Heidegger Hegel

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12

Sein und Geist: Heidegges Conontation with

Hegels Phenomenology

robet Sinnebink

The genuine eutation must penetate the opponents stong-

hold and meet him on his own gound; no advantage is gained

by attacking him somewhee else and deeating him whee he

is not.

Hegel, Science o Logic

Ate a cetain peiod o neglect, philosophical inteest in the Hegel-Heidegge

elationship has ecently intensied in the English-speaking wold.1 While some

studies adopt a distinctly Heideggeian pespective concening Heidegges ci-

tique o Hegel,2 othes launch a Hegelian deence o Hegel against Heidegges

intepetation, seeking to show that Heidegge has simply gone wong in basic

points o Hegel intepetation.3 Othes again adopt a moe agnostic view o the

1. recent woks on the Hegel-Heidegge elationship include: rebecca Comay and John Mc-

Cumbe (eds.) Endings. Questions o Memory in Hegel and Heidegger, Evanston, Nothwesten Univesity

Pess, 1999; Kain de Boe, Thinking in the Light o Time: Heideggers Encounter with Hegel, Albany, State

Univesity o New Yok Pess, 2000; Michael Allen Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground o History,Chicago, Chicago Univesity Pess, 1984; David Kolb, The Critique o Pure Modernity. Hegel, Heidegger,

and Ater, Chicago, Chicago Univesity Pess, 1986; Catheine Malabou, The Future o Hegel: Plasticity,

Temporality, and Dialectic, tans. Lisabeth Duing, London, routledge, 2005; Dennis J. Schmidt, The

Ubiquity o the Finite: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Entitlements o Philosophy, Cambidge, The MIT Pess, 1988.

See also Giogio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place o Negativity, tans. K. E. Pinkus with M.

Hadt, Minneapolis, Univesity o Minnesota Pess, 1991.

2. See, o example Pavis Emad, The Place o Hegel in Heidegges Being and Time, Research in

Phenomenology, no. 13, 1983, pp. 159-173; and David Faell Kell, Hegel, Heidegge, Nietzsche. An

Essay in Descensional refection,Nietzsche-Studien, no. 5, 1976, pp. 255-262.

3. See, o example, Denise Souche-Dagues, The Dialogue between Hegel and Heidegge in

Chistophe Macann (ed.)Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments Volume II: History o Philosophy, London,

routledge, 1992, pp. 246-276; robet B. Pippin, On Being Anti-Catesian: Heidegge, Hegel, Sub-

j i i d S i li i r B Pi i Id li M d i H li V i i C b id C


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Heideggers Conrontation with Hegels Phenomenology186

veacity o Heidegges eading o Hegel.4 While all these appoaches have meit,

I wish to oe a moe dialogical appoach to the Hegel-Heidegge elationship.

Indeed, both Hegel and Heidegge advocated such an appoach to the pactice

o oiginay philosophical thinking. In the Science o Logic, Hegel emaks on the

immanent citique that moves beyond mee extenal eutation in ode to con-ont the poblem at issue om within an opposing philosophical standpoint (SL

581).5 Heidegge, o his pat, obseves that i a genuine dialogue with Hegel is to

occu, we ae equied to be kinded with him in the sense o being committed

to the st and last necessities o philosophical inquiy aising om the matte

[Sache] (HPS 31).6 This pape shall theeoe attempt to pusue the thinking

dialogue between Hegel and Heidegge, a dialogue cented on Heidegges con-

ontation [Auseinandersetzung] with Hegels Phenomenology o Spirit. In paticula,

I conside Heidegges citique o Hegel on the elationship between time and

Spiit; Heidegges intepetation o the Phenomenology o Spirit as exempliyingthe Catesian-Fichtean metaphysics o the subject, examining in paticula the

question o the phenomenological we in Heidegges eading; and Heidegges

late efections on Hegels Phenomenology as aticulating the moden metaphysics

o subjectity [Subjektitt] that culminates in moden technics. I shall ague that

Heidegge ogets those aspects o Hegels philosophy that make him ou philo-

sophical contempoay: Hegels thinking o intesubjectivity and ecognition, his

thinking o the histoicity o the expeience o spiit, and his attempt to sublate

moden subject-metaphysics which is also a citique o modenity. The point o

this dialogue is to begin a ecovey o etieval o Hegel om Heidegges citicaldeconstuction, and to theeby suggest that the utue o Hegelto use Cathe-

ine Malabous esonant phaseemains o us something still to-come.

I. HEIDEGGErS CrITICISM OF HEGEL ON TIME AND SPIrIT

It is signicant that Hegel is one o the ew gues inBeing and Time (along

with Descates and Kant) singled out o an explicit citique.7 In this sense, we

could egad Heidegges bie analysis o Hegels conception o the elation be-

tween time and spiit as a contibution to the task o a de-stuction [Des-struktion]o the histoy o ontology.8 Tempoality as such, accoding to Heidegge, has

4. One o the estictions Kain de Boe imposes in he account o Heidegges encounte with

Hegel is to minimize any consideation as to how a Heidegges intepetations o his pedecessos

ae coect. It is had to see, though, how thee can be a genuine thinking dialogue i Heidegges

eadings o Hegel ae accepted without citical efection. de Boe, Thinking in the Light o Time, p. 5.

5. As evident in my opening quotation om Hegels geate Logic, SL 581.

6. Heidegge, Hegels Phenomenology o Spiit, tans. Pavis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington,

Indiana Univesity Pess, 1988, p. 31, (henceoth HPS).

7. Matin Heidegge,Being and Time, tans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany, State Univesity o New Yok,

1996, 82, pp. 391-396, (henceoth BT).

8. On this point Malabou eschews any conontation between Heidegge and Hegel: It is not my

h i b h H li d H id i i i


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robet Sinnebink 187

emained unthought o at least distoted and misundestood within the histoy

o metaphysics, with the sole exception o Kant (BT 20). Howeve, because Kant

neglects to pose the undamental question o Being, and lacks a peliminay

ontological analytic o the subjectivity o the subject, he was unable to gain pop-

e access to the ontological signicance o the poblem o tempoality (BT 21).Heidegge taces Kants diculties back to an appopiation o the Catesian

cogito without a undamental ontology o Da-sein, and an assumed conception

o time cented on the pesence o the pesent. This metaphysical undestanding

o time is based upon the assumption that the denitive dimension o tempoal

expeience is povided by the amilia peception o the pesence o beings en-

counteed in the pesent.

This pesupposition becomes even moe acute in the case o Hegel, who is

taken to exempliy the vulga metaphysical conception o time as an innite

sequence o discete Nows o pesent moments. Indeed, Hegels concept o time,accoding to Heidegge, is the most adical way in which the vulga undestand-

ing o time has been given om conceptually (BT 392). Heidegge thus pesents

his bie citique o Hegels metaphysical conception o time and spiit (in 82

oBeing and Time) as a contast to the existential-ontological intepetation o the

oiginay o ecstatic tempoality o Da-sein. Hegels account o the elationship

between time and spiitthat spiit alls into histoical time and yet can be sub-

lated o augehoben by speculative thoughtis pesented as evidence o how the

metaphysical tadition has obliteated the question o tempoality in avou o an

ontologically inappopiate intepetation o Da-sein as objective pesence.In accodance with Aistotles demacation o time within the ontology o

natue, Hegels analysis o time is located in the second pat o the Encyclopaedia,

namely The Philosophy o Nature. Heidegges exposition o paagaphs 254-258 o

Hegels Encyclopaediaaims to establish how Hegels basic conception o time, de-

ned as intuited becoming, pivileges the punctual moment o the pesentas

a Now-Hee momentwithin the abstact becoming o fux o successive mo-

ments. Heidegge agues that the logical conceptualizing o timeas the nega-

tion o the negation o the punctuality o spacedemonstates how time has

been omalized in the most exteme sense and levelled down to an unpec-edented degee (BT 394).

A citical point can immediately be made hee concening Heidegges

claims. Hegel discusses space and time (in the Philosophy o Nature) as the most

minimal, elementay, and abstractdeteminations o natue in geneal (space pe-

supposes nothing but natues sel-extenality while time pesupposes nothing but

space). Space and time in this abstact sense aleady acquie a moe concete sig-

nicance with place [Ort]: thepositedidentity o space and time that is also thei

posited contradiction (EPN 261). With the categoy o place, the abstact punctu-

ality o the Now as a pesent moment is aleady suspended in elation to the con-


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cete detemination o space.9As Hegel emaks: The Hee is at the same timea Now, o it is the point o duation. This unity o Hee and Now is Place (EPN

260 A). The exteme omalization o time as a succession o Now moments

that Heidegge attibutes to Hegel is aleady challenged at this still elatively

simple level o categoical development in Hegels Philosophy o Nature. Althoughbelonging to a somewhat dieent context, the Phenomenology o Spirit(PS 90-

110) similaly povides a citical demonstation o the untenability o the abstact

punctuality o the Now in the expeience osense-certainty. These points cast doubt

on Heidegges pesentation o Hegels conception o time as such.

Nonetheless, Heidegge claims that Hegels detemination o time as the

negation o negation is the most adical vesion o the Aistotelian conception o

time, but also the most levelled down conception o tempoality in Heidegges

oiginay, existential-ecstatic sense. This logical ormalization o time is pecisely

what allows Hegel to make the connection between spiit and its developmentthough histoical time: Hegel shows the possibility o the histoical actualiza-

tion o spiit in time by going back to the identity o the ormal structure o Spirit and

time as the negation o a negation (BT 396). This is the decisive point in Heidegges

discussion: the identity o time and spiit as shaing the logical stuctue o the

negation o the negation is also thei eduction to an empty omal-ontological

abstaction that obliteates oiginay tempoality. This eduction makes possible

thei kinship as well as the ontologically obscue actualization o spiit in time

that Hegel descibes. In connecting time and spiit in this manne, howeve, He-

gel also leaves unexamined the question o whethe the constitution o Spiit asthe negating o negation is possible at all in any othe way than on the basis o

pimodial tempoality (BT 396).

Heidegge insists that this bie discussion o Hegel cannot claim to decide

whethe Hegels intepetation o time and Spiit and thei connection is coect

and has an ontologically pimodial basis (BT 396). Nonetheless, I suggest that

Heidegges cucial claim with egad to Hegel deseves uthe citical engage-

ment. Hee I daw attention to Heidegges compessed discussion o the essence

o Hegelian spiit as the ConceptoBegrif. Heidegge denes Hegelian Conceptu-

ality as the vey om o thinking that thinks itsel: Conceivingitselas graspingthe non-I (BT 395). This denition o the Concept is intepeted as the die-

entiation and compehension o the dieence between the I and the non-I:

the gasping othisdieentiation, a dieentiation o the dieence between I

and non-I (BT 395). The Concept thus has the omal stuctue o the negation

o a negation. The absolute negativity o the Concept, o Heidegge, gives a

logically omalized intepetation o Descates cogito me cogitare rem (BT 395).

In othe wods, the Concept compehends itsel in sel-consciousness: it is the con-

ceivedness o the sel conceiving itsel , the sel as it can authentically be, namely

I hi h i d i i i h l i i l l i li i l


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robet Sinnebink 189

asree, a univesality that is just as immediately individuality (BT 395).10

Heidegges intepetation o Hegels Concept o sel-consciousness is ce-

tainly legitimate in its geneal outlines: the I isthe existing Concept, accoding

to Hegel. At the same time, howeve, Heidegge ovelooks that this way o unde-

standing the elationship between the I and the Concept ails to take into accountthe (logical) limitationso the categoy oexistence, and moeove ignoes the act

that sel-consciousness is o Hegel the eal-philosophical, nite actualization

o the Concept. To make this point cleae, we must conside the elationship

between the stuctue o the Concept and that o the I as subjective spiit. In

the Phenomenology, Hegel denes the Concept o sel-consciousness as compising

thee inteelated moments: the universality o the pue undieentiated I; the

particularity o the mediation though the sensuous object o desie; and the con-

cete individuality o the efective movement o ecognition between sel-conscious

subjects (PS 176). While Heidegge accounts o the st moment (the abstactsel-identity o the I as I = I) and the second moment (the paticulaity o sel-

consciousness as desie), he has no account o the thid moment (concete in-

dividuality aticulated though intesubjective ecognition). Indeed, Heidegges

ailue to account o the moment oconcrete individuality in the Concept o sel-

consciousness clealy paallels the deciencies in the Kantian-Fichtean account

o sel-consciousness that Hegel seeks to ovecome though his account o the ole

o mutual ecognition. In this sense, Heidegge, like Kant and Fichte, emains

stuck at the level o reection in conceiving o sel-consciousness accoding to an

abstactormalism:a decient conception o sel-consciousness which ails to uniteall thee moments o univesality, paticulaity, and the cucial thid moment o

individuality achieved though the pocess o ecognition.

Hee we should also distinguish, uthemoe, between the innite stuctue

o the Concept (the absolute, efexive sel-enclosue o the Concept as unitay

o unique); and the elative independence o the I, which is sel-efexive only

though the recognition o the othe, a pocess o doubling o mutual efection

in which the othe is both absobed andeleased, both integated andset ee.

The chaacte o this pocess o ecognition o and though the othe, moeove,

necessaily depends on the histoically given stuctues o objective and absolutespiit. Fo Hegel, the I is unitary only by not beinguniqueo solitay: it nds its

sel-identity in otheness only within a pluality that peseves the othe. To this

extent, the I genuinely does all into time, accoding to Hegel, insoa as the

chaacte o its sel-identity depends upon something which it, as nite spiit, can

neve ully absob and sublate; it depends upon the histoical actuality o objec-

tive and absolute spiit as an othe o which it is merely an aspect, but in which it

10. In suppot o this Catesian-Fichtean intepetation o the Concept, Heidegge cites Hegels

statements that the I is the pue Concept itsel which, as concept, has come into existence[Dasein]

(SL 583), and that the I is rst, this pue sel-elated unity, as making abstaction om alldeteminateness and content and withdawing into the eedom o unesticted equality with itsel

(SL 8 ) A I l h i i i l i H l ll l b h


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nds its sel-identity and eedom in the sense o being with itsel in otheness.

Only spiit in its evolving totality ully realizesthe Concept; in its histoical actu-

alization it ovecomes time within time itsel.

Moeove, by emphasizing the paallel between the omal stuctue o sel-

consciousness and the Concept, Heidegges Catesian intepetation o sel-consciousness, as I shall ague uthe below, ails to compehend the hermeneutic

aspectso Hegels account o the elation between the I as existing Concept and

spiit as sel-compehending totality. Hegels chaacteization o the I as existing

Concept meely indicates itsormalstuctue as a unity o univesality, paticula-

ity, and individuality. It does not yet disclose those eal-philosophical conditions

(namely the concete histoical oms o developing ecognition) that make pos-

sible the deteminate actualization o this omal stuctue (epesented by the I

= I). Spiit is the concete o actualized Concept that must appea in histoical

time, not simply because o the omal stuctue o the negation o the negationshaed by time and spiit, but because nite spiit emains dependent on objec-

tive and absolute spiit o its concete sel-identity in otheness. To be sue, spiit

as totality is not educible to subjective spiit as individual sel-consciousness.

Nonetheless, spiit exists concetely and histoically only because thee ae sel-

conscious individuals who can acquie adequate sel-consciousness within histoi-

cally developing stuctues o mutual ecognition, wok o thei natual paticu-

laity and inequality in a histoical pocess which pogessively discloses spiit in

its concete ationality, and thus (e)poduce (objective and absolute) spiit as that

which in tun makes possible the nite sel-consciousness o these histoically situ-ated individuals. Hegels Phenomenology depicts this pocess as a ecollection o the

histoical-dialectical expeience in which spiit ecognizes itsel within compe-

hended histoya pocess o conceptual-histoical ecollection without which,

Hegel tells us, absolute spiit would emain lieless and alone (PS 808).

Although Heidegges bie citical analysis does not claim to do justice to

Hegels boade philosophical poject, Hegel is still pesented as exempliying

the vulga metaphysical conception o time. Questions must be asked, howeve,

about the adequacy o Heidegges intepetation. Why does Heidegge ocus

on the concept o time taken om the philosophy o natue athe than Hegelsexplicit discussions o the histoicity o spiit? Moeove, why is Heidegges dis-

cussion in this espect esticted to the most abstract, elementay categoization o

time in the philosophy o natue?11 Heidegge ignoes the hermeneuticaldimension

o Hegels pocedue in appopiating and conceptualizing categoies and models

om the histoy o philosophy; he ails to ecognize Hegels method o simulta-

neous exposition and critiquein pesenting categoical systems within speculative

philosophy.12 It is not supising that Heidegge nds Hegel to have ecapitulated

11. In the section on the animal oganism in the EncyclopaediaHegel seems to suggest that time (andspace) eceives moe concete, highe deteminations at highe levels o natual oganization. The

subjectivity o the animal is a ee time that accoding to inne contingency detemines its place


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robet Sinnebink 191

in the Jena Lectues Aistotles theses on time in the Physics, o Hegel heme-

neutically appopiates these Aistotelian themes within the philosophy o natue

as one aspect o the speculative system. In the paagaphs Heidegge discusses

om the Mechanism chapte o the Encyclopaedia, o example, Hegel examines

the categoical stuctue o time and space petinent not only to Aistotle but toNewtonian mechanics. The latte emains within the paadigm o the logic o es-

sence that is the subject o Hegels critical exposition in this pat o the system (pa-

alleled, o example, by the analysis o the dialectic between oce and law in the

Phenomenology). This discussion, howeve, cannot povide an adequate example o

the essential elationship between time and spiit, o the simple eason that na-

tue occupies a dieent conceptual/categoical level than spiit, and thus cannot

povide the basis o conceptualizing sel-conscious spiit in its histoical develop-

ment. In 82 oBeing and Time, Heidegge ovelooks this hemeneutic dimension

in Hegels discussion o time within the philosophy o natue and Hegels citicalexposition o the I as theniteactualization o the Concept.

II. FINITUDE AND INFINITUDE: HEIDEGGErS rEADING OF

HEGELS PHENOMENOLOGY

As Denise Souche-Dagues emaks, Heidegges simple eusal o Hegel in

Being and Timeailed to do justice to the complexity and powe o Hegels specula-

tive thought.13 Hegelian metaphysics cannot be educed to a copus o histoically

ossied mateial in need o citical de-stuction and ontological e-animation,o Hegel claimed to have achieved the suspension o substance- and subject-

metaphysics within the speculative metaphysics o spiit. Heidegge thus embaks

upon a dieent stategy, a dialogical conontation with Hegel that is pat o the

poject o ovecoming metaphysics in the sense o compehending the undelying

question o the metaphysical tadition (the question o Being) and o consequent-

ly esponding to the ogetting o the ontological dieence between Being and

beings. In this egad, Hegel is now undestood as epesenting the beginning o

the completion o consummation o Westen metaphysics (with Nietzsche as the

conclusion), a pocess that must be citically displaced in ode to pepae o thepossibility o an othe beginning o (no-longe-metaphysical) thought.

Heidegges next sustained engagement with Hegel occus in the 1930/31

Suhkamp, 1980, o an intepetation o Hegels Logicas involving this movement o simultaneous

exposition and citique.

13. As Souche-Dagues suggests in he helpul schema, we can identiy thee impotant phases in

Heidegges eading o Hegel: 1) The citique o the Hegelian theoy o time in the 1925-26 Mabug

lectues and in 82 oBeing and Time. 2) The 1930/31 lectues on the Consciousness chaptes o the

PhG and the 1942-43 commentay on the Intoduction to the Phenomenology. 3) The 1957 lectue on

The Onto-theological Constitution o Metaphysics, based on a semina on the Science o Logic, and

the accompanying 1957 text on The Pinciple o Identity. These thee moments can also be chaac-

teized as making thee distinct attitudes adopted by Heidegge towads Hegel: 1) a simple eusal

h H li bl i ) i il H l i H id j d )


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lectue seies on the opening chaptes o the Phenomenology o Spirit, a eading

that is cented on the poblematic onitude. Heidegge takes up this challenge

concening nitude and innitude in eading the Consciousness and Tuth o

Sel-Cetainty chaptes o Hegels Phenomenology. It is also pusued and deepened

in the late (1942/3) commentay on the Intoduction to the Phenomenology, theessay entitled Hegels Concept o Expeience published in Holzwegein 1950.14 In

his lectues on the Phenomenology, Heidegge explicitly situates his citical dialogue

with Hegel in the context o the post-Kantian metaphysics o the sel-conscious

subject. The conontation between Hegel and Heidegge takes place on the

teain o the problematic o nitude, the cossing between Hegels conceptualiza-

tion o the innity o spiit and Heidegges thinking o the nitude o Being. As

Heidegge emaks:

In ou obligation to the st and last inheent necessities o philosophy, we shall ty

to encounterHegel on the problematic o nitude. This means, accoding to what we saidealie, that though a conontation with Hegelspoblematic o innitude we shall

ty to ceate, on the basis o ou own inquiy into nitude, thekinship needed to

eveal the spiit o Hegels philosophy (HPS 38).

Heidegges aim hee is clea: to continue the task o a citicalDestruktion o the

histoy o ontology though a conontation between the Hegelian poblematic

o nitude and Heidegges own inquiy into nitude, and in so doing to povide

the common poblematic o a thinking dialogue with Hegel on the question o

Being.

Although Hegel ousted nitude om philosophy by sublating it within the

innitude o eason, this was only an incidental nitude, Heidegge claims, a

conception inscibed within the metaphysical tadition that Hegel was oced

to take up and tansmit (HPS 38). As distinct om Kant, with Hegel innitude

becomes a moe signicant poblem than nitude, since the inteest o specula-

tive eason is to suspend all oppositions within the ational totality o thought-

deteminations. In this sense, Heidegge undestands the poject o post-Kantian

idealism to consist in the systematic attempt to ovecome the elative knowledge

o nite consciousness (in the sense o object-dependent knowledge o otheness)

in avou othe absolute knowledgeo speculative eason (in the sense o a no longe

elative o object-dependent sel-knowledge). As ab-solving o detaching itsel

om the elativity o consciousness, absolute knowledge detaches itsel om ela-

tive cognition such that consciousness becomes awae o itsel o becomes sel-

consciousness. As I shall pesently discuss, Heidegges intepetation o conscious-

ness thus ests on the assumption that the entie phenomenological exposition

adopts the standpoint o absolute knowing in the sense o an absolventknowledge

that has absolved itsel om any dependency on the consciousness o objects

(HPS 51). It is only with the unity o consciousness and sel-consciousness in reason

that knowledge becomes purely unbounded, purely absolved, absolute knowledge (HPS


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robet Sinnebink 193

16). Phenomenology can thus be chaacteized as the absolute sel-presentation o

reason (ratiologos), whose essence and actuality Hegel nds in absolute spirit (HPS

30).15

a) The Presupposition o the Absolute and the Phenomenological We

A decisive aspect o Heidegges intepetation o the Phenomenology is the

claim that Hegel presupposes already at the beginning what he achieves at the endnamely

absolute knowledge (HPS 30). Absolute knowledge must be pesupposed om

the outset o the exposition: i we do not aleady om the beginning know in the

mode o absolute knowledge, then we cannot tuly undestand the Phenomenology

(HPS 33). Hegel, Heidegge continues, pesupposes that the absolute is with us,

in and o itsel, all along (PS 73). Indeed, Heidegge takes this statement to

captue Hegels undamental position.This aises the question: who is the we in Heidegges eading o Hegel?

Heidegges intepetation pesupposes that the Phenomenology begins absolutely

with the absolute, and consequently that the phenomenological obseve is al-

eady in possession o absolute knowledge. Indeed, Heidegge insists that we e-

ject intepetations that take the Phenomenology to be an intoduction to philoso-

phy leading om the so-called natual consciousness to a genuine speculative

philosophical knowledge (HPS 29). Heidegges ontologicalintepetation empha-

sizes, athe, the unolding o absolute knowledge as a undamental-ontological

pesupposition. We must have aleady abandoned the natual attitude o evey-day consciousness, not just patially, but totally, i we ae popely to undestand

phenomenological expeience (HPS 33).

This abupt dismissal o any popaedeutic o educative intepetation o

the Phenomenology as a Bildungsprozeis maintained in the essay Hegels Concept

o Expeience. Heidegge again ejects hee taditional intepetations o the

Phenomenology as an edicatoy intoduction to philosophical science, a popae-

deutic o natual consciousness to educate it to the level o philosophical o ab-

solute knowledge: in the opinion o philosophy even today, the phenomenology

o spiit is an itinerarium, a desciption o a jouney, which is escoted by eveydayconsciousness towad the scientic knowledge o philosophy (HCE 107). Such

appoaches, o Heidegge, ail to compehend the ontological meaning o the

Phenomenology as the sel-pesentation o the absolute in its pesence (parousia) to us

(HCE 109). Fo [t]he pesentation o phenomenal knowledge, Heidegge tells us,

is not a oute which natual consciousness can tead (HPS 108).16

15. Fo Heidegge, Hegels undestanding o eason basically ulls the taditional conception

o the Geek logos, via its tansomation into the Latin ratio, and late development as eason o

Vernunt in conjunction with the taditional discipline o logic. This explains Hegel pesentation o

the conceptual and categoical stuctue o the Absolute, which simultaneously integates the basicmetaphysical positions o the Westen tadition om Geek ontology to tanscendental idealism, in

tems o a science o logic


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It is woth mentioning the obvious diculty that this intepetation is shaply

at odds with numeous explicit statements in the text: Hegel descibes the phe-

nomenology as a ladde to the standpoint o science [Wissenschat] (PS 26), as

an education o the individual consciousness which epeats the omative path o

univesal spiit as though in a silhouette (PS 28), a path odoubt o even pathodespair (PS 78), and as the detailed histoy o the education [Bildung] o con-

sciousness itsel to the standpoint o Science (PS 78). Heidegges intepetation

seemsprima acieto contadict Hegels epeated assetions in the Phenomenology.

Heidegges esponse is to point to the undamental-ontological signicance

o the poject o phenomenology. In Heidegges ontological intepetation, the

phenomenological we has om the outset lost the option o being this o that

peson and thus o being, andomly, an ego (HPS 48). rathe, Heidegges ead-

ing implies that the phenomenological we is to be undestood as a subjectiv-

ized vesion o Heidegges undamental ontologist aleady in possession o ab-solute knowledge; the we ees to those who have aleady attained to absolute,

undamental-ontological knowledge o the whole.

Heidegges undamental-ontological intepetation o the we can be con-

tasted, I suggest, with a historicist-propaedeuticintepetation, which emphasizes the

historicalchaacte o the pocess o educative cultivation to the level o Science

o Wissenschat. The phenomenological we, on this intepetation, ees to the

cultually and histoically situated ideal o imputed eades o the Phenomenology:

philosophically cultivated individuals who desie, but do not yet possess, Science,

and ae theeoe to be educated to the level o speculative philosophy in ode totansom thei sel-undestanding [Besinnung] as histoical subjects o modenity.

The Phenomenology on this view is a philosophical-histoical popaedeutic to Sci-

ence that has an intinsically dialogicalstuctue: the cognitive claims o a given

gue [Gestalt] o consciousness ae pesented by natual consciousness in its own

voice, while the stuctual inadequacies o each cognitive attitude, accoding to

its own standad o tuth, emeges o us as phenomenological obseves. We

can gasp the sel-testing o consciousness and the immanent tansitions to po-

gessively moe complex and integated gues o consciousness in a manne

that ought to be intelligible to the supeseded oms o natual consciousness aswell, though usually is notdue to the lattes basic unthinking inetia (PS 80).

Indeed, o Hegel, natual consciousness is typically pone to existential inetia

o thoughtlessness, sentimentality, lack o efection, and histoical amnesia con-

cening its own histoical-phenomenological expeience (PS 80). At the conclu-

sion o the phenomenological dama, we ealise that we have been obseving the

philosophico-histoical conditions o ou own expeience as dissatised moden

subjects. Absolute knowledge, as the philosophical sel-compehension o the his-

toy o spiit, is the resultthat is also thegroundo ou expeience o sel-alienated

modenity.

b l k l d hi h b l h i d i i i ibl hi k l


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robet Sinnebink 195

Why assume this histoicist-popaedeutic eading o the phenomenological

we? One eason is that it avoids the diculty in Heidegges ontological inte-

petation that pesupposing absolute knowledge seems to make edundant the

poject o a phenomenology beoe it even begins. In Heidegges intepetation,

the Phenomenology quickly becomes an absolute ontology o all-consuming scienceo the absolute, athe than an intoduction to the speculative system. I we pe-

suppose that the we is aleady in possession o absolute knowledge, we also pe-

suppose knowledge o the categoies and concepts undelying the gues o con-

sciousness and sel-conscious eason depicted in the Phenomenology. This means

that Hegels claims concening what the phenomenology is to peom (to be a

ladde to Science, a path towads philosophical sel-education, an intoduction

to the speculative system as a whole) become nonsensical. The pesupposition o

an absolute standpoint not only endes phenomenology supefuous but makes

it collapse beoe it even begins.An histoicist-popaedeutic intepetation answes this diculty by pointing

out that the immanent phenomenological exposition is pecisely what educates

us both to ecognize the expeiences o consciousness as histoical gues o

spiit and to ecognize ouselves within this expeience. The phenomenological

path o sel-consummating scepticism is supposed to be a path that the so-called

natual consciousness o the (histoically situated) eade can tead, pecisely in

ode to lean that its sel-alienation can be ovecome in thoughtthough the con-

ceptual compehension o its histoico-philosophical expeience. The histoically

achieved level o conceptual-philosophical undestandingwhat Hegel calledthe efection philosophy o subjectivity culminating in Kantian idealismpo-

vides the only pesupposition necessay o compehending the tansomation

om natual o athephilosophically naveconsciousness to the level o specula-

tive thought. As Hegel states, the philosophically nave eade has the ight to

demand that Science should at least povide him with the ladde to this stand-

point, show him this standpoint within himsel (PS 26); a ight based upon

the individuals absolute independence, the right o subjectivity that is one o the

distinctive achievements o modenity.17 The nave consciousness need not be ex-

cluded om phenomenology as a path that it cannot tead. rathe, the modensubject can claim its ight o subjectivity in being educated to the standpoint o

Science by climbing (and theeby suspending) Hegels phenomenological ladde.

Heidegges esponse to this issue is to point to the inheently circularchaac-

te o the Phenomenology that, like all philosophy, meely unolds itspresupposition

(HPS 36). In this case, it is the absolute knowledge o Being that allows the Be-

ing o sel-conscious spiit to compehend itsel. Heidegges stongly cicula

intepetation, howeve, aces the poblem o accounting o Hegels rejection o

the notion that philosophy develops out o a undamental pesupposition (as in

Hegels citicisms o reinholds basic pesuppositions o philosophizing). Fo He-

Th i lli ibl S i di H l i h d ll ibl


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gel, athe, the end emeges out o a pocess which is itsel included in the esult.

Hegels undamental hemeneutical pinciple is that the whole is the tuethe

tuth emeges as a esult o the whole pocess and the whole pocess in its sel-

unolding is the site o the emegence o tuth. The phenomenological exposition

is theeoe not the unolding (and legitimation) o the oundational tuth o aninitial pesupposition (such as the absolute knowledge o Being), but athe the

path o absolute o sel-consummatingskepsis. It is the unolding o the untrutho

whateve pesuppositions consciousness makes about itsel, the untuth o its own

(limited and sel-contadictoy) standads o knowing and tuth; this untuth

is thus itsel a necessay moment o tuth as it is disclosed in the whole devel-

opmental movement. Indeed, it is only the ailue o the pejudices o natual

consciousness that poduces the possibility o Sciences claim to be philosophical

knowledge without pesuppositions.

The Phenomenology thus pesents the demonstation o ou libeation om theopposition o consciousness (SL 49), and attainment o the speculative level o

pue thought-deteminations that is the only pesupposition o the Logicas such.

It is in this sense that Science begins with the matte itsel [Sache selbst], without

any extenal efections.18 Hegels poject in the Phenomenology is theeoe adi-

cally anti-oundationalist: Hegel ejects all (Catesian o reinholdian) oundational-

ism in avou o a sel-constucting pocess though which the dispaity between

knowing and tuth is nally ovecome. As Hegel emaks, the Phenomenology de-

scibes the coming-to-be oWissenschat, a becoming that is quite dieent om

the oundation o Science; least o all will it be like the aptuous enthusiasmwhich, like a shot om a pistol, begins staight away with absolute knowledge,

and makes shot wok o othe standpoints by declaing that it takes no notice o

them (PS 27). In asseting absolute knowledge as the absolute pesupposition

o the Phenomenology, Heidegge appeas not to have heeded Hegels impotant

claim that the absolute as a esult is also the gound o the whole pocess o its

own becoming.

b) Heidegger on Finitude

This bings us to the cossoads o which Heidegge speaks in elation to

Hegel: the poblem o the innite in Hegels and Heidegges undestanding o

nitudein elation to the meaning o Being. As Heidegge asks:

Is the undestanding o Being absolvent, and is the absolvent absolute? O is what

Hegel epesents as in the Phenomenology o Spiritas absolvence meely tanscendence

in disguise, i.e., nitude? (HPS 65)

Heidegge is concened to ask whethe Being in its essence isniteand how this

nitude is to be undestood with eeence toBeingathe than in elation to be-

ings. This is in contast with what Heidegge takes to be Hegels conception o

8 S S h H l di i h i i H l j l i l i


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robet Sinnebink 197

Being qua innity, in which the innity o absolute knowledge detemines the

tuth o Being, and does so such that it has aleady sublated eveything that is

nite into itsel (HPS 75). Fo Heidegge, Hegels sublation o nitude means that

all philosophy moves in and asthis sublation o nitude, which occus in the poc-

ess o a dialecticalmovement. Heidegge thus aises the question o the nitudeo Being, a question that has hitheto not been aised but which has implicitly

motivated pevious metaphysics (HPS 75). This is why the conontation with

Hegel ove the poblem o nitude and innitude is inheently and histoically

necessay as well as being a poductive pecondition o thinking though the

question o Being.

Let us tun to Heidegges account o the Hegelian concept o innity.

Heidegge indicates two aspects to this concept: 1) Hegels gounding o the pob-

lem o Being in the logos, maniested in Hegels logical account o thinking as

speculative knowledge o dialectic; and 2), the tansposition o this logical gound-ing in Descates tun towads the ego cogito, maniested in Hegels undamental

thesis, as omulated by Heidegge: Substance is in tuth subject19 (HPS 76-77).

Heidegge thus descibes the Hegelian concept o innity as having both a logi-

cal and subjective gounding. The Phenomenology undetakes the pope subjec-

tive gounding o innity in the subject and assubject, while the pope logical

gounding is developed in the Science o Logic(HPS 77). What is the elationship

between the logical and the subjective gounding o innity? On Heidegges

eading, the concept o innity is inheently and necessaily gounded in the

second [subjective] one (HPS 77). The logical meaning o innity is goundedin the innite chaacte o sel-consciousness, which is in act the evese o He-

gels pocedue, namely to point to sel-consciousness o subjectivity as a omal

maniestation o the logical stuctue o innity.

We can theeoe aise cetain questions hee about Heidegges intepeta-

tion o innity and sel-consciousness, and his claim that the logical meaning o

the innite is gounded in the stuctue o sel-consciousness (athe than the e-

vese). Indeed, Hegels own account o the innite chaacte o sel-consciousness

emphasizes its inadequacy as an exemplication o the tue innite. Fo it is pe-

cisely because o its subjectivity that sel-consciousness is not the ull o completemaniestation o the innite (undestood as sel-subsisting independence that in-

copoates the nite within itsel). To be sue, sel-consciousness is the existing

Concept, as peviously discussed, but cetainly not its ull eality o concete

actualization, which is athe Spirit in its whole developed aticulation. In this

casenamely the standpoint o sel-consciousness as itsel a Gestalt, o seies o

gues in the Phenomenology, sublated by reasonwe have the nite (subject)

as innite, but not the innite (spiit) as nite, that is, aticulated as a concete

individuality. The esult is an opposition between an abstact sel-identity o sel-

consciousness that attempts to dominate and integate otheness, an otheness

W h ld i i h hi l i i i l l i h id d d


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that is epoduced in this vey pocess such that the opposition between sel and

othe can neve be ovecome.

Fo claication o this point we must tun to Hegels citique o the bad o

spuious innity o Kantian sel-consciousness (and its Fichtean vaiant) in the

Science o Logic. Hegel is concened hee in paticula with the pactical eects othe opposition between nite and innite within the spuious innite belonging

to the analytic undestanding o Verstand. The lattein the om o a quantita-

tive pogess to innity which continually sumounts the limit it is poweless to

emove, and pepetually alls back into itis exalted in the philosophy o efec-

tion as something ultimate and even divine (SL 228). Within the sphee o pacti-

cal eason, the pogess to innity is likewise exalted in the eeling o the sub-

lime, in which the subject, to quote Kant in the Critique o Practical Reason, aises

himsel in thought above the place he occupies in the wold o sense, eaching out

to innity (SL 229). This exaltation o the limitless pogess indicates, o Hegel,athe the ailue o succumbing o thought: the bad innite o the Kantian

moal subject esults in a weaisome epetition in which a limit vanishes and

eappeas, is displaced into a beyond in ode to be ovecome, but in being ove-

come is once again displaced into anothe beyond, and so on ad innitum. What

esults om such a endless pogession is only the eeling oimpotencein elation

to this unattainable innite as an ought-to-be, an alienation geneated by the efec-

tive undestanding which attempts, but always ails, to masterthe nite (SL 229).

Hegels citique o the Kantian account o sel-consciousness points to the

deleteious moal-pactical eects o the opposition between eedom and na-tue. Within Kants account, the innity o oute sensuous intuition is opposed

to the innite o sel-consciousness in its abstact univesality. The sel-conscious

subject nds that its eedom lies in its (abstact) sel-identity that is dened by ex-

cluding and opposing itsel to the ullness o natue and Geist, which inevitably

cononts it as a beyond(SL 231). The contadiction that emeges hee is the same

as that which stuctues the innite pogession: that between a etunedness-

into-sel which is at the same time immediately an out-o-selness (SL 231). The

contadiction emeges between a sel-identity dened by opposition to an othe

that is essential to the constitution o this sel-identity, but which at the same timecontadicts its essential chaacte as a solitay sel-elation o solus ipse. The esult

is a pepetual longingeminiscent o the sel-alienation o the unhappy conscious-

ness and beautiul soul o omanticism: the unsatisable desie to ovecome the

beach between the solitay and sel-detemining void o the ego, and the ull-

ness o sensuous otheness, whee the latte is negated by sel-consciousness yet

still pesent in the om o an unattainable beyond.

The pactical implications o this decient om o sel-identity and unive-

sality ae highly signicant. Hegel agues that the antithesis between nite and

inniteo the maniold wold and the ego aised to its eedomesults ina elation odomination in which the innite ails to maste the nite. Sel-con-


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robet Sinnebink 199

nite (natue) and reication o the innite(the ee subject) in which the powe o

the ego ove the non-ego (sense and oute natue) is conceived such that moality

can and ought to pogess while the powe o nite sensuousness is diminished

(SL 231). The moal poject o achieving a peect adequacy o the ee will in

elation to the univesal moal law is in act an unending pogess to innity, anachievement that is epesented as an absolutely unattainablebeyond (SL 231). The

stuggle and meaning o moality is dened pecisely though this unattainability

o moal tuth as an ovecoming o the opposition between innite eedom and

nite sensuousness.

The conclusion I want to daw om this analysis is that it is impossible o the

logical Concept o innity in its tue sense to be gounded in the innity o sel-

consciousness, as Heidegge maintains. Indeed, Hegels citique o the subjectivism

o the innitude o sel-consciousness agues explicitly against Heidegges thesis.

Fo the innitude o sel-consciousness emains a bad innite mied within aninsumountable opposition to the nite that takes the om o an endless pogess

towads an unattainable beyond. Heidegge thus misattibutes to Hegel the vey

conception o the spuious innite that Hegel attempts to ovecome.20

III. HEGELS CONCEPT OF EXPErIENCE

Heidegges 1942/43 intepetation o the Intoduction to the Phenomenolo-

gythe essay Hegels Concept o Expeienceis his most intensive teatment o

Hegels philosophy as a whole. Hee I shall pesent a bie analysis with paticu-la eeence to the ole o the ontological dieence. Fo the citical question is

whethe Hegel actually does neglect the ontological dieence in the exhibiting

o the dialectical expeience o consciousness, o indeed within the unolding o

dialectical-speculative logic. My aim hee as peviously is to question Heidegges

eading o Hegel and to suggest that Hegels thought cannot be so eadily seques-

teed as the culminating phase o moden subject-metaphysics, as Heidegge and

his twentieth-centuy ollowes will ague.

As Heidegge amously declaed, moden philosophy is dened by the seach

o an absolute oundation o knowledge in unconditional sel-cetainty (inau-guated by Descates and citically delimited by Kant). Hegel inheits and com-

pletes this seach o an absolute o sel-gounding knowledge that is gounded

in the unconditional sel-cetainty o sel-consciousness. Indeed, Hegel is the st

philosophe, Heidegge notes, to ully possess the teain o sel-cetain subjectiv-

ity once the Catesian undamentum inconcussum is thought o as the absolute itsel.

With Hegel, the absolute, Heidegge explains, is spiit:

that which is pesent to itsel [bei sich] in the cetainty o unconditional sel-knowing.

real knowledge o beings as beings now becomes the absolute knowledge o the

absolute in its absoluteness (HCE 97).

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Heidegges omulations ae cetainly legitimate as a as Hegels claim to de-

velop a system o absolute knowledge is concened. Fom an ontological point

o view, Heidegge develops in this connection his undamental thesis concen-

ing the meaning o the Phenomenology: that Hegel pesupposes the pesence o

parousiao the absolute to us, and that the absolute wills to disclose its Beingthough (absolute) knowledge. Hegels aim om the beginning o the Phenom-

enology, Heidegge emaks, is to indicate the absolute in its paousia among us

(HCE 98). Indeed, Heidegge takes Hegels emakthat the absolute is om

the stat in and o itsel with us and intends to be with usto be the undamen-

tal statement o Hegels conception o Being (HCE 98). Hegels conception o Be-

ing is aticulated in this being-with-us (parousia) o the absolute, which is in itsel

aleady the mode in which the light o tuth, the absolute itsel, beams [anstrahlt]

upon us (HCE 98). The absolute isas the ontological hoizon o Being in which

beings ae disclosed to us in thei adiant and intelligible pesence.Heidegge then shits emphasis in ode to develop a thesis cucial o his

late thinking: that in the couse o moden philosophy, om Descates and Kant

to Hegel and Nietzsche, the meaning o Being is pogessively subjectivized(culmi-

nating in the essence o moden technics o das Ge-stell). This thesis o a subjectivi-

zation o Beingis a cental eatue o Heidegges eading o the Phenomenology and

o Hegels cucial ole in the completion o Westen metaphysics. Accoding to

Heidegge, Hegel takes complete possession o the teain o subjectivity by tans-

oming it into sel-knowing and sel-willing spiit. Philosophy becomes science

o Wissenschatin the absolute metaphysics o Hegel pecisely because it takesits meaning om the essence o the subjects sel-cetainty which knows itsel

unconditionally (HCE 99). Philosophical science is thus the completion o the

Catesian poject o a sel-gounding knowledge that has its absolute oundation

in the unconditional sel-cetainty o the knowing subject.

What does Heidegge mean hee by the subject? Since Leibniz, Heidegge

claims, entities have been undestood to be whateve ae intelligible as epesent-

able o a cognitive subject. The subject, in speculative metaphysics,

is now that which tuly (which now means cetainly) lies beoe us, the subiec-

tum, the hypokeimenon, which philosophy since antiquity has had to ecognize as that

which pesences (HCE 99).

The subject has its Being in the epesenting elation to the object, and in be-

ing this epesenting elationship it also epesents itsel to itsel as subject. The

mode o Being o the moden metaphysical subject is sel-certainty, in the sense

o a sel-conditioned, o athe, unconditional sel-knowing. This mode o Being as

unconditional sel-knowing is what Heidegge calls the subjectity [Subjektitt] o the

subject:

The subjectity o the subject is constituted by the subject being a subject, i.e., bythe subject being in a subject-object elation. Subjectity consists in unconditional

sel-knowing (HCE 100)


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robet Sinnebink 201

which Hegel aises to the level o speculative science. This unconditional sel-

awaeness, which o Heidegge is the goal o the Phenomenology, aticulates the

subjectity o the subject and povides the basis o conceptualizing being qua

being [das Seiende als Seiende] as a mode o sel-gounding sel-knowledge. Inte-

peting the beingness o beings as subjectity means that Being is subjectivized;subjectity in Hegel is now tantamount to the absoluteness o the absolute (HCE

100).

A poblem aises hee that meits uthe consideation. How can the subject,

whose Being is dened by subjectity, be consideed absolute? As we saw ealie,

the subjectity o the subject is dened in tems o the Being o the subject-object

elation, which is theeby aised to the level o unconditional sel-knowledge.

But the vey notion o a subject as absolute seems sel-contadictoy, since the

subject, accoding to Heidegge, emains inscibed within the paadigm o the

subject-object elationship, and thus maked by its elative status, that is, itsinsumountable nitude. Accoding to Heidegge, howeve, absolute knowledge

is gounded in the Being o the subject-object elation quasubjectity, a move that

educes speculative knowledge to the level o meely elative knowledge. It is not

clea, then, how the gue o the subjectity o the subjectgiven its ieducible

nitude and object/othe dependencecan at the same time be aised to the

level o the absoluteness o the absolute, as Heidegge maintains.

A nal point to conside in Heidegges intepetation is the poblem o the

ontological dieence within the Phenomenology. Accoding to Heidegge, this un-

damental dieence between Being and beings povides the un-thought oiginand element o metaphysics in its entie histoy om Plato and Aistotle to Hegel

and Nietzsche. This is to be undestood as a histoy o decline [Verallsgeschichte],

namely as theorgettingo the ontological dieence and indeed o the question o

Being. Heidegge intoduces the ontological dieence into his intepetation o

Hegels Phenomenology, aligning ontological knowledge with Being and ontic o

natual consciousness with knowledge o beings. Hegels natual consciousness

is thus akin to ontic o pe-ontological consciousness that petains to beings as

pesent to consciousness. Ontological consciousness, on the othe hand, descibes

the ab-solvent standpoint o the phenomenological we, those undamental on-tologists who heed the Being o beings in absolute knowledge.

Indeed, Heidegge poceeds to assimilate Hegels natual consciousness to

allen o inauthentic Da-sein, which coves ove any authentic ontological ex-

peience o oiginay tempoality o indeed o Being as such (HCE 111-112). As

Heidegge emaks:

In its epesentation o beings, natual consciousness does not attend to being; none-

theless, it must do so. It cannot help but paticipate in the epesentation o the

being o beings in geneal because without the light o being it cannot even be lost

amidstbeings (HCE 111-112).

Hee the ontological dieence is explicitly invoked in ode to claiy Hegels


18/21


point o the phenomenological obseve. The vey possibility o phenomenology

is opened up by the ontological dieence between beings appehended by natu-

al consciousness and Being as compehended by the phenomenological we.

Dawing on the analytic o Da-sein inBeing and Time, Heidegge intepets

Hegels consciousness as ontico peontological consciousness whose object com-pises beingstaken as representable. At the same time, consciousness is also ontologi-

cal consciousness in the sense o having an awaeness o the beingness o beings

as objectivity. The paallel Heidegge daws hee ees to the ontic o peontologi-

cal undestanding belonging to Da-sein in its eveyday being-in-the-wold; con-

sciousness too has such a peontological undestanding even though conscious-

ness only epesents the beingness o beings as objective pesence. Heidegge

thus attempts to absob Hegelian phenomenology within the poject o thinking

the dieence between Being and beings. Phenomenology is the pocess o mak-

ing explicit this implicit dieence between ontic and ontological tuth, o com-pehending the (unthematized) expeience o the ontological dieence between

Being and beings.

Heidegges theses concening the ontological meaning o sel-consciousness

and the subjectivization o the absolute ae thus bought togethe in his intepe-

tation o the dialectical movement oexperienceas naming the Being o beings.

Hegels concept o experience, accoding to Heidegge, names phenomena, as

phenomena, the on hei on, o beings thought in thei beingness (HCE 135). Ex-

peience, Heidegge agues, is thus now a wod oBeingdesignating the subjectity

o the subject. Accodingly, the dialectical expeience o consciousness involves acompaison between ontic peontological knowledge and ontologicalknowledge.

A dialogue o legein takes place between these two poles in which the claims o

ontic and ontological consciousness ae head (HCE 138). This dialogical cha-

acte o ontic-ontological consciousness pompts Hegel to call the movement o

consciousness dialectical, whee the latte is undestood ontologically as the ex-

peience o consciousness dened as subjectity: Expeience is the beingness o

beings, Heidegge states, which is detemined as subiectum on the basis o subjec-

tity (HCE 138).

Heidegges ontological eading concludes with the tuning o natual con-sciousness towads Being o the pesence o the absolute: the invesion o con-

sciousness is constued as etuning usthe phenomenological ontologists who

ae attentive, skeptically, to the being o beings (HCE 153)to ou natue, which

consists in ou being in theparousiao the absolute. As phenomenological ontolo-

gists, we allow the ontic-ontological dialogue o expeiencethe parousiao the

absoluteto unold accoding to its will to be with us o disclose itsel in ontologi-

cal knowledge.

At this point Heidegge aticulates the explicit connection between the met-

aphysics o subjectity and the moden undestanding o Being disclosed withinthe hoizon o the essence o technology. As we have seen, Heidegge agues that


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robet Sinnebink 203

to powe, detemines modenity as the epoch o technics. Heidegge thus con-

nects his citique o metaphysics with the conontation with modenity: the citi-

cal encounte with technology as completed subject-metaphysics is announced

though Hegels intepetation o Being as subjectity. As Heidegge states:

Within subjectity, evey being as such becomes an object. All beings ae beings om

out o and within steadast eliability. In the age o subjectity [i.e., modenity], in

which the essence o technology is gounded, i natue as being is put in opposition

to consciousness, then this natue is only anothe name o beings as the objects o

moden technological objectication which indisciminately attacks the continued

existence o things and men (HCE 144).

What is stiking in this analysis is its poximity to Hegels own citique o the

subject-metaphysics, o what Hegel elsewhee calls the metaphysics o efec-

tion. Hegel too citicizes the pactical eects o the pinciple o abstact identity

and univesality that esults in the obliteation o paticulaity, the domination ootheness, and the eication o subjectivity. Modenity, o Heidegge, is the ea

o subjectity and hence o technological objectication. Moden technology is

itsel nothing othe than natual consciousness that has at last made easible the

unlimited, sel-assuing poduction o all beings though the inexoable objecti-

cation o each and evey thing (HCE 112). But as we have seen, Hegels own

citique o the subjectivization o the Concept, the bad innity o the unde-

standing, also emphasizes the domination, eication, and objectication esult-

ing om moden subject-metaphysics. In this sense, Heidegges citical emaks

povide a stiking epetition o Hegels own citical conontation with modenmetaphysics o the subject and its moal-pactical implications. In this espect,

the dialogue between Hegel and Heidegge nds its shaed matte o thinking in

the citical conontation with the metaphysics o modenity.

To conclude, in Heidegges eading o Hegels Phenomenology, the need to

ovecome the sel-alienation o the unhappy consciousness becomes the need to

ovecome the objectiying thinking o ontic consciousness in ode to etun to

the parousiao the absolute. In Heidegges conontation with Hegel, howeve,

the negativity o the histoical expeience o spiit is lost in avou o a ecovey o

the ogotten expeience o the oiginay question o Being. Instead o Hegelsdynamic histoical unolding o intesubjective spiit we have Heidegges Ver-

allsgeschichteo a peennial ogetting o Being. Heidegges conontation with

Hegelian metaphysics thus emains detemined by a philosophical metanaative

culminating not in eedom o subjectivity (as o Hegel) but in the nihilism o

moden technics.

The main diculty hee, as I have agued, is Heidegges ailue to gasp the

intersubjectiveconstitution o sel-consciousness that povides the basis o Hegels

dialectical intepetation o eason and spiit. Fo Hegels lasting legacy o the

metaphysics o subjectivity is pecisely his move om the abstact sel-identity oomal models o sel-consciousness (the Kantian and Fichtean I = I) towads


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ing less than an attempt to think the expeience o modenity; to compehend the

histoy and conditions o the omation o moden subjects, and to do so in the

most conceptually systematic manne possible.

Heidegges intepetation, howeve, neglects this intesubjective dimension

o Hegels Phenomenology. This is paticulaly evident in Heidegges ontologicalintepetation o the phenomenological we, which equates it with the unda-

mental ontologist oBeing and Time, and hence claims that the Phenomenology is

gounded in a undamental pesuppositionthe absolute knowledge o Being. I

have agued that this is an implausible intepetation o the poject o the Phenom-

enology that ails to do justice to Hegels attempt to povide a pesuppositionless

intoduction to philosophical science.

In these espects, we could say that the thinking dialogue between Hegel

and Heidegge emains pehaps a philosophical monologue. Heidegges ne ea

o the un-thought at the heat o metaphysicsso billiantly attuned to Kantand pooundly engaged with Nietzscheseems somewhat dea in the case o

Hegel. Fo Heidegge ails to heed that the nihilism o metaphysics is not only

the ogetting o Being but also the expeience o eedom.21 Nonetheless, the

Hegelian and Heideggeian naatives o metaphysicswhich mio and invet

one anothestill povide a dual hoizon o ou own questioning o metaphysics

and modenity; this is why the dialogue between Hegel and Heidegge emains

philosophically impotant o us today. Genuine dialogue, howeve, equies eci-

pocity, an engagement with the othe; but pehaps we cannot demand this o

a thinke exclusively devoted to the mystey o Being. Hegel once emaked, asthough anticipating Heidegge,

the high sense o the Etenal, the Holy, the Innite, stides along in the obes o a

high piest, on a path that is om the st no path, but has immediate being at its

cente, the genius o poound oiginal insight and loty fashes o inspiation. But

just as poundity o this kind still does not eveal the souce o essential being, so,

too, these sky-ockets o inspiation and not yet the empyean. Tue thoughts and

scientic insight ae only to be won though the labou o the Concept (PS 70).

A H id h i ll i h S h lli


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