised (from 122 BC) and eventually free wheat (from 58 BC); citizens and ex-soldiers received land-grants in colonies established outside central Italy and in the provinces. One function of all these developments was to allow the rich to occupy more land in central Italy because the state was providing alternative supplementary benefits for the free poor.

Slaves were forcibly imported aliens who were exploited to a degree and in a way which citizens would not allow. Moreover, slavery fed on itself. The presence of a substantial number of slaves in Roman society defined free citizens, even if they were poor, as superior. At the same time, free citizens' sense of superiority probably limited their willingness to compete with slaves, to work full time as the overt dependants of other citizens.27 Yet rich men, by definition, need dependants. Slavery permitted the ostentatious display of wealth in the palaces of the rich without involving the direct degradation of the free poor. Indeed slavery persisted as a method of displaying wealth in the Roman empire long after it had ceased to be a major method of producing wealth. Slavery allowed an increase in the discrepancy between the living-styles of rich and poor, while the traditional independence of the citizens was apparently preserved. It was important for the state that citizens should not be alienated from their willingness to fight as soldiers, for the further extension of the empire and the capture of more slaves. Even so, it is worth noting that, although slaves were often a significant element in war booty for both soldiers and 86 Valerius Maximus 7.5.2. 97 This is a core argument of M. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (London, 1972) 76IF.

I am not sure that the resistance to working for someone else persisted among the proletariat or peasantry after the fall of the Republic; cf. n. 22 above and D. Norr (1965: esp. 75ff.).

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generals, there is no evidence that the capture of slaves was a primary objective of warfare. Slaves were an important but incidental product of empire.

The sudden influx of huge wealth disrupted long-established patterns of production, consumption and exploitation. The elite converted their new-found wealth into the only asset which conventionally gave high status, Italian land. Compared with public office, land-ownership gave a steady income. Roman nobles did not become feudal lords or satraps, each ruling one sector of the conquered domain; oligarchic control of nobles by each other and by citizen soldiers was too strong. The central government, after a severe struggle throughout the last century of the Republic, survived as a strong force which controlled the power of individual nobles. Even so, Roman nobles increased their wealth towards a level commensurate with their control over a huge empire. But they kept their main source of wealth, the private ownership of land in the home country.

The preservation of these political and economic boundaries determined the developments already outlined. The nobles dispossessed large numbers of peasants of their land and replaced them by slaves. This led to the mass emigration of peasants. They went to the army and to the towns (and much later went to settle in the provinces). As soldiers, they provided the means of new conquests; as plebs, they formed a market for the consumption of the produce grown by slaves on the farms of the rich. The forcible intrusion of so many slaves into the peasant economy precipitated the repeated civil disturbances of the last century of the Republic. Even so, slavery was probably less disruptive than some of its alternatives, such as feudal fragmentation or the sudden transformation of Roman citizens into serfs.

This analysis suggests some of the aspects of slavery which have been common to the five 'slave societies'. In Rome and the Americas, and perhaps in Athens too, mass slavery was a direct consequence of imperial expansion. The purchase price of slaves was largely funded from outside the slave societies. In the southern states and in the West Indies, the growth of slavery can be seen as only one point in a triangle of extensive economic development. North-western Europe and the northern states of the USA provided both capital and a market; Africa provided labour; the slave states produced staples for export. The Roman economy was less differentiated; slavery was more direcdy a product of war: booty capitalism, as Weber called it, instead of industrial capitalism.

In both Athens and Rome, the mass participation of citizens in prolonged fighting was to some extent dependent on the labour of

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slaves. Large numbers of citizens could fight, simply because slaves were producing food or goods (wheat, wine, armour, ships). In both societies, the rights of citizenship were secured by the military power of citizens; these same rights prevented the full exploitation of citizens by each other. The rich were driven to exploit imported aliens as well or instead. Democracy in Athens and plebeian privileges in Rome were made possible by the combination of imperial conquest and slavery. It is interesting that slavery was also an important part of the economic network of democratic England and the northern states of the USA; but the connection between them is obscured by the fact that slavery was geographically located outside the boundaries of democratic society.28

It is tempting to use these selected common characteristics of mass slavery as part of an explanation of its rarity. Conquest seems to have been a prerequisite, since most pre-industrial societies do not by themselves generate a sufficient surplus to pay for the capital purchase of a large alien labour force. The predominance of the subsistence sector precludes the sudden expansion of production, if only because there is no market for the consumption of a surplus. A similar vicious circle still binds economically underdeveloped societies today.

But when conquest had occurred, slavery was only one of several possible forms of exploitation: feudal fragmentation, the colonisation of populated territories (which requires the conquerors to live in the conquered lands) or dependence on tax revenues (which presupposes a stable fiscal system and bureaucracy), each lessens the need to purchase and transport a slave labour force to the home country. Mass chattel slavery has arisen only where there was either a shortage of a local labour force in the conquered territory, or some effective limitation on the number and degree to which conquerors could themselves be exploited; or both.29 In Athens and Rome, the rich remained in the home-country; their exploitation of fellow-citizens was constrained by the norms of citizenship and by their continued dependence on citizens as soldiers, In a simple economy, where ownership of land was the chief basis of wealth, the distance between production and consumption was so short that effective disguise of exploitation was difficult. Exploitation was mostly face-to-face. You knew who was profiting from your labour. Slavery allowed the rich n The part played by slavery in the economic development of the first industrial

nadons is provocatively stressed by £. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (London, 1964).

* This analysis is derived in part from H.J. Nieboer, Slavery as an Industrial System (The Hague1, 191 o); cf. for an interesting comparative discussion A. Sio, * Interpretations of slavery', Comp. Stud. Soe. Hist. 7 (1964-5) 289-308.

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to enjoy the fruits of conquest by exploiting outsiders instead of insiders, without provoking a sharp break in the political culture. How else could the elite take advantage of a rapid increase in the chances of being rich?

W H Y D I D T H E ROMANS F R E E SO M A N Y S L A V E S ?

I took care that h e would not die a slave, w h e n a fatal fever held h im burning in its grip. I res igned all my rights as a master to the sick man - he deserved my gift and to get better. Dying, he was conscious of his reward, and called m e 'patron' [not master] , as he began his journey to the underworld waters, a free man. (Martial 1.101.5-10) Freedom conferred at the e n d of l i f e . . . is of n o importance. (Julian - a Roman lawyer second century AD (D 40.4.17))

On the number of ex-slaves and the high status of some

One of the most striking aspects of Roman slavery was the frequency with which slaves were freed by their masters. The impression one gets from the sources is of a large number (i.e. tens of thousands) of ex-slaves mingled with the free-born population in the city of Rome. It is important to note that we have clues rather than precise numbers of ex-slaves in the total population. For example, one successful political general in the late Republic (Sulla) is said to have freed ten thousand slaves (Appian, Civil Wars 1.100 and 104); the fire-brigade of seven thousand men, formed in AD 6, was initially recruited only from ex-slaves (Dio 55.26); under Augustus, a law was passed prohibiting a master from freeing more than a hundred slaves in his will (Gaius, Institutes 1.42-3), although no effective limit was placed on the number of slaves whom he could free during his life-time.30 About seven thousand tombstone inscriptions from the city of Rome clearly indicate the dead person's status; of these, three times as many commemorate ex-slaves as free-born.31 We should not conclude from this that most 30 See S. Treggiari, Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic (Oxford, 1969) 31-6; and

A. N. Sherwin White, The Raman Citizenship (Oxford*, 1973), 322-34; and on the ineffectiveness of laws restricting manumission see G. Alfoldy, 'Die Freilassung von Sklaven', Rivista storica dell* antichita 2 (1972) 97-129; he shows that a high proportion of ex-slaves, whose ages at death were recorded and who were freed, died before the age of thirty. But such slaves are probably not a random sample of all slaves or ex-slaves, to that his conclusion that most slaves were freed before the age of thirty is obviously illegitimate (see note 63 below).

31 On Republican tombstones from the city of Rome recording the death of slaves (N « 650), see Treggiari (1969) 32; for later evidence see L. R. Taylor, 'Freedmen and freeborn in the epitaphs of imperial Rome', Amer. /. Phil. 82 (1961) 113-32. It is very important to note that only about one third of 22,000 tombstone-inscriptions from the city of Rome provide clear indication of the dead person's status, whether slave,

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citizens living in the city of Rome had once been slaves or were the offspring of slaves.32 But it seems reasonable to think that the numbers of ex-slaves were substantial.

Almost all ex-slaves freed by Roman masters received Roman citizenship (but see Gaius, Institutes i . i 2 f f . ) . Some ex-slaves gained considerable wealth and social prominence. In a debate in the Roman senate, it was reportedly said that many knights and some senators were descended from ex-slaves (Tacitus, Annob 13.27). Throughout the first century AD, ex-slaves of the emperor's household filled important posts as secretaries of state (of the treasury, appeals etc.) in the central administration. They were the confidants of emperors, resentfully flattered and courted for favours by free-born nobles. Pallas, the ex-slave of the emperor Claudius, for example, was given the rank of praetor; and in a fulsome decree the senate offered him fifteen times the minimum fortune of a senator. * Pallas, to whom all to the utmost of their ability acknowledge their obligation, should reap the just reward of his outstanding loyalty and devotion to duty' (Pliny, Letters 8.6). To add insult to injury, he refused the offer.83

In the provinces, ex-slaves of the emperor supervised the collection of taxes and kept an eye for the emperor on the activities of senatorial governors.34 Sometimes, ex-slaves governed a province; for example, Felix, the procurator of Judaea who judged St Paul, was an ex-slave. Ex-slaves were sometimes admirals in charge of the Roman navy. Slaves of the emperor frequendy married women of free birth and

ex-slave, free citizen or alien. Their status was clearly not as important to them as to us. On the basis of names typically given to slaves (for example, Eutyches), and from the marriage of men and women with the same name taken from their common master, Taylor deduced that among those whose death was recorded and whose status is uncertain the proportion of slaves and ex-slaves was as high as among the minority whose status was certain. But what about the descendants of ex-slaves, who were free born? T. Frank ('Race mixture in the Roman empire', Amer. Hist Rev. 21

(1916) 689-708) concluded that most people living in Rome, including the descendants of ex-slaves, were of slave extraction.

M Brunt (1971: 377, 386) concluded on even worse evidence that in the late Republic most people living in the city of Rome were either slaves, ex-slaves or their descendants. Prima facie, this is improbable; it presupposes a cordon sanitaire around Rome preventing the immigration of landless citizen-peasants. It seems clear to me that the surviving tombstones are unrepresentative of the total city population; that said, the explanation for the preponderance of tombstone inscriptions set up to or by ex-slaves escapes me.

33 Other notable flatteries by free men of ex-slaves are in Statius, Silvae 5.1 and 3.3 (the latter addressed to the son of an ex-slave married to a woman of noble birth); Seneca, To Polybius, On Consolation - addressed by a senator to an ex-slave high official of the emperor.

34 For a very good general discussion see A. M. Duff, Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire (repr. Cambridge, 1958) 143-86; for detailed footnotes, see G. Boulvert, Esclaves et affranchis imperiaux (Naples, 1970), esp. io7ff. on ex-slave provincial procurators.

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Why did the Romans free so many slaveys?

themselves owned slaves.35 Private owners used slaves as business agents, confidential secretaries and farm bailiffs. Such slaves were put in charge of other slaves, as overseers, and unlike practice in the American south, they were, at least ideally, specially trained for the task (Columella, On Agriculture i I . I ) . Education and literacy were in no sense thought of as subverting slavery. Many skilled slaves gained their freedom. A few amassed huge fortunes and set up magnificent monuments; the wealth of ex-slaves became notorious, a subject of satire on the decadence of old free Roman virtues.36 One ex-slave at his death owned over 4,000 slaves, 7,200 oxen and 60 million HS in cash (sixty times the minimum fortune of a senator) (Pliny, Natural History 33.135). Our sources give the impression that at humbler levels of society ex-slaves dominated commercial life in the city of Rome. Nor was it only commercial life which they dominated. Ex-slaves commonly became leaders of religious cult-groups, apparently on equal terms with free citizens.37

The large number of ex-slaves and the high status of some pose a problem. Why did Roman masters free so many slaves? At first sight, it seems amazing. Slaves cost money. Skilled or talented slaves apparently stood the best chance of securing their freedom, and they cost a lot of money.38 By buying a slave in the first place, a master had acquired the right to all the slave's labour and produce for the rest of his life, without further payment. Why did he surrender these rights? Roman society was not marked by altruism.

Historians of ancient slavery have usually described the emancipation of slaves from a humanitarian point of view; they have seen it as a softening element in a harsh system. It is true that for the individual slave, manumission was an act of generosity by the master 35 P. R. C. Weaver, Familia Caesaris (Cambridge, 1972) 114. Of 462 known wives of

imperial slaves, only a quarter were themselves slaves. 38 The archetypal rich ex-slave is Trimakhio, Petronius' satirical fiction in the Satyricon.

He made his money through inheritance from his master and by risky trade. For other ex-slaves' wealth, see Martial 5.13; Pliny, Natural History 33.134-5; Seneca, Letters 27.5 and 86.7.

37 One inscription (ILS 6073) from the second century A D shows that 229 ( 8 6 % ) out of 275 district officials (magistri vicorum) connected with the imperial cult in the city of Rome were ex-slaves; see Duff (1958: 132). In many religious cults there was no stria dividing line between slaves, ex-slaves and free. Indeed slaves were sometimes cult-masters (magistri) with free men as cult 'servants' (ministri). See F. Bdmer, Untersuchungen uber der Religion der Sklaven in Griechenland und Rom, part 1 (Wiesbaden, 1958) passim.

38 Columella (On Agriculture 3.3.8) advised the purchase of a skilled vine-dresser at 6-8,000 HS, that is three-four times the 'normal* (see n. 23) price for an unskilled adult male slave. At the conventional wheat price of 3 HS per modius of 6.5 kg, 6,000 HS - 13 tons of wheat equivalent, roughly enough to support a peasant family at minimum subsistence for thirteen years.

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which allowed him to escape from servitude. Ex-slaves presumably felt, and in the surviving records frequendy expressed their gratitude to their masters - a feeling for which we have the flattering mirror-image in Martial's poem on the liberation of his own dying slave, quoted at the beginning of this section.

Such descriptions of individual feelings have biased the discussion of slave emancipation. If we consider slavery as a system, then the liberation of slaves, whatever blessings it brought to individuals, acted not as a solvent of the slave system, but as a major reinforcement. Emancipation reinforced slavery as a system because Roman slaves, frequently, even customarily in my view, paid substantial sums for their freedom. The prospect of becoming free kept a slave under control and hard at work, while the exaction of a market price as the cost of liberty enabled the master to buy a younger replacement. Humanity was complemented by self-interest.

Misery, cruelty, rebellion and philosophy

Both views of slave manumission, the humanitarian and the economic, require some qualification and elaboration. Most Roman slaves were freed only by death.39 Roman writers on agriculture took it for granted that their readers' land would normally be worked by gangs of chained slaves.40 Such slaves presumably had no realistic prospect of liberty, Cato recommended that slaves worn out with work should be sold (On Agriculture 2.7). And we know that some masters in the first century AD left their sick slaves to fend for themselves in public places dedicated to the god of healing, only to reclaim them if they recovered (Suetonius, Claudius 25; D. 40.8.2); the emperor denied the master's right to recover slaves neglected in this way.

Roman literature abounds with examples of incidental cruelty to individual domestic slaves. The emperor Augustus, for example, ordered that the legs of a trusted slave be broken because he had taken a bribe and revealed the contents of a letter (Suetonius, Augustus 67). Th<e physician Galen reported that the emperor Hadrian once in anger stabbed a slave in the eye with a stylus. He later regretted it and asked the slave to choose a gift in recompense. The slave was silent. The emperor pressed him for a reply. The slave said that all he wanted was his eye back (ed. Kuhn, vol. 5, 17-18). Seneca portrayed a master at dinner, surrounded by slaves: 'The unfortunate slaves are not * This assumes an egalitarian heaven. 40 Pliny (Letters 3.19) made a special point of the fact that he and neighbouring

land-owners did not use chained gangs. This makes sense only if it was common in some other places - for which see Columella, On Agriculture 1.6.3; 1.8.15ff.; 1.9.4.

I l 8

Why did the Romans free so many slaves?

allowed to move their lips, let alone talk; the birch keeps murmuring down. A cough, a sneeze, a hiccup is rewarded by a flogging, with no exceptions. Any break in the silence is severely punished. They stand at the ready all night, tense and mute* (Moral Letters 4 7 ) 4 1

Gladiatorial shows in which slaves were publicly killed for the pleasure of the free, and the legal fiction in criminal cases that the evidence of slaves could be trusted only if it was exacted under torture are two symptoms of the customary cruelty of Roman masters to their slaves. Ancient descriptions of working conditions for slaves in quicksilver mines in central Asia Minor, or gold mines in Egypt make it clear that slave miners there did not survive long.42 In the Spanish silver mines, forty thousand slaves were said to have worked:

T h e s l a v e s . . . produce incredible profit for their masters, but they themselves wear out their bodies, d igg ing underground by day and by night, and many of them die under the strain of such terrible conditions. T h e y are not allowed any pause or rest from their work, but are forced by the blows of their overseers to endure sheer misery. (Diodorus 5.38)

'All slaves are enemies' (quot servi, tot hastes) went a Roman proverb.43 Tens of thousands of slaves were systematically exploited on farms and in mines; even talented and responsible slaves in the households of senators and knights were liable to suffer from the cruel caprice or normal disciplinary practices of a master.44 Slaves were at

41 Augustus was also said to have punished an ex-slave procurator in Egypt, who ate a prize-fighting quail, by having him nailed to a ship's mast (Plutarch, Sayings of the Romans 207B). Beating slaves was routine; philosophers merely advised that it should not be done in anger (Galen, ed. Kühn, vol. 5, 17-18; Seneca, On Anger 3.32!^).

41 For the realgar (Pquicksilver) mines, see Strabo 1 2 . 3 . 4 0 . .in addition to the harshness of the work, it is said that the air in the mines is deadly. . . so that workmen very soon die*. Cf. Cyprian, Letter 76 (Bud£) for a rhetorical account of conditions in mines for condemned Christians. For numbers in the Spanish silver mines in the second century BC , see Strabo 3.2.10 citing Polybius. For Egyptian gold-mines in the second century BC , see C. Müller, Geographi Graeci Minores vol. 1,123 ff., and Diodorus 3.12-14. For an overview, cf. O. Davies, Roman Mines in Europe (Oxford, 1935).

43 Festus 314L; Seneca, Moral Letters 47.5; Macrobius, Saturnalia 1.11.13; all call it a proverb. Seneca (loc. cit.) preached that masters alienated slaves by their cruelty and abuses; Macrobius similarly: 'At home we become tyrants and want to exercise power over slaves, constrained not by decency but capacity'.

44 It is of course difficult to tell what was normal. Ancient sources provide no systematic account of slavery; there are no slave autobiographies, no abolitionist tracts -because no one questioned the institution of slavery. The occasional glimpses provided by ancient authors, however, fit in well enough with the full and very interesting accounts provided by, for example, Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom (New York, 1855), and G. Osofsky, Puttin* on Ole Massa (New York, 1969) respectively the best and a collection of slave autobiographies from the American south. See also the detailed eye-witness accounts in The Minutes of the Evidence taken before a Committee of the Whole House (the British House of Commons on slavery in the West Indies) 1789-91, and the discussion by G. Freyre, Masters and Slaves (New York, 1946) on Brazilian slavery.

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the mercy of their masters. They could be overworked, neglected, thrown out when old, beaten, or even killed, and mostly had no realistic chance of protecting themselves (but see below, p. 222). To be sure slaves had no monopoly of misery. The free poor did most of the jobs which slaves did; they worked in mines and on farms, though less often as domestics. Indeed, the economic value of slaves to their masters sometimes protected them. In Roman Italy, as in the southern states, masters on occasion gave dangerous jobs to free men explicitly in order to safeguard their slaves (see Varro, On Agriculture 1.17). Even so, slaves must often have feared maltreatment, and that fear must have affected even more than those who actually suffered.

The mutual hostility of master and slave, which slavery inevitably evokes, showed through both collectively and individually. Between 135 and 70 BC, there were three major slave rebellions in Sicily and Italy, which were apparendy fostered by the concentration and neglect of thousands of newly enslaved. The slaves' initial success against Roman legions was not maintained; eventually the slave armies were defeated and ruthlessly crushed.4 5 It is worth noting that rebel slaves never aimed at the abolition of slavery, only at the exchange of roles with their masters or at escape to their home country; after 70 BC, we hear of no serious, large-scale slave revolts, though minor outbreaks occasionally threatened (Tacitus, Annals 4.27; Histories 3.47; ILS 961).

The hostility of masters to their slaves ran just below the surface of Roman civilisation. It erupted in the law and the practice that all the slaves living in the house of a master killed by one of his own slaves should be tortured and executed.46 In one notorious case (AD 61), four hundred household slaves were executed, though only after a debate in the senate and in the teeth of popular outcry. According to Tacitus, the clinching argument in the senate was:

. . . d o you believe that a slave m a d e u p his mind to kill his master without an o m i n o u s phrase escaping him, without o n e word uttered rashly? Assume however that h e kept quiet, that h e procured his weapon in an unsuspect ing household . Could h e pass the watch, carry in his light, and perpetrate his murder without an accomplice? A crime has many antecedent symptoms.

So long as o u r slaves act as informers, we may live a minority amid their mass, secure while they fear, and finally, if we die , certain of vengeance against the guilty. O u r ancestors always suspected s l a v e s . . . 45 The road from Capua to Rome was lined with 6,000 crucified slaves captured from

the remnants of Spartacus' rebellion. In general, see J. Vogt, Struktur der antiken Sklavenkriege (Wiesbaden, 1957) now translated in J. Vogt, Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man (Oxford, 1974) $gff.

46 By a senatorial decree of A D 10 (SC Silanianum)t if a master was killed, and the murderer could not be found, all the household slaves were tortured and executed.

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Now that our households comprise tribes with customs the opposite of our own, with strange cults or with none, you will never coerce such a mixture of humanity, except by terror. (Annals 14.44, c** ,3-3 2)i trans adapted from the Loeb Classical Library)

Most slave resistance involved neither open rebellion nor murder. It probably took the form of guile, deceit, lying and indolence. This can be documented only from incidental remarks in Roman and Greek literature, which of course reflect the masters' stereotype of their slaves. Yet it is interesting that the character of slaves in Roman comedy has a lot in common with the American stereotypical slave Sambo: impudent, gossiping, lazy, deceitful, light-fingered, unscrupulous. It seems reasonable to suppose that the stereotype was based in reality; many slaves' characters were moulded by their overt powerlessness.47

Roman slaves had one decisive advantage over American black slaves; they had no obvious distinguishing marks. Proposals to make them wear special dress were rejected out of fear that they would then realise the strength of their numbers (Seneca, On Mercy 1.24). Both as slaves and as freed men they could merge with the rest of the population. In a society without photographs, it was relatively easy for slaves to run away. The emperor Augustus recorded in his list of achievements that during the civil wars he had returned 30,000 runaway slaves to their masters for punishment.48 Conditions during the civil wars were exceptional; but the problem was recurrent, witness the iron slave-collars excavated by archaeologists. Several are inscribed; for example. *I have escaped; arrest me; take me back to my master Zoninus and you will be rewarded with a gold piece' (CIL i 5 - 7 I Q 4 ) -

The viciousness of Roman slavery, the exploitation, cruelty and mutual hostility are worth stressing because modern accounts often focus instead on those elements in Roman philosophy, literature and law which point to the humanitarian treatment of slaves, and to the willing loyalty of some slaves to their masters.49 Stoic philosophers stressed the common humanity of slaves and free men: the master buys and sells only the slave's body; 'only their body is at the mercy and disposition of the master; the mind is its own master, and is free...' (Seneca, On Benefits 3.20); the slave can be free in spirit, just as the 47 G. E. Duckworth, The Nature of Roman Comedy (Princeton, 1952) 249fr.; S. M. Elkins,

Slavery (New York, 1963) 81-139. 4 9 My Achievements 25; those for whom no master could be found were impaled, so Dio

49.12.5. See now also H. Bellen, Studien zur Sklavenfiucht im römischen Kaiserreich (Wiesbaden, 1971).

49 On loyal slaves, see J. Vogt on Sklaventreue (1972) 83-96; (1974) 129.

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free men can be a slave to ambition, fear, grief or gluttony. Man is by nature free, not a slave.50 But for all their enlightened views on slavery, Stoic philosophers were not social reformers. They objected to cruelty, but they never aimed at abolishing slavery. The elevation of moral freedom above the slavery of the body relieved them of any pressure to change the social order. Christians similarly, by their emphasis on rewards in heaven partly in compensation for sufferings on earth, accepted slavery.51

Slaves, give entire obedience to your earthly masters, not merely with an outward show of service, to curry favour with m e n , but with s ingle-mindedness out of reverence for the L o r d . . . knowing that there is a Master w h o will give you your heritage as a reward for your service. Christ is the Master whose slaves you must be. (Paul, Colossians 3 . 2 2 - 4 ; T h e N e w English Bible, 1961)

Within these rigid lines of accepting slavery, philosophy and later Christianity both helped to soften the rigours of Roman law concerning slaves. It was forbidden to sell slaves as gladiators or prostitutes without stating specific cause (SHA, Hadrian 18); masters were not allowed to punish slaves excessively or to kill them (unless they died as a result of reasonable punishment!); the separation of slave wives and children was discouraged; slaves who thought that they were unjustly treated could seek asylum at the emperor's statue, in a temple, or later in a Christian church; a magistrate could order maltreated slaves to be sold to another master.52 In some borderline cases, the law gave the benefit of doubt to the slave and upheld his right to be freed. Slavery was even defined by an academic jurist as 'a practice of the law of nations, by which one person is subjected to the dominion of another, contrary to nature* (D. 1.5.4.1 Florentinus). Yet for all this, it is doubtful that the Roman government ensured that its laws were executed systematically, let alone in favour of slaves. Rather, we should understand the laws as reflecting a desire of the ruling class to see that the worst excesses of masters were checked. 'Masters, be just and fair to your slaves, knowing that you too have a Master in Heaven' 80 Seneca, On Benefits 3. i8ff. ; Epictetus, Discourses 1.29; 3.24; Dio Chrysostom, Discourses

14-15 which (in fifteen pages) form the longest treatment of slavery in classical literature.

51 Still the best discussion of Christian and philosophical attitudes is H. Wallon, Histoire

de Vesclavage dans Vantiquité (Paris, 1879) v°l* 3» l~4ß* niore recently, H. Gülzow, Christentum und Sklaverei (Bonn, 1969).

M Gaius, Institutes 1, 53; D. 1.6.2: Ulpian; Paul, Sententiae 5.23.6; D. 33.7.12.7: Ulpian; Wallon (1879) v°l- 3» *>2fF.; W. L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Philadelphia, 1955) 114fr.

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(Colossians 4 . 1 ) . 5 3 Ideals no doubt affected practice; but moral prescription is usually weak evidence of actual behaviour. Evidence from elsewhere suggests that laws and social values deprecating cruelty failed to prevent excesses.54 The midgation of slavery by philosophical belief and imperial decree probably made litde impression on the routine corruption implicit in an elite culture which took the massed subservience of slaves for granted.

The legal and social status of slaves and ex-slaves

In Roman law, slaves were treated more as things than as persons. According to the Roman senator Varro, agricultural slaves were 'articulate tools* (instrumentum vocale) as distinct from 'semi-articulate tools* such as oxen, or 'dumb tools' such as carts.55 These definitions are yet further symptoms of the powerlessness and suffering of many slaves in Roman Italy. Yet the starkness of the legal definition is too persuasive; it tempts us to think of slaves as forming unequivocally the lowest stratum in the Roman social pyramid.

But an important minority of slaves had considerable prestige, social power and influence. Their social status conflicted with their legal status as slaves. I am not thinking here of masters' pet slaves, concubines or nannies. As in Brazil and the southern states, their privileges implied a dent in the stratification system, but their deferential dependence on their masters kept them in their place. However, there were other slaves whose value to their masters lay in the fact that they were able to take responsibility as thinking persons, not things. These were slave doctors, teachers, writers, accountants, agents, bailiffs, overseers, secretaries, and sea-captains. Why did the Romans give such jobs to slaves?

Part of the answer lay in the cultural and administrative implications of conquering an empire. The Romans admired and wanted to imitate the culture of the conquered East. But imitation required refined education and the exercise of skills, in which Romans had no experience. To fill the gap, Greek-speaking philosophers, teachers and 53 Cf. Seneca, On Mercy 1.18:' It is praiseworthy to be moderate in what you tell slaves

to do. Even with slaves, one ought to consider not how much you can make them suffer without fearing revenge, but how much jusdce and goodness allow; both enjoin mercy on captives and bought slaves.*

54 See Douglass (1855) and Minutes (1789-91) cited in note 44; poor masters did maltreat their only valuable slave. Occasionally Roman slaves succeeded in invoking the law in their favour; I suspect they had powerful patronage.

55 On Agriculture 1.17; but see D, 1.6.2: Ulpian; Gaius, Institutes 1.53.

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doctors were brought to Rome.5 6 Slavery was one of the chief methods of recruiting the highly cultured to work in Roman Italy. The sophistication of Rome as the cultural capital of the empire depended considerably on educated, foreign-born slaves. Similarly, the administration of a huge empire under a single stable government required the development of a bureaucracy. As we have seen, free-born Roman citizens traditionally disliked the idea of working as long-term employees at the beck and call of other free men (except in the army). The second-century satirist Lucian has left an amusing account of the servitude implicit for a free man working as a * professor' or litterateur in the house of a noble Roman (On Salaried Posts in Great Houses, esp. 23-4). In a later essay, he justified his own actions in taking a salaried post in the provincial administration, on the grounds that working for the emperor did not involve the same servitude (Apology 11). It seems amazing that this had to be argued, even for amusement, in the second century. Free men apparendy felt that a permanent job restricted their freedom of choice, constrained them like slaves. Faced by this prejudice, provincial governors in the Republic and then emperors staffed their administration predominandy with slaves and ex-slaves, and not with free born citizens.57

The slaves and ex-slaves of the emperor formed an especially privileged and powerful group. The status and power of their master inevitably rubbed off on them.5 8 Unlike nobles, slaves' tenure of office was not restricted to short periods. They had time to accumulate power. Several top slaves and ex-slaves had privileged access to the emperor; they provided him with, or cut him off from information; they were his trusted confidants. But their inferior legal status was still important; they were at the emperors' mercy, even more than senators; because they were slaves, or ex-slaves, they could easily be punished and they were not rivals for imperial power. In many other monarchies, lower-class servants have been similarly used in positions of power (see below, Chapter iv).

In the imperial household, and in private households too, the discrepancy between the legal status of cultured slaves and their actual power and responsibility was repeatedly solved by giving them 46 On slave litterateurs, see for example those listed by Suetonius, On Grammarians.

Both Terence and Aesop, for example, were slaves. A notable ex-slave doctor was Antonius Musa, physician to the emperor Augustus. Many such skilled men were freed.

87 Freeborn citizens served as lieutenants or aides-de-camp of the governor; as such they were subordinates, but only temporarily and they saw themselves ideally as men of independence. For a Republican example of the power of a slave assistant to the governor, see Cicero, Letters to his brother Quintus 1.1.17.

88 On the influence of the emperors* slaves and ex-slaves, see Boulvert (1970: 335ff.).

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freedom. But it was only a partial soludon. First, even the insignia of high rank, commensurate with actual power (for example, a few imperial ex-slaves were given senatorial insignia, several the status of knights) could not erase the stigma of previous slavery. Secondly, the émancipation of imperial administrative slaves did not generally raise the status of administrative jobs in the eyes of many free men suffi-ciendy to make them attractive; the attitudes of Lucian cited above show this clearly. Throughout the High Empire, many important posts remained the preserve of slaves and ex-slaves, although in the course of the first century AD the highest positions in the central and provincial administration (such as head of the central government secretariat or of indirect taxes in the provinces), were increasingly filled by free-born knights.59

The regular use by Romans of skilled and highly cultured slaves in responsible positions (which contrasts so markedly with common practice in the American southern states) induced a series of flexible compromises with the weaknesses and rigidity of chattel slavery. For example, by a legal fiction, an agreement made by a slave acting as his master's accredited agent was binding on the master; the slave was assumed to be an extension of the master's body, working with his master's mind.*0 The master thus revoked total control of the slave and gave him discretion in bargaining. In other cases, the master explicidy limited his liability to the extent of the slave's own 'private purse* (peculium).

The concept 'peculium' applied originally to the money which a father allowed a son, who was still under his authority; in our sources, however, it is most commonly used to describe a slave's possessions. The institution of peculium allowed the slave a working capital, 'borrowed' from his master. The use by slaves and ex-slaves of their master's capital gave them a decisive advantage over the free poor, and must have been an important factor underlying the prominence of slave and ex-slave enterprises in Roman commerce and manufacture. The manumission of slaves engaged in commerce or manufacture, with finance derived from their masters, symptomised the fragmentation of production and trade in the Roman world and the predominance of the family as the unit of labour. In the Roman world, slavery was almost the only mechanism which allowed the aggregation of labour into units larger than the family. But manumission split large units owned by a capitalist master back into smaller, M On the rise of knights, see H. G. Pflaum, Les procurateurs équestres sous le haut-empire

romain (Paris, 1950). 60 W. W. Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery (Cambridge, 1908) 131IF.

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family units, based on the ex-slave. In the process, the master sacrificed any economies of scale for lower costs of supervision and smaller risk. In return, he presumably got from his ex-slaves, either interest on loans or a share in the ex-slaves' profits, or both. The devolution of risk and control in commerce to individual ex-slaves was similar to the growing preference of Italian landlords in the High Empire for tenancies rather than large direcdy-controlled farms.

The very idea that slaves could de facto control their own property, including their own slaves, implied independence of action. The peculium was the institutional expression of that freedom of action. Although even privileged slaves were not always able to sell their labour on the market as they chose, many of them worked in positions in which they were able to make a profit for themselves. Indeed, there is evidence that masters paid some of their slaves a regular monthly wage.61 Slaves could save out of their earnings. And eventually they could use their savings to buy their freedom.

The slave's desire to buy his freedom was the master's protection against laziness and shoddy work - although the slave might also cheat his master to speed his chances of buying freedom. The slave had freedom to work for. The master held out the carrot as well as the stick; the stick by itself, as the American experience showed, was ineffectual. The cost of providing an incentive for good work was liberty. But the regular emancipation of slaves subverted the original unconditional purchase of a slave's total life-long labour. For skilled slaves, chattel slavery was effectively transformed into a medium-term labour 'contract'. Of course, it was not a legal contract; it could not be enforced by individual slaves; slaves had no such legal rights; but in general, the 'contract* was honoured. The slave who killed his master and so brought about the execution of four hundred fellow slaves may have been provoked, according to Tacitus (Annals 14.42) by his master's refusal to grant him liberty, after a price had been fixed. Cicero once implied (Philippics 8.32) that 'diligent and honest' slaves could reckon on liberty within seven years.62 Among the ex-slaves of private owners 61 Seneca, Moral Letters 80.7 indicated that urban slaves got 5 modii (33 kg) of wheat and

20 HS cash per month. Lucian (On Salaried Posts in Great Houses 23) made it clear that slaves there got monthly pay. Roman manumissions were not unique. Some slaves were freed in the American south, and a great number of slaves were freed in Cuba, through the bridging institution of caartacion (H. S. Klein, Slavery in the Americas (London, 1967) 197). However, the scale of manumission in Rome, the high status of some ex-slaves and their assimilation into the free population, all seem exceptional.

68 In other passing remarks, Cicero implied that freedom was regularly granted to slaves (Pro Balbo 24), and that without the prospect of freedom slavery would be intolerable (Rob. Perd. 15 and 16). It is likely that he was thinking of a narrow range of slaves such as those with whom he himself came into contact. Even then his perceptions may not have been realistic for all masters.

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whose age at death was recorded on tombstones in the western half of the empire, over three fifths had been freed before the age of thirty (N = i,20i). 6 3 Among ex-slaves belonging to the emperor, the proportion was lower, but clearly freedom was granted to most of those commemorated before the age of forty.64 Such evidence is difficult to interpret because slaves and ex-slaves with inscribed stone memorials were unlikely to have been typical of all slaves, or perhaps even of all ex-slaves. Yet this evidence does corroborate the general impression we get from the sources. A substantial body of skilled slaves secured their freedom at an age when they were still valuable to their masters. Why?

Analytically, we can separate the various reasons for freeing slaves, but in reality the reasons were probably mixed. Some masters freed their slaves predominandy out of affection. Three fifths of the ex-slaves, commemorated as dying before the age of thirty, were female (N == 768),65 and we find a similarly high proportion of females among the slaves freed at Delphi (Chapter 111). A fair number of tombstones record marriages between a master and his ex-slave. Admittedly, tombstone inscriptions invite pious over-statement; still, full legal marriages between master and ex-slave, publicly acknowledged, bespeak a paternalism quite different in quality from what is known from the southern states of the USA. Slaves were not considered slaves by nature; they had no distinguishing racial characteristics and so could easily become free parents of free citizens. Other surviving tombstones record affection between a master and the slave he had found, reared (alumnus) and then freed. The law codes preserve dozens of legacies by which a master provided for the benefit or maintenance of ex-slaves

63 This is based on G. Alfdldy's (1972) analysis of 1,201 ages at death of ex-slaves from the city of Rome, Italy, Spain and the Danubian provinces, excluding the emperors' ex-slaves. He drew attention to the fact that only 14% (N = 644) of slaves, as against 3 8 % of ex-slaves are recorded as dying over the age of thirty. He concluded that therefore most slaves, except those living in the countryside, were released before the age of thirty. But those who had their age at death recorded by patrons, masters or fellow slaves may have been a biased sample of all slaves and ex-slaves dying; for example, young highly valued slaves, of a quality such that they might later be freed, were presumably more likely to be commemorated if they died young, than dull slaves who would never be freed. For a discussion and analysis of uncorrectable bias in ages of death recorded on Roman tombstones see Volume Two. But even though Alfoldy overstated his case, it does seem that manumission before the age of thirty was common for those * privileged' ex-slaves commemorated on tombstones. Moreover, ex-slaves who died at ages greater than thirty may have been freed before they reached thirty.

64 Among imperial ex-slaves, only 24 % (N = 173) are recorded as freed and dead before the age of thirty, while 47 % (N = 440) of imperial slaves died over the age of thirty while still slaves. Overall, Weaver (1972: 100-4) plausibly concluded that imperial slaves were often manumitted at ages 30-40.

• G. Alfdldy (1972) i n .

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after his death (for example D. 33.1; 34.1 and 40.4). Moreover, it became common to allow ex-slaves to be buried together with the ex-master's wife and children in the family tomb. For example, a tombstone inscription from the city of Rome reads: *To the Gods of the Underworld. Q. Alfidius Apolaustrus to his revered wife Turrania Satulla with whom he lived for 45 years and to his son Q. Alfidius Apolaustrus who lived 27 years...and to their ex-slaves and their descendants' (CIL 6.11439).

Masters also freed slaves as an ostentatious token of their wealth and power. Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote of conditions in the late Republic, before Augustus limited the number of slaves who could be freed by will: ' I know of some who have allowed all their slaves to be freed at their death in the hope of being called good men when they are dead, and of having a large funeral procession of ex-slaves wearing the cap of freedom on their heads' (Roman Antiquities 4.24). Perhaps some prominent citizens freed their slaves to swell the numbers of their clients (though I don't know whom they would have impressed); and it is said that others freed their slaves to take advantage of the free wheat distributed to citizens. Emancipation of this kind caused something of a scandal in the time of Julius Caesar and Augustus, but it seems doubtful that the numbers involved were really as great as the objectors implied.

In the final analysis, the liberation of so many slaves was acceptable to masters only because it was profitable. As we have seen, masters derived some of their profit from the extra work which favoured slaves did under the spur of freedom enticingly visible on the horizon. This prospect of freedom was underpinned by yet another subversion of pure chattel slavery: such slaves were paid a wage. If the slave died before he bought his freedom, which must have happened often in the conditions of high mortality prevalent in Rome, then in law his savings automatically went to the master. Generous masters might waive their rights in favour of the slave's wife or children (Pliny, Letters 8.16), but that was mentioned presumably because it was exceptional. The sum which the slave paid, or contracted to pay out of his future earnings, was the master's chief source of profit from manumission. With this money he could replace an old slave with a young one.

These arguments are plausible, but they do not constitute proof. Unfortunately, the Roman evidence for frequent self-purchase of manumission is only circumstantial. The frequency with which the practice was mentioned in the Roman law codes (I have found over

128


seventy references) suggests that the practice was common.66 Opinions in the law codes confirm also that the slave's purchase of freedom was compatible with other forms of release. For example, a master in his will commonly gave a slave permission to buy his freedom in the formula: *If he gives n denarii to my heir, let him be free.' Lawyers sometimes just took it for granted that a slave had to pay his market value to the ex-master's estate.67 Many slaves would have been grateful for such an opportunity; yet literary sources have understandably concentrated on the axis of generosity and gratitude, rather than on the cash paid. All in all, it seems reasonable to argue that slaves' purchase of their own freedom was very common. In the manumissions from Delphi in Greece which we examine in Chapter HI, purchase of freedom was almost universal. Passing references in literature took it for granted that slaves were saving up to buy their liberty. 'The money which slaves have saved up by robbing their stomachs, they hand over as the price of liberty' (Seneca, Moral Letters 80.4).

Sale was not the only source of profit. By custom, the ex-slave owed his former master, his patron, a whole set of unspecified obligations (obsequium, revereniia, officium); the ex-slave was expected to be at his patron's service until his death, and when he died at his children's; he was generally precluded from doing anything to put his former master in disrepute (for example, by suing him at law); and he was expected to help maintain his former master if he fell on hard times.68

M Frequency of mention is a risky criterion. Buckland (1908: 496), considered that payment of money by the slave was the most common condition exacted in testamentary manumission. There seems to be no handy compendium of wills. The references are mosdy to be found in the Digest, Bks 3off., and see M. Amelotti, / / Ustamento romano (Florence, 1966).

97 See D. 40.7.3 (Ulpian) and ff. for several variations on the formula and Buckland (1908: 496ff.) for comments. When a will was technically void, but by the ruling in favour of freedom (favor libertatis), liberty was still granted to those named in the will, they were required to pay 20 aurei — 500 dn (so D. 5.2.8.17: Ulpian). These 500 dn equalled the 'normal' value of a slave fixed in the census (see note 23). It is worth adding that in the Principate the 5 % tax on manumissions was well-conceived only if it was common for the slave to buy his freedom in a publicly declared act which specified the price. Otherwise, the master and slave could collude to defraud the tax collector by fixing a low value on the slave. The tax would certainly make more sense if slaves normally bought rather than were given their freedom.

·* See M. Kaser, Das romische Privatrecht (Munich1, 1971) 298-9, and in greater detail his 'Die Geschichte dcr Patronatsgewalt ttber Freigelassene', ZSS 58 (1938) 88-135. Three legal opinions on ex-slaves' duties are worth citing: 'ex-slaves shall give support in accordance with the resources they possess to their former masters, when they are in need (egentibusY (D. 25.3.5.19: Ulpian). 'Former masters and their children have absolutely no rights over the possessions of their ex-slaves unless they have proved before the governors that they are sick or poverty-stricken as to merit

129


It became a commonplace in ruling circles to complain of the 'insolence and ingratitude, of some ex-slaves nowadays'; the senate in AD 56 debated the proposal that masters should have the right to re-enslave. According to Tacitus some senators argued that 'it would be no great burden for a freed slave to keep his freedom by the same obedience which had earned it' (Annals 13.26). The emperor Nero rejected the proposal because it threatened too large a class of ex-slaves. However, magistrates still had the power to punish 'ungrateful ex-slaves' by fine or whipping, and in exceptional cases by re-enslavement.69

In addition, as a condition of freedom, slave-owners often stipulated specific duties (operae) which the ex-slave had to undertake for the benefit of his former master and if specified, for his heirs. The Roman evidence on these duties is unfortunately sketchy. According to one distinguished lawyer in the late Republic, masters 'customarily made very stringent demands on their ex-slaves' (Servius cited in D. 38.2.1). Surprisingly, the praetor eventually limited this form of exploitation by law, 'because it had grown excessively, so that ex-slaves were burdened and oppressed* (D. 38.1.2). It usually takes considerable excesses to persuade an unselfconscious ruling class to limit its exploitation of the powerless.

From the Principate, legal opinions are preserved which insisted, for example, that the specific duties (operae) required of an ex-slave should suit his health and status; that no such jobs be required of women over the age of fifty; and significantly, that the ex-slave either be given enough time to earn his own food, or be fed while working for his former owner.70 Of course, such legal regulations were for the most part unenforceable; but they reflect both the sympathetic concern of lawyers and the actual burdens imposed on ex-slaves by exploitative masters.

We know very little of the variety of terms imposed by Roman masters on their ex-slaves; it is tempting therefore to supplement our knowledge with the rich details about manumission available from central Greece (see Chapter in). But to what extent can we infer Roman practices from Greek, even though for most of this period Greece was

aid from their ex-slaves in the form of monthly maintenance* (D. 25.3.9: Paul). Ulpian also ruled that a slave's purchase of his own liberty reduced the master's claim on an ex-slave's general obligations (D. 25.3.5.22). It is worth noting that a patron also owed his ex-slave a general obligation to help.

99 Buckland (1908: 422!!.); see also Suetonius, Claudius 25. 70 See particularly, D. 38.1 and 2. In general, manual dudes (operae fabriUs) could be

willed to heirs, service dudes (operae officiales) could be willed only if that had been stipulated on manumission (Ulpian, D. 38.1.5-6).

130


part of the Roman empire? There are similarities: for example, in Roman law (D. 48.19.11.1: Marcian) as in central Greek practice, an ex-slave who continued to live in his master's household was subject to his master's discipline like a slave. One difference was that Roman masters often seem to have stipulated specific, rather than open-ended obligations for their ex-slaves. Moreover, Augustus in his social legislation on the family, legally undercut the Roman system by offering ex-slaves release from their specific obligations to their former masters if they bore two children by a free spouse (D. 38.1.37 pr. Paul). This suggests that such services were a marginal not a major factor in a slave-owner's recompense for granting freedom.

C O N C L U S I O N S

Our clear distinction between slave and free, indeed the clear legal distinction between slave and free in Roman law cannot do justice to much Roman practice.71 The Roman system of slavery, like the Greek, worked by adulterating slavery with some of the privileges which we normally associate with freedom (such as giving slaves the right to make contracts, and to receive wages and to save); on the other hand, the Romans often extended a slave's servitude into the period when he had become legally free.

The prospects of emancipation served as an incentive for many slaves, including perhaps many slaves who never succeeded in getting their freedom. For the masters, manumission was economically rational, partly because it tempted slaves to increase their productivity and lowered the cost to the master of supervising his slaves at work, and partly because the slave's purchase of freedom recapitalised his value and enabled the master to replace an older slave with a younger one. In some cases the contract of manumission also provided an additional source of income even after the slave had been freed. Manumission, for all the benefit which it gave to individual ex-slaves, thus served to strengthen slavery as a system.

Roman slavery was a cruel system of extreme exploitation. Its cruelty was attacked, and for some slaves perhaps even mitigated, by philosophers and philanthropists. Manumission offered a channel of escape. The evidence suggests that the number of freed slaves was absolutely large; we have litde idea and can only guess that slaves who secured freedom constituted a minority, though perhaps a substantial minority of all slaves. We have concentrated on the economic under-71 Sec particularly, M. I. Finley, * Between slavery and freedom*, Comp. Stud. Soc. Hut.

6(1964) 233-49.

• 3 1


pinning of manumissions. Masters could afford to be generous with liberty, because they benefited from giving it. But we should also remember the non-economic factors which may have determined their acdons. Some Roman masters freed their slaves by will and did not exact compensation. Their wishes took effect only when they themselves had died. What did they hope to gain from this public dissipation of the family wealth, which worked only to the detriment of their heirs? Was it merely a desire for social ostentation, or an attempt to secure an easier path to quick salvation in purgatory? We do not know. Many other slaves were freed without charge by living masters, somedmes out of love or gratitude or kindliness. Slaves often felt and expressed their gratitude to their masters. Masters who manumitted their slaves liberally, and who acted as considerate patrons to their ex-slaves received their social reward from heightened prestige, and no doubt got personal rewards from a favourable self-image. These human factors have often been exaggerated, but they should not be ignored.

132

I l l B E T W E E N S L A V E R Y A N D F R E E D O M :

O N F R E E I N G S L A V E S A T D E L P H I Written in collaboration with P. J . Roscoe

T H E B A C K G R O U N D

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyse changes in the practice of freeing slaves at Delphi in central Greece in the last two centuries before Christ. It is based on roughly one thousand recorded acts of slave manumission, involving over twelve hundred slaves. Most of these records were carved on the smoothed polygonal blocks which make up the retaining wall for the terrace on which the temple of Apollo at Delphi was built; others were carved in the base of prominent public monuments by the side of the Sacred Way which led to the temple.

These inscriptions provide some of the fullest information which we have from the ancient world on the price which slaves paid to their masters for full freedom. The inscriptions also cast light on a curious institution called paramone, which we translate rather loosely as conditional release; perhaps suspended release would be better. By this institution, slaves bought formal freedom but contractually bound themselves to stay with and to continue serving their former owners even after they were freed, just as though they were still slaves, usually until the former owner's death. Conditional release was a twilight state of juridical freedom combined with slave-like service, a state which overlapped both slavery and freedom. It is found elsewhere in Greece, besides Delphi, as well as in other parts of the Roman world; parallels have also been found in the ancient Near East. But the Delphic inscriptions, with their amazing variety of specified conditions, reveal more than all the evidence from elsewhere the ties which bound ex-slaves to their former owners.

Our study shows that the prices which slaves paid for their freedom rose in the last two centuries before Christ. And as the prices of full freedom rose, a higher proportion of slaves bought conditional release. The price of conditional release remained fairly stable, but the conditions of release contractually agreed were increasingly to the

'33

Between slavery and freedom

slaves' disadvantage; some ex-slaves were even required to hand over their babies as replacement slaves. We argue that one of the functions of manumission, particularly if a slave bought full freedom, was that it enabled masters to recapitalise the value of older slaves and to replace them with younger ones. Finally, we argue that the prices which slaves paid for release approximated the market price for slaves and that market forces both systematically overrode affective ties between masters and slaves and disrupted the slaves' ties with their families.

Excavations at Delphi yield information about over twelve hundred slaves freed in the period 201 BC-AD too. Over two thirds (71 % ) of these were freed in the second century BC; less than one tenth ( 9 % ) were freed in the first century AD (see Table I I I . I ) . Rostovtzeff once argued that this decline in the number of recorded and surviving manumissions from Delphi reflected a general decline in the Greek economy under Roman rule.1 This deduction seems wrong, partly because we know nothing about manumissions at Delphi before 201 BC, and partly because the manumissions in neighbouring Thessaly show clearly that the rate of recorded and surviving manumissions rose in Thessaly during the last century BC, that is when recorded manumissions at Delphi declined; and they were still at a high level in Thessaly in the early second century AD, when no manumissions were apparendy recorded at Delphi. It seems likely therefore that the number of manumission tablets at Delphi reflects local developments in the social history of Apollo's shrine rather than rates of manumission in Greece as a whole. This conclusion poses difficulties. The surviving manumissions fit somewhat awkwardly with what else we know about the Delphic oracle, although our knowledge of that too is patchy. The peak of Delphi's glory and prosperity was much earlier and its fame endured much later than the manumissions. A brief overview of Delphi's history will give some background to the manumissions.

According to ancient myth, Delphi was situated at the centre of the earth (Strabo 9.3.6). 2 In its golden age, that is in the sixth and fifth centuries BC, the Delphic oracle had given its enigmatic prophecies to ambitious generals and kings from all over Greece and even from Asia Minor. Its blessing was regularly sought to ensure the appropriate 1 M.I. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World (Oxford, 1941)

vol. 2, 625-6. And on manumissions in Thessaly, see K. Hopkins and P. J. Roscoe, Manumissions in Thessaly (forthcoming).

* The brief account of Delphi depends on H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, The Delphic Oracle (Oxford1, 1956), G. Daux, Delphes au He et let Steele (Paris, 1936) and R. Flaceliere, Greek Oracles (London, 1965) 33ff.

'34

The background

religious rites and propitious timings for the foundation of new colonies sent out from Greece to southern Italy and Asia Minor. City states appealed to the priestess at Delphi for decisions on disputes, both military and religious, which could not be resolved at home. The temple of Apollo at Delphi was in some sense a ritual centre for Greeks from all the different city states. The gratitude which the oracle inspired in its devotees was reflected in the wealth, grandeur and beauty of the buildings, monuments and dedications at Delphi, and presumably in the prosperity of its citizens (priests, guides, hoteliers).

The political role of Delphi changed as the larger kingdoms created in the wake of Alexander's conquests robbed small city states of their political independence. In the third century BC, Delphi fell under the political control of the local Aetolian League. In general, the oracle became less concerned with affairs of state, although great kings still occasionally made flattering dedications. The Roman senate, after a crushing defeat in the war against Carthage (216 BC), sent an official delegate to consult the Delphic oracle (Livy 22.57; 23.11); and eventually, when the Romans defeated Carthage, the shrine was richly rewarded (Livy 28.45). A few years later, when the Romans were fighting the Macedonians in Greece, both sides used Delphi as a place to publicise their claims or to proclaim their victories (Plutarch, Flami-ninus 12; Aemilius PauUus 28 and 36; Polybius 25.3.2; Livy 41.22). But Roman domination of Greece ended both the Aetolian League's control over Delphi (191 /190 BC) and the oracle's own role as a mediator in interstate politics. Even so, Delphi continued to engage occasionally and profitably in relationships with the kings of Pergamum, Syria and Egypt; and the Amphictionic Council, which represented Greek states from a wide area around, continued to meet regularly at Delphi.

The oracle retained some of its old prestige. Important persons consulted it. Sulla, for example, asked for the interpretation of a dream; but that did not prevent him from robbing the shrine when he needed money for a military campaign (Plutarch, Sulla 12 and 19); Appius Claudius consulted the oracle on the outcome of the Roman civil wars (Valerius Maximus 1.8.10); Cicero called Delphi the oracle of the whole world (Pro Fonteio 30). The recorded visits by famous men serve as one index of the continued high reputation of Delphi, which presumably at once reflected and increased the flow of lesser visitors. Important men paid more for their consultations, but it was ordinary folk and dignitaries from surrounding towns, with their anxieties about marriage, voyages and loans (Plutarch 408c) who presumably provided priests and temple guardians with their regular basic income.

! 3 5


According to Plutarch, cides still consulted the oracle officially not on matters of state but about the size of crops and public health (408c).

It is difficult to know how much these changes, the growth of Roman power and the domestication of the oracle, affected Delphi's prosperity. The evidence is ambiguous. The geographer Strabo, wridng at the end of the last century BC stated that the temple was then very poor compared with older times (0.3.8) . 3 But there is considerable evidence that Delphi continued to be a tourist attraction with impressive buildings, thousands of statues (Nero removed 500, but 3,000 statues remained), professional guides and occasional royal patronage (Pausanias, Description of Greece 10.7; Pliny, Natural History 34.36). Nero's patronage was a mixed blessing; Hadrian visited the shrine and asked the oracle the old chestnut about where Homer came from and he got a stunning reply: Homer was the grandson of Odysseus (Contest of Homer and Hesiod 314). Plutarch, writing at the end of the first century AD, in an essay On the Obsolescence of Oracles (Moralia 4ogff.), stated that Delphi employed only one priestess; formerly, there had been two with a third in reserve. He attributed the decline of oracles to a general decline in the population of Greece (414A). But he also noted that many shrines at Delphi were new or restored, and that its affluence had spread even to its suburb (409A). Pausanias, who wrote in the second century AD, devoted the best part of a book in his Description of Greece to the artistic wonders of Delphi.4 In sum, although our knowledge of Delphi is scanty, we should not expect from what we know that manumissions would begin to be recorded about 201 BC (ten years before the Roman domination) nor that they would peak in the second century BC, nor that they would stop before the end of the first century AD. T O be sure, such expectations do not help; but it seems worth saying that the limitation of recorded manumissions to this period (201 BC-AD 100) is puzzling.

3 Delphi had been attacked by barbarians in the beginning of the last century BC (Appian, IUyrian Wars 5) before its despoliation by Sulla, who made some reparations (Plutarch, Sulla 19). According to some interpretations of a sentence in Plutarch, (Antony 23), the temple at Delphi was not rebuilt for forty years; this may serve as a symptom of Delphi's decline, but this interpretation is speculative (sec Daux, 1936: 410). The previous wealth of Delphi was mythical, so a decline may have been imagined (cf. Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 37.36).

4 It seems customary but dangerous for scholars to equate dated mentions of Delphi with temporary efflorescence and decline. A visit by the emperor Hadrian or Julian in the mid-fourth century is not good evidence of prosperity; nor is silence in the sources good evidence of decline. The local council of Delphi was apparendy in difficulties about providing games as late as A D 424 (C.Th. 15.5.4).

136

The background

These Delphic manumissions have often been studied.5 Since Cald-erini's basic work of 1908, most scholars have concentrated on religious and legal aspects of manumission. They have been fascinated by the role played in manumission by the priests of Apollo, and by the so-called holy or temple slavery which existed elsewhere in the ancient world. They have attempted to sort out the exact legal status and implications of the conditional or suspended release (paramoni), for which there is comparable evidence from the pre-classical Near East and from several areas of the classical world outside Greece.6 Westermann and Finley have used this intermediate stage of conditional release to create the concept of a spectrum of statuses between slave and free.7 This idea seems now to have won general acceptance among ancient historians and has undermined the old, strict dichotomy, slave-free. Recently, some Russian research, notably by Zel'in and Marinovich, has combined Marxist theoretical sophistication with careful deductions from fragmentary evidence and an empathy with the oppressed; this constitutes a real advance over the stricdy juridical approach which has guided many Western studies.8

8 The basic work is A. Calderini, La manomissione e la condizione dei liberti in Grecia (Milan, 1908); W. L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Philadelphia, 1955: i8ff.) gave not only a sympathetic account of the Delphic manumission inscriptions, but also briefly described comparable Semitic-Oriental practices; he also reanalysed Calderini's data on freed slaves' origins. P. Foucart, Memoire sur Vaffranchissement des esclaves (Paris, 1867) gave the most colourful account of the detailed variations in Delphic manumissions, and we have benefited a lot from his ideas. The review by H. Rädle, Untersuchungen zum griechischen Freilassungswesen (Diss. Munich, 1969) is somewhat legal but careful and useful, except on prices. M. Bloch, Die Freilassungsbedingungen der Delphischen Freilassungsurkunden (Diss. Strasburg, 1914) presented the best statistical analysis.

6 On temple slavery, see F. Börner, * Die sogenannte sakrale Freilassung', Abhandlungen der Akad. Mainz, geistes- undsozialwiss. KL ( i960,1), A. Cameron, 'Sacral manumission and confession', Harvard Theological Review 32 (1939) 148fr. and P. Koschaker,4Uber einige griechische Rechtsurkunden aus der östlichen Randgebieten des Hellenismus', Abhandlungen Sachs, Akad. Wiss. phiL-hist. KL 42 (1931) iff. On paramoni, see W. L. Westermann, 'The Paramone as a general service contract', Journal of Juristic Papyrology 2 (1948) 9-50, and A. £. Samuel,4 The role of paramone clauses in ancient documents', ibid. 15 (1965) 221-311, especially 221-9 and 256fr. - this is the fullest account of paramoni clauses in English, but some of his main conclusions concentrate on legal clarification without taking account of social practices or pressures: in short, one has to ask not merely what the law was, but also whether people obeyed it.

7 W. L. Westermann, 'Between slavery and freedom', American Historical Review 50 (1945) 213fr; M. I. Finley, 'Between slavery and freedom*, Comparative Studies in Society and History 6 (1964) 233-49, 4The servile statuses of ancient Greece', Revue internationale des droits de Vantiquiü 7 (i960) 165fr, and The Ancient Economy (London, 1973) 6afF.

8 See particularly K. K. Zel'in in K. K. Zel'in and M. K. Trophimova, Forms of Dependency in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Hellenistic Period (in Russian; Moscow, 1969) 119-87 and L. P. Marinovich, 'Paramone in Delphic manumissions of the Roman

'37


We thought that it would be worthwhile to analyse the manumission inscriptions from Delphi once again to see if we could squeeze anything further out of them. We used the chronological list of priesthoods and inscriptions published by Daux (1943) and followed the example of Westermann (1955: 32) in splitting the data into fifty-year periods to coincide with priesthoods.9 But first a note of caution. The surviving inscriptions were merely the last part, the by-product of a religious ritual, in which the master set the slave free solemnly and publicly before the god Apollo, his priests and civil witnesses and guarantors. Only those masters, and slaves, who set store by a solemn act of manumission validated by a religious ceremony and by a public record of the act took the trouble to manumit and to be manumitted at a prestigious shrine. The ceremony must have cost money; the priests must have expected something in return for their involvement; inscribing a detailed record of the act on stone and on papyrus cost money. All these factors probably made these Delphic manumissions a biased sample of all manumissions. We cannot correct the bias, since we know litde or nothing of other manumissions. We do know that in the beginning of the second century BC the majority of manumittors recorded at Delphi came from the towns surrounding Delphi, convincing evidence of the shrine's extra-local prestige. We assume that they were typically visitors to the shrine rather than resident aliens. But from the middle of the second century BC onwards, slave-owners from other towns apparendy freed their slaves in their home-towns, and the majority of manumittors at Delphi came from Delphi itself.10

period', Vestnik Drevnei Istorii 118 (1971) 27-46. Marinovich's concentration on manumissions after 20 BC is slighdy odd; the numbers of manumissions surviving from this period are too small to justify some of his tabulations. But his findings reinforce our view, which perhaps we should have put more forcefully, that the manumissions of the first century A D are, for reasons unknown, signihcandy different from the earlier manumissions.

• G. Daux, Chronologic Delphique (Paris, 1943); the date ordering of the inscriptions is fairly secure, especially in the second century BC; but we do not know the exact dates of later priesthoods, so that the dates used in the text are only rough. Period A (201-153 BC) covers priesthoods I-V; period B (153 -c . 100 BC) covers priesthoods VI-XII1; period c t (c. 100-53 BC) covers priesthoods XIP-XVI; period c* (c. 53-1 BC) covers priesthoods XVII-XXV; period D T (c. A D 1-47) covers priesthoods XXVI-XXVIII; period D , ( C . A D 4 B - 1 0 0 ) covers priesthoods XXIX-XXXIV. The dates of the later periods are approximate only.

10 On the origins of manumittors from towns near Delphi see G. Daux (1936: 490-6). We supplemented these conclusions with three systematic samples of fifty inscriptions, complete with the relevant data, taken from the periods 201-174 BC, 152-125 BC, 100-53 the proportions of known non-Delphic manumittors fell from 5 5 % to 2 2 % to 16% respectively. In the later inscriptions, the custom of stating expliritiy that a manumittor came from Delphi, which was prevalent in the earliest period, fell into disuse; we assume that this was because the vast majority of manumittors in the later periods did come from Delphi.

138

The background

And the great majority of Delphic manumissions recorded in these inscriptions came from a narrow interrelated circle of priests, town-councillors and guarantors.11 This suggests that the Delphic material is surprisingly complete, and not just a dny surviving sample of a vast mass of lost inscriptions. However that may be, in the rest of this chapter when we write of manumissions at Delphi we mean only those which were recorded and have survived. Finally, we should stress that freed slaves were probably only a small minority of all slaves. Most slaves, we think, were never freed. Therefore, we cannot properly make deductions about all slaves from those slaves who were fortunate enough to buy liberty.

A preliminary analysis is set out in Table I I I . I . 1 2 We apologise for the mass of numbers in it. Let us glance quickly at three factors: age, sex and origins. In a significant minority of cases ( 17%) , the inscriptions record that the freed slave was a young boy (paxdarion) or a young girl (korasion). These categories are never explicidy defined and may not have meant anything precise.13 We necessarily assume that all the remaining freed slaves were adults. Of these, a majority (63 % ) were female; that implies a sex ratio of only 59 male freed slaves for every 100 female slaves freed. This high proportion of females among freed slaves is found elsewhere in the Roman world, but that does not make it easier to understand.14 Since slaves paid considerable sums for their freedom, we have to ask what opportunities these female slaves had for acquiring money.

Finally, origins; in one half of the inscriptions, no mention was made of a slave's origins.15 The other half can be divided into home-born 11 According to Zel'in (1969:185), 75 % of the manumittors who came from Delphi itself

(N = 452) between 180 and 120 BC were archons, councillors, priests, guarantors, or close relatives of such; the circle of known manumittors from Delphi was thus quite small.

11 The inscriptions come from two prime collections: H. Collitz, J. Baunack et al., SamnUung der griechiscken Dialckt-Inschriften (Gdttingen, 1899) vol. 2, i683ff; and G. Daux, ed., FouilUs de Delphes vol. 3 (Paris, 1922-70) in six parts. Hereafter they are called GDI and FD respectively. Many of the works cited in the last few notes are cited hereafter only by author and date.

13 In the newly discovered fragments of Diocletian's Edict on Maximum Prices from Aphrodisias, kindly shown to us by Michael Crawford and Joyce Reynolds, slave prices of youths were split into age groups 0-7, 7-15 years (by English reckoning); adults began at age 15; we do not know if these practices have any relevance to what happened at Delphi.

14 See Hopkins and Roscoe (forthcoming), and G. Alfoldy, 'Die Freilassung von Sklaven', Rivista storica dell* antichita 2 (1972) 109-14, and Chapter II above, notes 30 and 63.

15 Westermann's influential reanalysis of slaves' origins (1955: 32-3) depended effectively on ignoring those ex-slaves whose origins were unknown and concentrated on the ratios of home-bom ex-slaves to known aliens. Thus in his and our first three periods (ABCJ in Table I I I . I ) home-born ex-slaves constituted successively 28%,61 %

*39

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The background

slaves (oikogeneis, endogeneis) and' known aliens', that is those for whom a specific ethnic origin was given; they came from Asia Minor, Syria and the Balkans as well as from other parts of Greece. Overall, 2 9 % of freed slaves are known to have been home-born, but in some periods the proportion was much higher (153-100 BC: 4 4 % ) . This, as Westermann argued (1955: 32-3) , is an important finding. These figures constitute the only hard evidence which we have from the classical world on rates of slave reproduction.18 But they are underestimates. We must also take into account the actual origins of those slaves whose origins are unknown; 1 7 evidence on prices (which we present later) suggests that many of them were in fact home-born. Indeed it seems safe to conclude that from 153 BC to AD 47, over half of the slaves freed were home-born.

This conclusion poses a problem of succession. If home-born slaves were freed, who then were the home-born slaves freed in the next generation? Two complementary answers are obviously possible: first those freed were only a small proportion of all slaves;18 and secondly, slaves were typically freed only when they had left children behind them in slavery to take their place. We shall explore this problem later in greater detail.

F U L L F R E E D O M A N D C O N D I T I O N A L R E L E A S E

Most (72 % ) of the slaves freed at Delphi in the second century BC were freed unconditionally; they were given full freedom. As soon as they had paid, their masters declared them free in a formal act which took

and 8 4 % of those whose origins are known (these proportions are based on Westermann's figures which are very slighdy different from ours). But those of unknown origins should not be so cavalierly ignored. It seems safer to argue for a real fall in the proportion of known aliens in period c than for a real increase in the proportion of home-born slaves in period B (see note 17).

14 The argument that slaves' children were a major source of slaves is put strongly for Roman Italy in the late Republic, perhaps too strongly by E. M. Schtaerman, Die Bluteteit der Sklavenwirtsckaft in der romischen RepuMik (Wiesbaden, 1969) 36-70.

17 Changes in the recorded proportion of home-born slaves may have resulted from a change in what was conventionally recorded rather than from a revolution in slave imports or slave reproduction. We can date the transition to a twenty-year period 157-139 BC (Delphic priesthoods v - v i n ) . The proportions of slaves who were recorded as home-born by priesthoods was as follows: I - I V 10% (N * 449); v 17% (N = 4 6 ) ; v i 3 6 % (N - 144); v i i - v i i i 5 0 % (N = 56). In priesthood ix (c. 139-122 BC) the proportion of recorded home-born ex-slaves was 49 % (N * 120). For the evidence on prices see below, note 55.

18 G. Alfdldy (1972) has argued from Roman data that most slaves were freed; but in our view his arguments are unconvincing. He ignores the probability that only a small proportion of all slaves and ex-slaves were commemorated on inscribed stone memorials; cf. p. 127, note 63.

141


the form of a fictional sale to the god Apollo. We quote from a second-century BC inscription, which is typical:

A date In the Magistracy of Damosthenes, in the month of Poitro-pios, when Philaitolos the son of Phainis and Timokles the son of Thraslas were councillors for the first half of the year, and when Anaxandridas the son of Aiakidas was scribe,

B sale to Polemarchos, the son of Polemon, with the agreement the god of his son Polemon, sold to Phythian Apollo, the female body

[slave] whose name is Pistis, home-born, on the following conditions for a

c full price of four and a half mnoe [450 drachmae]. Accordingly, freedom Pistis has entrusted the sale price to the god, on condition

that she is free and cannot be claimed as a slave by anyone for all her life; she can do whatever she wants, and she can run off to whom she chooses.

D guarantee Guarantor in accord with the law of the city... of free ( G D I 2187) status

The slave became juridically free; she was her own mistress, free from arbitrary seizure, doing what she wanted, and going where she chose. These were the four aspects of freedom repeatedly emphasised in these inscriptions. But in the second century BC, a substantial minority, and before the end of the first century BC a majority (52 % ) of slaves were freed conditionally.19 There was some considerable variety in the conditions specified, but for us the definitive condition was that the ex-slave, although juridically free, should stay and serve (paramenein) her former owner, usually until the owner's death. An illustrative example dating from the first century BC is on the page opposite.

The formula discussed

Several points in this formulaic record deserve our attention. The temptation to dismiss formulas, simply because they are repetitive, should be resisted. The inscription begins with the date (A) and then records the sale of the slave to the god, Pythian Apollo. The sale was fictitious in that its function was not to transfer the ownership of the slave to the god, but to give a religious sanction to the slave's freedom.

* We are making a statement about social relations here, not about law. In law perhaps, as Samuel (1965: 282-4) argued, all ex-slaves were fully free; some then entered into contractual obligadons similar to those into which originally free-born persons had entered; these obligations did not affect their juridical status as free men. In fact, the obligations taken on by ex-slaves in paramoni clauses severely restricted their actions and status; socially, therefore, we think that it is proper to see them as conditionally freed, in the sense that they were freed and then bound by conditions. We leave legal debate to others.

142

A typical manumission giving conditional release

In the magistracy of Ant ipholos son of Gorgilos, in the month of Enduspoitropios [April /May], w h e n Aristokles son of Philoneikos, and D a m o n son of Polemarchos were councillors, o n the fol lowing condit ions Eurydika daughter of Archi-damos sold to Pythian Apol lo , so that h e would free them, two female bodies [slaves] whose names are Onasiphoron and Sotero, home-born for a price of e ight mnae [800 drach

mae], and I have received the whole price. T h e guarantor in accord with the laws of the city is Stratagos son of Philon. T h e two aforement ioned bodies are to stay and serve Euri-dika the whole t ime so long as Euridika lives and are to d o everything she orders without giving cause for complaint. If e ither or both of the aforement ioned bodies disobeys or does not d o what she is ordered by Euridika, Euridika may punish them in whatever way she wishes. W h e n Euridika dies, let the aforement ioned slaves be free, never to be claimed by anyone for all t ime, be longing to n o o n e in any way. But if o n e of the aforement ioned bodies wishes to be freed from staying and serving (paramone) at an earlier t ime, let her give o n the spot whatever price for release she may persuade [her mistress to accept] and let her be released from staying and serving (paramone) just as she would also be freed after the death of the w o m a n w h o gave her conditional release (paramone).

A n d if anyone lays a hand o n the aforement ioned bodies after their [release] from staying and serving (paramone), let the seller and the guarantor make the sale to the g o d secure. Similarly, let anyone have the right to rescue and set the aforement ioned bodies free, without incurring punishment or trial, free from all legal action and penalties. Witnesses: the priests of Pythian Apol lo , Philon, son of Stratagos, Polemarchos, son of D a m o n , and private citizens K l e o n . . . , Pason, son of Polemarchos, Diolkes son of Philis-tion, A g o n son of Poplios, Theok les son of Kaloklidas, Ant igonos son of Babylos. (G. Daux ed. , Fouilles de Delphes

3-3*313; e n d of first century BC)

'43


The role of the god in maintaining the slave's freedom against allcomers is reaffirmed in the last section of the record.

Even at the moment of their freedom, the slaves were called bodies (somata). In law slaves were regarded in some ways as things not persons; but it still comes as a shock to see how depersonalised, how degraded slaves were, not men or women, but bodies male or female. And just as in the American south, masters called slaves by their given names. This was another social stigma of slavery. A free person had a socially recognised father (Euridika daughter of Archidamus); the father of the slave was not socially recognised; the slave was simply Zoila.2 0 Just because stigma is commonplace, that is no reason for us to take it for granted.

We shall be discussing conditional release in some detail below, so for the moment let us merely stress two aspects of the paramone clause (c) in the formula; first the tension between what we might call the ex-slave's juridical freedom given in the previous paragraph (B) and the contractual restraints of conditional release. In numerous Delphic inscriptions, this contrast was even starker than in the example quoted; the slave was first explicitly given full freedom, then contractually constrained:

Accordingly Athenais has entrusted the sale price to the god on condition that she is free, never to be claimed by anyone for all time, doing what she wants and running off to whomever she wants...

But let Athenais stay and serve [her mistress] Klyta as long as Klyta lives... (GDI 1925)

Secondly, let us stress that the master, anxious to secure good performance of the contract from the freed slave, found his chief answer in punishment. If the freed slave did not do what she was told, the mistress had power to punish her in whatever way she wished. Westermann (1955: 22 and 41) has written of the general leniency shown towards slaves in classical Athens and, individual abuses apart, of the non-oppressive nature of Hellenistic slavery; perhaps Greek slavery was lenient, if it is compared with Roman slavery in mines or on large estates. But we should beware of masters' idealisation (Ps. Xenophon, The Constitution of the Athenians 1.10), and we doubt if any chattel slavery can in general be humane, in any normal meaning of that word. The Delphic inscriptions make it quite clear that punish-

*° AH discussions of classical slavery take place in the shadow of American slavery. Indeed one of the purposes of the present chapter is to stress some areas of difference between Greek and American slavery. For slave institutions, see still K„ M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution (London, 1964); for colour and much else, see £. D. Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll (London, 1975).

144

Full freedom and conditional release

ment, at the complete discretion of the master, was central to the owners' perception of the slave system, and that the threat of punishment persisted in conditional releases, even after the slave was freed.*1

In the final sections of the formula (EF), the seller, the guarantor, the priests of Apollo and other witnesses joined forces in assuring the ex-slave that his newly won freedom would be protected. This clause reflected the history of the institution of manumission: in most Greek city-states, manumission was originally a private act, of no formal interest to the state authority, and in theory susceptible to easy upset. If a rich citizen laid hands on a poor non-citizen claiming him as a slave, the poor man needed both protection and evidence that he was indeed free. Hence the public record of manumission - in the theatre, in a temple, on papyrus, on stone; the slave needed reassurance that all the effort expended on winning his release would not arbitrarily be lost. The guarantor and witnesses were meant to ensure that. But at the same time the formula recognised the violability and uncertain status of the unprivileged outsider in Greek city-states. Changes of Fortune and Death were prominent in ancient life, not just in ancient literature and philosophy.22 We should stress two conclusions: first, conditional release as an institution depended upon the probability that the master would die soon, even if soon meant a decade; secondly, both masters and slaves sought through religious sanctions to give the ex-slave a security of status which civil authorities were too weak to ensure.

Our present-day scepticism should not lead us to underestimate the god Apollo's power. Manumission was a religious ceremony held 'in the middle of the temple by the altar' (GDI 2010). The following inscription from the shrine of Apollo the Sun God at Dionysopolis (in modern Turkey) reveals the public abasement which transgression against the god could induce. It was put up by an ex-slave:

I confess that I have perjured myself.. .and that I have transgressed and forcibly entered the (holy) precinct.. .and although the god commanded me not to give up the document of manumission to my master, when I was pressed from all sides, I gave it up.

And I was punished by the god gready, and he appeared unto me in dreams and stood over me and said 41 shall take my slave by the feet, even if he were sitdng at the gates (of Hell) and shall bring him back up from there/ 21 On the centrality of punishment in the American south see perhaps best the

collection of autobiographical accounts by ex-slaves, collected in the 1930s edited with an interpretative summary by G. P. Rawick, The American Slave, From Sundown to Sunup (Westport, Conn., 1972) especially 55-7, and Genovese (1975) passim.

n This point is well made by A. Gouldner, Enter Plato (New York, 1965) 24R.


And I command that no one shall scorn the god of the Sun Apollo, when he shall have this monument as a reminder.23

In sum, four elements of the formula are striking: first, the role of the god Apollo as guardian of liberty for the ex-slave; secondly, the danger that the ex-slave might lose his status through arbitrary seizure; thirdly, the centrality of punishment; and finally the severity of the contractual obligations which some slaves entered as soon as they were formally free.

The problem

Conditional release posed three obvious problems. First, why did slaves scrimp and save sizeable sums of money merely to change their legal status? To all appearances, conditional release obliged the slave to remain in a slave-like condition, liable to work and punishment just like a slave, with only the indeterminate prospect of full freedom when her former owner died. There were some advantages: in most cases we think that children born to the freed slave during this protracted service were free; that was one of the obvious advantages to the slave of securing conditional release; but several scholars (cf. Zel'in 1969; 148) have assumed the opposite; no one knows for sure. Above all, the ex-slave would have the feeling that she was free. But the price paid for this illusion was considerable. At conventional wheat prices, the sum of 400 drachmae which was commonly paid for conditional release (cf. Table 111.4) equalled some three and a half tons of wheat equivalent, enough to feed a poor peasant family for over three years.24

Such a calculation is inevitably crude and gives only a rough order of magnitude. Yet halve or double the price of wheat, and the sum still ** The text is edited by Cameron (1939: 155ff.) with an interpretation of possible

meanings and this is the text which we translate as best we can here. 84 We know only seven Greek wheat prices from the second century BC. Four of these

come from the small island of Delos between 190 and 169 BC; the most common price was \o drachmae presumably for one medimnos conventionally estimated at 52 litres = 39 kg wheat. This seems high for three reasons: first, the price of barley meal from Delos in the same period, which should be higher than for barley grain, was only 3-5 drachmae per medimnos (N = 5) - see J. A. O. Larsen, * Roman Greece* in ESAR vol. 4, 385-6; secondly, in Egypt and elsewhere, barley prices were normally about three fifths of wheat prices; thirdly, Delos wheat prices also look high if we compare them with the conventional Roman price for wheat (3 HS per modius of 6.5 kg = 4.5 drachmae per medimnos). The three other prices for wheat (SIG 976 Samos; IG 5.2.437 Megalopolis; Inschriften von Priene 108.46) were not market prices but administered prices: for example, the price fixed by a public benefactor in a famine. They were 5 ^ , 5 ! ^ and 4 drachmae per medimnos respectively, all much closer to the conventional price of wheat at Rome than to the price of wheat at Delos. Whether we take the wheat prices from Delos or Rome, the 400 drachmae paid by a slave equalled 1W to 3J4 tons of wheat equivalent. We think the latter price more plausible. A poor peasant family needed one ton of wheat equivalent for minimum subsistence, which includes a bare allowance for heat, housing and clothing.

146


remains sizeable, difficult enough for a peasant, let alone a slave to accumulate.

This leads to our second problem, which we have already raised: how did slaves, perhaps especially female slaves, acquire such sums of money? In the cities of Rome and classical Athens, both trading centres and capitals of empire, it is easy enough to understand that there were spaces in the economy in which outsiders, aliens, even slaves, could acquire small fortunes. Indeed perhaps because they were outsiders, like the Chinese in south-east Asia or Indians in East Africa, they had more social space in which to make a profit, exacdy because they were outsiders, free from the constraints which compelled citizens to give their kin-folk and fellow citizens a bargain. But all that does not explain why large-scale manumission, based on cash accumulations, was possible in the relatively rural and economically underdeveloped area around Delphi (and in Thessaly). To be sure, business derived from the oracle and Apollo's temple accounted for some economic activity, but they do not fully explain the high level of release prices paid by slaves, and of course they do not explain the high rate of manumission in Thessaly.

Our third problem is why did slave-owners free their slaves conditionally. Perhaps an answer to this problem presupposes an answer to the broader problem: why did masters allow slaves to buy their freedom at all? Let us discuss that briefly; two arguments seem important.

First, it was sensible for masters to opt for the carrot rather than or in addition to the stick. The prospect of buying freedom encouraged a slave to show both initiative and parsimony. Ideally, the slave both sought to make a profit and to save. If the slave died before achieving liberty, the master pocketed his savings; in strict law, they belonged to the master anyhow. If the slave later bought full freedom, the master had recapitalised the slave's value and with the purchase money he could buy a younger slave to replace him. The second argument is complementary: as the adult slave grew older, the chances of death and sickness increased; insofar as release prices were related to market prices, it was better for the master at some stage to capitalise the slave's current value than to go on risking total loss or to keep on a declining asset.25 It was the paradox of classical slavery that a master maximised his profit from a valuable slave by selling him freedom.

We do not assume that all or even most masters and slaves perceived manumission in this light, or that all masters maximised their profit.

tt It might be particularly in the master's interest to sell a slave freedom, if the slave borrowed some part of the capital costs of liberty from someone else, for example from her father or husband-to-be. Borrowing transferred the risk of death or of non-repayment from the master to outsiders.


But doubtless some did; and it seems probable that some such rationale underlay the institution of manumission as a whole. Very few slaves were given freedom without payment; a small minority bought release at well below average prices (for reasons unknown), and as we shall see, home-born slaves paid on average about 6 % less for their freedom than foreign-born slaves. Some exploitation was coated over with a veneer of paternalism and of its reciprocal, loyalty, and even with affection. From the individual's point of view, whether master or slave, the master's agreement to release a slave counted as generosity. The master had given away his right to the slave's life-long labour. But from the point of view of the system, if that makes sense, manumission reinforced slavery as an institution. It allowed ambitious slaves a focus for their ambitions; it gave them the possibility of being released, and it gave them the crowning prize of eventual success, with all its implications of virtue rewarded. Finally, manumission provided slaveowners with the working capital to buy new slaves; manumission gave strength to the slave market. But manumission also transformed slavery, at least for some, from the inescapable hereditary caste which it might have become, into a temporary servitude.26

In the light of this discussion, let us take another look at conditional release. Clearly it was a compromise between slavery and freedom, between what the master wanted and what the slave wanted. The master capitalised some part of the slave's value, and yet retained a lien on the slave's services. He did not have to buy a new slave or to break him in; he simply kept the old slave on. The slave too gained something. He paid only part of his market value; indeed, as we shall see, the average prices paid for conditional release remained fairly steady throughout the last two centuries BC, while the cost of full freedom rose sharply, so that the difference in the price paid for each became substantial (see Table 111.4). The ex-slave on conditional release also remained secure in the socio-economic role which he had occupied as a slave; he did not have to leave the house and find a new niche. Juridical freedom probably made very littie difference to his way of life; nor was that necessarily to the slave's disadvantage. We imagine that he continued to receive food and clothing from the ex-owner, whom he continued to live with and serve. Conditional release was an insurance against the harsh risks of independence.27 Epictetus presents a M Not that slavery in the American south, still less in Brazil or Cuba, was an inescapable

caste (for manumissions in Cuba see H. S. Klein, Slavery in the Americas (Chicago, 1967) 62!!.). But the existence of colour difference reinforced hereditary status; the. low visibility of status distinctions in the classical world must have helped manumissions.

17 The shock of independence recurs in the autobiographical accounts collected by G. P. Rawick, The American Slave, A Composite Autobiography (Westport, Conn., 1972-) 19 vols.

148


colourful picture of the slave putting all his hopes and fantasies in freedom:

'If I am set free', he says, 'immediately everything will be fine...I shall talk as an equal on equal terms with everyone; I shall go where I please*.. .Then he is freed, and immediately he has nowhere to eat; he looks for someone to flatter at whose table he can eat...he falls into harsher slavery than before.. .and yearns for his old slavery. 'What was wrong with it? Someone else clothed me, shod me, fed me, looked after me when I was ill: and I didn't do much for him'.. .(Discourses 4.1.33)

Yet there were difficulties on conditional release; three seem particularly worth stressing. First, the master committed himself to wasting a valuable asset; as soon as the master died, the ex-slave became completely free and the loss of the slave fell on the master's heirs. Secondly, giving the slave the status of a free person made it difficult to exact from the ex-slave, now formally free, punctilious performance of slave-like duties; from the master's point of view, the slave became less reliable. Thirdly, conditional release gave the slave an active interest in his master's early death, which occasionally must have made the master feel uncomfortable. Given these disadvantages, it is interesting that conditional release survived and was not displaced by manumission by sealed will, which was so common in Rome, and perhaps had fewer drawbacks.28 Manumission by will was known in post-classical Athens (Diogenes Laertius 5.55 and 72-3), and in neighbouring Thessaly (e.g. IG 9.3.1118); but it is only once recorded in Delphi and then by an outsider (GDI 2101). Finally, from the slave's point of view, the main disadvantage of conditional release was that he remained at his master's beck and call while his master went on living, sometimes for years on end. Greek masters and slaves were clearly aware of all these problems. The variations of conditions which we shall now discuss under the three headings 'Length of service', 'Performance', 'Loss of an asset' reflect their attempts to tackle them.

Length of service after manumission - fixed term and doubled obligations

The majority of conditionally freed slaves were obliged to stay and serve either their former master or their former mistress, until the old owner died. We do not know how long on average this service lasted, because we do not know how old manumittors typically were. But if we assume that most manumittors were mature adults, we can use life

** Manumission by will did not necessarily preclude the slave from paying the master's heirs for his release. W. W. Buckland (The Roman Law of Slavery (Cambridge, 1908) 496) considered that the payment of money by slaves was the most common of the conditions exacted in Roman testamentary manumissions.

H 9

Between slavery and frtdedom

tables to get a general idea of the average length of a slave's post-manumission service. At levels of mortality most probably prevalent among slave owners in the classical world (an average expectation of life at birth of 25-30 years), half the men aged forty survived a further 17-20 years, and half the men aged sixty survived a further 8-10 years.29

Female owners would have survived marginally longer. If these projections based on historical data from comparable societies are a good guide, then in general and on average, slaves released conditionally to serve oldish owners could still expect to continue in service for a substantial term. Of course, each slave was interested not in the average, but in his own length of service. The sheer fact that he did not know how long it would last was probably a continual source of irritation. Some slaves must have developed a ghoulish interest in their master's every illness.

A substantial minority of conditionally released slaves were obliged to serve both master and mistress until both had died. The chances of protracted service were doubled. The obligation to serve both master and mistress as a condition of release became increasingly common during the last two centuries BC (see Table 111.2: col. c); from 201 to 153 BC, only a tenth of conditionally released slaves were exploited in this way; but in the last century BC, the proportion rose to one third.

This double obligation was merely one aspect of a general deterioration in the conditions of release which slaves got from their owners. Over time, as we have already seen (Table I I I . I , col. k)9 progressively fewer slaves were given full freedom, and those who were given it paid steeply higher prices (see Table 111.4). In the second century BC, a small minority of slaves ( 1 3 % of those conditionally released 201-153 BC) negotiated a fixed term with their masters, similar to the old English indenture; on average, it lasted six years (N = 25). But by the first century BC, according to these inscriptions, the practice had died out completely (Table in.2: col. d).30

The fixed term was replaced, again for the few, by manumission in stages. As the price of full freedom rose, more slaves bought conditional release; if they were lucky, this was only the first step. Instead of waiting for their old owner(s) to die, they bought full freedom with a second and often sizeable payment (av. = 388 drachmae; N = 12). We can trace this two-stage purchase of freedom for forty-four slaves, who *· United Nations, 'Methods for Population Projection by Sex and Age*, Population

Studies (New York, 1956) 7off. 30 In a few cases the year limit was used to protect the owner's interest. For example,

in one case (GDI 2084 cf. 1742) a female ex-slave was required to serve her master until his death, and to serve his wife if he died before eight years had passed.

150


Table 111.2. Conditionally freed slaves were increasingly exploited

Conditionally freed slaves were required to stay and serve until a b c d e

One One Total master mistress Both Fixed number of died died died* termf cases

(%)

A 2OI-153 BC 49 27 11 '3 142 B 153-IOI BC 38 V 24 8 88 C I O I - I BC 24 41 35 0 107

* T h e great majority of these paired owners were apparendy husband and wife - but in some cases they were brother and sister, mother and daughter , etc.

t T h e average length of fixed term service was 6 years.

constituted a small but steadily increasing proportion (it eventually affected one quarter) of those conditionally freed.31 We can also tell, though only somewhat roughly, how long their service after manumission lasted. Most of them ( 5 9 % N = 4 i ) secured full freedom during the same Delphic priesthood in which they had been conditionally freed; the duration of priesthoods varied, on average they lasted ten years; the average length of conditional service within one priesthood was probably significantly shorter. But a few ( 2 0 % ) had to wait several priesthoods, in some cases for twenty years or more, before they secured the second stage of full freedom (cf. FD 3.3.43; 340-1 ) . 3 2

The increasing frequency of two-stage manumissions is corro-

" The successive proportions of conditionally freed slaves who were released from service in periods A B c t d and D (see Table I I I . I ) were4%, 2 % , 10%, 2 6 % , and 27%; NB the base numbers in the later periods are small - c. fifty per period. In one case, in the second century BC, a master who gave a slave release from service without charging her a fee, explicidy declared himself to be sound in mind and body (GDI 1751). This suggests that charging a fee was normal; but in the formula for release which became established about the time of Christ, the price paid was rarely mentioned; occasionally (e.g. -ED 3.3.333) it was stated that the money had been paid as arranged; indeed in this example, it was paid in spite of the fact that the ex-slave was clearly the mother of the slave-owner's son. We doubt if silence about price meant that the second release was usually free. Samuel (1965: 265) came to a similar conclusion after an excellent discussion of the evidence.

a We can trace these two stages of release for forty-one ex-slaves. Twenty-four were fully freed in the same priesthood, nine in the next priesthood and eight several priesthoods after their first manumission.


borated by the standardisation of the formula giving release from conditional service. In the second century BC, release from service had been recorded in a form similar to the first ficdve sale to the god; but by the first century BC it was recorded in a distinctive, standard and brief formula (contrast GDI 2015/1868 with FD 3.3.398 and 419). This standardisation strongly suggests that formal release from service before the owner's death had become common.33 And in the first century BC it also apparendy became common to make specific provision in the first manumission contract for a slave to buy himself, or more often herself, out of service, sometimes at the death of one of two joint manumittors, sometimes whenever the ex-slave wished (eg. FD 3.3.351). There had been occasional provision for this early release (eg FD 3.2.243; GDI 1717) in the second century BC, but in the first century BC the two-stage releases (which we know to have been successful) and the provisions for slaves to buy early release (about whose outcome we are ignorant) cover a third (33 %; N = 109) of all the slaves conditionally freed.34 Thus although the Greeks adopted an institution of conditional release (seemingly from the Near East) which catered for slave-owners until their death, they adapted it and allowed a significant proportion of ex-slaves to escape from service before the owners had died.3 5

Performance

Up to now we have taken for granted that masters and slaves had conflicting interests, as did the former owners and the ex-slaves still serving them. We have assumed that the ex-slaves wanted speedy release into full freedom, while the masters wanted sterling performance of all duties both from slaves and from the ex-slaves serving them. Punishment was as central to this intermediate institution of conditional service as it was to slavery itself. The tension between the ex-slave's formal status as a free man and the contractual obligations 33 This point is made by Daux (1936: 615) but his list of releases from conditional

service stops in the middle of the last century BC and is therefore shorter than ours. 34 The 36 cases of potential or actual two-stage release from service may be subdivided

as follows: (a) 11 slaves were freed in two stages, (b) six more slaves were offered the option of early release and we know that they took it, (c) six slaves were obliged to stay with their owner(s) until death and then could buy freedom with a second payment (this may be considered to belong to another category, since it was in the owner's interest to exact a second fee), but the slave may have seen it as early release, (d) thirteen slaves were given an option to get early release, usually when they wished, but subject to the agreement of their master and the payment of a fixed fee. Please note that in the second century BC, similar provisions, excluding those who received fixed term contracts, covered less than 5 % of the conditionally freed.

35 See I. Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East (New York, 1949) especially pp. 1 off. and 74!!. Samuel (1965: 255) attributed the creation of the legal concept of paramoni to the third century BC.

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into which he entered when he was first freed, was solved in the master's favour. In some manumission contracts, ex-slaves were ex-plicitly required to go on working after manumission, 'like slaves' (douleuonta - FD 3.3.337 cf. 6.51). Such requirements, which have parallels in Roman practice, make nonsense of the conventional dichotomy, dominant in the sociological literature, between slave and free; in the classical world, the two categories had a significant overlap.36

Masters usually took the right in conditional manumissions to punish ex-slaves as they chose, if the ex-slave did not do what he was told or did not stay and serve. * If Eisias does not stay and serve or does not do as she is ordered let Kleomantis have power to punish her in any way he wishes; he may beat her, chain her or sell her* (FD 3.3.329). Of course, formal contracts do not tell us how people, ex-masters and ex-slaves behaved. Legal documents often merely set limits, which are not necessarily tested. Yet they do betray each party's fears and give clues about actual behaviour. After all, the centrality of punishment in the manumission records reflected not only the owners' power, but also their fear that ex-slaves might not do what they were told, neither stay nor serve.

At one extreme, then, the master could legally punish the ex-slave's disobedience by selling him, presumably as a slave, to someone else; in other words, the master could, unilaterally, void the sale to the god and revoke the freedom which the slave had paid for: 'but if he does not stay and serve, the sale is void and without effect' (GDI 1721 -there are a dozen similar instances; cf. FD 3.3.6). In this respect, the institution of paramoni gave Greek slave-holders more power than Roman manumission did. This may have been partly because the act of manumission at Delphi, although it was carried out in public, was a private act, in the sense that state authorities were not involved.37

*· In formal law, Roman ex-slaves could not be slaves: *the praetor does not allow tne manumitted slave to serve as a slave, unless he is bound under another law' (Dositheus, frag. 12, FIRA vol. 2, 620). But Roman freedmen owed their masters the general duties of clients to patrons and could be contractually bound at manumission to perform specific services. Moreover, ex-slaves who stayed in their master's household after manumission were subject to his disciplinary power, to some extent like slaves (D. 48.19.11.1: Marcian) while free men who worked for a period in a household were also like slaves (D. 43.16.1.16-20: Ulpian). See F. M. Roberds, Lavoro e lavoratori net mondo romano (Bari, 1963) 101-42; D. Nörr, 'Zur Bewertung der freien Arbeit in Rom', ZSS (ram. Abt.) 82 (1965) 90ft. and M. Käser, 'Die Geschichte des Patronatsgewalt über Freigelassene', ZSS 58 (1938) 88-135 and S. Treggiari, Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic (Oxford, 1969) y$ß.

37 Rädle (1969) analysed very well the progression of manumission from private acts done in private to private acts proclaimed and recorded in public to acts in which the state took an active interest. However, his proffered explanations, namely that literacy was increasing and that ex-slaves wanted to preserve their free status, are plausible, but surely insufficient.

l53


At Rome by contrast, slaves who were properly manumitted before a magistrate became Roman citizens; they lost citizenship only rarely and by official acdon. In sum, Greek masters sought to secure high performance from their freed slaves who stayed with them by threats of punishment, sale and the loss of freedom.

This was not true of all conditional manumissions. In several cases the master's power was restricted.38 The single most common limitation (N = 26) was that the master could not sell the ex-slave. He could punish as he wished but not sell. Slaves wanted to avoid sale, not merely because sale would sever the slave from his or her family but also because it would presumably destroy the rights which the slave had acquired at manumission. In a few cases at Delphi, the restriction on a master's power was considerably greater; masters and freed slaves agreed to resolve any differences about the quality of the ex-slaves' work through arbitrators (GDI 1832, cf. 1694, 1696, 1874). This provision implicidy recognised a measure of equality between master and freed slave. But most contracts of conditional release were unequal; the legal force of contract was being used to get ex-slaves to agree to their own exploitation.

Masters and slaves were not always at loggerheads. In some cases, a slave was acknowledged as the owner's foundling (idion threpton: FD 3.6.37 and eleven similar instances), reared by him, presumably with some affection. We should stress again that neither this tie nor the obvious parentage by the owner of a slave (such parentage was never made explicit but it can be deduced from names; for example, Kleo-mantis changed the name of his slave's son to Kleomantis - FD 3.3.333) led to any obvious reduction in the fees which child or foundling paid for freedom. But it is clear that in some cases the ex-slave was the master's only or main helper, obliged to care for him 'day and night' (FD 3.6.57), provide all bodily services (FD 3.2.169), and look after him in old age (GDI 1723, 1731). When the master died, the ex-slave, in a dozen surviving instances, was charged with the care of the funeral, so important in Greek life, and even inherited the owner's property (FD 3.2.172 and five other cases). As in other slave societies, the tie between master and slave could be warm; this warmth did not necessarily lessen exploitation, though it may have softened the slave's feelings about it. 38 The following sketch of various conditions is necessarily selective. Please note that

the universe is 289 conditional manumissions involving 400 slaves. From a statistical point of view, therefore, none of the conditions discussed is important, though several seem intrinsically interesting. These two dimensions of analysis, incidence and interest, have sometimes been confused.

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How to lessen the loss of an asset

From the slave-owner's point of view, there were two main arguments against conditional release. First, freeing a slave, even when he was kept on in service, weakened the master's control over him, and made it more difficult to get good work out of him. We have already dealt with these problems at some length. Secondly, freeing a slave conditionally might cost the slave-owner money. Conditionally freed slaves paid considerably less for the change of juridical status than those who bought immediate and full freedom. But when the owner died, the conditionally freed slave became completely free. The master's heirs had lost an asset. We have seen how a minority of owners struggled against this loss, whether by doubling a slave's obligations so that he served both his former owner and his mistress, until both had died, or by exacting an additional payment from the ex-slave when one of his owners died.

Two further sets of conditions revealed in the inscriptions deserve our attention, since they highlight interesting aspects of exploitation. The first is familiar because it has a direct parallel in Roman law. In these cases, the slave-owners freed a slave but kept a lien on the ex-slave's property even after he had gained full freedom, by stipulating that when the ex-slave died, especially if he had no issue, all his property reverted to his erstwhile owner, or to his owner's heirs. He was not allowed to give anything away or to adopt an heir (see for example, GDI 1891, 2097, 2202). The savings of these freed slaves, just like the savings of a slave, were claimed by the master. But in other cases, owners explicidy allowed their conditionally freed slaves to take their savings away with them when they left service (FD 3.3.37 and 205).

The second set is more dramatic. It concerns the children born to conditionally freed slave-women during their service. Were their children to be slave or free? We assume that in most cases, children born during service were free, but we really cannot know for certain, since up to 50 BC explicit provision was rarely made (but see GDI 2136, 2171 and perhaps 1719). But towards the end of the last century BC and in the first century AD, it became increasingly common for masters to make explicit provision in the manumission contract about the status of children born during service. The number of inscriptions surviving from the first century AD is small, so that any conclusions must be very tentative; moreover the provisions are polarised, and split evenly between slave-women whose children born during service were free (N = 9/27), and those who were required to hand over a child or children as slaves usually to the heir, son or daughter, of their former

*55


owner (N = 10/27). 3 9 In extreme cases, the master specified that although the children of his ex-slave were formally free, he reserved the right to sell them if the need arose (FD 3.6.39), or that children born during service belonged to the master, and once again, if the need arose, they could be sold by the master (FD 3.3.306). But the most common stipulation was that the female slave who had already bought her freedom at a price should serve her owner until he died and in addition should surrender a baby or babies, one or two years old, to the master's heir. It was not enough for the master to get money from his former slave with which to buy a new slave; he wanted the slave's own flesh and blood, and was knowledgeable enough to wait undl the child was weaned and the risks of mortality had diminished.

The development of this new institutional form of hereditary slavery and its ironical creation within the framework of manumission are extremely interesting. And although the number of instances known from Delphi is limited, many similar cases have been found from the same period, the first century AD, in Calymna, a tiny Greek island near Cos.4 0 Perhaps this development can be partly explained by the increasingly peaceful conditions of the early first century AD, which drastically reduced the numbers of prisoners of war enslaved. The fall in slave supplies may have forced masters to seek replacement slaves outside the market, from among the children of their own slaves. Rather than prevent manumission, they compromised and got the best of both worlds by giving the appearance of freedom and by demanding child replacements for the adults freed.

The following is an illustrative example from Delphi:

... Euphoria sold to Pythian Apollo two bodies called Epiphanea and Epaphro for the price of six mnoe [600 drachmae], and I have received the whole sum...on the following conditions: they [the ex-slaves] shall remain with Euphoria as long as she lives and are to do everything she orders without giving cause for complaint. If they do not do what they are told, let Euphoria have the power to punish them in whatever way she wishes.

And after my death, let Epaphro give to my grandson Glaukias, son of Lyson, three babies (brephi), each two years old. If she does not have any children, let her give 200 denarii (= 200 drachmae).

And let Epiphanea give to my son Sostratos one three-year-old child * The requirement to produce children for the former master gained momentum only

in the first century AO. In the second half of the last century BC, only one out of twenty-seven conditionally freed adult women was required to surrender a child or pay a fee of 300 drachmae to her previous owner's heir (FD 3.3.291), although two out of twelve conditionally freed young girls were so required (FD 3.3.273 and 332).

40 See M. Segrl ed: 'Tituli Calymnii', Annuario delta Scuola archeologica di Atene 22/3 (1944-5) ifyff.; his introduction to these inscriptions is very useful.

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(paidion) after five years, and another three-year-old child to my grandson Glaukias after three years.

And then let Epaphro and Epiphanea be free.. ,(FD 3.6.38 - c. AD 20)

The Calymna inscriptions show that the institution of service after manumission was not limited to central Greece; they also suggest that the development of demands for young replacement slave children was widespread, a response to developments within slave society at large.41 The following is a typical example from Calymna:

In Asklepios' third monarchy [of Cos] in the month of Hyacinth... Asphales and Menodotos freed their own foundling slave Monarchia o n condition that she stays and serves Asphales for the rest of her life. A n d if she does not stay and serve h im, she shall pay for each day's absence 4 asses [ > 2 kg wheat equivalent]. A n d she shall bear and rear for the sons of Menodotos a male child [and hand h im over] when he is two years o ld, or pay 50 denarii. After the death of Asphales, she shall be freedwoman to n o one . (Tituli Calymnii

176a; ed . M. Segre (1944/5))

As at Delphi in this period, most of the slaves (for whom a record survives at Calymna) were freed conditionally (56/68) and of these, half were apparendy released only for service during the lifetime of one owner, less often of two owners. The other half of the conditionally freed slaves (28/56) were required to stay and serve their masters and to produce one, and less often two children for their owner or his heirs; in a few cases (6/28), children only were required, apparently without service.42

One difference between Calymna and Delphi is striking: at Calymna, 41 W. L. Westermann (1948) reported about sixty instances of paramoni from docu

ments found in Roman Egypt; but these do not seem to be connected with release from chattel slavery. They were general service contracts, usually associated with a loan to the servitor or to his family. There are several isolated examples of conditional service, as discussed in this paper from elsewhere, but not in sets of data comparable with those from Delphi and Calymna. See, for example, in other parts of central Greece, IC 9.1.36-42 and 189-94, especially 193 (second century AD ) in which an ex-slave was required to hand over a two-year-old child at the end of service or 200 dn; the prices charged in these inscriptions were very high (6/7: 1,000 drachmae or more); cf. IG 9.1.318 (Amphissa), 350-1 (Physkus) and 3796*. (Naupaktus), and SEG 25 097 1 ) 640 and 23 (1968) 352-3, where the prices read by the editor £. Mastrokostas are difficult to believe. See also PSI1263 (Egypt, second century A D ) and Gregory Nazianzen's will (PG 37.392b: Asia Minor, fourth, century A D ) .

41 Several of these inscriptions are fragmentary; the analysis of conditions which is set out in Appendix ill. 1 may overestimate numbers in the short categories, such as 'no conditions' (rows A B E F ) . We distrust Segr6's condusion (1756*.) that all ex-slaves were legally bound to provide (a) service after manumission and (b) one replacement slave child. He deduced this from the fact that the phrase 'in accord with the manumission laws' only once occurred when these two conditions were explicit, and argued therefore that these were the conditions which the manumission laws prescribed. G. Klaffenbach (Gnomon 25 (1953) 459) also disagreed with Segre\

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male as well as female slaves were conditionally freed with an obligation to produce issue for their previous owners. If they did not meet these requirements, they were often liable to pay money instead. But we are not told whether or how much they paid for their first formal liberation. It was usually specified that the child should be male and two years old when it was handed over to the former owners to start a new generation of foundlings (threptoi).43 This category of foundlings of which there are 23 examples from Calymna (out of less than 75 possible cases) seems to have replaced the older category - home-born.

Overall the purposes of these chilling practices seem clear. The old stock of slaves was given formal freedom with residual dudes of service until the owner died, and at the same time the slave stock was updated; adults were replaced by children within the framework of a quasi-familial relationship. For the owners, foundlings were better than slaves bought in the market.

P R I C E S

The prices which slaves paid for their freedom at Delphi form the single largest series of prices over time which we have from the classical world. For that reason alone, they deserve more attention than they have received. To be sure, many of the prices seem conventional: prices of 300, 400 and 500 drachmae were very common. But when we analysed the prices in terms of the other variables known: sex, age-group, conditions of release, origins and date, significant patterns emerged.

Table 111.3 shows what we think no one has previously argued from this evidence, namely that there was a steady rise in slave prices in the last two centuries before Christ.4 4 Average prices of all slaves rose by 43 It seems likely that the ownership of the baby by the ex-slave's master was confirmed

formally, rather than that the baby was actually handed over to be cared for in the master's household. The whole institution of service after freedom and of foundlings' slavery presupposes a close settled community in which the slaves, the ex-slaves and the enslaved children of the ex-slaves lived in various shades of dependence on the master. The classic but opaque article on foundlings is by A. Cameron, 'Threptos and related terms in the inscriptions of Asia Minor', Studies presented to W. H. Buckler, ed. W. M. Calder and J. Keil (Manchester 1939) 27-62; see also A. N. Sherwin-Whitc, The Letters of Pliny (Oxford, 1966) 650.

44 The prices in Tables 111,3 and 111.4 are for slaves freed singly. We excluded the multiply manumitted slaves because most of their prices are given in combinations (for example, an adult male and an adult female freed together for 1,000 drachmae - GDI 2158) which we do not know how to split. Occasionally, prices for slaves freed together were given separately, or for pairs of slaves of the same sex. However, we decided not to include these prices as and when they occurred lest there was a systematic difference between the prices paid by slaves freed singly and multiply,

158

Prices

Table 111.3. The average prices (drachmae) paid by slaves for freedom at Delphi (201-1 BC)

Approximate dates

a

Adult males

h

Adult females

c

Boys

d

Girls

e

Rough ratios*

A 201-153 BC 4<>3 376 235 160 100 B 153-100 BC 510 4 2 8 276 244 125 Ci IOO-53 BC 566 4 7 0 3 * 9 287 140 C, 5 3 - I BC 641 437 33o 333 150

Rough ratios 100 8 0 55 50

Number of cases A 130 190 11 9 B 8 3 128 «9 18 Ci 9 27 8 15 Ot *9 l9 10 15

* The vertical ratios indicate the relative cost over time of one man, one woman, one boy and one girl. The horizontal ratios indicate the relative cost over time of four men to four women, etc.

roughly 5 0 % (Table 111.3 col. e.). One explanation which immediately comes to mind is that the demand for slaves in Roman Italy outran supply, in spite of the thousands of prisoners captured in war and enslaved. Central Greece was hooked by Roman conquest into a pan-Mediterranean economy, and so slave prices rose.

Table 111.3 also shows fairly steady rises in release price over two centuries for adult males, adult females, boys and girls. It is impressive to find steady price rises (only two figures are awry) for each category. The rough ratio of release-price paid by adult male and adult female slaves (100:80) and the lower prices paid by children (55:50) seem to rule out prostitution associated with Apollo's temple (for which there is no evidence) as a major source of slaves' income. The steep rise in release-price for adult males (from an average of 403 drachmae to 641 drachmae) may reflect demand for adult male slave labour in Italy.

or lest the master was more interested in the total price than in its allocation between those freed together - for example between a mother and her child. In fact, there was no significant difference in prices paid by those multiply freed, and their exclusion or inclusion makes only slight differences to the profile. This is illustrated in Appendix in. 1, where Table 111.4 is recast to include the multiply freed. The only exception we made was to include in Table 111.3, cols, cd 18 boys and girls released in pairs or trios of one sex without an adult; their inclusion increased the base numbers signihcandy, although the profile was not much changed.

*59


In most cases, presumably the grant of full freedom to a slave involved the owner in buying a new slave to replace the slave who had been freed.45 Insofar as this was true, it is therefore probable that the prices which slaves paid for manumission bore a close relationship to what it would cost to buy replacement-slaves in the market. Indeed in one manumission inscription, replacement was specified: a conditionally freed slave was to be allowed full freedom if she provided a slave of similar age instead of herself (GDI 1717). Of course, it is possible that many slaves paid more for their freedom than the market price.4 6 Masters had power to impose their own terms; and they were often harsh. But it was also in the masters' interests to keep within reason. In general, they wanted slaves to accumulate savings; freedom had to appear reasonably achievable. In sum, we conclude that release prices approximated market prices.

Table 111.3 prompts two questions. First, did the rise in release prices reflect a general rise in prices throughout the Greek world, or a specific rise in slave prices? Unfortunately we do not know enough about prices in the rest of the Greek world to make any firm statement about price trends in the last two centuries BC. But Table 111.4 solves part of the problem. Secondly, can we properly combine prices for full freedom with prices for conditional release? That depends on the problem being considered. Prices for full freedom and conditional release can be amalgamated, if what we want to know is how much slaves paid for release of any type. And it is worth stressing that on average they paid a high price, and that the price during the last two centuries BC rose. But the price of full freedom was significantly higher 45 Alternatively manumission led to a reduction in the number of slaves, or slaves left

replacement slave children behind them in slavery; but the latter alternative would work easily only if slave holdings were very large.

48 Westermann (1955: 36) doubted that manumission prices were closely tied to market prices. We have no firm information on Greek slave market prices for this period; contemporary data from Greek Egypt are exiguous and difficult to compare with Greek prices; but they seem to confirm that prices paid by slaves at Delphi were high. Radle (1969: 165-7) argued and Bloch (1914: 21) noted in passing that the mna at Delphi was divided into 35 staters = 70 drachmae, and so was worth only 70/100 of the Attic mna (100 drachmae). By no means all the evidence fits this assertion (see GDI 1951, 2001, 2082) and what does (for example, three manumission prices including the figure 17^ staters) can easily be explained as survival from the fourth century BC (when there is apparently evidence of a mna of 70 drachmae) rather than as current practice in the second century BC. We have willingly followed the dominant convention: one Delphic mna equals one Attic mna. The only problem is what to do with the 38 prices which include staters and/or drachmae. We have counted them in the Attic style, as equally 1/50 and 1/100 of a mna. If we had treated them as 1/35 and 1/70 of a mna, it would have altered the average prices paid by slaves for freedom by 0.01 drachma or less in each period. We thank Mr M. Crawford for advice on these points.

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Prices

Table 111.4. The cost of full freedom increased, but the cost of conditional release held steady at Delphi (201-1 BC)

Average prices (in drachmae)

Adult males Adult females

Full Conditional Full Conditional Approximate dates freedom release freedom release

A 201-153 BC 405 3 ^ 390 337 B 153-100 BC 532 422 440 372 Ci 100-53 8 0 641 (3°°) 500 3 6 7 c* 53" 1 827 433 485 383

Numbers A 107 23 140 50 B 67 16 106 22 Ci 7 2 21 6 c, 10 9 10 9

than for conditional release, so that we are mixing two different entities. Table 111.4 provides some answers.

Table in.4 is extremely interesting. It shows that the price of conditional release remained fairly constant, while the price of full freedom soared. Indeed for adult males, the average price of full freedom doubled (from 405 to 827 drachmae) while the price of conditional release increased by only 10 % (from 396 to 433 drachmae). The changes in the average price paid for freedom by adult females were significant but less striking; their average price for full freedom rose by a maximum of 2 8 % from 390 to 500 drachmae while the price of conditional release rose by only 14%. These differences in the increase of prices make it unlikely that general inflation is the correct explanation. If there had been inflation, the price of both full and conditional freedom for adult males and females should have increased similarly.47

As the price of full freedom rose, the proportion of slaves who could afford it fell (from about three quarters of those freed in the second century BC to under half at the end of the last century BC - see Table 47 At first we were tempted to see the markets for full and conditional freedom as

somehow belonging to different circuits of the economy, to different markets, Mediterranean and local. Perhaps they did, but please note that although the price of conditional release remained roughly constant, the terms of conditional release became tougher, so that slaves received less for their money. The cost of conditional release rose even though the price did not.

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in. i , col. k). Complementarity, since the average price of conditional release remained fairly steady for two centuries (at 396-433 drachmae for adult males and 337-383 drachmae for adult females), more slaves compromised and bought conditional release. Again from Table m.i (col. k) we know that between the second century BC and the second half of the last century BC the proportion of slaves having to be satisfied with conditional release almost doubled (from 2 7 % to 5 2 % ) . It was all that they could afford.

At the beginning of the second century BC, there was only a very small difference between the cost of full freedom and conditional release; indeed for adult male slaves, the average difference (9 drachmae) was negligible. Why? Surely it makes sense only if there was little practical difference between the actual consequences of the two types of freedom.48 We suggest that in the early period most ex-slaves continued to live in the same socio-economic roles which they had fulfilled as slaves. In a stable, local economy, the juridical status of workers made only a slight objective difference to their other social and economic ties; most ex-slaves, once freed, continued to depend on their former owners for patronage, for the preservation of their new status, for the sale of produce, for loans in times of famine or family crisis.

The integration of central Greece into the Roman world, the prolonged upsets which followed the Roman conquest, the imposition of taxes, the migration of slaves and of ex-slaves to Roman Italy stirred up local economies throughout the entire Mediterranean basin.49 By the last century BC, owners who gave slaves their full freedom not only changed the slaves' status, but also ran the real risk of losing the ex-slaves' services. Moreover, replacement slaves had to be bought in a slave market, whose tentacles now stretched from the rich market of Italy as far as Greece. We think that is why the price of full freedom rose, and that is why it increased more steeply for men than for women slaves - because men could more easily take advantage of the expanding economy by personal mobility.

But why did the price of conditional release remain relatively stable? Once again we can only speculate, but the principal reason must surely 48 Radle (1969: 134ff.) argued, as others have done, that Plato's Laws (11.915) reflected

current Athenian practice and that ex-slaves there owed their former master serious obligations. It does seem likely that paramone as an institution grew up out of practice. What we see in these Delphic inscriptions is the codification and development of those practices, and the bifurcation of paramone as an institution from full freedom. It is of course possible, though we know nothing of it, that the two forms, of freedom were reserved for distinct categories of slaves.

49 This process in Greece is described in Rostovtzeff (1941: vol. 2, 6ioff.).

162

Prices

be that the slaves who bought conditional release secured only a change in status; they had no chance of changing their socio-economic roles. As ex-slaves they continued to stay with and serve their former owner, until his death. Therefore the price of conditional release was relatively unaffected by increases in the price of full freedom and of new slaves. In short, the price of conditional release was fixed in a different, completely local market. But the two markets did influence each other. As the price of full freedom rose, and so became more difficult to acquire, so some masters, as we have seen, felt able to squeeze conditionally-freed slaves harder: they doubled their obligations by requiring them to serve during the lives of both master and mistress, or they exacted an extra payment for full freedom. Similarly, as the cost of replacement slaves increased, so masters exacted new slaves - infants - from a significant minority of the conditionally freed. The increasing harshness of conditional freedom was a consequence of the higher cost of full freedom.50

F A M I L Y T I E S A M O N G T H E F R E E D

One stark contrast between slave and free was in family relations. In the American south, free persons were married in church * until death do us part'; slaves were married by ceremonially jumping over a broomstick in the master's house, and the marriage was scheduled to last, the cynics said, until buckra [master] sold one of them.51 Surviving classical evidence cannot match the American south for richness of detail; we have to be satisfied with glimpses. But even the lapidary inscriptions from Delphi reveal many of the family ties between free manumittors, and also between the freed slaves.

As we have seen, husbands and wives often joindy required conditionally-freed slaves to serve them until they both died (see Table in.2). A free manumittor also often secured the formal consent of a relative to the manumission; this collaboration was not required by law, but since relatives were potential heirs they had an interest in the family property and so bore witness to the renunciation of a shared good.52

50 A somewhat similar conclusion, reached in a different way by Rädle (1969:152), relied too much on the ratio of home-born slaves to the known aliens; but see Bloch (1914: 25 and 37-8).

51 Genovese (1975: 481). 51 Collaboration may not have been related only to property but may also have helped

guarantee the ex-slave's freedom. In this respect, collaboration especially by sons who might oudive the prime manumittor was particularly helpful (soCalderini 1908: igoff.). We should stress that although women had collaborators more often than men, they also acted singly; and many men had women as collaborators.

163


Table 111.5. Manumissions by male slave-owners decreased; manumissions by female slave-owners increased. Manumissions in which relatives formally collaborated increased*

Proportions (%) of cases in which a slave was released by a b c d

Joint CollaboraMale Female manu- tive manu

manumittor manumittor mittorst missions:):

A 201-153 B 68 17 15 *9 B 153-101 BC 52 3° 18 58 G I O I - I BC 35 3* 32 56

* These data are based on systematic samples of 100 inscriptions from each period.

t Joint manumittors are manumittors who released a slave together, equally (x and y freed the slave z). Please note that the figures in columns a+6+c horizontally add up to 100%. The figures in column d are separate.

X By collaborative manumissions, we mean manumissions in which the manumittor explicidy indicated that the manumission was undertaken with the agreement of relative(s) (x with the agreement of y freed z).

Husbands agreed to manumissions by wives (GDI 1697) and more surprisingly wives formally consented to the acts of husbands (FD 3.3.295 and 394); sons and daughters agreed to the acts of fathers and mothers (GDI 2062, 2212, 2245); less often mothers (FD 3.3.375), brothers (FD 3.3.433) and grandchildren (GDI 2188) signified their agreement. What is more, the custom of collaborative release became increasingly common, for reasons which may be connected with, but which are not fully explained by the increase in the number of manumissions performed by women (cf. Tables in.2 and 111.5)· But for our present purposes, all we need to stress is that these brief inscriptions recorded a wide variety of family relationships among free slave-owners.

Among slaves, matters stood differendy, at least as far as their owners were concerned. We can see this particularly in the large number of multiple manumussions which occurred in the last two centuries BC (133 acts analysed, involving 323 slaves). By multiple manumissions we mean those manumissions in which more than one slave was freed. A priori, we might expect such multiple manumissions explicidy to include slave husbands and wives freed together, or slave fathers and sons, brothers and sisters. But they do not. The only

164

Family ties

relationship among slaves repeatedly recognised in these Delphic inscriptions was that between slave mother and child (in 29 out of 133 multiple manumissions). The law, of course, did not recognise the capacity of slaves as persons to have husbands or wives; this was true in Roman law as well, but in Roman pracdce slave mates were frequendy commemorated. We suspect that slave mothers were ex-plicidy recognised as mothers, both because slave status derived from the mother, and because it was in the slave-owners' interest that slave children should be nurtured. Even among slaves, motherhood was a valued role.

The recognition of lateral kin among slaves, whether husbands, wives or brothers (or even fathers) would have limited masters' freedom to split families by sale. This judgement may sound harsh. But how else can we explain the virtual absence of any other acknowledged relationship in the large number of slaves freed in multiple or single manumissions.53 Only once in a thousand (N = 978) manumissions, single or multiple, was the tie between slave husband and slave wife explicitly recognised (GDI 2183); and only once was a slave's father acknowledged (GDI 1708). Chattel slavery depends upon the market. The market operates best by denying family ties, partly because buyers do not necessarily want to purchase a whole family unit, partly because slaves themselves might not be able to pay for the release of all family members at one time. The tie between slave mother and slave child was the only tie which partly withstood these forces of separation.

Most ( 8 0 % ; N = 2 i 5 ) of the slaves freed as children were freed separately from their mothers (a few of these ( 1 0 % ) were freed with apparendy unrelated adults). Apparendy the pressure of increased prices for full freedom paid by adult slaves induced an increasing proportion of slave parents to buy their own liberty first and to leave their children behind them in slavery, perhaps with the hope of buying them out later. And then the increased cost of manumission induced more and more parents to rest satisfied with the cheaper intermediate stage of conditional freedom. This pressure was probably highest when an ex-slave tried to free a mother and child, or children, altogether at the same time. Table 111.6 shows the trends: the proportion of child slaves released alone, without an adult, rose during the last two centuries BC from 5 0 % to 8 5 % (Table 111.6, col. a); the proportion of children conditionally freed, which was initially the same 53 In six cases, we can deduce reladonships from the similarity of names of slaves freed

together; they are probably sibs: for example, Kleo, Kleonika (GDI 1977): Boiska, Boiskos (GDI 1837; cf. 1836). Fatherhood is probably implied by the joint release of an adult male and a one-year-old child (FD 3.6.12), but it is the only such case.

165


Table m.6. Slave families were split by manumission

a b e d

Slave children Slave children Number of slave freed without freed Adults freed children

an adult conditionally conditionally recorded

(%)

A 2 O I - I 5 3 BC 50 30 29 40 B 1 5 3 - I O I BC 63 46 19 70 C I O I - I BC 85 56 38 73

as for adults (cf. col. b with col. c), became significantly higher and eventually accounted for half of the slave children whose manumission is recorded at Delphi in the last century BC (Table 111.6, col. b and col. c: 5 6 % for children as against 3 8 % for adults). Thus many ex-slave parents succeeded in securing their children's full or partial freedom only by the successive manumission of family members (father, then mother, then child). It must have taken years of struggle. But our figures, especially the overall ratios of adults to children (c. 4:1) and the high proportion of home-born slaves who bought freedom only as adults, suggest that most parents failed to free their children. Parents left children behind in slavery to win freedom for themselves as adults.54

Slave-owners also developed family ties with slaves. Masters had children by their female slaves; and they probably established affectionate ties with some of the slaves who had been members of the household since birth. As in several other slave societies, the category * home-born' (oikogenes) grew out of this recognition that home-bred slaves were different from the aliens bought in the market place. We can see the impact of these affections both statistically and by illustrative example. First, statistically: there are over five hundred prices for singly freed adult slaves from the second century BC, enough to run a series of paired comparisons between the prices paid by home-born and by known alien slaves (for example, from 201 to 153 BC the average prices paid by adult males for full freedom were: 54 The overall proportion of children among the freed slaves at Delphi (17%) is the

product of some uneven sub-totals. In 201-153 BC, the proportion was only 8 % ; from 153-100 BC, it was 19%; and in the last century BC, it was 2 9 % . These figures perhaps support the idea that the proportion of home-born slaves was increasing; just as the high proportion of home-born slaves among those freed suggests that freed slaves left slave children behind them.

166

Family ties

home-born: 350; known aliens: 410 drachmae). The average price paid by home-born slaves was lower in six out of eight such paired comparisons, and the (unweighted) average price-advantage to home-born slaves was 6 % . Put another way, being home-born counted for litde when the master fixed the price of a slave's release.55

Some masters may have been more generous than we know about. After all, there were many factors affecting price; we do not know which slaves were ugly, handsome, attractive, hard-working, lazy, clever or dull. Less than a dozen inscriptions record that a slave had a particular skill, such as embroiderer (FD 3.3.230) or bronze worker (FD 3.1.565), skills which elevated the cost of their freedom well above the norm. This may mean that such skills were not usual; we cannot tell. Nor can we tell from the prices alone which slaves their masters loved, or which they were pleased to see go. The overwhelming majority of slaves paid sizeable sums for their freedom. We noted only two slaves who were explicidy given their freedom free of charge (FD 3.3.45 and 364), and each had to stay on with her previous mistress and serve her as long as the mistress lived. Some gift. In addition over thirty slaves, less than 3 % of the total, paid what we may call a concessionary price of 100 drachmae or less; most of these were children; and in any case the top limit, 100 drachmae, was equal at conventional wheat prices to 850 kg wheat equivalent, somewhat less than a year's maintenance for a poor family; this was surely not a token sum to most slaves.

A few masters, as we have seen, relied on an ex-slave to look after them in old age, to arrange the funeral; some masters made their ex-slaves heirs, a measure of loneliness but also of affection. In 172 BC, for example, one girl was freed by her master and was to be' considered the daughter' of his daughter Dorema' doing all that children properly do for their parents' (GDI 1803; cf. 1806, 1945). For this privilege the girl called Hedula paid 350 drachmae; her real parents probably paid it on her behalf. The matter apparendy ended well: fifteen years later, 56 Other paired comparisons, for example, are (201-153 BC):

males with home-born 333 drachmae; known-aliens 357 drachmae paramone

females without home-born 363 drachmae; known-aliens 404 drachmae paramone'

females with home-born 300 drachmae; known-aliens 346 drachmae paramone

Those whose origins were not given tended to pay a price between the home-born and the aliens, but the pattern was not as even as in the home-born/known aliens comparisons. Nonetheless, it suggests that many of those whose origins were not given, were in fact home-born. Such analyses were not practicable for the slaves freed in the last century BC, because the numbers involved were too small.

.67


another inscription records the manumission of a slave by Dorema 'with the approval of her daughter Hedula' (FD 3.3.8). In another case ( G D I 1715), a master Agamestor, son of Telestas, released a woman and two house-born males called Agamestor and Telestas; the names certainly suggest that they were the owner's own sons. Yet the trio paid 700 drachmae for conditional freedom (for similar cases see GDI 2144; FD 3.3.372). In the southern states of the USA, similar instances are recorded in which masters acknowledged the paternity of slaves; but that paternity only mitigated slavery, it did not eliminate slave status.


Finally, we should return to a basic problem which we raised earlier and never solved. How did slaves, perhaps especially female slaves, acquire the very considerable sums necessary for buying their freedom? The straightforward answer is that we do not know, and in the absence of knowledge, we shall be reduced to speculation. Several points are worth making. First, the average prices paid by slaves for their freedom at Delphi were high - roughly equal (at 400 drachmae) to a family's sustenance for three years. Many paid substantially more. This suggests that those slaves who were freed lived at well above the level of minimum subsistence. During their time as slaves, they accumulated sizeable capital sums. They were not an underclass; they must have been richer than many free peasants. We do not know what they did. It seems unlikely that they were typically tenant farmers, because the region around Delphi is not agriculturally rich. Very few of the slaves freed (less than a dozen) are explicidy stated to have been craftsmen. We have excluded temple prostitution as a typical characteristic of the slaves freed, because men paid more for their freedom than women and boys or girls. It seems likely that many of the slaves freed were in some way connected with the prosperity derived from the Delphic shrine. And we should stress once again that these slaves, freed by special ritual, are likely to have been an unrepresentative sample of all slaves freed, and a minority of all slaves most of whom, we suspect, were never freed.

Secondly, we may have been wrong to assume that all slaves paid for their own freedom. We cannot help wondering whether money for the purchase of freedom was sometimes put up by someone else. Perhaps the best way to broach this speculation is by posing another problem. By and large most masters in Delphi released a single slave; admittedly this was partly a function of the style of record: one

168

Conclusions

inscription per act of manumission. We know that some masters freed more than one slave in the same year (GDI 2169, 2187) or freed several slaves in several years (GDI 1783, 1888; FD 3.3.37); but such cases are rare. And when masters did release more than one slave in a single act of manumission, then by and large the number of slaves released in each multiple manumission was small (the average was 2.54 slaves in 159 acts).56 Typically most masters released only one slave at a time. We deduce that most slave-holdings were small.

Small slave-holdings face a special problem of reproduction. Each slave household is unlikely to contain a marriageable male and a nubile female. Among free persons in free societies, the circulation of females, if we can look at it in this crude way, so that each adult female goes to one adult male, takes up a lot of social time, emodon, ritual and expense. Perhaps then, some of the release money for female slaves may have been paid by males, whether free or slave, who wished to marry them. Freedom, full or conditional, may have been the only path by which slaves mates could be provided.

Why did masters not sell their slaves outright to the owners of male slaves? Perhaps they did, and if they did, we should know nothing of it from manumission documents. But we can easily envisage a situation in which the owners of a young single female slave, acknowledging her wish to marry, sold her partial freedom, which both allowed her to marry an outsider and yet retained a lien on her services. Eventually in a number of cases, owners even demanded a share in their former slaves' offspring. Of course, this reconstruction is only speculation. But even so, understanding intermarriage between small slave households and their reproduction remains a real problem. And there are eleven cases in the Delphi manumission in which the ex-slave was conditionally released and required to serve someone other than her former owner. Probably not all those who paid for a slave's liberation had marriage in mind. But it is worth stressing that in this tiny minority of cases the purchaser of liberty was not the slave herself but some one else.

Thirdly, slavery in central Greece, like slavery in Roman Italy, seems to have been only a temporary servitude, at least for some slaves. Greek slavery, even the slave-like service of conditional release, was usually indeterminate; its period was decided either by the master's 'genero-86 Over the whole period, covered by the manumission at Delphi (201 B C - A D 100), both

the proportion of all manumissions which were multiple, and the proportions of slaves freed in multiple manumissions doubled (see Table 111.1, cols mm 14 % to 35 %, and 2 9 % to66%). It seems reasonable todeduce from this that thesizeof slave-holdings among those who freed slaves at Delphi was increasing. We reached a similar conclusion in our study of Thessalian inscriptions (see note 1 above).

169


sity' in allowing the slave to buy his freedom at a price, or by the ex-master's death. But in spite of this uncertainty, numerous slaves became free. This system worked for masters because it made slaves work harder and because the money which slaves saved and gave to their masters paid for new slaves. Manumission and the slave market grew hand in hand.

Finally, our data have allowed us to trace changes both in the price which slaves paid for freedom and in the degree of exploitation implicit in the institution of conditional release (paramone). While the price of full freedom rose, the price of condidonal release remained nearly constant; but for a significant minority of conditionally freed slaves the terms of their release deteriorated; they received less for what they paid; they either had to serve two owners for their life-times instead of one, or to pay a second fee to win full freedom, or to surrender one or two of their children as replacements for themselves. Thus their own escape was tempered by a child's enslavement. We have discussed these developments in detail; the point we wish to make here is that the institutions of slavery, manumission and conditional release are too often treated as monolithic, unchanging. It will come as no surprise to historians, that they changed.

A P P E N D I X I I U Conditions of release in manumissions from Calymna (see note 42)

Male Female Sex not Conditions of release slaves slaves known Total

A No conditions 5 7 12

B Paramonë only *3 "S 2 28

c Paramone only, one child 8 8 - 16

D Paramone only, two children 2 4 - 6

£ One child only 1 1 2 4 F Two children only I 1 - 2

G Conditions not known 3 3 1 7

Totals 33 37 5 75

170

Conclusions

Table 111.4. - bis. Recast to include prices paid by slaves multiply freed*

Adult males Adult females Full Conditional Full Conditional

Approximate dates f reedom release freedom release A 2OI-153 BC 409 375 387 330 B 153-IOO BC 5»8 413 43 1 369

d 100-53 BC (3°°) 478 367 C, 53-I BC 794 409 467 356

Numbers A 112 34 65 B 72 l9 116 25 Ci 9 4 23 6

c , H 11 »3 17

* By 'multiply freed* we m e a n those slaves w h o were freed together by o n e owner.

171

T H E P O L I T I C A L P O W E R O F E U N U C H S 1

T H E P O W E R A N D T H E P R I V I L E G E S O F T H E C O U R T E U N U C H S

Why Eunuchs? Primarily because they were important. No one who has waded through the church histories of the fourth and fifth centuries or the numerous later Byzandne chronicles, or those lives of the saints which touch upon court life, can have failed to be struck by the frequent imputation that, in the Eastern Empire especially, the real power lay in the hands not of the emperor nor of his aristocrats, but of his chief eunuch;2 or alternatively that the corps of eunuchs as a group wielded considerable if not predominant power at court.3 Yet the eunuchs were barbarians by birth and slaves into the bargain.4 The purpose of this chapter is to explain why slave eunuchs and particularly ex-slave eunuchs held so much power in the imperial and aristocratic society of Eastern Rome, to put this power in the context of the socio-political developments of the later empire, and to analyse some of the social functions of this power. 1 This chapter owes a huge amount to the kindness and encouragement of my then

supervisor Professor A. H. M. Jones, and to his great work The Later Roman Empire (Oxford, 1964). An earlier version of this chapter was published in the Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 189 (1963) 62-80.1 am grateful to the society for permission to publish this version.

1 For the power of chief eunuchs under various emperors see, for example, Libanius, Speeches 18.152; Malalas 340; Olympiodorus, frag. 13; Priscus, frag. 7; Cedrenus 1.587 and 626 (Byzandne annalists are cited from the texts published in the Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae - CSHB).

3 Again for eunuchs' collective power under different emperors, see Sozomen, History of the Church 3.1; Zosimus 4.22-3 and 28; Suidas, sv thladias; John of Antioch, frag. 191,194. The fragments of John of Antioch, Olympiodorus and Priscus may be found in C. Mtiller, ed. Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum vol. 4 (Paris, 1885).

4 Castration was forbidden on Roman soil (C/4.42.1-2) and the penalties were severe; Justinian made the penalty fit the crime (NJ 142). Most eunuchs apparendy came from outside the empire (Cedrenus 1.601; Theophanes 1.154), especially from the Abasgi (Procopius, Gothic Wars 8.3.15-17 and 19), at least until the sixth century. But in times of famine some parents are said to have castrated their children and sold them (Cedrenus 1.590); moreover general laws like this could not be rigorously enforced, so that some eunuchs may have been from inside the empire.

172

Power and privileges of court eunuchs

Here, right at the beginning, the objection might be raised that we are faced with nothing but a problem of historiography. Eunuchs might have been to Byzandne historians nothing more than women and gods were to Herodotus, convenient personal pegs to hang historical causes on. In itself this would not be without its interest. Eunuchs served as scapegoats. They were like Court Jews in German states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.5 They were subjected to similar obloquy and similar characteristics were attributed to them by contemporaries. This comparison suggests, what we should have suspected, that these characteristics (ambidon, emotional instability, arrogance and avarice) were the product of a position within the structure of power, common to both court eunuchs and Court Jews, rather than a direct consequence of castration. Being a scapegoat was one of the eunuch's functions at court. But above and beyond this, I hope to show that ex-slave eunuchs did in fact exercise real power; that people who wanted important tasks immediately executed with the support of imperial authority regularly approached the court eunuchs rather than any other imperial officer or indeed the emperor himself. People believed that eunuchs exercised power and acted upon that assumption.

But were court eunuchs actually responsible for the acts attributed to them by historians in antiquity, or were these acts instituted by the emperor himself with the ex-slave eunuch as a front? What were the motives of each in effecting a particular policy? Such questions can never, with our sources as they are, be finally answered. It was difficult enough at the time. For example, the emperor Julian did not really know whether it was the Grand Chamberlain Eusebius alone who had prevented him from having audiences with the then emperor Constantius I I , or whether Constantius himself also did not want to see him.6 Eunuchs were unpopular. Even an intelligent and well-informed contemporary like the historian Ammianus Marcellinus took a somewhat prejudiced view. He believed that his hero and commander Ursicinus had been insufficiendy recognised and rewarded. He put the blame on the palace intrigues of malicious eunuchs, 8 See S. Stern, The Court Jew (Philadelphia, 1950) 4-49, 245**., and H. Schnee, Die

Hofinom und die moderne Stoat (Berlin, 1955-5) vol. 3, ijztt. In many interesting ways the Court Jews paralleled court eunuchs. They were dependent on the favour of the prince, but their rise to power was independent of the characteristics of any particular prince and often took place in the context of the struggle between the ruler and the Estates. The rulers needed servants who were free from attachments to religious and corporate associations. And Court Jews like eunuchs had relatively free private access to rulers.

* Julian, To the Athenians 274AB.

173

The political power of eunuchs

and on one eunuch Grand Chamberlain in particular. But a modern scholar has argued convincingly that there may have been a serious and well-considered purpose behind this policy;7 the Grand Chamberlain may simply have been responsible for executing this policy and not acting out of self-interest.

The problem is more difficult with the annalistic compilers of the later Byzantine period. Many of their stories have an apocryphal ring about them. Anything strange or wrong was attributed to the court eunuchs; above all, anything unpopular. This may be valuable in showing the common attitude to eunuchs or for the analysis of their usefulness in soaking up criticisms which might otherwise have fallen upon the emperor. But it makes an accurate estimate of their powers difficult. Once again the function of court eunuchs seems similar to that of Court Jews, who received some of the unpopularity caused by political acts which had been initiated by the ruler; the Court Jews were rewarded with great wealth, but at the cost of increased social isolation; and like ex-slave eunuchs, Court Jews ran the risk of sudden denunciation.8 Many of the acts which the Grand Chamberlain executed on the emperor's behalf and in response to his instructions must have been debited to the Grand Chamberlain's account. We cannot say, of course, which particular actions come under this category; we cannot say with certainty that any did; but it is unlikely that most writers had any accurate inside information. In this quandary we shall have to turn not only to historical anecdotes, but to the development of certain institutions which reflect the real and increasing power of eunuchs.

Whatever may have been the prestige of eunuchs in society at large, the rank which they held at court was almost the highest in the land; and if anything the court eunuchs improved their rank during the fourth and fifth centuries, as the depreciation and inflation of tides produced yet more formal differentiation within the central elite. In the first part of the fourth century, the Grand Chamberlain (proepositus

sacri cuhiculi) seems to have been of senatorial rank ( C I L 6.31946). In the second half of the fourth century, the tide of clarissimus attached to senators had so depreciated as to make necessary the institution-alisation of two new and superior tides for court nobles, those of Respectable (spectabilis) and Illustrious (iUustris). The highest title, that of Illustrious, was restricted at first to a very small group of prefects 7 Ammianus 18.4.3 a n < l E - A • Thompson, The Historical Works of A mmianus Marcellinus

(Cambridge, 1947) 42-5. 8 See note 5 above.

*74


and generals, and members of the * Privy Council* (consistorian counts). By AD 384 the Grand Chamberlain was also reckoned 'among those of the first rank'.9 In the established order of precedence of the Eastern Empire, the Grand Chamberlain, eunuch and ex-slave, held the fourth rank in the realm, coming after the Praetorian Prefects, the Prefect of the City and the Masters of the Soldiers.10 A similar ranking was given in a Western law of AD 412 (C.Th. 11.18.1). This is interesting because it shows that the rank achieved by Grand Chamberlains in general was independent of the great individual power of the Eastern Grand Chamberlain, Eutropius. In AD 422 the grade illustris was already depreciated and was split into two. The Grand Chamberlain was classed with the upper group which consisted of the prefects and the masters of the soldiers (C.Th. 6.8.1). And at the end of the fifth century the Grand Chamberlain was still an official of the highest rank (CJ 3.24.3 (AD 485/6) and 12.5.5 (Anastasius).

The Grand Chamberlain was not the only court eunuch to hold high rank, although he was in a special position because his tenure continued at the emperor's pleasure and often lasted longer than the three years thought to be normal for praetorian prefects.11 Beneath the Grand Chamberlain, two other eunuch ex-slaves, the Superintendent of the Sacred Bedchamber (primicerius socri cubiculi) and the Chief Steward of the Sacred Palace (costrensis socri polatii) were probably recruited from the corps of eunuchs and held their offices for a statutory two years.1 2 The very names of their titles and their close association with the emperor's private person recall the high status of similar functions in the courts of European monarchs (for example, the English Lord High Chaniberlain and the pages, grooms and Ladies of the Bedchamber); but in European courts these duties were

• C.Th. 7.8.3 ( A D 384); but cf. C.Th. 11.16.15 ( A D 3&*) which Ensslin (ic£Suppl. 8,558) interprets wrongly; see rather J. E. Dunlap, The Office of the Grand Chamberlain in the Later Roman and Byzantine Empires (University of Michigan, Humanistic Series, 14; New York, 1924) 184.

10 Notitia Dignitatum, ed. O. Seeck, Or. 1, index; cf. Occ. 1, index. 11 Cf. for example, Socrates, History of the Church 2.2; Sozomen, History of the Church

3.1; Ammianus 21.15.4 for the long tenure of Eusebius; and Theophanes, 1.125 and 127 for Andochus.

18 It could be inferred from CJ 12.5.2 ( A D 428) that promotions to three of the four top jobs held by eunuchs: primicerius, costrensis and comes domorum went by seniority. This is partially confirmed by John of Ephesus (Lives of the Eastern Saints, trans, from the Syriac by E. W. Brooks, P.O. 19.202) who wrote that Theodore retired before his time, as costrensis; and that castrenses normally retired after two years (C. Th. 6.32.1. ( A D 416)). But there are difficulties about ranks; E. A. Costa ( T h e Castrensis Sacri Palatii', Byzantion 42 (1972) 358-87) argues convincingly that in the early fourth century, the castrensis was superior to the Grand Chamberlain and may not have been a eunuch; by the end of the fourth century, the Grand Chamberlain was certainly superior. See also for other difficulties, Hopkins (1963) 65 n.6.

175


performed by nobles or gendefolk of high status, not by castrated ex-slaves. The closest parallel to these late Roman practices can be found in the Chinese and Ottoman courts; the latter probably inherited or copied Byzantine habits. According to the Roman book of precedence (the Notitia Dignitum), the Superintendent of the Sacred Bedchamber and the Chief Steward of the Sacred Palace both ranked as Respectables (spectabiles) and thus were equal in rank, in spite of their origins, to high nobles.13 In the late fourth and during the fifth century, four further posts of high rank were created and filled exclusively by eunuchs.14 The number of high positions open to them was still further increased when it became customary for the empress to have a separate Bedchamber with its own complement of high officers.15 Nothing reflects more clearly the tremendous and sustained influence which court eunuchs were able to bring to bear upon a whole succession of emperors than their occupation of a regularly increasing number of offices, and the high rank which went with them.

In the early days of the Roman monarchy, in the first century AD, some ex-slaves of the emperor exercised considerable power as heads of administrative bureaux; and they were given the insignia of high rank (inter praetores). But the chief eunuchs in the later Empire continuously achieved rank superior to the vast majority of nobles, and quite out of proportion to the formal duties of palace organisation. 13 Notitia Dignitatum Or. 17; Occ. 14-15; C.Th. 6.32.1 (AD416). 14 In sum, the chief positions held by eunuchs in the palace and the earliest known

date of their tenure were: (i) Grand Chamberlain (praepositus sacri cubiculi) A D 326; Codinus, On the Origins of Constantinople 18. (ii) Superintendent of the Sacred Bedchamber (primicerius sacri cubiculi) perhaps by A D 312, more certainly by A D 326; ib. 18 and 21. (iii) Chief Steward of the Sacred Palace (castrensis sacri palatit) c. A D 343; Athanasius, History of the Arians 15; Apologia against the Arians 36. (iv) Count of the Imperial Estates in Cappadocia (comes domorum per Cappadociam) between A D 379 and A D 414; CTh. 6.30.2 ( A D 379); 11.28.9 subscript (AD 414); Not. Dign. Or. 10; Dunlap (1924) 187. (v) Count of the Imperial Wardrobe (comes sacrae vestis) A D 412; C.Th. 11.18.1. (vi) Captain of the Bodyguard (spatharius) A D 447; Theodoret, Letters n o . (vii) Keeper of the Purse (saceUarius) A D 474-91; John of Antioch, frag. 214.4. NB: offices may well have existed before these dates and may also have been occupied by non-eunuchs.

19 Already by the reign of Constantine, the empress was attended by eunuchs (Philo-storgius, History of the Church 2.4, and Codinus, On the Origins of Constantinople 18 and 21) mentions two Grand Chamberlains in Constanune*s court, though Ensslin doubts that any firm condusion about their rank may be drawn from so late a source (RE Suppl. 8,557). Certainly in A D 400, Amantius was Chief Steward to the empress Eudoxia (Marcus Diaconus, Life of Porphyry 36-7,40), and by the reign of Theodosius II, and again at the coronation of Leo I and in the reign of Anastasius, there is evidence of separate Bedchambers (Theophanes 1.151-2; Constantine Porphyro-genitus, On Ceremonies 1.91 (416 CSHB); CJ 3.24.3 ( A D 485/6) and 12.5.5). In A D 536. the empress had her own Keeper of the Purse (John of Ephesus, P.O. 18.630, n.i). In fact the two Caesars, Gallus and Julian, both had their own Grand Chamberlains in the middle of the fourth century (Ammianus 15.2.10; 16.7.2).

. 7 6


In the highly centralised system of the later Empire, with its detailed and established order of precedence, the exercise of informal power without formal recognition would have been very difficult. Besides, however important the rights of aristocratic birth and of wealth, and no one can deny that they were important, what gave most power at court in the later Empire was the degree of association with the emperor. And the exercise of office near to the sacred person of the emperor entided even eunuchs to honour and acknowledgement.

This proximity to the emperor and the assurance of his favour was the sole firm basis of court eunuchs' power.16 Their duty to protect the emperor from intruders was of great importance in this respect. It served to emphasise the eunuchs' own freedom of access and their opportunities for informal persuasion.17 And it gave them the formalised right of controlling audiences (Constantine Porphyroge-nitus, On Ceremonies 1.87). It was Gallicanus, the Grand Chamberlain of the usurper Maximus, who apparendy decided that St Ambrose should be received in formal council and so wrecked his diplomatic mission (Ambrose, Letters 24). On a humbler level it was through the services of Amantius, the Chief Steward of the empress Eudoxia, that Porphyry bishop of Gaza gained an imperial order against pagans still practising in his home town (Mark the Deacon, Life of Porphyry 366*.).

A further product of the eunuchs' closeness to the emperor was that those who wanted favours, either positions or policies, found it advisable to grease the palm of the court eunuchs and to get them to espouse their cause.18 Several stories ilustrate this point. When one governor of a province was accused of corruption, he only just managed to escape by putting his whole future at the disposal of the court eunuchs (Zosimus 4.40.8). When the Arian sect wanted support from the new emperor Constantius, they found it easiest to get at him by winning over the Grand Chamberlain Eusebius first. The lesser eunuchs and the empress followed suit, and the emperor was surrounded (Socrates, History of the Church 2.2). To be sure we must be careful in the evaluation of these stories. Many of them may have been based upon hearsay. However that may be, there is enough reliable evidence that men of importance were willing to stake very consid-

" On occasions the emperor seems to have been surrounded by eunuchs alone (Cedrenus 1.622); certainly even the Grand Chamberlain was within calling distance while the emperor was asleep (Theophanes 1.253).

17 The Grand Chamberlain could enter the presence freely (Constantine Porphyro-genitus, On Ceremonies 1.97 (442 CSHB); the other chamberlains could gossip with the emperor while performing intimate tasks (Ammianus 14.11.3; 18.4.2; Suidas, sv. thtodios; Zosimus 5.1.4).

18 Libanius, Speeches 18.149; Ammianus 18.4.3. c f * al*0 Sozomen, History of the Church 4.12.16; Mark the Deacon, Life of Porphyry 26-7.

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erable sums on the assumption that the persuasive powers of eunuchs were paramount. When Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, wanted to win the emperor over to his cause, he distributed considerable bribes both to the wife of the Praetorian Prefect and to the Master of Offices: each got ioo Roman pounds of gold and sumptuous furnishings. A similar amount went to the chief legal officer, the quaestor of the palace. But one of the two chief eunuchs received twice as much gold, and a further seven chamberlains shared between them similar furnishings and 380 Roman pounds of gold in cash (Acts of the Ecumenical Councib,

ed. E. Schwartz (Berlin, 1922-) vol. 1.4, 224 and 293). In addidon to favours for others, eunuchs were not slow to gain

privileges for themselves. They exacted fees for audiences;19 and by the fifth century they exacted a sizeable commission from everyone appointed to public office. It was a token of their influence in the process of selection. The eunuch Chrysaphius demanded a payment even from a newly appointed patriarch of Constantinople; nor was he put off by the archbishop's plea that in order to pay up, church plate would have to be sold. (Evagrius, History of the Church 2.2; Theophanes 1.150-1). Justinian, even when he abolished payment for office, allowed the fees of eunuchs to survive. And there is further evidence for the privileged position of eunuchs to be found in a law of AD 430; if the emperor made a grant of confiscated land, eunuch chamberlains alone were allowed to keep the whole grant; everyone else had to surrender half to the treasury.20 Some of them, Ammianus claimed (18.4.3), w«re not above plotting against those whose possessions they coveted.

The consistent exploitation of these opportunities led eunuchs to consolidate usage into privilege; such privileges brought wealth, and wealth can be considered as both an index of their power and a reinforcement of it. The fortunes accumulated by eunuchs, even by ones not noted for their avarice, were enormous (John of Ephesus, Lives, P.O. 19.202; Zosimus 4.5.3-4). The wealth of the eunuch Narses was legendary;21 the bequests of the eunuch chamberlains Calapodius and Antiochus to the Church survived as entities for near on two centuries, and were so large that they required the services of twelve full-time accountants (chartularii) to manage them (CJ 1.2.24.11; AD 530). The fortune of Theodore, a pious eunuch who retired before his time, as Steward of the Sacred Palace, is illustrative. His fortune amounted to 1,500-2,000 Roman pounds of gold, plus silver, slaves and rich clothing (John of Ephesus, Lives, P.O. 19.200-5). One hesitates to 1 9 Life of Melania (Analecta Bollandiana 8 (1889) 29), 1.11.

*° C.Th. 10.10.34; eunuchs had various other privileges: CJ 12.5.2 ( A D 428); C.Th. 7.8.16

( A D 435). 11 Liber Pontificalis 63 (ed. L. Duchesne (Paris, 1886) 1.306); Gregory of Tours, History

of the Franks 5.13 (19). 178


think what an impious eunuch could have acquired. For this fortune alone was equal to that of a very wealthy eastern senator. It can do nothing but reflect the socio-polidcal power of eunuchs that they managed to expropriate so large a slice of the economic surplus and accumulated wealth.21

Proximity to the emperor had yet another consequence. It led to the selection of eunuchs for special tasks. Invested with imperial authority and high rank, eunuchs were sent on special missions.23 The Grand Chamberlain, Eusebius, was sent to quell an incipient revolt in the Gallic army by bribing the rebel leaders (Ammianus 14.10.5). And later in his career he was given the delicate duty of persuading the pope, Liberius, to condone Arianism (Athanasius, History of the Avians

35-8). The future Grand Chamberlain, Eutropius, was sent by Theo-dosius the Great to consult a holy hermit in Egypt about the outcome of his batde against the usurper Eugenius (Sozomen, History of the

Church 7.22). Another eunuch chamberlain, Chrysaphius, was instrumental in organising a plot to assassinate the king of the Huns Attila, and the eunuchs' power is reflected in the fact that when Atdla uncovered the conspiracy and demanded the surrender of Chrysaphius on the threat of invasion, there was sufficient support at court for Chrysaphius for the emperor to run the risk of calling Atdla's bluff (Priscus, frag. 7-8, 12-13).

Certainly Eusebius, Eutropius and Chrysaphius were exceptional. In their dme they wielded nearly absolute power. But there are many other humbler examples.24 And it was this consistent exploitation of the emperor's need for servants he could trust,25 and the loose demarcation of jurisdiction typical of a patrimonial bureaucracy, which together paved the way for the extensive informal powers of eunuchs, many of which crystallised into exclusive privileges. This is not to say that eunuchs considered as a body, let along as individuals, were the major political force in the state. Their power rested upon their personal contact with the emperor, and was usually confined to palace politics. In the provinces the hereditary and traditionally

M The same Theodore was given a pension of 1,000 solidi p.a. when he had dispersed his capital in charity (John of Ephesus, Lives P.O. 19.205). This was more than the entire annual salary of a governor of a small province (NJ 24-7).

83 There are many examples; e.g. Vitae vivorum apud monophysitas celeberrimorum, ed. E. W. Brooks in CSCO, scr. syr., ser. 3, vol. 25, 9; Cedrenus 1.581; Jordanes, Getica 42.224; Ammianus 20.8.4. These tell of rather less famous eunuchs than those mentioned in the text.

u Cf. Marcellinus Comes, Chronicon (MGH. AA XI) 83, a.449; 101, a.519. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, On Ceremonies 1.92 (421-2), and 1.93 (428 CSHB); two attempts at king-making.

** E.g. Ammianus (21.16.8) speaks of Constantius' fear of conspiracy and his tireless investigation of the slightest suspicion.

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legitimate powers of the aristocracy, church, and army were paramount; and at court too their representatives competed for the emperor's favour. Yet the power of eunuchs was both great and significant enough to pose a problem. It was so firmly entrenched that the two upstart emperors (Julian and Maximus) who attempted to do away with eunuchs, both failed to establish an effective alternative.

Julian executed the Grand Chamberlain Eusebius and his followers for their part in the prosecution of the Caesar Gallus, and dismissed eunuchs and other palace attendants from service. His pretext for the dismissal of the eunuchs was that, since he was celibate, he had no need of eunuchs. More likely the real motive was to show that he was not subject to the same influences as his predecessor Constantius (Socrates, History of the Church 3.1). Julian's policy was surprisingly unpopular; if we can believe a Christian historian, people thought that he was stripping the monarchy of its necessary pomp (Socrates, History of the

Church 3.1). But the reversal of Julian's policy was easy, because eunuchs fulfilled a vital function. They acted as a lubricant preventing too much friction between the emperor and the other forces of the state which threatened his superiority. Constantius, with the eunuch Eusebius as his chief executive, managed both to keep the army from getting above itself, as Ammianus says (21.16.1-2), and to avoid giving too many honours to the nobility. The several accounts of plots against over-powerful generals, often attributed to emperors but engineered by eunuchs, are symptomatic of the same conflict and the eunuchs' role in it.2 6

A sociological dimension

The problem of the ancient power of eunuchs was never been adequately tackled, either because historians until recendy thought that it offended propriety or because the position of eunuchs could be superficially explained in psychological terms. Eunuchs exercised their power, the traditional view maintained, under 'weak' emperors, by means of 'subde flattery', oily insinuation and unsavoury ambition reinforced by their sexual frustration. Over the long road from Ammianus Marcellinus in the fourth century through Gibbon in the eighteenth to Hug, Dunlap and Herter in the twentieth century this has been thought sufficient.27

M Theophanes 1.197; Marcellinus, op. cit. 90, a.471; John of Antioch, frag. 201.2; 201.4;

Zosimus 4.23.5. t7 Ammianus 18.5.4; Gibbon, Decline and Fall, ed. Bury, vol. 2, 245; Hug, RE Suppl.

3, col. 454; Dunlap (1924: 180); Herter, R.A.C. sv Effeminatus. But for more sensible views cf. S. Runciman, Byzantine Civilisation (London, 1933) 203-4, and best of all K. A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (Yale, 1957) 354-8.

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What can be said against this explanadon is not so much that it is untrue, but that it is inadequate. The most significant aspect of the power held by eunuchs is its consistency, its repetidveness from the middle of the fourth century onwards. No sooner had one eunuch been burnt because of his arrogance, or executed after a batde because his power threatened all other forces in the state, or compulsorily retired to a monastery as the result of political intrigue,28 than another took his place at the apex of formal power. Within a few years either he, his successor, or the eunuchs as a body had accumulated considerable informal influence as well. We should be wary of evaluations of emperors as 'weak', which are based exclusively or mainly on whether eunuchs held power in their reign. For eunuchs flourished under powerful soldier emperors like Valentinian I, even under Theodosius the Great, just as under an idle fop like Theodosius I I 2 *

We are confronted here with something more than the weakness and virtues of individual emperors. To be sure, it is not only fruitful but indispensable to view history in this dimension, as a mosaic of the individual actions of separate individuals; without a doubt we can profitably discuss the personalities and achievements of individual actors. But there is another dimension. Emperors as individuals delegated power to different barbarian, ex-slave eunuchs, but the whole series of eunuchs cannot be explained satisfactorily exclusively in terms of their individual actions. It was not merely coincidental that all emperors appointed eunuchs to positions of power, nor was the power of eunuchs determined exclusively by the psychological make-up of each emperor. The continuing power position of eunuchs must be considered rather as a socio-political institution in itself, a patterned regularity, a phenomenon to be explained not only by its individual manifestations but with reference to other broad social factors. It is this generality which we shall now discuss.30

C H A N G E S I N T H E P O W E R S T R U C T U R E

Political eunuchism as an institution arose in response to and gained a new weight in society because of changes in the power structure of society as a whole. Political development in the Roman Empire can

M Cf. the fates of Rhodanus: Malalas 339-40; Eutropius: Philostorgius, History of the Church 11.6; Antiochus: Cedrenus 1.600. A similar recurrence in the wealth and power of imperial ex-slaves in spite of individuals' demise is noted by Tacitus, Histories 1.37 and 2.95.

* Malalas 340; Zosimus 4.28; Cedrenus 1.587. * Cf. N. Elias, Uber den Prozess der Zivilisotion (Basel, 1939), vol. 2, 2 - in my view a

neglected sociological masterpiece; but now see his Die hdfische GeseUschoft (Berlin, 1969) especially the chapters on sociology and history, and on court etiquette as a restriction on the king's freedom of action.

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be seen as the gradual concentration of power in the hands of the emperor, and of his direct nominees holding office in the patrimonial bureaucracy.

In the early days of the principate, wide areas of self-government were left to the cities through the unpaid services of avocational (non-professional) notables. Taxadon was light. The senate ruled the internal provinces of the empire by means of its appointees. The emperor was only first among equals, and often had friendly and personal relations with his aristocratic peers. Trajan's surviving correspondence with his provincial governor Pliny and Hadrian's dinner parties for senators can not be paralleled in the later Empire, the so-called dominate, because by then the emperor was removed from fellows mortals not only by elaborate court ceremonial, but also by the general idea that he was sacred. A weak point of the monarchy in the first three centuries after Christ lay in its failure to legitimate among aristocrats the supremacy of any particular man or family. The first emperor Augustus had originally made monarchy tolerable to republican aristocrats by proclaiming that emperor and aristocrats were social equals; this inevitably led to the idea that any one noble might replace or succeed the ruling emperor. To confirm his position, therefore, the emperor had to restrict the power of aristocrats and to secure the loyalty of the standing army, paid from taxes raised by his bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was at first the extension of the administration of the emperor's private household and estates: a classic case of what Max Weber called patrimonial bureaucracy. It was staffed by slaves and headed by ex-slaves. The hierarchic organisation of the bureaucracy, and the long working career which alone enabled expertise in it, implied a submissiveness which in the beginning excluded aristocrats.31 However, because of the increasing prestige associated with wielding the delegated power of the ruler, the bureaucracy came by the end of the first century AD to be headed by equestrians or knights, drawn from the second estate of the empire, though the emperor's slaves and ex-slaves were still powerful.

In sum, we can enumerate the constituent elements in the power constellation of the High Empire as follows: (1) the emperor; (2) his patrimonial bureaucracy headed by personal appointees with

the social status of knights but largely manned by imperial slaves and ex-slaves;

31 For an apology by a litterateur for working in the imperial bureaucracy see Lucian, Apology 10. On patrimonial bureaucracy, see M. Weber, Economy and Society (New York, 1968) vol. 3.

182

Changes in the power structure

(3) the army, recruited from the peasantry and officered by regulars with the social status of knights and access on retirement to the bureaucracy;

(4) the peasants who paid taxes and rents and so supported the whole empire on their backs;

(5) the small urban population, both slave and free, which manufactured goods and provided services for landlords, army and peasants;

(6) the cities administered locally by notables with access in recognition of services to the status of knights or senators;

(7) the senators themselves, the political elite of the hereditary landowners.

First a few words about senators. Some of them renewed their social position in each generation by holding offices for a short term only (rarely more than two years) in an area where they had no possessions, or as supreme military generals with an under-staff of professionals. Most members of the senatorial stratum inherited status by virtue of their inherited wealth; only a minority of them entered active politics. But senators, individually and collectively, were the greatest threat to the emperor's position; and senatorial status was the prime objective of many men's ambitions; promotion to the senate was in the emperor's and his servants' estimation the highest reward. The organisation of the political system which gave senators the positions of greatest honour, but restricted their tenure of office and exposed them to persecution, confiscation of goods and execution, is sufficient evidence of the tension in the power structure (see further in Volume Two, Chapter 11 of this work).

The emperor maintained his position only by maintaining a balance of power between constituent elements. The appointment of the praetorian prefect as chief executive of the government from the equestrian estate, and his combination of military and fiscal authority were significant indications of which way the balance was turning: away from the senatorial aristocracy towards the consolidation of the emperor's supremacy over his social rivals. In the crises of the third century brought about by the barbarian invasions, it was the technical efficiency of the bureaucratically organised army and administration which saved the empire. To minimise risks of amateurish defeat in batde, the emperor increasingly excluded senators from responsible gubernatorial or military positions and arranged for the collection of taxes from cities by way of professional tax collectors under the general supervision of the traditional local gentry. In spite of num-

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erous barbarian attacks and civil wars, the empire was saved both from barbarians and from regional fragmentation.

The winner of the last scrimmage of the third century, a soldier of obscure origins from the north Balkans (Eutropius, Breviarium 9.19), Diocletian, was faced with a different balance of power from that of the Principate. The senatorial aristocracy had high social esteem, but had only localised power. Its individual members were by lack of training excluded from the efficient exercise of military or bureaucratic command. The bureaucracy had grown beyond the palace, and was headed by equestrians and divided into separate ministries with an organised jurisdiction and an established order of promotion. The army officered exclusively by equestrians offered the greatest chance of social mobility, and the biggest threat to established authority.

Diocletian and his successor Constantine together by their reforms established a system by which the equestrian order was assimilated to the old senatorial order; military power was divided between palace and local troops, and military power was separated from fiscal power, while the size of individual commands was greatly decreased. Similar developments took place in the bureaucracy. Staff was increased to gain greater control over the populace and greater revenues, but the area of individual authority was diminished. The legitimation of the emperor was heightened by symbols and rituals which asserted his close association with god.

The elements in the new power situation of the later empire thus were (1) the emperor deified or in Christian times, the vice-gerent of God on

earth;3 2

(2) a large and by former standards very efficient professional bureaucracy, separate from the army and divided into ministeries; the lower ranks were hereditary occupations; the upper ranks, upon retirement only, gave access to the new nobility (which was a significant separation of administrative power and social prestige);

(3) the army, recruited from the peasantry and from barbarians living on the borders of the empire, divided into border troops, heavy reserve and imperial guard, organised in small units and officered by professionals, who on retirement received ennoblement;

(4) the peasantry as before were so diffused that they lacked any organisation by which they could express effective objections to the

n Cf. e.g. 'The emperor is one, image of the one all-ruling God', Eusebius, In Praise of Constantine 7 (GCS 7.215), and K. M. Setton, Christian Attitudes towards the Emperor. in the Fourth Century (New York, 1941), for the interrelation of the Christian idea of the emperor and of God.

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Changes in the power structure

increased taxation which supported the larger army and bureaucracy or to the deterioration of their status vis-a-vis land-owners;

(5) the urban population in the later Empire was probably smaller than in the High Empire and probably contained significandy fewer slaves; some manufacturing for the army was carried on by hereditary workers in state factories;

(6) the cities, much fallen in prestige, with vestigial autonomy and a hereditary local gentry who were dragooned into being collectively responsible for the payment of taxes which were high;

(7) a new nobility made up of: (a) great landlords and their immediate descendants, who might be invited by the emperor to fill office for a very short period, (b) upwardly mobile lesser landlords, originating in the local gentry, who served semi-professionally as provincial governors or bureaucratic executives, (c) high army officers both serving and retired, often of barbarian origin, ( d ) retired professional bureaucrats.

The tensions at work in this constellation may be seen from the developments which actually took place over the next two centuries, Whereas previously the emperor had been able to control the aristocracy by the persecution of individuals, and by means of the professional equestrians in the army and in the bureaucracy, the complete victory of the equestrians and the eclipse of the cities had left only one unified upper order. To be sure entry into this order was controlled by the emperor and given only upon office, that is, upon the performance of certain services. But there was a constant and powerful tendency in both East and West for the aristocracy to expect to hold office as a matter of birthright and as a profitable sinecure. The second tendency, one reinforced by the high level of taxation, was centrifugal in direction: a tendency for the local land-owners to resist the tax-collecting claims of the bureaucrats. On the other side of the balance sheet, the division of the army into different corps of differing prestige and smaller units, plus the theocratic (or morecorrecdy caesaropapist) legitimation of the new order, reduced considerably but by no means eradicated rebellions and usurpations. The unified honour system, which gave everyone of importance an exact position in the hierarchy, emphasised the overall superiority of the emperor. But it also accentuated the major problem which the emperor had to face. In so far as efficiency in executing the major tasks of government, that is, the collection of taxes, the administration of justice, the supply of the army, and its command, depended upon the skill and experience of his chief officers, any step the emperor might take towards the lengthening

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of their service to increase their experience, or any reward he might give them in terms of wealth or prestige in the only way available to him, and in the only way they wanted, was likely to increase the threat they represented to his survival as sole emperor.33

T H E S T R A T E G I C P O S I T I O N O F E U N U C H S

In other societies a similar general problem has occured; namely the problem of conflict between an autocratic government aided by a patrimonial bureaucracy on the one hand, and on the other the military power of a professional army and a centrifugally inclined hereditary aristocracy. Yet in by no means all such societies have eunuchs risen to power. A structural analysis of developments in the power structure of the Roman Empire is indispensable. Without it we cannot delineate the functions of political eunuchism; we cannot analyse its contribution to the maintenance of the socio-political order of the Roman Empire; nor can we show why eunuchs came to power in the fourth and fifth centuries rather than before or after. Nevertheless, such an analysis cannot by itself explain the rise and survival of political eunuchism rather than of any other institution with the same function. It does not explain the question: Why eunuchs in particular rather than any other analogous group? For this we shall have to turn to a more detailed examination of the specific traits of eunuchs and of Roman culture.

Eunuchs, in the later Han and T'ang dynasties, were able to rise to positions of power when the emperor was deified and the executive ministers were excluded from intimacy.34 It was in the same conditions that eunuchs became powerful in the later Roman Empire. The ritual of an audience became elaborate and compared with republican times servile.35 It was a mark of humility on the part of Valentinian II that he forgot his imperial dignity sufficiendy to kiss the head and hands 38 This rather abstract analysis should be supplemented by the basic chapters on

Government, Administration and Senators in A. H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (Oxford, 1964) 32iff. or the splendidly written evocation of J. F. Matthews, Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court (Oxford, 1975).

34 Ch'ien, T-S., The Government and Politics of China (Harvard, 1950) 31. 35 Cf. A. Alföldi, 4Die Ausgestaltung des monarchischen Zeremoniells', Mitt, des

deutschen arch. Instituts 49 (1934) 1-117, reprinted in Die monarchische Repräsentation im römischen Kaiserreiche (Darmstadt, 1970). Alföldi argues forcibly for the gradual development of elaborate ritual and exposes the general attribution of its introduction to Diocletian as little more than a literary topos. But then how does one explain the fact that the literary topos centres so frequendy around Diocletian? The two views are not irreconcilable: a general development of ritual with additions by Diocletian.

186

The strategic position of eunuchs

of his sisters.36 To kiss the bottom of the emperor's robes was the peak of some men's careers (adorotio)37 The emperor's consilium changed its name and its tenor. It became at first the consistorium and finally the silentium.3* St Ambrose on a diplomatic mission for Valentinian II objected strongly to being received in such a formal atmosphere (Letters 24). Negotiation was impossible, persuasion out of the question. By keeping to himself the emperor gained in prestige but lost in contact with his subjects. Synesius of Gyrene complained bitterly about this to the emperor Arcadius. Nothing, he said, is so bad as shutting the emperor away from public sight. The emperor should lead his troops in*person as he used to do; he should travel around the provinces in person and see for himself how his people are faring (On Kingship PG 66: 1076, 1080, 1100).

In many cases the exercise of power leads to isolation. This is to the leader's advantage when, like the captain of a ship, he is secure in the legitimacy of his authority. But the Roman emperors had to reaffirm their legitimacy by their divinity, reinforce it with a ritual which served to emphasise their superiority over humans, and each rebellion or palace plot served only to emphasise their insecurity. Absolute power is correlated with absolute isolation. There is no need to exaggerate, but the atmosphere in which nobles could mix with the emperor was completely different in the fourth century from the first. Gallus Caesar like Harun al Raschid wandered in disguise through the streets and inns of Antioch, asking people what they thought of him (Ammianus

14.1.9).3 9 The comparison of the Byzandne empire with the Abbasid Caliphate and the very fact that a Caesar had to go to such lengths are not without their significance. Most emperors did not have Gallus' sense of adventure. And to rule effectively the man at the top needs information. The rise of eunuchs is not to be attributed to their ' skilful flattery and shrewd insinuation \ 4 0 There is more to it than that. Eunuchs met a distinct need, the need of a divine emperor for human information and contact.41

36 Ambrose, de obitu Valentiniani 36. Cf. the story of a doctor who sat down to treat a bedridden emperor without permission by Marcellinus Comes, Chronicon (MGH AA XI), 88, a.462.

37 It was also customary to kiss the emperors slippers, see Constantine Porphyrogenitus, On Ceremonies 1.84 and 86 (CSHB 387, 392).

38 Cf. iV/ 62.1-2, where both terms are used; cf. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, On Ceremonies 1.86 (CSHB 393).

39 So too did Nero, but on drunken sprees (Suetonius, Nero 26). 40 Dunlap (1924: 180). 41 Insofar as the Scriptores Historiae Augustae reflected fourth-century conditions and

allowed their opinions to enter their historical judgements, the following passage might be of interest: 'under Elagabalus, when everything was sold by the eunuchs

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The power position of eunuchs stemmed in the first place then from their intermediary position between a sacred and isolated emperor and those about whom the emperor wanted information or who wanted favours from the emperor. Governors and bishops, nobles and vicars who wanted strings pulled had access to the emperor only through the Grand Chamberlain, the chief eunuch, and his services had to be paid for. From being a mere channel of information, through the exploitation of informal influences such as the patrimonial bureaucracy permitted, the Grand Chamberlain in particular and the corps of eunuchs in general expanded their power well beyond the formal confines of palace administration. But the continuity of their power as individuals depended upon the direct patronage of the emperor, and the sphere of their power was limited as it radiated from the court.

Secondly, eunuchs' power depended upon the tension between the autocratic emperor and the other power elements in the state whose exercise of power threatened the emperor's supremacy.42 Yet the emperor had to entrust the execution of his commands to some of his subjects and the exercise of imperial authority inevitably invested its bearers with high status. The traditional bearers of this delegated authority, backed by the system of imperial justice (i.e. the systematic protection of traditional property rights), were precisely the people who most threatened the emperor's legitimacy and his universal power. Aristocrats had to be given power. But in the fourth century there were no equestrians to counterbalance them. Aristocratic power was limited by collegiality and short tenure, but the danger implicit in the situation can be seen in the growth of proto-feudal large landowners (potentiores) in the western empire and in their resistance to taxation and to the levy of recruits for the army.

Since power, and especially that power whose major source is derived from the centre, is fixed, any exercise of power by non-aristocrats limited the power of aristocrats. Indeed the authority exercised by eunuchs not only by-passed the aristocracy but also served to supervise them.4 3 The search for executives of lowly or foreign

- a class of men who desire that all the palace-affairs should be kept secret, solely in order that they alone may seem to have knowledge of them and thus possess the means of obtaining influence or money* (SHAt Severus Alexander 45.4-5, Loeb Classical Library translation).

41 The power of eunuchs is put in the same context in other studies of comparable societies, namely the emperor's desire to liquidate rival political cliques. Cf. H. S. Levy, Harem Favorites of an Illustrious Celestial (Taichung, 1958) 17-18. P. A. Tschepe, S.J., Histoire du royaume de Ts'in (777-207 avJ.-C.) (Shanghai, 1909) 360; and cf. Zosimus 2.55.

43 4 Since his castration deprived him of hopes of the purple, he persuaded the emperor to make him patrician and consul.' So Philostorgius (History of the Church 11.4) of Eutropius.

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origin free from aristocratic ties and dependent upon royal favour has been common to many kings and most notable in those who have struggled against the traditional or hereditary interests of the aristocracy. But whether we take the service nobility of Peter the Great, the incipient bureaucracy of Prussia, or the commoners of Henry I I , none wielded delegated imperial authority so much in the emperor's interest as the eunuchs of the Chinese and early Byzantine empires.44

There is no specific ancient evidence that early Byzantine emperors used eunuchs with a clear vision of their superiority over functionally comparable groups. Yet the very fact that eunuchs, in spite of their unpopularity with the aristocracy, in spite of their despised status, were constandy invested by emperors with high rank and great power, does in some measure confirm the hypothesis that this was done to counteract the power of the nobles. Nonetheless, the following analysis is not presented on the assumption that it was directly perceived by contemporaries, but that, whether it was perceived or not, the qualities of eunuchs could not but have influenced the role they played in politics.

This may appear in its sharpest light when eunuchs are compared with other groups. Let us take for example the Imperial Secretaries (notarii), a body of short-hand writers who took notes at meetings of the imperial council. They were recruited in the first half of the fourth century from outside the elite, probably because the long training needed to acquire manual skill was traditionally despised. Yet their knowledge of state secrets acquired in the course of their job and their personal contact with the emperor made them suitable for executive and supervisory jobs. They gained power and prestige. And by the end of the fourth century they had already become litde more than a fashionable body ignorant of short-hand and holding sinecures, with the status of ordinary senators ( C I L 6.1710). They had to be rewarded in conventional terms of high status and rank, and were thus assimilated to the aristocracy; they both penetrated into and were penetrated by the aristocracy.

By contrast the corps of eunuch chamberlains could never be assimilated into the aristocracy. Their origin as slaves and barbarians, their physical deformity and the emotions it aroused, their easy recognisa-bility, were all against it. They were completely dependent upon the emperor and had no natural allies in society, no other retreat than his protection.45 Nor could they, unlike others, gain acceptance by the 44 Wittfogel (1957) sees the rise of eunuchs in the T a n g and Ming dynasdes as

coindding significandy with the attacks upon the hereditary power of nobles through the establishment of the examination system and the restriction of yin prerogadves.

45 Their barbarian origins robbed them of support outside the court. Cf. Claudian, In Eutropium 1.187.

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social mobility of their sons.46 In this respect they were like the clergy of the Middle Ages; but unlike them they had no corporate existence by which they could transmit inherited wealth.47 The existence of a strong clergy might preclude the extensive use of eunuchs, but the non-corporative character of eunuchism was much more favourable to the maintenance of the emperor's power.

The complete dependence of eunuchs as individuals upon the emperor made their exercise of power more tolerable to all parties. Like Court Jews in German states they took the blame for many unpopular actions, and like Court Jews they could be sacrificed when the outcry was too great.48 Their accumulated wealth, often enormous, could then be redistributed by the emperor to his favourite supporters; the aristocracy would breathe more easily now that a threat to their power and honour had been dramatically removed. The official decree dismissing the Grand Chamberlain Eusebius went as follows:

H e shall be stripped of his sp lendour and the consulship is to be freed from the foul stain, the memory and the sordid dirt of his name; all his acts are to be annul led, so that all ages will pass h im over in silence, and a blot will not appear in the history of o u r t i m e s . . . W e c o m m a n d that all his statues, all his images, in bronze and m a r b l e . . . shall be destroyed in all cides, towns, private and public places, so that the blemish, as it were , of o u r age may not pollute the sight of onlookers... (C. Th. 9.40.17 (AD 399))*·

The exclusion which eunuchs faced, the hatred they met all around them, cut them off from the rest of the Court and must have strengthened their cohesion as brothers in misfortune: \ ..those whom nature or bcJdily disaster has separated from the common lot of humanity and exiled from either sex' (Claudius Mamertinus, Panegyric

n . 1 9 . 4 ) . 5 0 And compared with ambitious aristocrats who were ama-46 Eunuchs seem to have a desire for wives and children. Their acquisition by purchase

of both in China was a sign of their power, an attempt both at evading the appearance of being a eunuch and at transmitting wealth. Acolius, Grand Chamberlain under Valentinian III, had an adopted son (Constandus, Vita Germani 39 (MGH SRM. 7.279)).

47 Eunuchs by a decree of Constandus were allowed to make wills (CJ 6.22.5 (352))» but even so they could hardly be compared to the institution of the Church. Cf. Procopius, Anecdote 29.13.

48 Schnee, 1953-5: vol. 3, i9off. 49 See also the brilliant homily on vanity of vanities, preached by John Chrysostom over

the quaking prostrate Eutropius who had sought asylum in his church (PG 52.392^). 50 The trauma of castration itself might also have strengthened their ties. Justinian cited

one instance in which 87 out of 90 boys died from the operation (NJ 142). If this was the normal rate of loss we should expect to find it reflected in the price; slave prices given in a law (CJ 7.7.1 ( A D 530)) reveal a sizeable premium for eunuchs but nothing of the above order; newly discovered fragments of the Diocletianic Edict on Maximum Prices kindly shown me by Mr M. Crawford and Miss J. M. Reynolds do not give eunuch slaves any special price.

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teurs fighting their way competitively to the top as individuals, at best with patronage, and who held office only for short periods, eunuchs were lifetime professionals, habitues of court ceremonial, and furthermore with unrivalled opportunities of free access to the emperor (Constantine Porphyrogenitus, On Ceremonies 1.97). Insofar as eunuchs stuck together, they did not cater to the emperor's best interests. In combination, they can be seen less as intermediaries and more as an independent force with its own interests, and not always on the emperor's side. We can see them, for example, in action as a group, hammering away at the emperor to secure the execution of the Caesar Gallus, in support of the policy of the Grand Chamberlain Eusebius (Ammianus 14.11.3-5), just as we can see them collectively protecting Gorgonius, Gallus' Grand Chamberlain, from the fate of his master (Ammianus 15.2.10).

To recapitulate: the tension between an absolutist monarch and the other powers of the state; the seclusion of a sacred emperor behind a highly formalised court ritual; the need of both parties for intermediaries; the exploitation by eunuchs of this channel for the appropriation to themselves of some of the power of controlling the distribution of favours; the non-assimilability of eunuchs into the aristocracy; the cohesive but non-corporate nature of their corps; and the expertise which resulted from the permanence of their positions as compared with the amateurish, rivalrous and individualistic strivings of aristocrats; all these factors in combination and in interaction can account for the increasing power with which eunuchs were invested, and the continuity with which they, as a body, held it.

Eunuchs and chamberlains: the convergence of two traditions

Such general considerations as these, however, though they help to account for the continuity of eunuchs' power and the gradual increase in their rank and influence, can hardly explain their introduction into the palace and their rise to power. For this we have to look at the convergence of two traditions and an external catalyst. The position of chamberlain, cubicularius9 involving general duties of personal attendance upon a Roman nobleman and the surveillance of visitors, is first recorded in our sources in the first century BC (Cicero, Against

Verres 2.3.8). Its appearance was in line with the progressive specialisation of duties within wealthy households. Like aristocrats, the early emperors had chamberlains, and some like Helicon under Caligula and Parthenius under Domitian achieved considerable influence, but their power was never institutionalised as it was in the later Empire.

' 9 i


Apparently very few of the chamberlains known to us from the Principate were eunuchs.51 In sum, the position of chamberlain was well established, and the chamberlains of the later Empire fulfilled similar dudes to those of their predecessors; but it was new to use castrated servants in the bedchamber.

Eunuchs had been known to the Mediterranean world from the earliest times.52 They were associated in classical times with certain priesthoods, such as that of Cybele, or with harems such as that of the Persian king (Herodotus 3.48; 8 . i 0 4 f f . ) . In the early Roman Empire their use does not seem to have been widespread, though there are an increasing number of references to them in the literature.53 Occasionally, for example under the emperor Claudius, a eunuch is said to have been influential (Suetonius, Claudius 28). By the early third century, there is evidence that they were increasingly being employed in private households, probably as attendants upon women. Dio noted with shock (75.14) that a contemporary praetorian prefect under Septimius Severus had a hundred free Romans castrated so that only eunuchs should wait upon his daughter; and according to a rather doubtful source, the emperor Aurelian limited the number of eunuchs a noble might own.5 4 The position of eunuchs at court in the third century thus seems to have been insecure; except under the mad Elagabalus, there is no evidence to suggest that eunuchs wielded power or con-sistendy filled the post of chamberlain before the reign of Diocletian.55

It is my suggestion, therefore, that the consistent use of eunuchs as court chamberlains and their repeated exercise of power were probably connected with the elaboration of court ritual, which can be roughly dated to the end of the third century. There is evidence from a variety of sources that there were eunuchs at work in the palace of Diocletian, and also a suggestion that they were powerful.56 I cannot help wondering whether the capture of the Persian king's harem by Galerius M Dunlap, 1924: 166-9; ana" F- Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (London, 1977)

74-83 goes through the evidence on the early powerful chamberlains. Parthenius, the chamberlain of Domitian, had a son (Martial, Epigrams 4.45), and so did Cleander, the powerful chamberlain of Commodus (Dio 72.13), so they were not eunuchs. Such chamberlains had huge influence and wealth and were occasionally assimilated to the formal status hierarchy (AE 1952, 6), but not as a matter of course. And see Dio 76.14 and 7717.

88 Wittfogel (1957: 354-5) *o r references. ** Hug, RE Suppl. 3, col. 451. M SHA, Aurelian 49.8. Cf. Alex. Sev. 23.5^, but see also Clement of Alexandria,

Paidagogus 3.26. 9 9 SHA, Gordiani I I I 23.7^; but Cams 8.7. M B. de Gaiffier, 'Palatins et eunuques dans quelques documents hagiographiques',

Analecta Bollandiana 75 (1957) 17-46; Lactantius, de mortibus persecutorum 15.

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in AD 298 led to a proliferation of eunuchs in the Roman court.57

Their presence may have acted as the catalyst for the separate traditions of chamberlains and eunuchs. The new emperors may well have felt the need for a ritual which elevated them above their courtiers, and for these purposes what servitors could be better than eunuchs acquainted with the elaborate ritual of the Persian court? Lactantius certainly accused Galerius of imitating the Persian king.5 8 In any case eunuchs, wherever they came from, became the proper appurtenance of an emperor, and once established, their power increased for the reasons which we have already analysed.

The eunuch image

The full paradox of the political power of eunuchs cannot be complete without a description of their public image. To some extent, of course, their stereotype was built up as part of the aristocratic objection to the power which eunuchs wielded. But it also reflected the residual characteristics of eunuchs, and the roles they played in social life. It appears from modern comparative studies that eunuchs have a normal range of intelligence, but that as with domestic animals castration leads in many cases to docility, though a small proportion of hypogonads have compensating aggressiveness.59 Eunuchs have high-pitched voices, and faces with smooth glossy skins covered with a network of 57 Theophanes 1.11 -13 (CSHB). On the Persian campaigns see T. D. Barnes, * Imperial

campaigns 285-311 ', Phoenix 30 (1976) i82ff. 5 8 de mortibus persecutorum 21 ; Theophanes (1.11-12) connected Diocletian's elation at

the success of Galerius* Persian campaign with the introduction of prostration (proskynesis). Cf. Aurelis Victor, de Caes. 39.2-4; Claudian, In Entropium 1.415; but contra Alfôldi, 1970 and see note 35 above. ^

M R. I. Dorfman and R. A. Shipley, The Androgens (New York, 1936) 319; J. Kasanin and G. R. Biskind, 'Personality changes following substitution therapy in préadolescent eunuchoidism*,/. Amer. Med. Assoc. (1943) 1317-21; S. L. Simpson,'Hormones and behavior patterns', BMJ (1957) 839. Hypogonads may not be stricdy comparable to eunuchs in their social situation, but the sense of deprivation may be a significant common factor. J. J. Matignon, a doctor at the French legation in Peking, who had opportunities to study court eunuchs at first hand, wrote 'C'est à tort qu'on a représenté l'eunuque comme sanguinaire et violent. Il est plutôt doux, conciliant, conscient de son infériorité', 'Les eunuques du palais impérial à Pékin', Bull, de la soc. d*anthropologie de Paris, 4 sér. 7 (1896) 334. J. J. Bremer, in a comprehensive recent study of the castration of adult sex criminals, etc., wrote of a 'peculiar emotional lability' among castrates and of an endocrine psychosyndrome (usually of an asthenic and dysphoric-depressive nature) which affected 25 % of his sample. He did not find a general pacifying effect in many cases in social behaviour; one cannot tell how far this was affected by the psychopathology of his subjects (Asexualisation (Oslo, 1958) 25,159/., 309). The same lability is remarked by A. Mez, Die Renaissance des Islams (Heidelberg, 1922) 336.

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fine wrinkles; they tend to run to fat.60 Their physical distinctiveness must have reinforced their group solidarity and separateness.

What makes eunuchs' exercise of political power at court even more remarkable is the type of occupations with which eunuchs were normally associated. Hordes of them, wrote Ammianus (14.6.17), 6 1 looking sallow and misshapen (obluridi, deformes) cleared the way for the sedan chairs of noble Roman women. They were increasingly used as private attendants upon women,62 and were clearly intended to be their ineluctably safe guardians. But humans are resourceful, and we are told that even eunuchs were occasionally exploited to satisfy their mistresses' appetites;63 sexual intercourse could have occurred to any serious extent only with post-adolescent castrates. And there is evidence to suggest that most boys were castrated young.64 These young castroti seem to have been often used as catamites by men, who took advantage of the fact that eunuchs preserved their freshness longer than boys passing through puberty.65 To these indignides were added the performances by eunuchs of lewd dances in theatres (Prudentius, Hamartigenia 309-10); and in private service too, part of their attraction, as with the hunch-backed jesters of medieval courts, lay in the freakish piquancy of their deformity.

In the descriptions of court eunuchs which survive, these general associations were rarely forgotten. Eutropius was alleged to have progressed from catamite to pander in private service before his elevation to Grand Chamberlain under the emperor Arcadius (AD 395-408 BC, cf. Claudian, Against Eutropius 1.62-150). True, the poet Claudian had a particular axe to grind, and perhaps the eunuchs Eusebius and Chrysaphius would not have suffered so much if they had been on the side of victorious orthodoxy. But perhaps most revealing is the way in which Ammianus hedged his praise of the chamberlain Eutherius:

If a N u m a Pompil ius or a Socrates should give any good report of a e u n u c h and should back their statement by a solemn oath, they would be charged 60 Bremer, 1958: 100-11. 61 Cf. Jerome, Letters 22.16 and 32; 54.13; 66.13. 8 2 Life of Melania 1.5 {Anal. Boll. 8 (1889) 23); Cyril of Alexandria, Sermon against

Eunuchs, PC 77.1108; Palladius, Historia Lausiaca 35 (ed. Butler, 106); ibid. 61.157; Malchus, frag. 8.

63 Cyril of Alexandria, Sermon against Eunuchs, PG 77.1108-9, *o r a catalogue of their activities; Jerome, In Jovinianum 1.47 and cf. Juvenal 6.366!.

64 Claudian, In Eutropium 1.45-6; Basil, Letters 115; CJy.y. 1 ( A D 530); Petronius, Satyricon 119. Cf. the Chinese custom of early castration: S. W. Williams, The Middle Kingdom (New York, 1904) vol. 1, 408; and the Spanish: R. P. A. Dozy, Spanish Islam (trans. London, 1913) 430. The eunuchs had to be trained and educated for the palace service.

65 Theophanes 1.79; Cyril of Alexandria, op. cit. PG 77.1108.

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with having departed from the truth. But among the brambles roses spring up, and among the savage beasts some are tamed...In unrolling many records of the past, to see which of the eunuchs of old I ought to compare him to, I could find none. True there were in times gone by those that were loyal and virtuous (although very few), but they were stained by some vice or other. (16.7.4 a n d 8 - Loeb Classical Library translation)*6

Praise was the exception; more typical of fourth- and fifth-century attitudes, if more than usually vituperative, was the view attributed to St Basil:

... lizards and toads... the dishonest race of detestable eunuchs, neither men nor women, but made with lust for women, jealous, corruptible, quicktempered, effeminate, slaves of the belly, avaricious, cruel, fastidious, temperamental, niggardly, grasping, insatiable, savage and envious. What else can I say? Born to the knife, how can their judgement be straight when their legs are crooked? They do not pay for their chastity; the knife has done it. Without a hope of fulfilment they are made with desires which spring from a natural dirtiness. (Letters 115)

One can only imagine the horror with which a blue-blooded aristocrat must have approached such tainted upstarts to beg for favours (cf. Sozomen, History of the Church 4.16).

It was easier to curse court eunuchs behind their backs than to their faces. A considerable part of the objection made to their power arose from the lowness of their origins (Ammianus 22.3.12). Roman eunuchs deserved the soubriquet of eunuchs in China, 'the lucky risers'.67 But social mobility in so stable a society offended the interests and the oudook of hereditary aristocrats; and the literature which survives stems mostly from the aristocracy, or reflects their prejudices. Nothing shows the dislike of eunuchs more clearly than their behaviour on retirement. Sundered from the protection of the emperor's favour, they lurked, wrote Ammianus, like bats in secret hiding places (16.7.7). At court it was a different story. Their non-assimilability to the aristocracy left them isolated, not as individuals but as a group. And it was as a group that they exercised power. The Grand Chamberlain and the high officers stole the limelight, but beneath them there must have been a substantial number of chamberlains of all ages gradually progressing upwards through the ranks.6 8 Their survival depended 66 There is a fulsome dedication to the chamberlain Lausus in Palladius' history, but

Buder considers it a later bombastic redaction (E. C. Buder, Historia Lausiaca (Cambridge, 1904) 4). Priscus (frag. 13) says that all men held Chrysaphius in high regard, but this was not a view shared by all (John of Antioch, frag. 198).

67 Yang, L.-S., 'Great families of eastern Han', trans, in Chinese Social History (Washington, 1956) 122.

68 There is no accurate indication of number. Libanius says they were' more numerous than flies on sheep in the spring' (Speeches 18.130). As an impression only, I should

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upon the emperor's favour; the price was that they served his interests;69 the rewards were great wealth and high rank; though the greater the power, the higher the risks of sudden demotion and execution.

The violent criticism directed against eunuchs diverted dissatisfaction which might otherwise have been aimed at the emperor. But this was not their only or their most important function. By acting as intermediaries they made the emperor's isolation viable. To be sure other groups as well were used as lubricants for the system, but as in the case of the Imperial Secretaries and the Companions (comités), they were rapidly assimilated to the aristocracy. As can be seen from the rise in eunuchs' rank and from the increase in the number of offices which they filled, eunuchs also progressed by this process of consolidation of privileges, which seems endemic to a patrimonial bureaucracy. Thus their powers can be understood only in the context of their non-assimilability and their consequent continuity. This applies to the Grand Chamberlains with exceptional powers as well as to the run-of-the-mill Superintendents and Stewards of the Sacred Bedchambers. The one was inconceivable without the other. Finally, the exercise of power by eunuchs limited the power of centrifugal forces in the state. Eunuchs' influence in the Eastern Empire was one of the major interacting factors (partly cause, partly result) in the preservation of central monarchic authority. In the Western Empire, there was a polarisation of power between the army which dominated the emperor and the aristocracy which avoided tax payments, whether of men or money. In the East, the eunuchs were at the very balance of power between these constituents. Paradoxically, the political power of eunuchs in general, far from being a sign of the emperor's weakness, was, in the Byzantine empire of the fourth and fifth centuries, a token of, and a factor in, the survival of the emperor as an effective ruler.

say there were hundreds rather than thousands. If they were taken in young, and given education, and there is evidence that they were (Ammianus 17.7.5, and no accusation of illiteracy), given the high rates of mortality prevalent in the Roman empire, a fairly large base number would be needed to fill seven top posts with reasonably efficient eunuchs.

* Certainly eunuchs feathered their own nests, but they were not exclusively self-interested. Cf. Ammianus 21.15.4; Malchus, frag. 2a; Ambrose, Letters 20.28: Calïi-gonus, the Grand Chamberlain of Valentinian II, said to the great bishop Ambrose: * While I am alive, do you criticise Valentinian? 1*11 have your head off/

196

V D I V I N E E M P E R O R S O R T H E S Y M B O L I C

U N I T Y O F T H E R O M A N E M P I R E

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Absolutist kings of large pre-industrial states have almost always ruled with divine aid. The nature and degree of their divinity have varied: for example, the Pharaohs of Egypt were god-kings, Chinese emperors ruled by the mandate of heaven, Abbasid Caliphs called themselves Shadows of God on Earth, Byzandne emperors ruled as the vice-gerents of god on earth, English and French kings claimed divine right.1 The list could be extended; but the basic point is clear. The king of a large empire, never seen by most of his subjects, legitimates his power by associating himself and his regime with the mystic powers of the universe. Reciprocally, subjects who rarely see an emperor come to terms with his grandeur and power by associating him with the divine.

The first part of this chapter is concerned with emperor worship, but emperor worship is only one way of approaching a wider problem. The problem is: How did the Romans know that they were living in the Roman empire? In what sense was the Roman empire a single political system? One obvious answer is that the inhabitants of the empire shared an emperor. In many rituals and public celebrations the emperor was declared to be divine, a god or the son of god, or he was closely associated with a god. The diffusion of emperor cults, their acceptance in once Republican Rome, and philosophical resistance to the idea of human divinity have fascinated many scholars. I too have succumbed. But I have also tried in the second half of the chapter to look beyond the direct evidence, which consists mosdy of 1 'The state of monarchy is the supremest thing on earth, because kings are not only

God's lieutenants here below and sit upon God's thrones, but even by God himself are called gods' (from a speech by James I of England in 1609; see C. W. Mcllwain, The Political Works of James I (New York, 1965) 3o6ff.). The literature on the religious legitimation of rulers is enormous, but sec M. Weber, Economy and Society (New York, 1968) vol. 3; P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974); and the different perspective of S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York, 1963) 5off.

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Divine emperors

honorary inscriptions, to the rituals which created the evidence. And 1 began wondering about the significance of stories or myths which, although they were untrue, had considerable currency in Roman circles. Sober historians are interested primarily, sometimes exclusively, in the truth; they therefore usually ignore untrue stories. Indeed as one reads an ancient source, there is a temptation, rooted perhaps in modern scientific rationalism, to pass over these fabrications, roughly as most readers turn over a page which contains statistical tables, with barely a glance. But political power and legidmacy rest not only in taxes and armies, but also in the perceptions and beliefs of men. The stories told about emperors were part of the mystification which elevated emperors and the political sphere above everyday life. Stories circulated. They were the currency of the political system, just as coins were the currency of the fiscal system. Their truth or untruth is only a secondary problem.

Power is a two-way process; the motive force for the attachment between the king and the gods does not come from the ruler alone. His aides and his lowest subjects, since they cannot usually change the social order, wish to justify, indeed they often wish to glorify, the status

quo and their own place within it. The attachment of the people is not necessarily to a particular king, but to an ideal king, who symbolises the fixed order of the world. When the king dies or is deposed, the people's loyalty is automatically transferred to the new king. The close association of the king with god or gods, the sacred rites performed in his honour, the laudatory rhetoric, the similarity of attributes of god and king (such as Omniscience, Justice, Omnipresence), all stem from the belief that the emperor like god represents the moral order, and that the emperor, as the best of men, stands between ordinary men and the gods. This view is most clearly expressed, if clearly is the right word, in semi-philosophical writings:

Of all that is most honoured in nature, g o d is greatest; so too, in earthly and h u m a n matters the king is greatest. As g o d rules the universe, so the king rules the state. As the state is to the universe, so the king is to god . T h e state is a harmony of many different e lements and so imitates the order and harmony of the universe; since the king has absolute power and is living law, he is transformed into a god a m o n g men . (From Diotogenes , O n Kingship cited in Stobaeus, Anthologium 7.61 = Wachsmuth and H e n s e eds . , vol. 4, 265).*

2 Diotogenes is unknown except from the citations in Stobaeus dating from the fifth century A D . According to L. Delatte (Les traités de la Royauté (Liège, 1942) 2d4ff.), Diotogenes' vocabulary, style and ideas date him to the first or second century A D ; this is hotly disputed by H. Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period (Abo, 1961 ) 65ff. ; see also F. Taeger, Charisma (Stuttgart, 1957-60) vol. 2, 6i6ff. and E. R. Goodenough, 'The political philosophy of Hellenistic kingship', Yale Classical Studies 1 (1928) 55ff. for commentaries on these philosophical excerpts.

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Introduction

This formulation is regrettably abstract, but the underlying problem is clear enough. How and why did Roman emperors reinforce the political system by associating themselves with gods? Why did local leaders of towns in Italy and in the provinces honour emperors in the elevated language of prayer and call emperors, like gods: Saviour, Benefactor of the Whole World, Defender from Evil, Lord of all mankind?3 It is not enough to say that the practice originated in the east and spread to the west, because that begs the question: Why did it spread? Nor is it enough to say that professional orators elaborated the language of panegyric, so that it took on an academic life of its own, divorced from reality. That is true as far as it goes; but why did subjects and kings spend long hours listening to this inflated rhetoric of praise? What meaning did they attach to the extravagant metaphors and similes scattered through honorary decrees and speeches? These rococo figures of speech recurred too often to be simply meaningless or hypocritical.

The following extravaganza is taken from a formal speech of welcome delivered in the presence of the emperors Diocletian and Maximian (alias Jupiter and Hercules) in Milan in AD 2 9 1 . 4

. . .while other m e n and places were frozen and overcome by the bitter cold, you were followed by gentle breezes and spring winds, and the rays of the s u n . . . shone o n your path. With the greatest of ease, you overcame obstacles which others would find unsurmountable . O n e of you crossed the Julian, the other the Cottian Alps, as though they were beaches o n the o p e n shore w h e n the tide is o u t . . . Y o u , invincible emperors , almost s ingle-handed with your divine steps like H e r c u l e s . . . o p e n e d u p the path across the Alps blocked by winter s n o w s . . .

T h e n , as your divinity shone from the ridge of each of the Alps, a brighter light shone over the whole of Italy and all w h o looked u p were struck with wonder and doubt as to whether the gods had risen to the mountains or whether they had descended to earth from the sky. 3 The parallelism between the cults of emperor and Christ is striking: the following

terms were used frequendy of both: god (theos), Son of god, god made manifest, lord (Kurios), lord of the whole world, lord's day (Sebaste - pagan, Kuriake-Christian), saviour of the world, epiphany, imperator, sacred writings. See the superb discussion by A. Deissman, Light from the Ancient East (tr. London, 1910), 346-84, and more recendy K. M. Setton, Christian Attitudes Towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century (New York, 1941).

4 It may seem dangerous to use evidence from the late third century to cast light on attitudes in the Principate. Yet there seems to be a similarity in thought and expression between the extract cited and Greek honorary decrees and, for example, the speeches of Aelius Arisddes (second century). The only surviving Latin panegyric from a significandy earlier period is by Pliny (AD 100). It is less floridly fanciful, but dates from a dme when the emperor Trajan was consciously trying to play down imperial power. Imagine the panegyrics delivered by Roman senators to Caligula, Nero and Domitian; and besides, the idea of Jupiter and Hercules as especially associated with Roman rulers dates back at least to Trajan, see J. Beaujeu, La religion romaine a Vapogee de Vempire (Paris, 1955) 7iff.

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But as you came nearer, people began to recognise you. All the fields were filled not only with m e n rushing to see you, but also by the herds of catde which abandoned their distant pastures and glades. In all the villages, farmers rushed to spread the n e w s . . . altars were lit, incense put in place, libations of wine were poured , victims sacrificed. Everywhere ardent joy was felt, everywhere applause resounded. Praises and thanksgiving were sung to the immortal gods . Jupiter was i n v o k e d . . . a s visible and present; Hercules was w o r s h i p p e d . . .as an emperor . (Panégyriques latines 3.9-10 ed . Galletier)

In modern societies, similarly inflated language is heard at alumni reunions, retirement banquets and at political rallies, though the metaphors are different: * Brethren, let us keep alive the white hot fires of Socialism' - U K 1975; 'May Chairman Mao Live for Ever.' These are ritual occasions during which the evocation of sentiment induces feelings of camaraderie, necessary for the success of a large and mixed social occasion. The language reflects a search for symbols, redolent with shared associations, which will suspend criticism and unite divergent groups. The mystical elements in Roman decrees to the emperor may have served a similar function. The fusion of god and emperor reflected the coalescence of the moral and political order.

T H E B E G I N N I N G S O F E M P E R O R W O R S H I P I N R O M E , I T S E S T A B L I S H M E N T A N D D I F F U S I O N

Originally, the divinity of the living emperor was alien both to traditional Roman religion and to Roman oligarchic politics. Its eventual acceptance even by the elite in the city of Rome was a symptom of the growth of emperors' power and of the changes which took place in Roman political culture; these changes made it possible to express individual emperors' political power in religious terms. But the emperor's divinity was only one aspect, albeit the most impressive aspect of the emperors' association with the gods. The intricate relationship of emperors and gods and its political significance can be understood only against the backcloth of Roman religious beliefs and rituals. Religion and politics were intertwined.

In metaphors, myths and sacred rites, Romans frequendy bridged the great divide which in puritan Christianity separates man from God. The every-day world of the Romans (not simply their mystic world) was populated by a host of divine intermediaries who stood between men and the great gods of Heaven and Hades. They ranged from demi-gods and divine heroes such as Castor and Hercules to divine forces such as Victory, Fortune and Hope and even to portents and omens of good and evil. Each household had its private cults in which

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men placated the spirits of the living (Genius) and the dead (Lares) with sacrifice and ritual, and invested them with such divinity as they chose. Cicero, for example, wanted to build a shrine, not a tomb to his dead daughter in order 'to achieve deification as far as possible* (Letters to

Atticus 12.36). This was a private act, and therefore consistent with his violent public objection to the official deification of Julius Caesar.5

Earlier in the Republic, Romans had associated several of their leaders with gods, but not in the state cult. For example, after the political murder of the Gracchi brothers, statues of them were set up in a prominent place in the city of Rome; 'many people sacrificed at and worshipped their statues every day, as though they were visiting the shrines of the gods' (Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus 18). Other leaders were similarly honoured, while they were still alive. For example in 102-101 BC, the general Marius achieved a crushing victory over the Celtic tribes which had for several years defeated Roman armies in northern Italy. He was honoured in the city of Rome with libations 'just like the immortal gods' (Valerius Maximus 8.15.7). Exceptional ability or success or the spark of genius was commonly recognised as having something divine about it. The dictator Sulla took the soubriquet Felix, Fortunate, to reflect his protection by divine forces. Republican poets such as Ennius, Lucretius and the early Virgil each referred to great men (Scipio, Epicurus and Octavian) as though they were gods or god-like.6

Emperor worship involved the transfer of what had previously been private and unofficial rites to the public domain; it involved the inclusion of the emperor in private household rites; and it involves paying honours to the living which had customarily, though not exclusively, been given to the dead. For example, a wall painting has been discovered in a private house in Pompeii, which shows the spirit (Genius)

of the head of the household, surrounded by his family, pouring a libation; a second figure was added to this picture, and was carefully 5 The background to Julius Caesar's deification is discussed by L. R. Taylor, The

Divinity of the Roman Emperor (Middletown, Connecticut 1931) 42ft. and at length by S. Weinstock, Divus Julius (Oxford, 1971) - on which sec J. A. North, JRS65 (1975) i7iff. Cicero violendy objected to Caesar's public and official deification: 'Do you think, conscript fathers, that I would have voted for the decree which you have reluctandy passed and which associates a cult of the dead with prayers, introduces sacrilegious practices into state religion and decrees prayers to the dead? I deny that honour to anyone, even to Brutus, who liberated the state from monarchy.. . I cannot accept that I should associate any dead man with the worship of the immortal g o d s . . . May the immortal gods pardon the Roman people who did not approve the decree and voted it unwillingly...' (Philippics 1.13).

• Scipio: Seneca, Moral Letters 108, 33-4; Epicurus: Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe 5.8; deus ille fuit, deus; Octavian: Virgil, Eclogues 1.6-7. Cf. Weinstock (1971: 294-6).

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preserved in ancient dmes. Mau interpreted this figure as the Genius of the emperor Augustus, since beneath the picture were the letters E X SC 'by decree of the senate', which Mau took to be the decree of the senate which ordained that a libadon should be poured to the emperor at all public and private meals (Dio 51.19) - like a Christian grace or an English royal toast.7 And we know from literary sources that this toast: 'To Augustus, Father of the Fatherland, hail' (felieiter)

became common practice (Petronius, Satyricon 6 0 ) . 8

Julius Caesar was the first Roman to be recognised as a god in a public state cult. He had also been more powerful than any Roman before him. His divinity followed from his political power. Julius Caesar had also been the first living Roman noble to claim descent from a god, through Aeneas from Venus. Even during his life-time, when he was dictator, he was given honours similar to those given to a god. For example, a statue of Caesar was set up in the temple of Quirinus with the inscription 'To the Unconquered God* (Dio 43.45). At the circus games, an ivory statue of Caesar was carried in solemn procession along with those of the gods (ibid.). The senate ordered that a temple be built 'To Julius Caesar and his Clemency', and that a special priesthood be instituted in his honour similar to Jupiter's (Dio 44.6). But his elevation provoked opposition. He was assassinated by a band of nobles who could not endure his supreme power and quasi-divinity.

Julius Caesar's deification after his death was partly a legitimating manoeuvre by his political successors, particularly by his adopted son and heir Octavian, who thus became 'Son of God' (divi ftlius)*

Deification after death was also a continuation of Caesar's life-time ambitions and of popular belief. An angry crowd reacted to his assassination by burning down the senate-house in which he had been murdered and then attempted 'to bury his body in the temple [of 7 This interpretation seems bold but justifiable. Mau cites two other instances in which

the Genius of the emperor may have been portrayed in private shrines. Cf. A. Mau, Pompeii in Leben und Kunst (Leipzig, 1908) 278; G. K. Boyce, 'Corpus of the Lararia of Pompeii', Memoirs of the American Academy at Rome 14 (1937) no. 466. 'A genius is a god, the same as a larf as many ancient authorities such as Granius Flaccus [? first century BC] have sa id . . . A genius constandy observes us and is not away from us even for a second, but stays with us from the moment of birth until our dying day1 (Censorinus, On The Birthday 3).

8 Horace described how the peasant on his return from the fields had dinner and invoked Augustus as a god: 'he prays to you, honours you with unmixed wine and joins your divine spirit (numen) to his household gods' (Odes 4.5.29!?.).

• In Latin there was a distinction between deus and divus (Weinstock (1971) 391—2). Stricdy, deus was used for the immortal gods and divus for gods who had been men (Servius on Aeneid 5.45); in Greek, both were called Theos and the Greek equivalent of divi filius was theou huios, son of god.

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Jupiter on the Capitol] along with the gods' (Appian, Civil Wars 2.148). The priests turned the crowd back and so they burnt the body on a hastily built pyre in the Forum. Caesar's power, his popularity, the manner of his death and the political sagacity of his heir, all combined to make his funeral and his memory more a public than a private family matter. Julius Caesar was numbered among the state gods, wrote Suetonius,

not only by public decree but also by popular belief. At the first games, which his heir Augustus gave in honour of his consecration, a comet shone for seven successive d a y s . . . it was believed to be the soul of Julius Caesar, which had been taken to heaven. A n d this is why a star is set at the top of his statue. (Julius Caesar 88) 1 0

Augustus and the emperors who succeeded him were the first Romans to be widely acknowledged as gods during their life-time. Several emperors found this personally embarrassing, and in the city of Rome it was politically awkward; it cut across the constitutional mask which disguised the emperors* supremacy. They did not want to be assassinated. Members of the elite, who suffered most from the emperor's human weaknesses, were most sceptical of his divinity. Hence, for example, Seneca's savage skit on dead Claudius' arrival in heaven and his open scorn for the senators who had seen the soul of the imperial dead rising in the sky and had been richly rewarded for the speed of their vision (The Pumpkinification of Claudius 1; Dio 56.46; 59.11).

Emperors were caught in a cleft stick. In the eastern provinces rulers were traditionally honoured as gods. Emperors could not refuse the honours and prayers of the eastern provincials without giving gratuitous offence which might undermine the provincials' loyalty. Equally, they could not afford to be seen, especially by the Roman elite, to welcome divinity. Augustus and his immediate successors tried to cope with this clash of cultures by a compromise which they enforced in the provincial state cults; in these, they allowed temples and priests 10 The separation of the divine spirit from an obviously dead body is always an

awkward moment in the apotheosis of a human; cf. the Christian account of Jesus' death/ascension. On this problem for the Romans, see £. Bickerman in Le cutte des souverains dans Vempire romain, Fondation Hardt, Entretiens 19 (Geneva, 1972) 3-37 (the essays in this collection are excellent) and the dramatic account of the ritual of apotheois at Rome by Herodian (see below, p. 214). Julius Caesar's deification became a noted motif in Roman state art. See, for example, the picture of four horses pulling a chariot carrying Caesar's soul, steeply rising into the sky, depicted on an Augustan altar from the city of Rome (I. Scott Ryberg, 'Rites of the state religion in Roman art', Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome 22 (1955) fig. 28a); also the Augustan silver coin from Spain (19—15 BC) which showed a comet with eight rays and a tail and bore the legend Divus Julius (BMCRE 1.63).

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to be established in their honour, but only in association with an established deity, usually Roma. Or they diverted the direct imputation of personal divinity by allowing sacrifices only to the living or divine spirit of the emperor (Genius, Numen Augusti). In this way, religious rites and feelings were harnessed to the political order as well as to the individual emperor.

Several sources reveal the awkwardness of this solution, as emperors rejected unwanted honours proffered by deferential provincials or defended themselves to Romans for the honours which they had accepted. The extract which follows is from a papyrus, first published in 1924, which contained a letter from the emperor Claudius to the Alexandrians sent in AD 4 1 :

. . . First, I allow you to keep my birthday as a sacred day as you have requested, and I permit you to e r e c t . . .a statue of m e and my fami ly . . . B u t I decl ine the establishment of a high-priest and temples to myself, not wishing to be offensive to my contemporaries and in the belief that temples and the like have been set apart in all ages for the gods alone. (P. Land. 1912 = Corp.

Pap. Jud. 153 = Loeb Classical Library, Select Papyri 2 1 2 ) 1 1

But in the proclamation publicising this very letter, the Roman prefect of Egypt referred to 'the Greatness of our God Caesar*, apparendy in direct defiance of the emperor's explicit wishes. The conventional explanation of this inconsistency is persuasively simple; it was considered all right publicly to entide Caesar 'God', provided it happened in the provinces. But decisions about emperor worship in the provincial state cults were often made in the city of Rome. The contradictory expectations of Roman aristocrats and of provincials therefore could not be segregated.12 And when a decision was made in public in the city of Rome, the emperor often took the Roman elite's view into account. Besides the emperor was a member of that elite. Tacitus records the following debate which took place in the senate in AD 25:

Farther Spain sent a d e l e g a t i o n . . . (which applied) to follow Asia's example and built a shrine to Tiberius and his mother . Disdainful of compl iment , II Claudius* refusal was made at Rome, which partly explains its tone. In Egypt itself,

temples had been set up to Augustus during his life-time, and we know from one (at Philae) that he was depicted as Pharaoh God (cf. Taylor (1931) 143-4» fig. 22). A Greek epigram to Octavian from the same place, inscribed on stone, identified him with Zeus: *To Caesar, Lord of the Sea and Ruler of the Universe, Zeus the Liberator, bom of Zeus the Father, Lord of Europe and As ia . . . ' (CIG 4923 * G. Kaibel, Epigrammata graeca 978).

11 I follow here the conventional distinction between the provincial state cults and individual or town cults, but without much conviction. Perhaps the place where the derision was made about the cult's form was more important than whether the cult was provincial or municipal.

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Tiberius saw an opportunity to refute rumours of his increasing self-importance.

' I am aware, senators*, he said, * that my present opposit ion has been widely regarded as inconsistent with my agreement to a similar proposal by the cides of Asia. So I will justify my silence then and my intentions from now on.

' T h e divine Augustus did not refuse a temple at Pergamum to himself and the city of Rome. So I, w h o regard his every action and word as law, followed the precedent thus established, the m o r e since the senate was to be worshipped together with myself. O n e such acceptance may be pardoned. But to have my statue worshipped a m o n g the gods in every province would be presumptuous and arrogant . . .senators, I emphasise to you that I am h u m a n , performing h u m a n tasks. I am content to occupy the first place a m o n g men. '

Later too, even in private conversation, (Tiberius) persisted in rejecting such veneration. S o m e attributed this to modesty, but most people thought it was uneasiness. (Annab 4.37-8 tr. slighdy adapted from M. Grant, Penguin books)

Such public protestations had litde effect, in Italy or the provinces. We can see this, for example, in the public proclamation made by Germanicus Caesar, the nephew and adopted son of Tiberius, in Alexandria in AD 19. He refused divine honours for himself, although the offer was very restrained by Egyptian standards.

I welcome the good-will which you always display w h e n you see me , but I totally reject your acclamations which are invidious and appropriate to the gods . T h e y be long exclusively to the real Saviour and Benefactor of the H u m a n Race, my father [the emperor Tiberius] , and to his mother, my grandmother [Liv ia ] . . . (Loeb Classical Library, Select Papyri 211)

He was perhaps afraid that exaggerated reports of the honours accepted by him would reach the jealous emperor's ears.

Emperor worship in a broad sense, that is the public association of emperors with gods, divine forces, sacred rites, altars and temples, flourished almost everywhere. Even the elite in the city of Rome repeatedly elevated living emperors to the level of a god. The list of honours voted to Octavian is extraordinary: in 29 BC, the senate decreed that his name be included in its hymns equally with the gods (Dio 51.19-20). They decreed 'that a tribe should be called the Julian tribe after him, that he should wear the triumphal crown at all festivals ... that the day on which he entered the city of Rome should be honoured with sacrifices by the whole population and be held sacred for evermore' (Dio 51.20). In 27 »c, he took the name Augustus, which like divi filius - theou huios (Son of God) - symbolised his superiority over the mass of humanity. An altar was set up in Rome to his Victory, temples were built to Fortune which vouchsafed his Safe Return (Fortuna Redux), and to the Augustan Peace. His statue was placed in the entrance to the Pantheon while another statue of him, dressed in

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all the insignia of Apollo was set up in the library attached to the new temple of Apollo (Ps. Aero on Horace, Epistles 1.3.17).

Stories about the connections between Augustus and Apollo circulated even in sophisticated circles and have survived in the histories of Suetonius and Dio. In the book About the Gods by Asklepias of Mendes, the story was told that Augustus* mother once spent the night in the temple of Apollo with other matrons. While she slept, a snake came to her (by Roman convention, a snake was apparendy used on household altars to represent the Genius - but Freudians will also make speculations about the imagery in the story); when she awoke, she washed herself as though after intercourse with her husband, but she could not wash away the mark of the snake which she found on her body. In the tenth month afterwards, Augustus was born and was therefore considered to be the son of Apollo (Suetonius, Augustus 94; Dio 45.1).

To continue the saga, Augustus eventually in 12 BC became High Priest. He did not move into the traditional High Priest's house, but gave it to the Vestal Virgins. In compensation he made part of his own house into a public shrine with an ever burning fire. In this way the household gods of the state and Augustus's own household gods were under the same roof. Augustus was Father of the Fatherland {pater

patriae) as well as head of his own family (paterfamilias). The headship of state was fused with the office of High Priest; the regime had the ostensible support of the gods.

Outside Rome, in Italy and in the provinces, eastern and western towns and town-councillors competed in their search for the appropriate honours to pay their monarch. They looked for honours which would cast most glory upon themselves, in their own eyes, in the eyes of the distant monarch, 1 3 and in the eyes of the common folk who watched the sacrifices and participated in the festivals held in the emperor's honour. The emperor's birthday and other anniversaries were celebrated by public games and in other ways. In 9 BC, for 18 The vote of honours by a municipal coundl was often marked by the dispatch of

a legation to inform the emperor. This provided towns with an opportunity for self-advertisement and gave ambassadors a legitimate excuse for a trip to court with the prospect of an audience, with enhanced kudos on their return home. On the accession of Caligula, in A D 37, the small town of Assos (in western Asia Minor) swore an oath of loyalty to Caligula 'by Zeus the Saviour, the God Caesar Augustus and the ancestral Holy Virgin [Athene] . . . It was decreed by the town council and by the Roman businessmen among us and by the people of Asserts to appoint an embassy chosen from the foremost and best Romans and Greeks to seek an audience and congratulate him and to beg him to remember the city with solicitude, as he himself promised when he first visited our city's province with his father Ger-m a n i c u s . . ( w h e n Caligula was aged six!) (SIG 797).

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example, 'the cities of Asia [Minor] decreed.. .that a crown be awarded to the person suggesting the highest honours for the god [Augustus]. ..' (OGIS 458). Discreetly enough, they then awarded the prize to the Roman governor of the province for suggesting 'an honour for Augustus hitherto unknown among the Greeks, namely to start the year on his birthday' (ibid.). The idea was taken up with public enthusiasm. 'The birthday of the most divine emperor is the fount of every public and private good. Jusdy would one take this day to be the beginning of the Whole Universe.. .Jusdy would one take this day to be the beginning of Life and Living for everyone...' (CIG 3957b - Apamea Cibotus).

In other cities also, the emperor's birthday and other anniversaries were publicly celebrated by sacrifice, rituals, ceremonies and games. Three more examples will be enough to give the flavour, and to illustrate the variety. The following is a brief extract from a calendar inscribed on stone from Cumae in the bay of Naples; it listed public festivals and is one of a number found in Rome and nearby towns:14

January 7 O n that day Caesar first held high office. Public prayers to Eternal Jupiter.

January 16 O n that day Caesar was called Augustus . Public prayers to Augustus .

January 30 O n that day the Altar of the Augustan Peace was dedicated. Public prayers to the rule of Caesar Augustus , guardian of Roman citizens and the whole world.

(CIL 10.8375: heavily restored = A. Degrassi, Inscriptiones Italiae 13.2 (Rome, 1963) 279) 1 5

14 Fragments of nearly forty calendars inscribed on stone have survived, nearly all from the city of Rome and the surrounding towns. They date from after Julius Caesar's calendar reforms to the end of the first century A D . They listed public and sacred festivals. Unfortunately, the fragments allow us to assess uniformity and diversity only in about ten towns and not in all of them for the same months. For some festivals (such as Augustus' victory in Spain or his deification) there was considerable uniformity; but in other cases there were discrepancies; for example, the anniversary of the assumption of the tide Augustus was recorded as a festival in only three out of five towns; the consecration of the Altar of the Augustan Peace was celebrated in only four out of six towns, and of the Altar of Victory in only one out of three towns for which the calendar is complete. This diversity is interesting and shows how unrealistic it is to create single calendars, as though all festivals were celebrated everywhere. The evidence is collected by A. Degrassi, Inscriptiones Italiae 13.2 (Rome, 1963) and collated by J. Marquardt, Römische Staatsverwaltung (repr. Darmstadt, 1957) vol. 3, 5676*.

15 The cumulative impact of celebrating imperial achievements can be seen in the calendar of festivals of the 20th Palmyrene cohort stationed at Dura (Syria) dating probably from A D 225-7. By dien 21 deified emperors and empresses were still recognised; and of 41 festival days recorded for this military unit, 27 were connected with the imperial cult. By then also most of these imperial festivals were celebrated expensively by the sacrifice of animals (usually an ox), rather than by the simpler

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Secondly, in AD I I , the town council of Narbonne in southern France had a marble altar erected to Augustus and dedicated it in perpetuity to Augustus' divine spirit (numen). They put it there so that 'each year on this altar on 23 September, the day when he [Augustus] was brought forth to be ruler of the world for the happiness of the age, three Roman knights chosen by the people and three ex-slaves will each sacrifice a (sheep) a n d . . . will provide the colonists and the other inhabitants with incense and wine for the cult worship of his spirit' ( C I L 12.4333). Similar celebrations were to take place at the expense of the chosen six on four other days of the year, while another inscription on a bronze plaque probably from the same period records the establishment of a provincial priesthood of Augustus - the priest to have the right to set up a statue of himself with the name of his father and his year of office and the obligation to set up statues of the emperor with surplus temple money ( C I L 12.6038).

The third example comes^from Naples: in 2 BC, the cidzens there voted to establish games sacred to Augustus, ' ostensibly because Augustus had restored the town after it had been laid flat by earthquake and fire, but in reality because its inhabitants.. .emulated Greek customs ' (Dio 55.1 o). The games were grandiosely called Italien Romaia

Sebasta Isolympica and to drive the point home the Neapolitans built a temple to Augustus, the first temple to a living emperor on Italian soil. Augustus must have approved, since he attended the fourth games in AD 14 (Dio 56.29).

These examples illustrate three general points. First, the style of public celebrations held in honour of the emperor varied considerably from town to town, as it did between provinces.16 This variety demonstrates that the festivals were not instituted by Augustus himself or by the dictate of the central government. The varied arrangements reflected local initiatives or competitive innovations rather than imperial decree. The strength of local feelings and beliefs, the sense of

offering of wine and incense which dominated (15:1) the Cumaean calendar cited above. But then one would expect the imperial cult to be more effusively celebrated in the army than elsewhere - it was in the emperors* interest to invest heavily in the army's loyalty to their image. Sec R. O. Fink, A. S. Hoey and W. F. Snyder, *The Feriale DuranunT, Yale Classical Studies 7 (1940) esp. 236., 1739. We can compare the festivals at Dura with those at Theveste (Algeria) from an inscription (ILAlg$041) dated A D 214. Of 15 imperial festivals listed at Theveste, 1 2 were also celebrated at Dura, but N.B. 16 out of 36 festivals certainly dated from Theveste are of no known public significance (Snyder op. cit. 1940: 20X)ff.). Thus in the early third century, there was a central core of uniformity in imperial festivals between a military unit in Syria and an African colony, and considerable local variation as well.

16 An additional example: the imperial cult was joined with that of Roma in only one (Tarraconensis) of the three Spanish provinces - see R. Etienne, Le culte impérial dans la péninsule ibérique (Paris, 1958) 293, cf. 231.

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obligation to the emperor, the belief in the benefits to be derived from his propidadon far outweighed the effect of any imperial regulation. The evidence simply does not match the model which consciously or unconsciously still seems to underlie some modern discussions of the imperial cult, especially in the western provinces: namely that it was inidated, licensed, controlled and maintained primarily by the emperors themselves in the interest of some overall policy of political control, and that western provincials were far too sensible to believe in such eastern superstititions.

Sometimes local leaders spontaneously initiated their own rites in honour of the emperor; at other times, especially in the western provinces, emperors themselves or their delegates did play an important role in initiating and organising the cult of the emperor. For example, Drusus, Augustus' stepson, is said to have forced a meeting of the chiefs of sixty Gallic tribes, at a time when they were reportedly dissatisfied with Roman administration. Apparendy, he won them over and instituted the cult of Rome and Augustus, with a great altar and a provincial high priest chosen annually from amongst them (Livy, Summary of Book 139; Strabo 4 .3.2). This official promotion of the state cult is often considered as overt political manipulation. And so it was. But the cult would have been of no use to the emperor, nor would the provincial leaders have kept it alive unless they had quasi-religious feelings or beliefs which could be harnessed.

At other times, emperors responded to provincials* requests that they approve certain honours. Emperors' replies to these requests, together with competitive imitation between towns and the common cultural traditions which existed within provinces, combined to create distinct patterns of emperor worship: statues, processions, games, altars, arches, temples, sacrifices in commemoration of birthdays, victories and of each new emperor's accession. But within and around this common core there was always variation which reflected the uncontrollability or spontaneity of local demonstrations of loyalty to the emperors.17 For example, it is impossible to imagine that the 17 Sometimes provincials and provincial governors behaved contrary to the emperor's

declared wishes, often because they did not know better. For example, the senate pressed Tiberius to have his birth-month November named after him as Julius Caesar had done before him. He refused the honour scathingly: 'What will you do when you get to the thirteenth Caesar?' (Dio 57.18). But in Smyrna and Calymna, for example, November was called Tiberion (A. £. Samuel, Greek and Roman Chronology (Munich, 1972) 175) and in Egypt this month was called Neos Sebastos - New Augustus-and the name stuck through the second century (K. Scott, 'Honorific months', Yale Classical Studies 2 (1931) 243-4). So much for control by the emperor. The Cypriot calendar of 15 BC was exclusively honorific, with months named after the following: Augustus, Agrippa, Livia, Octavia, Julia, Nero, Drusus, Aphrodite, Anchises, Rome, Aeneas, Capitol (ibid. 183).

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following script for a public presentation celebrating the accession of the new emperor Hadrian in AD 117, which was found on a papyrus fragment from a district capital in upper Egypt, was anything but local. The two characters in the dialogue represent the sun god Phoebus Apollo and the People:

Phoebus: With Trajan in my chariot of white horses I have just cl imbed aloft to heaven; and now I c o m e to you, o h people , I Phoebus, by n o means an u n k n o w n god to proclaim the new ruler Hadrian. All things serve h im o n account of his virtue and the Genius of his Divine Father.

People: Let us make merry, let us kindle our hearths in sacrifice, let us surrender our souls to laughter, to the wines of the fountain and the unguents of the gymnasia. For all these we are indebted to the reverence of our governor [strategos] towards our Lord [Hadrian] and to his zeal o n our behalf.

(P. Giss. 3 adapted from the translation by P. J. Alexander , Harvard Studies

in Classical Philology 4 9 (1938) 143-4.)

One of the main functions of these celebrations was that they confirmed the prominence of local leaders. Emperors and the feelings which they evoked served as the pretext for ceremonial display, for the expense and the fun. But it was also more serious than that. The processions, dedications and sacrifices were the symbolic forms by which the local elite and the local populace of free men and slaves, townsmen and peasants, reaffirmed their relative positions and their subordination, however they perceived it, to their distant emperor. How else would anyone have known that he ruled?

Secondly, participation by the poor must have been encouraged by the gift of free wine and incense, and by the prospect of a share in the meat from the sacrifice.18 The gods got only the entrails. In a poor society, hunger was endemic; food was a recurrent subject for art in rich men's houses; eating meat was a treat. The sense of occasion was heightened by the dramatic slaughter of the choice victim and by the anticipation of eating. In surviving carved altar panels, the sacrificial victims figure prominendy (for example, a bull for the Genius of Augustus, a hog for his Lares). At the celebration of games or at the dedication of a statue to the emperor, rich men often gave banquets to their social equals. Scores of inscriptions, mosdy from Italy, also 18 It is clear that sacrifices were sometimes made .the excuse for eating meat. For

example, Titus in thanksgiving for his victory in Judaea 'sacrificed a vast number of oxen . . .and distributed them all to the army to feast on* (Josephus, Jewish War 7.16). For a similar equation, sacrifice equalled a meat feast, see Ammtanus Marcellinus 22.1a. However examples illustrate but do not prove my point that sacrifice was an important source of meat for the urban poor.

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record that occasionally they also gave money or a feast, or meat (visceratio), sometimes just rusks and mead (crustum et mtUsum) to all the citizens.

Sacred to Apol lo Augustus , for the safety of the Emperor Marcus Aurel ius C o m m o d u s Antoninus Augustus , Conqueror of the Sarmatians and of the Germans, Son of the divine Marcus Antoninus Pius, Conqueror of the Germans and of the Sarmatians, Grandson of the divine Pius, Great-grandson of the divine Hadrian, Great-great grandson of the divine Trajan, Great-great-great grandson of the divine Nerva, High Priest, in the seventh year of his Tribunician Power, Victor for the fourth time, in his third Consulship, Father of the Fatherland, Quintus Abonius Secundus son of [?] in honour of his (priesthood) which the order (of decurions) decreed to h im of its o w n accord, has set u p this statue with a donat ion of 4,000 H S of his own money over and above the legal sum required, and o n the occasion of the dedication [has donated] gifts of money to the decurions and a feast [to the people ] . (Inscribed o n a statue base from a small town in north Africa - C I L 8.14791)

The role of ex-slaves in the imperial cult

The cult rules from Narbonne also show that ex-slaves played a prominent part in the celebration of the imperial cult. Why did ex-slaves take a leading part in the worship of the emperor? To be sure, some of them were rich; but all of them bore the stigma of their foreign origin, captivity and enslavement. Yet in spite of their low origins, ex-slaves held office as organisers and celebrants, Augustales,

of the rites associated with the family spirits of Augustus, held at the cross-roads (compitalia) in the city of Rome and throughout Italy and the western provinces.19

An explanation is difficult to find. The rites were partly an Augustan innovation built on a traditional base. In Republican Rome, the two guardian spirits of the cross-roads (Lares compitales) had been propitiated in local festivals and sacrifices provided by district leaders (vicomagistri) (Asconius, p. 7 ed. Clark). Slaves and ex-slaves had always 19 For a detailed analysis of hundreds of inscriptions recording the existence and

functions of Augustales, see A. von Premerstein, DE sv. Augustales. In central and southern Italy, nearly all the Augustales whose status is known were ex-slaves, but in northern Italy several free-born Augustales are known (ibid. cf. CIL 5.1765). Leading Augustales (usually seviri) gave money for the celebration of games as well as animals for sacrifices. See also now R. Duthey,' La fonction sociale de l'August-aiitl', Epigraphica 36 (1974) 134-54» D u t his deductions about those whose status is unrecorded should be treated with caution.

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played a prominent part in this ritual and for the duradon of the festival they Were traditionally freed from all slavish stigmata and got extra wine rations (Dionysius Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 4.14; Cato, On Agriculture 57). Interestingly enough, the cult leaders were also allowed for the duration to wear senatorial dress of purple-bordered toga, and like magistrates, were accompanied by two lictors (Dio 55.8). Our sources tell us that Augustus revived this cult along with other parts of the traditional religion which were dying (Suetonius, Augustus 31) and transformed it by adding his Genius to the two Lares of the cross-roads; the three were thereafter called the Lares August!.20

I looked for images of the twin gods , But they had decayed with the force of time. T h e City now has a thousand Lares and the Genius of our Leader; H e gave them to us; and the districts worship three divinities. (Ovid; Fasti 5 .143-6)

Several finely sculpted altars to the Augustan Lares, nearly all of them set up by district leaders, survive from the city of Rome and confirm the transformation of the cult. Like other monuments of the period, they depict scenes which glorify the virtues of Augustus and his family: for example, a chariot carrying the soul of Julius Caesar to the sky, winged victories, and Augustus in priesdy garb handing over to other men, presumably district priests, a statuette of a Lar. 2 1

Augustus cannot have created this cult from nothing. It seems more likely that in the course of his long reign, ex-slaves had begun to celebrate the emperor's power in the traditional local festivities and rites; when Augustus reorganised the districts in the city of Rome and was High Priest, he legitimated and institutionalised these local celebrations, which had been till then only informal, and they became the rites of his cult. The cult of the emperor's Genius and his guardian spirits persisted over the next two centuries, as the evidence of more than a thousand surviving inscriptions shows. The cult provided rich M Excavations at Pompeii show that it was common for Roman households to have

niches or shrines (like saints' wayside shrines in rural Italy or Greece recently) which contained a statuette or portrait of a Lar (or portrait of the Genius - for their fused identity see note 7 above) and two Penates - household gods. Shrines at the cross-roads traditionally held only two Lares, one for each road - Augustus made it a trio - and at least in some minds Penates equalled Lares.4 Augustus had ordered household-gods (Penates) to be set up in the cross-roads.. .The priests were ex-slaves called August-ales' (Ps.-Acro on Horace, Satires 2.3.281); cf. the oath *by Jupiter and divine Augustus.. .the genius of the [living] emperor and the household gods (Penates)* (CIL 2.1963).

II Ryberg (1955) has the best pictures; but the discussion by Taylor (1931) 186 is as interesting as ever; cf. CAHr plates vol. iv, i28ff.

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ex-slaves, as organisers of the cult, with a prestigious and public outiet for social display. And it allowed emperor worship to flourish at street level.

The emperor's divinity won some acceptance even in the elite. It may seem surprising that leading Romans gave even grudging acceptance to the idea that their human emperor and his father were divine. It seems surprising partly because it contrasts with earlier Republican sentiments, and partly because it contradicts our own modern notions of humanity, divinity and rationality. As a consequence, several modern historians of Rome have dismissed the evidence of our sources as glib flattery or as insincere exaggeration. Perhaps much was, but that does not explain it away. The idea of the emperor's divinity and close association with the divine persisted and was fostered by Roman notables.

Sometimes emperors demanded, and sometimes the Roman senate volunteered, an extra token of its belief that the emperor was a favourite of the gods. For example, at the beginning of the New Year in AD 40, the senate in a body went to the Capitol and offered the regular sacrifices; and then because the emperor was away from Rome, they abased themselves (prosekuneson) before his empty throne in the temple of Jupiter. Roman senators, grandchildren of the generation in which the heroes of the Republic, Brutus and Cassius had assassinated Caesar, returned to the senate house and * spent the whole day in praising the emperor and saying prayers on his behalf (Dio 59.24)** In AD 65, the consul-designate proposed that a temple should immediately be built to the divine Nero, because Nero had earned the worship of mortals. Nero refused the honour as an unwelcome presage of his death (since in the city of Rome emperors had been openly deified in a state cult only when dead) and was content to rename the month of April Neroneus (Tacitus, Annals 15.74 and 16.12) and planned to rename Rome Neropolis (Suetonius, Nero 55). Perhaps fear prompted the senators to humble themselves with flattery, but fear does not explain the form which their flattery took. Nor was it fear which induced the 'richest citizens to use all their influence to compete with each other to obtain the priesthoods' of the temple to Caligula (Suetonius, Caligula 22). The emperor's divinity was created by the deference of subjects to a visibly powerful ruler more than by the emperors' own policy.

" Caligula was particularly extravagant in his demands; in the temple, which he had set up to his own divine spirit (numen), * there was a life-size statue of the emperor made of gold, which was dressed every day in clothes similar to those he was wearing' (Suetonius, Caligula 22). But the ceremonies recorded here by Dio seem to have been initiated by the senators themselves.

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These developments can be illustrated from Roman art. Plate 2a shows the magnificent panel which celebrated the ascent to heaven and deification of the emperor Antoninus Pius and his wife Fausdna. It formed one side of the pedestal which supported a high funerary column, set up in the city of Rome to commemorate the emperor's death. The panel portrays the emperor's ascent to heaven on the back of a winged Genius, watched by two seated figures. The beautiful young man on the left, holding the whole column in his lap, represents Mars, the god of war, in whose field (the Campus Martius) the monument was built and Roman emperors were solemnly cremated in effigy. The female on the right is the goddess Roma. The imperial couple is seated; each is carrying a sceptre and is flanked by an imperial eagle; traditionally the eagle was believed to carry the imperial soul to heaven and of course signified Roman power.23 Plates 1 and 2b show other scenes of deification, one of the empress Sabina, who died in AD 136/7, the other a beautiful cameo, said to be of either Germanicus (Tiberius' adopted son) or of the emperor Claudius. For our present purposes it does not matter which; what matters is that in Roman art, seen by people who never read a literary text, the Roman emperor was portrayed as a favoured inhabitant of heaven.

Deification was not merely a subject for sculpture, however brilliantly executed. It was also the end process of lively and impressive rituals with a cast of thousands. The historian Herodian, who wrote in the early third century, has left a good account of the elaborate ceremonies which in the city of Rome surrounded the emperor's death and elevation to Heaven.

It is normal Roman practice to deify emperors w h o d i e . . .All over the city, express ions of grief are displayed, but they are combined with a festival and a religious ceremony. T h e body of the dead e m p e r o r is buried in a normal way with a very expens ive funeral. But then they make a wax model exacdy like the dead man and lay it o n an e n o r m o u s ivory couch raised u p o n high legs at the entry to the palace, and spread go lden drapes under the effigy.

T h e mode l lies there pale, like a sick man , and o n either side of the couch people sit for most of the day. O n the left is the entire senate dressed in black cloaks and o n the right all the w o m e n w h o hold a position of high honour because of the distinction of their husbands or fathers. N o n e of these w o m e n appear wearing gold ornaments or necklaces; they wear only a plain white dress to show they are in mourning .

For seven days these ceremonies continue. Each day the doctors c o m e and g o u p to the couch, and each day they pretend to examine the patient and make an announcement that his condit ion is deteriorating. T h e n , when it appears that h e is dead , the noblest members of the equestrian order and 23 I rely here on L. Vogel, The Column of Antoninus Pius (Cambridge, Mass.; 1973) 32ff.

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picked young m e n from the senatorial order lift the couch u p and take i t . . . out of the city to the Campus Martius, w h e r e . . .a square building made of vast w o o d e n beams has been constructed in the shape of a house (with several storeys). Inside, the building is completely filled with brushwood, and outside it is decorated with gold-embroidered drapery, ivory carvings and a variety of p a i n t i n g s . . . .

T h e bier is taken u p and placed o n the second storey. Every per fume and incense o n earth and all the aromatic fruits and herbs and juices are collected in great heaps. T h e r e is n o tribe or city or prominent person w h o does not compete in sending these last gifts in honour of the emperor . W h e n an enormous heap of these aromatic spices has filled the entire space, a cavalry procession around the pyre begins; the whole equestrian order rides in a circle round and round in a fixed formation, following the m o v e m e n t and rhythm of the Pyrrhic dance. Chariots circle round in the same f o r m a t i o n . . . carrying figures which wear masks of all the famous Roman generals and emperors .

W h e n this part of the ceremony is over, the heir to the throne takes a torch and puts it to the built-up pyre. T h e whole structure easily catches fire because of the large amount of dry wood and aromatic spices which have been piled high inside. T h e n from the highest and topmost storey an eagle is r e l e a s e d . . . and soars u p into the sky with the flames, taking the soul of the emperor from earth to Heaven , as the Roman believe. After that he is worshipped with the rest of the gods . (Herodian 4 . 2 adapted and abbreviated from the translation by C. R. Whittaker, Loeb Classical Library)

S O M E F U N C T I O N S O F B E L I E F — T H E L I V I N G P R E S E N C E

Did sensible educated men really believe that a man was a god, or did they merely mouth these empty metaphors and put on a polite face through the formal ritual of singing the emperor's praises? Did they do it only because it brought them political advantage or social prestige, while it left their hearts and minds untouched? In short, was emperor worship political rather than religious?

No single answer to this question can be found; the surviving literary evidence relates only or predominandy to educated men; surviving memorials were put up mainly by the prosperous. And it is difficult to deduce feelings from artefacts. We know little of the actions and feelings of the lower classes. In a society as large and as culturally varied as the Roman empire, the range of cult practices was immense. Add the dimension of time stretching over three centuries, and it becomes painfully obvious that historians are forced to impose plausible and simplifying fictions on a complex and largely irrecoverable past. Besides, the question is itself misconceived, since it treats the two categories of politics and religion as separate. Even in modern,

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relatively irreligious societies, the two are often intertwined (for example, at ceremonies commemorating those killed in war, or at the installation of new heads of state). But in classical Rome, religion and politics often overlapped and were fused.

There was a wide spectrum of values, beliefs and attitudes. At a rational level, several of them were probably incompatible, yet in fact held by the same people simultaneously. Indeed, people often pick values, beliefs and attitudes from a common social stock and give them different emphasis and expression according to the demands of social circumstances. For example, different values and beliefs are expressed at cocktail parties or stag parties and in church, in public and in private, at the emperor's court, in the royal presence, and in a philosophical discussion. It is both impracticable and undesirable to compress this huge variety into a single historical account, whether our subject is beliefs in contemporary England, America or in ancient Rome. Nor can we discover what the Romans really believed, any more than we can give a single account of what really happened. What we can do is to illustrate the variety of Roman religious values, beliefs and practices, and consider particular social contexts (such as public processions in provincial towns, appeals to the emperor by maltreated slaves, or the prosecution of Christians) which moulded the expression of beliefs in the emperor's divinity. Our task ideally is to show the relationship between beliefs, social processes and the political structure. That is a tall order, and I shall tackle it selectively, choosing evidence from a variety of places and periods, so that we can draw on the full inventory of Roman beliefs and practices.24

In the sophisticated circles of philosophers, courtiers and historians, cynical scepticism about the divinity of a human emperor was readily available. Roman emperors themselves manifesdy distrusted or rejected as absurd some of the honours wished on them by flattering admirers. The emperor Vespasian, for example, on his death-bed was reported to have said:4 Alas, I think I am becoming a god', a story told then, as now, in mockery of his impending deification (Suetonius, Vespasian 23J. 2 5 A panegyrist, Aelius Aristides, in a letter to the

14 This concentration on structure and process has its costs. In this case, by drawing on a wide variety of evidence from different places and periods, I somewhat ignore the canons of time and place, which are the prime ordinandsof most history-writing. In other words, for these purposes, I treat the Roman empire statically as a single entity, when dearly there was both change over time and variation between regions. Obviously, I regret this; as I show elsewhere in this book, this is not a strategy imposed by my methods, only a tactic in this chapter.

** When the citizens of Tarraco reported to Augustus that a palm tree had magically grown on his altar, he is said to have quipped: * That shows how often you light fires on it* (Quintilian, Institutes 6.3.77). But the most notable satire on deification is by Seneca, The Pumpkinification of Claudius - an eye-witness account of the new god's arrival in heaven.

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emperors (AD 178), when Smyrna was in ruins after an earthquake, made a clear distincdon between the gods to whom men pray, and * the most divine rulers' from whom men beg favours (Speech 19.5, ed. Keil). He clearly did not intend any disrespect; we can assume that his distinction was acceptable and did not cause offence. Whatever men said, at least some knew that the emperor was not a real god.26 Indeed after the excesses of the emperor Domitian, there was a period of reaction in which emperors emphasised their humanity not their divinity, at least at court in Rome (Pliny, Panegyric 2). Speculative philosophers often made fine distinctions:

T h e emperor is the last of the g o d s . . .but the first of men . As long as he remains o n earth h e is separate from his true divinity, but in relation to m e n he has something exceptional, which is akin to the divine. His soul within him comes from a higher place than the souls of men . (Corpus Hermeticum, ed . Festugiere (Paris, 1954) vol. 4, 53; frag. 24.3)

We simply do not know how widespread such sophisticated distinctions were either among intellectuals or common folk. Nor does it matter much. After all, in the contemporary world, it is quite possible to find cynical unbelievers who participate in religious rituals of marriage and death, and who listen to the rhetoric of Christian prayer and gain a certain satisfaction or pleasure from their participation, without feeling that it challenges their disbelief. We do not have to choose between politics and religion, between hypocrites and true believers. The rituals themselves, the symbolic acts of priests and congregation, the words of prayer are all redolent with associations, whether from childhood or a historical past. They bring a message which transcends the actual meaning of the words.

Immortal Nature, after Overwhelming Benefactions, has Bestowed o n Men the Greatest Good of all. She has given us the Emperor Augustus , w h o is not only the Father of his Country, Rome , Giver of Happiness to our Lives, but also the Fatherly God and Saviour of all Mankind. It is H e whose Providence has not only Fulfilled but even Surpassed the Prayers of all. For Land and Sea lie at Peace and the Cities b loom with the Flowers of Order, Concord and Prosperi ty . . .(Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum 8 9 4 ) "

* I owe this point to G. W. Bowersock, 'Greek intellectuals and the imperial cult* in he cuUe des souverains (see note 10) 179!!., who amply illustrates the scepticism of philosophers. I think however that he underestimates the probability that philosophers' acts differed from their thoughts. J. R. Fears (Princeps a Diis Electus (Rome, 1977) 10) makes a distinction between the 'official ideology of the prinripate' and the metaphorical language of men of letters. But he puts too much weight upon it; it is only one of several plausible distinctions. Otherwise this seems a very good guide to the evidence.

97 It is a pity that classical epigraphers have concentrated exclusively on the transcription of discovered texts and have done so litde to present a synoptic picture which

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This was a decree of the local senate of Halicarnassus in Caria inscribed on stone for the occasion of a visit by the emperor's grandson in i BC. To the rationalistic prejudice of moderns, the language may seem hopelessly inflated, reminiscent of English tombstone encomia in the eighteenth century. But statements which do not mean exactly what they say, should not be summarily dismissed as meaningless. Honorary decrees recur much too often for that; the hundred which survive must reflect many thousands ever drafted, intoned or carved.

It is clear from these surviving decrees that in the East the emperor was widely acknowledged in public as a god. The following is a fragmentary extract from a decree set up early in the first century in a small town (Tlo) in Asia Minor, to mark the establishment of a cult in honour of Livia, the wife of Augustus, the mother of the emperor Tiberius:

. . . since She had established the family of the Augusti through the most Holy Succession of the Gods Manifest, the Incorruptible and Immortal H o u s e for T i m e Everlasting, the Lycians in their Piety to the Goddess [Livia] have decided to institute Processions, Sacrifices and Banquets to Her in Perpetu i ty . . . ( T A M 2.549)

To catch the true flavour, such passages should not be read softly to oneself; they should be intoned aloud, at half an octave above or below one's normal speaking pitch. Each of these two extracts has some uncanny echoes of later Christian prayer; they belong to the same genus.

We should not be too impressed by the evidence which happens to survive. Words cut in stone stand a good chance of survival; the memory of 'Processions, Sacrifices and Banquests' fades. Yet to the provincial notable who played a prominent part in the processions, and paid for them, and certainly to the men in the street who watched and cheered, the actions of the day mattered more than their record for posterity.28 Cult acts, sacrifices, ritual, public games, feasts all underwrote the conception of the emperor's supremacy and the benefits derived from the existing order. The following description,

highlights the importance of their hard work, unifies the texts with the monuments on which they were inscribed, and which explicates the culture which shaped the ceremonies which prompted the inscriptions. Credit in the profession apparendy goes to those who transcribe new texts, however similar to those already found.

** Of course, both mattered. That is why men spent money on inscriptions for posterity. I wonder how long the interval was between the erection of a monument and its displacement. Tombs often declared fines against violators in perpetuity. * Statue bases did not, and we know that new heads were sometimes fitted onto old torsos.

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although it is of an emperor's proud entry into the city of Rome, and comes from the fourth century, gives a good idea of how impressive such processions were, and were intended to be.2 9

. . . [the emperor] sat alone in a gold chariot in the resplendent blaze of various precious stones, whose mingled glittering seemed to form a second d a y l i g h t . . . H e was surrounded by dragons which were woven from purple thread and attached to go lden and jewelled spearheads, their gaping mouths exposed to the breeze so that they hissed as though in anger, while their tails whirled behind them in the wind. . . . when he was hailed as Augustus with shouts of a p p r o v a l . . . h e never moved , but showed that imperturbability which had been apparent in the p r o v i n c e s . . . he gazed straight ahead as if his neck was in a vice, and turned his face neither to right nor l e f t . . . nor d id he n o d when the wheel jolted, and not once was he seen to wipe his face or nose , or to sp i t . . .and although this was affectation o n his part, n e v e r t h e l e s s . . . [it was also] an indication of considerable endurance granted, it was thought , to h im alone. (Ammianus Marcellinus 16.10)

The emperor's progress, like the king's progress in post-feudal Europe, was only one aspect of royal grandeur.30 Since most emperors in the High Empire visited few cides outside central Italy, the towns which were visited by the emperor often tried to immortalise their transient glory by erecting commemorative arches, temples and columns or even by starting the calendar year or an era from the date of the emperor's visit (*in the 6 9 t h year from the first visit of the god Hadrian in Greece'= AD 101/2; one of several such decrees from Tegea, IG 5.2.52)* 3 1

In daily life, there were repeated reminders of the emperor, and of his close association with the gods. All coins carried a picture of the emperor's head and name, the reverse showed portraits of symbols illustrating the emperor's success or power such as, for example, the personification of Victory, Rome or Justice together with varied *· On such processions see S. MacCormack, * Change and continuity in late antiquity:

the ceremony of adventus\ Historian (1972) 721-52; T. E, V. Pearce, Classical Quarterly 20 (1970) 313-16.

30 I am very grateful to C. Geertz who first persuaded me of the significance of such processions and the symbols of power, and gave me his then unpublished article to read, 'Centers, Kings and Charisma* in J. Ben-David and T. Clark, eds., Culture and Its Creations (Chicago, 1977).

31 'Some Italian towns made the day on which (Augustus) visited them the beginning of their year* (Suetonius, Augustus 59). In Thessaly, Greece, the era of Claudius was apparendy dated from a visit to Greece in A D 10/11 as well as by the years of his reign: 'in the seventh year of Caesar Germanicus Augustus and the 37th year' = A D 47/8 (IG 9.2.13). See H. Kramolisch, Chiron 5 (1975) 543ft*.

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slogans reminding people of the benefits of imperial rule (such as LIBERTY RESTORED, CONCORD, JOY, LOYALTY OF T H E ARMIES). 3 2

In city streets, squares and temples, prosperous cidzens erected statues of the emperor, usually to commemorate their own tenure of local office. The dedication inscribed on the statue base recorded the formal tides of the emperor and often the exact sums spent. For example:

Anicia Pudentilla in her will ordered two statues to be erected at a cost of 30,000 H S Manlia Marcina her mother and heir had that d o n e , add ing 8,000 H S of her own G. Manilius Manilianus her son-in-law executor. (The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania 22, from Sabratha) In some provincial towns, statues of the emperors were highly standardised. At Bulla Regia in north Africa, for example, statues of the joint emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus were almost identical except for a higher brow on one (Marcus Aurelius), a detail which may have been copied from a coin. In other towns, statues of emperors portrayed as gods have been found (for example the face of Hadrian with the body of Mars at Carthage).

In the city of Rome in the fourth or fifth century there were said to be close on 4,000 bronze statues of emperors in public places and an unknown number of stone or marble;33 excavations at Lyttos, an undistinguished town in Crete, have yielded thirty-two bases of emperor's statues from a single century (Inscriptiones Creticae

1.18.15-46); in a medium-sized north African town (Leptis Magna), archaeologists have found over eighty statue-bases with inscriptions 31 Too much is often made of these slogans as a means of communication. After all

most coins circulated for decades so that most messages were passe\ That said, the symbols are sometimes very striking, much more raised than in modern coins, and the messages were probably more prominent in popular consciousness then than they would be nowadays, when we suffer from mass communications pollution. The Roman coin slogans reflect most on their composers whoever they were. In several reigns, there were too many issues for the emperor to have supervised them personally.

u Two late Syriac epitomes perhaps from the chronide of Zachariah Rhetor, who wrote in the late fifth century, preserve the number of bronze statues in Rome, and much other such information; they probably derive from Greek versions of the earlier (fourth-century Curiosum urbis Romae. See R. Valentini and G. Zucchetti, Codice topografico delta cittd di Roma (Rome, 1940) vol. 1, 320-34 with an Italian translation. For Leptis, see J. M. Reynolds and J. B. Ward Perkins, The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania 3i6ff. My thanks to Joyce Reynolds for information about excavations in Leptis. But apparendy almost no statues of emperors have been found in private houses, so E. Bickerman in Le culte des souverains (see note 10 above) 5-6; emperors were public gods who protected the public good; for private benefits, men prayed to other gods.

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to emperors. To be sure this number represents the accretions of four centuries - by no means all would have been on display at the same time. On the other hand, the whole of the public area has not yet been excavated and many statues and bases must have been lost. However, the exact number does not matter too much. The point I want to stress is that public places were filled with or dominated by representations of royalty, most of them put there by private cidzens. In a letter to Marcus Aurelius, then heir to the throne, his former tutor Fronto wrote: 'You know how in all the money changers' shops, in booths and bookstalls, eaves, porches, anywhere and everywhere, people have put up busts of you, badly enough painted to be sure, indeed for the most part modelled or sculpted in a crass, cheap style...' Even so, Fronto went on, however bad the likeness, the sight made him remember his royal pupil with a private smile (Fronto, Loeb Classical Library vol. i , 207 translation adapted).

The emperor's statue (see Plates 3 and 4)

The emperor's statue was not just a lifeless monument, an aesthedc adornment to a public square. Slaves, litigants and even magistrates in times of trouble fled to the emperor's statue, as though it stood for the emperor himself, as though it could provide the protection and justice which ideally the emperor would himself dispense - if only he were present and knew the facts. Once in Aspendos (in southern Turkey) in the reign of Tiberius, during a food shortage ' . . .an excited crowd was infuriated with the chief magistrate and was lighting a fire to burn him alive, even though he was clinging to the statue of the emperor, which at that time was more feared and venerated than the statue of Zeus at Olympia' (Philostratus, Life of ApoUonius 1.15).

In the Greek East, the right of asylum in certain temples, such as the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, had long been recognised. But the idea of asylum was alien to traditional Roman law, since it seemed to offer an extra-judicial escape from deserved punishment. And it was open to abuse. In AD 22, the Roman senate received a report (which may well have been exaggerated) that: 'Throughout the Greek cities, there was a growing laxity in granting rights of asylum, so that criminals escaped punishment. Temples were filled with the dregs of slaves, the same asylum was granted to debtors escaping their creditors, and to men suspected of capital offences' (Tacitus, Annak 3.60). The senate determined to restrict the number of sanctuaries, and with that in mind, investigated the rights of various cities. Some sanctuaries were said to stretch back centuries to a mythical past, while the Cretans

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claimed rights of sanctuary for a statue of Augustus (Tacitus, ibid.

3- 6 3)* The very existence of a supreme emperor tempted appeals to the

highest authority. In both civil and criminal cases, Roman citizens even in the provinces could appeal to Caesar. If they were lucky, like St Paul, they were sent to Rome for trial. But citizenship did not always afford protection. The town magistrates at Philippi (northern Greece) had St Paul flogged and imprisoned; next day, when they discovered that he was a Roman citizen, they apologised (Acts 16). 3 4 In Jerusalem, St Paul saved himself from another flogging by declaring his citizenship immediately to thetenturion in charge (Acts 22.25). He spent two years in captivity, while his case was being considered; it was said that the governor hoped for a bribe (Acts 24.26). Eventually when a new governor came, St Paul extricated himself from prosecution by Jewish leaders by appealing to Caesar. 'Then Festus [the governor], after conferring with his advisers, replied: "You have appealed to Caesar; to Caesar you shall go" (Acts 25.12). But when a murderer pleaded his Roman citizenship to another provincial governor, all he got for his trouble was an extra high white-washed cross to be crucified on (Suetonius, Galba 9) . Several such cases show how erratically legal privileges were honoured.

What concerns us here is not only the access to higher authority which some citizens gained through their right of appeal to Caesar, but also the feeling that Caesar was there to protect the rights of the underprivileged against injustice. It was this feeling which underwrote the extraordinary development by which slaves, the least privileged stratum in Roman society, could appeal against malreatment by their masters to the statue of Caesar (Seneca, On Mercy 1.18). By the middle of the first century AD, slaves in Rome had an established right to flee to the statue of the emperor to complain against outrageous cruelty; starvation or enforced prostitution (Ulpian, D. 1.12.1.8; Labeo and Sabinus (consul in AD 69) cited in Ulpian, D. 21.1.17.12). If their case was upheld, they were sold to another master. Emperors had to steer a delicate course. They did not wish to undermine the slave-owners' traditional rights: 'the powers of masters over their slaves should not be diminished' (decree of Antoninus Pius, D. 1.6.2); after all, emperors' own power rested upon respect for tradition. At the same time, with the plea of public interest, emperors sought to earn their reputation for all-seeing justice by checking outrageous abuses. Tf you exercise authority with revolting cruelty, the provincial governor may be forced. 34 I follow here Jones (i960: 53-65). On slaves' appeals, see H. Bellen, Studien zur

Sklavenflucht im römischen Kaiserreich (Wiesbaden, 1971) 64-78.

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to prevent a possible breach of the peace by taking away your slaves with my authority' (decree of Antoninus Pius, Comparüon of the Laws

of Moses and the Romans 3.3.6). We do not know how many slaves managed to exercise their rights by fleeing to the statue of Caesar; success must have been even more difficult for them than for Roman citizens. The difficulty of bringing off an appeal to Caesar successfully is caught beautifully by Apuleius in his satirical story, The Golden Ass.

The author had just been turned into an ass by a magical error, when robbers broke into the magician's house in a small town in Greece and used the author-ass to carry away their booty:

I was a l m o s t d e a d w i t h the w e i g h t . . . I d e c i d e d to a p p e a l to t h e civil a u t h o r i t i e s , by i n v o k i n g t h e v e n e r a b l e n a m e o f t h e e m p e r o r , a n d so d e l i v e r m y s e l f f r o m so m a n y m i s e r i e s . . .1 t r i e d to call o n the A u g u s t n a m e of C a e s a r i n G r e e k , I c a l l e d o u t * 0 \ c l e v e r l y a n d l o u d l y , b u t as for the rest of C a e s a r ' s n a m e I j u s t c o u l d not get it out. A n d t h e thieves w e r e f u r i o u s w i t h m e for b r a y i n g a n d s l a s h e d m y p o o r s k i n u n t i l it wasn' t fit f o r a n y t h i n g . (3.29)

In real life, the appeals of many slaves must have been similarly frustrated by their owners' violent punishment.

But the mere possibility of making an appeal, even dreaming about it or telling stories about how others had successfully done it, must have been important, just as the myth of the poor man becoming the President of the USA has been more important in fantasy than in reality. Yet, in fact, it was significant that the sellers of slaves in Rome reassured buyers by claiming that the slave was 'neither a gambler, nor a thief, nor had he ever fled to [Caesar's] statue' (Ulpian, D. 21.1.19.1). The statues were a silent court of appeal against injustice, and not merely for slaves. An unsuccessful claimant in Egypt, disappointed in his appeals to the local bureaucrat, finally deposited his petition 'in the temple of Augustus at the feet of our Lord and most divinely favoured emperor Gaius.. .Trajan Decius' ( C P R 2 0 , AD 2 5 0 ) . The statue of the emperor was the only court of appeal available to him.

The statues and portraits of the emperors helped maintain a living presence of the emperors in public places and in the consciousness of subjects.35 These statues were not necessarily objects of worship, especially as worship is commonly understood in our culture; rather the emperor's statues and portraits were objects of homage or respect, symbols of the emperors' legitimate authority. This point is well made by a bishop called Severian, who preached at the end of the fourth century. 35 See H. Kruse, Studien zur offiziellen Geltung der Kaiserbildes im römischen Reiche (Pad

erborn, 1934).

2 2 3

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Consider how many governors there are in all the world. Since the e m p e r o r is not with them all, the emperor's picture has to be put u p in courts of justice, in market places, in meet ing-houses , in theatres. T h e emperor's picture must be put in every place in which the governor exercises power, in order to give his acts authority. (Sermons on the Creation of the World 6.5 = PG 56.489)

I do not know how far back this practice went or how widespread it was in the early Roman Empire, but there is one instance recorded from north Africa in the second century in which the defendant appealed to the emperor's statue in the court room as the final arbiter of propriety (Apuleius, Apology 85). And the custom persists even today: portraits of the President of the USA, of British monarchs and of Chairman Mao Tse-tung adorn different court-rooms and public offices throughout the world.

The cult of the emperor, alone or associated with other gods, was particularly important to the authorities in the Roman army. Emperors continued the Republican tradition of taking tides (such as Germani-cus, Parthicus) to celebrate the victories of their armies, and were ever conscious of the need to foster a special relationship with the army - as Commander in Chief (Imperator), as leader in battle (a role played by Caligula and Claudius as well as by Vespasian, Trajan and Marcus Aurelius among others), and as benefactor, donor and paymaster. Soldiers' loyalty and their will to fight bravely were enhanced by having their minds fixed on the greatness and glory of the ruler of the known world, the divine emperor in Rome. From the first century onwards, the emperor's portrait was carried (like a flag or in medallions) along with the other military standards (Tacitus, Histories 1.41 and 4.62). Indeed a special soldier (the imaginifer - C I L 13.1895) was entrusted with the task of carrying this royal standard for each unit. Reverence was given to the emperor, or to his Genius, alongside the military standards, and emperors were worshipped or closely associated with divinity on altars set up by officers in military camps throughout the empire. For example, in a British fort near Hadrian's wall, two altars have been found inscribed: 4 To the Genius of our Lord and of the standards of the first cohort of the Vardulli and the Unit of Scouts...' ( R I B 1262) and *To the God Matunus for the welfare of Marcus Aurelius who reigns for the good of the human race' (RIB 1265). 3 6

In other contexts too, the presence or power of the emperors was recognised in the custom of swearing oaths by the emperor, or by the emperor's Genius (or Tyche), just as, in other circumstances, men swore, as they still do, by a god (Jupiter, God, Christ). Of course, there M On the importance of the imperial cultin the army, see Fink, Hoey and Snyder (1940).

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was an element of formulaic repetitiveness in oaths; but nonetheless, the style of such formalities has to be taken seriously. For example, on the accession of the emperor Caligula in AD 37, the inhabitants of Aritium in Portugal swore the following oath of loyalty: \ .. If consciously I swear falsely or am proved false, may Jupiter the Best and Greatest and the deified Augustus and all the other immortal Gods punish me and my children with loss of my homeland, with loss of security and of all my fortune' ( C I L 2.172: adapted from the translation in Ancient Roman Statutes). It is noteworthy that the deified ancestor of the new emperor kept the highest company.

In less formal acts, it also became common practice to swear what came to be known as 'the divine oath' ( P . Oxy. 85). For example, in a will made in the second century AD in Italy, the testator appealed to the local town-councillors: *I ask and beg you by the welfare of the most holy (sacratissimi) emperor' ( I L S 6468) to keep the terms of the will. In Egypt, many papyri show that statements made in court, routine statements of tax obligations, and even of record-keeping were sworn to be true 'By the Fortune of the Emperor* (e.g. P . Oxy. JJ), or by the emperor himself: ' I swear by the Emperor Caesar Marcus Aurelius Commodus Antoninus Augustus that the above statements are correct' (AD 180-92 - P. Oxy. 79 cf. 246). And a master manumitting a slave in central Greece did it 'in the presence of the priest of Sarapis and of Isis, and before the aforesaid Gods and the Augustus Trajan Caesar Germanicus' ( I G 9.1.86 Hyampolis). Since the emperor Trajan himself was certainly not there in person, the manumittor was either relating to a statue or to a metaphorical presence, which gave his act supreme validity. In consequence, the violation of the oath involved the law-breaker, or tax defrauder not merely in crime, but also in sacrilege. The oaths of subjects, voluntarily undertaken, legitimated aspects of the political order by appeals to the religious and moral order.

Romans did not always think well of their emperors. The ubiquitous imperial statues were also targets for attack. They were exposed to popular hostility as well as to admiration. Indeed, at times of riot or rebellion, the emperors' statues were often the prime target, much easier to overthrow than the emperor himself. For example, a crowd of rioters in Antioch objected violendy to an increase in taxation in AD 387:

. . . see ing the many images (of the emperor) o n painted panels, they committed blasphemy by throwing stones at them, and jeered at them as they were smashed. / T h e statues of the emperor and of the empress were thrown d o w n

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and dragged through the city, and as is usual o n such occasions, the enraged multitude uttered every insult which passion could suggest. (Libanius, Speech

22.7 / Sozomen, History of the Church 7,23)

On other occasions the rioters indulged in ostentatious hostility, maltreating the statue of the emperor like a common criminal. Libanius against tells how once the citizens of Edessa pulled down a bronze statue of the emperor Constandne and dragged it through the streets face downwards, hitting it like a school-boy as it went with straps 'on the back and the parts below as befitted someone furthest removed from royalty* (Libanius, Speech 19.48). In this way, the populace exorcised their anger and then spent anxious days in trepidation, awaidng condign punishment, while officials diplomatically pleaded their basic innocence, since only the statues and not the emperor himself had been harmed (John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Statues, PG 49, 73 and 216).

The destruction of the image sometimes symbolised, not merely discontent, but rebellion. For example, the end of Galba's regime was dramatically signalled, when the colour-bearer of the imperial escort, at the approach of rebel troops, tore the portrait of Galba from its standard and dashed it to the ground (Tacitus, Histories 1.41; cf. Plutarch, Galba 26). Once an unpopular emperor had been dethroned and killed, the desecration of his statues, the erasure of his name from the historical record, in short, the damnation of his memory, invited widespread and uninhibited participation. The staid senator Pliny recalled the delight with which Domitian's golden statues had been deposed after his assassination.

It was our del ight to dash those proud faces to the ground , to smite them with the sword and savage them with the axe, as if blood and agony could follow from every blow. Our transports of joy, so long deferred, were unrestrained; all sought a form of vengeance in beholding those mudlated bodies, limbs hacked in pieces, and finally that baleful, fearsome visage cast into the fire, to be melted d o w n . . .(Pliny, Panegyric 5 2 , trans by B. Radice, Loeb Classical Library) The violence of the hatred, almost primitive in its intensity, is surprising. It indicates, perhaps better than eulogy, the high hopes which men had of their ideal emperors. Deification was merely one ritual expression of such hopes. 'For as the old proverb correcdy states: To rule is to have the power of a god' (Artemidorus, The Interpretation

of Dreams 2.36). The hatred expressed by Pliny reflected the disillusionment which men experienced when their expectations were betrayed by a bad ruler.

The importance of the emperor in the minds of men and the close

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association of the emperor with the gods can be seen in the Roman response to attacks upon their religious-political culture. The most systematic attacks were launched by Christians and by Jews. These attacks induced Romans in positions of power to identify the central elements in their own culture, which distinguished them from their attackers. Roman accusations against the Christians, according to the Christian apologist Tertullian, for example, were:' You do not worship the gods; you do not offer sacrifice for the emperors' (Apology 10). Thus, emperor worship, in association with the worship of the other pagan gods, had become a defining characteristic of the Roman political system, a test by which one Roman recognised another as a full member of the society.37 Indeed loyalty to the emperor, seen as divine or favoured by the gods, was probably the only universal symbol of belonging available to the Romans and valid for all social groups in all provinces of the empire.

Let me illustrate this point by quoting from the dramatic dialogues between Roman judges and Christian martyrs. The hagiographical literature is suspect in many ways, but I shall quote here from those Acts of the Martyrs, or those passages in the Acts which are considered genuine records of court cases. The first excerpt is from the Acts of the twelve Scillitan Martyrs, executed in Africa in AD 180; their leader was Speratus.

Saturninus the proconsul said: You can earn the pardon of our Lord the Emperor if you return to your senses. Spearatus said: W e have d o n e n o wrong, we have never turned our hands to wickedness, we have cursed n o one , but return thanks when we are abused, and therefore we are loyal to our Emperor. Saturninus the proconsul said: We too are religious, and our religion is simple, and we swear by the Genius of our Lord the Emperor, and we make offerings for his safety, which you ought to d o too. Speratus said: If you will listen, I shall tell you a mystery of simplicity.

37 F. Millar,1 The Imperial Cult and the persecutions * in Le culte des souverains (see note 10) i45ff. has argued powerfully, and I think wrongly, for the unimportance of the imperial cult in the Christian persecutions before the mid third century. In his view, moderns have underestimated the pagan religious elements in the persecutions; in many or most of the persecutions of Christians, he claims, the critical test was sacrifice to the gods; the worship of the emperor, and sacrifice to the gods for the emperor's welfare, were in his view of modest importance, partly because emperor worship was integrated into the wider spectrum of pagan cults.

I agree that the imperial cult was less important in most circumstances than other major pagan cults, and that the motive for persecuting Christians was probably fear that neglect of pagan gods would damage humans, Romans, everybody. But I think that the evidence also shows that the emperor, and his close association with the gods, repeatedly appeared as a critical element in most accounts pf the prosecution of Christians.

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Saturninus said: I shall not listen if you speak evil of what we hold sacred; please swear by the Genius of o u r Lord the Emperor. Speratus said: I d o not recognise the empire of this world; I serve instead the God w h o m n o man has ever seen or can see with mortal eyes. I have not committed theft; but if I buy anything, I pay the tax o n it; for I recognise my Lord, T h e King of Kings and Emperor of all Mankind. Saturninus the proconsul said to the rest: Stop be ing of this be l ie f . . . D o not be involved in this man's madness . (Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs).38

They refused, the proconsul offered them a period of thirty days in which to think it over; they refused. So he ordered them to be beheaded. They all said: * Thanks be to God; and so they were all crowned with martyrdom together and reign with the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit for ever and ever. Amen.'

The sequence is similar in other acts of the martyrs. If these reports are accurate, they reflect surprisingly well on the Roman magistrates who clearly preferred to reform rather than punish Christians. But once the Christians had adamandy refused to recant, and had boldly professed their faith, they often earned martyrdom only after the most terrible tortures. Two further examples of official conversations illustrate the centrality of the emperor's divinity: \ . . they tried to persuade him, saying "Now what harm is there in saying Caesar is L o r d . . . Swear by the Genius of Caesar"' (The Martyrdom of St Polycarp

8-9) . * Change your mind, said the proconsul Perennis; take my advice, Apollonius, and swear by the Genius of our Lord the Emperor Corn-modus', and then again \ . .sacrifice to the gods and to the image of the Emperor Commodus' (The Martyrdom of St Apollonius 3 and 7). Of course; (a) sacrifice to the image of the emperor or (b) swearing by the emperor's genius or (c) sacrificing to the gods for the welfare of the emperor are distincdy different acts, but they can all be understood as blending into each other, as a fusion of religious and political processes.

In yet other prosecutions of Christians, the emperor appeared first as the political authority who had ordered the observation of pagan rites. * You surely know the emperors' decrees that you must honour the gods' (The Martyrdom of Saints Carpus, Papylus and Agathonice 4 (cf. 11 Greek version).39 But even this presentation of the emperor as

38 I follow here the translation of T. D. Barnes, TertuUian (Oxford, 1971) 61; his chapter on the persecutions is excellent, as is his article * Legislation against the Christians', Journal of Roman Studies 58 (1968) 32ft. See also W. H. C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church (Oxford, 1965) and G. E. M. de Ste Croix, 'Why were the early Christians persecuted?* in M. I. Finley ed.; Studies in Ancient Society (London, 1974) 21 off. For the other martyr acts, I broadly follow the translations given by H. Musurillo, The Acts of the Christian Martyrs (Oxford, 1972).

39 For similar passages, see also the martyrdoms of St Justin (B) 2 and St Pionius 3, cf. 5.2 and 8.4.

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protector of the faith seems important, and his divine associations were only just in the background: 'By allowing you to babble on so much, said the proconsul, I have allowed you to blaspheme the gods and the August Emperors* (ibid. 21). From the pagan side, we get a similar story; the following excerpt comes from the famous letter written by the provincial governor Pliny to the emperor Trajan:

For the m o m e n t this is the line I have taken with all persons brought before m e o n the charge of being Christians. I have asked them in person if they are Christians, and if they admit it I repeat the question a second and third time, with a warning of the punishment awaiting them. If they persist, I order them to be led away for e x e c u t i o n . . .

N o w that I have begun to deal with this problem, as so often happens , the charges are becoming more widespread and increasing in variety. A n anonymous pamphlet has been circulated which contains the names of a number of accused persons.

A m o n g these I considered that I should dismiss any w h o denied that they were or ever had been Christians, when they had repeated after m e a formula of invocation to the gods and had made offerings of wine and incense to your statue (which I had brought near for this purpose a long with the images of the g o d s ) . . . (Pliny, Letters 10.96 from the translation by B. Radice, Loeb Classical Library) It seems quite clear from this considerable evidence that acknowledgement of the emperor's divinity or of his close association with the pagan gods played a critical part in the formal judgement that self-confessed Christians were not full members of Roman society.

Of course, it is difficult to know what most provincials felt about the emperor. I do not want to exaggerate or to romanticise their attachment. It seems obvious that some prayers to the emperor were recited without feeling, that some games were celebrated only nominally in the emperor's honour, and that some altars or statues were erected by magistrates to emperors primarily out of duty or to advertise the donor's generosity. Yet the several thousand surviving inscriptions honouring the emperor represent considerable solemn ceremony. Public bodies, local magistrates and private citizens voted honours, dedicated altars and public buildings to the emperor. They have been found all over the empire, from the east and from the west and from Italy, and from all periods including the reign of Augustus: triumphal arches, huge altars, porticoes, temples, colossal statues of stone, or small ones of silver or bronze; some, as we have seen, declaimed the full tide of the emperor and asserted his legitimate succession stretching back over generations. Others associated the emperor more or less direcdy with a god or gods. Two examples from Roman Africa and Syria, and from the first and second century respectively will suffice:

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Sacred to Ceres Augusta C. Rebellius Blandus consul, state priest, Governor [of the Province] Dedicated Suphunibal Benefactress of her h o m e town Annobal Ruso Provided With her own Money for the Erection (The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania 269; from Leptis Magna, an altar of ten l imestone blocks altogether 12 m long; AD 35-6) T o Jupiter Best and Greatest, to Venus , Mercury and the Gods of Heliopolis For the Safety and Victories of o u r Lord Antoninus Pius Felix Augustus A n d of Julia Augusta, Mother of O u r Lord, and for the Army, Senate and Fatherland Aurelius Antoninus Longinus, military pol iceman (speculator) of the 3rd Legion - the Gallic Antonine Has given the Capitals of T w o Columns in Gilded Bronze at his own Expense Willingly in Accompl ishment of his Vow (Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie vol. 6, 2711-12; Baalbek, early third century).

The synthesis of gods with Augustus in a single dedication (for example, to Apollo Augustus, Mars Augustus) is extremely interesting. Hundreds of similar inscriptions have been found from all over the empire and all periods. The emperor was associated with almost every god, for example with Aesculapius, Ceres, Hercules, Isis, Mercury, Neptune and Venus, and on monuments great and small: ranging from the huge temple of Jupiter Augustus in Cyrene set up in the reign of Augustus (PBSR 26 (1958) 38) to a humble undated stone slab set up in southern Spain to Apollo and Aesculapius Augustus ( C I L 2.2004).

It is possible that men had in their minds only the god, to whom they gave the added tide Augustus. But even that is revealing. The local gods of conquered peoples were slowly assimilated to the Graeco-Roman Pantheon of the conquerors. Sometimes, the Roman and native gods merged into one, as for example in Britain and Gaul, where several dedications to Mars Lenus have been found ( R I B 309; C I L 13.3654). Sometimes a Roman god received the attributes of a native god and vice versa. For example, Jupiter was sometimes represented in Britain with a wheel (the attribute of the native god Taranis), or Celtic gods were depicted in traditional animal form, accompanied by the thunderbolt of Jupiter. In yet other cases, two gods, one Roman, one native were joined in a single cult, for example of Mercury and Rosmerta. Yet almost all of these numerous cults were only local. The Greek and Roman Pantheon served to integrate local gods into the religious frame of the conquerors. And beyond this, Augustus served

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as the integrating title of them all. Most people may have been hazy about what this meant; only sophisticated litterateurs would have thought about it, and even then perhaps not clearly.40 It is enough that many people thought in a vague way that kings like gods had mystical powers, worth invoking in a public crisis and worth being grateful to for public well-being. Both the religious and the political world were under a single government-identified in one second-century inscription from near Cordoba in Spain as Jupiter Pantheus Augustus (CJL 2.2008).

OMENS A N D P O R T E N T S

Mystical power and close association with the gods implied magical power. This attribute of kings is well attested in other cultures. In England, for example, in the mid-seventeenth century, Charles I I touched about eight thousand people in one year to cure them of the King's Evil. 4 1 His legitimacy was confirmed, both to himself and his people, by the ritual touch. For our present purposes, it was not the cure that mattered, but the widespread reporting of such cures as took place and the widespread belief in the King's curative powers.

What of Roman emperors? Almost the only known miracles were performed by Vespasian just after his accession to the throne in AD 69 while he was at Alexandria waiting to sail to Rome. Tacitus wrote that at this time 'many miracles occurred'.

T h e r e s eemed to be indications that Vespasian enjoyed heaven's blessing and that the gods showed a certain leaning towards him. A m o n g the lower classes at Alexandria was a blind man w h o m everybody knew as such. O n e day this fellow threw himself at Vespasian's feet, imploring h im with groans to heal his blindness. H e had been told to make this request by Serapis, the favourite god of a nation much addicted to strange beliefs. H e asked that it might please the emperor to anoint his cheeks and eyeballs with the water of his mouth . A second petitioner, w h o suffered from a withered hand, pleaded his case too, also o n the advice of Serapis: would Caesar tread u p o n him with his imperial foot?

At first Vespasian laughed at them and refused. W h e n the two insisted, he 40 The sophistication of philosophers and litterateurs was beyond most people. On this

see the interesting book on the religious beliefs of a single village and the different levels of knowledge about the Buddhist and Taoist pantheon by D. K. Jordan, Gods, Ghosts and Ancestors (Berkeley, Calif.; 1972). For Roman religlion, J. Toutain, Les cultes patens dans Vempire romain (Pans, 1907-20) 3 vols, still seems best; cf. J. Ferguson, The Religions of the Roman Empire (London, 1970) for a brief account.

41 In general, M. Bloch, Les rots thaumaturges (Strasbourg, 1924) and the brilliandy evocative book by K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (London, 1973). On Vespasian's miracles, see A. D. Nock, Essays on Religion and the Ancient World, ed. Z. Stewart (Oxford, 1972) vol. 2,838. Hadrian was also said to have cured a man and a woman of their blindness (SHA, Hadrian 25); but on the whole recorded magical cures by Roman emperors were rare.

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hesitated. At o n e m o m e n t he was alarmed by the thought that he would be accused of vanity if he failed. At the next , the urgent appeals of the two victims and the flatteries of his entourage made h im sanguine of success. Finally he asked the doctors for an opinion whether blindness and atrophy of this sort were curable by h u m a n means. T h e doctors were e loquent o n the various poss ib i l i t ies . . . Perhaps this was the will of the gods , they added perhaps the e m p e r o r had been chosen to perform a miracle. Anyhow, if a cure were effected, the credit would g o to the ruler, if it failed, the poor wretches would have to bear the ridicule. So Vespasian felt that his destiny gave h im the key to every door and that nothing now defied belief.

With a smiling express ion and surrounded by an expectant crowd of bystanders, he did what was asked. Instantiy the cripple recovered the use of his hand and the light of day dawned against u p o n his blind companion . Both these incidents are still vouched for by eye-witnesses, though there is noth ing now to be gained by lying. (Tacitus, Histories 4.81 translated by K. Wellesley, Penguin Books)

Several aspects of this dramatic account are interesting: the emperor's hesitation, his request for scientific information, the temporising doctors, the pressing flattery of the courtiers, the magical cure, the lasting belief. As with Christ, miraculous cures were part of the process of legitimation. Vespasian needed it, because 'he lacked authority and majesty, since he was unexpectedly and recendy called to the throne' (Suetonius, Vespasian 7). Portents provided an answer. In Suetonius' biographies of the first nine emperors, by far the highest number of portents presaging an emperor's rule relate to Augustus and Vespasian, both founders of a dynasty. To quote but one example of many: an ox on Vespasian's country estate shook off its yoke when it was ploughing, burst into the dining-room where Vespasian was at table, scattered his servants and then, as if weary, knelt down and bowing its neck placed its head beneath Vespasian's feet (Suetonius, Vespasian 5). In Krauss' interpretation, the ox was the state; the overthrown symbolised Nero's tyranny.42 The truth of such stories and of their interpretation matters less than the fact that they were told and believed, not only by common folk but also by elite historians and litterateurs.

Miracles, omens and portents, like ritual incantations, curses, astrological predictions, divinations, the interpretation of dreams, and belief in omnipresent maleficent and benevolent forces all contributed to the atmosphere in which Romans regarded their emperors as in 41 K. Scott, The Imperial Cult under the Flavians (Stuttgart, 1936) 4; F. B. Krauss, An

Interpretation of Omens.. .(Diss. Philadelphia, 1930) 173. On the number of portents, see R. Lattimore, Classical Journal 29 (1934) 443; Augustus had 17, Vespasian 12;. the next highest was Galba 6, Tiberius 5 and Vitellius 3. The discrepancies are too marked to be meaningless.

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some sense like gods. Because of our modern rationalistic prejudices, we tend to underestimate the pervasiveness of the unpredictable, the inexplicable and the magical in the daily life of Romans, rich and poor, educated and uneducated. Yet even a cursory inspection of Artemidorus' Dream-book (especially Book 5) or Firmicus Maternus' text book on astrology or Julius Obsequens' book of prodigies should convince us how persecuted Romans were by the unknown; they sought to control it by propitiating sacrifice, prayer and magical incantation, and to understand it by the interpretation of signs.43 To be sure, the books I have mentioned are store-houses of what we and some disbelieving Romans might have called superstitition, although it is worth recalling how seriously they were taken by most of their readers. Several emperors were devotees of astrology; magic men like Apollonius of Tyana were held in high social regard, and were consulted by both emperors and senators. Tricksters like Alexander from Abonoteichus held whole provinces to ransom, and induced even the emperor Marcus Aurelius in the hope of victory against border tribes to have two lions thrown into the Danube with a load of perfumes - the lions swam to the other bank, and the Romans suffered a tremendous defeat (Lucian, Alexander 48). Serious and scholarly historians and litterateurs, doctors and philosophers mingled careful observation and cynical detachment with credulous superstition. In our attempts to find out what 'really happened', we should be careful not to suppress what Romans thought was happening.

It seems impossible to find a satisfactory index of the pervasiveness of what we might today call the irrational elements in Roman public life. We shall have to be content with illustrations. For this purpose, I shall concentrate on astrology. Of course, people look up their fate 43 It is difficult to integrate what we know of Roman magic with Roman elite politics;

usually the two have been considered separately. A. Bouchl-Leclercq, L'astrologie grecque (Paris, 1899) 543-627 still serves as a useful introduction. R. Macmullen, Enemies of the Roman Order (Harvard, 1966) 95-162 has brought much recondite material together; his account is both tantalising and evocative, but the overall impression is confusing. W. and H. G. Gundel, Astrotogoumena (Wiesbaden, 1966) give an excellent account of the astrological tradition, including Firmicus Maternus. A. Barb, T h e Survival of Magic Arts' in A. D. Momigliano ed.; The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity (Oxford, 1963) illustrates excellendy what we know of magic and politics in the fourth century and P. Brown (Religion and Society in the Age of St Augustine (London, 1972) 119-46) subtiy interprets accusations of sorcery as weapons between established and unestablished factions in the elite. But above all, I must stress the pervasiveness of what we would call superstitious practices. For example, Augustus is said to have carried an amulet of seal-skin as a protection against thunder and lightning which frightened him (Suetonius, Augustus 90) and Julius Caesar is said to have repeated a prayer three times whenever he entered a carriage, to ensure a safe journey, * just as most people do nowadays* (Pliny, Natural History 28.21).

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in the stars nowadays, but among the Roman elite astrology was a major intellectual pursuit, a preoccupation which, like economics nowadays, coloured serious political behaviour.44 Men were killed for it.

Domitian, for example, had a senator executed because it was generally known that he had an imperial horoscope (Suetonius, Domitian 10), and it was said that he would have killed his successor Nerva but for a friendly astrologer who assured the emperor that Nerva would die soon anyhow (Dio 67.15; cf. a similar story about Tiberius - Dio 58.27). Astrologers also predicted the manner, day and hour of Domitian's own death - and this may well have encouraged his assassins.45

O n the day before he was murdered , some apples were brought to him. 'Serve them tomorrow*, h e said and added 'if it comes to pass.' T h e n turning to his companions , he remarked ' T h e r e will be blood o n the m o o n as she enters Aquarius and a d e e d will be d o n e , which m e n will talk about all over the world.' In the middle of the night Domitian was so terrified that he j u m p e d out of bed; first th ing in the morning , he tried a sooth sayer, w h o had been brought from Germany o n a charge of predicting a change of g o v e r n m e n t . . . and c o n d e m n e d him to death. While h e was scratching vigorously at the festering wart o n his forehead, he drew some blood; *I h o p e this is all the blood required' , h e said. (Suetonius, Domitian 16)

He then asked the time; his attendants lied to him that it was the sixth hour, because they knew that he feared the fifth. 'Convinced that the 44 For example, the story is told that Nero was worried by the appearance of a comet

on successive nights, since it was commonly believed to be a portent of the death of kings. The court astrologer (Balbillus, the son of Thrasyllus who was astrologer to Tiberius, see below ad note 46) advised Nero that kings usually averted the danger by killing some nobles. Nero set about this, all the more willingly when he discovered two conspiracies against him (Suetonius, Nero 36). Other emperors killed men who had imperial horoscopes: Tiberius (Dio 57.19), Domitian (Dio 67.15), Hadrian (SHA, Hadrian 23; CCAG 8.2.85: the horoscope of an ill-advised young man). In general, see the readable and informative book by F. H. Cramer, Astrology in Roman Law and Politics (Philadelphia, 1954).

45 For the prediction, see Suetonius, Domitian 14 and Cramer (1954) 144; it is unreasonable to suppose that all such predictions took place after the event, although some obviously did. For example, Apollonius of Tyana, according to Philostratus (8.26), was credited with supernatural vision; when he was at Ephesus, he saw what was happening at Rome, stopped in the middle of a philosophical discussion and shouted: 'Strike the tyrant; strike him', as though he saw the murder taking place; incidentally the time of day and other details are different from those recorded by Suetonius. Accuracy mattered less than the moral of the story: the confrontation of philosopher and tyrant (7·iff.). The philosopher always won; for example, when he was brought to court before Domitian himself, he was accused of contempt; he is told to keep his eyes 'on the God of all Mankind'; 'at which he turned his eyes to the ceiling, to show that he had his eyes on Zeus' (8.4). This anti-establishment literature was careful to attack an emperor whose memory had been officially damned; even so, it still upheld the possibility of criticism.

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danger had passed' Domitian happily went off to have a bath and was murdered.

In such accounts, and there are several similar, it is difficult to distinguish truth from fiction. Do we have to? Once told and repeated such stories became part of the myth of kingship; the actors were not only assassins but agents of Fate. What happened had to be. In fact Suetonius lived through the reign of Domitian and was well connected at court; the story probably has some truth in it. However that may be, we know from him and from other historians and litterateurs that successive emperors Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Vespasian, Titus, Domitian and Hadrian (the list is not exhaustive) all took astrology seriously.

And so, in antiquity, did their historians. Tacitus, for example, related how Thrasyllus, scholar and astrologer, became the confidant of Tiberius. When he was in exile in Rhodes, and his succession to the throne was very much in doubt, Tiberius took Thrasyllus, as he had taken other astrologers, to a high cliff and questioned him about his chances of becoming emperor. Tiberius was impressed by Thrasyllus* answers. Finally, he asked Thrasyllus about his own horoscope for that day. Thrasyllus pondered, shuddered with fear and said he was threatened with a crisis. 'Then Tiberius embraced him and congratulated him on his fine prescience of danger and of his escape [from being thrown over the cliff], treated everything which Thrasyllus had told him as an oracle, and kept him among his closest friends' (Tacitus, AnnoU 6.21). The same story is told with minor variations by Suetonius and Dio and appears in an anonymous Byzantine astrological fragment (CCAG 8.4.99). B u t *s a l s o t o ^ mutatis mutandis in the Greek, Armenian, Syriac and Ethiopic versions of the romantic and semi-fictional life of Alexander the Great.4 6

The recurrence of this myth in a different context casts some doubt on its credibility. That matters, but not as much as one might at first think. Political power and legitimacy rest not only in taxes and armies, but in the minds of men. The myths made up and told about emperors were part of the mystification which elevated the political sphere above everyday life. The stories circulated and were told whether they were true or not. Obviously emperors neither created nor controlled their currency (although they tried to), since emperors were often depicted 46 The Greek story is conventionally attributed to Ps. Callisthenes, Historic AUxandri

Magni ed. Kroll (Berlin, 1926) 1.14. In the oldest (fifth-century) Armenian version, The Romance of Alexander the Great tr. A. M. Wolohojian (New York, 1969) the story is slighdy different, but the Syriac version is substantially the same with virtuoso variations (tr. E. A. W. Budge (Cambridge, 1889) 15-16) and so is the simpler Ethiopic version (tr. E. A. W. Budge (London, 1896) vol. 2, 32).

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in a light which they would not have chosen for themselves. The stories were created by subjects and so served as the batdeground and the catharsis of the conflicting emotions which power aroused.

A comparison may help clarify the point. In a modern university, myths and stereotypes of the pedantic and absent-minded professor in one sense elevate him above other more worldly professors and students and yet at the same time depreciate him as merely 'academic*. The stories of the absent-minded professor's antics help preserve respect for the institution's core values, while allowing students a pigeon-hole into which they can dismiss those values as being inapplicable to themselves. Similarly, the story about the emperor and the astrologer implicidy deprecated the emperor's cruelty, while admitting his power (to kill astrologers) and acknowledging his final mercy; it

• also contrasted the foolishness of most astrologers with the conquering wisdom of the astrologer royal (and perhaps by implication, of the story-teller). The royal astrologer survived to show that if properly done, astrology works.

Roman astrologists felt most comfortable with the prediction of events which had already occurred. We can see this in the hundred or so surviving retrospective horoscopes recorded by Vettius Valens in the second century and the horoscope of the emperor Hadrian, cast after his death by Antigonus of Nicaea:47

[At his birth, Hadrian had] the Sun in Aquarius 8 degrees , the M o o n and Jupiter and the Horoscopos , the three together at the first degree of the same sign, namely Aquarius; Saturn in Capricorn 5 degrees and Mercury with it at 12 d e g r e e s . . . H e was adopted by a certain e m p e r o r [Trajan] related to h im T h e y lived together for two years and then h e became emperor . H e was wise and educated so that h e was h o n o u r e d in shrines a n d temples . H e married only once; she was a virgin; they had n o chi ldren. H e had o n e sister; he quarrelled violently with his relatives. At the age of 6 3 , h e d ied of dropsy and difficulty of breathing (Pasthma). (Catalogus codicum astrologorum

graecorum = CCAG vol. 6, ed . W. Kroll (Brussels, 1903) 6 7 - 8 ; partly translated by O. N e u g e b a u e r and H. B. von Hosen , Greek Horoscopes (Philadelphia, 1959) 9 0 . )

The astrologer then took each of these scanty pieces of information and explained which conjunction of the stars was responsible, and sometimes added how slight changes in the stars would have effected a different outcome. For example: 47 Vettius Valens, Anmobgiae ed. W. Kroll (Berlin, 1908). O. Neugebauer and H. B.

Van Hosen, Greek Horoscopes (Philadelphia, 1959; see especially 8iff. and ijSff.) translate many of Valens* horoscopes and also date them by the conjunction of stars. Such retrospective horoscopes were used to instruct would-be astrologers. Valens expected his readers to swear to keep what they read 'mysterious and guarded' (7. pr.)-

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He was wise and educated and stern because Mercury with Saturn was in the morning phase in the twelfth locus with the Sun attendant... He was honoured and worshipped by all, because with the Sun attendant, the star of Jupiter occupied a cardinal point.. .and he gave benefits to many and was worshipped by many, as I have said, because of the cardinal position of the Sun and the Moon.. .{CCAG 6 . 6 9 - 7 0 )

These interpretations were more contentious than is at first apparent. Was the emperor controlled by the stars? Was it proper for his subjects to know his fate? And, most important, who were the others fated to become kings? According to the lawyer Ulpian, nearly every emperor prohibited astrology; on ten occasions in the first century astrologers were expelled from Rome; meanwhile emperors retained their services, and senators continued surreptitiously to consult them even in exile (for one example, see Tacitus, AnnoU 16.14). 4 8 The proscriptions probably had the opposite effect from the one intended: they increased astrologers' prestige (Juvenal, Satires 6.55JR.). Besides, the sheer repetition of the laws illustrates their ineffectiveness, the demand for magic was too strong to be suppressed by law.

In recognising astrology, emperors acknowledged the existence of an authority higher than themselves. Of course, unlike Christianity, astrology was not based on a single sacred text, interpreted into an orthodox dogma by a hierarchy of priests with exclusive congregations of parishioners. Unlike Christianity, therefore, astrology and other pagan beliefs posed no substantial threat or limitation to imperial power. Nevertheless, emperors even if they could not gain a monopoly by exiling astrologers, wanted to control access to them.

Ideally, they succeeded. The following extract is taken from the book of astrological learning (Mathesis) written by the senator Firmicus Maternus in the fourth century; some of his formulations were contemporary, but much of his work was copied from earlier treatises which have been lost.

Never reply to anyone who asks about the condition of the State or the life of the Roman emperor. It is both morally wrong and illegal.. .An astrologer who replies when he is asked about the fate of the emperor is a disgrace and deserves all the punishment he gets, because he really can neither say nor discover anything... * The recorded expulsions of astrologers are listed by Cramer (1954: 234). * Prophets

who pretend to be inspired by a god are by decree expelled from the state, lest public morals be seduced by human credulity into hoping for change, or lest they excite the minds of the people. . .Who ever consults astrologers, soothsayers, omen-interpreters or prophets about the health of the emperor or about high matters, shall be executed together with the person who gave an answer.. .And if slaves consult about the health of their masters, they are to be punished with crucifixion' (Paul, Opinions 5.21); cf. Ulpian, Comparison of the Laws of Moses and the Romans 15.2.

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In fact no astrologer could find out anything true about the desdny of the emperor. The emperor alone is not subject to the course of the stars and in his fate alone the stars have no powers of determination. Since he is the master of the whole world, his destiny is governed by the judgement of the god most high; since the whole of the earth's surface is subject to the power of the emperor, he himself is also considered among those gods whom the supreme power has set up to create and conserve all things...

For all free-born men, all orders, all the rich, all the nobles, all the officials, all powers serve him; he is endowed with the power of divine authority and immortal freedom and is numbered among the first rank of the gods. (Mathesis

2.30; translation adapted from J. R. Bram, Ancient Astrology (Park Ridge, N.J.; 1975»

In practice, these prohibitions were ignored. Ptolemy, the great astronomer and geographer of the second century, also wrote an astrological treatise, in which inter alia he recorded the conjunction of the stars which would bring a new-born child to imperial power (Tetrabiblos 4 .3). In spite of the risk, senators repeatedly sought out imperial horoscopes and emperors repeatedly executed those whom they considered potential even if improbable rivals. One rare exception was noted by Suetonius: the emperor Titus was so confident in the security of his own Fate that he spared two patricians who had been convicted of aspiring to the throne.

.. .his only reaction was to advise them to desist, since.. .the Principate was a gift of Fate.. .the next day, he deliberately seated them near him at a gladiatorial show and offered them the combatants' swords brought to him for inspection. It is also said that he consulted the horoscopes of both men and warned both of them that they would be in danger, but at some other time and from someone else - quite correcdy as events proved. (Suetonius, Titus 9)

Fact or fiction, astrology the real reason or an embroidered pretext for well-considered ostentatious clemency? We do hot now, nor do we have to choose. As we have seen, such stories circulated in court circles and among the population at large. They were the currency of the political system. They have been largely ignored or underestimated by rationalistic historians, partly because historians are looking for something more recognisably 'fact', and partly because such accounts fuse moral and metaphysical myth with what we might rashly and in an old-fashioned way call objective truth. However much we may regret this fusion, we can at least be glad that Suetonius, Tacitus and Pliny did not write modern scholarly histories.

I took astrology as an example because it provided the Roman upper-class with a theatre for the fusion of their moral, mystical and political views. Of course, it provided much else as well: predictions

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about length of life, character, wealth, happiness, the choice of a wife, the sex of children, the outcome of an illness and style of death (cf. Ptolemy, TetrobMos 4 .1-9).

Instead of astrology, it would have been possible to use dreams, or omens or magic (each was prevalent at all levels of Roman society, from emperors to beggars), to illustrate not merely the nature of Roman 'superstititions', but also the force of the supernatural which rulers and subjects had to take into account. For example, Tacitus reported how Germanicus Caesar, the emperor Tiberius' adopted son died; he had a relapse aggravated by his belief that Piso, the governor of Asia, in whose house he was staying had poisoned him; he had his sick-room investigated. 'Examination of the floor and walls of his bedroom revealed the remains of human bodies, spells, curses, lead tablets inscribed with the patient's name, charred and bloody ashes and other malignant objects which were supposed to consign souls to the powers of the tomb* (AnruUs 2.69 transl. by M. Grant, Penguin books).

Of course, we know that Germanicus did not die from magic; but Germanicus as reported by Tacitus, clearly thought otherwise (ibid.

2.71). And the emperor Hadrian on a visit to Egypt was reportedly impressed by the magical skill of the priest of Isis:

Pachrates, the prophet of Heliopolis , demonstrated the spell to the e m p e r o r Hadrian, to reveal the power of his magic. For by his spell, he caused a man to c o m e to h im within o n e hour, caused h im to take to his bed within two hours and caused his death within seven hours. H e also caused a dream to be sent to the e m p e r o r himself which [acquainted] h im with the complete truth about his magical powers . T h e e m p e r o r was amazed by the prophet and ordered that h e be given a double salary. (Papyri graecae magicae ed . K. Preisendanz, vol. 1, 148)

In most cases, presumably, magic was used in the service of highly personal interests, as in lovers' spells, remedies for sickness, or in curses on the unfaithful.49 For example, figurines have been found, with heads cut off, arms and legs tied tight behind the back with leaden cords; bronze nails transfix the heart and stomach. With these figures went curses inscribed on lead tablets invoking outlandish gods; the following example was found in north Africa; it was written in Latin transcribed into Greek letters, perhaps to make it more mysterious and effective; * On figurines, see A. Audoilent, Defixionum TabeUae (repr. Frankfurt, 1967) esp.

L X X I X and Sophronius, Miracles of St. Cyrus and St. John (PG 87.3541-8); on magical spells, see K. Preisendanz, Papyri graecae magicae (Stuttgart8, 1973-4) with a German translation; S. Eitrem, Magical Papyri - Papyri Osloenses 1 (Oslo, 1925); and recendy a long example translated and explained by D. Wortmann, 'Neue magische Texte', Bonner Jahrbucher 168 (1968) S$ft.

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Divine emperors

I call to witness and e n t r e a t . . .by the great god and by Anterotas and by him w h o has a hawk above his head and by the seven stars, that from the m o m e n t I have written this, Sexdlius son of Dionysia may not s leep, but will burn with fever; let h im not s leep, sit nor speak, but let h im have m e Sepdma, daughter of A m o e n a o n his mind; let h im burn furiously with love and desire for me , let the mind and heart of Sexdlius son of Dionysia burn with love and desire for m e Sepdma, daughter of A m o e n a . A n d you Abar Barbarie Eloe Sabaoth Pachnouphy Pythipemi, ensure that s leep does not touch Sexdlius son of Dionysia, but let h im burn with love and desire for me , let the spirit, heart and all the limbs of the whole body of Sextilius son of Dionysia be o n fire. If you d o not achieve this, I shall g o d o w n to the shrine of Osyris and d i smande the tomb and send it to be torn away by the river, for I a m the great deacon of the great g o d Achrammachala la . . . (A. Audol lent , Defixionum

Tabellae (repr. Frankfurt, 1967) 270)

Yet sometimes as in astrology, personal magic and the political sphere overlapped. The following curse, one of several against adversaries in court-cases, was uttered against Theodorus tentatively identified as a governor of Cyprus: 'Spirits below the earth, spirits everywhere... take away the danger of Theodorus against me.. . take away his power and strength, make him lifeless and speechless...' (T. B. Mitford, The Inscriptions of Kourion (Philadelphia, 1971) 130-1). And there followed a curse, which might have sounded impressive, but which seems unintelligible. Yet other spells were thought to be immensely powerful; 'brings victory, works even with kings'.. .'also brings men to women and women to men, and makes virgins run out from their homes' (Papyri Osloenses 1). These infernal forces could either help emperors or hinder them. Therefore they had to be dealt with, placated and sometimes their agents on earth had also to be indulged. Since kings and gods had many similar powers, it was important to make sure that they were all fighting on the same side.

I am I s i s . . . I gave a n d ordained laws unto m e n , which n o o n e is able to c h a n g e . . . I divided the earth from the h e a v e n . . .1 ordered the course of the sun and the m o o n . . . I made strong the right. I brought together woman and m a n . . . I ordained that parents should be loved by their c h i l d r e n . . . I taught m e n to h o n o u r images of the g o d s . . . I broke d o w n the government of tyrants. (IG 12.5.14; an inscription from Ios, second or third century AD; transl. A. Deissmann (1910: 136-7))

Religion, as the Christians showed, was the one power-base within Roman society from which opposition against the regime could be effectively launched.

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Conclusions


The prevalence of magical practices and of astrological beliefs among rich and poor, powerful and weak does not explain emperor-worship. Nor does the pervasiveness in daily life of unknown mystic powers. But they provided the necessary conditions in which emperor worship flourished. We started with the question: Why did the Romans, contrary to their dominant political and religious traditions, grow to accept the idea that their visibly human ruler was a god? To answer this, we invoked in the traditional way a whole array of factors concerning the origin, transmission, acceptance and institutionalisation of emperor cults, without being able to attach specific weight to any of them. They included: the reluctant acceptance of eastern * flattery', popular belief in Julius Caesar's and Augustus' divine connections, the close association of Augustus and the succeeding emperors with a divine father and with other gods, the appeal to emperors in public and private oaths, and the widespread initiative of provincials in celebrating the emperor's divinity with sacrifices, statues and festivals.

Our initial question (why did Romans worship emperors?) had its origins not only in the earlier Roman sceptical dismissal of emperor-worship as alien, but also probably in our modern rationalistic antipathy to 'superstition' as unworthy of a 'fact-based' history. This antipathy has allowed modern scholars systematically to under-value repetitive and inflated honorary decrees and the myths whether true or fabricated, reported by serious Roman historians. Modern scholarly concentration on * facts' and on the surviving epigraphic * evidence' has diverted attention from the beliefs and feelings which prompted the creation of the evidence.

Investigation along these lines gradually changed the focus of our discussion. We already know that in Graeco-Roman culture the distinction between man and god was blurred, not only by the existence of semi-divine figures, such as Hercules, and by spirits (manes, dai-

mones), but also by ambiguities in feelings and expression. Belief can be, and often is, at odds with action; indeed there would be litde point in having ideals if they were always or even often realised. Nor is there any profit in accusing the inconsistent of hypocrisy or deceit; spoken scepticism and conformist superstition may simply belong to different pigeon-holes or different social contexts. It is dangerous therefore to deduce behaviour from statements about beliefs. As Pliny wrote: '... Do magic words and incantations have any power?... individually, one by one, our wisest minds have no faith in such things; but in mass, throughout their everyday lives, they act as though they believe,

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without being aware of it' (Natural History 28 .3) . 5 0 Sophisticated Romans may not have believed that the emperor was a god, nor did the courtiers who saw him, but they sacrificed to him, as though he was a god, and perhaps they covered the conflict of evidence with a metaphysical metaphor - god made manifest, son of god, the least of gods but highest of mortals, son of Apollo, Hercules on earth. Most people probably did not bother with the demarcation; the emperor was clearly both man and god.

In the last part of this chapter, we returned to our main theme. The unity of a political system rests not only in shared institutions, taxes and military defences, but in shared symbols, in the minds of men. Emperor cults, and all that they involved: oaths, sacrifices, sharing meat and wine, processions, games, statues, images, the reading and recording of pompous decrees which under the pretext of honouring the emperor recorded the reluctant generosity of some local burgher, the hopeful embassies to the distant capital, the distant memory of an emperor's visit, the stories of sudden success at court, of the emperor's cruelty - all these provided the context in which inhabitants of towns spread for hundreds of miles throughout the empire could celebrate their membership of a single political order and their own place within it. Small wonder, then, if for such important purposes the distant emperor was in the collective mind 'transformed into a god among men' (Stobaeus, Anthologium 7.61 - see p. 198 above). 50 See V. Pareto, Mind and Society (London, 1935) vol. 1, io6ff. for surely the best

sociological discussion of these aspects of Roman religion.

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B I B L I O G R A P H Y

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Revolut ion' in H. Tempor in i , ed . , Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt,

Berlin, vol. 1.1, 668ff. Baehrel R. (1961) Une Croissance, Paris. Beloch K. J. (1886) Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt, Leipzig. Beloch K. J. (1926) Römische Geschichte, Berlin. Besnier R. (1955) * L'Eut économique d e R o m e [500-264 BC], Revue historique

de droit français et étranger 33, io^ff. Bleicken J. (1968) Das Volkstribunat der Klassischen Republik, Munich2 . Brunt P. A. (1950) 'Pay and superannuation in the Roman Army' , Papers of

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SUPPLEMENTARY B I B L I O G R A P H Y

ROMAN HISTORY FOR SOCIOLOGISTS AND SOCIOLOGY FOR

ROMAN HISTORIANS

Several sociologists have written about the ancient world. At first sight, their works may seem an obvious starting point for students of sociology and ancient history w h o wish to explore the overlap between the two disciplines. But n o n e is des igned as introductory reading. For example , it is I think preferable to begin with M. Weber, Economy and Society (New York, 1968) especially vo lume 3, rather than with the same author's more obviously relevant The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations (London, 1976). K. Marx, Pre-capitalist Economic Formations (London, 1964) is shorter and more readable than his Grundrisse (London, 1973); like V. Pareto, The Mind and

Society (London, 1935), it contains i l luminating c o m m e n t s o n Roman society, but n o ex tended discussion of Roman society alone. Perhaps the best recent sociological book o n the ancient world is A. W. Gouldner's , Enter Plato

(London, 1967), especially the first part, but that is about Greece not Rome. B. Hindess and P. Q. Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production (London, 1975) is * a work of Marxist theory' with chapters o n the ancient m o d e of production a n d o n slavery; I admire their intellectual gymnastics while be ing oppressed by their ignorance. I should like to ment ion two m o r e works, an essay in a collection which might interest historians, and a book: R. A. Nisbet, 'Kinship and political power in first-century R o m e ' in W. J. Cahnman and A. Boskoff, Sociology and History (New York, 1964) and G. £ . Lenski, Power and Privilege

(New York, 1966) which is in effect a sociological history of the social evolut ion of inequality, with a long section o n agrarian societies.

S o m e sociologists may like their history straight. T h e following are all, in my opin ion , excel lent and unlike many Roman history books are written so as to be intelligible to those w h o know little Roman history: £ . Badian, Roman

Imperialism in the Late Republic (Oxford1 , 1968); P. A. Brunt, Social conflicts in

the Roman Republic (London, 1971); M. I. Finley, The A ncient Economy (London, 1973); W. Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History

(Oxford, 1973); M. I. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Roman

Empire (Oxford2 , 1957); C. G. Starr, Civilization and the Caesars (New York, 1965); and a source book: N. Lewis a n d M. Reinhold, Roman Civilization (New York, 1966).

252

Bibliography: sociology

For Roman historians w h o want to read sociology without be ing crushed by jargon or by text-books, I tentatively suggest the following, some of which are comparadve history or good social history rather than straight sociology: P. Anderson , Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974) - it is, I think, much better than his Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London, 1974); C. M. Arensberg and S. T . Kimball, Family and Community in Ireland (Cambridge, Mass., 1948); F. Braudel , Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800 (London, 1967); M. Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (London, 1973); M. Freedman, Lineage Organization in Southeastern China (London, 1958); B. Moore, Social

Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (London, 1967); R. A. Nisbet, Social

Change and History (New York, 1969); J. D . Spence , Emperor of China (London, 1974); K. T h o m a s , Religion and the Decline of Magic (London, 1971); I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System ( N e w York, 1974).

253

I N D E X O F S U B J E C T S

administrators, lack of, 45 advocacy, career in, 28 ager publicus, 5, 58-61

agricultural handbooks, 3, 23, 55, 105-6, 118

agriculture: numbers e n g a g e d in, 6, 15; productivity, 14-15, 44» 106-7

allies, military obligations, 31, 57 anecdotes , 174, 177, 206, 223, 232,

234-8, 241; currency of, 198 annalists, Byzantine, 172, 174 aqueduct , 58 arbitration, 154 aristocrats: power of, 59, 65,172,180,

182- 5, 'SB* ' 9 ° ' ! 96; pride, 26, 112, 190, 195; relations with emperor , 94-5, 182, 185-6

army: loyalty to emperor , 182, 208, 224-6; power, 30-1, 92, 94, 183-6; professionalisation, 30, 35, 37, 50, 75,89,103; re-organisation in Later Empire, 185; size, 4, 11, 30-5, 66-7, 72-3; stationed outside Italy, 73,94, 183-4; see also military service; peasants

art, 210, 214 assassination, see political murder astrology, 233-41 asylum, at emperor's statue, 221-3 augustales, see emperor worship;

slaves, ex-slaves barbarians, 184 bishops, 177, 188 booty: from booty to taxes, 16,37,41,

104; booty-capitalism, 113; distribution, 38, 48, 111; vo lume, 11, 104

bureaucracy: complexity, 184;

inefficiency, 185-6; patrimonial, 116, 124, 179, 182, 184, 188

calendars, 207, 209, 213, 219 Caliphate, 187, 197 census, 20, 66 centurion's pay, 40 chamberlain (cubicularius), 191 ff.;

Grand, 174-5; see also eunuchs change: cultural, 58,70-1,76-7,79-80,

90,93-4; social, 58, 76, 78,80,87,91 Chinese court, 176, 224; emperor ,

197; eunuchs , 186, 189 Christian: prosecutions, 227-9; reli

g ion, 218, 232, 237; views o n slavery, 122

citizens, 39, 114; status, 109, 112, 124 citizenship: gained by ex-slaves, 116,

154; lost by colonists, 57 civil war, 60,63,66,70-1,92-3,95,113,

184 clients of lawyers, 87 clientship, 22; see also ideals;

patronage coinage, absence of, 19 colonies: foundat ion, 56-7, 64, 66-7,

70, 72-3,112; land allotments in, 57, 107, 114; size, 21, 57, 67

commerce , 52, 53 competit ion for resources, 75, 90 concepts (selected): autonomy of insti

tutions, 89; chain reaction, 95; coefficients, 32; class conflict den ied , 46; compatibility theory of truth, 3; core values, 236; diffusion, 79, 199, 210; free-floating resources, 90; functions, 13-14, 41» 45» 72~4» 79» 108, 112, 134, 173, 186, 189, 200;

255

Index of Subjects

concepts (cont.)

marginal propensity to consume , 74; norms and values, 80, 89, 94; patterned regularity, 181, cf. 65; role mode l , 80; selective use of evidence , 21; social exchange , 88, 93; social m a p , 91; social mobility, 79; stereotype, 91, 121, 172-3,181,193; structure and process, 180, 216; underclass, 168; unspecified obligations, 87; vicious circle, 70-1,95,114

confiscation, 48, 56, 66, 71, 178 consuls, 54, 60 cont inuous war, 11,25ff.; see also mili

tary service; war conscription, see military service corruption, 41,43,47,60,81,89,177-8 council (conciliumr^omistoriurn-silen-

Hum), 187 court: European post-feudal, 175-6;

precedence at Roman, 176-7 debt: of peasants, 22, 25; of political

candidates, 49; of provincials, 42,52 d e m a n d , aggregate , 18 destruction, in war, 4, 28, 35 deus/divus, 202

divorce, 88 doctors: in emperor's entourage , 232;

in ritual of emperor's death, 214; slave, 124

dowry, as channel of wealth, 48 drachma, 160 dreams, interpretation of, 135, 233,

239 economies of scale, 36 economy: subsistence, 15; unification

of, 94, 159, 162; without labour market, 109, 111

edict, praetor's, 81, 86 educat ion, 76ff., 117 elite: based o n slavery, 123; belief in

astrology, 234!?.; differentiation within, 90-1, 174; relation to e m peror's divinity, 200-5, 2 1 3 » shared norms and values, 27, 87-8, 93, cf. 65; wealth, 12, 14, 47-8

emperor ; acts attributed to, 173; appeals) to,| 222-3;! audience with, 177;

belief in astrology, 233ff.; birthday begins year, 206-7, 219; Byzantine, 197; death of, 198, 214-15; epithets, 199, 202, 204-7, 2 1 ' » 2 1 7 » 23°J * a v " ourites of, 190; first, 94, 182, 205; flattery of, 180, 213, 241; ideal, 182, 222; image o n coins, 219; isolation, 187; legitimacy, 182, 184-5, *87-8, 197-8, 202, 225, 229, 232, 237, 242; magic power , 231-2, 239-40; n e e d for information, 187; need for trusted servants, 179, 188-9; proximity to person of, 124, 175, 177, 179; reliance o n ex-slaves, 124; relation to aristocracy, 94-5, 185, 189; ritual surrounding, 186-7, , 9 I "3» 2 °°> 205, 214-15, 219; symbol of moral order, 198, 225, 228-9, 2 3 ! * symbol of political order, 197,222,226,228, 231; weak emperors , 180

emperor's statue, 122, 205-6,208,210, 220-6

e m p e r o r worship: al leged unimportance, 227; and army, 224; ascent to heaven, 203, 214-15; association of e m p e r o r with gods , 198-200,

204-5, 2 2 4» 2 2 7 » 2 2 9-3°» 2 4 F J bel ieved in, 202-3, 2o8~9> 213,215,241; between m a n and god , 198, 217; deified o n death, 202-3, 213; disbelieved, 203-4,213; divinity, i97ff., 200, 202, 235; formal belief, 199, 225, 229, 241; genius of emperor , 204, 212, 224, 228; political, 209, 215; sacrifices, 205,207-8; senators, 204-5, 213»ex-slaves active, 211 -13; son of God , 201, 202; test of loyalty, 227-9

empire: area, 1, 102; populat ion, 1, 102

empress , 176, 214 e n e m y killed or captured, 26 epigraphers , failings of, 217-18 eunuchs: access to emperor , 173, 177,

188; agents of emperor , 174, 179; barbarian origins, 192; bribed, 177-8, 188; castration, 173, 190, 193-4; corporate identity, 179, 189-91, 195-6; functions, 173-4, 196; n u m b e r at court, 176,195; per-

256

Index of Subjects

eunuchs: (cont.)

sonal characteristics, 173, 180, i o 3 - 5 J power at court, 173, 177, 179-81, 190-1, 196; ranks, 174-6; sudden demise , 174, 180-1, 190; wealth, 174, 178, 190

ex-slaves, see slaves expectat ion of life, 21, 34, 50 exploitation: forms, 114, 125-6; limi

ted by political structure, 24, 112, 114; of citizens, 14; of provinces, 41; of slaves, 114

family, life cycle, 22 family, as unit of labour, 109, 111,

125-6 farms: single family, 4; increase in

size, 105 folk-heroes, 21, 25 food: distribution to poor, 13; see also

wheat fortunes, size of, 39 foundl ings ((threptot), 158 free labourers, 9-10 free peasants, 5, 7 freedman, see slaves, ex-slaves games , public, 38, 95, 119, 206-8 genius, 201-2, 214; of emperor , 204,

212, 224, 228 grammarians, see Greek and Latin

culture Greece, conquered by Romans, 135 Greek: culture, 76-9, 83; e conomy,

134; manumiss ion, 130, 133, 153; slaves, 124; slave society, 99

hereditary status, 184-5

ideals: of aristocracy, 45, 52; Christian, 122; of clientship, 23; legal, 88; of phi losophers , 121-2; of Prin-cipate, 182, 199-200, -203, 226; rhetorical, 28, 198-200; of slaveowners , 15, 121-3, 129-30

inflation of titles, 174 inheritance, as channel of wealth, 48 innovation, resisted, 78, 91 inscriptions: honorary, 198, 211; re

cording manumissions, 133

Jews, Court, 173-4, 190 juries, 84 justice, 43, 8 iff., 222

king, English, French, 197, 231 kinship, 88 knights (equites): against senators,

46-7, 90-1; army officers, 184; imperial administrators, 125, 182, 184; killed, 71; land-owners, 49-51, 66; lawyers, 86; tax-farmers, 45-7,51

labour: cost subsidised, 39; input of peasants, 110; productivity increased , 36; of slaves, 10, n o ; see also

wage-labour land: arable to pasture^; the basis of

wealth, a safe investment, 6, 11,13, 48-51, 65, 104-5, i o 7» " 3 1 outside Italy, 95, 105; in politics, 6, 50, 59, 63, 66; as security for contracts, 51; small-holdings, 21; to soldiers, 30, 36» 39» 50, 70» 105

land-commission, 5, 63-4 land-laws, 5, 50, 58-64, 66 lar, see genius

large landholdings: formation of, 4, 11, 35, 48-9, 54, 56, 60, 105, 111; slaves on , 55, 109; see also slaves

Latin culture, 76-8 law: codification, 86; see also Twelve

Tables; criminal, 84-5, 93; ineffectiveness, 115, 122-3, 237> praetorian, 84; protecting property, 85; rule of, 93-5; substantive, 83, 85

laws (specific): o n astrology, 237; debt, 50; employment of free m e n , 109; ship-owning by senators, 52; slaves, 115, 120, 122, 128-9, 222; sumptuary, 49

law courts: criminal, 81,84; emperor's portrait in, 223-4; extort ion, 41-2, 46-7; magic in, 240; specialised, 81, 89

lawyers, 37, 80, 83-7 legal: consultants, 86; fictions, 82,125;

formulae, 82,86; judgements , exe cution of, 81; language, 80-1; rubrics - terms of reference, 83, 86; system, 81-3

257

Index of Subjects

legal procedure, 80-4, 86, 227-9 legionaries, see soldiers legion, size, 33, 35 legitimacy of monarchy, 91, 94-5; see

also ideals of Principate letters of recommendat ion , 88-9 litterateurs, 79

magic, 231, 233, 239-41 magistrates, 83, 86 manumiss ion: age at, 126-7, l39~40>

bought by slaves, 126; chances of getting, 126-7, " 3 1 ; c o s t » ! 3 3 - 4 . 138- 9, 142, 146, 160; frequency, 101-2, ii5ff.; profitable to slaveowners , 128, 131-2, 170; reasons for, 117, 127-8, 147; sex-ratio, 139-40; by statue of emperor , 225; see also slaves, ex-slaves

manumiss ion at Delphi , i33ff. market: lack of labour market, 23;

new, 12, 106-7; s * z c » 3™4» 15-16 marriage of slaves, 163 meat, 3, 207-8, 210-11 Mediterranean, 1,4, 162 methods: extremes juxtaposed, 75;

formal definition, 89; frequency of ment ion , 129; incompatible rejected as anachronistic, 24; mode l (scheme), 12, 17-18, 34, 94-5, 103; plausibility not proof, 128; rough order of magni tude , 58,66,97,146; tied to testimony, 65; traditional m e t h o d inadequate, 2, 107; wigwam argument , 20

migration: to army, 50; colonies, 57; from Italy, 50,64,66-7,95,103,106; within Italy, 66, 68-9, 113; process, 57-8; scale, 7,66-9,72; of slaves into Italy, 50; to towns and the city of Rome, i 1,1 3,5<>»57-8»6d-9'72-3»« 04-5

military service: of allies, 57-8; changes in pattern, 2off., 63, 74; of landed, 20,28-30,37,75; of landless, 31, 36, 91, 105; l ength, 27, 30-2, 35, 75; number liable, 4, 61, 67, 108, 112—13; proport ion of males recruited, 34, 104; in provinces, 73; rewards at e n d , 70; unpopular , 3 0 - 1, 36; see also army

militaristic ethos, 1, 25ff., 103-4

mining: condit ions, 119; corporations of investors, 53

miracles, see emperor: magic power mnoy 160 monarchy: imposed by Augustus , 72,

92, 94; modus operandi, 95, 124

monétisation, 8, 94 money, multiplier effect of e x p e n

diture, 48 mortality, h igh, n o , 128, 145 mystic powers of universe, 197,23 i ff . ,

241 myth, 223, 234-7; see also anecdotes nobles: modest standard in early

Rome, 24; see also aristocrats; senators

oaths: by emperor , 224-5; °f loyalty, 225

oligarchy, power-sharing, 46, 93-5 olive oil, 3, 107 omens , see portents ostentatious display, 26, 39, 48-9, 71,

104, 112, 128

paramoni, see slaves, ex-slaves at Delphi , conditional f reedom

patronage, 22, 87-9 patrons' power over ex-slaves, 115,

153-5 peasants, i6ff.; eviction of, 10, 30, 36,

49, 56ff., 63, 103, 113; impoverishment, 11,18,36,62; lack of political power, 183-5; participation in e m peror worship, 210; see also military service of landed

peculium, see slaves: private purse Persian king's harem, 192-3 philosophers, 58, 61, 77-8; and e m

peror, 197-8, 217, 234; o n slavery, i 2 i , 123

political conflict, 46-7, 50, 60, 63, 85, 90, 92-3, 180

political murder , 63-4, 71, 93, 105, 202, 235

political office, 14,28,48,54,63,111,178, 183

political slogans, 72-3, 220 political system, 92, 185, 196-8 p o m p , see rituals

Index of Subjects

poor, 5, 14, 62, 74, 81, 109 popular assemblies, 59-60,84, 111-12 population: of city of Rome, 2, 96-8,

105, 107; of empire , 1; rural, 63, 67-70, 73; urban, 68-9

portents, 232, 239 power: arbitrary exercise in provin

ces, 41-4; emperor's , 94, 172,187-8, 197-8, 200, 202; eunuchs' , 173, 177, 179-80,188; government's , 91-2; of imperial ex-slaves, 116, 124; land-based, 7, 50, 61; military, 92-3, 184; plebs', 14, 37, 59, 112; political and religion, 92; senate's, 59, 182; structure, 46, 181-6, 196, 198-200

prefects, 174-5, 183 pre-industrial society, 90, 114 prices, see slaves, conditional free

d o m , full freedom; wheat priests, 37,85-6,91-2,135, 204,208-9,

213 Principate, 94-5 processions, 25-6,206,209-10,215-16,

218-19 profit, 10, 41-3, 48, 66; from provin

ces, 41, 45-6, 48 provincials, emperor worship, 203-5,

207-10

rebellion, 55, 120, 187 recruitment, see military service religion: at Delphi , 134rT., 142-3,

147; divine forces, 200-1, 219; and emperor-worship, 201-2, 205, 225, 227-30; and law, 85-6; and politics, 204-6, 212, 215-17, 231, 237, 240; sacrifice, 202, 210; and ex-slaves, 117, 142-3, 145-6

rents, 5, 16, 18, 38, 50, 55 resettlement of soldiers, 36, 66 return o n investment, 2, 107 rhetoric, 77-9, 85, 89-90, 198-9, 217 rich: incomes, 39, 51-2, 55; land

owners , 3-4, 50, 66, 70, 105, 113; and poor, 3, 14, 50, 59, 61-3, 112; become richer, 38, 39ff., 71, 90; slaves, 59, 114

rituals, 82, 180, 182, 186, 192-3, 212, 214-15

schools, 76-7, 79-80, 89-90

school-teachers, 37, 79, 123 secretaries, imperial, 189 seed, 17 senatorial career, 28, 46-7, 86, 191 senators: and emperor , 213, 226;

killed, 71; and knights, 46-7, 90-1, '184; land-owners, 49-50,55,66,179; lawyers, 85-6; power, 182-3, 238

sexual desire, 240 slave-owners: affective ties to slaves,

127, 134, 148, 154; cruelty, 118-21, 122-3; female, 164; generosity, 117, 127, 129, 132; hostility to slaves, 119-21, 152; humanity, 121-3; and manumiss ion, 128-9, 130-2, 147, 155, 160; size of holdings, 168-9

slavery: compared with American, 9, 100, 113-14, 121, 125, 163; decline, 156; functions, 13-14, 99-100, 102, 112-13, l 2 5» labour in, 9, 24, 100, i n , 124; m e d i u m term, 126, 148, 169; punishment central to, 144-6; stigma, 144; system of, 114, 118, 147-8

slaves: affective ties to owners , 127, 132, 134, 148, 154, 166-7; agricultural, 55, 106, asylum, 221-3; D U V

freedom, 128-30, i33ff., 142-3,146, 148, i58ff., 168, see also manumission; ex-slaves (below); children 165-6; compared with free labour, 108, i n , 125, 131; decline, 95, 185; gangs, 109,111; h igh status of some, 101; hostility to owners, 119-21, 152; import of, 1, 103; legal status, 123»., 131, 153; marriage, 163; misery of, n8ff., 144; motivation, 126, 128, 147,149; never freed, 118, I 2 7> i 3 9 - f i ; number, 7-9, 55, 102, 108; origins (aliens), 112-13, 141, (captives), 8, 108, (home-born) , 139-41; paid wages, 128; price, 108, n o , 113, 117, 134, 158».; private purse (peculium), 125-6, 129, 147, 168; productivity, 10, i i o - n , 131; profitability, 107; rebellions, 55, 120; reproduction, 155-8, 166-7, 169; rich landowners, 59,61-3,106; risk of loss, n o , 126; runaway, 121; status spectrum, 131, 137, 153; stereotype character, 121;

259

Index

slaves: (conL)\

supervision, 110,126; teachers, 76, 79; trusted, 51,123-5, urban, 49, 67, 97, 104.

ex-slaves: as agents, 117; in commerce , 52; g iven citizenship, 102, 116; d isappointed with freedom, 149; active in emperor worship, 211-13; gratitude to former owners , 118, 128, 130, 154; legal status, 153; number in the city of Rome , 115-17; obligations to former owners , 129-31, 144, 155

ex-slaves at Delphi , 1331T.; conditional f reedom (contract), i42ff., (defined), 133, 142, (deteriorated), «34» i49-50» !55» 1°*» Oength), 149-5«» (price), 148, 156, i58ff., 161 - 2 , 171, (punishment during) , 145-6, (surrender of child), 155-8, (compared with conditional freed o m at Calymna), 156-8, 170; full f reedom, 133, 141-2, (declining proportion) , 150, 161, (increasing cost), 150, 159, 161-2, 165-7, ! 7«

imperial ex-slaves, 116, 176; status, 124-5

slave societies, 9, 99-100 small-holdings, 3, 6, 106 soldiers, 38, 40, 42, 70, 75, 90, 94; see

also army; land; military service soubriquet, 25, 103, 195, 224 specialisation: in law, 8 0 - 1 ; in schools,

80 state: attacks o n , 91-2; power, 93-4,

113; resources, 91; revenues , 37-8, 44» 63, 73» 94» weakness, 36, 43,45, 196

statue, 201—2; see also emperor's statue stratification pyramid, 40, 46-7 structural differentiation, 37, 74-5,

89ff.,96 subsistence, level of min imum, 40,58,

n o , 146, 168 surplus, 16,90,106-7; surplus labour,

9» *4

f Subjects

taxes, 11, 16-17, 38, 94, 182, 185, 198 tax-farmers, 43-4; corporations, 53;

knights, 45-7, 51 temples , 25, 133, 137, 145; asylum,

221; to emperor , 204-5, 2 ° 8 tenancy, 53, n o , 126 town-councillors (decuriones): compe

tition among , 206, 208-9, 229; gifts from, 210-11; power, 183, 185; statues, 208, 220

town-country relations, 18 trade and tax interacting, 94 traditional Roman histories, 4,20,27,

64-5, 103, 112 transport costs, 3, 107 tribune of the people , 5,36,38,59-61,

triumphal procession, 26; see also processions; rituals

Twelve Tables , 22, 80

underemployment , 2, 4, 10, 24 urban markets, n , 74, 107 urban poor, 3, 15, 74, 95,97,183,185,

210

violence, 3, 70-1, 93, 95,105

wage-labour, 23, 43, 109-11, 120 war, 251T., 28, 56, 104, 108; war

trophies, 25 water supply, 58 wealth, 8, 13, 39, 41, 48-9, 107, 113 wheat, 3 ,97-8,107-8; price, 20,38,56,

73» 146 wheat dole , 15, 38-9, 66-7, 72-3, 90,

95, 108, 112; cost and functions, 39, 72-4; number of recipients, 67, 73, 96, 105

wheat equivalent, n o , 157 wills, 87, 127, 129, 149 wine, 3, 107, 210, 212 w o m e n : emancipation, 88; and e u n

uchs, 192, 194; sex-ratio, 97, 106; slaves, 147, 159^., 162, 168; ex -slaves, 127, 139-40, 152

y e o m e n , 2 iff . , 37

260

I N D E X O F P R O P E R N A M E S

Abasgi, tribe in Caucasus, 172 Abbasid Caliphate, 187, 197 Acolius, Grand Chamberlain under

Valentinian III , 190 Acts of the Aposdes , 222 Aeneas , mythical founder of Rome ,

202 Aesop , 124 Aetolian League, connect ion with

Delphi , 135 Africa, Roman provinces in, 108, n o ,

239-40 Africa, and slave trade, 100 Albinus, A. Postumius, consul, 151

BC, 77 Alexander the Great, 135, 235 Alexandria, 54, 205, 231-2 Amantius , Chief Steward to empress

Eudoxia, 176, 177 Ambrose , Saint, Bishop of Milan (AD

374-97)» «77» **7> 196 American, southern states of USA, slavery in, 9, 99-101, 113-14, 117, 119,121, 123,125-7, *44-5» 148» 163, 168

A m m i a n u s Marcellinus, historian, 4th century AD, I 73-4,175,176,178, 179, 180, 187, 191, 194-5» !96» 2 I O » 219

Amphict ionic Council , met at Delphi , «35

Anastasius, emperor (AD 491-518), 175» 176

Ancient Near East, slavery in, 133,152 Andronicus , Livius, m a n of letters,

3rd century BC, 76 Antigonus of Nicaea, astrologer, 2nd

century AD, 236-7

Antioch, 187, 225-6 Antiochus, Grand Chamberlain

under Theodos ius II (?), 175, 178, 181

Antoninus Pius, e m p e r o r (AD 138-61), 214, 222-3; Plate 2a

Antony, M. Antonius , consul 44 BC, 70» 9*> 95

A p a m e a Cibotus, city in Phrygia, 207 Apolaustrus, family tomb of, 128 Apol lo: associate of emperors , 206,

21 o; oracle of, at Delphi , 133-6,137, 142-3, 145, 151, 156, 159; power of, 145-6; see aJso Delphi

Apol lonius of Tyana, wonder-worker, ist century AD, 221, 233, 234

Apol lonius , Christian martyr, 2nd century AD, 228

Appian , historian, 2nd century AD 5, 32, 36, 38, 40, 60, 70, 103, 115, 136, 202-3

Apuleius , man of letters, 2nd century AD, 223, 224

Arcadius, e m p e r o r (AD 395-408), 187, 194

Arezzo, Italy, 70 Aristides, Ael ius, man of letters, 2nd

century AD, 199, 216 Artemidorus , interpreter of dreams,

2nd century AD, 226, 233 Artemis, temple of at Ephesus , 221 Asia Minor, 63,94,119,141,204,206-7 Asklepias of Mendes , writer, 206 Aspendos , city in Pamphylia (south

ern Turkey) , 221 Assos, city in western Asia Minor, 206 Athanasius, Saint, B i shop of Alexan

dria (AD 328-73), 176, 179

Index of Proper Names

Athens: Academy of, 77; factory at, 53; slavery at, 99, 113-14» «44» «47

A tula, H u n leader, 5th century AD, '79

Augustoles, 21 i f f .

Augustus , tide of gods , 211, 230-1 Augustus , C. Julius Caesar Octavia-

nus, Plate +d; establishes Princi-pate, 72, 94-6,182; h o n o u r e d like a g o d , 201-10, 21 i f f . , 218, 222-3, 225, 229,241 ; land sett lement and army, 6 » 1 3» 3°* 32» 36» 38» 4<>» 5°» °9-7<>» 72» 92,94-7,106; and slaves, 115,118-19, 121, 124, 128; o ther m e n d o n s , 65, 79, 87, 232, 233

Aurelian, e m p e r o r (AD 270-5), 192 Aurelius, Marcus Aurel ius Antoni

nus, e m p e r o r (AD 161-80), 79, 211, 220-1, 224, 233; Plate 3c, Plate 4c

Aurelius Victor, see Victor A u x i m u m , colony in Italy, 64

Baalbek, Syria, 230 Balbillus, court astrologer u n d e r

Nero , 234 Basil, Saint, B i shop of Caesarea in

Cappadocia (AD 370-9), 194, 195 Brazil, slavery in, 100, 119, 123 Brutus, Marcus Junius, 'tyranicide',

1 st century BC, 52, 213 Bulla Regia, city in Africa (Tunisia) ,

220

Caecilian Law (98 BC), 81 Caesar, C. Julius: army r e m u n e r a d o n

and land setdement , 6,13,36,40-1, 67, 70, 72-3, 94, 96, 106; h o n o u r e d like a g o d , 201-3,209,212,241; military career and successes, 25-6, 28, 38, 40-1, 65, 92, 103; o ther m e n tions, 16, 50, 52, 71, 109, 128, 233

Calapodius, Grand Chamberlain under Leo, 178

Caligula, e m p e r o r (AD 37-41), 191, 199, 206, 213, 224-5

Calligonus, Grand Chamberlain under Valentinian II, 196

Calymna, small island near Cos, 156-8, 209

Capua, Italy, 2, 210

Carneades, phi losopher, 2nd century BC, 77-8

Carpus, Papylus and Agathonice , Christian martyrs, 2nd or 3rd century AD, 228

Carthage (Tunisia), 19, 31, 45, 54, 72, 135, 220

Catiline, L. Sergius Catilina, 6 Cato, M. Porcius Cato 'Censor im' ,

consul 195 BC, 76-8; o n farming, 5, 9-10, 23, 51, 55, 106, 109, i n , 118, 212

Cedrenus , Byzantine chronicler, 172, 181

Censorinus, grammarian, 3rd century AD, 202

Charles II of England, and King's Evil, 231

Chief Steward of the Palace (costrensu

socri polatii), 175ff.; see also under

individual names

China, 1, 14, 79, 100; Imperial court, 176, 186, 188-90, 193-5, 197

Christianity, 122-3, 2 °°» 2 2 2 » 2 2 7"9» 237, 240

Chrysaphius, Grand Chamberlain under T h e o d o s i u s II , 178-9, 194-5

Cicero, M. Tull ius, orator, consul 63 BC; o n government and tax-farming, 16,41-2,44-5,47,54,89,91 ; o n land-ownership, 31,47-8,50,51,55, 61, 71, 85; law, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86-7; senatorial politics a n d elections, 88-9, 91, 93; slaves, 71,89,124,126; other ment ions , 28, 39, 46, 52, 65, «35

Cicero, Quintus Tull ius , brother of M. Tul l ius Cicero, 53-4, 89, 124

Cilicia, 41 Cincian law (204 BC), 87 Cincinnatus, general a n d farmer, 5th

century BC, 4, 21 Claudian, poet , late 4th century AD,

189» «94 Claudius, e m p e r o r (AD 41-54), 116,

192, 203-4, 214, 224 Claudius, Appius , senator, 135 Cleander, chamberlain under Corn-

modus , 192 Cleopatra, 92

262


Codinus , writer o n Constantinople, ?i5th century AD, 176

Columella, writer o n farming, 1 st century AD, 9, 53, 55, 106, 109, I I I , " 7

C o m m o d u s , e m p e r o r (AD 180-92), 192, 225, 228

Constantine I, e m p e r o r (AD 306-37), 176, 184, 226

Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus , e m p e r o r (AD 912-59) and author, 176-7, 179, 191

Constantius II, e m p e r o r (AD 337-61), 173. 179» 190. 219

Cordoba, Spain, 231 Corinth, Greece, 99 Cornelian Law, 81 Corpus Hermeticum, 217

Court Jews, in 17th/ 18th-century Germany. «73-4» »9°

Crassus, M. Lirinius Crassus Dives, millionaire, 1st century BC, 39-40, 4̂ » 52, 7 1

Crete, 221-2 Cuba, slavery in, 148 Cumae , near Naples , 207 Cybele, 192 Cyprian, Saint, B i shop of Carthage

(AD 248/9-58), 119 Cyprus, 41, 52, 209, 240 Cyrene (Libya), 230 Cyril, Saint, B i shop of Alexandria

(AD 412-44), 178, 194 Danube and Danubian provinces,

127» 233 Decius, e m p e r o r (AD 249-51), 223 Delos , 146 Delphi , 99, 127, 129, Chapter III

passim; Apol lo and priests involved in manumiss ion, 137-9, 140-2, 145- 6, 156; full f reedom and conditional release, 133-4» 137» I4 I~4» i46ff., 148-52, 169-70; inscriptions recording manumiss ion of slaves, *33> l35> «37» »42-4» *53» l5^T> origins, 99, 139-^1, 166; prices, 133-4, 146- 8, 158-63,166-8; relations with owner a n d his family, 144-5,153-4, 163,167; slave w o m e n and children,

127» '55-8» 164-6, 169; temple and oracle at, 134-6, see also Apol lo

Dentatus, Manius Curius, consul 290 BC, 21

Dio, Cassius, consul AD 229 and historian, 70,87,115,192,202,205,208, 212-13, 235

Dio Chrysostom, orator, ist century AD, 122

Diocletian, e m p e r o r (AD 284-305), 184, 186, 192, 199-200; edict o n Prices (AD 301), 79, 110, 190

Diodorus Siculus, historian, ist century BC, 119

Diogenes Laertius, historian of philosophy, 148

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, historian, 1 st century BC, 4,5,20-1,23,128,212

Dionysopolis , Asia Minor, temple of Apol lo , 145-6

Domitian, e m p e r o r (AD 81-96), 191-2, 199, 217, 226, 234; Plate 36

Dositheus, lawyer, 153 Drusus, stepson of Augustus , consul

9 BC, 209 Dura Europos , town o n the Euphra

tes, Syria, 207-8

Edessa, northern Mesopotamia, 226 Egypt, 16, 119, 135, 146,157, 204, 210,

223, 225 Elagabalus, e m p e r o r (AD 218-22),

187-8, 192 England, 18th century, 52, 100 Ennius, poet , 3rd/2nd century BC, 201 Ephesus , west coast of Asia Minor, 99,

221, 234 Epictetus, phi losopher, ist/2nd cen

tury AD, 51, 122, 148 Epicurus, phi losopher, 4th/3rd cen

tury BC, 201 Eudoxia, empress , wife of Arcadius,

176 Eugenius , usurper (AD 392-4), 179 Eusebius, B ishop of Caesarea in

Palestine (c. AD 315-c. AD 340) a n d church historian, 184

Eusebius, Grand Chamberlain of Constantius II , 173, 179-80, 190-1, 194

263


Eutherius, Grand Chamberlain of Julian, 194-5

Eutropius, consul AD 387 a n d historian, 183

Eutropius, Grand Chamberlain u n d e r Arcadius, 175, 179, 181, 188-90, 194

Evagrius, church historian, 178

Fabius, Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator, consul for the fifth t ime 209 BC and general , 25, 103

Falcidian Law, 81 Fausdna, empress , wife of Antoninus

Pius, 214; Plate 2a Felix, procurator of Judaea, 1st cen

tury AD, 116 Festus, procurator of Judaea, 1st cen

tury AD, 222 Festus, scholar, late 2nd century AD,

" 9 Firmicus Maternus, astrological

thinker, 4th century AD, 233, 237-8 Florentinus, lawyer, 122 Fronto, orator and tutor to Marcus

Aurel ius, 79, 221 Gaius, lawyer, 2nd century AD, 82,84,

104, 115-16, 122-3 Galba, e m p e r o r (AD 68-9), 226, 232 Galen, doctor, 2nd century AD, 99,

118, 119 Galerius, e m p e r o r (AD 293-311),

«93 Gallicanus, Grand Chamberlain of

usurper Maximus, 177 Gallus, brother-in-law of Constantius

II and Caesar (AD 351-4), 176, 180, 187, 191

Gellius, Aulus , m a n of letters, 2nd century AD, 23,26,29,49,51, 79,82,

Germanicus, adopted son of Tiberius, 205, 214, 219, 239

Gorgonius , Grand Chamberlain of Gallus, 191

Gracchi, land reformers and sons of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, 13» 36, 61-5, 72-3, 201; Gaius Gracchus , 46, 64; Tiberius Sempronius

Gracchus, brother of Gaius Gracchus , 58-9, 61^4, 105

Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius , consul 177 BC and 163 BC, 25

Grand Chamberlain (proepositus socri

cubicxdi), i74ff., i88fL, 195-6 Greece, 130-1, 162-3, 2 19» 2 2 5 Greek language , 76-7, 90 Gregory Nazianzcn, Saint, B i shop of

Constantinople (AD 381), 157 Gregory of T o u r s , Saint, B ishop of

T o u r s (AD 573-94) and historian, 178

Hadrian, e m p e r o r (AD 117-38), 118, 122, 136, 182, 210, 219, 231, 234, 236-7, 239; Plate 4a

Hadrian's Wall, 224 Halicarnassus, Caria (south-west

Turkey) , 218 Hammurabi , 180 Hannibal, Carthaginian general ,

3rd/2nd century BC, 28, 56, 60, 103 Harun al Raschid, Abbasid Caliph

(AD 786-809), 187 Helicon, chamberlain under Cali

gula, 191 Heliopolis , Egypt, 239 Heliopolis , Syria, see Baalbek Hercules , 199, 230, 241 Herodian , historian, early 3rd cen

tury AD, 203, 214-15 Herodotus , historian, early 5th cen

tury BC, 192 H o m e r , 76, 136 H o n g Kong, populat ion of, 97 Horace, Q. Horatius Flaccus, poet , 1st

century BC, 76, 202, 206, 212 Hyampolis , central Greece, 225 Hyginus , writer o n land-tenure, 6

Ios, inscription from, 240 Isis, Hel lenised Egyptian goddess ,

225, 230, 239, 240 Italy: food a n d farming, 2,4,6,9-10,

12, 14-15, 38-9, 55, 67, 106-8; land-ownership a n d land law, 3, 5, 7-8, 13, 16, 18-24, 36-7» 39» 4 8 - 5 1 . 54~6» 59-65,105; land taxation, 16-18,24, 38; migration, colonies a n d the

264


Italy: (cont.)

effects of war, 4,11,13-14,21,24-5, 28-32, 35-8, 56, 64, 66-74; 103»., 105-6; slavery, 2-3,5,8-10,14,24-5, 5 1* 55. 99* I 0 2 f f - » l o 7> 1 < & S > I59 f f-» 169, 211-12

James I of England, 197 Japan, 23, 79 Jerome, Saint, 194 Jerusalem, 222 Jesus Christ, 199, 203, 232 John of Antioch,historian, 172,176,180 John Chrysostom, Saint, Bishop of

Constantinople, (AD 398-403), 190, 226

John of Ephesus , church historian, 6th century AD, 175-6, 178-9

Josephus, Jewish historian, 1st century AD, 97, 210

Julian, e m p e r o r (AD 361-3), 136, 173, 180

Julius Caesar, see Caesar Julius Obscquens , writer o n prodigies

(?4th century AD), 233 Jupiter, 27, 199, 202-3, 22b* 230-1; see

also Zeus Justinian, e m p e r o r (AD 527-65), 178;

C o d e of, 172, 175, 176, 178; Digest of, 129, and see under names of law

yers; novels, of, 172, 179, 187, 190 Juvenal, satirical poet , i s t /and cen

tury AD, 237

Kleomantis, slave-owner at Delphi , 153-4

Kourion, Cyprus, 240 Kwakiud, 100 Lactantius, Christian political satirist,

3rd/4th century AD, 192-3 Laelius, C. Lealius Minor Sapiens,

consul , 140 BC, 61 Lares Compitales , 211-12

Latins, 57 Lausus, Grand Chamberlain u n d e r

Theodos ius II, 195 laws, see under names of individual laws

and lawyers and under Justinian and

Twelve Tables (Index of Subjects)

Leo, e m p e r o r (AD 457-74), 176 Leptis Magna (Libya), 220-1, 230 Lex Julia Municipalis, 81 Libanius, orator, 4th century AD, I 72,

177, 195, 225-6 Liber Pontifical^ 178

Liberius, B i shop of R o m e , (AD 352-66), 179

Ligurians, 58 Livia, wife of Augustus , 218 U v y , Ti tus Livius, historian, 1st Cen

tury Bc / i s t century AD, 2, 5, 16, 22, 25-8,30,36,46,52,56-8,60,104,135

Lucian, m a n of letters, 2nd century AD, 182, 124, 233

Lucretius, poet, 1st century BC, 201 Lucullus, general and gourmet , 1st

century BC, 47 Lysias, orator, 5th/4th century BC, 53 Lyttos, Crete, 220

Macedonians, 135 Macrobius, writer, early 5th century

AD, 119 Madrid, 3 Malalas, John, Byzantine chronicler,

6th century AD, 172* 181 Malchus, historian, 196 Mamertinus, Claudius, political

orator, consul AD 362, 190 Mao Tse- tung , Chairman, 200, 204 Marcellinus Comes , Byzantine chron

icler, 6th century AD, 179-80, 187 Marcian, lawyer, early 3rd century

AD, 131, 153 Marcus Aurelius, see Aurel ius Marius, consul for the seventh time

86 BC, general , 31, 65, 92, 201 Mars, 214, 220,230; Field of Mars, 29,

214-15 Martial, poet, 1st century AD, 115,118 Maximian, e m p e r o r (AD 286-305),

199-200 Maximus Thrax , e m p e r o r (AD 235-8),

Plate 3a Maximus, usurper (AD 383-8), 177,

180 Melania, the Younger , Saint, 178,194 Mercury, 230 Milan, 199

265


Moses, 80 Musa, Anton inus Musa, doctor of

Augustus , 124

Naples , 97, 208 Narbonne (southern France), 208,211 Narses, e u n u c h general u n d e r Justi

nian, 178 Nero , e m p e r o r (AD 54-68), 131, 136,

187, 199, 213, 252, 234 Notitia Dignitatum, 175-6

Octavian, see Augustus Olympiodorus , of Thebes , historian,

early fifth century AD, 51, 172 Ottoman court, 176 Ovid, P. Ovidius Naso , poet, 1st cen

tury Bc / i s t century AD, 212

Paetus, Sextus Aelius, consul 198 BC and lawyer, 86

Palestine, 140 Palladius, hagiographer, 4th/5th cen

tury AD, 194-5 Pallas, ex-slave of the e m p e r o r Clau

dius, 116 Papinian, lawyer, early 3rd century

AD, 84, n o Parthenius, chamberlain u n d e r

Domitian, 191 -2 Paul, Saint, 116, 122-3, 222 Paul, lawyer, early third century AD,

n o , 122, 131, 237 Pausanias, antiquarian and traveller,

2nd century AD, 136 Pergamon (Asia Minor), 99, 135, 205 Persian court, e u n u c h s at, 192-3 Petronius, novelist, 1st century AD,

117, 202 Philae, holy island in the Nile, 204 Philippi, Macedonia (northern

Greece) , 222 Philostorgius, church historian,

5th/6th century AD, 181, 188 Piso, Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, consul

7 *=» 239 Plato, 162 Plautus, playwright, 3rd/2nd cen

tury BC, 99 Pliny the Elder, naturalist, 1st century

AD, 3, 21, 26, 45, 51, 53, 54, 70, 117, 136, 241-2

Pliny the Younger , n e p h e w of Pliny the Elder and friend of Trajan, 88, 116,118,128,158,182,199,217,226, 229, 238

Plutarch, phi losopher and biographer, ist/2nd century AD, 26, 38, 44, 52, 58-9, 76, 78, 119, 135-6, 226

Polybius, historian, 2nd century BC, 20, 31» 45» 77» «35 Polycarp of Smyrna, Christian martyr, 2nd century AD, 228

Pompeii , near Naples , 201-2, 212 Pompey, consul 52 BC a n d general , 6,

«5» 36» 37» 40- 1» 49» °5-6\ 92-3, 103

Porphyry, Bishop of Gaza (AD 395-420), 176-7

Priscus, historian, 172, 179, 195 Procopius, historian, 6th century AD,

172, 190 Prudentius, Christian poet , late 4th

century AD, 194 Ptolemy, astronomer, 2nd century

AD, 238-9 Puteoli, near Naples , 44

Quintil ian, orator, 1st century AD, 109, 216

Regulus, M. Atilius, consul for the second time 256 BC, general and farmer, 4

Rhodanus , Grand Chamberlain under Valentinian I, 181

Rhodes , 235 Roma, cult, of 208-9 Rome: citizenship and law, 41, 80-7,

116,123,153-4; culture and display, 48-9,76-80,104,123-5; early Rome , 19-25; emperors h o n o u r e d at, 200, 202-6,211-15,217; food supply, 2-3, 14-15,38-39,66,73-4,107-8; immigration to, 14, 50, 56-8, 66-7, 73, 105; m o n u m e n t s and triumphs, 2, 16,25-7,104,219-20; populat ion of, 68-9, 96-8, 107, 127; power of and politics at, 2, 11,19,42,46,88-9,94, 102-4, 237; slaves a n d ex-slaves,

266


Rome: (cont.)

113-14, i i5 f f . , n8ff . , i26ff., 147, 153-4, 211-13

Roscius of Ameria, 1st century BC, 71 Rullus, land reformer, 1st century BC,

66

Sabina, empress , wife of Hadrian, 214; Plate 1

Sabratha, Libya, 220 Sallust, historian, 1st century BC, 6,

3 !> 70 Sarapis, 225, 231 Sardinia, 16, 25 Scillitan martyrs, Christian martyrs in

Africa, late 2nd century AD, 227-8 Scipio Africanus, consul for the

second t ime 194 BC, and general, 25, 201

Scriptores Historioe Augustoe (SHA),

late 4th -century AD imperial biographies, 98, 122, 187-8, 192, 231, 234

Seneca, phi losopher, 1st century AD, 116, 118-19, I 2 I ~3» I 2 9> 201, 222

Septimius Severus, see Severn s Servius, lawyer, 86, 130 Servius, literary critic, 4th century AD,

202 Severian, Bishop of Gabala (c. AD

400), 223-4 Severus, Septimius, emperor (AD

193-211), 192 Severus Alexander , emperor (AD

222-35), Plate 46 Sicily, 16-17, 61, 102, 108, 120 Smyrna, west coast of Asia Minor,

209, 216 Socrates, church historian, 4th/5th

century AD, 175, 177, 180 Sophronius , B ishop of Jerusalem,

(AD 634-8) and hagiographer, 239 Sozomen , church historian, early 5th

century AD, 175, 179, 195, 225-6 Spain, 16, 94, 119, 127, 204, 230 Spartacus, leader of slave revolt 73 BC,

120 Speratus, Christian martyr, late 2nd

century AD, 227-8 Statius, poet, 1st century AD, 116

Stobaeus, compiler, ?5th century AD, 198 (Diotogenes) , 242 (Diotogenes)

Strabo, geographer , 1 st century BC/ I st century AD, 119, 134, 209

Suetonius, biographer, ist/2nd century AD: lives of literary m e n , 76-9, 124; lives of emperors , 10, 50, 69, 96-7, 109, 118, 130, 187, 192, 203, 206, 212-13, 222, 232-4, 238

Suidas, Byzantine encyclopaedist, late 10th century AD, 172

Sulla, consul 88 BC and general, 6,36, 41, 60, 65-6, 70-1, 92, 115, 135

Superintendent of the Sacred Bedchamber (primicerius socri cubiculi),

175* Symmachus , consul AD 391, 88 Synesius of Cyrene, Bishop of Ptole-

mais (c. AD 410-c . AD 414) and man of letters, 187

Syria, 135, 141 Tacitus, historian, ist/2nd century

AD, 50, 74, 87, 116, 120-1, 126, 130, 181, 204-5, 2 I 3» 221-2, 224, 226, 231-2, 237, 239

Taranis , British god , 230 Tarraco, Spain, 216 T e g e a , Peioponnese , 219 Terence , playwright, 2nd century BC,

124 Tertull ian, Christian sophist, 227-8 T h e o d o r e , Steward of the Sacred

Palace under Justinian, 178-9 Theodore t , B ishop of Cyrrhus (AD

423 -c . AD 466) and church historian, 176

T h e o d o r u s , ? governor of Cyprus, 240 T h e o d o s i u s I, e m p e r o r (AD 379-95)»

179, 180 T h e o d o s i u s II, e m p e r o r (AD 408-50),

176, 180; Theodos ian Code (AD 438>» *75» 178» «9° T h e o p h a n e s , Byzantine chronicler, 8th / o t h century AD, 172,175-6,180, «93» 194

Thessaly, 219, slavery in, 134,147,149 Theves te (Algeria), 208 Thrasyllus, court astrologer under

Tiberius, 234-5 267


Tiberius, e m p e r o r (AD 14-37), 50, 204-5,209,218,221, 232, 234-5,239

Titus , e m p e r o r (AD 79-81), 210, 238 T l o , Lycia (south-west Turkey) , 218 Trajan, e m p e r o r (AD 98-117), 51,182,

199, 210, 224-5, 2 2 9 Trimalchio, see Petronius Tull ius , Servius Tull ius, king of

R o m e (trad. 578-535 BC), 20

Ulpian, lawyer, early 3rd century AD, 110,122,123,129-30,153,222-3,237

Ursicinus, general under Constandus H . «73

Valens, Vettius Valens, astrologer, 2nd century AD, 236

Valentinian I, e m p e r o r (AD 364-75), 181

Valentinian II, e m p e r o r (AD 375-92), 186-7, l$ß

Valentinian II I, e m p e r o r (AD 425-55), 190

Valerius Maximus, historian a n d moralist, ist century AD, 4, 26, 29, 112, 135, 201

Varro, polymath, ist century BC, 3, 9-10, 22, 51, 55, 106, 120, 123

Verres, governor of Sicily (73-70 BC), 16, 42-3, 45, 54, 85

Verus , Lucius Verus , e m p e r o r (AD 161-9), 220; Plate 3<f

Vespasian, e m p e r o r (AD 70-9), 216, 224, 231-2

Vestal Virgins, 206 Victor, Aurel ius Victor, historian, 4th

century AD, 193 Victory, goddess , 102, 200, 205 Virgil, poet , 1st century BC, 201 Vitellius, emperor (AD 69), 232

West Indies , slavery in, 100, 106

X e n o p h o n , historian, 5th/4th century BC, 55; P s e u d o - X e n o p h o n (The Constitution of the Athenians), 144

Zachariah Rhetor, Zacharias of Myti-lene, church historian, 5th/6th century AD, 98, 220

Zeus, statue of at Olympia, 221, 234 Zosimus, historian c. AD 500, 172,

177-8, 180-1

268

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