POPULAR FRONT FOR THELIBERATION OF PALESTINE

HANDS OFF

THE

M / L / T / A / "

HANDS OFFTHE

MILITIA!

« The richest source of power to wagewar lies in the masses of the people ».

Mao Tse-Tung

« On Protracted War »

Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 186.

Information DepartmentBEIRUT

1971

The resistance movement started long be-fore the defeat of 1967. It never found thesuitable circumstances necessary for its ra-pid growth either inside or outside the occu-pied territory. The reasons for this were:

1. The occupied area of 1948 was smalland densely populated with Israelis.

2. The proportion of the Arab inhabitantsinside this area was small in comparison tothe large Israeli population. These factorsprevented the establishment of differentforms of guerrilla activities other than theformation of underground bases.

3. The maintenance of external guerrillabases (underground or otherwise) in thesurrounding Arab countries was extremelydifficult and risky. These countries werespeaking loudly about liberation and beat-ing the drums of war ( strictly for localconsumption). It was even more difficultin the West Bank, because the Jordanianauthorities had disarmed the people anddeprived them of training; suppressed anymilitant or semi-militant activity; and

they even outlawed any form of reconnais-sance to the occupied territories.

Then came the June 1967 defeat, shiftingthe conditions in favor of the resistance mo-vement in several important ways: the occu-pied area became larger; the number ofArabs in the occupied territory increased;huge numbers of heroic Gaza Strip inhabi-tants (who were well trained and armedlong before the occupation) had joined themovement; the people of the Hebron moun-tain region (who are known for their endu-rance and familiarity with guerrilla war-fare) also joined the movement. Further-more, the people of all the other areas hadjoined the movement as a vast moral andphysical reserve force. This shift also af-fected the surrounding Arab countries,which for quite sometime during the war,acted as if they were disarmed while theenemy was expanding. A cease fire, whjchwas in effect everywhere, silenced all gunsexcept those of the resistance movemnt,which stood facing the enemy. In the

midst of defeat, on one hand, and with theactive challenge on the other, the resis-tance movement proved to be the only dy-namic and largely effective Arab move-ment in the region. It gained vast popularsupport (Palestine and Arab) which helpedit grow remarKably inside and outside theoccupied territory. It also found a suitableopportunity to create its bases on the sur-rounding Arab land, especially on Jordan-ian soil. The majority of Palestinian mas-ses who immigrated in 1967 from the WestBank and Gaza Strip now inhabit Jordan,adding thousands and thousands of impo-verished people to the camp's populace ).The process of forming the guerrilla basesin Jordan had suffered partial difficultiesand obstacles imposed by the defeated ar-my which was retreating from the WestBank accompanied by sections of the RoyalGuard and of the Bedouins. Obstacleswere also imposed by police forces who ori-ginally were not involved in the battle. Inspite of their fears of the growth, and ex-panding influence of the resistance move-

ment among the people, the Jordanian au-thorities did not have the power, physicallyor morally, to corifort the commando's po-wer and influence. At the time they couldnot present any concrete excuse to deprivethe commandos of dealing heavy blows tothe enemy who had captured the WestBank and Jerusalem, and had destroyedthe pride and moral of the Jordanian mili-tary. Hence, the Jordanian authorities hadno alternative but to go along with the re-sistance on a short, compulsory honey-moon. In the midst of this atmosphere, alot of slogans, such as «The army is theshield of the resistance » and « We are allcommandos », etc., were perpetuated.

The trick was relatively successful withsome of the commando groups and the ide-ology of unprincipled coexistance foundfertile soil in which to grow. Those whoperpetuated this liberal ideology also beganspeaking of the concept of Arab nationalbrotherhood as being a weapon against theZionist enemy. The more progressive groups

6

among the commandos were aware of thetrick and the true nature of such a joiningof all forces and the benefits to be gainedby those people from this. These progres-sive groups had learned, through experi-ence with the Jordanian government, howto expose the true nature of this regime,and the intentions of the classes that bene-fit from it. They were also enabled to esti-mate the time period that the regime couldbe expected to silently tolerate the risingrevolutionary tide. The progressive groupscould also foresee and observe how the re-actionary Jordanian government was forti-fying and rearming itself to protect thethrone, not the masses. After these groupshad firmly established their guerilla basesand strengthened their ties with the vastpopulation, they realized the necessity forprotecting themselves from expected stabsin the back. This could only be done byarming the people who are the origin oftheir power, the source of their inspirationand the real shield of the commandosagainst the claws and fangs of the reac-

•tionary regime. This is how the militiacame into being as a potential force whichwould stand firm, protecting the revolu-tion. So it became to the Jordanian autho-rities like the sword of Democles.

In spite of this, the Jordanian regimedid not move to crush the movement beforeit got out of hand. Many took this to be aproof of wisdom on the part of the part ofthe regime, of a genuine desire to avoidArab bloodshed, and of an intention to pre-pare instead for the decisive battle with theZionist enemy. Those with the bourgeoismentality of brotherhood and compromisewere satisfied by t i c k l i n g them-selves with this dream. These are the oneswho failed to see the total material andmoral emptiness hidden behind this so-called wisdom. The PFLP and other pro-gressive groups understood that the enemy(the regime) would not eat from the dishof revenge before it got cold and that thecurrent preparations inside the armyamong the loyal classes and clans were defi-

8

nitely not in preparation for a liberationwar. Consequently, the back stabbing wascoming for sure and the reactionary regimewas only waiting for the right time. ThusPFLP and other progressive groups streng-thened their ties with the people, widenedtheir militia bases, and intensified trainingand arming of the militia so that theywould be prepared to carry their responsi-bility of facing the enemy. (They provedtheir ability to carry this responsibility inSeptember.

The Jordanian army was rearmed; theloyalties of certain people were paid for;and the contradictions exploded with thehelp of the liquidationists who had beenprepared both morally and financially.These preparations being completed, thefirst target that the army moved againstwas the residential areas and the refugeecamps where the real strength of the resis-tance existed — where the militia was.When the fighting stopped, the primarydemand of the lackey's authorities was that

9

the commandos should get out of the cities,knowing very well that there were no com-mandos in the cities. They pushed this de-mand as an excuse to rid themselves of themilitia before escalating the struggle agai-nst the resistance outside the cities. Thisstand of the Jordanian authorities is com-patible and homogenious with the ideologi-cal and class structure of the regime.After all, all oligarchies and exploiting ru-ling classes have always and everywherebeen opposed to the idea of forming militiawhich is the starting point of people's con-trol and freedom. The history of revolu-tions assures us that the existance of themilitia is a fundamental phenomenon ofthe people's democratic rule serving themasses. And every «Brumaire» of every re-volution starts by dealing a blow to the mi-litia (the armed masses). It's true, then,that the Jordanian oligarchic reactionaryregime was in harmony with its role, andtherefore, the resistance had to harmo-niously stand by its historical role whosebanner it carried. It had to resist the sus-

10

picious plan and not give up its shield (themilitia) and be trapped.

More than one Plekhanov stood repeating« we should not have fought». These werethe people who were shocked by the partialsuccess of the authorities and forgot — ormay be they never knew — two principalrevolutionary rules: one recognizes the ina-bility of the militia to stand in defense fora long period of time against forces super-ior in number, arms, and experience; theother recognizes the inevitability of the ebb,and flow in the course of any long term re-volution. The shock was so great that theyaccepted many concessions, the main onebeing the disarmament of the militia ina way that would change the partial pacti-cal successes of the authorities to strategicones. These concessions would also changethe nature of the resistance from a politicaland military force existing everywhere,welded together with the oppressed masseswherever they may be, into a semi-militaryforce isolated in the countryside. This

11

would also change the strategic distribu-tion of the resistance. Instead of it beinga net spread out all over the country withthe attention of the fighting units of thecommandos being focused on the struggleagainst the Israeli enemy and with its mi-litia groups standing ready to strangle anyattempt to deal a blow to these fightingunits, the resistance became a point inspace, moving to deal a blow to the Israelienemy without knowing when it would behit from the rear. The Popular Front forthe Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) reject-ed all such concessions because it wantedthe hands of the fighting units to remainunchained in order to be able to operateinside the occupied territory and becauseit knew that their freedom of activity wasextremely dependent upon the militia exis-tance to crush the intentions of the coun-ter-revolutionaries. The Front refused tosurrender the arms of the militia becauseit refuses to be a partner in pushing the re-sistance toward a graveyard.

12

Surely this refusal was not accidentaland did not arise out of a desire to take anindividualistic stand (as some are claim-ing). Instead, it sprang from a thoroughscientific analysis of the nature of the situ-ation — an analysis of the revolutionarymaturity among the ranks of the masses,the nature of the Jordanian system and itsinternal contradictions, the contradictionbetween the Jordanian system as a wholeand the existance of the resistance, the re-sidential and class structure of the EastBank of the Jordan River, and a good num-ber of other social, political and militaryelements. This rejection was a fundamentalstand based on a clear vision of the tan-gible circumstances, precise aims, and acomplete evaluation of the balance of allforces, not just of the military. The PFLPhad built the militia units ( the RedGuards) and prepared them politicaly andmilitarily because it refuse to be just asemi-military fighting organization isolatedfrom the masses. It will never allow any-one whoever he is to prevent it from exer-

13

cizlng its historic role as one of the van-guards leading the masses to their overallrevolution and as a spearhead directed atall enemies of the people, regardless of who

these enemies might be.The PPLP clearly understands the limi-

ted abilities of the Red Guards, its role inpreparing and mobilizing the masses andits various obligations and roles at everystage of the battle. It also knows very wellthat the Red Guards are subject to the lar-gest part of repression in the cities whenthe counter-revolutionaries start their at-tack. The Front created the militia in themidst of the revolutionary atmosphere ofthe circumstances which developed afterthe June 1967 defeat and without whichthis creation would never have been pos-sible. The PFLP insists on the existance ofsuch a revolutionary foree as long as a revo-lutionary atmosphere exists. The liquidationof the milita is the beginning of the liqui-dation of the revolution and the liquidationof the revolution means the end of the mi-

litia. How odd it is that we have the rulesand laws of revolutions right in front ofour eyes — and we don't even bother tolook at them ! And yet we label ourselvesREVOLUTIONARIES !! Since the matteris so clear, how would those who advocatethe disarming of the resistance from itsshield justify their position ? Althoughthere are also differences in motives andaims, what are the justifications given bythese advocates (among the authorities andthe bourgeoise and some also among theresistance) ? What is our answer to thesejustifications ?

The First Justification; They do not wantto give the government any excuse forconfronting the resistance — as if the oli-garchic government, which is in contradic-tion with the resistance from the begin-ning, needs an excuse to clash with it.One look at history teaches usthat neither the external forces of aggres-sion (imperialists) nor the internal appa-ratus of repression (lackey governments)

15

need excuses to begin their work. Theirjob rests upon a suitable moment for start-ing the attack, the balance of forces favo-rable for attack, the limitations of theirensuing aims, and the expected reaction ofexternal (local and world) opinion. But theexcuse itself is there at all times and at allplaces. Is it realistic for us to imagine thatthe authorities did not have any excuse,throughout 1969 and the first half of 1970,to deal a blow to the resistance ? The exis-tance of two forces, diametrically opposedin aim and structure, in the same theatreforms the first impetus for any confronta-tion. The existance of these forces is pre-sent today and has always been. It has ex-isted since the day the resistance picked up'the first gun, since it built the first base,and since the day it conducted its first raidon the Israeli enemy who retaliated with a'large scale operation against the Jordanian,army and against the Arab villages on the'East Bank ! The existence of this justifica-tion (not giving the government any ex-cuse for confrontation) grows out of the

16

failure of many people to clearly see theswitch of the Jordanian reactionaries frombeing probable Arab allies in the struggleagainst colonialist Israel to being a firstdegree enemy of the Arabs. The Jordanianreactionaries, by their aggressive standshad inverted the order of priorities of theenemies oppressing the Arab masses. Itplaced itself in the camp of the mainenemy; furthermore, it placed itself in thefront of this camp. These reactionaries(historically the conspirators against thepeople) deceived the national armed forcesby dragging them into an anti-nationaland dangerous path. They also fed uponthe regional loyalties in an attempt similarto those of the princes of the middle agesand became the most dangerous obstacle tothe course of revolution.

Therefore, we see that the lackey regimedoes not search for excuses for wherever itlooks and finds a starring gun, a head heldhigh and boiling blood prepared to flow onthe soil of home, it finds those excuses in

17

front of it. The excuses necessary to securethe success of worldwide propaganda and po-litical maneuvers are available and if not,the reactionaries will create them. Didn'tHitler and the chain of exploiters teach thereactionaries this lesson ? Didn't the thou-sands of Israeli aggressions, big and smallteach us this fact ? It's true that there arethose who are difficult to teach !

The Second Justification: There is morethan one Svitchin attacking the militia to-day, but their arguments are more vulgar andless sincere than those of Svitchin. Theyclaim, that the armed militia inside the ci-ties creates a kind of chaos, fear and con-fusion and an atmosphere of aggression,etc. Why ? Why is it that the weapons inthe hands of the Red Guards arouse a fearof these atrocities and why it is viewed asnot when these weapons are in the handsof the police, army or any other armed or-ganization ? If the «gentlemen » ( ! ) theofficers of the armed forces, are able to im-pose a strict upper hand which is based on

18

mechanical obedience, then our comrades,the cadres of the Red Guards, have the abi-lity to insure an even stricter disciplinaryobedience voluntarily. This is so becauseour obedience g-rows out of a deep con-sciousness of the gravity of our historicalduty and an awareness of the role of thevanguard revolutionary class. If the sold-iers of the armed forces are subject to therules and regulations of their barracks,then the men of the Red Guards are sub-ject to the rules of the party which consti-tutes their disciplinary, ideological and mi-litary school. If the troops of the armedforces are willing to maintain security,then our comrades in the militia are alsoconscious of maintaining security.

The difference here is, what security areyou talking about ? Your police forceswhich want to protect and provide securityfor a handful of exploiters standing in thecounter-revolutionary camp which are a ho-ly, and untouchable apparatus.They must bereinforced with more and more trucks armedwith 500mm guns. You bring back more

19

and more soldiers from the borders withthe enemy, remove their military clothesand give them police uniforms in order toface the masses with their spears. The mi-litia, the men of the proletarian Red Guards,who want to assure the security of the peo-ple and of the revolution are a dangerousapparatus which should be liquidated anddisarmed. It's true that our dialogue ismeaningless and that we don't speak thesame language, our security is differentfrom yours, our enemy is different fromyours, the color of our «skin» is differentfrom yours, the nature of our «blood» isdifferent than the nature of yours. Eventhe vocabulary of our children who playwith the empty bullet shells and pick up thefragments of the bombs of your USA im-ported guns from the thick mud of thestreets and who are sinking in misery up totheir eye-lashes, is different from the voca-bulary of your children for whom you haveto measure the temperature of their honey-sweetened milk every morning before theydrink it !

20

, The Third Justification:They say that sincewe are now camping in the mountains, sinceour future war will be directed toward theIsraeli enemy,and since the main theater forguerrilla warfare is in the mountains, wecan w a g e guerrilla warfare againstthe Jordanian authorities whenever theywant to put obstacles in front of our efforts.Therefore, why do we need to keep the BedGuards in the cities ? In spite of the since-rity of those who advocate this justificationin spite of the fact that some of our revolu-tionary comrades are among them, oneshould not hesitate to draw attention to theerror in this justification. These are the ad-vocates of focusing the revolution in thecountryside and their ideas come from an at-tempt to apply the Cuban experience or theChinese experience at some stages in a me-chanical form. It is enough for us to takea close look at the conditions of the EastBank: the distribution of the inhabitantsin the East Bank and the centralization ofthe majority of these inhabitants in thecities; the existance of the impoverished

21

masses (the aim of the revolution, its tooland its fuel) piled in the poor districtsclose to the districts of the compra-dor b o u r g e o i s i e or in the re-fugee camps neighboring the cities; thedomination of the clanish tribal ties in thesouth and the sparsity of the population inthe mountains or in the wilderness; thenon-existance of rear support (borders) onwhich the guerrillas of the mountains maydepend during fighting; the centralizationof peasant aggregates or big villages whichare loosely called cities just because theylie on the main roads; the poverty of thecountryside in general and the sparsity ofwater and supply resources in particular;the passavity of the peasants caused bytheir historical fear of the authorities; thenegligence of the resistance and the pro-gressive parties to create a revolutionaryatmosphere among them; the success ofthe reactionary authorities in taking ad-vantage of the incorrect common opinionthat the resistance is just a movement ofPalestinians, thus feeding the sectarian al-

22

legiances in some of the regions; the capi-tal (Amman) being the center of the au-thorities' political and economic forces forthe entire country; etc. These circumstan-ces in the East Bank prevent us from ap-plying the Cuban experience, On the con-trary, they assure the necessity of the exis-tance of two revolutionary integrated for-ces able to operate together when necessary,and to cooperate closely to provide securityfor the coordinated rebellion against allwho want to deal a blow to the revolutionfrom the rear. This is with the conditionthat the primary force be from the fightingunits operating in the countryside and themountains, and that the secondary forcebe from the armed militia groupings in thecities. In this way, the fighting units inthe mountains will not be operating sepa-rate and isolated from the masses or thesensitive positions of the authorities norwill the militia face the repressive forcesalone in the cities except during the firstperiod until the fighting units move insupport of the militia with guerrilla war-

23

fare. Given the current circumstances^this is the most objective solution and it isthe solution which is adopted by the Popu-lar Front as opposed to the mechanical li-teral application of the experiences ofother revolutions which is being adoptedby some of our comrades and which wasadopted by Che (one of the greatest con-temporary revolutionaries) who paid for itwith his life in the jungles of Bolivia.

The Fourth Justification : They say thatthe militia does not necessarily form a revo-lutionary force. They also say that the reac-tionary authorities also have militia whichwork at their service against the interestsof the masses. THIS IS NONSENSE! andan old trick that no one buys any more.All the self-righteous governing classes areable to take advantage of the ideological,racial and clan contradictions. They arealso able to benefit from the decaying sec-tarian mentality and from the financialand moral bribes made for the purpose ofcreating such «militia» organizations con-

24

taining a number of fascist volunteerssuch as sons of the governing classes andin addition, a number of deceived proleta-

_ rians and half proletarians, and a largesection of lumpen proletariat. As far as thenature of these associations is concerned,it makes no difference whether they arelabelled « The Militia », « The Popular Mi-lita •», « The National or State Guards » orany other name. The name of a military orsemi-military association will never changeits structure or its role; the only guide toits nature is the direction of its spearheads. Since the spears of the NationalGuards are directed toward the chests ofthe masses, it is one of the counter-revolu-tionary forces.

The Fifth Justification: Some of the com-rades point out that the resistance and thewhole region are passing through a stage ofebb tide in the revolution and hence itmust, under the shadow of the circum-stances, make flexible tactical retreats, am-ong which is the disarming of the militia.

25

•

HOLD IT !Here, the Central Committee (of the Re-

si tance Movement) must stand up and eva-luate the status and nature of the situa-tion. It, alone, is able to precisely calculatethe- ebb and flow and the extent of the tacti-cal retreats. Only the Central Committeehas the right to make such decisions andfurthermore, it is its duty to do so.

But even if we are to suppose, for thesake of argument, that the evaluation ofthe comrades is correct, the extent of thetactical retreats during the tidal ebb of therevolution is a precisely calculated matter,and should not be extended, in time orplace, beyond its planned tactical limits.Otherwise it will be turned into a defeat.Furthermore, the stage of the tidal ebb ofthe revolution itself demands, more thanany other stage, the existance of a stronglyarmed militia inside the cities, so as to pro-tect the overall revolutionary status bywaging a fierce and firm battle of strategicretreat. We all know that to attack and to

carry out a vanguard operation necessita-tes tremendous daring and determination,but we also know that the rear to whichthe battle of retreat is assigned forms acommando force which must entertain aneven more tremendous daring and evenstronger determination.

The sixth justification: The Jordanianauthorities do not intend to withdraw thearms of the militia, but its collection anddeposition in depots supervised by the Re-sistance Movement.

The recurrence of this justificationshows complete ignorance of the meaningof the Red Guards and it's operationaltactics in the cities. The importance of theexistence of the Red Guards, its ability tostand firm in the face of the regime's re-pressive apparatus as well as it's being a de-terrent against it, all these are not only theresult of the Red Guards material strength,but also a result of the inability of the re-pressive regime's forces to locate this forceahead of time, and in depriving the enemy

of knowing its operational mechanism at allplaces and all times.

It is certain that the withdrawal of thearms and depositing them in depots, makesit easier for the regime's forces to controlthese arms. This means depriving the mili-tia from its weapons before putting it intothe cage, and depriving it from the tacticof surprise — in time and place — if it in-tends to wage an offensive. By this it is en-dangering all its strength and subjecting it-to a single surprise attack in case the royaltroops decided to wage the offensive. Thisin short, means depriving the militia fromthe freedom of action.

The resistance has had numerous show-downs with the authorities and the Sep-tember showdown must teach us to be morecohesive with the masses, to carry tne wea-pons with greater solemnity, to be morecautious than before, and to reinforce the

28

militia instead of depriving it of its arms, sothat it won't be taken by surprise.

It is the duty of the leadership of the re-sistance to stand bravely before its histo-rical role, to intensify the direction towardarming the militia, to create from the Pro-letarian Red Guards a whole army with nocamps, living under the same conditions asthe working class. At the same time it willprotect the mountain fighting units. (Themilitia is not a^substitute for the fightingunits but is, instead, their second arm).

The Popular Front which refused andstill refuses to surrender the arms of theMilitia never forgets the saying of the re-volutionary Jose Marti : « It is a crime toperpetuate a war which could be avoided ina country ». The Front realizes that it isnot adequate to quote only this part of thesaying of the Cuban revolutionary but alsoremembers the second part which statesthat it is also criminal «to stay away froman unavoidable war ».

29

The Chinese proletariat paid a great dealof blood in the first Shanghai uprising ofOctober 1926 and in the second Shanghaiuprising of February 1927 until they learn-ed deep lessons by which they were enabledto win the victory of the third Shanghaiuprising of March 1927. But the ignoranceof the Party's leadership to the develop-ment and shift of the Kuomintang from thecamp of the allies of the revolution againstthe imperialists and the super reactionariesto the camp of the counter-revolutionaries,pushed the leadership to issue orders tosurrender the arms of the Red Guards tothe army of Chiang Kai Shek. When thiswas done, the Kuomintang crushed theforces of the Red Guards and killed thou-sands of its best elements and cadres. Buthistory did not allow this leadership to es-cape punishment. It was condemned by anemergency convention which was held bythe Chinese Communist Party in August1927 as being opportunist and revisionistand was deprived of any leadership posi-tion. So that the Jordanian regime and the

30

existance of the imperialist Israeli enemywhich signed a cease fire treaty with Hus-sein will not deceive you, so that the Jor-danian Kuomintang can not repeat theShanghai tragedy, and so that history willnot issue its cruel judgement on you, GETRID OF THE ILLUSIONS OF THE BOUR-GEOISIE AND TAKE YOUR HANDS OFFTHE MILITIA !

31