Hegel Aufheben

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KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVENInstitute of Philosophy

HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF SUBLATION

A Critical Interpretation

Prooter! Professor William Desmond "issertation presente# to fulfill there$uireents for the #e%ree of"octor &Ph'"'( in Philosophy)y! Ral! Palm

Leu*en+ ,--.

KATHOLIEKEUNIVERSITEIT

LEUVEN


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my promoter Professor William Desmond for his invaluable guidance

throughout the work on this dissertation; philosophical expertise is one thing, and insight

another, and I have been lucky enough to study under someone gifted with both in excess. Iwould also like to thank Professor udovicus De !os for his thoughtful and challenging

comments; this study is all the stronger due to his input. I am grateful to the many other

professors of the "oger Instituut voor Wi#sbegeerte, especially Professors Paul $ruysberghs,

"erman De Di#n, %artin %oors, &art 'aymaekers, and 'udi !isker. What I know about

philosophy I learned from them.

(hanks also go to those who helped me with the final preparation of this dissertation.

%atthew )ostelecky helped proofread the text and provided valuable philosophical feedback.

*o )+hler was kind enough to doublecheck the -erman of the text for me. (his dissertation

was greatly strengthened through the contribution of 'embert De &lander, who assisted me

with the statistical analysis in $hapter . %y brother /ric Palm, who also helped with theproofreading, has forgotten more about the /nglish language than I could seem to remember.

(o these four, as well as 'en0e, %ichael, *ulianne, 1ydney, "eidi, (om, 2nneke, 3rank, uc,

!incent, 1arah, %ichelle, Dan, &rian, *osh, Pascale, and anyone else that I have forgotten to

mention4 you should know that your friendship over the years will always be remembered.

(his dissertation has involved a lot of hard work, but no small part of its successful

completion has been due to blind luck. I was fortunate enough to be born to parents who have

supported and encouraged me my entire life. (his work would not have been possible without

them, in more ways than I can count.

2nd to Iris4 ik kan geen woorden vinden, in geen elke taal, om te zeggen hoe belangrijk jebent voor mij.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................. .1

-/5/'2 '/%2')1 .......................................................................................................................... ........6

78(I5/ 73 ("/ P'7*/$( .................................................................................................................. .....9

PART I: STRUCTURE .......................................................................................................................... ........ ........8

CHAPTER 1: DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................8

2. P71I(I!/ D/3I5I(I751 ..............................................................................................................................:

'emark4 7n (ranslating 2ufheben ..............................................................................................................6&. 5/-2(I!/ D/3I5I(I751 ............................................................................................................ ........ .....69

6. 5egation ..................................................................................................................................... ........ .......6et, for such an important concept, it has received relatively scant

treatment in the secondary literature. 2mong 2nglophone "egel scholars in particular,

extensive discussion of the concept is difficult to find outside of a translatorHs preface.I

would like to take a small step toward rectifying this lacuna by presenting a critical

interpretation of "egelHs concept of sublation.

1ublation can most simply be explained as the mainspring in the intricate clockwork

of "egelHs thinkingthat which drives it forward.8nderstanding what "egel means by the

term BsublationB in this technical sense is vitally important to understanding "egelHs

philosophy as a whole.?(his word, in its various forms, is ubiJuitous throughout "egelHs

writings. /verywhere in "egel, one can read over and over again how a given concept is

sublated in the transition to another. 2nd while one can read volumes on those concepts and

6 EAufheben und das Aufgehobene ist einer der wichtigsten Begriffe der Philosophie, eine Grundbestimmung,die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt K16C


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that can be readily abstracted from its sub#ect matter.


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9

OUTLINE OF THE PRO'ECT

In this study, I analyOe of "egelHs concept of sublation in three ways4 structurall#,

functionall#, and criticall#. 2s we proceed, we will see how each of these analyses is

ultimately intertwined with all the others. (he remainder of this section will specify more

precisely what I have in mind for each of these modes of analysis in particular.

(he first part, on structure, analyOes "egelHs concept of sublation in terms of how his

own writings present the concept, both explicitly and implicitly. $hapter 6, on the explicit

structure, first deals with "egelBs own discussions of sublation as suchhis Bpositive

definitionsB of the term, or the points where "egel states what sublation is. 5ext, this chapter

discusses the terms with which he contrasts sublationhis Bnegative definitionsB, or points

where "egel states what sublation is not. $hapter , on the implicit structure, looks at how

"egel uses the term and what that usage can tell us about its meaningfrom the general level

of the context in which and the freJuency with which the term sublation occurs, down to the

specific level of the syntax of the sentences in which it is used. (he benefit of approaching

sublation at this level of detail is that it will be useful for isolating some of the nuances of

"egelHs sense of the term that might otherwise remain obscure. (hus, Part I will help clarify

the most common misconceptions about sublation and provide an overview that will guide

our later analysis. $ontinuing with the organic analogy, this section on the structure of the

concept could be said to present the anatom#of sublation.

(he second part takes up three examples from the 'cience of $ogicin order to

illustrate how the concept of sublation functions in "egelBs system. If Part I discusses what

sublation is, Part II discusses how it works. In the first chapter of this part K$hapter M, I

discuss the classic first chapter of the$ogic, in which "egel treats the transition from &eing

and 5othing to &ecoming. In the second chapter of this part K$hapter ?M examines the second


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atterKreprint 7liver and &oyd, 6:@:4 original 6:


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6?

experiment with some substitute. I am inclined to agree with 1uchting that BsuspensionB works

well as a possible /nglish translation. "arris and -eraetsBs argument that suspension is Nout of

place in pure logicN is a non se?uitur.C1uchting mentions that N(he only ob#ection I have

heard against the suggestion is that BsuspendB has an overtone of temporariness, which

aufheben, at least in "egelBs technical use of it, does not.N61ince "arris and -eraetsBs

introduction provides no real #ustification for their decision, one need not wonder for long

from whom 1uchting heard this ob#ection. It is, in any case, an unsound one, insofar as the

temporary connotations of BsuspensionB are related to its institutional Kand academicM senses,

and not, say, its physical or chemical senses; few would argue that salt is NtemporarilyN

suspended in seawater Kexcept on a broad hydrological scaleM or that the &rooklyn bridge Ka

suspension bridgeM is a NtemporaryN construction Kopened 6::M. I have not adopted this

substitution simply because its utility as a translation is metaphorical; suspension has a dual

sense, but it conveys "egelBs particular dual sense of aufhebenonly figuratively. ike

aufheben, suspension has a dual sense, but this does not mean anything other than that they

are comparable, not that they are synonymous. 3or example, the negative aspect of suspension

in its chemical senseBdissolutionBis comparable to negation, but is not literally negation.

&y contrast, "egel is explicit in his contention that the double meaning of aufhebenis to be

taken literally. 2ny introduction of metaphor into the eJuation, even if it is not the sort of

metaphor "egel re#ected, still risks confusion.

(he problem is that there is no literal, direct translation for aufheben. 2ny /nglish

term would simply be a placeholder, because there is no single verbum verboeJuivalent.

5or is such a wordforword substitution strictly necessary. 'ecogniOing this, some

C /xxvi. 5o reason is given Kby "arris and -eraetsM wh#it would be Bout of placeB, or why it would evenmatter if it were.6 /xxvi 3or sublationBs utility as a placeholder, see the translatorBs remark in *ean uc5ancy,6egel% !he

7estlessness of the egative, trans. *ason 1mith and 1teven %iller K8niversity of %innesota, CCM, 66: n.6.5ancy himself is not interested in the Nmultiple choices of various translatorsN arguing instead that N7ne must

mediate these and try to penetrate the thing.N 5ancy, 66:.


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translators have instead opted to translate aufhebenwith various terms in the same text, each

tailored to the specific context of each passage.In this case one buys precision at the cost of

textual integrity. (he fact that for "egel the term expresses a single operation is completely

lost and the problem of aufhebenBs complexity is simply ignored. 2nother possibility is

leaving the term untranslated in /nglish.?(he problem with this approach is that as a -erman

word, it cannot be con#ugated in an /nglish sentence. 2s such, it is restricted to appearing in

its nominative form KAufhebungM or as a gerund KAufhebenM. In this case, the active, verbal

character of the term is lost. ". &. 5isbet applies the somewhat novel solution of combining

these approaches, translating aufhebenwith a variety of terms depending on the context, but

indicating each instance with the -erman original in parenthesis.98nfortunately, while this

solution works when translating "egelBs writings, it is of less use in discussing them.

-iven these difficulties, the traditional option of BsublationB is probably the least

problematic alternative. While the /nglish term is obsolete and explains virtually nothing

about the original termBs meaning, it does not conceal anything about it either. 2lso, since the

/nglish term is no longer in common use, there is little chance that any connotation of it will

obscure the meaning of the original "egelian term. With the use of such a placeholder,

however, an explanation of the originalBs meaning is absolutely essential. Providing such an

explanation of the term aufhebenis an important function of this study.

B. NEGATI&E DEFINITIONS

"aving now presented what "egel says sublation is, I can now examine what "egel

says it is not. "egel contrasts his technical sense of sublation with three other concepts4

negation, synthesis, and irony. 2nalyOing these contrasts will help us further determine

"egelHs basic comprehension of his concept of sublation.

1ee, for example, $lark &utlerBs recent translation of the$ectures on $ogic% Berlin, @@KIndiana 8niversity

Press, CC:M.? "eideggerBs*asein, for example, is a similarly problematic term for the point of view of translation.9 "egel, -.W.3.,Political 0ritings, trans. ".&. 5isbet K$ambridge, 6@@@M.


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6oment in der spekulativen &dee, doch, als diese blo/e dialektische nruhe und Aufl5sung des nendlichen wiedes "ndlichen gefa/t, auch nur ein >oment, nicht aber, wie 'olger es will, die ganze &dee.G K2


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CHAPTER 2: USAGE

In $hapter 6, we saw how "egel explicitly defines his technical conception of

sublation, both positively and negatively. 5ow, we will proceed further and examine what

"egelBs writings convey implicitly about sublationnot what he says about it, but how he

uses it.6I examine "egelBs usage in three ways. 3irst, I analyOe the relativefre?uenc#with

which he uses various forms of aufheben. 1econd, I look at the grammaticals#nta+of the

sentences in which these uses occur. (hird, I examine what the conte+tin which he uses the

term can tell us about its precise meaning.

(aken in itself, this level of detail might initially seem excessive. "owever, what I

hope to show in these analyses would be difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty by

other, more general methods. (he basic purpose of these analyses is to reinforce some of the

claims made in my textual analysis in $hapter 6. 3urthermore, it is my hope that these

analyses will highlight certain aspects of "egelBs concept of sublation that might otherwise be

neglected or overlooked.

A. FRE"UENCY

(he first step in the analysis of "egelBs usage of BsublationB will be to examine the

freJuency with which the term occurs in "egelBs writings. &y analyOing this freJuency

statistically, relative to certain other variables, we will be able to draw certain conclusions

about "egelBs usage. (he basic methodology behind this freJuency analysis is derived from

what is called BstylometryB, a form of Juantitative linguistics. "owever, the application here is

distinct. 1tylometric analyses commonly use known features internal to a text Ke.g. distinctive

features of a given writerBs particular styleM to ascertain unknown features external to the

6 (he general treatment of "egelBs usage here is distinct from the treatment of its function in Part II insofar as

this chapter treats its use in abstract, general terms, while the next Part will treat its use in relation to concretemoments of "egelBs logic. (o put it another way, while general usage as an aspect of structure is an implicit

feature of "egelBs writings, the particular uses that occur there are something explicit.

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content of the text itself Ke.g. Juestions regarding authorship or the seJuence in which texts

were writtenM. &y contrast, this freJuency analysis uses known external features Ke.g. target

audience, seJuenceM to help determine features internal to the structure of the text itself. I am

not aware of any precedent for this approach, but I hope to demonstrate its potential utility by

way of example. It is also important to emphasiOe at the outset that this statistical approach is

only presented as one mode of analysis among many, and is offered as a supplement to, and

not a substitute for, more traditional modes of textual analysis.

(hroughout his works, "egel uses aufhebenin a variety of declensions, con#ugations,

and various other specialiOed forms. (he four most common forms in which the term occurs

are4

aufgehoben D is sublatedDaufheben D to sublateDaufhebt D sublatesD

Aufhebung DsublationD

(he data presented in the tables below are based on the freJuency with which each of these

forms occur in "egelBs works and compared with other relevant information. (he first table

K(able 6M lists the number of occurrences in "egelBs works of each of these forms of aufheben

compared with the number of instances of*ialektik.(he second table K(able M summariOes

this material, together with other Juantitative information about each volume4 the total

number of pages per volume, the average date of each text, the total instances of all forms of a

term, the average number of occurrences per page Kthe freJuencyM, and a comparison of the

average freJuencies of aufhebenand*ialektik.

isted in order of freJuency, highest to lowest. 1ee (able 6 for details. Importantly, this list does not include

instances of aufhebenused separably Khebt...aufM. (his problem is addressed at the end of this section. (his data has been collected from the electronic version of "egelBs collected works4 G.0.8. 6egel 0erke. $D

'7%. (apla!erlag &erlin, !ersion .C, which is itself based on -.W.3. "egel, 0erke in EF B)ndenK1uhrkamp, 6@CM. (he original files were converted to PD3 format in order to facilitate navigation, search, and

data collection.

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T/+ 1. N(0+ ) O(+-+ ) *+ &6( F0"

aufgehoben aufheben aufhebt Aufhebung * ialektik dialektische

/arly Writings


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lifetime Ki.e. thePhenomenolog#, the$ogic, thePhilosoph# of 7ightand the"nc#clopediaM,

thePhenomenolog#and the$ogicwere the only two written directly for an audience of

professional philosophers. While the"nc#clopediaand thePhilosoph# of 7ightcertainly have

serious philosophical content, they were originally published as textbooks or outlines for

students. (hus, for our purposes the designation BtechnicalB indicates a published work that is

not a student textbook.


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which "egel wrote that work, that is related most directly with how often he uses the term

BsublationB.

In order to test these first two claims, a regression analysis was conducted,:in which

the difference of the average freJuencies of aufhebenminus*ialektikKthe last column of

(able M was related to the average volume date and each volumeBs BtechnicalityB. @(he results

of this regression analysis are presented in (able KbelowM.

2 brief explanation of the information presented in (able is in order.6C'egression

analysis is a statistical procedure for determining the relationship between a dependent

variable and one or more independent variables. KIn this case, the dependent variable is the

difference in freJuency between aufhebenand*ialektikand the independent variables are the

average date of each volume and each volumeBs BtechnicalityB.M (he BcoefficientsB listed in the

table define the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 2 coefficient

value of greater than Oero Ka positive valueM indicates a relationship between the two

variables, where an increase in the value of the independent variable entails a proportional

increase in the dependent variable.66In the same way, a negative coefficient value would

indicate an inverse relationship, and a coefficient of or around Oero would indicate no

noticeable relationship. (he BpvalueB indicates the probability of obtaining a result eJual to or

: Initially in the preparation of this chapter, my analysis of the data was conducted on the hypothetical basisdiscussed above. ater, I consulted with a statistician in order to test these hypotheses and better ground these

claims. (he regression analysis itself was conducted by Dr. 'embert De &lander Kan econometric researcher atouvainla5euveM and testing these claims would not have been possible were it not for his contribution. (heinitial hypotheses themselves and the arguments subseJuently derived from them are my own, as are any errors

in my explanation.@ B(echnicalityB was incorporated into the analysis through the use of what is called a Ndummy variableN, where

BtechnicalB works were assigned a value of 6 and all others were assigned a value of C. In regression analysis,such dummy variables are used when comparing Juantitative data to other nonJuantitative factors.6C (o avoid a lengthy digression, I will only discuss those terms most immediately relevant to the claims beingmade. (hese terms are underlined in (able . (he other information in the table was used to calculate the results

we will examine more closely. 3or a more detailed introduction to the statistical terms used here, see $hapter omenten herab, noch unterschiedenen, aber zugleich aufgehobenen.NK16C9; "W9L66M

: (his example is somewhat artificial since I have abstracted these two sentences from their broader context.(his abstraction is intended to isolate the syntactical element being described, not to obscure "egelBs meaning.

(he full passage is Juoted below in 1ection $ of this chapter, note


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itsrelationshipto being or its semblance K'cheinM, and in its determination is no longer

external but is sub#ectivefree, selfsubsistent and selfdetermining, or rather it is the sub#ect

itself.N@In this example, the grammatical ob#ect of sublation is NrelationshipN KBeziehungM.

%ore specifically, it is the sublation, by the logic of the concept, of the relationship between

essence and being. In this instance, the sense of sublation as preservation is clearly

emphasiOed. What is negated is not being or essence, but the nature of the relationship

between the two. 2t the level of the concept, the e+ternaldetermination of being and essence

is replaced with aselfdetermination.C(he externality is negated, but at the same time both of

the moments themselves are preserved. (hus, this passage illustrates the association between

the sublation of a relationship between moments Krather than the moments themselvesM and

the sense of sublation as preservation.6

"aving carefully examined the grammar of particular sentences in which the word

sublation occurs, we can draw two important conclusions. 3irst and foremost, we can see that

there is apatternin "egelBs use of sublation. When used BdirectlyB Kthe sublation of momentsM,

the sense of negation is emphasiOed. When used BindirectlyB Kthe sublation of the relation

between momentsM, the sense of preservation is emphasiOed. 'ecognition of this pattern helps

to show that "egelBs system is not simply an arbitrary aggregate of moments that can each be

read independently of the other. 2t the same time, the variations in the patternthe fact that

the Bliteral double meaningsB of sublation are not always weighted eJuallyhelp show how

"egelBs system is not simply the result of the repetitious application of an abstract formal

method. (here is a pattern here, but at the level of grammar, rather than dialectic.

@ N*ie subjektive $ogik ist die $ogik des Begriffs, 3 des 0esens, das seine Beziehung auf ein 'ein oder seinen'chein aufgehoben hat und in seiner Bestimmung nicht erlich mehr, sondern das freie selbstdige, sich in sichbestimmende 'ubjektive oder vielmehr das 'ubjekt selbst ist.N K1


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I should note at this point that a sense of these sorts of patterns is helpful but not

sufficient for a thorough interpretation of "egelBs concept of sublation. In my emphasis on the

importance of this Bgrammar of dialecticB, I am in no way advocating a reductivel#structuralist

approach to the interpretation of "egel. (o do so would be simply to repeat the old mistake of

the BtextbookB reading of "egel Ke.g. the (hesis2ntithesis1ynthesis formulaM, which treats

"egel as having the sort of merely formal method that he explicitly condemns.?'ather, it is

my claim that structural methods can act as a useful supplement to Kbut again, not a

replacement ofM a more historiographical approach. When reading "egel Kor any text, for that

matterM, one can never, for specific reasons we will see in the next section, be so foolish as to

neglect an eJually close attention to context.

C. CONTE%T

While structural analyses such as examinations of word freJuency and syntax can be

useful tools, providing helpful glimpses into certain aspects of "egelBs concept of sublation,

they cannot Kby themselvesM present a complete picture. (hus, the third step in our analysis

will be to look at what the conte+tin which "egel employs the concept of sublation implies

about its specific meaning.

(he most important aspect of context to take note of here is "egelBs freJuent use of the

term BsublationB with an emphasis on the sense of negation, but with the addition of some sort

of Jualifying remark. 2long these lines, a relatively common formulation in "egelBs writings

is that something is said to be sublated in the negative sense, Nbut eJuallyN Kaber ebensosehrM

or Nbut at the same timeN Kaber zugleichM it is preserved. 3or an illustration of this, we can

return to the first example from the section on syntax,9this time looking at the broader

context of the paragraph as a whole.

&y this I mean structural associations in general, including patterns of both freJuency and syntax.? 1??9; "W9L9.9 2lso cited in part in previous section, in note .

:


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&ecoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not the unity which abstracts

from being and nothing; but as the unity of being and nothing it is this determinate

unity in which there is both being and nothing. &ut in so far as being and nothing,

each unseparated from its other is, each is not. (hey are therefore in this unity, butasvanishing moments, only as sublated. (hey sink from their initially imagined self

subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct, but at the same timearesublated.


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sublation in its technical, double sense. 7f course, a careful reader must always look beyond

the syntax to the context or else risk missing the point.

(he distinction between the term and the concept is important not #ust for avoiding a

misreading of "egelBs use of sublation, but also in order to avoid missing it altogether. In

some cases, the concept of sublation is present without any explicit use of the term at all. 3or

example4

...there is nothing, nothing in heaven or in nature or spirit or anywhere else which

does not eJually contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two

determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the

opposition between them to be a nullity.:

5ow, this passage makes clear Kalbeit implicitM use of both the positive and negative senses of

sublation. (he opposition between immediacy and mediation is a NnullityN Ki.e. it is negatedM.

2t the same time, both immediacy and mediation are present, Ncontained eJuallyN in

everything, in spite of the nullity of their opposition Ki.e. they are preservedM. (hus, the two

senses of sublation are both clearly present. /ven elements of the syntactical structure are

found here, insofar as it is not immediacy or mediation that are a nullity but the opposition

between them. It would be absurd to claim that the concept of sublation is not at work here

simply because it is not referred to explicitly, simply because it is not named. 'ecognition of

this fact depends upon a distinction between the term and the concept of sublation. @

2 Blinguistically positivistB interpretation, which assumes that a concept can never be present without thecorresponding term, is forced to ignore these important contextual aspects.: N...da/ es ichts gibt, nichts im 6immel oder in der atur oder im Geiste oder wo es sei, was nicht ebensodie nmittelbarkeit enth)lt als die 1ermittlung, so da/ sich diese beiden Bestimmungen als ungetrennt unduntrennbar und jener Gegensatz sich als ein ichtiges zeigt.N K1


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Transition to Part II

2t this point, we have reached the conclusion of Part I of this study on the structure of

"egelBs concept of sublation. 1everal key aspects of this concept have been established. In

$hapter 6, we saw how "egel explicitly defines the term BsublationB and how he implicitly

distinguishes it from other related terms such as negation and synthesis. In $hapter , we saw

what "egelBs general usage of the term can tell us about the concept4 6M that sublation is the

operant, active expression of "egelBs logic; M that the meaning of a particular instance of

sublation can be better ascertained by attending to its grammatical ob#ect; M that a particular

instance of the concept of sublation cannot be either isolated from its context or completely

identified with instances of the term alone. (aken together, these structural aspects of "egelBs

concept of sublation will help us to examine, in Part II, how this concept functions in

individual moments and transitions in "egelBs logic.

?6


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claims I have made about the implicit structure are in fact correct. (he first test is necessary if

one does not merely want to assume, but rather to demonstrate, that "egel does not contradict

himself, i.e. that his statements about sublation are in fact coherent. (he second test is

necessary if one wants to make not only abstract, but also concrete claims about "egelBs

philosophy. It is only by actually traveling to our destination that we can see if the map we

originally consulted is accurate.

With these two purposes in mind, one can see how the structural and functional

analyses of "egelBs concept of sublation play complementary roles in this interpretation. /ach

helps reciprocally to determine the other more fully, and helps isolate details and insights in a

way that neither could accomplish alone.

In this part, I take up three examples from the 'cience of $ogicin order to show how

the concept of sublation functions in "egel. I examine the role of sublation in three key

relationships4 being and nothing,identity and difference,and the system and its moments.?

While these are only three of many possible examples, they are not chosen arbitrarily. /ach

illustration will provide certain benefits.

3irst, choosing concepts that are more generally recogniOable beyond the scope of

their particular "egelian sense Ki.e. more broadly relevant to ontology andLor systematic

philosophy as suchM means that they should be more broadly elucidating than those more

specialiOed examples that might be only more narrowly relevant Ke.g. %easure, $hemism,

etc.M. 2s a general principle, the more widely recogniOed a concept is, the more helpful it

should be for the purposes of exposition.

1econd, in practical terms, some sort of selection must be made. 2n exhaustive

catalogue of every instance of sublation in the'cience of $ogiccould very well be useful for

2s discussed in &ook 6, 1ection 6, $hapter 6 of the 'cience of $ogic, also referring to becoming. 2s discussed in &ook , 1ection 6, $hapter of the 'cience of $ogic, also referring to similarity, diversity,

opposition, and contradiction.? 2s discussed in &ook , 1ection , $hapter of the 'cience of $ogic, referring to the 2bsolute Idea and itsconstituent moments.

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"egel scholars treating any number of other topics, but it would be of little help for the

purpose of explaining the concept of sublation itself. It would constitute a counterproductive

digression away from the main thesis, like a child telling a story that goes on too long because

he does not know which details are the important ones. (he topic of this dissertation is "egel

concept of sublation, not "egelBs entire 'cience of $ogic.9

(hird, in addition to illustrating more specifically how sublation functions in "egelBs

logic, treating these three topics will enable me to address three more general Juestions

relevant to a broader understanding of the concept of sublation.

6M Is "egelBs logic simply absurdQM Does "egel violate the law of noncontradictionQ

M "ow does "egel conceive of his systemQ

3rom a "egelian perspective, these Juestions may seem overly simplistic, but they are Juite

common in references to "egel by nonspecialists. I will look at each of these Juestions, in

the chapters on being and nothing K$hapter M, identity and difference K$hapter ?M, and the

system and its moments K$hapter 9M, respectively, through the lens of sublation. (hrough

these analyses, I hope to demonstrate how the structuralfunctional approach I have used here

can be useful as a way of elucidating a philosopher like "egel.

&efore we proceed, it is important to emphasiOe that the purpose of the discussion here

of moments like being, nothing, and becoming is a better understanding of "egelBs concept of

sublation, not these moments in themselves. 2s such, I must set aside important issues that do

not bear directly on the matter at hand. 1pecifically, I must set aside certain logical Juestions

Ke.g. NIs it valid to begin the logic with beingQNM and metaphysical Juestions Ke.g. NIs "egelBs

concept of being an adeJuate oneQNM which, while important, are not directly pertinent to the

issue at hand.

9 In this study, however, I have focused specifically on the concept of sublation as it appears in "egelBs logic,

insofar as the 'cience of $ogiccontains its most explicit and elaborate expression.

??


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(hat being said, any discussion, regardless of its focus, needs to begin by laying some

sort of groundwork. 1o, while some discussion of being and nothing in themselves will be

unavoidable, the relevance to sublation should become apparent as we proceed.

A. BEING AND NOTHING

(o start with, what does "egel mean by NbeingN K'einMQ 2t the beginning of the

'cience of $ogic, he obviously does not mean it in the sense of Ba beingB Kthat is a more

specific determination, clearly distinguishable in -erman as 'eiendeM, but rather being in the

sense of Bbeing in generalB. "owever, "egel uses the term BbeingB in the sense of Bbeing in

generalB in two ways. 7n the one hand, BbeingB refers to the entire sub#ectmatter of &ook 6

and its place in the 'cience of $ogicas a whole K*ie $ehre von 'einM4 being insofar as it is

externally determined Ki.e. in contrast with essence and conceptM and insofar as it is internally

determined Ki.e. in terms of Juality, Juantity, measure, etc.M. 7n the other hand, the term

BbeingB also refers to the specific sub#ectmatter of the first part of $hapter 64 Npure beingN

Kreine 'einM.


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"egel goes on to define pure nothing Kreine ichtsM as Ncomplete emptiness, absence

of all determination and contentundifferentiatedness in itselfN.66In addition, he states in his

first 'emark that this nothing KichtsM is not opposed to something K"twasM, because such a

nothing would already be a determinate nothing Kein bestimmtes ichtsM. 2n eJually apt term

for nothing as purely indeterminate would be BnonbeingB KichtseinM.6

(he key point for "egel here is that since pure being and pure nothing both lack any

determination, they are, in effect, the same. "egel makes the same basic claim at the ends of

both sections 2 and & of $hapter 64 N&eing, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing,

and neither more nor less than nothing.N6and N5othing is, therefore, the same determination,

or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as pure being.N 6?(his

identification clearly follows from the way "egel defines his terms. If there were any feature

with which one could distinguish them, then that feature would be a determination, and they

would be something other than pure indeterminacy.

2lthough the sameness of being and nothing follows from his definitions, this does not

by itself make this notion clear. "egel was well aware of this, adding to the three paragraphs

of the basic text, four extensive remarks and considerable revisions between the two editions.

In order to clarify what exactly "egel means by Nthe unity of being and nothingN K"inheit des

'eins und ichtsM, I will now discuss some of these remarks.69

(he first point that should be mentioned is that while the notion that being and nothing

are the same makes sense if one accepts "egelBs definitions, it still seems paradoxical. 7n this

point, "egel contrasts those determinations which occur in philosophy to those of Nordinary

66 N...vollkommene $eerheit, Bestimmungs3 und &nhaltslosigkeit- nunterschiedenheit in ihm selbst.N K1:;"W9L:M6 1:; "W9L:?. 1ee also the contrast between nothing as such KichtsM and a determinate nothingKichtseiendeM already presented in $hapter 6, 1ection &, 1ubsection 6.6 N*as 'ein, das unbestimmte nmittelbare ist in der !at ichts und nicht mehr noch weniger als ichts.NK1:; "W9L:M6? Nichts ist somit dieselbe Bestimmung oder vielmehr Bestimmungslosigkeit und damit 2berhaupt dasselbe,

was das reine 'ein ist.N K1:; "W9L:M69 In order to lead more directly the relevance of all this for the analysis of sublation, I will treat these remarksthematically, rather than seJuentially.

?


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common senseN Kgemeinen >enschenverstandeM.6


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that, on the contrary, the# are not the same, that they are absolutel# distinct....NC1o, on the

one hand, "egel dismisses the common sense notion that the unity of being and nothing is

paradoxical, and, on the other hand, he identifies it as the basis of the transition from being

and nothing to becoming. "ow is one to make sense of thisQ I will examine this problem in

the following subsection.

Remark: On the Transitions in Hegel's Logic

&efore addressing this problem, we need to make a brief digression in order to clarify

the nature of BtransitionB here, as this is an important part of understanding #ust what goes on in

the concept of sublation, as well as in the organiOation of "egelBs logic in general. 3irst of all,

it is important to note that there is no essential priority between being and nothing. (he

treatment in these opening pages of the$ogicdoes not indicate any temporal se?uencewhere

there would be something like Bfirst there was being, then there was nothingB or vice versa.

Implicitly, one can see that if there were any criteria for deciding their relative priority, this

would constitute an invalid introduction of a determination into their indeterminacy. 2ny

temporal seJuence would be necessarily excluded for this reason. /xplicitly, one can see that

"egel contrasts his position with that of Parmenides, &uddhism, and "eraclitus, who

prioritiOe, respectively, being, nothing, and becoming. (he most relevant part of this passage

comes from "egelBs re#ection of "eraclitus Kand similar Npopular oriental proverbsNM. While

they also unify being and nothing in becoming,

...these expressions have a substratum in which the transition takes place; being and

nothing are held apart in time, are conceived as alternating in it, but are not thought intheir abstraction and conseJuently, too, not so that they are in themselves absolutely

the same.6

C N*as reine 'ein und das reine ichts ist also dasselbe..... Aber ebensosehr ist die 0ahrheit nicht ihrenunterschiedenheit, sondern da/ sie nicht dasselbe, da/ sie absolut unterschieden...D K1::; "W9L:/2M6 NAber diese Ausdr2cke haben ein 'ubstrat, an dem der Jbergang geschieht- 'ein und ichts werden in der

(eit auseinandergehalten, als in ihr abwechselnd vorgestellt, nicht aber in ihrer Abstraktion gedacht, und daherauch nicht so, da/ sie an und f2r sich dasselbe sind.N K1:?; "W9L:?:9M

?:


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"ere, "egel specifically distinguishes his presentation of being and nothing from the notion

of being and nothing alternating in time. 1ignificantly, the grounds of the distinction Ki.e. that

when they are thought of temporally they are not thought in their abstractionM also preclude

any other sort of temporaliOation as well because any temporal priority would introduce a

determination into their indeterminacy.

If there is no temporal seJuence among the transitions of "egelBs logic, what about

those passages where "egel seems to suggest a historical se?uenceQ (he exclusion of the

former would seem to entail the exclusion of the latter. 7ne cannot have history without time.

'eferring to Parmenides and being, "egel writes that NWhat is the first in the sciencehad of

necessity to show itself historicall#as thefirst.N"ere and elsewhere, "egel repeatedly

draws correspondences between logical moments and historical thinkers4 Parmenides and

being, "eraclitus and becoming, and so forth. "owever, this need not contradict his position

that the transitions of the logic are not temporal. It is consistent if one interprets the historical

seJuence as a reflection of the logical seJuence, but not the other way around. In other words,

logic shapes history, but history does not shape logicthe necessity flows only one way.

&ut if there is no temporal or historical seJuence in the transitions of the 'cience of

$ogic, then how are these transitions to be understoodQ (he best, most coherent answer is that

the seJuence of the$ogicis an expository, or Kmore loosely speakingM a narrative one.?%ore

precisely, the 'cience of $ogiccontains both a logical and an expository seJuence, with the

latter being an account of the former. 3or example, the expository seJuence of the 'cience of

N0as das "rste in der 0issenschaft ist, hat sich m2ssen geschichtlich als das "rste zeigen.N K1::; "W9L@6M 3or a contrary interpretation, see $lark &utler,6egels $ogic% Between *ialectic and 6istor#K5orthwestern,6@@


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$ogicin this chapter is N&eing[5othing[&ecomingN, but the logical seJuence is N&eing V

5othing[ &ecoming.N

I will use two analogies to explain further what I mean by this distinction. In one

sense, the seJuence of the logic is like a story4 the main paragraphs are like the main plot,

while the remarks are like the flashbacks, foreshadowing, and digressions of a Ksomewhat

complicatedM story.9ike a story, the narrative seJuence of the logic does not necessarily

correspond to the temporal seJuence. 8nlike a story, the seJuence of the logic is a necessary

one. In this sense, the logical seJuence of the science of logic is more like a Ksomewhat

complicatedM math problem, the sort of problem where the seJuence of the operation matters,

but not because it is in any way temporal. 3or example, solving the eJuation N6 X x 9ZN

produces different results depending on the order in which the operations are carried out KN6 X

K x 9MZ6


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(he solution to this problem is to be found in the location of the paradox.2t the

level of being and nothing, being and nothing are the same Kdasselbe=.:(he unity K"inheitM of

being and nothing, on the other hand, arrives only at the level of becoming. "ere, unity and

sameness are distinct insofar as this unity is more than mere sameness; it includes both their

sameness and their distinctiveness. In the transition to becoming, they are both the same and

not the same,

...and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. (heir truth, therefore, is thismovement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other4 becoming, a movementin which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has eJually immediately

resolved itself.@

(here are two relevant points here. 3irst, the transition between being and nothing and

becoming is, in a conceptual sense, a sublation Keven though the term is not explicitly used.M

1econd, a distinction between being and nothing only appears at the level of becoming. 2t the

level of being and nothing themselves, there is no distinction and no determination Kboth are

pure indeterminacyM. In becoming, there is also no difference between being and nothing

Kbecause it is Nimmediately resolvedNM, but this resolution is something newa

determination.C(hus, the mistake of common sense is not in considering the unity of being

and nothing as contradictoryper se, but rather in considering the paradox to exist at the level

of being and nothing in themselves. (here are, in effect, two different paradoxes at play here4

the mistaken one of common sense Kwhich confuses indeterminacy with determinacyM and the

operant one of the logic Kwhich underlies the logical transitionM. In order to understand how

(hat is, its position in the logical seJuence of the transition.: "egel himself uses the term sphere K'ph)reM instead. I chose to use the term BlevelB only to facilitatediscussion in /nglish Ki.e. Bat the level of...B is much more idiomatic than Bin the sphere of...BM.@ N...jedes in seinem Gegenteil verschwindet. &hre 0ahrheit ist also diese Bewegung des unmittelbaren1erschwindens des einen in dem anderen% das 0erden- eine Bewegung, worin beide unterschieden sind, aberdurch einen nterschied, der sich ebenso unmittelbar aufgel5st hat.D K1:; "W9L:/2MC (his is only a sort of Bprovisional determinationB between being and nothing. It is a distinction, rather than afull determination Ki.e. a negationM. While it is minimally sufficient to remove them from the level of pure

indeterminacy, being Kand nothingM will only acJuire a Bproper determinationB at the level of determinate beingK*aseinM. In fact, it is the inadeJuate determinacy of this initial distinction Kin becomingM that leads to thesubseJuent logical transition Kto determinate beingM.

96


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dropped.NI have already discussed "egelBs criticism of the concept of synthesis relative to

sublation, and it is noteworthy that the same distinction reoccurs here. ?(hus, here we have a

negative definition of the unity of being and nothing in becoming; it is not, strictly speaking, a

synthesis.

"egel provides further negative definitions at the end of the third remark. "ere,

referring specifically to the transition of being and nothing Ninto each otherN Kwhich occurs in

becomingM, "egel warns against introducing later, more determinate mediations Kbestimmte

1ermittlungenM too soon. %ore specifically, he writes that Nthe transition in Juestion is not yet

a relation.N9"aving made this distinction, "egel goes on to specify that, since this transition

is not a fully developed relation, it is not the case that either being or nothing could be

considered a ground or a cause of the other. (hus, for "egel, neither being nor nothing is

taken to be anything like a first principle or a first cause. 2nd, by implication, "egelBs logic

would seem to be neither deductive nor metaphysical in any traditional sense.

1o, while we have seen that the unity of being and nothing in becoming is not KonlyM

sameness, not Kstrictly speakingM a synthesis and not KtechnicallyM even a relation, the Juestion

still remains4 what is itQ

2t the level of being and nothing, the two are the same. "egel refers to this sameness

as a mere Nabstract unityN Kabstrakte "inheitM. &y contrast, at the level of becoming, they are

in a Ndeterminate unityN Kbestimmte"inheitM. In becoming, being and nothing are unified, but

unified in a way that removes them from their initial pure indeterminacy4 N(hey are therefore

in this unity but only as vanishing,sublatedmoments. (hey sink from their initially imagined

N0erden ist diese immanente '#nthesis des 'eins und ichts- aber weil der '#nthesis der 'inn von einem)u/erlichen (usammenbringen )u/erlich gegeneinander 1orhandener am n)chsten liegt, ist mit 7echt der ame'#nthesis, s#nthetische "inheit au/er Gebrauch gesetzt worden.N K1@


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selfsubsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct but at the same time are

sublated.N


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1econd, it is a somewhat unusual sublation. In the subseJuent transitions of the$ogic,

the roles of negation and preservation are inverted. In the later transitions, it is the opposition

between terms that is negated, and the moments that are preserved. "ere, in the transition

from being and nothing to becoming, it is theirsamenessKi.e. their indeterminacyM which is

negated in order to constitute them as moments, and this constitution is in effect their

preservation. (hus, while the structure is the same Ki.e. in the general relationship between

negation and preservationM, in this instance there is a variation in how sublation functions Ki.e.

in how negation and preservation operate relative to different individual contentsM. (he

presence of this sort of variation helps illustrate why identifying a structure in "egelBs logic is

not the same as attributing to "egel a merely formal method. If "egelBs method were simply

an abstract, applied by roteas if it were the operation of some sort of Blogic machineBthere

would be no such variations between the structure and the function of sublation. In other

words, the presence of occasional variations in the form suggests that the content itself

matters and thus that "egelBs explicit claim that his method it is not merely formal is

consistent with how the system is in fact articulated.@

(o complete this analysis of how sublation functions in this first transition of the

$ogic, two more things need to be said about the determinate unity of becoming. (he

determination of being and nothing in becoming is in fact a double determination4 comingto

be K"ntstehenM and ceasingtobe K1ergehenM. In comingtobe, N...nothing is immediate, that

is, the determination starts from nothing which relates itself to being, or in other words,

changes into it....N In ceasingtobe, N...being is immediate, that is, the determination starts

from being which changes into nothing....N?C"egel identifies both comingtobe and ceasing

tobe as types of becoming.

@ 3or more on the relation between form and content in "egelBs logic, see $hapter 9, 1ection $, 1ubsection ofthis study.

?C N...in der einen ist das ichts als unmittelbar, d. h. sie ist anfangend vom ichts, das sich auf das 'einbezieht, d. h. in dasselbe 2bergeht, in der anderen ist das 'ein als unmittelbar, d. i. sie ist anfangend vom 'ein,das in das ichts 2bergeht...N K16C96C


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'egarding these two determinations, "egel writes N(hey are not reciprocally sublated

the one does not sublate the other externallybut each sublates itself in itself and is in its

own self the opposite of itself.N?6(here are two things to note about this last passage. 3irst,

even though these moments are in themselves suggestive of a temporal determination, once

again, there is no priority between them; comingtobe is not BbeforeB ceasingtobe, and vice

versa. 1econd, "egel draws an implicit distinction here between BreciprocalB andBreflexiveB. In

comingtobe and ceasingtobe, it is not that being and nothing sublate each other

reciprocally, because this would be an external determination. Ki.e. problematic in the same

way that synthesis is problematic.M Instead, "egel prefers to express their sublation reflexively

they do not sublate each other; rather, they each sublate themselves. In other words,

sublation is Kstrictly speakingM not an e+ternal determinationof one moment operating on

another, but an internal determinationfrom within a given moment operating on itself. (o put

it another way, being and nothing are not sublated b#becoming KexternallyM, but rather sublate

themselves KinternallyM inbecoming. While it sometimes easier, as a matter of exposition, to

talk about sublation in external terms, it is important to keep in mind that sublation is, for

"egel, an internal, selfdetermination of the content itself. (hus, a fundamental point to keep

in mind about the function of sublation in "egelBs science of logic is that it is not the act of a

philosopher on a concept, or of one moment on another, but an act originating from within

each moment itself.

"aving now completed the analysis of this first set of examples of the somewhat

unusual function of "egelBs concept of sublation in the transition from being and nothing to

becoming, I will now take up a second set4 identity, difference, and contradiction.

?6 N'ie heben sich nicht gegenseitig, nicht das eine )u/erlich das andere auf, sondern jedes hebt sich an sichselbst auf und ist an ihm selbst das Gegenteil seiner.N K16C


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CHAPTER 4: IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND

CONTRADICTION

In this chapter, I examine the function of sublation in &ook , 1ection 6, $hapter of

the 'cience of $ogic, which discusses those moments "egel calls the NessentialitiesN

K0esenheitenM, or the Ndeterminations of reflectionN K7efle+ionsbestimmungenM. (hese

essentialities include4 identity K&dentit)tM, difference KnterschiedM, diversity

K1erschiedenheitM, opposition K"ntgegensetzungM, and contradiction K0iderpruchM. %y

purpose in using this set of moments as an example is twofold. 3irst, it serves as another

illustration of how sublation specifically operates in "egelBs logic. 1econd, selecting this

chapter also allows me to treat in more detail the relationship between sublation and

contradiction Kwhich I mentioned briefly in the first chapterM. 2 proper grasp of this

relationship is not only useful as an illustration, but is a key to understanding the role of

sublation in "egelBs logic overall.

2t the beginning of this chapter of the$ogic, "egel remarks that4

(he determinations of reflection used to be taken up in the form ofpropositions, inwhich they were asserted to be valid for everything. (hese propositions ranked as the

universal laws of thought that lie at the base of all thinking, that are absolute in

themselves and incapable of proof, but are immediately and incontestably recogniOed

and accepted as true by all thinking that grasps their meaning.6

"egel associates these determinations of reflections with the traditional K2ristotleanM notion

of the categories, as Nwhat is predicated or asserted of the existent.N"owever, "egel re#ects

the expression of these categories in the form of propositions, as Nlaws of thoughtN4

$onseJuently, if these\ categories are put in the form of such propositions, then the

opposite propositions eJually appear4 both present themselves with eJual necessity

and, as immediate assertions, are at least eJually correct. (he one, therefore, would

6 N*ie 7efle+ionsbestimmungen pflegten sonst in die 8orm von ')tzen aufgenommen zu werden, worin vonihnen ausgesagt wurde, da/ sie von allem gelten. *iese ')tze galten als die allgemeinen *enkgesetze, die allem

*enken zum Grunde liegen, an ihnen selbst absolut und unbeweisbar seien, aber von jedem *enken, wie es

ihren 'inn fasse, unmittelbar und unwidersprochen als wahr anerkannt und angenommen werden.N K1?C@;"W


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3urthermore, this sublation is a reflexive onea BselfsublationB. Identity is not some

preexistent concept or category that externally sublates Kor BconsumesBM earlier, separate

moments. 'ather, identity is made up of Kor Bconstituted byBM the sublation of those earlier

moments. (o put it another way, the earlier moments are not sublated b#identity, but rather in

identity. 2nd since they are sublated in identity, their sublation is the selfsublation, the self

determination, of identity itselfhence the phrase, NidentitywithselfN K&dentit)t mit sichM.

2bstract identity, by contrast, is not Kstrictly speakingM a moment of the system. It

does not stand in relation to any KlogicallyM earlier or subseJuent moments, and thus it entails

no sublation. It is, for "egel, simply an erroneous notion. Importantly, this error is not an

error that is sublated and ultimately included within the overall systematic framework. 2side

from a passing, negative reference in the main body of the text Kwhich serves only to define

essential identityM it is only discussed in the remarks. While these discussions are very

helpful in explaining the nature of the logical transitions, it is important to note that this

exposition is not part of these transitions. (he remarks are a gloss on the system, not a part of

the system itself.:(hat being said, an understanding of abstract identity is necessary for a

complete understanding of essential identity Kwhat one might also call Bsystematic identityBM.

2nd since most of "egelBs explanation of abstract identity is contained in the remarks, I will

draw from both the main body text and the remarks for my analysis here.

N'ie ist insofern nicht abstrakte &dentit)t oder nicht durch ein relatives egieren entstanden, das au/erhalbihrer vorgegangen w)re und das nterschiedene nur von ihr abgetrennt, 2brigens aber dasselbe au/er ihr alsseiend gelassen h)tte vor wie nach.N K1?66; "W


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"egel defines abstract identity most clearly in his second remark on this section4 N(he

proposition in its positive expression 2Z2 is, in the first instance, nothing more than the

expression of an empty tautology.N@"egel further notes that since this law of identity is a

tautology, it is merely formal, it has no content, and no further progress can be made from it. 6C

(his identity is abstract because it is only onesided4 NIt is admitted that the law of identity

expresses only a onesided determinateness, that it contains only formal truth, a truth which is

abstract, incomplete.N66(hese notions of NonesidedN KeinseitigM and NincompleteN

Kunvollst)ndigM are best understood in terms of "egelBs application of the premise that

Bdetermination is negationB.6Without some sort of negation,6some contrast against which it

could be defined, a concept cannot be adeJuately determined. (hus, when "egel claims that

some notion6?is onesided or incomplete, he means that it lacks this other determination. In

this case, identity is only complete when it is understood not abstractly Knot as separate and

distinctM, but in relation to another determination4 difference.

2. #ssential I"entity

Identity in its full speculative senseessential identityis inextricably related to

difference. (his is in explicit contrast to merely abstract identity4

It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to

be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that

identity and difference are different. (hey do not see that in this very assertion they

are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is

@ N*ieser 'atz in seinem positiven Ausdrucke A L A ist zun)chst nichts weiter als der Ausdruck der leeren!autologie.N K1?6; "W


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different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature

of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in

its very nature, is this, to be different.69

It is in this sense that N...truth is complete only in the unity of identity and difference.N 6


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1uch identical talk therefore contradicts itself.N6@It is important to note a distinction here

between tautolog# as suchand the specific examples or e+pressions of tautolog#that "egel

presents here. 7n the one hand, the opposition within tautology as such is the aforementioned

point that identity cannot be different from difference without itself containing some

difference. 7n the other hand, the contradictionCin particular expressions of tautology Ke.g.

N-od is -odN, N2 plant is a plantN, etc.M is the opposition between oneBs expectations about an

argument and the argumentBs claim. Importantly, this latter opposition is not a dialectical

speculative one, and is not the basis on which "egel presents the logical transition between

identity and difference. 1trictly speaking, it serves only an illustrative or expository function,

rather than a systematic or logical one.

2t the end of his second remark, "egel addresses Nthe other expression of the law of

identity4 2 cannot at the same time be 2 and not 2N;6that is, the law of contradiction Kor,

more precisely, the law of noncontradictionM.In the law of identity expressed KnegativelyM

as the law of noncontradiction, the precise relationship between identity and difference

becomes more apparent. In this formulation, identity explicitly includes an element of

negativity Ki.e. the not2M.

In this proposition, therefore, identity is expressedas the negation of negation. 2

and not 2 are distinguished, and these distinct terms are related to one and the same

2. Identity, therefore, is here represented as this distinguishedness in one relation or

as simple difference in the terms themselves.

6@

N...etwas zu sagen, eine weitere Bestimmung vorzubringen. &ndem aber nur dasselbe wiederkehrt, so istvielmehr das Gegenteil geschehen, es ist nichts herausgekommen. 'olches identische 7eden widerspricht sichalso selbst.N K1?69; "W


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(hus, this element of negativity shows, for "egel, that identity contains two opposed

determinations4 the BpureB identity of the law of identity Kwhich contains no differenceM and the

identity of the law of noncontradiction Kwhich contains, in effect, a double negationM. While

the two laws are formally eJuivalent, they are not the same. ?(he former contains no

determination; the later contains a determination Ki.e. a negationM, which is itself negated.

Importantly, this negation of negation, as distinct from the mere absence of negation, is a

sublation. (he negation is itself negatedKi.e. they are formally eJuivalentM but it is at the same

timepreservedinsofar as the negation of a negation is not the same as a mere absence of

negation.9Without interpreting the negation of negation in terms of "egelBs concept of

sublation such a distinction would be unintelligible. Without the element of preservation,

there would be no distinction between the negation of negation and the mere absence of

negation. 2nd if one were to conceive of the transitions in "egelBs logic as merely simple

negations Krather than as sublationsM, then this particular transition would be eJually

unintelligible.

It is only by taking into account "egelBs overall argument that one can see past its

initial,prima facieabsurdity. 7ver the years, more than one casual reader of the $ogichas

undoubtedly re#ected out of hand the notion that tautology could ever contain even the merest

glimmer of contradiction. >et if "egelBs actual argument for this point is taken into account

Krather than #ust its conclusionM, then this apparent absurdity is easily dispensed with. Identity

is not simply negated; it is sublated, and it is the technical, doubled sense of sublation that

makes this transition ultimately intelligible. 2t this point, any reader who remains skeptical

need only, at a minimum, keep in mind that for "egel, N...these laws contain more than is

? In case this distinction is not already clear, one could imagine having two apples and two oranges. 3ormally,

they are e?uivalentKZM, but, at the same time, apples are of course not the sameKi.e. the same sort of fruitM asoranges.9 I take this interpretation of "egelBs logic in terms of the negation of negation from Dieter "enrich. 1ee hisN(he ogic of 5egation and its 2pplicationN,Between Kant and 6egel% $ectures on German &dealism, ed. and

trans. David 1. Pacini K"arvard, CCM, 6


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meant by them....N


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2bsolute difference is difference as NdeterminateN, NselfrelatedN, and above all

NsimpleN4 NIt is essential to grasp absolute difference as simple. In the absolute difference of 2

and not 2 from each other, it is the simple notwhich, as such, constitutes it.NIt is this

simplicity of absolute difference that suggests why "egel here uses the Jualifier BabsoluteB Ki.e.

not relativeM. "egel presents this in terms of a contrast between KabsoluteM difference and

otherness KAndersseinM. 7f course, there is a basic structural distinction at work here insofar

as absolute difference is a moment of the sphere of essence, while otherness is a moment of

the sphere of determinate being K*aseinM. In the text itself, "egel articulates the distinction as

follows4 N(he other of essence Si.e. absolute differenceT...is the other in and for itself, not the

other as other of an other, existing outside it but simple determinateness itself.N:(hus,

absolute difference includes otherness, but as an earlier KsublatedM moment. It is more

determinate than otherness alone.

"egel uses this distinction between otherness and absolute difference to illustrate the

sense in which absolute difference is NselfrelatedN difference. 2bsolute difference, as self

related, is different only Nfrom itselfN. (his seemingly paradoxical expression is "egelBs way

of conveying that difference understood as absolute difference contains the same internal

conflict that abstract identity did4 N&ut that which is different from difference is identity.... It

can eJually be said that difference, as simple, is no difference; it is this only when it is in

relation with identity....N@In this sense, absolute difference as separate and simple and only

selfrelated could also be called Babstract differenceB. 2bsolute difference is, also in this sense,

one sided insofar as it lacks the more complete determination it would have if defined not

simply as being selfrelated, but rather in some determinate relationship to its other, identity.

N"s ist wesentlich, den absoluten nterschied als einfachen zu fassen. &m absoluten nterschiede des A undicht3A voneinander ist es das einfache icht, was als solches denselben ausmacht.N K1?6; "W


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While certainly not an issue for "egel himself, one can also consider this concept of

absolute difference in comparison to the twentieth century theories on radical alterity. C3or

"egel, the notion of a difference that is BbeyondB identity in this way would be incoherent

insofar as such a difference would be both radically unrelated to identity and, at the same

time, defined in contrast to identity.

3rom the fact that "egel would argue that such an absolutedifferenceis self

contradictory, however, it does not follow that "egelBs system eliminates or purges all

differenceor difference as such. 2s we have already seen, the sublation operant in the logical

transitions is not a simple negation, where all the distinctions internal to the logic, once

treated, would be afterward cast aside. Difference is not simply negated, but also preserved.

%oreover, this preservation is utterly essential to the coherence of the logical transitions

themselves4 if the differences between the moments were not in some sense preserved K?ua

determinationsM, then these moments would lack the concrete determination that is "egelBs

whole reason for writing the$ogicin the first place.6If "egel understood himself to be

simply negatingthat is, eliminatingall of these distinctions, making them in the first place

would serve no coherent purpose. Without some preservation of difference, these

determinations would not even be determinations at all. (hus, a critic might claim that "egelBs

conception of difference is in some way inadeJuate, but to claim that "egel himself proposes

or desires to purge all difference from his system is, to say the least, inaccurate. 3ar from

wishing to eliminate all difference, "egel refers to difference Nas the specific original ground

of all activity and selfmovementN,which for "egel is high praise indeed.

C I have in mind here primarily /mmanuel evinas, !otalit# and &nfinit#% An "ssa# on "+teriorit#, trans.2lphonso ingis KDuJuesne, 6@


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2. %iersity

1o far, we have seen thatidentity and difference are KsomehowM related to each other insofar

as each reJuires the other for its complete determination. "owever, "egel has not yet

specified whatKpreciselyM this complete determination entails. 2t this point,

...as each moment is thus onlyself3related, they are not determined against oneanother. 5ow because in this manner they are not different in themselves, thedifference is e+ternalto them. (he diversemoments are, therefore, mutually related,not as identity and difference, but merely as simply diverse moments, that are

indifferentto one another and to their determinateness.

(hus, the complete determination suggested in the passages on identity and KabsoluteM

difference has not yet arrived. We have seen the conflict within both moments, that both are

inthemselves Ki.e. in their own selfrelationM inadeJuate, but that conflict has not yet been

resolved. Identity and difference here remain only e+ternall#related. (hey each possess only

a onesided determination and are not yet determined in full contrast to each other, not yet

internall#related. "egel refers to this relationship as an NindifferenceN?because, without

being determined in relationship to each other, their variance9is not a more fully determinate

difference. It is merely a NdiversityN.

N...indem so jedes dieser >omente nur auf sich bezogen ist, sind sie nicht bestimmt gegeneinander. 3 0eil sienun auf diese 0eise nicht an ihnen selbst unterschiedene sind, so ist der nterschied ihnen )u/erlich. *ie1erschiedenen verhalten sich also nicht als &dentit)t und nterschied zueinander, sondern nur als 1erschiedene2berhaupt, die gleichg2ltig gegeneinander und gegen ihre Bestimmtheit sind.NK1?6:?6@; "W


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Diversity itself has two moments4 identity and difference.


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determinations of difference Si.e. diversityT; they are relations to one another, the one

being what the other is not; like is not unlike and unlike is not like; and both

essentially have this relation and have no meaning apart from it....@

(hus, like identity and difference, likeness and unlikeness are understood as being separate,

and yet at the same time also reJuiring one another. With the sublation of the externality of

their relationship, likeness and unlikeness are brought into a Nnegative unityN Knegative

"inheitM. "egel will call this negative unity NoppositionN KGegensatzM.

3. O((osition

"egel defines the third moment of differenceoppositionas the unity of identity

and difference4 NIn opposition, the determinate reflection, difference, finds its completion. It is

the unity of identity and difference; its moments are different in one identity and thus are

opposites.N?C(his Bdifference in one identityB is "egelBs way of expressing that opposites are

internall# related. (he first way to appreciate this internal relation is to understand how it

contrasts to the two previously given types of relations. Identity and difference as such Ki.e.

essential identity and absolute differenceM areself3related, that is, each is defined Bwithin itselfB

in isolation from any other determination. (his first relation is incomplete because it lacks any

contrast with an other4 without a negation, there can be no determination. Identity and

difference as moments of diversity Ki.e. likeness and unlikenessM are e+ternall# related, that is,

each is defined Balongside the otherB. "ere, the two moments are understood not in isolation

from each other, but nevertheless separately, as Kfor exampleM items on a list. (his second

relation is inadeJuate because while the determination contains a negation, it is not yet a fully

articulated selfdetermination. In the case of moments that are internall# related, each

@ N*urch diese ihre !rennung voneinander aber heben sie sich nur auf. Gerade was den 0iderspruch und dieAufl5sung von ihnen abhalten soll, da/ n)mlich etwas einem anderen in einer 72cksicht gleich, in einer andernaber ungleich sei, 3 dies Auseinanderhalten der Gleichheit und ngleichheit ist ihre (erst5rung. *enn beide

sind Bestimmungen des nterschiedes- sie sind Beziehungen aufeinander, das eine, zu sein, was das anderenicht ist- gleich ist nicht ungleich, und ungleich ist nicht gleich, und beide haben wesentlich diese Beziehung undau/er ihr keine Bedeutung-N K1?C; "Womente sind in einer &dentit)t verschiedene- so sind sie entgegengesetzte.N K1??;"W


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moment is defined Bwithin the otherB; that is, each moment is defined not only in itself or in

contrast to another moment, but in a contrast to another moment expressed in terms of that

other. (his third type of relationship, where one term is understood not as not only distinct

from another, but indefinable without it, is opposition.

7ne could also articulate this continuum of relations in terms of the specific case of

identity and difference. 3or "egel, identity and difference cannot be adeJuately defined in

isolation from one another or enumerated as a list of distinct terms Ki.e. the law of identity, the

law of diversity, and so forthM. 'ather, identity and difference can only be adeJuately defined

in contrast to each other. %oreover, this contrast between identity and difference remains

inadeJuate as long as they remain understood as two separate terms, each subsisting

BalongsideB the other, yet still each defined only Bfor itselfB. What "egel reJuires is that identity

and difference each be defined in terms of the other4 identity in terms of difference, difference

in terms of identity. 7nly in this way can their relationship be fully grasped. 2nd only if their

relationship is fully grasped can the concepts themselves be fully determined. (his way of

being Bmutually definitiveB is essential to the concept of opposition.

5ow, #ust as identity and difference were likeness and unlikeness as moments of

diversity, they are further developed as moments of oppositionas the positive KPositiveM and

negative KegativeM. (he classic example of the positive and negative is the poles of a magnet;

one cannot have a magnet with a positive pole without also having a negative pole, and vice

versa. In the remark on this section, "egel gives the example of positive and negative

integers. 2n even more accessible example might be simply the notions of right and left;

nothing can have a right side without having a left side and vice versa. 3or "egel, identity and

difference are as mutually definitive as the notions of right and left.

"egelBs own expression of this mutually definitiveness is somewhat complex4

(herefore each of these moments is, in its determinateness, the whole. It is the wholein so far as it also contains its other moment; thus each contains reference to its non

6


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being, and is only reflectionintoself or the whole, as essentially connected with its

nonbeing.?6

(his can be best explained in terms of an example like right and left. 'ight and left are wholes

Ki.e. completeM only insofar as each contains its opposite4 BrightB is BnotleftB and BleftB is Bnot

rightB. (he two terms mutually define each other. 2t the same time, each also contains a

Nreference to its KownM nonbeingN; that is, the BleftB in the BnotleftB that defines BrightB is itself

BnotrightB. (hus, right and left are not simply defined in contrast to one another, but also

grasped as opposites, with each pole of that opposition containing what amounts to a double

negation.

(his complex relation applies more broadly to opposed moments in general.

In the first place, then, each is, only in so far as the other is not; it is what it is, through

the other, through its own nonbeing; Sit is only positedness;T secondly, it is in so far

as the other is not; it is what it is, through the nonbeing of the other; it is reflection

intoself.?

(his Breciprocal determinationB is clearly a more elaborate determination than was present in

the earlier moments. 2s selfrelated, the moments of identity and difference are merely

posited or asserted. 2s externally related, the terms are merely contrasted or related in terms

of a simple negation. 2s internally related, opposed moments are neither simply asserted nor

simply contrasted to one another, but contrasted in and through their owndetermination.

&ut the positive or negative in itself essentially implies that to be an opposite is not

merely a moment, does not stem from comparison, but is a determination belonging to

the sides of the opposition themselves. (hey are therefore not positive or negative in

themselves apart from the relation to the other; on the contrary, this relationan

exclusive relationconstitutes their determination or initself; in it, therefore, thereare at the same time explicitly and actually San und f2r sichT positive or negative.?

?6 N...ebenso die ngleichheit ist nur in derselben reflektierenden Beziehung, in welcher die Gleichheit ist. 3Cedes dieser >omente ist also in seiner Bestimmtheit das Ganze. "s ist das Ganze, insofern es auch sein anderes>oment enth)lt- aber dies sein anderes ist ein gleichg2ltig seiendes- so enth)lt jedes die Beziehung auf seinichtsein und ist nur die 7efle+ion3in3sich oder das Ganze als sich wesentlich auf sein ichtsein beziehend.NK1??; "W


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(hus, for "egel, complete determination, a determination that is not merely onesided, entails

a Breciprocal determinationB. In the case at hand, the positive is not fully constituted as positive

unless it contains the negation of the negative and vice versa. Identity is not full constituted as

identity unless it contains the negation of difference, and so on. (his complete determination

is not only relevant for the system as a whole, but also for the determination of each

individual moment. *ust as any definition of BrightB would be incomplete without reference to

the notion of BleftB, for "egel, any definition of a given term is incomplete without reference to

its opposite.

(hus for "egel, opposition is the more complete unity of identity and difference. /ach

pole of an opposite both negatesits other Kinsofar as the two terms are contrastedM and

preservesits other Kinsofar as each term contains its other as a double negationM. 1tructurally

speaking, every opposition necessarily entails a sublation. 2nd if every opposition contains a

sublation in this sense, and opposition is the unity of identity and difference, then sublation

could itself be described as the unity of identity and difference. %ore precisely, sublation is

the logically operant mechanism through which identity and difference are unified.

C. CONTRADICTION

We now arrive at one of the most difficult passages in "egelBs logic4 his treatment of

contradiction. (his difficulty is intuitively obvious4 if each moment of "egelBs logic

constitutes a sort of proof of that moment, and since contradiction itself is included Kand

indeed, must be includedM as a moment of the logic, then in what sense can one comprehend a

proof of contradiction as suchQ It is difficult to express such a concept in any way that does

dieser Bestimmung wird blo/ an dem abstrakten >omente dieses 7eflektiertseins festgehalten. Allein dasansichseiende Positive oder egative hei/t wesentlich, da/ entgegengesetzt zu sein nicht blo/ >oment sei, nochder 1ergleichung angeh5re, sondern die eigene Bestimmung der 'eiten des Gegensatzes ist. An sich positiv oder

negativ sind sie also nicht au/er der Beziehung auf Anderes, sondern Hso,I da/ diese Beziehung, und zwar alsausschlie/ende, die Bestimmung oder das Ansichsein derselben ausmacht- hierin sind sie es also zugleich anund f2r sich.N K1?; "W


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not sound fundamentally incoherent, since it is not #ust at odds with our ordinary way of

thinking, but also with the overwhelming ma#ority of the Western philosophical tradition.

1uch an explanation is at least as difficult for the interpreter as for the philosopher

himself, and so I will proceed cautiously. In this section of the chapter, I will conform as

closely as possible to "egelBs own exposition, and offer two parallel explanations of the

concept of contradiction and its relevance for our analysis of the concept of sublation. 3irst, I

will summariOe the key elements of the argument "egel makes in the main body of the text

his logical argument. 1econd, I will present some of his remarks that follow that texthis

exposition of the logical argument. It is my hope that this doubled approach will better serve

the purposes of my own interpretation of "egelBs science of logic and assist my efforts to

render these complex passages more clearly.

1. )irst #*(lanation

2t the beginning of this section of the$ogic,"egel takes a small step backward in

order to recapitulate what has led his readers up to this point4

Difference as such contains its sides as moments; in diversity they fall indifferently

apart; in opposition as such, they are sides of the difference, one being determined

only by the other, and therefore only moments; but they are no less determined within

themselves, mutually indifferent and mutually exclusive4 theself3subsistentdeterminations of reflection.??

1o, at the level of opposition, the determinations of reflection become selfsubsistent

Kselbst)ndigM. (hey are no longer merely selfrelated or externally related, but internall#

related4 N2s this whole, each is mediated with itself by its other and contains it. &ut further, it

is mediated with itself by the nonbeing of its other; thus it is a unity existing on its own and it

excludes the other from itself.N?9

?? N*er nterschied 2berhaupt enth)lt seine beiden 'eiten als >omente- in der 1erschiedenheit fallen siegleichg2ltig auseinander- im Gegensatze als solchem sind sie 'eiten des nterschiedes, eines nur durchs anderebestimmt, somit nur >omente- aber sie sind ebensosehr bestimmt an ihnen selbst, gleichg2ltig gegeneinanderund sich gegenseitig ausschlie/end% die selbst)ndigen 7efle+ionsbestimmungen.D K1?6; "W


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(his internal relation, which up to this point "egel has insisted upon Kand which has

grounded his criticisms of the inadeJuacy of earlier momentsM itself becomes problematic.

(he selfsubsistent determinations of reflection that contains the opposite

determination, and is selfsubsistent in virtue of this inclusion, at the same time alsoexcludes it; in its selfsubsistence, therefore, it excludes from itself its own self

subsistence. 3or this consists in containing within itself its opposite determinations

through which alone it is not a relation to something externalbut no less

immediately in the fact that it is itself, and also excludes from itself the determination

that is negative to it. It is thus contradiction.?


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there is not simply an analogy among the logical transitions here, but a homology4 that is, in

their structure, they are not simply similar but identical.?:

5ot only is there a homology among these transitions, there is also a progression. In

each case, the more closely related or more intertwined "egel understands the two sides of a

variance to be Ki.e. BunrelatedB, external, or internalM, thestrongerhe understands that variance

to be. 7ne could think of this in terms of two magnets being pushed together; the closer they

are, the stronger the force keeping them apart. 3or "egel, as well as for ordinary thinking,

contradiction is the strongest possible variance because unlike all of the earlier transitions,

which each involved their own particular contradiction, the transition from opposition

involves not #ust acontradiction, but the transition to contradiction as such.?@(he implicit

contradictions of the earlier transitions at this point become explicit, not #ust as an element of

this or that particular logical operation but as a moment of the system as a whole.

(he key difference between the previous, particular contradictions and contradiction

as a moment of "egelBs logic comes to the fore in the process of its resolution. Whereas

earlier contradictions were resolved as later moments, "egel claims KinitiallyM that

contradiction as such, as a moment rather than simply as an element of a logical transition,

must resolve itself KN*er0iderspruch l5stsichaufDM.(his is where the principle difficulty for

ordinary thinking arises. (hat an argument or concept could resultin a contradiction is easily

conceivable to both ordinary thinking and traditional philosophy. 2n argument that results in

a contradiction is simply false. (hat a particular contradiction could be resolvedis also not Kin

and of itselfM problematic. In any argument, a part

Hegel Aufheben

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