Historical Lessons in the Melian Episode

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Historical Lessons in the Melian EpisodeAuthor(s): James V. MorrisonSource: Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-), Vol. 130 (2000), pp. 119-148Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/284308

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Transactionsof theAmericanPhilological Association 130(2000) 119-148

Historical Lessons in the MelianEpisodeJames V. Morrison

Centre College

Thucydidescalls attention o the Melianepisode (5.84-116) by its uniqueform:it presents the only dialogue in the History. In addition,we find a rhetoricaldispute in which the goal of each side is to convince not a thirdpartybut theotherspeakers.1This paperwill arguethat in additionto these unusualfeatures,a thirdaspect-both unusual and insufficientlynoted-is that both sides' argu-ments offer the type of instruction hat is parallelto thatofferedby Thucydidesto his reader. By consideringthe experience the reader has gained from theearlierbooks of the History,we are able to uncoverandappreciate he lessons ofhistory relevant to this confrontation.The Atheniansattemptto teach the Me-lians what the readerhas already earned n the History: hat,in spite of the usualappealsfoundin diplomaticdiscourse,cities base theirdecisions on expediency.For theirpart, n seekingto persuadeAthens to allow them to remainneutral, heMelians must be able to referto bothpastaction andfuturepossibility. Althoughthe Athenians say such discussion is out of bounds, here, too, the readerap-preciatesthe importanceof what the Melianstryto do, for a second lesson of theHistory is that statesmen must consider the past and speculateaboutthe future.By settingwhat the Atheniansand the Melianssay and do in the broadercontextof Thucydides' History and applying the lessons of the first five books, thereader s in a positionadequately o evaluateargumentandaction.2Thucydides'employmentof a novel formathelps to drive home the lessons that the readerisexpected to have learnedfrom consideringthe History as a whole. In essence,the Athenian-Melianexchange has become a kind of test case for the reader,askinghow much the readerhas learnedby the end of five books.

lIn the firstset of speeches,he CorinthiansndCorcyreansttempto persuadeheAthenians;later the Thebans and Plataeansarguebefore the Spartans; ndividuals,suchas Cleon andDiodotus,work to persuade he Athenianassembly.2As Meiggs 345 remarks:"Thucydides'treatmentof the Melian episode cannot besatisfactorily udged in isolation."


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Much of scholarly opinion concerning this conflict suggests that the readermust make a choice. The Melians may be seen as victims, as de Romilly argues:

The choice is obvious, as far as sympathy s concerned.The Meliansare presented as having a very vivid sense of their independence(100); theyactjustly (104) andcourageously 113): all these featuresare complimentsfor Thucydideswhen he can applythem to Athens.Similarly, he takes care to secure the reader's sympathy for theMelians by frequentlyrecallingthe cruel situationin which they areplaced,and the factthattheyhave righton their side.3

Alternatively, the Athenians, if amoral, may still be thought of as merciful intheir search to avoid bloodshed. Bosworth goes so far as to label this approachof the Athenians "humanitarian." Rather than simply overpowering the smallcity, he contends, Athens gives the Melians the opportunityto save themselves:

Harsh as [the Athenians'] language undoubtedly is... it has ahumanitarian nd, to convince the Melian oligarchs of the need tocapitulateand save themselves and the commons the horrorsof asiege. If they acted sensibly, there would be no bloodshed,or evendamageto property.4

3de Romilly (1963: 290). Andrewesstates (HCTIV: 168):"Thucydides'presentationhas the effect of weightingthe sympathiesof most readers n favourof the Melians."4Bosworth33. Andrewesremarks HCTIV: 185) thatin contrastwith othermassacres(Torone 5.3, Scione 5.32), here the Athenians are giving the Melians a choice of"peacefulsurrendernsteadof useless resistance."The Athenians'decision to talk thingsover first with the Melians rather han simply attackmust be seen as humanitariann aqualified sense, as Bosworth 43 acknowledges: "Humanitariant certainly is in thelimited sense that it is designed to force the Melians to accept the most advantageoustermsfromAthensandavoid bloodshed."Bruell 16 believes thatthe policy of Athens "isindeed compatiblewith, and to some extent conducive to, a remarkable entleness."deSte. Croix 14 argues:"thewhole purposeof the Athenians s to persuade he Meliansthatthey would be well advisedto surrender, ecauseresistancewould be futile. It would be abad mistaketo say thatThucydidesis 'on the side of the Melians' in any sense. The factthat they are being foolishly over-optimistic is made very clear by the Athenians."Connor(1984: 151) comments:"thereis virtuallyno overt sympathyfor the Melians."Cartwright221 says that "the victims...were given the opportunity o save themselvesfromdestruction.Theyrejected t, andthe significanceof this episode for Thucydides iesin part in the thinking behind this decision." Here Athenian action and rhetoric areconsistent,as notedby HCTIV: 179-80: "There s almosta sincerityin this appealto theMelians to 'behave sensibly,' to give up an oppositionwhich can do them no good, andsurrender." tahl 165 describesthe Atheniansas "almostimploring" fast beschworend)

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HistoricalLessons in the MelianEpisode

This problem of interpretationarises from the authorial reticence ofThucydides, who withholdsjudgment and commentary.Thucydidesomits anyexplicit judgmentabout the prudenceor moralityof Melos or Athens. Never inhis own voice does Thucydidescall the Athenians evil or clever, nor does heever label the Melians foolish or brave.5This reticence, of course, is almostuniversalthroughout he History:as Westlakenotes, Thucydidesseldom rendersan explicit judgmentof individualsor theirdecisions.6Inthe end, each side failsto persuadethe other;neither Athens nor Melos wins the argument.One effectof the dialogue form and the lack of rhetoricalresolution is that a balance iscreated between the Melians and the Athenians. I endorse Wasserman's as-sessment fromfifty years ago:

Thucydidesuses the form of the dialogueto makehis readers isten tothe arguments rom both sides. Bothhis Atheniansand his Melianssoconvincingly advance their points that either side has been takenmistakenly as his mouthpiece, while in reality both parties areintended o be seen together o give the completepicture.7

The failure of either side to convince the otherreflects both strengthsandweaknesses in each side's arguments. Only a retrospective reading of thedialoguewill allow us, as readers,accurately o assess each side's argumentsandthe reasons or the Melians'andAthenians' ailureto persuade neanother.8

the Melians. For examplesof miscalculating he likelihood of surrendern the twentiethcentury,see Chuter.Even de Romilly(1963: 291) acknowledges hat"froma rationalandpolitical pointof view, one fact standsout immediately:heMelians werewrongto resist."5Thucydidesrefuses to tell the readerwhy AthensattacksMelos at this particularimeor whether the Melians have done anythingto provoke it. Amit 217 points out thatThucydides omits the "entirely Athenian debate in the Assembly" to determine themannerof punishmentafter the city is taken, and,we could add,he also omits the debatein the assembly which originally sent the expedition. On Thucydides' omissions, seeHerter316-19, Andrewes2, Stahl 170, andnotes 73 and 74 below.6Westlake 5.

7Wasserman27.8I find myself very much in agreement with Wassermanregarding Thucydides'balanced presentation, basing this interpretationpartly on Thucydides' own remarkswhere he says that his work will lack what is often translatedas "the romanticelement"or "the storytelling element" (to muthodes, 1.22.4). Flory 194 argues that we shouldunderstand his expression in a political sense, as referringto patriotic"stories which

exaggerateand celebrate the glories of war."Thucydidesis claiming that he will avoidchauvinism;he will offer no biased or exaggeratedstories of patriotism,Athenian orotherwise. In the case of Melos, Thucydidesdoes not necessarilyendorse the arguments

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Let us begin by juxtaposing the goals of each side with possibleconsequences. Earlyon, the Melians express their apprehensionregardingwar,if they are in the rightand do not give in to Athens, or slavery, if the Atheniansare persuasive(5.86). Much of the discourse thereafterconsists of the Meliansarguing to maintain their neutral status, or to evoke images of a successfulresistancewith help from Spartaor the gods. There are three apparentavenuesfor Melos: to give in and "join"Athens (i.e., become a subjectally), to remainneutral,or to resist. Clearly the third option of resistance is more open-endedanddangerous: t is all or nothing,success or destruction.9The first two possibleoutcomes,acquiescenceorneutrality,can resultonly fromnegotiation.

On the Athenianside, there appearto be the same three options from theopposite perspective: o persuadethe Melians, allow them to remainneutral,orattack. (Neutralityis dismissed, but theoreticallythe Melians could prove per-suasive.) But before consideringthese choices from the Athenianpoint of view,we should emphasize the significant option of discourse itself. The militarysituation has put the Athenians in a position to attack immediately,but theychoose to discuss the situationwith the Melians first. If they begin an assaultand Melos resists, the city could be destroyed, with its value to Athens di-minished. We may conclude that the Atheniansinitiate the dialogue with a sin-gle goal in mind:to gain controlof an intactcity and rule Melos "withouttoil"(&arr6vcos,.91.2).10In lightof this, we shouldrecognizethat,while the Athen-

of either side. I conclude that the readeris encouragedto look withoutprejudiceat thedialoguefromboththe AthenianandMelianpointsof view. Forthe difficultyof derivingThucydides' own opinions from speeches, see Hornblower(1987: 155-90), and hisconclusion (185): "nothing can be straightforwardlyextracted from the MelianDialogue... aboutThucydides'sown position."9Another possibility other than Athenian success or defeat is simply giving up (cf.3.91); see note 70 below. Liebeschuetz73 sees the outcome as inevitable:"In the firsthalf of the dialogue the speakers discuss the expediency of forcing Melos into theAthenian Empire, in the second they discuss the likelihood of the Melians resistingsuccessfully. But since the Meliansare offeredno alternative o becomingsubjectsexceptcomplete destruction, and since they are clearly not ready to choose the safe butdishonouring alternative, even though they have no chance of defending their citysuccessfully, the inevitabledestructionof Melos casts its shadow over the whole of thenegotiations."Macleod 390 remarksthat "this cannot mask that what is possible forAthens is conquest whereas what is possible for Melos is surrenderand that theAtheniansarethe realagentswhereasthe Meliansmustsimplyendure."

10Cleonand Diodotus have previouslypointedout the value of intactcities at 3.39.8,3.46.3; cf. Sparta'smotivationsat 2.77.2 and Stahl 162. Amit 224 assertsthatthe busi-ness of the Athenian troops "was to implement the decisions already taken by the

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ianshave theoptionof attackingandputting hecityundersiege, theveryfact thatthey aretalkingat all impliesthatthey wouldprefer o persuade he Melians.Each side fails to convince the other: the Melians do not acquiesce; theAthenians reject neutrality.11Why? As we turn to a detailed analysis ofthe argumentswithin the dialogue, we note the importanceof rules regardinghow to proceed. The failure of each side derives partiallyfrom a rejection ofexploringall possibilities in discussion. Let us examine the variousrestrictionsplaced on context and discussion. Limitations concern audience, format, andsubject. First, as the dialogue is not spoken before a majorityof citizens, thespokesmen-i.e., the interlocutors-for the Melians are just a few of theircitizens who hold office (5.84.3).12 Accordingto the Athenians,this advancesthe Melians' interests n at least two ways (5.85):

OTrCJS ll tuvEXEI pIlCEIOi TrOXXoiETraycoya Ka'l&VEXEyKTaESdTra( adKouoavVTEs lpcovdaTraTTrlco.o)v....so thata majorityf citizensmaynot heara setspeechof ours,atthe same time attractivend immune romcross-examination,ndbedeceived.l3

The audience is restricted-the majority (hoi polloi) is not addressed.Without the majority of the Melians, who may favor accommodation withAthens, the small set of Melians involved concentrates ts energies on the goalof neutrality.14The second and related restrictionis that-in contrast to allprevious speeches15-the Athenians propose a point-by-point discussion,allowing for immediateresponse. This is explained in part by the deceptive

Assembly, with the minimum of casualties, expenses, and harm to Athens." On theAthenians'willingnessto negotiate,cf. 3.3-5.11Cartwright 20 remarks:"Thetwo sides are as far apartat the end of the debate asthey were at the beginning" see 5.112.2). We may compare he Plataeandebate andhowthe Spartansask the same questionbefore and after the Plataeanand Theban speeches(3.68.1). See also Wasserman 2-24.

12oi MjiXiotl rpOS i'EVTO rArXrfloOUK ilyayov, Ev 5E Tals dpxaC(S Kai TOTSo?iyois XEyEiv (5.84.3). Andrewes comments (HCT IV: 159) that "apXai in Greekwould include the council, often the most powerful organ in an oligarchy, as well asmagistrates n the more familiarsense;andoXiyot will be the privilegedvoters."13Englishtranslationsof Thucydidesare modified versions of those of Warer's inThucydides 1954).14Cartwright222 points out that those in power fear that the Melian people maysupportAthens;see 5.84, 5.116.

15Although ee 1.53, 3.113, 4.97-99.

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power of set speeches (5.85).16 Fromthe reader'sperspective,not only is theformatof dialogue striking;we must also reckon with what the Athenians sayaboutlong speeches,namely,thatthey aredeceptivebecausethey are"attractiveand immune from cross examination" ('rraycoya KaCaVEXEyKTCa,5.85). Thishas to cause some uneasiness for the reader,who is now forced to revisit theprevious speeches within the History in an entirelynew light.17To what extenthave the speeches from the first five books been deceptive? When have theybeen manipulative? In what sense are they unanswerable or irrefutable?Thucydideshas highlightedthe choice of format for this discussion by raisingthe questionas to whether he dialogueform is actuallya betterway to arriveatthe truth.18By criticizingset speeches, Thucydidesis able to privilege dialogueover extendedspeechat this pointof the History.

Besides concernsof audience and format,the thirdstipulationestablishedby the Athenians imposes severe restrictionsupon what is "allowed" to beexplored. The encounter between Athens and Melos, as Thucydides hasstructured t, is not a militarycontest;rather, t is rhetorical.A dialogue wouldappearto grantboth sides equal standing,but the fact that Athens has insisted

16Thisdistinctionbetweendialogueand set speechwouldhave been familiar oThucydides'ifth-centuryudience.While herewerelongspeeches n the lawcourts,assembly,anddramatic roductions,ialogue or brachyologia)ccurredn sophisticdisplays prominentlyecreatedn Plato'sProtagoras) ndthestichomythiaf tragedy.Cartwright20 remarksponThucydides'xperimentationn featuring ialogue s partof his critical olitical istory.Onthedialogueorm, eeHudson-Williams.acleod 00notes hatoneof the reasonsor thedialogues that t allows or"thepeculiar rivacy fthenegotiations...which] ave heopportunityora dialecticalreatmentf somemajorhistoricalhemes."17Inparticular,hereadermaybe ledback o theMytilenianebatewhere he valueofdebates questionedyCleon 3.37-38).18Cf. 5.89 on the untrustworthiness f long speeches (Xoycov PinKOS-rrcTov) andthecomment tHCT V:162:"thecombinationeems o imply hata very ong speech

is, as such,less credible r persuasivehana shortone."Macleod 87 remarks n the"deceptivenessf theuninterruptedpeechandthesuperior recision f dialogue"withreferences. eyondhis, heres a challengeoAtheniannstitutionss well.Thebasisofdecision-makingithinheassemblyand nthe lawcourts)s votingbasedonspeeches:this feature f Athenian emocracytself is underattack.OnThucydides'riticism fAtheniandemocracy,ee Ober(1998: 78) wherehe concludes for the Corinthian-Corcyreanebate): Thucydides'mplicitesson s thatdemocraticnowledge oesnotprovide nadequateroundingorassessinghe truth alueof rhetoricaliscourse.Andthus,badly-or atbestindifferently-instructedy speech, heAthenianAssemblywaslikelyeventuallyofallintoerror nd,asaresult,o makebadpolicy."

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that the discussion follow a prescribedformat reduces the advantagesMelosmay gain from a point-by-pointdiscussion.19The rangeof subjectsis not open-ended, as the Athenians continually try to eliminate certain topics fromdiscussion. Nonetheless, the dialogue formathelps the Melians tremendously,who areable to makerepeatedefforts to redefine andrestructure he discourseinorderto allow for a broaderscope of exchange.If the Athenianshad laid out theground rules in a first set speech, there could have been no Melian response.The dialogue form not only permitsMelos to challengeAthenian assertionsbutalso allows them to call into questionandresist the rules of discussion as stipu-lated by the Athenians. Purely from the Melian point of view, the first twostipulations small audience and dialogueform)aresufficientlyadvantageous oallow themto neutralize hethirdrestriction egardingadmissibletopics.20

Let us survey how Athens restricts the range of allowable issues. Early inthe dialogue,when the Melianssay that if they are in the right(TrEpiyEvolaEvois[EV TC- tiKaico,5.86) war will come, the Athenians immediately insist that thediscussion is only aboutthe survival(ocoTrpiCa) f the city of Melos (5.87).21

Ei UEVToiVUV UTrovoiaS TC)V IEXXOTVTCOV AOoytlOUEVOI ii aXXo TIWUViKETE Tl EK TCV TrapO6VTcOVKaCi coV OpaTE TTEpi OCOTlpiaSO3OUXEUOOVTE TIr TOXEI, TrauoiuEO' V' Ei 5' ETTiTOUTO, XEyOIpEv av.If you are going to spend the time in enumeratingyour suspicionsaboutthe future,or if you have met here for any otherreasonexceptto deliberateconcerningthe safety for your city on the basis of thepresentsituationthat is beforeyou, we would stop the discussion. If,however,you will do as we suggest,thenwe wouldcontinuespeaking.

19Macleod389-90 arguesthat "while the Athenians are claimingto give the Meliansthe chance of a free, rationaland practicaldecision...the Melians know what is in storefor them." Monoson and Loriaux 292 find that "languages not used for purposesofdeliberationbut as an instrument of siege." Regardingthe Athenian restrictions ondiscourse,see Gomez-Lobo 12-23.20Wasserman 21 comments: "If Thucydides had had his Athenians refute theiropponents by a speech in his usualway, we would not have hadthe dramatic ntensityofa prizefightin which the Melians,thoughoutmatchedon the battlegroundof expediency,rise again and again with new objections against the striking force of the apparentlyirrefutableAthenianarguments."Orwin 98 sees "intheirchoice of formatthe [Athenian]envoys reveal sovereignconfidence in the power of theirarguments."For an analysisofthe Dialogue as exemplifying a "formal disputation," consisting of "move andcountermovepossibilities,"see Alker.

21Macleod 387 asserts that the "stipulations"hat there be no suppositionsabout thefuture and that the subject for discussion must be established are required by themethodologyof practicaldeliberationand the principlesof rhetoric.

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In part, the Athenians object to "suspicions about the future"(discussedfurtherbelow), but it also appearsthat the Melians' mention of justice (5.86)leads the Athenians to threatento cut off dialogue entirely:the Melians mustlimit discussionto the issue of survival. The Atheniansthemselves rephrase hisrestriction in a number of ways: only the issues of survival,22 safety,23reasonable expectation,24 and the disparity between strong and weak arerelevant.25Thatis, the Atheniansattempt o collapse a largenumberof potentialtopics for discussioninto one basic idea: the continuedexistence of Melos.26

The Athenians consider off-limits any mention of justice, fine deeds,freedom,shame,and the past or future.Regarding ustice, the Atheniansopenlysay (5.89):

'HETsS oivuv OUTEUrTOiET'OVOC'TC)V aXcoV, bos slKaica;TOV Mfl8ov KaTaXrAoaVTEs apxoi.EV fl aslKOVUIEVOIUVETrrEEpXO6EOa, 6ycov uKOs a'rrOToV TrapEOPJEV,v, 'uJasii&XIOUOiEVT" OTt AaKEBaIpOViCOV alTOiKOI OVTES oUSUVEOTpaTEUOaTEr CGoSClS OUOEVnBtlKViKaTEAEyOVTasiEcY0OalTEiOEIV.Thenwe on oursidewill use no fine phrases aying, or example,thatwe havea right o ourempirebecausewe defeatedhePersians,or thatwe havecomeagainstyou now becauseof the injuries ouhave,doneus-a greatmassof wordsthatnobodywould believe.And we ask you on yourside not to imaginethatyou will persuadeusby saying thatyou, thougha colony of Sparta,have notjoined Spartain the war,orthatyou havenever done us anyharm.

Any mention of justice (SIKaCIko, abIKOuJuIEVO,ouSeVV filKrIKaTE) isrejected.The idea thatjustice is irrelevant o foreignpolicy recursprominently

220oTTrpita: 5.87, 5.88, 5.91.2, 5.101, 5.105.4, 5.110, 5.111.2; cf. "not to bedestroyed" t Btacp0EipavTES,.93), andthe ideaof avoidingdangerat 5.99.23aoctpa)XEa: .97, 5.98, 5.107, 5.111.4. By ruling more, the Athenians will be"safer" 5.97).24ai (apavepa'i XTiSES, iterally, "visible expectations," by which the Atheniansevidently mean reasonable-or likely-expectations of the future, as opposed to"invisiblehopes"(ETrraS dqpavEis, 5.103.2; cf. 5.102, 5.111.2, 5.113).255.89, 5.101, 5.111.4.26Allison 55 notes that"soteriahas littleto do with Atheniansand Athensfor the firsthalf of the wareven as a considerationof policy";of the 37 uses of soteria, seven appearin the Melian Dialogue, yet here "soteria will only apply to Melos" (57); "as Book 6gives way to Book 7 and the disaster in Sicily becomes palpable, soteria figuresprominently n Athenian hought" 56).

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in the History.27Here Athensarguesthat ustice mustyield to self-interest(5.90,5.104); the only law (v6olos) is the law of ruling where one is strong (ou avKpari' &pXEIV,.105).28There are other issues that the Atheniansdeclare outof bounds. When the Melians insist that they are "still free" (ETl XEV0eEpOlS)and it would be "cowardlyand base" (TrroXXraK6TrIsKa'lBElXia,5.100) ifthey submittedto Athens, the Atheniansrespondthatthe issue is not goodnessor shame (a&vpaya0ias...aioXouvriv, 5.101), but rathersurvival (ocowrTpia,5.101). In fact, to be defeated, and yet survive, is "not unworthy" (OUKaiTpETTES,.111.4).29

Remarkablethroughoutis the utterly frank way in which the Atheniansaddress the Melians.30 Yet a lesson lies here, for the reader-having the

271.73-77,2.62-64,3.44-47. Inbuilding n whatwasimpliedat 1.73-77,Diodotusstates quite bluntly that, when it comes to international ssues, Athens is simply notinterested n hearingabout ustice (3.44, 3.46.4, 3.47.4-5). Liebeschuetz 74 remarks hat"theargumentof Diodotus appliedto the Athenian case at Melos suggests that the Athe-nian determination o press home their attackon the independenceof Melos to the pointof destroyingthat city completely is based on a misguidedview of Athenian interest."The reasongiven for the rejectionof justice's relevanceis that Athens andMelos arenotequal in power:"justice(SiKata) is judged fromequal [powerof] compulsion(Trro TrfS'iorlSavdyKrl KpivETai)...thestrong do what they are able, while the weak submit"(5.89). Theremay be a qualificationon the prohibitionagainstappealingto justice. TheAtheniansare not necessarilysayingthat ustice is irrelevant o foreign policy or relationsbetween cities (or at least to the discourse between cities); what they are maintaining sthat when one power is much greaterthan another(as in this situation),discussion ofjustice is not applicable.28This is, the Atheniansassert,both a divine and a human law. Regardingdivine aid,the Atheniansbelieve they maycounton the gods as much as the Melians(5.105.1).29Note that when the Atheniansaddress he idea of shame(aischune), it boils down tothe Spartansconsidering"what is pleasurableas fine and what is advantageousas just"(5.105.4; cf. 5.107), thus imputingmoralreductionism o the Spartans.It is noteworthythat the Melian oligarchs' appeal to freedom and honor shows a sensitivity to popularmoralityand discourse, while the Athenians-a democracy-dismiss such concepts asmere words. Thucydideshas already analyzed the collapse of such conventions in theplague at Athens and the civil war in Corcyra(2.52-3, 3.82-4). When Athens instructsthe Melians to focus on expediency, it also plays the role of a stern teacher (B3ialosStdaoKaXoS,3.82.2). On such"schooling"metaphors, ee Pouncey3.30Andrewescomments(HCT IV: 161): "Inthe privacyof this conference, the Athe-nians give up hollow pretense." Kagan 150-51 notes the "blunt" language of theAthenians. As Coby 76 puts it: "The Athenians arehonest even about the deceptivenessof rhetoricalspeech.... The peace that is latentin the new moralitydependson forthrightcommunication between parties, not on deception of the weak by the strong."

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advantageof the History-recognizes the disparitybetween speech and action.Previously in the History when one city attemptedto persuade another indiplomaticdiscourse, the usual practice was to invoke justice, honor, and thegloriousdeeds of the past, in additionto the advantages o be gained.31The au-diences of such speechesat the very least heardthat a particular ourseof actionhad both strategic and moral implications. And yet, as Thucydides showselsewhere in the History, cities make decisions on the basis of advantage.Forexample, the Atheniansbringthe Corcyreans nto a defensive alliance becausetheywant theirnavyand the route o the west is important1.44.2-3).Although herhetoric in the Plataeandebate is laden with moral language, Spartaexecutesthe Plataeansbecause the Thebans were "useful" (cbcpE;ious, 3.68.4).32 Bypointedly indicatingafter speeches what the actual motives were, Thucydideshighlightsthe "disconnect"between the rhetoric of justice found in debatesandthe decisions themselves, which were based on expediency. What is so unusualabout the Melian dialogue is that the Athenians have called into question awhole set of basic appeals normally used in diplomaticdiscourse. Andrewescommentsthat

Thucydides distorts his political picture by leaving out argumentswhich mayhave seemed superficialto him butplayeda practicalpartin persuadingfifth-centuryassemblies to their decisions. The stillstarker xclusionof ovo6IaTa KaCXAromthe Dialogueis a still moreviolent distortion. The danger of stripping away the pretences,attractiveas the attemptmay be to a critical historian,is that withthem you stripaway the actual incentiveswhich decide the ordinaryman's vote.33

Yet this is precisely what the Athenians have done. They have strippedaway the elevatedappealsto country,honor,andjustice. How arewe to explainthis attempt o narrow he discussion?

Liebeschuetz76 goes so faras to call it "repulsive"andthe Atheniansas "bullyingandarrogantto the weak, boundlessly self-confident, lacking humility even towards thegods."Pouncey92 finds"thetoneof hardness s adoptedprospectively, o matchthe finaloutcomeof the confrontation";ee also Bruell 14. Bosworth 31, however,believes that ifthe Melianscapitulate, hatwouldbe "a decision whichminimisessufferingon all sides."31Diodotus' speech is an exception, but it is part of an internaldiscussion amongAthenians,not of diplomaticdiscoursebetweencities.

32Irejectthe ideaof de Ste. Croix 19 andBruell 15 thatappealstojustice alwayscomefromthe losing side;cf. the Corcyreansat 1.32-36 and the Thebansat 3.61-67.33Andrewes9.

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We havejust referred o the way in whichThucydidesfrequently uxtaposesdiplomaticdiscourse (which includes morallanguage)with the actual bases fordecisions (which are exclusively in termsof expediency). Given this backdrop,we may view what the Atheniansare doing here-arguing that the discussionmust be restricted to advantageand survival-as a kind of instructionfor theMelians that is analogous to what Thucydides teaches the reader of hisHistory.34Of course,such lessons areintroducedn a particular ontext andmaynot be appliedsimplisticallyto all othersituations.Here, however, it is evidentthe Athenians are attempting o teach the Melians what the reader has alreadylearned: that decisions are based on considerationsof advantage,not elevatedsentimentsor a rosy pictureof the past. If the Melians are hoping to affect theoutcome of the currentconflict, they needto limittheir discussion to factors thatwill actually influence the Athenians.The rest is superfluous.35On this reading,even the thirdrestrictionon permissible topics may be seen as having Melianinterests at heart.In the end, the Atheniansfail to teachthe Meliansthis lesson.Such a lesson, however, must be taken seriously, because by this point of theHistorythe readerhas alreadywitnessed how decisions are made. What Athenssays to the Melians should strike the readeras accurate.When the Melians failto limit their argumentto the topics of safety and advantage,this ultimatelydooms theirattempt o persuade he Athenians o allow themto remainneutral.Before turning to the Melians' arguments,we should note the distancecreatedbetween the readerand the Melians. While in one sense the readermaybe fully engaged, actively trying to assess, support, and supplement theargumentsof both sides, in another sense there is a markedgap between whatthe reader knows and what the Melians insist on doing. To the extent that byreadingThucydides' Historythe readerhas "experienced"he war, he or she isnow better versed in the ways of the world than the Melians, whose survivaldependsupon a sounderappreciationof Realpolitik.In this case, Melos appearsto be unawareof the gulf between diplomaticdiscourse and actual decision-making. Thucydides' History not only makes this distinction clear but uses

34In anothercontext, Ober (1998: 77) notes "thespeakersthus claim to do just whatThucydides claims that his text will do: teach about interest and power, and offer anunderstanding f pastevents andthe probablecourse of the future."35Bosworth37 believes that"bythe time of the MeliandialogueThucydideshas givenus a surfeit of propaganda.Now it is time for realities."Coby 73 arguesthat"relativeandtemporarypeace is the promiseof the new morality,which is judged to be more realisticthan exhortations o virtue."As Forde 378 says, "TheAtheniansmay wish to make theMeliansbetterrealists."

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Melos to illustratethe danger of failing to distinguishbetween moral appealsandprudentdecisions.The effect is one of strongdramatic ronyandpathos.36Let us now turn to the Melians' argumentsas they try to dissuade Athensfromattacking.Clearlythe Melianshave a difficulttask.They are outmatched nterms of militarypower;all they have are words and arguments,yet even herethey face restrictions.37Whatthe Meliansdo, however, is in a varietyof ways toredefine or simply disregardAthenian limitations on possible discourse. Wemight think the Melians would do better to speakdirectly,as the Atheniansdo,and to limit their remarksto matters of expediency. To this extent, they havefailed to learnthe lesson of the Athenians-and of Thucydides'History.In onearea,however,the Meliansoffer valuableadvice-namely, in theirdiscussion ofpastandfuture,a lesson thatthe Atheniansfail to appreciate.

The Melians begin by trying to redefine the concept of justice, which theAthenianswill notallow, ntermsof advantage,which heAthenians rize 5.90):38'Hi PLv5i voPiroiPv yE, Xpolai!ov (avayKfr yap, ETrEtirlutAESoUTco 'rtapa TO SiKcaov TO [ulcpEpov XEyEiv UTrOEOOE)KaCTaCUEiV yaSTO KOIVOVyao66V, a\,a0 TC aciEiEV KIVVUvc9

36Williams 198 states that the Melians are "quite lacking in prudence,moderation,foresight, willingnesso negotiate r evento bendatall,goodplanning,nd heabilityto consider easonablyothsidesof an issue... n the unjustworldof the fifth-centuryGreeks, the non-rationalandunyieldingpostureof the Melians helped ensuretheir owndestruction."For realism in Thucydides, see Doyle, who distinguishes between threetypes of realism (minimalism,fundamentalism,and structuralism) nd arguesthat Thu-cydides' own methodsand lessons follow only the minimalistformof realism, in whichchoices "dependupona priorconsiderationof strategicsecurity" 170). This the Meliansfail to do. Forde373 arguesthat,while Thucydidesis a realistin internationalaffairs,he"triedto defend the theoreticallymore difficult position that international ealism neednot entailuniversalmoralskepticism."Garstalso finds that"Thucydides'historydirectsattention to the confusion underlying neorealist debates over power in internationalpolitics"(21), for "in neorealism,this leadership[of hegemonicpowers] lacks the moraldimensionso heavily emphasizedby Thucydides" 22); cf. Alker.37At the very least, the Melians feel it is reasonableand understandablehat theyshould have recourse to all kinds of argumentsand points of view (EiKO6SPi Ka'SuyyV)cPnrl EVTC TOOICE Ka0BECTCOTaSETtTTOXXaKaXI dEyOVTaSKa'lBOKOOuvTaTpETrTEeai, 5.88).38Pericles had earlier argued against the "calculation of advantage" (ovi TOo

uwpcpl)poVT-o... 3oyioPc4, 2.40.5).

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ylyvolEvc p eal rTa EiK6OTa ai SiKata,39 Kai Ti Kai EVTOSTOUaKplI[ouS TTEioavTa Tiva copq)Erleqval.Then-since you force us to leave justice (TO'6 iKatov) out ofaccount and to confine ourselves to self-interest TO'6UpCq)pov)-inour view at any rate it is useful (xpiaoipov) that you should notdestroy a general good of all men (TO KOlVOVayae6v)-namely,thatin the case of all who fall intodangerhereshouldbe suchathing as fairplay andjust dealing (T' EiKOTaKal SiKaia), and thatsuch peopleshouldbe allowedto use and to profitby argumentthat allsshort fprecision.

This is not so muchcollapsing ustice andadvantageas it is pointingout theadvantagesof justice.40 Even the Athenians, the Melians suggest, might findthemselves in a situation where the concept of justice is valuable. Partof theAthenians' response is a lack of concern for the empire's demise-theywillingly take on this risk-but the Athenians'otherpoint is thatthe Melians arespeculating about the future. The Athenians wish to speak only about thepresent, in terms of advantage o theirempireand the survival of Melos (5.91).The Melians then ask how it could be advantageous(xploai[iov) for them toaccept slavery (5ouXEUoat, 5.92). The Athenians respond that not beingdestroyed could be assessed as profit (KEpOaivoluEVav, 5.93).

The Melians attemptto equate justice with advantageand slavery withdisadvantage.The Atheniansreject these equations,counteringthat survival isan advantageand not being annihilated s profit.41At this point the Athenianrestrictionholds: the only acceptedcoin is advantage.The questionfor Melos iswhether survival is enough of an advantage o sacrifice autonomy-perhaps anadvantage in itself-yet their continued efforts at debate indicate that meresurvivalis not enoughof anadvantage or themto sacrificetheirindependence.

39See Radt 35 on the readingTa EiKoTra a'i SiKaa, though I do not agree withhis conclusions.40AndrewesemarksHCT V: 165):"theMelians eek to turn heAthenian ositionby claiming hatthe observance f conventionalusticeis in fact a generaladvantage,ulpaqepov."mit 230 feels that "theproblems to find what is xpflolaov to bothsides... t is the Melians who conductthe debate."Crane239 observes that "theMelians...arguehat ustice, airness, nd nterest re all interlinked."oby77 believesthat"theMeliansareattemptingo makecommon ausewiththeAthenians,o connecttheir nterest s a weaker tate odaywithAthens' nterest s a weaker tate omorrow";cf. Alker812.41Inwar, he situationndattitudes fpeople hange,which eads o anewapplicationof words ltKaicooiS):eeesp.3.82.4-8.

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But restrictingdiscussion to advantageis not irrelevant o the Athenians.Wheredoes theiradvantage ie? The Melians,who raise this issue, arguethat ifsafety (&atopdXEta)s the highest goal of the Athenians,the Atheniansmay beless "safe" (i.e., in a less advantageousposition) by attackingMelos, for thiswould encourageotherneutralpowers to turnaway from Athens, thus helpingAthens' enemies (5.98). The Athenians respond that-as for now-neutralmainlandersare not as threateningas Melos (5.99):

As a matter f factwe are not so much rightenedf stateson thecontinent(IrTrEIpcoTal).They have their liberty,and this means thatit will be a longtime(TroXXAv'rVSlaEaXXriav)efore heybegintotakeprecautionsgainst s. Wearemoreconcerned boutslanderslike yourselves, who are unsubdued(vrloicTas .. avapKTouS), orsubjectswho havealreadyfi6r)become mbitteredythe constraintthatourempiremposes nthem.Theseare hepeoplewho aremostlikelyto act in a recklessmannerTC)aXoyioTcp)andto bringthemselvesndus,too,into hemostobviousdanger.

We have already learned that the Melians are not like other islanders,because they are not willing to follow Athens (OUKrEXovrEXO aKoUEIV coTrrEpoi &XXol rlolcoaal, 5.84.2). Athensfinds the Meliansthreatening,as "islandersnot aligned with the empire" (vrloicoTaS... avdapKTouS, 5.99), and, as a navalpower (vauKpaTopcov, 5.97 and 5.109), cannotallow Melos to remainneutral.To this extent, it is the island status of Melos that concerns Athens. Neutralislands make Athens appear weak, thus encouragingreckless attacks (5.97,5.99). But, althoughthe Atheniansdistinguish between immediatethreat andwhat may occur at some point in the future,they imply that if neutralson themainlandpose no immediate hreat, hey may be disregarded.Onlythe here andnow is important.

The Melians have attempted o redefinejustice and safety by consideringthe advantagesof moralityand neutrality; hey hypothesizea potential"turningof tables"by sketchingout the futureconsequencesof Athenianaction. Giventhe Athenianresponse,the Meliansthenbegin to resist the Athenians'rhetoricalrestrictions. While such resistance is ultimately unsuccessful in persuadingAthens, the Melians' argumentsat 5.100ff. amount to a nullification of theoriginal stipulationson permissiblediscourse.The Melians revertto appealingto moral concepts, such as shame (5.100), freedom(5.112), andjustice.42 For

42Macleod94notes"astillmore triking eparturerom he 'rules'...n chs.100-11;for here the Meliansare constantlyappealingo those moral sanctionsand those

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example (5.104), "Neverthelesswe trustin chance from god not to be defeated,because we stand righteous against an unjust enemy (6alot1 rpos ou1tKaious)." By resisting the Athenians' "rules,"the Melians are able to raisebroader ssues than the Atheniansarewilling to address.This does not affect theshort-termoutcome:the Spartansdo nothelp;Athensis victorious with its siege;Melos is destroyed.Althoughthe Athenians win militarily,however, their pro-hibitions fail to constrain he Melians' words. As "mastersof the sea" the Athe-nians are successful; as "masters of discourse" they cannot control theMelians.43 In counteringandnullifying Athenianrestrictions, he Melians raisean importantissue: the long-term consequences of Athenianpolicy.44 Let usnow turnto the significanceof ponderinghistoryand the future.The Melians' goal in the dialogue is to persuadethe Athenians to allowtheirneutralstatus. Yet it appearsthat if the Melians are to be successful, theyhave to deal with past events and futurepossibilities-with what Thucydides'History itself addresses. We recall that early in the dialogue the Atheniansthreaten o stop the discussion if the Melians speculateabout the future(5.87).In her discussionof the Thebans'speech in Book 3, Debnarremarks hat "whilethe Spartans n effect deny the relevance of the past, in the Melian dialoguetheAthenians reject the relevance of the future."45 n fact, the dialogue is morecomplex: we find thatboth Athens and Melos discuss not only the presentbutalso the pastandfuture,albeitin extremelyrestrictedways.

speculationsbout he futurewhich heAthenians adruledout."See alsoAndrewesandOrwin103.43Amit234 argues hat n the rhetoricalontest heMelianshave "theupperhand."Crane 93 observes hatbytheiractions heMeliansprove hat heAthenians rewrongin their ontentionhat heweakalwaysyield o thestrong5.89,5.111.4).44Connor1984:153)points o theMelians'hesis hat"restraintouldbe inthelongterm nterestof the morepowerful." ee also Crane240. Liebeschuetz5 comments:"TheAthenianswere also perfectlyrightthatthe Melians' own interestrequired hattheyshould yield to the Athenians since they had not the strengthto resist successfully. Butironically, as far as their own interest was concerned, the Athenians were wrong anddeluded." Macleod captures the conflicted essence of Athens with its "characteristiccombination of forethoughtand folly" (398), concluding that "in attackingtheir punyneighbours,the Atheniansare ruthless,realisticandyet also paradoxicallyblind"(400);cf. Forde 384. Pouncey xiii sees Athenian action as proof of "Thucydides' essentialpessimism," which he defines: "The conviction that humannaturecarries within itselfdrives that are destructiveof its own achievements,thatthey are in fact the same drivesas those thatbuildhistoricalachievements n the firstplace."45Debnar 1996: 109).

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The Atheniansapparently ssertthe irrelevanceof the past.They will not beintroducingrecollections of their victory over the Persians and their right toempire;in turn,however,they do not wish to hearaboutthe Melians' innocence(5.89). Past actions, the Athenians here maintain, are not applicable to thecurrentconfrontation.46Elsewhere,however,the Atheniansthemselves do lookto the past. At the end of the dialogue, they remindthe Melians that they havenever previously given up a siege out of fear of other powers (5.111.1). TheAthenians'characterization f the cautiousbehavior of the Spartans 5.105.3-4,5.107, 5.109) is evidently based on the past; certainly the reader has notedincidents prior to 416 that supportthis (e.g., the Mytilenianepisode). That is,they selectively recountthe past in order to persuadeMelos. The Athenians'apparentrejectionof discussing past and futureis statedbroadly;perhaps theydo not want events concerning justice or innocence brought up. The past,however, is relevant for the Athenians when it concernspower and action. TheMelians themselves disregard his prohibitionconcerningthe past, basing theirfinal rejection of Athens on history, specifically their seven hundredyears offreedom(5.112).

Both Athens and Melos present extremely restrictedvisions of the past.Thisnarrownessresultsfromeach side's refusalto acknowledgeissues the otherside introduces.Melos has no responseto the Athenians'characterization f pastSpartanaction-which the readerknows to a large extent to be accurate.Byfailing to acknowledgethe significanceof previouscautionandtentativenessonthe part of the Spartans,the Melians put themselves in a poor position todetermine the chances of their receiving future aid. On the other side, byrefusing to allow shame,justice, or freedom into the discussion, the Atheniansignorean essentialcomponentof how the Melians define themselves in terms oftheirown history.We also find each side making fine distinctionsregardingthe future. The

Meliansequateaction with hope andinactionwithdespair 5.102):Ka' f1i4v TO pEiVEtial EuOOUSVE?XTIOTOV, IETaX E TOOUBpcOlEVOuETI Kai OTrfvatleATlS 6peco.-

46AndrewespeculatesHCT V: 168)thatpastactionsof Melosmayhaveincludedmaking ontributionso Alcidas n 427,resistingNicias n 426, ignoringhe assessmentof 425, and perhapssome provocativeaction immediately efore 416, but againThucydides as toldus nothingbeyond heresistancen 426 (3.91).See note68 below.OnMeliancontributionso theSpartanwar und,see Meiggs314andLoomis, sp.65-66, 74-75, whoargueshat heMeliansmusthavemade hecontributiono theSpartanwar fund(IG V.1.1) in 427;Seaman 01 argues hat hecontributionamefrom hosewhosurvivedheAthenianxpeditionn416.

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Andforusto yield mmediatelys to giveuphope,whilewithactionthere s stillthehopewemaysucceed.

The Melians look ahead to a variety of possibilities. Aid may come fromSpartain the future(5.104, 5.106, 5.108, 5.110, 5.112.2); the Athenianempiremay fall (5.90, 5.98, 5.110); the gods may intervene (5.104, 5.112.2).47 Insupportof the likelihood of successful militaryresistance are chance,48hope,and the fact that the Spartanswill takeon the risk.49The Spartansmay even, theMeliansspeculate,attackAthenian and(5.110).At first the Athenianssay they are dismissive of thinkingabout the future.

Hope is expensive (EATris...5adTravosyap (puoel) and belongs to the "invisiblefuture"(ETrriaS aq)avETs) n a category containing prophecies and oracles(5.103).50Inpart,this is a rhetoricalmove on the Athenians'part.By cuttingoffobjectionsthe Meliansmightraise,they set the rules of the debatein such a waythat their victory is guaranteed. The Athenians characterize the Melians'speculationas "senselessness" TO aqppov,5.105) and denigratetheir claim toforesee the futuremoreclearlythanwhat is actuallyin frontof them(5.113):TCX IV PECAOVTraTCv Opp VCVv aETaTaKaraKplVETE, aXiadq)avi TCrO3OUXEo0ai CS ytyvopjEva Tjrl OEaOEE.Youconsiderhefuture ssomethinglearerhanwhat s beforeyoureyes,andyoualreadyee uncertaintiesshappening,implybecauseyouwould ikethem o be so.

Throughout he dialoguethe Meliansattemptto get the Athenians to thinkabout the possible consequencesof theiraction(neutralsallyingthemselves withSparta,Spartacoming to help, divine intervention, he fall of the empire)not ascertainties, but as plausible contingencies that should influence Atheniandecision-making.51The Melians ignore Athenian limits on discussion, but theAtheniansrejectcontemplationof these futurescenarios.47SeedeSte.Croix14 onthelikelihoodf divineaidorSpartanelp.48The Melians at 5.102 state: 'AAA'EirlTaOpEa Tr TC)V TTOXEoCa)VEOTIV OTE

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Two points should be made.First,the Atheniansthemselves fail to observetheir own restrictionon futurespeculation.In fact, the Athenians find their ownvision of the futureworth contemplating.52The Atheniansassume that if theMelians resist the city will be destroyed (Trpo TOOT'a 8EivoTaTa TraOEiv,5.93);53the Meliansmay hope for Spartanaid but the Spartanswill never arrive(5.105, 5.107).54While shuttingout these alternativescenariosof the Melians,the Athenians advance a set of optimistic possibilities promoting their owninterest. Just as the Athenianshave failed to "teach"Melos the importance-even the necessity-of arguing n termsof advantage, o the Melians have failedto "teach" Athens the value of recollecting the past and contemplatingfuturecontingencies.55A comparisonbetweenthe Melian Dialogue and a Socraticdialogue offersinstructiveparallels.Any dialogue-as a means of communication,exploration,and persuasion-has the potential to raise questions that may bring theinterlocutor o realize his or her own misconceptions.Yet the only side to askdisillusioned mind of the Athenians sees only the blindness of chance." de Romilly(1963)294 articulates broaderequence: Oneach occasion he Athenians dmit hatthis danger[the fall of the empire] exists but are quite willing to accept it. On the firstoccasion, they only discuss how serious such a defeat might be; on the second, theymention only the people of whom they would be most afraid;and on the third and lastoccasion they simplyreplyby a threat."52Williams199 criticizesAthenianefforts in subjugating he small islandof Melos as"anactionwhich suggestsnot only a fondnessforbrutality,but also a lack of moderation,self-control,and even of the foresightto considerthe adverseimpression uch an actionwouldcause."

53Amit229 observesthatthe Athenians"nowindulgein fancyaboutthe futureandputinstead of war, destructionof the city." Connor (1984: 150) sees this as prediction:"withinthe speech itself the outcome is foretold:the Melians will resist; the Athenianswill conquer; he city will be destroyed." n Thucydides,Lattimore295 notes that,in spiteof theirprohibitionat 5.87, "the entiresituation s the resultof Athenian'suspicionsaboutthe future'."54We should note that in the narrativeframe, while the siege is still going on,Thucydidestells us thatthe Spartansdid not break theirtreatywith Athens, even thoughthe Athenians had extensively plundered Spartan territory (5.115.2). That is, theAthenians'prediction n the dialogueaboutSpartanaid to Melos is correct: he Spartansdo nothing,even when provokedby furtherAthenianaggression.Again the readerhas asuperiorvantage pointthando the Melians.On the accuracyof Athenianpredictions,seePouncey93.55Regarding"thissort of misguidedhopefulness,"Ober(1998: 105) remarks hat "asThucydides' readersoon learns, the Melian oligarchs and the post-PericleanAtheniandemoshave muchmorein commonthanthe Atheniangeneralssupposed."

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questionsis thatof Melos. Inpart,this reflects the reluctanceof the Athenians otake on the role of learner; hey evidentlythinktheironly purposeis to teach.56Subsequently, hey fail to pay adequateattention o the issues the Melians raise.

The second and more importantpoint has to do with the value of historyand the possibility of conjecturingusefully aboutthe future. Macleod criticizesthe selective vision of Athens, commentingthat the Athenians' "refusalto lookinto the future is farremovedfrom the foresight(Trpovoia)which characterizesthe Thucydidean statesman." Contemplating what may transpire is what"Diodotus conceives to be the object of political deliberation."57n both speechand narrativeof the History,probingattention s given to the importanceof thepast andthe abilityto planfor the future.58From the reader'sperspectiveat thispoint in the History, saying that the past is irrelevantgoes against the entirespiritof Thucydides'work:historyis useful, similar sorts of things may happenin the future,studyof the past may lead to learning(see esp. 1.22.4).59Just asThucydides'readersdo, politicians,generals,citizens-and here, the Atheniansand the Melians-must contemplate the future and consider whether theconsequencesof a particular ctionmay lead to any advantage.

It is one thing to arguethat a particularconsequence is unlikely and givereasons for such a conclusion. At least Archidamus(1.80-85) and Pericles(1.140-44) give a rationale for their strategies and try to account for thestrengthsand weaknesses of the opposing side. But to make such a selectivedismissal of the future as irrelevant,as Athens does here, is clearly condemnedby what Thucydideshimself has alreadyemphasized n his work. The readerhaslearned o consider both the short andlong-termeffects of decisions andactions.For example, the Plataeans' actions of executing the Thebanprisonersin 431(2.5.7) and rejectingthe Spartanoffer of neutralityin 429 (2.72-74) are used

56Garst 5 argueshat"frombeginningo end it is the Melianswhoputforwardheideasandproposalswhile t is the Athenians horeply.Becauseheyhavea responseoeverything,he Meliansareconstantlyoiled and sent off to find another rgument."Williams 01 notes:"TheDialogue tresses he needforcompromiseut neither ide iswilling o givein."57Macleod 91; he continues:"a concern or the future s also characteristicfstatesmanlikeorethoughtcf. further1.138.3;2.65.6), and so to concentrate n thepresentmaybesimply hortsighted."eeEdmunds,sp.7-88.58ForThemistocles' bilities,see 1.90-93, 1.136.1, 1.138.1;cf. Pericles(2.65.5,2.65.13),andconsultdiscussionn de Ste. Croix28-33. Monoson ndLoriaux remorecritical f Pericles' oresightedness.59On heusefulness f theHistory,eedeRomilly1956).de Ste.Croix32 commentsonthepossibility f intelligentoreknowledge.

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againstthem in 427, leadingto their execution (3.66-67, 3.68.1). In the Melianepisode, however, Athens is interestedonly in the short term. More generallythen, from the first five books of Thucydides' History the reader is able toappreciatelessons concerningnot only moral languageand practicaldecision-making,butalso the significanceof the pastand the necessity of anticipating hefuture. Thus the reader is sensitive to the Melians' "pig-headedness"60 ninsisting on moral sentimentsas well as to Athens' misguided neglect of pastand future.By contrastinghow Athens and Melos argueand behavewith what istaught in the preceding sections of the History, the retrospective readerrecognizesthe inflexibilityof Melos andthe recklessnessof Athens.61Let us turnnow to othersignificantconnectionsthe Melianepisode haswith the History.Beyond the general lessons of Thucydides' History, scholars have seen agreat many connections between the Melian episode and other specificsituations, arguments,and themes from the History. While Thucydides neverexplicitly tells us the significanceof the Melianepisode, the retrospectivereaderis encouragedto engage in juxtapositionand comparisonwith the context andmotives introduced here. We have alreadyseen the relevanceof Mytilene andPlataea,62but many have viewed the significance of Melos in connection with

60Bosworth3 callstheMelian overnmentpig-headed"nrefusingoacquiesce.61Melosadvanceshe idea thatAthensmaybe an example paradeigma, .90) toothersn thefuture:f theyabolishanynotionof thecommon oodand heir mpirealls,theywouldbe leftwithout nyrecourse.The Athenians separadeigman thepresenttense: "hatred of power is a clear proof to the ruled" (TO68E laoS SuvaEEcoSTrapdESEiyca TOIS apXopEvoiS SrXOuiPEov, 5.95). Williams 200-201 comments:"Idealismy itself,withoutheaddition f foresight,ntelligence, lanning,ndaboveallpower,is incapableof survival....As the Atheniansdiscover n Sicily, if rationalplanning, ctionat theappropriateime,sufficient esources, nity,andmilitarytrength(all of which ogether angive confidence) relacking, henmilitary ctionbasedonlyonhopeandfear s unable o succeed....Thucydidesouldnothelpbutsee someof theflaws n theMelian, swellastheAthenian,osition."62Cartwright20 commentshat, ikePlataea,Meloswaschosen"notbecauseof itsimportanceo the courseof the war but for the issuesraised n the accompanyingnegotiations."ee Liebeschuetz4; in 74 n. 12 he argues:"TheMeliansarea perfectillustrationf Diodotus' hesis."Orwin112 believes hat"indeedheveryargumentsfDiodotuswouldseemto point o clemencyn this caseas well."See Macleod391 andConnor 1984: 149-50). Connor 1984: 154) further rgues hat"for the reader...theMeliancounterattack...changeshe perspectiveromthe narrow oncentrationn theeventsof 416 to thebroader evelopmentf the war."This s theviewof Kagan149n.47. See Orwin107-8 on theexplicitmention f Brasidas5.110),which ooksbacktoBook4.

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the subsequentnarrative,n particular egarding he Sicilianexpeditionin Books6-7, the defection of allies (8.2ff.), and the end of the war in 404 (see X. HG2.2.3). ImmediatelyafterAthens takes Melos, Thucydidesturnshis attentiontothe Sicilian expedition at 6.1. Like Melos, Sicily is an island, althoughmuchlargerand more powerful.63The Atheniansare successful with Melos, whereasthey meet with unprecedenteddisasterin Sicily.64 Cartwright ommentson thesequenceof Melos followed by Sicily:

a minorvictorys followedby a majordefeat,botharisingrom hesamecause,a paradoxical spectof Athenianpowerrevealedbythe dialogue:n somewaysit limits,rather hanenlarges,Athenianfreedom f action.65

Connor notes that "the reader knows that another island, Sicily, will soonovercome an Athenianattack....[Athens, like Melos, is] forcedto rely on hope,chance,andspeculationaboutthe gods (esp. 7.77.4)."6663Williams 199 speculates: "if the Melians had possessed some sort of military

advantage-if for example, the Spartanswere already presenton the island in a strongforce, or if the Melians haddevelopeda greatfleet such as the Syracusansdo later,or ifthe Melians had some sort of technological advantage hatwould give them the edge inwarfare,or if they had united with manyislanderswho hadfleets, unlikeSparta, hen theMelians perhapswould have had good groundsfor their confidence in their ability towithstanda siege."64Wasserman30 asserts: "The most dynamic and most dangerous example of thisindulgencein wishful thinking s the SicilianExpeditionwith which the MelianDialogueis so closely connectedthat it has to be regardedas its prelude."Kagan 167 believes boththe Sicilian and Melian expeditionsresulted from the same motive-to restore the bal-ance of power after the Spartanvictory at Mantinea and regain Athenianprestige; seealso Corford 182-85, Herter330-32, and Amit 219-23. In linking Sicily with Melos,see Gomme 187: "Thecourseof events may itself be dramatic,andthe truthfulhistorianwill make this clear."On the links between Melos and the circumstances n 404, seeLiebeschuetz 75-76 and de Romilly (1963: 275): "the characters made to speak byThucydides show a strange foreknowledgeof the events which marked the end of thewar."Connor(1984: 155-57) comparesthe Melian episode with the Persianwar, whichforced Athens to become nautical (1.18.2, 1.93.3): the Athenians "confrontedin thatstruggle preciselythe preponderance f powerandapparenthopelessnessthatMelos nowfaced." See Crane 246-54. For the episode as a meditation on the natureof Athenianimperialism, see Andrewes 3-6 and de Romilly (1963: 274), who comments onThucydides'"desire o give his own treatmentof the questionof imperialismas a whole."

65Cartwright 21.66Connor(1984: 155). Allison 59 notes: "In this case greaterforce is given to theclimax of Book 7 becausethe readerhad not been accustomed o associatingsoteria with

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Scholars who make these connections are fully engaged in a process ofcomparison, juxtaposition, and extrapolation(captured by the Greek worldeikazein).67The retrospectivereader is encouragedto engage in these veryoperations,for Thucydides'use of self-reference within his History stimulatessuchjuxtapositions.I would like to focus uponone particularssue crucial to theMelianepisode: neutrality.

Thucydides imself callsattention o the neutral tatusof Melos at5.84.2:68aXXa TO pEV -rrWpTOV OUSJETEpCOV OVTESiOCUXaCOV, TTrEITa CdSauTo' rlvdayKa;ov oi 'AOrvaoil 8r,JUVTEs T'V yfv, ESTroXEpOVqavEpOV KaTEOT'roav.Butat first theMelians]emainedeutraloward oth ides,but henwhen he Atheniansavagedheir and heywere orced o engage nopen war.69

This passage and earlier mentions of Melos in the History raise severalquestions.First,was Melos neutralor-hostile o Athens in 416? When warbeganin 431, Thucydides indicated that Thera and Melos were the only Cycladicislands not allied with Athens (2.9.4). In 426, Nicias took sixty ships and twothousandhoplites to Melos. Thucydidesobserved that the Melians did not wishto submit to Athens; after ravaging their land, the Athenians sailed away

the Athenians.The absence from the Athenianprogramonly becomes evident when thetermrecurs so often in the MelianDialogue."67Hunter27 offers a full definition for eikazein: "It is the ability to relate past andpresentexperience,find theiressentialsimilarities,and then conjectureor predictwhat ismost likely to occur under he given circumstances. t is reasoningbased on probability"(see her discussion at 23-41). On the importanceof eikazein,see Morrison,esp. 96-105.Gribble45 believes that"Thucydides magines them [his readers, .e.] as motivatedbythe same intellectualand historicalgoals as the narrator-historianimself (1.22.4), likehimpossessed of highlydevelopedintellectsand sensibilities."68Garst 15 believes that "the debate at Melos is about whether the Melians canmaintaintheirneutrality. n rejectingthe neutralstatusof Melos, the Atheniansbetrayanew and urgent anxiety about their control over their allies and empire."Regardingevidence from the AthenianTributeList (IG I3.71) and whether Melos actually paidtribute,see Treu,answeredby Eberhardt ndKierdorf.I am in agreementwith Amit 221regardingthe "'minimalist'view of Eberhardt, .e., that the inclusion of Melos in theCleon assessmentof 425 (cf. ATL. A9) does not provethat Melos was ever a memberofthe AthenianLeagueor paidanytribute."69Cf. 3.91. Fora comparisonof those two passages,see discussion in Eberhardt 03-7andKierdorf255-56.

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(3.91.1-2).70 In 431, Melos was neutral; five years later, it resisted an Athenianattack of short duration. Before the confrontation in 416, Melos appears to havehad little involvement in the war. Yet when Thucydides says that the Melians"were forced to come to open war" (ES Tr60XEov(pavEpov KaTEOTrloav,5.84.2), to what occasion is he referring? Apparently not to 416, for theAthenians had not yet begun hostilities; they send ambassadors before attacking(5.82.3).71 Does the open hostility refer to the raid of 426?72 If so, is Melos stillhostile in 416-ten years later? How then can it claim neutrality? Could Melospossibly have resumed neutrality, perhaps in 421 with the peace of Nicias? Butif so, why does Thucydides omit any indication of this?73

The salient point, I think, is that in the dialogue as presented by Thucydidesin 416 the Athenians do not adduce earlier conflicts they have had with Melos.Presumably they could have used the resistance of the Melians in 426 as anexcuse for their aggression, but they choose not to do so. In part, this removesthe dialogue somewhat from its historical context and gives it a more universal

70Williams 200 remarks that "it is possible that the Athenians' lackluster earlierperformancecontributed o a Melian confidencethatthe Athenian hreatwas mereemptytalk and may have caused them to have greatertrust in the ability of their island'sdefenses to deter the Athenians."

71They are called "ambassadors"Trposp3EIS)hroughout 5.84.3, 5.85, 5.114.1). Forthe statusof these envoys, see the brief discussionin Bosworth32 n. 12.72This is Andrewes' conclusion (HCT IV: 157). Seaman 388 argues against thisinterpretation: First here is no supporting vidence which suggeststhat the Melians everwent to war with the Athenians (not to mention that doing so would have been quitefoolish). Second, if the Melianshaddecided on war with the Athenians(andtheirallies)they would likely have concluded a treatywith the Spartans,analliance for which there isagainno evidence."Bauslaugh116-17 arguesthat there was not necessarilyanyaction ofMelos which provoked the attack in 426; rather,with Athens' desperate search forrevenue, the Melians' "refusal to contribute to the cost of the war hindered Athenianefforts to procurerevenue fromevery possible source."73In endeavoringto "discern the reasons why the Athenians found it necessary tosuppressthe island in 416 B.C.," Seaman 386 maintains hat "in spite of a clash of armsin 426, the Melians maintained heirneutrality."Forthe Athenians'motivations,see HCTIV: 156-58, with the conclusion:"on balance,however, it seems likely that the attackin416 was due solely to an Athenian whim, without any immediate antecedentquarrel...[still] f therewere specific groundsfor the attack n 416, we cannotnow expectto discover whatthey were."Pouncey88 comments:"the narrative s deliberatelyclearedof all contextualinformation,any record of grievanceor politics attending he event, sothatthe Athenianaction is made to appeara perfectly gratuitousactof aggression."

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meaning.74 But, from the reader's perspective, that knowledge of previousconflict heightens an awareness of Athens' utter disregardof past action, asThucydides shows the forces, and the blindness, that drive Athens on. Thucy-dides apparentlyhas chosen to use this conflict to show that even if Melos werecompletely andunambiguouslyneutral,Athenswould still act to incorporate heisland.75 By this point Athens no longer needs recourse to past hostility toexplain its own aggressiveness:the will to power is its own drivingforce and nolongerneeds furtherustification.76

This is borneout by the Melians' argumentas well. In rejectingsubmissionandyet desiringto avoid war,the Melians say they hope that Athens will allowthemto remainneutral,offeringa definitionof neutrality 5.94):"OJOTE iouxiav &aOVTas TiLaS (piXouS; ?V Eival aVT'i

TroXEPIC,o, uPJPOdXoUS EPi rBETEpCov, OUKav BE'aiGOE;Wouldn'tyou accept us keeping the peace, being friends instead ofenemies, andallies to neitherside?

The Melians raise the spectre of possibility that, if Athens besieges them,otherneutralswill join Sparta, hus strengtheningAthens' enemies (5.98). Thatis, the Melians try to fit their goal of neutrality nto the Athenianset of values,which is apparently imitedto power, safety, and advantage.77The final wordsof the Melians, afterinvoking freedom,chance, and hope of Spartanaid, are aninvitationto Athens(5.112.3):

TTpoKaCXOupFjae uLaJS5pioihlEV Elval, -roXEplol 5E p185ETEpoIs,Kai iK Tfri yiS ripcJv 6vaxcoprpoal oTrovbaS TroirloaiiEvoUSaiTlVES bOKOUOIVETTiTri8EjO EivaI ad


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We inviteyouto be ourfriends,andto be enemies o neither ide.Make a treatywith us whichseemsappropriateo bothsides andleaveour and.

But the Athenianshave alreadystated their objectionto neutrality.Friend-ship, they say, is associatedwith weakness (r (piXtapEv&aOEVEiaS)nd bringsharmrather hanhatred 5.95).78Power alone has become its ownjustification.In terms of Thucydides' History, the option of neutrality was firstconsideredby the Corcyreanswhen they sought an Athenian alliance.79Theyconcluded in retrospect hat such a policy was a mistake(1.32) and successfullypursuedan alliance with Athens. The Corcyreanepisode before the war forcesus to considerseriouslywhen neutralitycould be a viable option. If an island atthe northwestedge of the Greek world can arguethat a policy of isolation isfoolish, what chancedoes Melos-without a navy, in the Aegeanthat is Athens'sphere of domination-have for disengagement?Archidamus ater offered the

option of neutrality o the Plataeans,which would have removed Plataea fromthe Athenian alliance (2.72). Yet neutrality was again rejected, as Plataeainsisted on maintaining ts relationshipwith Athens.80Athens now insists thatMelos not remainneutral,for Athens controls the sea and Melos is an island.The issue is not whetherneutrality s an option.As Bauslaughshows in his workThe Concept of Neutralityin Classical Greece, several states remained neutralduringthe PeloponnesianWar. The question is whether neutralityis a viableoptionfor this weak island at this time.The situation n the Melianepisode is similarto those previoussituations nsome respects, significantlyreversedin others. Like Corcyra,Melos has had orclaims a policy of neutrality; unlike Corcyra, however, Melos wishes tomaintain such a status. Corcyrawas independentand had a navy; Melos is

78Regardinghe Athenians' rgumentt5.97,Seaman 90 believes"theclear mportis that successfulresistanceby a weak island would be especiallydangerous."eeCleon's view on the hatred nd fearof subjectsat 3.40 andcomments y de Romilly(1963:287-88)on fearas motivationor theAthenians;f. Pouncey 8-101, who callsfear"the irst mpulseo imperialism"99).79Theprevalencef neutral tatess preemptivelyismissed y Thucydides, lthoughsee Bauslaugh 09:"Thucydides'elf-promotingtatementhatthe entireGreekworldwas involved n the war,somejoiningin immediatelynd other ntendingo do so(1.1.1), shouldnot be takenas a pronouncementf definitive act. The truth s thatThucydides newfull well that he situationwas farmorecomplicated,nd he didnothesitateoacknowledgeheexistence f neutrals t the outsetof thewar."80Bauslaugh32 notesthat,due to theirrejection f neutrality,thePlataeans avetheir nemies perfect egalpretextorannihilatinghem."

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virtuallywithout defense. Corcyracame to considerneutralitya mistake;Melosconsidersneutrality o be its best option.Like Plataea,Melos rejectsthe allianceoffered by a threateningpower. Plataeahoped for aid fromAthens,yet this wascompromisedby the fact that Plataeawas land-lockedand Athens' power lay onthe sea. A situation in mirrorimage appearsfor Melos, which hopes for as-sistance, yet as an island cannot be confident of aid from the land power,Sparta.81 n these three situations-Corcyra, Plataea,and Melos-we find thatneutrality s not a viable option for one reasonor another.The Melian episodehas the effect of forcing the reader to ask whether neutralitycan ever exist.Under what circumstanceswould it be possible for any city to opt out of thestruggleof the PeloponnesianWar?82In a practicalsense, cities are able to remainneutral.Bauslaughgives usseveral examples that prove the point, such as Argos.83 Thucydides evencomments on the advantages Argos gained from alliances with both sides(atq)oTpoIS 58 paXX)ov EvcWTrovSlOVTESEKKapTrc.oadIEVOi,.28.2).84 Yetbefore the war Corcyrahad a navy; Argos had an army. The question is notwhetherneutralitycan be a viable policy, but ratherwhether it is possible oradvisablefor a weak, small polis to claim neutrality.85The Melians' only hope,given thattheirsole resource s argument, s to arguein a way thatwill persuadeAthens. The Athenians nsist uponarguments n termsof expediency,yet, as wehave seen, the Melians fail to abide by this stipulation: nsteadwe find Meloscontinuingto put forthappealsto morality.Thucydides'accountof the warthusfar has made clear that for Melos to persuadeAthens, it has to articulateclear

81Theslandertatus fMelos s emphasizedt5.84.2,5.97,5.99;cf. 5.109.82Bauslaugh8 observes: itseems hatThucydidesonsideredhis anomalousolicy[i.e., neutrality]as a double-edged sword, simultaneouslydangerous,even potentiallyfatal, for those who pursued it, and yet also useful, even necessary, for belligerents,whose interests, indeed whose very victory or defeat, were served by convincinguncommittedstates, whose polarizationmight prove disastrous,that it would in fact bethe best and securest policy (i.e., sophrosyne)to abstainfrom the conflict and remainatpeace."83See Bauslaugh110-24, 146-60, 162-63 etpassim.84See discussionof this passagein Bauslaugh71-72.85Seaman 415 observes: "It is indeed ironic to consider that it was in fact herlongstandingneutralitywhich left Melos as prey for Athens duringthe Peace of Nicias."Williams 306 finds a broader esson: "The incident [of Mycalessus] also indicates thatany state which has a powerfulally thatcan come to its aid has an importantadvantage.This is particularly rue in the case of a small city-state that cannot defend itself well.Thucydidesillustrates his point over and over in the History:States which act withoutallies, such as Plataea,Mytilene,and Melos frequentlycome to grief."

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advantagesfor Athens. As Bauslaugh argues, the Melians are now confrontedwith a "newlyevolved ethos of hegemonial, imperialGreek states that refusedtoacceptanyrestraintson the pursuitof self-interest."86

The perspective of the reader instructs us in assessing the validity andwisdom of Melian and Athenianargumentand action. In fact, it turns out thatwe cannot evaluatewhathappensin the Melian episode-what goes wrong andwhy, the Melians' failure to see the difference between diplomatic discourseand actualmotivation,the Athenians' selective vision of past and future-with-out setting this episode in the context of the rest of the History. Everythingdemonstratedin the first five books puts the reader in an epistemologicalposition superior o that of the Melians and the Athenians.In earliersituations nthe History (e.g., the Corcyrean episode), Thucydides guides, instructs, andmakes connections for the reader.87By the end of Book 5, Thucydideshas set amore challenging project for the reader. The Melian episode may have manygoals, but one of these is to test the readerregardingwhat the History itselfteaches.88 The reader's ultimatetask is to examine lessons from the rest of theHistory and apply them in this new context. Thucydides' world suggests notonly the interconnectednessof cities, but also the relevance of conflict andargumentfound in one setting to new situations. While neutralitymay haveexisted in late fifth-centuryGreece, in the world constructedby Thucydidesonlythose who have learned the lessons of history have a chance of pursuingsuccessful policy.89

86Bauslaugh46.87E.g.,Thucydides xplicitlyinksthe Corcyreanonflict o theoutbreakf the war(1.23.6,1.55.2; f. 1.146); eeMorrison01-4.88Connor1984:15-19,233-40)discusseshedevelopmentfthe reader's eaction.89Bauslaugh 17 notes that all the previouslyneutralstates"eventually ecameinvolvedin the war,"which "emphasizes ow terriblydifficult it was to remainuncommittedn a time of generalconflict betweenpowerfulhegemonialalliances.Failuredid not mean that no abstentionwas possible, only that it was difficulttomaintain."would ike to thank he editorof TAPA nd severalanonymouseadersortheirextremelyaluableubstantive,tylistic, ndbibliographicaluggestions.

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Works CitedAlker, H. R., Jr. 1988. "The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue."AmericanPolitical Science Review82: 805-20.Allison, J. W. 1997. Wordand Concept n Thucydides.Atlanta,GA.Amit, A. 1968. "The MelianDialogueandHistory."Athenaeum46: 216-35.Andrewes, A. 1960. "The Melian Dialogue and Perikles' Last Speech (Thucydides V,84-113; II, 60-4)." PCPS 7: 1-10.Arnold [Debnar], P. 1992. "The Persuasive Style of Debates in Direct Speech in

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